

Currently released so far... 13368 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AEMR
AMGT
AR
APECO
AU
AORC
AJ
AF
AFIN
AS
AM
AFFAIRS
AA
ADM
ALOW
ACOA
ATRN
AID
AND
APER
ADANA
APEC
ADPM
ADCO
ABLD
AADP
AG
ARF
AMED
AY
AORG
ASEAN
ABUD
AROC
AE
AO
AL
APCS
AGAO
AINF
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ASUP
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASIG
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
AN
AIT
ANET
AGMT
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
BR
BB
BG
BEXP
BY
BA
BRUSSELS
BU
BD
BK
BL
BH
BM
BTIO
BP
BO
BE
BILAT
BC
BX
BIDEN
BF
BBSR
BT
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CPAS
CA
CASC
CS
CBW
CIDA
CO
CODEL
CI
CROS
CU
CH
CWC
CMGT
CVIS
CDG
CD
CV
CG
CF
CHIEF
CJAN
CBSA
CE
CY
CM
CONS
CW
CN
CDC
CT
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTRY
CBE
CIVS
COPUOS
CARSON
CTR
COUNTER
COM
CR
CFED
CKGR
CHR
CVR
CLINTON
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CIC
CITT
CAFTA
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CONSULAR
CLMT
CBC
CIA
CNARC
CIS
CEUDA
CAC
CL
CACS
CAPC
ECON
ETTC
EFIS
ETRD
EC
EMIN
EAGR
EAID
EU
EFIN
EUN
ECIN
EG
EWWT
EINV
ENRG
ELAB
EPET
EN
EAIR
EUMEM
ECPS
ELTN
EIND
EZ
EI
ER
ET
EINT
ECONOMIC
ENIV
EXIM
ES
ECONOMY
ERNG
ELECTIONS
ENERG
EK
EPA
ENGR
ETRC
ENVI
EXTERNAL
ELN
EAIDS
ECA
EFTA
EINVEFIN
EUREM
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EFINECONCS
ECOSOC
ETC
ENVR
EAP
EINN
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
ESA
EAIG
EUR
EUC
ERD
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
GM
GG
GERARD
GT
GA
GR
GTIP
GLOBAL
GV
GH
GL
GOV
GOI
GF
GTMO
GANGS
GCC
GAERC
GE
GZ
GAZA
GY
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
IZ
IN
IAEA
IS
IMO
ILO
IR
IC
IT
ITU
IV
IMF
IBRD
INDO
IWC
IRAQI
ISRAELI
ITALY
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
ICAO
ITRA
IPR
INMARSAT
ID
ICRC
INTERNAL
IIP
IRS
ICTY
IQ
IO
ICJ
ILC
IEFIN
IA
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
INRB
IAHRC
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IL
IACI
IDA
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ITF
INRA
INRO
IBET
INTELSAT
IDP
ICTR
IRC
KNNP
KFLO
KDEM
KOMC
KSUM
KIPR
KFLU
KPAO
KE
KCRM
KJUS
KAWC
KZ
KSCA
KDRG
KCOR
KGHG
KPAL
KTIP
KMCA
KCRS
KPKO
KOLY
KRVC
KVPR
KG
KWBG
KMDR
KTER
KSPR
KV
KTFN
KWMN
KFRD
KSTH
KS
KN
KISL
KGIC
KSEP
KFIN
KTEX
KTIA
KUNR
KCMR
KMOC
KCIP
KTDB
KBIO
KU
KSTC
KICC
KIRC
KSEO
KSAF
KR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KIRF
KOCI
KMPI
KCRCM
KNUC
KIDE
KPAONZ
KHLS
KPRP
KHDP
KNUP
KHIV
KCSY
KTRD
KNAR
KWAC
KJUST
KTBT
KBCT
KNPP
KO
KBTS
KSCI
KACT
KFSC
KENV
KAWK
KHSA
KPRV
KVIR
KCFE
KX
KVRP
KCOM
KAID
KPWR
KTLA
KMFO
KNNPMNUC
KNDP
KMRS
KERG
KPOA
KRCM
KCFC
KNEI
KCHG
KPLS
KREL
KFTFN
KTFM
KLIG
KDEMAF
KRAD
KBTR
KGIT
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KRGY
KREC
KIFR
KSAC
KWMNCS
KPAK
KOMS
KFPC
KRIM
KDDG
KCGC
KPAI
KID
KMIG
KNSD
KWMM
MARR
MX
MASS
MOPS
MNUC
MCAP
MTCRE
ML
MR
MRCRE
MTRE
MASC
MY
MK
MAS
MO
MTCR
MIL
MAPP
MG
MD
MAR
MZ
MU
MP
MA
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MW
MT
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MARAD
MDC
MEPP
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MEDIA
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MPS
MC
NZ
NATO
NI
NO
NG
NL
NU
NPT
NS
NA
NATIONAL
NSF
NDP
NR
NSSP
NP
NIPP
NGO
NAS
NE
NZUS
NH
NSG
NAFTA
NC
NEW
NRR
NT
NASA
NAR
NK
NOVO
NATOPREL
NSC
NV
NPA
