



**United Nations
Office of Internal Oversight Services
Internal Audit Division II**

Audit Report

**Audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section
(AE2005/311/06)
Report No. E05/R18**

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Audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section (AE2005/311/06)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From June to August 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNOG Security and Safety Section (SSS). SSS is part of UNOG; its Chief has a dual reporting line to the Director of Administration, UNOG and to the Director, Division of Safety and Security Services, Department of Safety and Security. *UNOG has accepted most recommendations made and is in the process of implementing them.*

Security management system

- No official coordinating mechanism existed for the many United Nations entities in Geneva and their respective security structures to allow for a “unified security management structure” in Switzerland. *UNOG commented that efforts had recently been made to formalize a coordination mechanism under the leadership of the Director-General, UNOG in his capacity as the Designated Official for Switzerland, who established a Senior Management Team.*
- While UNOG had established its Senior Emergency Management Group (SEMG) in June 2003, it has never been activated.

Mission and functions

- The ST/SGB/2000/4 on the organization of the United Nations Office at Geneva does not fully reflect UNOG SSS responsibilities vis-à-vis annex buildings and other United Nations Secretariat entities in Geneva. Some core functions related to the safety and security of persons and property were not properly carried out due to insufficient priority setting, lack of resources and means to enforce applicable security regulations and rules. *UNOG confirmed that the revised ST/SGB would reflect the services SSS provides, as well as its change of status. A policy on priorities would also be prepared.*
- The Memoranda of Understanding with client organizations are not clear on the responsibility of UNOG SSS in the event of a security crisis or emergency. *UNOG agreed that a clear plan of activities should be established.*

SSS structure and organization

- The establishment of the Department of Safety and Security resulted in new reporting lines for UNOG SSS. In practice, the necessary arrangements still need to be worked out to clarify what issues on a day-to-day basis are reported to whom. The envisaged transfer of administrative responsibilities from UNOG Central Support Services to SSS remains to be implemented.
- The planning function is decentralized resulting in duplication of efforts and scattered information related to leave, training schedules, etc. and in questions as to the objectivity of the assignment of staff to various stations. With the sharp increase in the size of the Section, UNOG SSS should reinstate a central planning function, with adequate information sharing

among units, and invest in specific software for planning and resource allocation. *UNOG stated that the creation of the Coordination and Planning Unit was planned for January-February 2006 and that a staff scheduling software had already been purchased in New York.*

SSS processes

- *Badges and magnetic cards* - UNOG SSS recognized the security defects of the current badge system. OIOS further identified risk areas in the outdated list of persons who authorise badge issuance, the ineffective process for checks on external contractors and the release to an external recycling company of expired badges intact without destroying them first. The 5-year limit to retain information on badge holders leads to systematic destruction of essential paper files even for long-term UNOG staff members.
- *Access control* - The requirement for all staff members to wear their badges at all times has not fully been enforced. Screening of delivery trucks has not been systematic.
- *Fire Group* - The fire-related responsibilities of UNOG SSS are not clear. The extent of autonomy, response and means that need to be deployed by UNOG SSS and by the local Fire Service remain to be formally stated. The controls over fire extinguishers were unsatisfactory.
- *Investigation* - There are no formal terms of reference or guidelines for the activities of the Investigation Sub-Unit.
- *UNOG confirmed that the necessary action had already been initiated or would be initiated in the months to come.*

Human resources management

- Security officers in UNOG have the status of General Service staff with no further requirements specific to the security function, such as stricter requirement for medical clearance. Until recently, there has been no testing on substance or alcohol abuse, nor psychological testing prior to release of firearms. Personnel files did not systematically include police records. *UNOG confirmed that medical checks, testing as well as background checks were or would soon be implemented.*
- The assignment of staff on a permanent basis to the night shift team, the high ratio of 28 per cent of security officers performing office and administrative functions and workload statistics developed for the various activities of the Section to support the allocation of resources, need to be reconsidered. *UNOG will look into the implementation of the recommendation in 2006.*
- In view of the Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (H-MOSS), a comprehensive training programme has been developed. However, the new objective of 10 training days per staff and year could result in a chronic deficit of staff during the training, as the original basis for additional staffing resources required under H-MOSS was only five days.
- Performance appraisals for the period 2003/2004 contained standard comments and, in some cases, did not fully reflect actual functions of the staff. The PAS should be used as an effective tool for performance management and to provide guidance for career development. *UNOG indicated that this would be implemented by the end of the current PAS period.*

