

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06NAIROBI3217, CHARTERHOUSE WHISTLEBLOWER DETAILS MONEY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06NAIROBI3217.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06NAIROBI3217 | 2006-07-26 02:51 | 2011-02-27 23:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.the-star.co.ke/ |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #3217/01 2070251
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260251Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEAWJF/HQ DHS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3228
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASH DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 003217
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
TREASURY PASS TO FINCEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2026
TAGS: KCOR KCRM PREF ECON EFIN KE TZ UG
SUBJECT: CHARTERHOUSE WHISTLEBLOWER DETAILS MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TAX EVASION AND REQUESTS REFUGE IN U.S.
REF: A. A. NAIROBI 2870
¶B. B. NAIROBI 2482
¶C. C. NAIROBI 1688
¶D. D. NAIROBI 1614
Classified By: Charge John F. Hoover for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Kenyan auditor Peter Odhiambo exposed
billions of shillings of tax evasion and money laundering at
his former employer, Charterhouse Bank, by a group of major
companies partly owned by notorious businessman John Mwau and
MP William Kabogo. On July 20, Odhiambo briefed Emboffs on
the details of the scam, and explained he had experienced
death threats and a frightening attempt by some policemen to
serve him with a bogus warrant. Because the people
implicated in the scandal are dangerous and appear to have
bought influence and protection from the GOK, Odhiambo
requested refuge in the U.S. Refugee Officer is prepared to
write an Embassy referral for Odhiambo to DHS for processing
his application for refugee status, and DHS is willing to
interview him. End summary.
Money Laundering and Tax Evasion at Charterhouse Bank
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶2. (C) Peter Odhiambo met with PolOff and EconOff on July
20 to describe his role in exposing massive money laundering
and tax evasion by the Nakumatt Group of companies. (See
reftels for more details.) Odhiambo moved from Barclays Bank
to Charterhouse in May 2003 as the internal auditor. Within
two months, he noticed suspicious transactions in accounts
lacking the customer identification information required by
the Central Bank of Kenya,s (CBK) &Know Your Customer8
regulations. Some accounts also appeared to violate CBK
prudential limits on loans and liquidity. Charterhouse
concealed the violations by manipulating the figures just
before the end of the month submissions were compiled, or
before visits from external or CBK auditors, and then
reverted the figures immediately afterwards. The General
Manager told Odhiambo not to write down anything about the
suspicious accounts in any report the CBK auditors might see.
¶3. (C) Odhiambo examined the suspicious accounts and found
many personal savings accounts with (annual?) turnovers in
excess of Ksh2 billion ($27 million). The transactions
records showed funds were being diverted from Nakumatt
Supermarket and related firms into various personal savings
accounts, presumably to avoid taxes by under-declaring
revenues to the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA). In May 2004,
Odhiambo collected the information on 85 accounts with annual
turnover of about Ksh20 billion ($270 million) and presented
it to the KRA, which promised strict confidentiality to
protect him. KRA however, took no action, and did not give
Odhiambo the 1% reward its newspaper ads promised to
informants who revealed tax fraud.
¶4. (C) Odhiambo identified the companies involved in tax
evasion and money laundering as the five companies in
Nakumatt Holdings: XXXXXXXXXXXX.
(A CBK report also implicated the John Harun Group, Triton
Petroleum, law firm Kariuki Muigua & Co., Pepe Ltd, XXXXXXXXXXXX,
and businessmen William Gitau). Odhiambo stated that, although
six South Asian Kenyans were listed as the owners of Nakumatt
Holdings, some of them were proxy holders of shares actually
owned by John Haroun Mwau and MP William Kabogo,
both of whom have been linked to smuggling XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Odhiambo noticed a deposit of Ksh10 million/day into Nakumatt,s
or Tusker Mattresses, accounts, and he suspected the funds were
smuggling proceeds from Harun Mwau,s container depot
company, Pepe. Odhiambo believes the perpetrators evaded
about Ksh43 billion ($573 million) in taxes, but that KRA has
been purposefully understating the figure.
Whistleblowing is Hazardous in Kenya
------------------------------------
¶5. (C) When KRA made no effort to pursue the fraud and money
laundering at Charterhouse, Odhiambo presented the
information in August to CBK Governor Mullei. Mullei formed
a task force with KRA and the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission (KACC) to investigate Odhiambo,s information.
Odhiambo left Charterhouse in August 2004. In November 2004,
colleagues still at Charterhouse warned him the bank was
aware of his disclosure of information. He began receiving
disquieting calls, but claims he was not offered any bribe
for silence. Odhiambo suspected someone at KACC revealed his
whistleblowing role to Charterhouse. In February 2005,
Mullei offered him a position at CBK advising the task force,
and his situation &quieted down.8 Odhiambo said the task
force confirmed Odhiambo,s information. (Note: Press
reports claimed the Charterhouse Bank Archives were destroyed
in a fire, so it is not clear whether the task force was able
to view the files Odhiambo copied. End note.) Press reports
said CBK fined Charterhouse for violations of the Banking Act
and on March 20, 2006 recommended to the Minister of Finance
that he cancel the bank,s license (ref A). A few days
later, Governor Mullei was charged in court with four counts
of abuse of office, apparently in retaliation for his effort
to indict Charterhouse.
¶6. (C) In an effort to defend himself, Mullei leaked
information on Charterhouse to the press, and Finance
Minister Kimunya was forced to close the bank temporarily to
prevent a run. On July 6, shadow Finance Minister Kerrow
tabled a bootlegged CBK report claiming the Nakumatt Group of
companies had evaded Ksh18 billion of taxes. On July 7, two
men who identified themselves as police officers from the
Central Station confronted Odhiambo at the CBK and ordered
him to accompany them to his house for a search.
