

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE655, CAFTA: REFERENDUM CONCERNS, BUT COALITION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE655.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07SANJOSE655 | 2007-04-04 20:36 | 2011-03-02 16:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-02/Investigacion.aspx |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0655/01 0942036
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 042036Z APR 07 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7704
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000655
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND EB; PASS TO USTR
AMALITO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV ETRD PREL PINR CS
SUBJECT: CAFTA: REFERENDUM CONCERNS, BUT COALITION
COOPERATING; LEGISLATION MOVING
REF: A. A) SAN JOSE 625
¶B. B) SAN JOSE 552
Classified By: CDA Laurie Weitzenkorn per 1.4(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Although optimistic that CAFTA can be
ratified by August-September, the Arias administration is now
concerned about the prospect of a CAFTA referendum.
Responding to a petition filed by CAFTA opponent, renegade
PLN member, former legislator and presidential candidate Jose
Miguel Corrales, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is to
rule on the issue by April 15. GOCR officials believe the
TSE may be inclined to agree to a referendum, but they are
SIPDIS
reasonably confident of winning the referendum, if it comes
to that. The cost and time involved will be challenges,
however; no such referendum has ever been held in Costa Rica.
Clothed as a &benign8 way to resolve the CAFTA issue in
public once and for all, the referendum could become one more
delaying gambit by the opposition. President Oscar Arias is
reported to be adamantly opposed, but other cabinet members
are contemplating strategy, if a referendum proves
inevitable. In the good news department, Arias,s coalition
is cooperating again, and key CAFTA-related legislation
continues to move ahead in the National Assembly. END
SUMMARY.
----------------------
TEMPERED OPTIMISM. . .
----------------------
¶2. (C) On March 29, the Ambassador called on Minister of
Government Rodrigo Arias, who was easing back into a work
schedule after hip replacement surgery. Looking fit and
sounding confident, Arias was optimistic that the GOCR would
be able to ratify CAFTA and approve implementing legislation
as &a package8 in August-September, the same prediction he
has made recently in public. (The next extraordinary
legislative session begins in August, when the executive
would have more control over the agenda.) The Minister
dismissed the &jump-start8 proposal of ML party leader Otto
Guevara ) to take CAFTA to a no-notice, simple yes or no
plenary vote in mid-April ) as going too far, too soon.
(NOTE: Guevara discussed this idea with Department
interlocutors during his Washington visit last month.)
Although technically constitutional, such a move would fly
against years of legal tradition permitting legislative
debate of interpretative clauses when considering
international agreements. The Supreme Court,s activist
constitutional chamber (Sala IV) would probably object (Ref
A).
¶3. (SBU) According to Arias, the GOCR will thus maintain its
current course on CAFTA:
-- Correct the procedural flaws in proposed fast track
legislation by mid-April (as demanded by the Sala IV on March
5), while moving ahead on key legislation in committee;
-- Once fast track legislation is ready (probably in late-May
or early-June, after one last Sala IV review, prompted by
another likely opposition challenge), take CAFTA to the
plenary for limited debate; and
-- In the meantime, apply existing fast track rules to
CAFTA-related legislation as required. (NOTE: Existing fast
track rules need no modification for use with regular
legislation. The modification is required to use fast track
with treaties.)
-----------------------------
. . . BUT REFERENDUM CONCERNS
-----------------------------
¶4. (C) However, Minister Arias said the GOCR has concerns,
which it is keeping private, about a possible CAFTA
referendum. In a separate meeting with the Ambassador on
March 30, First VP and Minister of Justice Laura Chinchilla
echoed those concerns. Chinchilla explained that Jose Miguel
Corrales (former PLN legislator and presidential contender
and strong CAFTA critic) had been pushing the referendum idea
since 2006. Because he helped Chinchilla draft the
Referendum Law when they were both legislators, he is
considered an expert on the subject. (NOTE: In October 2006,
the TSE rejected a petition by Corrales and others for a
non-binding CAFTA referendum, arguing that non-binding polls
were not permitting under the Referendum Law. Corrales and
company then pressed for a binding referendum. Their
petition reached the Sala IV, but was bounced back to the TSE
for action on February 16. END NOTE.) According to
Ministers Arias and Chinchilla, the TSE must issue a decision
in this latest challenge within 60 days, i.e., by April 15.
¶5. (C) Chinchilla said President Arias was adamantly opposed
to the referendum idea, but the GOCR would have to proceed
very carefully if the TSE decided in favor. She and Minister
Arias both described the outcome as uncertain. Of the three
TSE members, two had some doubts that a referendum could
SIPDIS
apply to any legislation with a fiscal aspect (such as a free
trade agreement dealing with tariffs and duties), but they
were leaning pro-referendum nonetheless. The views of the
third member ) currently a substitute ) were unknown.