Firearms management and safekeeping

- A task force is currently reviewing the firearms policy. However, considering its critical importance, UNOG SSS should, without delay, clearly define the responsibilities of the custodian and collect outstanding firearms or duly document their location or transfer. *UNOG indicated that improvements, such as a software application, SOPs and a new post for firearm management were being implemented.*

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. From 13 June to 26 August 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNOG's security and Safety Section. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. The Security and Safety Section is part of UNOG, its Chief reporting to the Director of Administration and at the same time to the Director, Division of Safety and Security Services of the newly created Department of Safety and Security at New York Headquarters. The Section is composed of the operations in the Palais des Nations building, comprising the Palais operations Unit and the Specialised Interventions Unit, the Administration and Support Unit and the Special Services and Annexes Subunits. As of July 2005, total staff was 146, of which 36 were posted in annex buildings, servicing other extra budgetary entities. Total budget for the Section in 2004-2005 amounted to \$25 million for the regular budget and \$4.1 million for extrabudgetary activities.

3. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed during the Exit Conference held on 12 September 2005 with the Officer-in-Charge, Division of Administration, the Chef de Cabinet, Office of the Director-General, the Chief, Deputy Chief and Assistant Chief of the Security and Safety Section. A draft of this report was shared with the Officer-in-Charge, Division of Administration on 8 November 2005, whose comments have been reflected in the report in italics. UNOG has accepted most recommendations and is in the process of implementing them.

II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

4. The main objectives of the audit were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of controls to ensure:

- Effectiveness and efficiency of operations;
- Safeguarding of assets; and
- Compliance with relevant United Nations regulations, rules and instructions.

III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

5. The audit focused on the main organizational components of UNOG SSS, namely its environment, and the Security Management System in Geneva, its missions, structure, processes and resources. The review focused on the current organization and processes, taking into account all changes to be implemented as part of the Headquarters Minimum Operating Security Standards (H-MOSS) compliance process.

6. The audit activities included a review and assessment of existing operating procedures and the compliance thereof, interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and a review of the available documents and other relevant records.

IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Security Management System

(a) Security coordination mechanisms

7. Strengthening the Security Management System requires a coordinated response to emergency situations at a duty station. However no official mechanism exists for the many United Nations funds and programmes in Geneva, let alone specialized agencies, and their respective security structures to allow for a “unified security management structure” in Switzerland.

8. The United Nations security accountability framework relies on a Designated Official at each duty station, who is fully responsible for the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Given the number of organizations and agencies, the executive direction of which is in Geneva, the role and responsibilities of the Designated Official as the “senior United Nations official at a duty station” needs to be clarified as applied to Geneva and Switzerland. UNOG commented that, although the Director General had been recently confirmed Designated Official for Switzerland by the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Safety and Security, there was still a need to communicate the significance of this function and the associated responsibilities to other United Nations system entities.

9. Efforts have recently been made to formally create a coordination mechanism, under the leadership of the Designated Official for Switzerland, with several meetings held with representatives of UN Geneva based entities. Early November 2005, the Director-General, UNOG in his capacity as Designated Official for security matters for Switzerland, consulted with Heads of Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programs in Geneva and by memorandum dated 22 November 2005, established the Senior Management Team. An ad hoc Working Group will assist the SMT with all matters included in the SMT’s Terms of Reference at the working level. The DO also established the Executive Secretariat of the SMT and of its Working Group, and defined the Terms of Reference of the Executive Secretary.

