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Viewing cable 09LIMA345, ALLEGED ARMY CORRUPTION -- A PERSPECTIVE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09LIMA345 | 2009-03-12 21:57 | 2010-12-12 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Lima |
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #0345/01 0712157
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 122157Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0184
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 2218
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6422
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8150
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 3709
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1348
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 5117
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 9687
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2393
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2234
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T LIMA 000345
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER SNAR KCRM PE
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ARMY CORRUPTION -- A PERSPECTIVE
REF: A. LIMA 1865
¶B. IIR 6 876 0037 08
¶C. LIMA 1640
¶D. IIR 6 876 0018 09
Classified By: Amb. P. Michael McKinley. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Introduction and Summary: The Garcia
Administration's efforts to combat narcotrafficking have been
stronger than under past administrations, and have included a
National Anti-Drug Strategy partly supported with government
funds, solid progress combatting coca production in the Upper
Huallaga Valley, and better police cooperation. And while
corruption has long plagued Peruvian government institutions,
few observers believe the problem today is anywhere near as
deep or extensive as during the shadowy (1990-2000) reign of
former President Fujimori's intelligence chief Vladimiro
Montesinos. XXXXXXXXXXXX as claimed to Poloffs that
remnants of the Montesinos narco-corruption web still exist
within the military. XXXXXXXXXXXX argues that some senior
military officials receive lucrative payoffs from drug traffickers
operating in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), which
is also the base of one of the most important remnants of the
Shining Path guerrillas. He contends that the army -- for
fear of disrupting these drug trafficking networks and losing
access to payoffs -- is unwilling to commit the large force
needed to pacify the VRAE. As a result, he argues, ongoing
military operations against the Shining Path are destined to
fall short. Some of XXXXXXXXXXXX ' accusations are
corroborated by other Embassy contacts, press reports, and
internal documents as well as circumstantial evidence. Although
XXXXXXXXXXXX clearly has an axe to grind against some
of his colleagues, the evidence calls for close monitoring. In the
meantime, it is apparent that Defense Minister Antero Flores
Araoz is continuing to push the military to build on and
expand new counter-terrorism efforts in the VRAE. (Note:
This cable focuses on military, rather than police corruption
because the military retains principal authority in the VRAE.
The military's recent operations against the Shining Path in
the VRAE are discussed Septel. End Note.) End Introduction
and Summary.
Army Command Dismantles Military Operations in the VRAE (2004)
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶2. (S/NF) Corruption has long plagued Peruvian government
institutions, including the security services -- military,
police and judicial. Former President Alberto Fujimori's
(1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for
example, collaborated with top army and other security
officials to develop a web of protection for favored drug
traffickers while cooperating with U.S. officials to combat
others. To many observers, that was Peru's "heyday" of
narco-corruption -- a time when the government of Peru verged
on becoming a kind of "narco-state" in which those who
controlled the main criminal trafficking networks were in
fact high government officials. While most observers
acknowledge that Peru has come a long way since that time,
sharply reducing the extent of such subterranean influences,
few believe that drug-related corruption has been eliminated
and some believe it may now again be on the rise.
XXXXXXXXXXXX for one, argues that significan
elements of this corrupt network continue to exist and t
operate -- now under the control of second-tier officers
from the Montesinos period.
¶3. (S/NF) Many of XXXXXXXXXXXX principle accusations
stem from corruption he says he witnessed while serving in
2004 as Army Commander in Ayacucho (which includes part of
the VRAE). At that time, he said, he launched a counter
insurgency operation that he claimed some senior army
officers later dismantled when it threatened their own corrupt
interests. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that when he first took
command in Ayacucho, his military aide offered him an
expensive vehicle as a gift from local drug traffickers. He
said he refused the bribe and instead used a small salary
increase approved by then-President Alejandro Toledo to
recruit auxiliary troops from local self-defense groups in
the VRAE to build his forces from 300 to 3,500 troops.
