

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05PARIS7835, ANALYZING THE CIVIL UNREST -- THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS7835.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS7835 | 2005-11-17 17:19 | 2010-12-01 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
171719Z Nov 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 007835
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: ANALYZING THE CIVIL UNREST -- THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
REF: A. (A) PARIS 7682 AND PREVIOUS
¶B. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR OCTOBER 28 -
NOVEMBER 16 (PARIS SIPRNET SITE)
¶C. (C) PARIS 7527
Classified By: Pol/MC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The perpetrators of the urban rampaging
(refs) in France are by and large of Arab-African and
Black-African background. In most cases, they are also
Muslims, raising the question as to what extent their
religious affiliation helps explain the explosion in France's
immigrant suburbs. There is widespread agreement that
unemployment and lack of education, and not religious
affiliation, are the primary factors underlying the angry
hopelessness of urban youth. That said, responsible
commentators on the situation -- from officials who monitor
potential support for terrorist activities to rights
activists with long experience working in troubled
neighborhoods -- see religious affiliation as a complicating
factor. Thus far most of the youths in question, while
happening to be Muslim by culture, are generally not viewed
as individually inspired by Islam, just as Islamic political
groupings are generally not viewed as being directly behind
the violence. Observers note, however, that these groups
have not hesitated to try to exploit the unrest for their own
purposes, just as extremist and nativist politicians on the
far-right have played to racism and xenophobic fears. The
government's decision to turn to Muslim leaders to quell the
unrest is itself seen by some as misdirected and a bad
precedent, in contradiction with the French republic's strict
secularism. In sum, while efforts to politicize the unrest
are seen as unsuccessful to date, there is concern that not
"getting it right" in dealing with the problems of France's
underclass Muslims could eventually produce the very Islamic
extremism identity that (almost) no one wants. End summary.
No direct links to Islamic extremism
------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Though it has carefully watched for it, the French
Government has not discerned any significant link between
Islamic extremism and the recent unrest. As Christophe
Chaboud, head of the Ministry of Interior's counter-terrorism
coordination body (known by its French acronym - UCLAT),
categorically reconfirmed to PolOff on November 15, "we (the
GoF) have not found any link between Islamic extremists and
those fomenting the unrest. He acknowledged that police and
internal intelligence organizations have received "a few"
signs that some Islamic extremists have participated in the
violence. That said, he believed that they were acting as
individuals and not as members of a coordinated, Islamic
group.
Fears of extremist and criminal exploitation
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Chaboud reported that GoF monitoring of websites and
blogs (in France and abroad) nonetheless reveals that
extremists are trying to exploit the unrest to their
advantage, claiming (for example) that it results from GOF
attempts to control and muzzle Islam in France. Asked
whether there was any connection between organized criminal
gangs and Islamic extremists in exploiting the unrest,
Chaboud said those in the "revolt movement" were, at most,
only petty criminals. Indeed, police are quoted in press as
observing that where organized crime is strongest is often
where there has been, counter to conventional expectations,
little unrest, presumably because drug-selling organizations
view burning cars as bad for business. (See also ref C for
the views of a investigating judge on the connection between
criminality and current unrest.)
Just hoodlums?
--------------
¶4. (SBU) Samira Cadasse, vice-president of a leading women's
rights group that focuses on empowering women in poor
immigrant communities, told PolOff that the small groups of
youths responsible for car burnings and police taunting are
the same ones who "hold hostage" suburban housing projects
throughout France. Cadasse's NGO -- "Ni Putes Ni Soumises
(NPNS -- translated literally as "Neither Whores nor
Submissives") focuses on the difficulties poor, often Muslim
women of immigrant background face in resisting
discrimination from French society as well as oppression
within their own cultural traditions. Cadasse said NPNS has
tried to highlight for years the way frustrated, angry,
aimless young men in poor neighborhoods, under the blind eye
of French authorities, visit their powerlessness first and
foremost on their female relatives.
Or "Islamic" hoodlums?