(b) The UNOG Senior Emergency Management Group (SEMG)

10. Using the model of the Crisis Management Operational Plan, developed at New York Headquarters in 2002, UNOG developed its own plan in 2003, articulated around a SEMG, which “Identifies potential security threats or emergency situations, analyzes current crisis situations and identifies possible response scenarios, advises the Director-General on matters related to prevention and response to emergency situations, upon the occurrence of a crisis, will decide on the appropriate security phase to be retained in order to protect the staff and the property.” While the SEMG was established in June 2003 and its members appointed, the Group was never activated. OIOS supports UNOG’s recent initiative to update the list of members of the SEMG and to plan for a workshop on crisis management to take place in the fall 2005, to bring all members together and start building awareness on their functions and eventual responsibilities.

B. Missions and functions

(a) Mission statement

11. The ST/SGB/2000/4 on the organization of the United Nations Office at Geneva summarizes UNOG SSS mission as: “Ensuring the safety and security of persons and property at the Palais des Nations, including providing special security services for conferences and other events, and for United Nations officials, as required”. This statement does not fully reflect UNOG SSS responsibilities, namely the services provided in the Annexes and other United Nations Secretariat entities.

Recommendation:

- The UNOG Division of Administration should initiate a revision of the January 2000 ST/SGB on the Organization of UNOG to properly reflect that UNOG SSS provides security services to a variety of United Nations entities within and outside the Palais des Nations (Rec. 01).

12. *UNOG confirmed that a revised version of the relevant ST/SGB had already been initiated in July 2004 and that it would be further revised by March 2006, so as update the services SSS provides, as well as its change of status.* OIOS will close the recommendation upon issuance of the revised ST/SGB.

(b) Operational priorities and allocation of resources

13. Despite its mission statement and UNOG SSS management confirmation that Palais operations were always a priority, insufficient prioritisation and conflicting activities were recurrent topics among the security officers who were interviewed. OIOS also observed that the Section seemed to be stretched too thin to conduct its missions in full. To replace staff on leave, on external missions or on training, the Section resorts to temporary staff, who are often assigned to the Palais operations, since Annexes or special missions require specific expertise. OIOS calculated that, for the month of July 2005, the share of temporary resources to total staff in the Palais operations reached a level as high as 64 per cent. OIOS believes that UNOG SSS should determine the level of temporary resources acceptable to adequately perform its functions in the Palais des Nations.

14. OIOS also noted that UNOG SSS lacked the resources and means to enforce applicable regulations and rules, to achieve its missions, regarding the following:

- Control access and surveillance in the premises are impaired, as the policy to wear badges visible at all times is not fully enforced in the Palais des Nations;
- Security coordination with staff is limited due to high absenteeism of wardens in UNOG SSS’ periodic training sessions on security and fire safety;
- The policy of control for the removal of assets, set out in ST/SGB/193/rev.1 provides for a follow-up of equipment removed from the premises, which is not complied with and UNOG SSS does not have the resources to conduct the necessary checks.

15. *UNOG stated that on the one side SSS services at Geneva include security services at ‘client’ annexes, which aim to provide quality management to be able to service UNOG and its annexes, without any priority among them. On the other side, SSS services at Geneva have*

priority over external conferences. A policy on the matter is being prepared. As for badge control, it was indicated that SSS is reviewing its access control policy, based on a new system that is being developed in coordination with DSS, and measures to enforcement of badge wearing are being examined. The project should be finalized by late 2006. The issue of the fire-wardens will be revisited in the context of the full review of fire and safety in UNOG, to be carried out in mid 2006. While equipment and property tracking is within the purview of the Mail Pouch and Inventory Section, UNOG SSS indicated it would work with the latter in order to determine the most suitable strategy.

16. OIOS found that general objectives were not further developed into concrete performance indicators for SSS. The indicators as disclosed in the proposed programme budget could be improved to effectively measure the Section's performance.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should formally set operational priorities, assign adequate resources and develop performance indicators for its activities including other stakeholders' prerequisite actions, to enforce existing instructions and policies (Rec. 02).