Minister Arias was confident that TSE president Luis Antonio
Sobrado, whom he described as &young and forceful,8
ultimately would make the right decision ) to reject a CAFTA
referendum because of the restriction on referenda with
fiscal implications. Even if the TSE supported a CAFTA
referendum, Arias believed that regular legislative work
could continue while the referendum was prepared.
¶6. (C) VP Chinchilla did not sound as confident on either
issue. She told the Ambassador that the rectors of the four
leading state universities may turn the heat up after Holy
Week by calling in public for the referendum, in exchange for
a pledge to tone down CAFTA opposition on campus and in the
streets. For Costa Ricans in and out of politics, (as well as
the TSE members), this eminently &Tico8 call to consensus
might be too powerful to ignore, in Chinchilla,s opinion.
¶7. (C) If the TSE ruled in favor of the referendum, the GOCR
could still take the initiative, according to Chinchilla. To
enact the referendum, the executive could submit appropriate
legislation to the Assembly. Because the referendum
procedure calls for an up or down, simple majority vote in
the plenary, without Sala IV review (as is the case with
normal legislation), Chinchilla said the GOCR might bundle
some CAFTA-related legislation with the referendum bill. The
opposition would then face a dilemma: either oppose the
referendum to block the CAFTA-related bills, or support the
referendum, but approve the CAFTA legislation at the same
time. The Assembly itself could also call for a referendum,
Chinchilla explained, but 38 votes would be required to pass
the relevant legislation. The Arias administration,s working
majority would block this route, if the opposition tried it.
¶8. (C) Chinchilla was more concerned about the third route
to a referendum: a public petition. Only five percent of the
national voter registry would be needed, approximately
150,000 signatures. The opposition could collect those, and
delay long enough to submit their petition so as to
jeopardize the CAFTA timetable. Ministers Arias and
Chinchilla both believe the GOCR could win a CAFTA
referendum, but the VP acknowledged that cost and campaigning
would be challenges. The GOCR would not be permitted to
campaign, for example, relying on the private sector to carry
the day against an already well-organized and well-funded
CAFTA opposition. The first test of the Costa Rican
referendum law and the only such vote on CAFTA no doubt would
attract support from international anti-globalization
organizations and from Venezuela, as well. Meeting the
minimal 40 percent turnout rate for the referendum to be
considered valid is another challenge, Chinchilla added.
-------------------------------
COALITION IS COOPERATING, AGAIN
-------------------------------
¶9. (C) Meanwhile, despite some mid-March turbulence, the
GOCR,s pro-CAFTA coalition seems to be working smoothly
again. Problematic ML legislator Mario Quiros (Ref B) is not
only supporting the GOCR,s position on correcting the
procedural flaws in the fast track legislation, but he is
writing the majority committee report, according to ML
president Otto Guevara. Energized from his Washington visit,
Guevara agreed with the Ambassador in a meeting on March 27
that President Arias should designate one minister to run the
CAFTA effort full-time. Minister of Foreign Trade Marco
Vinicio Ruiz is fully occupied with CAFTA substance and
negotiations with USTR. Minister w/o Portfolio Marco Vargas
thus would be a logical selection, Guevara said.
--------------------------
LEGISLATION MOVING FORWARD
--------------------------
¶10. (SBU) In the legislature, three of 13 bills necessary to
harmonize national law with CAFTA have reached the floor and
are pending plenary action: dealership regulation,
ratification of the Budapest IPR treaty and ratification of
the trademark treaty. Committee deliberations on six more
bills are to be completed by the last week in April: opening
the telecom market, strengthening public sector entities,
opening the insurance market, a bill dealing with
miscellaneous patent and trademark issues, a bill dealing
with IPR enforcement issues, and legislation dealing with the
protection of new plant species. Before the Holy Week
recess, key pro-CAFTA legislators were stressing in public
the need to keep moving and the urgency of mounting a
pro-CAFTA offensive with the private sector after Easter.
--------
COMMENT:
--------
¶11. (SBU) A referendum would further cloud an already messy
CAFTA picture, and would mean more delays in a much-delayed
timetable. It would also be a tempting solution for tired
legislators, looking for a way to share (or pass off) the
CAFTA burden. We hope the GOCR,s concerns are fueled more
by prudence than alarm. From our reading of related
jurisprudence (such as the Procuraduria,s decision of April
¶24. 2006), it appears that a free trade agreement which
regulates tariffs cannot be approved by a referendum, but we
are not the local experts. The details of referendum
procedures are not clear to us, either, nor is the Sala IV,s
potential role, e.g., could referendum results or procedures
be challenged in the Supreme Court? Even without a
referendum, the CAFTA end-game here will not be elegant, and
the timetable continues to slip. Instead of a clean
ratification-implementation sequence, we can expect to see
motion at varying speeds and times on both tracks, using a
complex, multi-layered strategy including special and normal
legislative committees, as well as fast track and normal
legislative rules. As one long-time political observer and
pollster told us, in politics or in soccer, Ticos play their
best when they are under the most pressure, &when their
noses are almost under water.8
WEITZENKORN