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Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1632, ARGENTINA: FAREWELL CALL ON KIRCHNER INNER CIRCLE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BUENOSAIRES1632 | 2006-07-21 21:27 | 2011-03-29 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires |
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1361157-la-relacion-con-chavez-al-desnudo |
VZCZCXRO8269
PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #1632/01 2022127
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212127Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5333
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1677
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001632
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: FAREWELL CALL ON KIRCHNER INNER CIRCLE
MEMBER
REF: A. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141
¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01610
Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on
President Kirchner's closest and most influential advisor,
Technical and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini, that included a
discussion on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional
policy. Reviewing the U.S. bilateral objectives over the
past three years, the DCM said he and the Ambassador had
sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic recovery
and political stability, cooperate with the GOA on security
and counterterrorism issues, and after Argentina recovered,
seek the GOA's constructive role in the region. The DCM
praised Argentina's economic recovery and Zannini thanked the
U.S. for its help during the crisis. Turning to regional
issues, the DCM noted U.S. regional concerns regarding
Venezuela and Bolivia. The DCM said that Kirchner's close
relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and
Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant
for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it difficult
for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations
with the GOA. Zannini said that the GOA's relationship with
Venezuela was based on economics and that Mercosur membership
would change Venezuela, not the other way around. On
Bolivia, both the DCM and Zannini agreed that isolating
President Morales would not be good, but the DCM said that
both countries needed to work to moderate Morales' actions.
Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped
communication between the two countries would be further
strengthened. The DCM highlighted incoming Ambassador
Wayne's strong qualifications and noted that he would
continue Ambassador Gutierrez's professional diplomacy. END
SUMMARY.
--------------------------
REVIEWING THE RELATIONSHIP
--------------------------
¶2. (C) On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on Technical
and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini that included a discussion
on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional policy.
Carlos Zannini is a long-time, close Kirchner advisor and
probably his most influential policy confidant (See reftel
A). Zannini began the discussion by noting the good
relationship the Casa Rosada enjoyed with the Ambassador and
DCM and expressed appreciation for U.S. help during the
crisis. The DCM said the U.S. is pleased that Argentina's
economic recovery has been strong and said that Kirchner
deserves a great deal of the credit for it. Zannini replied
that Argentina's process of recovery was unfinished, but that
they too were pleased they were on the way.
¶3. (C) The DCM reiterated U.S. objectives in Argentina. The
DCM said that in the past three years he and the Ambassador
had sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic
recovery and political stability, strengthen cooperation with
the GOA on security and counterterrorism issues, and after
Argentina recovered, seek the GOA's constructive role in the
region. The DCM detailed the support that the U.S. gave to
Argentina during the depth of the financial crisis, from
advocating for Argentina within the G-7 to the U.S.
Treasury's decision to support the private sector debt
exchange that allowed Argentina to secure a higher rate of
participation in the deal. The DCM noted that no major U.S.
company left Argentina during the crisis and that roughly 500
U.S. companies currently operate in Argentina generating
roughly 200,000 jobs.
---------------
REGIONAL ISSUES
---------------
¶4. (C) Turning to regional issues, the DCM noted U.S.
regional concerns and said the U.S. wanted to see Argentina
take a more active role in supporting regional democracy.
BUENOS AIR 00001632 002 OF 003
The DCM thanked Zannini for the GOA's continued help in
Haiti. The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that
Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his
penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it
difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral
relations with the GOA. The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is
meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior
because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the
next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a
genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler."" The DCM said that
by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez,
Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's
views. The DCM said that the U.S. does not oppose
Argentina's economic ties with Venezuela, as the
U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship is extensive, but both
Argentina and the U.S. need to support Venezuela's democracy.
¶5. (C) Zannini responded by emphasizing the economic nature
of Argentina's relationship with Venezuela and noted that the
U.S. and Argentina ""have different definitions of democracy.""
Zannini said, ""Our relations with Venezuela are not
anti-U.S., but based on economic interests."" Zannini
acknowledged Chavez's anti-U.S. tendencies, ""Attacking the
U.S. is a way for him (Chavez) to build power in Venezuela.""
He said that Argentina does not share Chavez's anti-U.S.
message. Regarding Venezuela's democracy, Zannini said that
for the GOA, the most important part of a democracy is
voting, pointing out that Chavez has won numerous national
elections. Zannini said that part of the problem with
Venezuela's democracy is the intransigence of Venezuela's
opposition. Zannini noted the many ways that Venezuela was
helping Argentina, from buying bonds, helping to meeting
Argentina's energy needs, to selling Argentina agricultural
equipment.
