

Currently released so far... 13368 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AEMR
AMGT
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
AJ
AF
AFIN
AS
AM
AFFAIRS
AA
ADM
ALOW
ACOA
ATRN
AID
AND
APER
ADANA
APEC
ADPM
ADCO
ABLD
AADP
AG
ARF
AMED
AY
AORG
ASEAN
ABUD
AROC
AE
AO
AL
APCS
AGAO
AINF
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ASUP
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASIG
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
AN
AIT
ANET
AGMT
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BA
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BK
BL
BH
BM
BTIO
BP
BO
BE
BILAT
BC
BX
BIDEN
BF
BBSR
BT
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CD
CV
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CM
CONS
CW
CN
CDC
CT
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTRY
CBE
CIVS
COPUOS
CARSON
CTR
COUNTER
COM
CR
CFED
CKGR
CHR
CVR
CLINTON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CIC
CITT
CAFTA
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CAC
CL
CACS
CAPC
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EU
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ELTN
EIND
EZ
EI
ER
ET
EINT
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EXIM
ES
ECONOMY
ERNG
ELECTIONS
ENERG
EK
EPA
ENGR
ETRC
ENVI
EXTERNAL
ELN
EAIDS
ECA
EFTA
EINVEFIN
EUREM
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EFINECONCS
ECOSOC
ETC
ENVR
EAP
EINN
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
ESA
EAIG
EUR
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
GM
GG
GERARD
GT
GA
GR
GTIP
GLOBAL
GV
GH
GL
GOV
GOI
GF
GTMO
GANGS
GCC
GAERC
GE
GZ
GAZA
GY
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
IV
IMF
IBRD
INDO
IWC
IRAQI
ISRAELI
ITALY
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
ICAO
ITRA
IPR
INMARSAT
ID
ICRC
INTERNAL
IIP
IRS
ICTY
IQ
IO
ICJ
ILC
IEFIN
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
INRB
IAHRC
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IL
IACI
IDA
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ITF
INRA
INRO
IBET
INTELSAT
IDP
ICTR
IRC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KOMC
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KPAO
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KMDR
KTER
KSPR
KV
KTFN
KWMN
KFRD
KSTH
KS
KN
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KMOC
KCIP
KTDB
KBIO
KU
KSTC
KICC
KIRC
KSEO
KSAF
KR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KIRF
KOCI
KMPI
KCRCM
KNUC
KIDE
KPAONZ
KHLS
KPRP
KHDP
KNUP
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KNAR
KWAC
KJUST
KTBT
KBCT
KNPP
KO
KBTS
KSCI
KACT
KFSC
KENV
KAWK
KHSA
KPRV
KVIR
KCFE
KX
KVRP
KCOM
KAID
KPWR
KTLA
KMFO
KNNPMNUC
KNDP
KMRS
KERG
KPOA
KRCM
KCFC
KNEI
KCHG
KPLS
KREL
KFTFN
KTFM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KRAD
KBTR
KGIT
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KREC
KIFR
KSAC
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KFPC
KRIM
KDDG
KCGC
KPAI
KID
KMIG
KNSD
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
ML
MR
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MAS
MO
MTCR
MIL
MAPP
MG
MD
MAR
MZ
MU
MP
MA
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MW
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MARAD
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MEDIA
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MPS
MC
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NG
NL
NU
NPT
NS
NA
NATIONAL
NSF
NDP
NR
NSSP
NP
NIPP
NGO
NAS
NE
NZUS
NH
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NEW
NRR
NT
NASA
NAR
NK
NOVO
NATOPREL
NSC
NV
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
OPRC
ODC
OIIP
OPDC
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OEXC
OPAD
ODIP
OPCW
OIE
OFDP
OFFICIALS
OHUM
OSCI
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
OVP
ON
OCII
OES
OCS
OIC
PGOV
PREL
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PPA
PCI
PAS
PALESTINIAN
PROP
PTE
PA
PAIGH
PO
PROG
PJUS
POLITICAL
PMIL
PGOF
PDOV
PSI
PG
PRAM
PREO
PARMS
PAO
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PP
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PNAT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PEDRO
PF
PHUS
PTBS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PINL
PBT
PINF
PRL
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PROV
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RICE
RM
REGION
RO
ROOD
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RUPREL
REMON
REACTION
REPORT
RSO
SZ
SENV
SOCI
SNAR
SY
SO
SP
SU
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SCUL
SG
SW
SR
SYRIA
SPECIALIST
SEN
SC
SF
SL
SAARC
SNARIZ
SARS
STEINBERG
SCRS
SWE
SN
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SEVN
SHUM
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SNARN
SIPRS
TRGY
TBIO
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TP
TW
TZ
TF
TN
TC
TL
TV
TS
TT
TK
TD
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
TBID
THPY
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
USTR
UZ
USEU
UV
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
UY
USPS
UNHRC
USUN
UNESCO
UNCHR
UNHCR
USNC
UNEP
USOAS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNO
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
UNCHC
UNCSD
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
UNCND
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAMA659, REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAMA659.