17. *UNOG noted the recommendation and stated that the establishment of realistic indicators would be discussed at the UNSSSNET meeting in December 2006.*

(c) Services rendered to United Nations entities

18. From the Memoranda of Understanding signed with the client organizations, UNOG SSS provides "security and safety services, within the premises." From this general statement, it is not clear what the responsibility of UNOG SSS is in the event a crisis occurs, since no clear link is made between the level of security to be achieved and the resources provided by the clients.

19. Recently, UNOG SSS undertook H-MOSS compliance reviews and issued recommendations to the clients on the improvements to security. However, UNOG SSS is not part of the ensuing decision-making process, which is entirely left with the client. For example at UNHCR and ITC, the decision to increase the security resources was concomitant with UNOG's. Still it took UNHCR eight months from the approval of new posts to submit to UNOG SSS an official request to provide the additional guards. The process is protracted, where the decision to authorize additional resources has not yet been taken, or action needs to be coordinated with the Swiss authorities (FIPOL).

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should liaise with UNOG FRMS and clients to clarify the nature and extent of its responsibilities vis-à-vis clients in case of emergency or crisis situations with due consideration to the adequacy of resources provided (Rec. 03).

20. *UNOG agreed that a clear plan of activities should be established.*

(d) Services to United Nations staff

21. With the exception of a 45-minute presentation of UNOG SSS at the twice-yearly orientation programme for newly recruited staff of the UN Secretariat in Geneva, no induction training specific to Geneva is in place to raise staff awareness for security issues. The security intranet site only provides instructions on evacuation and could usefully include information and guidance to staff on other security and safety issues. UNOG SSS indicated that a project to develop such an intranet page exists and was submitted to the Director-General, but that for the moment, neither they, nor the UNOG Information and Communication Technology Section, could make the resources available. *UNOG indicated that the Internet project would be taken into consideration by May 2006.*

22. Security officers at Door six, collect payments from and issue receipts to staff members for posting small announcements on the bulletin board. At times, receipts issued were not properly numbered and dated. Periodically, one designated Security Officer deposits the accumulated amount of cash collected into the bank account of the Staff Council. The UNOG Staff Council treasurer compares the deposit slips with pertinent entries in the bank statement. For some days in July and August 2005, no receipt was issued to staff members due to lack of blank receipts. Instead, a log of daily total amount received is maintained in the Door six security logbook. These duties are not included in the job descriptions of Security Officers and do not relate to their primary mission.

Recommendation:

- UNOG should assign to another UNOG office the functions of handling and depositing cash and posting of announcements, which are not within the mandate of the UNOG SSS. In the meantime, UNOG SSS should ensure that proper receipts are issued and periodically verified to deposit slips and bank statements (Rec. 04).

23. *UNOG accepted the recommendation and will review the issue with the Staff Coordination Council in January 2006.*

C. Structure and organization

(a) Reporting lines

24. The General Assembly resolution 59/276, creating the Department of Safety and Security, resulted in new reporting lines for UNOG SSS. A memo from the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, dated 31 May 2005, provided that the Chief of Security reports regularly to, and gets policy direction and operational guidance from, the Director, Division of Safety and Security Services, in the Department of Safety and Security. However, a reporting line also exists to the Director-General “in fulfilling the overall responsibility for security” in Geneva. In August 2005, the Director-General delegated his responsibility to the Director of Administration, and for the interim period, to the Officer-in-Charge of the Division of Administration, through the Chief of Central Support Services, reverting to the initial structure until further instruction is received from DSS.

Recommendation:

- UNOG should, in consultation with DSS, clarify the reporting lines of UNOG SSS, including practical guidelines as to what security-related issues should be reported to whom, and disseminate them to all staff members concerned (Rec. 05).