----------------------
¶5. (SBU) Contrary to much of the media reporting, Cadasse
said she definitely also perceived an Islamist element behind
some of the violence. Exclaiming that, "we all know who
these guys are," she claimed they had shaved their (Islamic)
beards in order to spread violence. These unemployed
Islamist youths were the same troublemakers who had sought to
repress women in the troubled suburban neighborhoods. She
also believed it significant that there were no girls among
the troublemakers. That said, while Cadasse clearly believed
that the misapplication of tenets some attribute to Islam
abets the widespread oppression of women in these immigrant
communities, she stopped well short of calling the "big
brothers" committed Islamist fundamentalists.
No role models or jobs
----------------------
¶6. (SBU) Cadasse identified lack of jobs as the real root of
the problem, which was compounded by the relative generosity
of the social safety net. As a result, young men sat idle at
home, while receiving a generous -- but ultimately
insufficient and humiliating -- 950-euro stipend from the
government. They could not afford to move away from their
parents, but at the same time accepted no parental control.
She did not think it accurate to portray these youths as
victims; these young men were guilty of arson and other
crimes and should be punished. At the same time, she thought
it would be difficult to break the vicious cycle. Cadasse
saw the current crisis -- due to larger failures and
shortfalls in education, employment opportunities and housing
-- as very difficult to resolve, and doubted that the
government had the will do go beyond the "Band-Aid" solutions
employed in the past.
30 years of "ghettoization"
---------------------------
¶7. (SBU) According to Cadasse, the government's history of
treating only the symptoms rather than the causes of minority
unemployment and social exclusion, and its failure to curb a
thirty-year ghettoization trend among French immigrant
communities, "has been an error" of governments of both left
and right. Cadasse was pessimistic about the prospects of
bettering the circumstances of France's immigrants of Arab
background. She said that overall, "we're no better off than
22 years ago" -- at the time of the "march of the beurs" -- a
turning point in North African immigrant activism. While she
did not envision a "Marshall plan" for France's
inner-city-like suburbs, she believed that "drastic measures"
were necessary nonetheless. PM de Villepin's pledge to
reverse the budget cuts to associations (like NPNS) and to
offer a range of other social program enhancements was a
positive start. Government funding was also critical for
secular NGOs like NPNS to combat the influence of Islamists.
But she doubted the government had the will to stay the
course. In her view, it was too tempting for the government
to focus on security in an attempt to appeal to
far-right-leaning voters in the upcoming presidential
election.
¶8. (SBU) Comment: French NGOs are largely dependent on
government support, and typically receive 80 percent or more
of their funding from the state. These associations are
essential to holding together the social fabric of poor
neighborhoods, providing everything from food kitchens to
tutoring to psychological support activities. Soon after
President Chirac's re-election in 2002, the state financing
of these associations was cut severely. Prime Minister
Villepin last week promised to restore the cuts. The
government appears to understand that diminishing the
viability of these secular, state-funded charitable
organization risks a vacuum that could be filled by home
grown, Islamist self-help organizations. End Comment.
GOF guilty of using religion?
-----------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Interestingly, some see the government itself as
guilty to some degree of having violated the principle of
secularism it holds so dear. In a meeting with the rector of
the Grand Mosque of Lyon on November 15, one Muslim religious
leader's criticized the government for violating France's
strict separation of the religious and the public. The
Rector, Kamel Kabtane, took to task the government's effort
to use Muslim religious figures to calm the situation in
troubled neighborhoods. Kabtane said that many of his
fellow-clerics were also ambivalent about the French
government's call on religious leaders to "do the work of the
government and security forces." "If farmers started
protesting", said the Rector, "the government wouldn't call
on the Archbishop to resolve the situation." He warned
against attributing a religious dimension to socio-economic
problems; there was a risk it could become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Better ecumenical than Muslim-only
----------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) Kabtane went on to point out that, "the government
says that France is a secular state, but then -- when it
serves its purposes to do so -- it turns around and calls on
religious leaders to solve non-religious problems that the
secular state should have been addressing over the last 20-30
years." Kabtane has not issued a statement condemning the
violence or calling upon the perpetrators to stop, as he
believes it is important not to conflate the actions of
violent youths with Islam. If religious leaders are to be
involved, he believes it would be preferable to adopt an
ecumenical rather than a sectarian approach. To that end, he
was organizing a meeting of religious leaders from the
Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities in Lyon on November
¶16. His aim was to convince those present to issue a joint
statement condemning the violence and calling for it to end.