NSFO
NW
NORAD
NPG
OTRA
OECD
OVIP
OREP
OPRC
ODC
OIIP
OPDC
OAS
OSCE
OPIC
OMS
OEXC
OPAD
ODIP
OPCW
OIE
OFDP
OFFICIALS
OHUM
OSCI
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OBSP
OFDA
OVP
ON
OCII
OES
OCS
OIC
PGOV
PREL
PARM
PINR
PHUM
PM
PREF
PTER
PK
PINS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PBTS
PL
POL
PAK
POV
POLITICS
POLICY
PPA
PCI
PAS
PALESTINIAN
PROP
PTE
PA
PAIGH
PO
PROG
PJUS
POLITICAL
PMIL
PGOF
PDOV
PSI
PG
PRAM
PREO
PARMS
PAO
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PP
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PNAT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PEDRO
PF
PHUS
PTBS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PEL
PINL
PBT
PINF
PRL
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PROV
RS
RP
RU
RW
RFE
RCMP
RIGHTSPOLMIL
ROBERT
RICE
RM
REGION
RO
ROOD
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RUPREL
REMON
REACTION
REPORT
RSO
SZ
SENV
SOCI
SNAR
SY
SO
SP
SU
SI
SMIG
SYR
SA
SCUL
SG
SW
SR
SYRIA
SPECIALIST
SEN
SC
SF
SL
SAARC
SNARIZ
SARS
STEINBERG
SCRS
SWE
SN
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SEVN
SHUM
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SNARN
SIPRS
TRGY
TBIO
TSPA
TU
TPHY
TI
TX
TH
TIP
TSPL
TNGD
TP
TW
TZ
TF
TN
TC
TL
TV
TS
TT
TK
TD
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TINT
TFIN
TAGS
TR
TBID
THPY
UNSC
UK
UNGA
UN
US
USTR
UZ
USEU
UV
UG
UP
UNAUS
UNMIK
UY
USPS
UNHRC
USUN
UNESCO
UNCHR
UNHCR
USNC
UNEP
USOAS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNO
UNDP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
UNDC
UNICEF
UNCHC
UNCSD
UNFCYP
UNIDROIT
UNCND
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07HELSINKI689, SCENESETTER: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13-15 VISIT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07HELSINKI689.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07HELSINKI689 | 2007-09-07 13:24 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXYZ0008
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHHE #0689/01 2501324
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071324Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3730
INFO RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 4186
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0949
UNCLAS HELSINKI 000689
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/MELISSA BUCK AND EUR/NB KEITH ANDERTON
AND KATIE GARRY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: FI PREL PGOV MARR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PDAS VOLKER'S SEPT. 13-15 VISIT TO
HELSINKI
REF: A. HELSINKI 416
¶B. HELSINKI 639
¶C. HELSINKI 682
SUMMARY / INTRODUCTION
----------------------
¶1. (SBU): The Embassy warmly welcomes you to Helsinki and
views your visit as a key opportunity to advance the most
important issues on the US-Finland agenda. Afghanistan
and NATO top the list, as both are the subject of intense
domestic political discussion right now. Many in the new
government are eager for Finland to increase aid and
troop commitments to NATO/ISAF, but they face a tough
political battle with the opposition and with NATO
skeptics within their own governing coalition. A similar
debate surrounds a pending decision on joining the NRF.
Your public and private messages can help tip the
Afghanistan and NRF arguments in a positive direction.