25. *UNOG commented that the reporting lines had already been clarified in a Memorandum from the USG/DSS dated 31 May 2005, a videoconference on 5 July 2005 and a Memorandum from the Director-General, UNOG dated 15 August.* OIOS still believes that these should be further developed and detailed to be fully operational.

26. It is also planned that administrative management of approved budget resources and staffing tables for Security and Safety services at all duty stations should be centralized at Headquarters. However, the conditions of this transfer of administrative responsibilities for the SSS, as well as those for the delegation to administer approved budget and staffing tables in UNOG, remain to be defined. As of now, SSS is lacking the skills to fully carry out administrative responsibilities and the process to approve the reclassification of security posts into administrative ones has not yet been initiated. *UNOG commented that the establishment of the Administrative Unit within SSS, which would tentatively consist of four GS posts under the supervision of the Deputy Chief, SSS, was under way.*

(b) Internal organization

27. The planning function within SSS has been decentralized resulting in duplication of efforts and scattered information related to leave, training schedules, etc. Also questions have come up as to the objectivity of the assignment of staff to the various stations. With the sharp increase of the size of the Section, OIOS believes that a central planning function should be reinstated, with adequate information sharing among units, and specific software for planning and resource allocation. In the latest organigramme submitted by UNOG SSS to DSS, an Operational Planning Unit is created and, although it falls under the Uniform Security Operations Group, UNOG SSS confirmed that it would be a central planning function. *UNOG stated that the creation of the Coordination and Planning Unit was planned for January-February 2006 and that a staff scheduling software had already been purchased in New York.*

28. Throughout the audit, many of the problems raised and complaints formulated officially or unofficially were related to inadequate or insufficient information and communication. It was also reported on several instances that the monthly Section meetings were not satisfactory (no minutes exist), and none took place in the recent period. The creation of an internal and external information function, as provided for in H-MOSS, would, in OIOS' view, solve some of these 'transparency' issues. UNOG SSS should also invest more efforts in communicating the objectives, target dates, progress made and changes introduced by H-MOSS, to ensure that all staff are informed and understand the objectives and stakes of the project.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should introduce regular formal communication to enhance information sharing within the Section and update all staff members on the status and progress of H-MOSS implementation (Rec. 06).

29. UNOG SSS commented that conclusions from an internal survey and a working group were being reviewed and that internal vectors of communication already included a broadcast system, monthly meetings, minutes of which were systematically prepared, and a monthly newsletter. OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt of the minutes of the monthly meetings and copies of the monthly newsletter.

D. Processes

30. OIOS reviewed UNOG SSS' main activities to ensure that adequate and comprehensive procedures were in place. In the context of H-MOSS implementation, UNOG SSS developed and promulgated security policies, techniques and procedures, via Standard Operating Procedures. The task of identifying and developing the areas necessitating SOPs had been delegated to the Units. Further instructions on ways to manage, monitor and update these procedures should be developed through a workshop, to take place in the fall of 2005.

31. From our review of the various processes of UNOG SSS, shortfalls, as well as good practices, were identified in the following areas.

(a) Badges and magnetic cards

32. In general, UNOG SSS is well aware of the security defects of the current badge system, including easily forgeable identity badges. It is expected that the implementation of the Secretariat-wide Global ID System will introduce significant improvement. It is noteworthy that the online identification system used by UNOG SSS has significantly reduced the delays in badge-issuance and allows for instant checks by access control officers.

33. OIOS noted in particular that:

- The list of persons authorizing the badge issuance was outdated;
- There is no coordination between the issuance of badges by the ID Unit and the release of magnetic cards by another UNOG SSS unit. A standard check-in procedure could be developed to streamline and coordinate these two processes. UNOG SSS explained that magnetic cards would fall under the ID Unit upon completion of the Pregny security gate currently under construction;
- The period left for external contractors to provide the necessary document to issue a non-temporary badge was long (up to 45 days). Following UNOG SSS comment, that some contractors had difficulty providing the documents within a given time, OIOS believes that the control in place is ineffective and could be enhanced;
- Expired badges are released intact to an external company for recycling. UNOG SSS should consider destroying them prior to their release;
- The 5-year limit to retain information on badge holders leads to systematic destruction of essential paper files older than five years, including information relating to long-term UNOG staff still holding badges;
- Practices at different duty stations could be adopted, which require the badge holder to acknowledge his/her responsibility to return the badge or report its loss.