The risk of an anti-Muslim backlash
-----------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) Kabtane indicated that he was much more worried
about backlash against Muslims following on the recent unrest
than about any putative use of the unrest by fundamentalists.
On November 12, a Molotov cocktail was thrown over the wall
into the Grand Mosque of Lyon. Then on November 13, someone
threw a Molotov cocktail over the wall of a mosque in
Saint-Chamond (a town near Lyon). Kabtane said that Muslims
were paying the price for the fact that French politicians --
and foreign media -- have blamed the violence on "Muslims"
and "immigrants" instead of on "unemployed" or
"underprivileged" youths. (Comment: We have now heard
reports of a handful of such attacks against mosques. In all
likelihood, they were perpetrated by right-wing,
anti-immigrant nativists. End Comment.) Kabtane added that
he was satisfied with the demonstrations of support he had
received from French authorities in the wake of the attack on
the mosque. The local prefect visited the site the following
morning, and Interior Minister Sarkozy had telephoned Kabtane
to offer support.
The French school system as the key
-----------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) During a public affairs talk show on the evening
of November 13, conservative philosopher Alain Finkelkraut
addressed how "the Republic" could reclaim the troubled,
inner-city-like neighborhoods "lost" to both law and order
and social integration. Finkelkraut poetically evoked his
experience in France's public school system, stressing its
role in separating youths from surrounding society in order
better to inculcate the values that underpin the "Republican
ideal" of equal citizenship blind to race, nationality,
religion and social class. Finkelkraut lamented the way
"society had invaded the schools," bringing with it a raft of
demands, identities, exceptions and resentments that, taken
together, interfered with the inculcation of a shared
national identity. In Finkelkraut's view, taking back the
neighborhoods for "Republican" law and order was the lesser
half of the battle. Providing, to those most removed from
the possibility of it, the convictions and opportunities
required for successfully integrating into French society was
the more difficult, and most urgent challenge, facing France
today.
Otherwise sectarianism could follow
-----------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) Finkelkraut warned that failure to meet this
challenge would inevitably open the door to the ascendancy of
separate, alternative identities focused on religion.
Controversial Islamic activist Tarik Ramadan, who also
participated in the round-table discussion, indirectly
confirmed as much. Turning around the image of "the Republic
needing to take back the neighborhoods", Ramadan, unctuously,
but deftly, argued for the right of "the neighborhoods" --
their cultures, identities, religion, etc. -- to "take the
Republic."
The French fear of "communitarism"
----------------------------------
¶14. (SBU) Former Prime Minister Alain Juppe -- spending a
semester teaching in Canada -- posted a long piece to his
blog (www.al1jup.com) that clearly identified "Islam in
France," specifically "radical Islam," as a factor also
"responsible" for the current unrest. In Juppe's view,
"French Islam's" refusal -- so far -- to "solemnly proclaim"
its acceptance of the "separation of the temporal from the
spiritual" and its recognition of "non-negotiable, universal
human rights" (including gender equality) contributes to the
difficulty of integrating those who live in the neighborhoods
where radical Islam presents itself as an alternative model
for social organization.
Comment
-------
¶15. (SBU) The gangs of underclass youths who are the
perpetrators of the car burnings and urban violence in France
are not Islamists, nor are they at all motivated by religion.
It is highly misleading to characterize them -- as is often
done in media coverage -- as "insurgent" and "Muslim" youths.
The anger felt by these youths stems from how they are
trapped and without a future -- facing pervasive racial
prejudice, and without the skills and education needed to
get-a-life of employment and conventional respect.
¶16. (SBU) That said, the dominant religion in France's
low-income housing projects affected by the recent violence
is Islam, and there are those intent on "saving" these
communities from their social ills by re-founding them on
religious, as opposed to secular, principles, in effect
filling the vacuum where French republican values have failed
to take root. Whether or not Islamic organizations and
fundamentalist proselytizing will make significant inroads
among the inhabitants of France's immigrant suburbs of course
depends on the effectiveness of the GOF's social programs and
the willingness of French society at large to face up to its
pervasive prejudices against Blacks and Arabs.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton