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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BOGOTA974, URIBE DEPLOYS TRUSTED LIEUTENANTS FOR REELECTION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BOGOTA974 | 2009-03-20 22:22 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/wikileaks/articulo-265440-santos-sin-carisma-vargas-lleras-sin-control-jose-obdulio-gaviri |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0974/01 0792222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 202222Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7893
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8753
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1865
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7184
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3249
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7910
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000974
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF CO
SUBJECT: URIBE DEPLOYS TRUSTED LIEUTENANTS FOR REELECTION
DRIVE
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) President Uribe has not said he intends to seek a
third term in office, but his allies--with his support--are
pushing hard for a constitutional change that would give him
the option. Uribe has deployed trusted lieutenants to
consolidate his control over coalition political parties and
block potential rivals. Former Peace Commissioner Restrepo
will take over the U Party, former Environment Minister
Lozano worked behind the scenes to undercut reelection
opponent and Cambio Radical leader German Vargas Lleras, and
former Agricultural Minister Andres Arias and Uribe acolyte
leads the polls in the Conservative Party. Presidential
Communications director Jorge Eastman said that unlike in
December, all of the Uribista parties now support reelection.
He predicted that the constitutional reform process would be
"neither easy nor pretty," but said the latest polls show
solid public support for reelection. End Summary.
URIBE WANTS REELECTION OPTION AVAILABLE
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) President Alvaro Uribe has not yet said if he intends
to run for a third term, but Presidential Communications
director Jorge Eastman told us he wants the option available
and has deployed trusted political lieutenants to make the
required constitutions reform happen. Long-time Uribe
advisor Jose ObdulioGaviria told us he left his position at
the palace in March to lead the third term push. He is
committed to reelection, because he believes there is no
viable alternative to Uribe. Gaviria said Defense Minister
Juan Manuel Santos has no political judgement or charisma;
Cambio Radical leader German Vargas Lleras cannot even
control his own party; and former Agriculture Minister Andres
Arias lacks intellectual heft. He said the Uribista
coalition remains a disparate group of individual political
leaders with no commitment beyond their opportunistic support
for Uribe. Without the president, the coalition would fall
apart.
URIBE RETAKES CONTROL OF COALITION PARTIES
------------------------------------------
3 (C) In addition to Gaviria, several other Uribe confidants
left government in March with the mission of solidifying
Uribe's control over the individual coalition parties and
blocking moves by potential rivals. Luis Carlos Restrepo
left his job as Peace Commissioner, and is set to be elected
as president of the U Party in March. Restrepo told us he
discussed his strategy with Uribe and intends to use the
position to build a new, unified Uribista party (with the
exception of the Conservatives) and to push for Uribe's
reelection. Restrepo said he would consider running for
Congress, and would also focus on increasing Uribe's
majorities in the 2010 congressional elections. The goal
would be to win 60 of 102 Senate seats and 100 of 166 House
seats.
¶4. (C) Restrepo told us he did not coordinate his plans with
Defense Minister and former U Party founder Santos. Though
Santos voiced public support for Restrepo's leadership bid, U
Party Senator and current Party President Carlos Ferro told
us Santos is fuming over the move. Santos had intended to
use the U Party for his own candidacy, and Restrepo's success
in taking control of the party showed how easily Santos could
be "outmaneuvered." U Party Senator and presidential
candidate Martha Lucia Ramirez also resigned from the Senate
and U Party on March 17. She said she would continue to
support Uribe, but could not remain in the party due to its
unfair rules for choosing its candidate. Her resignation
removes another reelection opponent from the party.
¶5. (C) Uribe also moved to split the most independent of the
coalition parties, Cambio Radical. Environment Minister and
Cambio member Juan Lozano resigned on March 11, and then
worked behind the scenes during the March 14-16 Cambio
Radical Party Congress to advance Uribe's reelection bid. At
the Congress, Cambio reversed its previous opposition to a
2010 Uribe run, dealing a major blow to Vargas Lleras who has
consistently tried to block a third Uribe term. Cambio
Senator Nancy Gutierrez told us Vargas Lleras was forced to
back down, since most party members support Uribe. Eastman
said Vargas Lleras' defeat shows that most Uribista
legislators--many of whom are only in Congress due to the
parapolitical scandal--see no future for themselves without
Uribe, leading them to back a second reelection bid. Unlike
in December, he added, the Uribista parties now fully support
the president.