Recommendations:

- UNOG SSS should improve security procedures related to the issuance and management of badges, namely:
 - Ensuring that the list of persons authorizing badge issuance is up-to-date;
 - Reconsidering the policy for issuing badges to external contractors;
 - Destroying expired badges prior to their release;
 - Ensuring valid information is available on all current badge holders;
 - Requiring badge holders to acknowledge their responsibility to return badges or to report their loss (Rec. 07).

34. *UNOG stated that efforts were being made to update the list of authorizing persons, issue instructions regarding destruction of badges and finalizing the ID Standard Operating Procedures. The issue of external contractors would be looked into within the context of the complete review of the access control policy.*

(b) Access control

35. The requirement for all staff members to wear their badges at all times is not fully enforced at the Palais des Nations, making it difficult for security officers to control access at the gates and within the premises. OIOS also observed that delivery trucks screening was not systematically performed. In response to the audit findings, UNOG recently issued a circular requesting staff members, conference participants, journalists and all persons visiting the Palais des Nations to show their ground pass to security officers on duty upon request and to wear it visibly at all times while on UNOG grounds. OIOS appreciates the immediate action taken. *UNOG further indicated that standing orders are in place for delivery trucks to be systematically checked.*

36. Visitors joining the guided tours of the Palais are not accompanied to the gate at the end of the tour and are free to wander around the premises where no access is restricted. *UNOG indicated that it is envisaged to negotiate with DPI means and ways to establish more strict controls on visitors.*

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should enforce controls over access of all vehicles and users of the Palais des Nations to its gates and premises in order to keep the security risk at a minimum level (Rec. 08).

37. Logbooks are kept at each entry gate at the Palais des Nations and the Annexes. OIOS noted that the information they contained was not consistent and ranged from general information memos to inventory of visitors' badges and records of incidents. OIOS found neither clear guidelines on the information to be kept nor indications on how to follow-up on some issues.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should develop clear guidelines on the information to be recorded in visitors' logbooks and the manner to address and solve issues reported therein (Rec. 09).

38. *UNOG indicated that SOPs have been established and responsibilities assigned. In the future, logbooks will have to be signed by the chief of the subunits and regular checks done by the heads of unit.* OIOS will close this recommendation, once it receives the SOPs and the newly released instructions regarding logbooks.

(c) Fire and safety group

39. Deriving from the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of persons and property, UNOG SSS has a Fire and Safety Unit with 12 posts. Ultimately, UNOG relies on the intervention of the local Fire Service. The extent of autonomy, response and means that need to be deployed by UNOG SSS and by the Swiss fire service, is not documented officially and should be clarified, as well as the responsibilities of the UNOG SSS Fire and Safety Unit. The Chief, SSS explained that autonomy of 30 minutes was used to determine the necessary resources.

40. The Fire Emergency System in the premises operates around wardens who are designated staff members who ensure the implementation of security plans in the zones under their charge. However, attendance in specific 'wardens' training provided by UNOG SSS proved to be as low as fifty per cent in the recent period. The role and responsibilities of wardens should be re-emphasized with staff members and management to ensure that information on security arrangements is shared and coordinated at all levels.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should formally define its responsibilities with regard to fire and safety services, as well as develop a scheme for warden duties to ensure recognition of their functions and availability for training at given times (Rec. 10).

41. *UNOG commented that a project is under progress to establish a formal framework with the Host Country fire and safety authority.*

42. Extinguishers in the United Nations premises should be controlled and replaced on a regular basis, a responsibility that has been outsourced to several companies in Switzerland, and was monitored by the UNOG Building and Engineering Section. Upon OIOS' request, UNOG SSS performed an extensive check of fire extinguishers, the control of which revealed to be unsatisfactory. UNOG SSS already took action to set-up a database to monitor their control and replacement.