¶6. (C) The DCM responded by noting the increasingly
authoritarian nature of the Chavez government. He stressed
Chavez's concerted efforts to weaken judicial independence
and retain monopoly control of Venezuela's Congress, as well
as his crackdown against the political opposition and media.
The DCM said that many in the opposition and in the media in
Venezuela lived in fear. The DCM also noted the foreign
policy dimension of the problem, citing Chavez's cultivation
of the rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea. Zannini
replied by highlighting the GOA's cooperation with the U.S.
on counterproliferation efforts on both Iran and North Korea
in the UN Security Council.
¶7. (C) On Bolivia, the DCM said that the U.S. is not trying
to isolate Bolivian President Morales, but is instead seeking
to moderate Morales' actions. Zannini said that isolating
Morales would just create a worse situation. Zannini said
that Morales and Chavez often have rhetoric that is much
worse than their actions. The DCM acknowledged that focusing
exclusively on rhetoric was not helpful, but reaffirmed that
the U.S. is also concerned with some of the actions of both
Morales and Chavez.
¶8. (C) Zannini raised the issue of the Mercosur Summit in
Cordoba. Zannini said Venezuela's incorporation into
Mercosur should not concern the U.S. ""Venezuela will adapt
to Mercosur, not the other way around. Argentina does not
have a regime like Venezuela's; Argentina has its own
characteristics."" Zannini acknowledged that
misunderstandings about Argentina's relationship with
Venezuela could cause many problems with the GOA's
relationship with the U.S. However, he again sought to allay
U.S. fears, ""Argentina is not going to be a tool of Cuba.""
Zannini said that the highlights of the Summit in Cordoba
would be announcing the creation of a South American
parliament and a regional infrastructure fund. Zannini noted
that Mercosur's success would lead to stronger democracies in
the region, ""With better economies, democracy can grow.""
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BUENOS AIR 00001632 003 OF 003
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
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¶9. (C) Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped
communication between the two countries would improve.
Zannini said that ""Argentina is focused just on the region
and the U.S. is focused on the world. At times, the U.S. has
not exercised the leadership in the region that was needed.""
The DCM replied that Argentina has benefited first-hand from
the U.S. regional leadership in recent years. The DCM
highlighted incoming Ambassador Wayne's strong
qualifications, predicting that he would maintain Ambassador
Gutierrez's efforts to reach out and seek to strengthen
bilateral ties.
¶10. (C) Zannini, noting incoming Ambassador Wayne's economic
background, appealed for more U.S. investment in Argentina as
the best way to improve bilateral relations. The DCM said
that the GOA needs to ensure that U.S. companies have the
freedom to operate in Argentina without GOA price controls
and interference that would harm the U.S. companies' ability
to compete. The DCM said that U.S. companies need open and
clear regulations in order to encourage them to invest.
Zannini acknowledged the benefits of the U.S.-style of
business-government relations, which he said was superior to
the common practice in Europe.
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COMMENT
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¶11. (C) As Secretary of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli did in
his recent meeting with the DCM (See reftel B), Kirchner's
inner circle always attempts to allay our concerns regarding
Argentina's relationship with Venezuela. Although the GOA's
goals in their dealings with Chavez are primarily economic,
Chavez's primary goals are political. President Kirchner is
playing a dangerous game as he is drawing Argentina ever
closer to Venezuela. Chavez, and his ally Fidel Castro, are
much more capable and adept at manipulating regional politics
than is President Kirchner. Kirchner likely thinks he can
continue to strengthen his ties to the leftist bloc in Latin
America, while maintaining positive relations with the United
States. Kirchner's foreign policy ineptness and lack of
competent international relations advisors will likely
prevent him from understanding the potential negative
consequences of his actions.
¶12. (C) Our experience has been that the GOA is difficult
government to work with and one with a lack of foreign policy
expertise. The Kirchner administration's lack of
understanding in the international relations area, coupled
with their sophomoric, 1970s leftist tendencies, make them
easily susceptible to manipulation by more radical regional
leaders, such as Chavez and Castro. It is therefore
extremely important for the U.S., both in Washington and in
Buenos Aires, to actively engage the GOA at a high level at
this critical juncture to avoid any further slippage of
Argentina towards the Chavez orbit. Despite differences, we
have been able to achieve excellent cooperation with the GOA
on a range of issues, including counternarcotics,
counterterrorism, non-proliferation and in Haiti. We need to
further reach out to the GOA to achieve more cooperation in
other areas. The consequences of not maintaining a fluid
dialogue with the GOA can only be negative for the U.S. END
COMMENT.
LLORENS
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