

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ROME558, G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ROME558.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME558 | 2009-05-20 08:19 | 2011-03-18 11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO9669
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #0558/01 1400819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200819Z MAY 09 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2090
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4560
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3631
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0043
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3820
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4822
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000558
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR ENERGY SECRETARY CHU
DOE ALSO FOR A/S DAVID SANDALOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: ENRG EPET OVIP PREL IR RU IT
SUBJECT: G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
Classified By: CHARGE ELIZABETH DIBBLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Your 23-25 May visit to Rome will provide
opportunities to interact with senior Italian officials on
priority USG energy issues. On European energy security,
Italy's very close relationship with Russia often causes it
to resist efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy
sources. We hope you can urge a broader reevaluation of
energy sources and technologies. In particular, Italy's
decision to return to nuclear power will -- if carried out --
reduce this dependence; you should raise worrisome
indications that U.S. firms will be unfairly denied the
opportunity to participate in this multi-billion dollar
project. Italy is a laggard in the EU on the use of
renewable energy, but its market may grow the most in the
near future. You can support the use of U.S. technology in
this area. Italy's parastatal energy company Eni is active
in Iran and wants to expand its operation in that country;
the USG is strongly opposed to this expansion of ""business as
usual"" at a time when Iran is continuing its own nuclear
program in defiance of UN and IAEA requirements that it
sustpend enrichment activities.
¶2. (C/NF) Because of the strong influence of organized
crime, Italian seaports are vulnerable to use for the
shipment of illicit nuclear materials. DOE's Megaports
program could significantly reduce this threat, but at least
two USG efforts to launch Megaports in Italy have faltered
owing to Italian red tape. We would like to make another big
push on this high USG priority, and your intervention could
be critical in getting high-level Italian support for this
effort. End Summary.
INTERACTION WITH ITALIAN POLICY MAKERS
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) During the 23-25 May 2009 G8 Energy Ministerial
in Rome, you will have at least one bilateral meeting with
Claudio Scajola, the Italian cabinet minister with
responsibility for energy affairs. This meeting, and other
potential side meetings with Italian officials during the
Ministerial are key opportunities to press a number of top
USG energy concerns with the Berlusconi government.
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
-----------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's close personal
ties with Vladimir Putin and the very strong corporate ties
between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom
often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce
Europe's dependence on Russian energy. That dependence has
been reflected in Italian policy vis--vis Russia. The
Italian government has been overtly apologetic for Russian
power projection in its so-called Near Abroad - notably
against Georgia last August. Italy opposes further expansion
of NATO, and, finally, Italy's energy policy too often
reflects Russian, rather than European, priorities. For
example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about
the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while ENI is poised to
help GAZPROM construct Black Sea and Baltic Sea pipelines
that will deepen EU's dependence on Russia. ENI, 30 percent
owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy
policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU
energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some
steps in the right direction: the Turkey-Greece-Italy
pipeline project could bring Europe gas from the Caspian, and
Liquid Natural Gas projects promise further diversification.
It would be helpful if you could raise with Italian officials
long-standing USG concerns about European energy security,
emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around
Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity
of energy sources, routes and technologies.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
--------------
¶5. (C) Minister Scajola announced in May 2008 that Italy
would pursue the start of construction of new nuclear power
ROME 00000558 002.4 OF 003
plants by the end of the current legislature (2013). The
uncertain cost of fossil fuels, the need to meet emission
targets, and a desire for greater energy security appear to
be the motives behind this return to nuclear power (Note:
Italy's previous nuclear power plants were decommissioned
after the Chernobyl accident led to a series of three
referenda in 1987 that had the practical effect of banning
nuclear power generation. End Note) Solid government
majorities in both chambers of parliament should facilitate
the passage of legislation to address the issues of nuclear
waste and plant siting. These issues, however, are likely to
remain thorny problems for the GOI. U.S.-based companies
Westinghouse and GE are interested in selling their nuclear
power plant technology to Italy, but they face stiff
competition from foreign rivals whose governments are heavily
lobbying the GOI. For example, intense French pressure,
possibly involving corrupt payments to GOI officials, led the
way for the February agreement by Italian and French
electricity parastatals ENEL and EdF to form a 50-50
consortium to build nuclear power plants in Italy and
elsewhere. The agreement foresees the construction of four
French Areva design nuclear plants in Italy by 2020 and,
more disturbingly for U.S. firms, may establish French
nuclear technology as the standard for Italy's return to
nuclear power. The GOI has assured us that GE and
Westinghouse can still compete for nuclear business, as Italy
intends to build up to 10 plants as part of its energy
security plan. Post continues to work for a level-playing
field for U.S. companies (see ref A). You could usefully
underline to Italian officials that we expect U.S. firms to
be given a fair opportunity to bid for contracts in Italy's
nuclear power program. You might also note that Italian
behavior since February has produced the impression that
other bidders -- including U.S. firms -- ""need not apply.""