(d) Investigation

43. General Assembly Resolution 59/287 of 13 April 2005, requests that an administrative mechanism of mandatory reporting to OIOS be put in place. OIOS noted that the Investigation Sub-Unit performed its missions without any formal terms of reference or guidelines for its activities, as well as no guidelines on sharing or transferring cases to the OIOS Investigation Division, leaving the decision to file an investigation case to the discretion of UNOG

management.

44. Until recently, none of the investigators had an investigation background or had undergone specific investigation training. Although professional investigators have now been recruited, no presentation or training on the specificities of investigations in the United Nations has been provided so far. Although OIOS provided basic investigation training to three SSS staff members, the Security Officers trained were not staff from the Investigation sub-unit.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should (i) arrange for investigation training of all its investigators to enhance their performance, (ii) ensure that all legal provisions applicable to investigation in the United Nations are complied with and (iii) establish a mechanism for referring cases to the Investigation Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (Rec. 11).

45. *UNOG indicated that additional training for investigators should be implemented by the end of 2006.* OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt of the training plan.

E. Human resources management

(a) Status and specificities of the security function

46. The status of security officers in UNOG is that of General Service staff, with no further requirements attached to the specificity of the security function (at United Nations Headquarters, security officers fall in the Security Service category):

- There is no stricter requirement for medical clearance - most personnel files reviewed by OIOS included medical clearance forms older than four years;
- Until recently, there was no testing on substance or alcohol abuse, nor was psychological testing conducted prior to the release of firearms;
- In a sample review of personnel files, police records were not always on file.

47. *UNOG stated that the new ST/AI/2005/12 requires annual medical examination for security officers, random testing for illegal drugs and controlled substances, as well as psychological testing prior to the release of firearms, will be conducted. A request for police records has also been introduced in the H-MOSS recruitment process.*

(b) Functions and staff allocation

48. Job descriptions within UNOG SSS were obsolete and OIOS was informed that they would be updated following the completion of H-MOSS recruitment.

49. Security services in different duty stations use shifts of various duration: 8 hours in Geneva, and 12 hours in Vienna, for instance. UNOG SSS could usefully compare the cost/benefits of these arrangements and, if need be, submit the most beneficial scheme to DSS for approval.

50. The responsibility of surveillance at night time is assigned to a permanent team, selected on a voluntary basis. Having a quite aged team, with an average of 55 years and

comparatively higher average of 21 days of sick leave compared to UNOG SSS' average of 14 days, raises the questions on conditions and rotation of the night shift team.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should review its various shift arrangements with a costs/benefits analysis and ascertain they implement the most beneficial shift system. (Rec. 12).

51. *UNOG noted the recommendation and its implementation would be looked into early 2006.*

52. The ratio of security officer performing office and administrative functions was 28 per cent of total security officers on day duty. This ratio should be reviewed to better comply with the destination/nature of the posts. Workload statistics should also be developed for the various activities of the Section to support the allocation of resources.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should review the size of its administrative and support structure to ensure that it is adequate and efficient with regard to its operations (Rec. 13).

53. *UNOG indicated that the creation of the Administrative Unit and the Coordination and Planning Unit should contribute to strengthening the operational tasks of SSS but that the report writing part of security work could not be avoided.*

(c) Training

54. OIOS found that UNOG SSS' training plan up to 2005 was not consistent with the proportionate response principle. Security officers were not always trained on the use of non-lethal weapons and annual recycling on firearms was not always performed on time. The recent emphasis put on training will address the problem, providing additional financial and human resources. A comprehensive training program has already been developed with an objective of 10 training days per staff and year. However, all additional staffing resources required under H-MOSS were determined based on a 5-day-a-year training policy assumption. The new 10-day objective would unlikely be achieved or would result in a chronic deficit of staff in the future whenever security officers are in training.

55. OIOS also noted from the 2004 and 2005 training statistics, that the training efforts are not evenly spread and some security officers never undertook training over the period under review. UNOG SSS explained that new training requirements would put increasing pressure on security officers to undergo training and that compulsory training prerequisites would be listed under each job description.

(d) Performance Appraisal System (PAS)

56. In reviewing PAS evaluations completed for the period 1 April 2003-31 March 2004, OIOS noted that many forms contained standard comments on the staff member and were sometimes mere copy and paste. Some of the PAS also did not reflect the functions actually fulfilled by the staff member. Further attention should be put in the PAS exercise to provide useful comments and guidance to the concerned staff and to ensure that the evaluation is

assigned and carried out by the direct supervisor.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should ensure that the performance appraisal of staff is assigned and carried out by the direct supervisor and provides adequate guidance and advice on each of the staff's professional and personal goals (Rec. 14).

57. *UNOG agreed with the recommendation and will endeavor to have full compliance by the end of the current PAS cycle.*

F. Asset management

58. In reviewing the current firearm management system, OIOS noted the following shortfalls:

- When releasing firearms to security officers, there are no written statements to acknowledge their responsibility and eventual disciplinary sanctions;
- One firearm was sent for repair without any justification or receipt from the Geneva armoury;
- Some security officers on mission in peacekeeping operations left with their firearm, in one case more than nine years ago and no action was taken to collect the firearm or transfer it formally to the DPKO.

59. OIOS is aware that UNOG plans to establish a central armory by the end of 2005, that additional firearms will not be purchased until then, and that a taskforce has been established to improve the existing policy related to firearms.

Recommendation:

- UNOG SSS should, considering the critical importance of comprehensive and strict firearm instructions, improve its firearm policy by defining clearly the responsibilities of the custodian as well as the officer who accepts firearms, and by immediately collecting outstanding firearms or clearly documenting their location and transfer of responsibility (Rec. 15).

60. *UNOG indicated that a software application was developed in October 2005, SOPs should be finalized by January 2006 and a new Lieutenant post for firearm management had been advertised. OIOS will close the recommendation upon confirmation that the software has been implemented, the post filled and upon receipt of the new SOPs.*

61. OIOS also noted that no internal control, especially segregation of duty, is in place for the management of listening devices. Controls should be strengthened to ensure appropriate use is made of the equipment. *UNOG stated that a SOP had been developed and that a security briefing to new security staff on the topic was planned for the first quarter of 2006.*

G. Headquarters minimum operating security standards (H-MOSS)

62. As H-MOSS compliance is an inter-dependent chain of security measures, physical, regulatory, practices and processes, security in UNOG is only as good as the weakest link of the chain. Considering the implementation schedule, recruitment of security officers is expected to be completed by the end of 2005, however the training and upgrading of all security officers will take another one to two years, and so with other developments to professionalize the services, such as earlier retirement age (to be negotiated with the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund), regular physical exercise requirement, etc.

63. Physical improvements at UNOG will not be fully delivered before the end of 2007, not to mention Global ID, the implementation timeline of which is still to be determined.

64. As seen throughout the report, H-MOSS touches on every activity of UNOG SSS and many are work in progress. However, the H-MOSS compliance process, and its numerous sub-projects, is not summarized in an action plan listing the steps, deadlines and staff assigned for each action. UNOG SSS explained that the mapping of all objectives and actions could not be achieved within existing resources and that only an offsite meeting would warrant the availability and dedication necessary for the exercise.

Recommendation:

- UNOG should improve its monitoring of the H-MOSS compliance project by developing an implementation plan with clear timelines, task-assignment and financial resources to complete the process (Rec. 16).

65. *UNOG commented that the new H-MOSS operational plan was under preparation.* OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt and review of the new H-MOSS operational plan.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

66. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors by the staff of UNOG Security and Safety Section.

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