

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BOGOTA4750, ESTIMATES ON REGROUPING OF DEMOBILIZED
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BOGOTA4750.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA4750 | 2006-05-30 19:02 | 2011-03-04 16:00 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #4750/01 1501902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301902Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6838
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7765
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 3820
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9179
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4463
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3568
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T BOGOTA 004750
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2025
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: ESTIMATES ON REGROUPING OF DEMOBILIZED
PARAMILITARIES, GOC STRATEGY
REF: BOGOTA 4645
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) Estimates of the collectively demobilized
paramilitaries (30,902 to date) that have regrouped into
criminal organizations range from 2 to 4 percent. According
to Colombian National Police Intelligence (DIPOL) analysts
and the Military's Joint Intelligence Center, 21 new criminal
groups have formed. Sergio Caramagna, Director of the
Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS),
warned that the numbers could increase significantly if
national and local governments fail to offer adequate
security, reinsertion programs, and basic services. In an
effort to improve security, 5,000 police officers are being
trained to be sent to 53 of the 120 administrative regions
the GOC and the MAPP/OAS have identified as critical.
Caramagna would like the Mission to increase its verification
efforts and assist high-risk communities with tailored
reinsertion programs, and requested USG support for these
efforts. Caramagna and DIPOL analysts agreed that the
Constitutional Court's May 18 decision to uphold most of the
provisions of the controversial Justice and Peace Law were
positive in the short-term, but not necessarily good for
future peace processes with the remaining illegal actors.
End summary.
-----------------------------------------
RELATIVELY FEW DEMOBILIZED PARAMILITARIES
REGROUP AS CRIMINAL GANGS
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Caramagna told poloff on May 19 that press reports
estimating over 4,000 demobilized paramilitaries returning to
criminal activity were inflated. In his view, less than 2
percent of the 30,140 collectively demobilized combatants
have returned to crime. Caramagna warned, however, this
number could increase if the national and local governments
fail to offer adequate security, reinsertion programs, and
basic services, such as education and health to these
individuals. (The majority of demobilized combatants are men
under 30 years of age with limited education.)
¶3. (S) DIPOL analysts believe 4 percent have regrouped.
According to DIPOL analysts and the Military's Joint
Intelligence Center, 21 new criminal groups have formed. Of
these, DIPOL identified 10 structures through intelligence
means, such as signal intercepts, and the remaining 11
through other evidence. On average, each group is composed
of 50 members and not all the members are demobilized
paramilitaries. Each group has a mix of former combatants,
paramilitaries who never demobilized, narcotraffickers, and
other criminals.
¶4. (C) DIPOL analysts said these new groups cannot be
categorized as re-emerging paramilitary groups, but rather
are criminal organizations primarily interested in
narcotrafficking and other illegal activities. DIPOL
analysts disagreed with some aspects of the MAPP/OAS Sixth
Quarterly Report, such as the sources and methods the OAS
used to gather its information. They did not say that the
information was inaccurate, but rather that it was mainly
obtained through individual testimonies rather than "hard
evidence."
¶5. (C) In DIPOL's field experience, information obtained
primarily by individual testimonies can be tainted because it
is associated with "paramilitary phantoms and legends" in the
regions. This does not mean that remnants of paramilitary
structures do not exist or that new groups use their
"paramilitary masks" to create fear, among the people, but
all intelligence indicates the main paramilitary groups and
leaders are tired of living in hiding and many have seen the
peace process as an opportunity to legalize their situation.
The individuals that DIPOL analysts have found leading these
new groups are mainly "third-tier" or "third-generation"
paramilitaries, with the exception of two groups that are led
by former mid-level paramilitary leaders. The "third-tier"
were never interested in the peace process and were fully
engaged in narcotrafficking, according to DIPOL.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
GOC'S STRATEGY AGAINST THE EMERGING GROUPS, REINSERTION
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶6. (C) According to DIPOL analysts, the GOC created in March
an interagency group called "Intelligence for Peace,"
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the
Peace Commissioner's Office, Administrative Security
Department (DAS, FBI equivalent), Army, Navy, and Police
intelligence, to coordinate GOC efforts on the reemergence of
new groups and encourage further desertions from illegal
armed groups. Since its initiation, three operations have
taken place against newly identified groups. The most recent
operation was held in Narino Department and police detained
three key individuals.
¶7. (C) With the help of MAPP/OAS, the Intelligence for Peace
Group has identified 120 administrative regions or
"corregimientos" of high risk that need immediate attention.
DIPOL analysts explained that these "corregimientos" are
located in zones "intersected by the conflict" or areas where
the different illegal armed groups are present and where key
routes or economic interests are found. Not surprisingly,
these "corregimientos" are located primarily in the
Departments where the majority of demobilized paramilitaries
are located. According to a study done by the Organization
for International Migration Mission in Colombia, 70 percent
of these former combatants live in five Departments:
Antioquia (32 percent), Cordoba (14 percent), Cesar (10.5
percent), Magdalena (8.6 percent), and Santander (4.8
percent). Other Departments that require attention are Choco,
Narino, North Santander, Sucre, Valle and North Valle.