VZCZCXRO3592
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0659/01 1971230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161230Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7020
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000659
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL BA POL
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT
REF: A. REF. MANAMA 476
¶B. REF. 06 MANAMA 1214
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) In this, al-Wifaq's first legislative session in
Bahrain's Council of Representatives (COR), the society has
fielded inexperienced MPs and endured poor relations with the
government and other political societies as a result of
al-Wifaq's boycott of the 2002 elections. However, al-Wifaq
has built trust among the other COR blocs and the government,
which has allowed it to pass proposals that are held in
common by other blocs. Al-Wifaq supported a 15% public
sector pay increase, income subsidies for those awaiting
public housing, a welfare system, and unemployment insurance.
On the more controversial issues of political rights,
individual freedoms, and constitutional reform, however,
al-Wifaq has seen a lack of support from other parliamentary
blocs, due largely to government influence over them. The
lack of cooperation from the government and other blocs has
led to increasing constituent discontent for al-Wifaq, which
has pushed the party to place a premium on widely supported
standard of living and general services legislation to retain
constituent support. Al-Wifaq also contends with the
rejectionist Haq, which actively discredits al-Wifaq to
advance its own cause. By allowing al-Wifaq to achieve more
results in the COR, the government can continue to bolster
al-Wifaq's legitimacy among its constituents and encourage
participation in government, rather than with Haq. However,
by continuing to limit al-Wifaq,s ability to pass
legislation, the government may risk delegitimizing al-Wifaq
and increasing the credibility of Haq in what may be a zero
sum game between the two Shiite groups. End Summary.
------------------------------------------
Al-Wifaq,s Experience in the First Session
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Meeting with Emboffs June 19, head of leading Shia
political society al-Wifaq,s 2006 election campaign Jassim
Redha said that he had been dissatisfied with his society's
election candidates because many were religious figures
without political experience. He explained that al-Wifaq
officials had been limited in how much they could influence
the slate of candidates because constituents recommended
candidates to the party. While society officials could veto
a choice, they worried that doing so widely would alienate
constituents. Instead, al-Wifaq accepted the nominations of
religious figures because it needed as many votes in
parliament as possible. The result, according to Redha, has
been a crop of MPs among which only five or six are qualified
and capable of producing results in parliament, while the
rest were elected for religious reasons.
¶3. (C) Al-Wifaq,s boycott of the 2002 elections resulted in
poor relations with the government and participating
political societies. When al-Wifaq,s MPs assumed their
roles in parliament following the 2006 elections, they were
initially faced with the need to repair those relationships.
Regarding the building of trust with the government, al-Wifaq
MP Dr. Jassim Hussein expressed satisfaction at al-Wifaq,s
access to ministers and the ministers, willingness to listen
and act on al-Wifaq,s concerns, with the exception of the
Sunni-dominated Ministry of Defense. (Note: Hussein, a
former Bahrain University professor who currently authors
several economic columns in the local press, told Econoff
July 15 that ministers were afraid not to respond to him.
"They always answer me quickly. They know I can make trouble
for them." End note.) According to al-Wifaq MP Jawad
Fairooz, when they started working with the other societies
in parliament, they found agreement on 40-50% of their
agenda, including raising the standard of living and
improving general services. However, while al-Wifaq had
additional issues on their agenda, Fairooz indicated that the
other societies did not. Thus, in order to gain political
allies and build trust, al-Wifaq chose to focus primarily on
these common issues of wages, housing, welfare, unemployment,
education, and the building of additional health centers.
They delayed pursuing the political reform portion of their
agenda, namely political rights, individual freedoms, and
constitutional amendments.
¶4. (C) Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq supported a wage
proposal increasing salaries by 15% in the public sector.
Al-Wifaq also supported a bill that provided income subsidies
for those awaiting government housing. For poor families in
need of financial assistance, al-Wifaq supported a one-time
MANAMA 00000659 002 OF 004
BD100 ($265) payout and a monthly BD150 ($398) welfare
payment from the Ministry of Social Development. All three
of these measures have passed the COR with al-Wifaq,s
support and are awaiting a government response. Al-Wifaq
supported an unemployment insurance program approved by the
government by Royal Decree. As it became clear that the
program would include a 1% mandatory deduction from
employees' salaries, al-Wifaq's constituents became
unsettled. (Note: This issue has since become a political
and religious issue and al-Wifaq has clarified that it
supports the program in principle, but does not support
mandatory salary deductions. The deductions began from
June's salary. End note.)