¶6. (C) Uribe strengthened his position in the other key
coalition party--the Conservatives--by supporting former
Agricultural Minister and Uribe acolyte Andres Arias, also
known as "Uribito," in his presidential campaign. Arias
leads in polling on a Conservative Party primary, but has
made clear he will end his campaign immediately if Uribe opts
to run again. In the past, Conservative Party leaders had
voiced their intention to run their own candidate in the 2010
presidential elections. Former President Andres Pastrana has
also discussed the need for the party to assert its
independence from Uribe--a shift which the success of Arias'
candidacy makes highly unlikely.
POLLS SHOW STRONG SUPPORT FOR REELECTION
----------------------------------------
¶7. (U) A recent Gallup poll showed wide support for Uribe's
reelection, though several difficult steps remain in the
process to change the constitution to allow a third term.
Gallup reported that 71% of those polled would either likely
or definitely turnout for a reelection referendum, and 80% of
that group said they would vote for reelection. Pollster
Jorge Londono told us those numbers would be enough to pass a
reelection referendum--as well as to meet the required
turnout of 25 percent of registered voters (approximately 7.2
million voters)--if the vote were held today. He noted that
despite Colombia's economic downturn, voters appear to
understand that the slowdown reflect a global crisis, not a
local problem, and do not blame Uribe. This could change if
Colombia's economic problems continue to deepen.
LEGAL STEPS REMAIN TO ALLOW REELECTION
--------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Eastman told us that despite Uribe's strong support
in Congress, obtaining passage of the required constitutional
reform will be "neither easy nor pretty." The bill to change
the constitution to allow reelection will be considered in
April in the Senate in the third and fourth of four required
votes to pass the measure. Senate President Hernan Andrade
told us the Senate will try to modify the bill's existing
language to make clear that Uribe can run again in 2010.
Most observers think the language passed in the House in 2008
would only allow for a 2014 run. If passed in the final two
Senate votes with new language allowing a 2010 bid, the
measure would then move to a House-Senate conference
committee to be reconciled. Eastman said the multiple votes
would offer legislators numerous opportunities to seek
presidential favors.
¶9. (C) Moreover, Eastman noted that House President German
Varon (Cambio Radical) opposes a third term for Uribe, and is
a close Vargas Lleras ally. He will name the House
representatives to the conference committee, and could use
his power to kill or delay the reelection bill. Still, this
would be difficult given the results of the recent Cambio
Radical Congress.Varon said Uribistas have been quietly
pushing investigations against him in the hope of finding
cause to seek his removal as House president. Supreme
Judicial Council Magistrate Angelino Lizcano told us Uribe
allies could also legally delay conference committee action
until July when a new House president takes office. Once
approved in Congress, the measure would move to the
Constitutional Court for approval and then to the referendum.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY: ABSTAIN
----------------------------
10 (C) Former President and Liberal Party Chief Cesar Gaviria
agreed Uribe wants a third term, but said his original
"F.D.R. 1940 nomination by popular acclaim" strategy had not
worked. Still, he said Uribe could still pull off
reelection with a hard push. If Uribe succeeded in amending
the constitution, he would be the heavy, odds-on favorite to
win. As shown by the support of former Liberal Senator
Rodrigo Rivera and twenty-two current sitting Liberal Party
legislators for Uribe's Democratic Security Policy, the
president commands substantial backing even within the
opposition Liberals. Liberal Party Senator Juan Cristo and
Polo Party President Carlos Gaviria told us the opposition's
best hope to block a third Uribe term would be an abstention
campaign which prevented Uribe from meeting the required 25%
turnout in the referendum.
NICHOLS
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