XXXXXXXXXXXX deployed these troops to small bases
of about 100 soldiers each, spread throughout the VRAE in
Ayacucho. He told Poloff he believed that such bases would
be better positioned to resist insurgents and drug traffickers
than the isolated outposts of five to seven soldiers -- the model
in use at the time -- who regularly accepted bribes rather than
risk confronting superior forces. (A variety of articles and
investigative news programs from 2004 confirmed this
description of XXXXXXXXXXXX strategy, characterizing
it as both effective and economical.)
¶4. (S/NF) After five months on the job, however, the army
high command removed XXXXXXXXXXXX and replaced him
with Edwin Donayre (the recently retired commander of the
Army), who dismantled XXXXXXXXXXXX operation and
reduced troop levels to 700. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed he
was fired because his operation threatened lucrative sales
of excess fuel by senior army officers to drug traffickers.
He said he had received prior warning about the practice from
the counter-drug police DIRANDRO and used his command to
aggressively combat the sales. When asked if another part of the
GOP could have demanded his removal, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that it had to be a military decision because he had coordinated
his mission with both President Toledo and Congress, where his
father-in-law headed the Defense Commission. (Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX himself was accused of corruption and
dismissed from the military after being removed from his post
in Ayacucho. The charges were dismissed after six months, however,
and he was reinstated. End Note.)
Excess Fuel Scandal Implicates Top Generals (2006)
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX contends that the excess military
fuel scandal that erupted in 2006 is linked to the army's drug
trafficking ties in the VRAE. The scandal broke when the
press denounced a scheme by some senior generals to request
hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel in 2006 for sale and
personal enrichment. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that about
half this fuel was sold to companies like Repsol, while the rest
in the form of kerosene, was sold to drug traffickers in the
VRAE. One prominent counter-narcotics analyst told
Poloff he had seen evidence that the military had sold
kerosene to drug traffickers in northern Peru, and – although
he did not have evidence -- believed it plausible they have also
sold to traffickers in the VRAE. Prosecutors have since
implicated dozens of Generals in the scheme to commercialized
fuel, including then Army commander Cesar Reinoso -- who was
forced to resign -- and his replacement Edwin Donayre. Reinoso
later claimed that the scheme was nothing new and that nearly
all senior generals participated. (Note: Officers are
officially provided periodic fuel allotments, usually more
than can be reasonably consumed, and consider this a
perquisite that complements their base salary. End Note.)
Army Commanding General Donayre retired from the military on
December 5 -- putatively for his politically inflammatory
comments relating to Chile (Ref A) -- but in the view of some
observers for other reasons as well, including his alleged
involvement in the fuel skimming scheme. (Comment: This is
probably the weakest link in XXXXXXXXXXXX argument.
Although the fuel theft is real, we have so far found no other
source to confirm that the military is selling kerosene in
bulk to narcotraffickers. End Comment.)
¶6. (S/NF) Peru's Public Ministry is currently investigating
the fuel scandal, so far without results. In a series of
recent articles published in the political weekly "Caretas,"
prominent investigative journalist Gustavo Gorriti has
alleged an army cover-up. Gorriti reported that General
Donayre declined to meet Public Ministry investigators on six
separate occasions, and that he reassigned the army's
internal inspector to a remote jungle posting after the
inspector issued a damning report on the scandal. Gorriti
also reported that the GOP's independent Comptroller in 2008
completed an investigation that said the military used clumsy
counterfeit documentation to "justify" over $2 million in
excess fuel. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloffs that the
army is withholding internal accounting documents that
would help prove the investigators case. He gave Poloff what
he said were copies of these documents, marked "Secret", that
showed hundreds of thousands of gallons of "extraordinary fuel"
allotments to various generals in 2004 and 2005.
Cocaine Exported Via Army Base in Northern Peru (2004)
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff he believed a drug
trafficking operation uncovered by police in 2004 at an army
base in Piura in northern Peru was also linked to some senior
military officials and drugs exiting the VRAE. According to
a series of investigative reports by a prominent newspaper, a
junior officer gave traffickers linked to a Mexican cartel
free rein to use the base and its military vehicles to
transit cocaine shipments to a military port where the navy
ran a fish-packing operation. At the port, the traffickers
packed the drugs in with the fish for export. In the 2004
bust, police captured 700 kg of cocaine. The commander of
the base at the time, General Williams Zapata -- now Peru's
representative at the Inter-American Defense Board in
Washington -- refused to comment beyond claiming that the
military was not involved with drug trafficking.