LIMITED BUT GROWING USE OF RENEWABLES
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Although Italy has some of the most generous
subsidies for renewable energy in Europe, more solar energy
is produced in gloomy Germany than in sunny Italy. Experts
attribute this to NIMBYism and difficulties in dealing with
Italian bureaucracy, noting that the premium that Italians
pay for renewable energy subsidies compared to Germans can
even be considered a quantitative measure of the cost of
Italian red tape. That said, Italy is now attracting
attention as a growing renewables market, as Germany and
Spain rein in their subsidies, and Italy's remain in place$wQz!4k2Q)CQgIQj'Qthe Laboratory to the Market.""
TRYING AGAIN ON DOE's MEGAPORTS
----------------------------
¶7. (C) With seaports, particularly those in southern Italy
under the influence of organized crime, it is especially
important that Italy be included in DOE's Megaports project.
Italian ports send large numbers of containers to the United
States, and some Italian ports are major transhipment
centers. In 2007 about 3 million containers were shipped
from or through Gioia Tauro, probably the port of most
concern owing to organized crime influence. Among these were
40,000 shipments to the U.S. (See Reftels C and D.)
Megaports would provide a critically important safeguard that
might prevent the shipment to the United States of nuclear
materials by terrorists. The USG has tried twice before to
launch Megaports in Italy -- on both occasions our efforts
were thwarted by the Italian bureaucracy. The GOI showed
little enthusiasm for the project, and consistently failed to
name a senior ""point person"" for implementation. As a
result, Megaports-Italy was crushed by Italian interagency
squabbling and red tape. We
are set to make another major push on this critical USG
priority. In order to avoid the pitfalls that killed our
ROME 00000558 003.10 OF 003
earlier efforts, we are seeking early, high-level GOI buy-in.
We want the GOI, at very senior level, to commit to
Megaports implementation, and to formally designate an
Italian cabinet minister who will be responsible for
implementation.
¶8. (C) Your meeting with Minister Scajola represents an
important opportunity to move Megaports forward in Italy.
Scajola is one of the GOI's most powerful Ministers, and is
considered personally close to Prime Minister Berlusconi. We
recommend that you tell Minister Scajola that nuclear
materials security is a top priority of the Obama
administration, and that Megaports represents an important
opportunity for Italy to do something tangible in support of
President Obama's efforts to protect the world from nuclear
terrorism. You may also wish to point out that Megaports
will help Italian ports meet the requirement for 100 percent
radiation screening (by 2012) of all U.S.-bound containers;
without Megaports, Italian ports could lose business to
competing European ports that are currently implementing
Megaports. For the Berlusconi government to take this issue
seriously, key Italian officials must hear this directly from
Washington, particularly from yourself.
IRAN
----
¶9. (C) You should be aware that Italian parastatal energy
company Eni is active in Iran, and is currently considering
an expansion of its operations in that country. On May 18,
Eni officials broached the possibility of this expansion with
USG officials in Washington and were told that the USG
strongly opposes any such expansion.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKDROP
----------------------------
¶10. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi continues to enjoy
record popularity numbers; he possesses a commanding
parliamentary majority that gives him a degree of political
security unprecedented in post-war Italy. Berlusconi's
standing has been bolstered by positive public perceptions of
his response to the devastating April 2009 earthquake in the
Abruzzo region. We expect him to stay in power at least
until the next scheduled national election in 2013.
¶11. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices
allowed Italy's banks to avoid the global financial sector
melt down. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime
lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so
much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not
been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that
has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth
rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis --
has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its
export markets and falling domestic demand. Unemployment is
expected to exceed 8 percent this year and to rise further in
¶2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off
sharply. Moreover, according to the IMF, an already large
government debt is expected to hit 121 percent of GDP this
year. Both factors reduce the government's ability to
provide for stimulus measures.
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) On a variety of important issues, your interactions
with Italian officials provide an opportunity to advance
important U.S. interests. Because Megaports is a DOE
project, it is especially important for you to ask Minister
Scajola for GOI support. Absent such a request it will be
very difficult for Embassy Rome to push Megaports forward in
Italy. It is also very important for you to remind the GOI
that we expect U.S. firms to be given a fair opportunity to
bid on nuclear power projects in Italy, given what we have
seen to date on the selection process.
DIBBLE