Fortunately, the acting CBK Governor demanded to see the
warrant, and rejected it because it was dated July 2005 and
the applicant was no longer the General Manager of
Charterhouse.
¶7. (C) Fearing further police harassment, Odhiambo called
the Daily Nation, which published his story on July 8, and
the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHCR). The head
of the Commission arranged a meeting for Odhiambo on July 11
with Justice Minister Martha Karua, who was concerned by his
story and regretted how &criminals had taken over so much of
the Kenyan Government.8 She advised Odhiambo to write a
letter to Police Commissioner Ali asking him to guarantee his
safety. He sent copies of the letter to Minister Karua,
Finance Minister Kimunya, Internal Security Minister Michuki,
the Attorney General and the CBK Acting Governor to ensure
they were all aware of the effort to use the police to
intimidate or threaten him. Odhiambo never received any
acknowledgment of the letters, nor any protection. Nor have
the CBK, KRA, KACC, or the Ministry of Finance taken any
further action against Charterhouse Bank or the account
holders. The Ministry has not officially released any of the
CBK,s reports on the Charterhouse investigation. A scathing
July 8 press article called into question Finance Minister
Kimunya's credibility in getting to the bottom of the matter,
pointing out a number of critical omissions and deceptions in
the Minister's June 27 statement to Parliament, when he
announced the temporary closure of the bank.
¶8. (C) After the July 8 newspaper stories, Odhiambo said he
began receiving threatening phone calls warning him to leave
Kenya, suspicious people were seen lurking around his house,
and his cell phone may have been bugged. He claimed one of
the Task Force members connected with him has also received
threatening calls. Odhiambo sent his family to the U.S.,
changed his cell phone, and changed his residence twice. He
suspects Mwau and the other businessmen bought protection
from all GOK enforcement agencies by funneling large sums of
money to senior officials to pay for the NARCs constitutional
referendum campaign in November 2005. For example, one
acquaintance at KRA told Odhiambo the KRA Commissioner
receives Ksh5 million/month from Mwau,s group. Odhiambo
fears Mwau, Kabogo and others involved will kill him or
&make him disappear8 both to retaliate and to deter other
potential whistleblowers. He does not believe any GOK agency
will protect him effectively.
Whistleblower Requests Refuge in the U.S.
-----------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Odhiambo therefore requested refuge in the U.S.,
where he would like to study and work in the banking field.
He believes protecting him would demonstrate the USG cares
about corruption in Kenya, protect people in jeopardy, and
shame the GOK into a better recognition of the need to
seriously address corruption. Odhiambo said it would be
dangerous, but he would be willing to return temporarily to
Kenya as a witness, if his testimony in court was needed to
convict the criminals. He said he was considering fleeing
Kenya shortly, with or without arrangements for onward travel
to the U.S. He believed he could travel to a neighboring
country and be safe for a time. Refugee Officer discussed
the possible options and procedures available for refugee
processing. He said he would discuss the issue with the DHS
officer responsible and get back to Odhiambo ASAP.
¶10. (C) Credible contacts familiar with the case, including
XXXXXXXXXXXX and the journalist investigating
the Charterhouse scandal, are unequivocal in lending credibility
to Odhiambo's fears. The believe that Odhiambo, as a low-profile
"small fish", makes a perfect victim through which Mwau and his
accomplices can vent their anger and send a message to other
whistleblowers to lay off. They urge the USG to do whatever it can
do now to assist Odhiambo, both for his own physical safety, and to
send a signal that the U.S. supports whistleblowers on corruption.
¶11. (C) Refugee Coordinator discussed this case with DHS rep
and others within the Mission. The consensus view among
those consulted, as well as Refugee Coordinator's own view,
is that the rarely used in-country DHS interview approach
would not be suitable in this case. However, Refugee
Coordinator is prepared to write an Embassy referral for
Odhiambo should he go to another country, and DHS is willing
to interview him for refugee processing. While Emboffs do
not advise anyone to become a refugee, we will let Odhiambo
know when he contacts us again that should he depart Kenya,
we will arrange an interview for him. Odhiambo has been out
of contact since July 20, and Emboffs are concerned about his
safety.
Comment
---------
¶12. (C) Odhiambo,s story is credible. It fits well with
information from other sources about Harun Mwau, Nakumatt,
and the others implicated in the Charterhouse scandal (see
reftels). We believe he has a well-founded fear of being
injured or killed. The perpetrators would most likely be
thugs working for John Harun Mwau and his accomplices, but we
can't rule out that corrupt police or security officers would
do the job. In any event, Odhiambo cannot expect GOK
protection given the strong ties we believe Mwau enjoys at
all levels of the Kenyan government. MP William Kabogo, if
he is involved as now alleged, also has a reputation for
being a ruthless businessman. Like Mwau, he got rich by
means of a large-scale smuggling operation in Mombasa. He is
believed by many to be behind the New Years Eve murder of a
CID officer investigating smuggling there. Given the stakes
involved (penalties that could reach roughly $1.3 billion,
plus potential criminal charges and prison) they have both
the incentive and the track record to make an example out of
Odhiambo through violent means.
¶13. (C) Although the GOK recently passed a Whistleblower
Protection Act, the recent death from pneumonia and in
poverty of Goldenberg whistleblower David Munyakei
demonstrates the neglect and lack of protection the GOK
provides. Odhiambo,s story and concerns sound realistic. A
DHS visit to a neighboring country could be arranged
relatively quickly, allowing DHS to make a refugee status
determination in short order, if Odhiambo chooses that route.
HOOVER