

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI6804, INDIA WALKING IRAN TIGHTROPE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI6804.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05NEWDELHI6804 | 2005-09-02 14:39 | 2011-03-15 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1538155.ece |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006804
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG PBTS IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA WALKING IRAN TIGHTROPE
REF: A. NEW DELHI 6485 B. NEW DELHI 5615 C. 04 NEW DELHI 2556
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: As Natwar Singh travels to Tehran September 2 to meet the new regime, India's overriding goal is securing energy, followed by preserving access to Afghanistan, maintaining influence in what India perceives as a swing state in the debate over Islam, and advancing other business relationships. Growing international unease about Iran's nuclear ambitions and long-standing relationships with terrorist organizations are subordinated to India's realpolitik interests in Iran. New Delhi hopes statements in the IAEA and elsewhere encouraging Iran in the right direction will appease other partners (especially the US) without upsetting its ties with Tehran. The GOI has clammed up about the August 30 visit of Tehran's nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, with normally open interlocutors protesting ignorance of his message. India needs good relations with Washington and Tehran, and hopes to avoid being forced to choose between the two. End Summary.
Balancing Interests in Iran: Pipeline Trumps
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) India is engaged in a risky balancing act in its Iran policies. While the GOI has no illusions about Iran's nuclear ambitions or support for terrorism, these concerns are subordinate in its foreign policy and economic considerations. New Delhi does, however, fear the consequences of being forced to choose between Iran and the US or other western countries if the nuclear standoff escalates. Against this danger, India sees Iran as an enormous actual and potential energy supplier, and a balancing power on Pakistan's opposite border. Thus, Indian policy tries to advance its interests with Tehran, appease the West, and largely ignore the looming crises.
¶3. (C) To this end, New Delhi hosted the visit of Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, for talks August 30. Larijani sought support for Iran's IAEA position in meetings with Natwar Singh and NSA Narayanan. Larijani told the press that he sought India's help in the IAEA on Iran's nuclear program, insisted Iran was fully committed to international regulations related to the nuclear field, and reported that the focus of his talks was expanding ""strategic relations and partnership"" with India on energy, including the planned $7 billion, 1800 mile natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India and the recently-agreed deal to export liquefied natural gas to India. Star News foreign affairs editor Jyoti Malhotra told us September 2 that the pipeline deal is moving fast. Larijani told IRNA upon his arrival in Tehran that the modalities of Pakistan transit were a key element of his New Delhi talks.
MEA: Iran a Lower Priority
--------------------------
¶4. (C) In this context, USG concerns with Iran (WMD programs and support for terrorism) remain largely unaddressed in GOI policy-making in part because they are hidden under two levels of neglect from decision makers. First, Iran is the third priority in the MEA division tasked with overseeing the relationships with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, Natwar Singh's reaction when the Ambassador raised Iran with him on August 23 (Ref A) suggested strongly that the Minister was unaware of the coincidence between his visit to Tehran and the next IAEA report. Second, Iran's attraction for Indian foreign policy is primarily as a source of oil and natural gas, and not out of any ideological affinity. Iran's role as a gateway to Afghanistan, a neighbor to play off of Pakistan, and a swing state in the Muslim world are also important. Although the GOI acknowledges international worries about Iran's nuclear deceit and support for terrorism, it has limited itself in public to anodyne suggestions encouraging Iran to clear up problems through dialogue with the IAEA. In private we understand the GOI approached Iran at the UK's behest to urge a positive reply to the latest EU-3 offer.
MEA Statements on Iran
----------------------
¶5. (SBU) GOI interlocutors have been mum on the content of Larijani's New Delhi visit, but MEA spokesman Navtej Sarna previewed for the media the FM's September 2-4 Tehran trip on September 1 and took questions on Larijani's visit. Sarna refused to comment on Iran's IAEA and EU-3 negotiations, even avoiding the standard GOI encouragement for Iran to comply with its NPT obligations. Sarna declined to answer whether India had consulted with the US, or to discuss the nuclear matter further. He also avoided questions on India's view of a role for the NAM in the IAEA or EU-3 negotiations.
¶6. (C) In the absence of the regional Joint Secretary (accompanying the FM to Tehran), A/DCM called J/S (Americas) S Jaishankar to express concern about the forgiving tone of Sarna's briefing, noting that in the past GOI officials have been clear about the requirement for Iran to live up to its NPT obligations. At this juncture in the EU-3 process, we have stressed, it is important that Indian actions and statements not give the impression of forgiving Iran. Jaishankar reported that he had discussed Iran with the Foreign Minister, who indicated that he would rather not conduct India's Iran diplomacy ""in the glare of the public spotlight."" The J/S added that both Natwar and Foreign Secretary Saran would want Iran to be a priority topic of
SIPDIS discussion during meetings with the Secretary and U/S Burns on the margins of UNGA.