---------------------------------------
Challenges on Controversial Legislation
---------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Political rights and individual freedoms, Fairooz
explained, are points of contention among the parliamentary
blocs. While other blocs do not include these issues in
their agenda, al-Wifaq considers them essential in building a
functioning democracy. Despite low support from other blocs,
al-Wifaq expects to receive drafts of a freedom of assembly
law and a press freedom law in the next session. However,
Fairooz speculated that the government would delay that
process as long as is legally permissible because the
proposed legislation was not supported by the government or
by pro-government blocs.
¶6. (C) According to Fairooz, al-Wifaq considers the eventual
transformation of the government into a constitutional
monarchy critical to the long-term viability of the state.
However, no other bloc shares al-Wifaq,s interest in
constitutional reform, thus limiting their ability to pass
amendments to the constitution. In this parliamentary
session, Fairooz explained, al-Wifaq tested the political
will of the other blocs by submitting two proposals for
changes to the lawmaking process. First, al-Wifaq proposed
to eliminate Article 87, which created a "fast track" process
for laws related to finance or the economy, allowing the King
to enact them by Royal Decree if the COR or Shura failed to
express approval or disapproval of it. (Comment: The GOB's
use of Article 87, though sparing, has been controversial.
Ref. B. End Comment.) Al-Wifaq,s second proposed amendment
was to eliminate Article 109C, which allowed the government
to pass a two year budget instead of an annual budget.
Deleting the article would make the process revert to a one
year budget by default. Fairooz indicated that other blocs
in parliament had agreed to support all three measures in
private discussions, but the support disappeared on the day
of the vote. Fourteen MPs were absent that day, making it
impossible for the proposed amendments to secure the 2/3
majority (27 votes) required for the amendments to move to
the Shura.
-------------------------------------------
Government Response to al-Wifaq Initiatives
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The largest opposition to al-Wifaq,s parliamentary
initiatives is the government and those who benefit from the
status quo. The foundation of this resistance, according to
Jassim Redha, is the parliament's established structure,
which includes the elected COR and the appointed Shura
Council. With a 2/3 approval requirement from both houses to
change the constitution, Redha said that parliament would
only be able to pass such an amendment if the government
supported the changes and appointed reformist members to the
Shura Council. Furthermore, Redha asserted that the Prime
Minister's preference is to show that "majlis democracy" is
better suited to Bahrain than a constitutional monarchy. In
this "majlis democracy," instead of allowing legislation to
work its way through parliament a system of patronage from
the Prime Minister and King allows those capable of gaining
an audience with the royal family to push through change
without involving the parliament and thereby undermining the
parliamentary system. For further evidence of government
resistance to change, Redha cited eight bills and 52
proposals that al-Wifaq initiated, added to 42 bills put
forth by the rest of the parliamentary blocs, to which the
government responded to zero within the parliamentary
session. (Note: The constitution does not require a
government response within the same session, but allows for a
response in the succeeding year's legislative session. End
note.)
¶8. (C) In light of the relationships other parliamentary
blocs had built with each other and the government in the
2002-2006 parliament, Jawad Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq
was at a disadvantage in trying to form its own coalition and
MANAMA 00000659 003 OF 004
support base within parliament. He said that the Royal
Court's influence over the Sunni parliamentary blocs was so
significant that the Court could deliver "suggestions" to MPs
to vote for or against a particular bill, a concern echoed by
Dr. Jassim Hussein. Examples Fairooz provided were issues on
which al-Wifaq thought it had secured the support of other
blocs in private discussions, but later the blocs voted
against. According to Fairooz, for one such vote a Sunni MP
came from the hospital, where he was scheduled to undergo an
operation that day, in order to cast his dissenting vote. A
second example was of a Sunni MP who left his dying mother to
vote against an al-Wifaq supported bill, causing him to miss
the final moments of his mother's life. Fairooz presented
these as obvious evidence of government influence over the
Sunni blocs, saying that this represents "control" over their
votes.
