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Viewing cable 10OTTAWA21, Canadian PM and NATO S-G Discuss Afghanistan, the Strategic

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10OTTAWA21 2010-01-20 18:49 2011-05-20 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO3302
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHOT #0021/01 0201849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 201849Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0288
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000021 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND WHA/CAN 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/20 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR AF NATO CA
SUBJECT: Canadian PM and NATO S-G Discuss Afghanistan, the Strategic 
Concept, and the Arctic 
 
REF: OTTAWA 24 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Bellard, Political Minister Counselor, 
Department of State, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
1. (C/NF) Summary.  In a meeting in Ottawa with the NATO Secretary 
General, PM Harper promised to consider a training role in 
Afghanistan after Canada's combat mission ends in 2011, while 
noting the importance of managing messaging to avoid 
characterizations of ""withdrawal.""  Mounting Canadian deaths, the 
perceived lack of progress on the ground, and a problematic Afghan 
Government are eroding public support in Canada for the mission. 
Canada wants to see strong and capable expeditionary forces within 
NATO, and rejects any ""sphere of influence"" for Russia.  Canada 
opposes a NATO role in the Arctic.  End summary. 
 
 
 
2.  (C/NF)  Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper met on January 13 
in Ottawa with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a 
series of sessions devoted to Afghanistan, the NATO Strategic 
Concept, and the Arctic.  According to Kelly Anderson, Deputy 
Director of the Defence and Security Relations Division at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the meetings 
with the PM were unfortunately overshadowed by unfolding events in 
Haiti.  SecGen Rasmussen met separately with Minister of National 
Defence Peter McKay and Chief of the Defence Staff General Walt 
Natynczyk.  Rasmussen also visited Canadian troops who had recently 
returned from Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
3.  (C/NF)  According to Anderson, SecGen Rasmussen assured his 
Canadian interlocutors that he was not coming to Ottawa to ""cause 
problems"" related to the 2011 end of the Canadian combat mission in 
Afghanistan that the Canadian House of Commons had mandated in 
March 2008.  In his media appearances, the Secretary General 
avoided criticism of Canada's decision and refrained from calling 
for a reversal of the decision.  The media also sought to draw him 
into the current politically-charged debate over treatment of 
Afghan detainees transferred to Afghan custody by Canadian Forces. 
In his meeting with the PM, SecGen Rasmussen sought Canadian 
commitment to a post-2011 role in training Afghan security forces 
as part of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan.  PM Harper 
promised that the government would look at the possibility, while 
noting the difficulties in providing effective training outside 
Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
4,  (C/NF)  SecGen Rasmussen and PM Harper agreed on the importance 
of managing the messaging related to the 2011 target also set by 
President Obama for troop reductions if warranted by conditions on 
the ground.  It is important that this not be interpreted as a date 
for withdrawal of NATO forces.  PM Harper observed that the U.S. 
target date was ""not helpful politically"" to his government, 
especially if he needs to make the case for continued Canadian 
engagement.  SecGen Rasmussen expressed concern that the Canadian 
withdrawal in 2011 could produce a ""domino effect,"" increasing 
domestic pressure on Germany and France to withdraw as well.  PM 
Harper rejected the parallel, saying that Canada has ""been there in 
a big way"" and that the circumstances of Canada's decision are not 
comparable to other ISAF troop contributors. 
 
 
 
5.  (C/NF)  PM Harper described th three major domestic 
vulnerabilities he faces with respect to retaining support for the 
Afghanistan mission, with the mounting Canadian death toll (so far, 
139 troop death, one reporter, one diplomat, and two aid workers) 
the most damaging.  The perceived lack of progress on the ground in 
Afghanistan is a second challenge that also saps public support. 
Furthermore, there is the ""problematic"" Afghan government, which 
raises questions of legitimacy and effectiveness.  PM Harper said 
that he supports and encourages the transition to Afghan lead on 
security, urging a special focus on police.  He argued that the 
Canadian ""Village Approach"" provides a successful model that could 
be useful in planning for ISAF transition.  The PM urged that 
transition to Afghan lead at the provincial level should be done 
""as much as possible, as soon as possible,"" wherever conditions 
 
OTTAWA 00000021  002 OF 002 
 
 
allow. 
 
 
 
6.  (C/NF)   In a subsequent discussion on the NATO Strategic 
Concept, PM Harper commented that it should be ""short, with a focus 
on key issues.""  He reiterated a long-standing Canadian call for 
the development of strong and capable expeditionary forces within 
NATO militaries.   He urged continued  transformation away from 
territorial defense toward forces able to deploy rapidly where they 
are needed, whether out-of-area or in response to a territorial 
threat to a  member nation under Article 5.  PM Harper also called 
for closer civilian-military coordination, urging that NATO forces 
must be structured to work more closely with civilian elements, 
especially UN missions.  SecGen Rasmussen noted that he had 
recently been at a retreat with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 
where these issues were also under discussion. He suggested 
inviting the UN Secretary General to the Lisbon Summit.  SecGen 
Rasmussen also told PM Harper that the Strategic Concept will offer 
a vehicle for reform and streamlining within NATO, and that he 
plans to draft the document. 
 
 
 
7.  (C/NF)   SecGen Rasmussen opined that Russia does want a 
cooperative relationship with NATO.  PM Harper commented that 
Moscow needs to work more constructively with the international 
community.  He specifically rejected any notion that Russia had a 
claim to a  ""sphere of influence,"" and argued that it is important 
that NATO maintain its ""Open Door"" policy.  SecGen Rasmussen 
observed that, in order to improve NATO-EU cooperation, ""we need to 
solve Cyprus.""  Despite the political challenges, he cited a need 
for arrangements with the EU that make practical cooperation 
possible in theaters such as Afghanistan, where it is vital to 
success. 
 
 
 
8.  (C/NF)  In  side comments following the lunch session, PM 
Harper cautioned SecGen Rasmussen that he saw no NATO role in the 
Arctic.  PM  Harper contended that it is not like Antarctica, in 
that the Arctic is inhabited and largely delineated by defined 
national territory.  It should not be a center for future conflict; 
practical issues such as Search and Rescue are addressed by the 
Arctic Council.  According to PM Harper, Canada has a good working 
relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic, and a NATO 
presence could backfire by exacerbating tensions.  He commented 
that there is no likelihood of Arctic states going to war, but that 
some non-Arctic members favored a NATO role in the Arctic because 
it would afford them influence in an area  where ""they don't 
belong.""   (Note:  Deputy Director Anderson commented to pol/miloff 
that FM Cannon had specifically requested points on NATO and the 
Arctic in preparation for his meeting with Secretary Clinton on 
January 22 in order to underline the importance of the issue to 
Canada. End note) 
JACOBSON