Your official meetings offer opportunities to bolster our
already strong collaboration on Kosovo and, perhaps, to
chart a more dynamic course on Russia, democracy in the
Near Neighborhood, and Finland's 2008 OSCE Presidency.
On the public diplomacy side, NATO and Afghanistan will
again be key, and we also stand to make some headway with
strong messages on climate change, missile defense and
the Middle East. "Watch-out fors" include lethal weapons
for Afghanistan, which has become politically very
difficult here, and insistent requests by the Finns for
POTUS and SecState meetings. END SUMMARY.
AFGHANISTAN
-----------
¶2. (SBU) Finland's solid contributions to NATO/ISAF and
to Afghan reconstruction will continue; our challenge now
is finding ways to help the GOF do more. Afghanistan
will receive $12 million in annual assistance for at
least the next six years, and the GOF is finalizing the
transfer of most if its 104 peacekeepers from a
Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh to the Swedish-led PRT at
Mazar-al-Sharif. We hope to see Finland increase its
troop commitments, with a view toward taking leadership
of the Mazar PRT in 2009. The Finns embed a small,
highly effective civilian liaison team at Meymenah that
targets development projects to support the PRT and which
has won kudos from US commanders in Afghanistan for its
effectiveness in building local community support for the
PRT's efforts. Taking leadership at Mazar in 2009 would
allow Finland to implement that model there.
¶3. (SBU) Domestically, Afghanistan is the subject of an
intense political debate right now. At the time of your
visit, the government will be finalizing a major report
that examines all aspects of the security situation and
makes recommendations on how/if Finland's role there
should expand (Reftels A and B). The MOD and MFA would
like to see increased troop contributions to NATO/ISAF,
PRT leadership in 2009, and more development and
counternarcotics assistance. Conservative Party members
of government -- led by FM Ilkka Kanerva and MOD Jyri
Hakamies -- support these recommendations, but are
running into increasingly vocal opposition not only from
outside government, but also from the NATO nay-sayers
within the governing coalition (in particular the Center
Party). We intend to include some of these skeptics in
the events on your schedule; your public and private
comments to them indicating the value the US attaches to
Finland's current contributions; how impressed we are
with Finland's PRT-CMO coordination model; and the
importance to Washington of what Finland is doing in
Afghanistan will be extremely timely and can help
influence the autumn debate in a positive direction.
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 1: LETHAL WEAPONS TO AFGHANISTAN
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (SBU) Washington and Kabul have long hoped that
Finland would make a lethal weapons donation to support
the Afghan security forces. However, this issue has
become political poison here and threatens to derail our
efforts to get Finland to do more in Afghanistan.
President Halonen adamantly rejects the idea, and PM
Vanhanen is clearly uncomfortable with it. Even
Conservatives like Hakamies, who personally support a
donation, have backed away, recognizing that pressing too
hard could cause Halonen (and probably even Vanhanen) to
veto their efforts to have Finland do more in Afghanistan
in other areas. At this juncture, we should avoid
pressing the Finns for a lethal donation that could
derail our efforts to achieve other important goals such
as more troops, more aid, and PRT leadership.
NATO AND THE NRF
----------------
¶5. (SBU) Finland has EU Battlegroup commitments through
mid-2008, but the MOD and MFA see Finnish participation
in the NRF as a good complement to the Battlegroups -- a
view we have actively supported. Conservatives in
government would like nothing better than to join Sweden
in formally announcing that Finland will join the NRF at
NATO's Global Force Generation conference in November, in
hopes of standing up troops for the Danish-led NRF in
¶2010. Unfortunately, the die-hard NATO naysayers in
government (Center Party) and in opposition (about half
the Social Democrats and some smaller parties) who
adamantly oppose Finland's joining NATO have now begun
alleging that the NRF is simply a 'slippery slope' to
NATO membership. Their argument is of course specious,
and messages you deliver that (1) point to how the NRF
can complement EU Battle Group participation and (2)
clarify that NATO membership and NRF participation are
entirely separate decisions will help keep this debate
fact-based.