----------------------
Constituent Impatience
----------------------
¶9. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein explained that al-Wifaq MPs meet
regularly with their constituents to gauge public opinion of
the society. He felt that while their constituents continue
to support the society and remain dedicated to the
parliamentary process, they are increasingly discontent with
al-Wifaq's inability to pass reform legislation. Mohammed
al-Shaikh and Yousif Zainal, former MPs defeated by al-Wifaq
candidates in the 2006 elections, asserted that al-Wifaq,s
action in this first session was more reactive to constituent
discontent over perceived al-Wifaq ineffectiveness than
proactive. Both cited the last-minute proposal to question
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin
Atiyatullah al-Khalifa on corruption allegations as a direct
response to constituent impatience and displeasure.
¶10. (C) Regarding constituent impatience, Fairooz explained
that the society's constituents are inexperienced in the
political process. He admitted that while al-Wifaq was
building trust with members of the other blocs, progress on
al-Wifaq's agenda was too slow for some of its constituents,
due in part to al-Wifaq MPs' inexperience. Fairooz explained
that al-Wifaq was further distracted from its parliamentary
duties by the need to defuse growing tensions between its
constituents and security forces over continuing
demonstrations. While al-Wifaq MPs felt a sense of
accomplishment at the end of this legislative session, more
tangible action to improve the standard of living and general
services needs to be taken in order to retain constituent
support.
-----------------
The Haq Challenge
-----------------
¶11. (C) Al-Wifaq MPs Dr. Jassim Hussein and Jawad Fairooz
and Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP who aligns
himself with al-Wifaq on non-religious issues, convey a sense
of urgency that al-Wifaq needs to attain tangible results in
the next parliamentary session to prevent al-Wifaq,s
constituents from changing their allegiance to Haq. Hussein
explained that in the first parliamentary session al-Wifaq
MPs in areas where Haq is strongly supported have already
experienced strong discontent from their constituents. Abul
explained that in his own district a portion of his
constituents felt al-Wifaq was too passive in parliament and
wanted a more hard-line stance in line with Haq. Fairooz
asserted that Haq actively discredits al-Wifaq by claiming it
passes negative laws, such as the 1% salary deduction, so as
to draw al-Wifaq supporters to Haq. Mohammed al-Shaikh
explained that since Haq and al-Wifaq pull from the same
Shiite pool, if current al-Wifaq supporters view the bloc as
inactive, they are likely to reject political participation
and support Haq. Al-Shaikh explained that the more support
Haq takes from al-Wifaq, the harder it will be for al-Wifaq
to achieve political solutions to constituent issues, and the
more likely it will be for Haq to act on its rejectionist
rhetoric.
-------------
Looking Ahead
-------------
¶12. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein indicated that al-Wifaq intends
to draft concrete proposals on salaries and living conditions
over the summer recess. Jawad Fairooz expressed optimism
over the cooperation al-Wifaq has built with Sunni blocs in
parliament and believed that cooperation would continue in
the next session as al-Wifaq pursues its standard of living
agenda. In addition, he explained that al-Wifaq remained
concerned that working strictly through parliament may take
MANAMA 00000659 004 OF 004
too long or be ultimately too ineffective for the society to
maintain its support base. Thus, he indicated that al-Wifaq
will seek to open channels of communication with the
government outside of parliament so as to use every resource
at its disposal to realize its agenda. Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul
indicated that the al-Wifaq bloc would support a
parliamentary audit of government finances in the following
legislative session; including an approval of the 2004-2005
budget and an inquiry into the 2005-2006 budget.
¶13. (C) Even though al-Wifaq failed to gain enough support
to question Shaikh Ahmed in the closing days of the session,
Jassim Redha indicated that al-Wifaq will renew the call for
an investigation into corruption allegations of Shaikh Ahmed.
Yousif Zainal speculated that the King may reassign Sheikh
Ahmed during the parliamentary recess to a position outside
of COR oversight so as to avoid questioning of his
activities.
-------
Comment
-------
¶14. (C) While al-Wifaq,s inexperience in governance is
itself a significant challenge to realizing tangible
progress, the extent of government resistance to future
al-Wifaq efforts remains to be seen. To create political
legitimacy for al-Wifaq and counter Haq support, the
government has granted al-Wifaq public relations victories
regarding security and Haq. The highest profile such
incident was al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman receiving
partial credit for the King's order to drop the criminal case
against Haq's leader, Hasan Mushaima, and Abdulhadi
al-Khawaja on the eve of their trial for promoting change to
the political system through illegitimate means and inciting
hatred of the political system (Ref. A). However, public
relations victories are not sufficient to counter government
efforts to block parliamentary accomplishments. In order to
avoid boosting the profile of Haq and perhaps inviting
increasingly violent demonstrations from the group, the
government could allow al-Wifaq some success in parliament to
reward them and their constituents for participating in the
democratic process.
********************************************* ********
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/
********************************************* ********
MONROE