Domestic (NAM and Shia Muslim) Considerations
---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Domestic opinion continues to influence GOI policy toward Iran. The UPA government derives a significant portion of its support from the Left Front and Congress factions who view Iran as a plucky developing nation holding out against Western imperialism. Although we do not believe this view prevails among senior GOI officials, who strongly oppose Iran developing nuclear weapons and recognize the threat this will pose to Indian interests, it does constrain their ability to speak out publicly against their fellow NAM member and be seen as siding with the United States. An op-ed by a reliably anti-American reporter for the Hindu on September 1 encouraged the GOI to stand by Iran as the ""litmus test"" of India's willingness to pursue an ""independent"" foreign policy.
¶8. (C) Additionally, Iran sees itself as a protector of Shia around the world, including some 13 million in India. The Iranian Embassy is very active in Shia cities like Lucknow, and our Shia interlocutors have told us that they expect the new Ahmadinejad regime in Iran to be more active in trying to whip up anti-American sentiment among Indian Muslims (Ref B). This religious appeal will also restrict the leeway of the UPA government to be seen siding with the US, as the UPA came to power promising to improve India's relations with the Muslim world. These domestic sentiments (which Iran played up with its appeal to involve the NAM in the nuclear negotiations) will be a thorn in the side, forcing the GOI leadership to make difficult choices as it calibrates its public approach to Iran.
The Middle Neighbors: Pakistan and Afghanistan
--------------------------------------------- -
¶9. (C) India's ties to Iran have a Pakistan and Afghanistan dimension as well. India sees Iran as a useful power with which to cooperate to encircle Pakistan, although it recognizes that Tehran aligns with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, and has in the past protested India's treatment of Muslims (Ref C). Iran, desiring Indian business and suffering its own strained relations with Pakistan, appears deliberately to have toned down its earlier comments on Muslims in order to maintain good relations with India. The outcome of both parties' balancing is a politely cordial but shallow commonality of interests.
¶10. (C) Iran's importance to India is greatly enhanced by Pakistan's unwillingness to grant transit rights to Indian goods moving to Afghanistan. Helping Afghanistan is a top Indian foreign policy goal. Iran is India's least expensive alternative entry point to reach Afghanistan and Central Asian markets, leading to the Indian commitment to expand the Chabahar port and build roads from there to Afghanistan. However, the MEA has complained to us that Iran has been less than helpful to India in providing access to Afghanistan and support (supplies and fuel) for India's Afghan reconstruction efforts.
Hoping to Duck a Confrontation Between Useful Partners
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶11. (C) Ultimately, although formal India-Iran relations are cordial, they remain prickly and ultimately self-serving. Retired Ambassador to Iran Hamid Ansari, now a member of the Prime Minister's National Security Advisory Board, agreed that India's policy has always been based on hard national security interests, despite all the talk of brotherly relations. What is clear is that the elites in New Delhi do not want to have to choose sides between Tehran and Washington. India has so far publicly supported our stance on Iran's NPT obligations while desperately hoping to avoid any vote in the IAEA that would force it to come out publicly in favor of one capital over the other. Indian policy is informed by a hard-nosed realpolitik calculus, but reflects a hope that Washington may one day adopt a modus vivendi with Tehran, at which stage India would position itself to help build bridges between its two partners.
What We Can Do to Try to Alter the Dynamic
------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) If the two main areas of Indian interest (energy and Central Asian access) were to disappear, India would have much less glue left in its relations with Tehran. Despite our commitments, the USG cannot solve India's energy needs immediately, but we do have an opportunity to try to eliminate the attraction of access via Iran to Central Asia by helping convince Pakistan to allow Indian transit to Afghanistan (septel).
¶13. (C) The mixed signals from the GOI (including the near simultaneous acceptance of our Iran briefing team, Larijani's New Delhi visit, and dispatching FM Singh to Tehran) illustrate India's continued efforts to straddle the fence. We should continue to make clear to New Delhi our view that turning a blind eye to Iran's nuclear ambitions out of NAM-centric motivations will not help India's relations with us or with Iran in the long run. The GOI realizes that coming down on either side of the fence will involve painful choices; we need to help soften the impact of sticking with us by eliminating India's need for Iran to advance its Afghan policy and achieve energy security. Without these two linchpins, India's affinity for Iran could fade, and a potential major irritant in our relations with India might subside.
¶14. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi)
MULFORD