KOSOVO
------
¶6. (SBU) Kosovo is one of Finland's highest foreign
policy priorities. The GOF has been one of our
staunchest allies and has worked hard behind the scenes
to ensure EU unity in support of Ahtisaari's final
status. Finland has more than 400 troops on the ground,
provides extensive aid, and is actively engaged in the
CFSP Planning Mission. The GOF is quietly becoming
concerned that the lack of a way forward may begin to
undermine international efforts and will not support
delays beyond the current Troika-led negotiating period
(Reftel C). The GOF has not made a national decision as
to how it will react at the end of the current
negotiating period if Kosovo unilaterally declares
independence, and is adamant about not publicly
discussing any kind of Plan B. That said, officials
will welcome an exchange of views on this and will be
open to Washington's latest thinking.
RUSSIA, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEAR NEIGHBORHOOD
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The general views of the USG and the GOF are in
close harmony when it comes to support for democracy,
civil society and human rights in Russia and Europe's new
neighborhood. Finland is already engaged in some
activities that complement US Freedom Agenda goals,
including support to environmental NGOs in Russia;
educational exchanges in Russia and Belarus; and funding
for the International Humanities University for
Belarusian exiles in Vilnius. GOF leaders have hosted
high-level meetings with Belarusian opposition leaders,
with Serb moderates, and with pro-democracy forces in
Ukraine and the Caucuses. The Estonian Bronze Statue
crisis also emboldened the GOF to move away from the
traditional Finnish propensity to acquiesce to Russia on
tough issues. Indeed, under the new government the GOF
has begun publicly to challenge Moscow's policies and
actions in ways the previous government eschewed. The
GOF is recognizing the need to speak out on heavy-handed
Russian trade practices -- especially on energy issues
and timber tariffs which directly affect Finland. Most
recently, MOD Hakamies used his Sept. 5-7 visit to
Washington to identify Russia as Finland's single most
important security challenge.
¶8. (SBU) Many Finns, however, are not yet fully
comfortable with challenging Russia, and there is
lingering reticence about taking too high profile a role
in pressing for greater democracy elsewhere. You can
nudge interlocutors in the right direction by expressing
appreciation for what Finland (and certain Finns, like
Ahtisaari and EU Commissioner Olli Rehn) have done in
these areas; by encouraging greater US-EU and US-Finland
coordination in dealing with Russia; by encouraging Finns
to play an even more active role in showing public
support for pro-democracy leaders; and by urging high-
level Finnish visits to countries where they can reach
out to democratic forces -- with Belarus, Ukraine and the
Balkans being perhaps the best fits in this regard.
FINLAND'S 2008 OSCE PRESIDENCY
------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Finland's agenda for its Presidency has some
positive elements, as well as others that are of less
interest. In the latter category, for example, Finland's
announced focus on European inland waterway issues is
less than stirring from a US perspective; however, by
emphasizing our priorities we can encourage more
leadership in other areas. One option is democracy.
Finns can be counted on to focus heavily on the good work
the OSCE does with election monitoring and institution
building, although the GOF will need active support from
us and other like-minded countries in countering the
efforts of certain OSCE members to weaken the
Organization in these areas. On a particularly positive
note, the Finns have told us that they intend to use
their Presidency as a springboard to become more involved
in promoting democracy and freedom within many member
states -- an initiative that, with the right
encouragement, could have a very positive impact on our
Freedom Agenda priorities (see above).
"WATCH OUT FOR" NO. 2: HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS
------------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) The Finns will use their OSCE Presidency (as
well as other issues) to press for S-Kanerva and POTUS-
Halonen meetings. While the S-Kanerva meeting in June
was very successful for both sides, you will want to be
prepared to urge the Finns to be realistic about how
difficult it is to schedule these high level visits.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
----------------
¶11. (SBU) We have programmed a heavy dose of PD into your
schedule, including an on-the-record speech (Topic:
"Finland, NATO and Afghanistan"), a "background" lunch
roundtable with leading editors and columnists, and an
on-the-record session with the electronic media and print
journalists. As noted above, your messages on NATO/ISAF
and the value the US places on Finland's doing more in
Afghanistan are the most timely and topical at this
moment. In addition, there will be strong interest in
the Administration's newest efforts to confront climate
change; in terrorism and other security-related issues;
and in your general assessments of the trans-Atlantic
relationship, NATO/EU cooperation; the US role in the
Middle East Peace Process and, to a lesser extent, Iraq;
and the current policy environment in Washington. All
your PD events offer a good opportunity to present the
facts surrounding Missile Defense, and the Finns will be
particularly interested in whatever you can share
regarding US efforts to create a dialogue with Russia.
HYATT