XXXXXXXXXXXX however, told Poloff that the
implicated junior officer as well as another perpetrator
privately alleged that both General Zapata and another
unnamed senior general had participated in the drug
operation. (Note: Currently, the junior officer is detained
in Brazil, awaiting possible extradition, and the other
offender is in prison in Piura awaiting trial. End Note.)
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX officers may have continued
to cooperate with drug traffickers. His main suspicion
surrounded a visit XXXXXXXXXXXX by the Director of the
National Chamber of Fishing of Piura, Rolando Eugenio Velasco
Heysen, to meet regional Army commander General Paul da Silva.
XXXXXXXXXXXX peculated that Da Silva and Velasco
-- who was arrested in October 2007 for attempting to export
840 kilograms of cocaine hidden in frozen fish -- were coordinating
drug shipments. An investigative journalist later reported that
both Da Silva and General Edwin Donayre had met with Velasco,
but that Velasco claimed he was merely promoting the
consumption of high-protein squid by the army.
XXXXXXXXXXXX claims this argument makes no sense
because the Generals' meetings with Velasco occurred outside
the time of year that the Army signs new contracts.
Counter-Drug Analysts on Possible Narco-Army Links
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶9. (S/NF) A prominent Peruvian counter-drug analyst who
travels regularly to the VRAE agreed with the assessment that
some senior army commanders were complicit with drug
trafficking. He further believed the military was beginning
to recuperate the political power that it had in the 1990s
under President Alberto Fujimori's spy chief Vladimiro
Montesinos, when senior military officers worked
surreptitiously and closely with (certain) drug traffickers.
This analyst said that on his last trip to the VRAE, a local
mayor told him the military controlled all the main riverine
drug routes, and that officers charged protection money
rather than staunch the flow. A second analyst who travels
regularly to the VRAE said he had clear evidence that the
military controlled at least one major drug route (through
Cayramayo) and charged bribes from passing drug traffickers.
¶10. (S/NF) The analysts also highlighted the case of a drug
plane that crashed in October 2007 while trying to take off
from a clandestine airstrip in VRAE. According to a report
in the left-of-center newspaper La Republica, the airstrip
was located in direct view of a military base. The paper's
local sources said that no plane could take off or land
without being spotted from the base. The first analyst said
his sources in the area told him the army had actually built
the airstrip. According to a DAO source, after the plane
crashed, an army unit sought to destroy any evidence by
cutting up the wreckage and dumping it in the river (Ref B).
The national police received a tip about the army's actions
and recovered the plane, but did not report the incident in
order to avoid inflaming already tense relations with the
military. Army sources told La Republica, however, that the
plane was the first they had ever discovered in the area and
that they immediately reported it to the police.
Implications for Military Operations in the VRAE
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶11. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX and several analysts
argued that the military are reluctant to implement a
serious plan to pacify the VRAE because the payoffs from
drug traffickers are too profitable. These contacts dismissed
the recent Operation Excellence in Vizcatan (Ref C and
Septel) as too small to have any real impact in such a larg
and harsh terrain. The operation may temporarily displace
Shining Path cells, they said, but it will not deter drug traffickers.
One analyst described the operation as a smokescreen designed
to deflect increasing political pressure on the army to show
results. Another analyst argued that the operation appeared
to be a serious effort to decapitate Shining Path while at
the same time avoiding the disruption of profitable drug
trafficking routes. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Comment: A Series of Worrying Indicators
----------------------------------------
¶12. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX clearly has an axe to grind,
and we do not have enough evidence to prove that all his
allegations are true. However, the limited and tentative
progress by the military in the VRAE to date does give some
plausibility to his argument that the some army officials may not
support the larger objectives of the ongoing operations in the
VRAE. We will continue to closely monitor evidence of drug
corruption in the military and to encourage the government to
consolidate and expand on the first steps taken during
Operation Excellence.
MCKINLEY