¶8. (C) Caramagna noted that the National Police has been
more engaged compared to the military in trying to promote
security. For example, 5,000 police officers are being
trained to be sent to 53 of the 120 "corregimientos"
identified (DIPOL analysts noted that in 24 of the 53
"corregimientos" police presence has recently been
increased). Moreover, the police plan to offer jobs and
training to 3,700 demobilized paramilitaries as unarmed
traffic auxiliaries. In contrast, Caramagna saw the military
divided between those who support the efforts to provide
security and those less willing, as they see the
demobilization of the paramilitaries as favoring the FARC.
There is a consensus between MAPP/OAS and the Intelligence
for Peace Group that in addition to creating new police
posts, there needs to be an integral effort from various
government entities to increase their presence and assistance
to these communities. Tierradentro, Cordoba Department will
be used as a model for this new interagency effort.
¶9. (C) Though the Medellin Reinsertion Program is always
cited as an example, Caramagna argued that it is not great,
but it is "the least the government should do" around the
country. He thought that the government should develop a
clear strategy to conduct a "territorial follow up" on
demobilized paramilitaries. Moreover, to increase the
relevance and importance on reinsertion, the GOC should name
a High Commissioner for Reinsertion. Caramagna said the
government is considering naming a High Commissioner or
creating a Ministry to deal with this effort. The name of
Gustavo Villegas, formerly in charge of the reinsertion
program in Medellin, is floating around (although Villegas
told the DCM he plans to accept another job within the
administration of Sergio Fajardo, Medellin Mayor, and is not
prepared to work as the High Commissioner for Reinsertion.)
------------------------------------
EVALUATING MAPP/OAS MISSION CAPACITY
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Caramagna highlighted the increased support to the
Mission from member states and observer countries, which has
permitted the hiring of personnel in recent months.
Twenty-two officers have been designated by members states as
their contribution, all of whom are international experts
with experience in reinsertion and conflict resolution. Even
though the OAS said in its Sixth Quarterly Report that the
Mission would achieve its goal of having 10 regional offices
and more than 100 officers by mid-year, Caramagna has decided
to increase OAS personnel in the already established offices
instead, until he is able to hire more people (MAPP/OAS
currently has a total of 80 people, 56 in the field and a
total of six regional offices.) With Spain's recent offer of
USD 1 million and the USG contribution of USD 1.5 million
just recently approved, this could enable the OAS to open
other offices later in the year.
¶11. (C) In addition to its verification role in the peace
process, Caramagna requested USG support for the Mission to
further assist high risk communities with reinsertion
programs. He argued that the Mission,s access to these
communities and the confidence that the people have in its
representatives, puts it in a unique position to help.
--------------------------------------------- --------
READ-OUT ON IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶12. (C) Caramagna and DIPOL analysts agreed that the
Constitutional Court's May 18 decision to uphold most of the
provisions of the Justice and Peace Law (septel) was positive
in the short-term, but not necessarily good for future peace
processes with the remaining illegal actors. Problems could
arise with the remaining three paramilitary groups that are
scheduled to demobilize after the presidential election on
May 28--Elmer Cardenas Bloc, Cacique Pipinta, and Martin
Llanos Bloc--and future peace processes with the ELN and the
FARC.
¶13. (C) Now that the Constitutional Court has upheld the
Justice and Peace Law, DIPOL analysts plan to continue to
assist the Prosecutor's Office Justice and Peace Unit. Since
the creation of the Intelligence for Peace Group, in the last
three months, DIPOL analysts knowledgeable about the various
demobilized paramilitary groups and leaders have been
training prosecutors and investigators on the history and
activities of each group.
-------------------------------------
FOLLOW UP ON CURUMANI, CESAR MASSACRE
-------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Caramagna noted that the Mission continues to follow
closely a massacre that occurred in Curumani, Cesar
Department, perpetrated by the AUC's North Bloc in December
¶2005. (This massacre was referenced in the OAS Mission's
Sixth Quarterly Report.) One minor who remained missing
(16-year-old Jesus Emiro Manzano) was found recently and he
and his family are in the GOC's protection program. Mission
staff talked to him; he vividly recalled the paramilitary
incursion and the killing of his father and cousin, among
others. Manzano reported that the AUC first tortured and
then shot people. He explained that several town members
were accused by the paramilitaries of being ELN sympathizers,
which he said was untrue and was used as an excuse. The true
motivation, according to Manzano, was competition between an
AUC informant and Manzano's cousin for the affection of one
of the town's girls. He explained, however, that the ELN has
always had some type of presence in the area, but in the
recent years has been weakening. Caramagna said that the
Mission has found these collusions/massacres to be generally
motivated by personal vengeance or disputes over economic
interests.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Because of the illegal nature of the activity, the
actual number of demobilized, who are now entering "new"
illegal gangs or remobilizing in their old blocs, is
difficult to ascertain. The OAS Mission is one of the few
neutral observers in a position to assess the dimensions of
the problem, but their estimates may also be optimistic.
Given the general coincidence of the OAS and DIPOL, however,
it is probably fair to say the problem so far is less than
feared. But it is early in a complex and novel process for
anyone to say with authority how much "remobilization" will
take place. End comment.
WOOD