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Viewing cable 09DOHA502, ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09DOHA502 | 2009-08-10 11:57 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Doha |
VZCZCXRO8648
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0502/01 2221157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101157Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9316
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000502
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS QA XF ZP ZR YM IR JO LE
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETINGS IN QATAR
Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
(C) SUMMARY
-------------
¶1. (C) During their July 20-21 visit to Qatar, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
Affairs, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, and State
Political-Military (PM) Assistant Secretary Andrew Shapiro
held meetings with Qatar's military Chief of Staff, Major
General (MG) Hamad al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince Tamim bin
Hamad al Thani. MG al-Attiyah and the Crown Prince tried to
assure the Assistant Secretaries that Qatar used the Chief of
Staff's visit to press Iran to respond to U.S. offers of
engagement and to dismiss as "rubbish" Iranian efforts to
blame the election crisis on U.S. and UK special services.
The U.S. affirmed displeasure with Iranian behavior, and said
the U.S. would not tolerate Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons. ASD Vershbow suggested now was the time for Qatar
to distance itself from Iran and its proxies and urge Iran to
end its destabilizing behavior.
¶2. (C) MG al Attiyah and the Crown Prince repeated the
Qatari position that they felt the need to engage all their
neighbors and that Qatar could perhaps influence Iranian
behavior through its engagement. MG al-Attiyah also
expressed disappointment that the Large Aircraft Infrared
Counter Measure (LAIRCM) system is not available to be
installed on Qatar's recently purchased C-17 aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the issue further and that a
formal response from the SecDef would be forthcoming. The
Chief of Staff also said no decision had been made on
fulfilling an earlier U.S. request to provide funding for the
refurbishment of Jordanian tanks being provided to Lebanon.
When ASD Vershbow requested that Qatar use its good offices
to help the U.S. in Yemen and induce a change in Hamas's
behavior, the Chief of Staff expressed irritation that
U.S.-Qatar friendship did not extend to issues of importance
to Qatar, such as LAIRCM. END SUMMARY
U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
-----------------------
¶3. (C) U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for
International Affairs Vershbow and Assistant Secretary of
State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, joined by
Ambassador, met July 20-21 over dinner and in a separate
office call with Chief of Staff (COS) Major General Hamad
al-Attiyah. The U.S. visitors thanked the COS for Qatar's
continued hospitality and support and for hosting our
presence at both Camp As Sayliyah (CAS) and Al-Udeid Air Base
(AUAB).
C-17 PURCHASE
-------------
¶4. (C) BG General al-Malki (Commander of the Fighter Wing and
Chairman of the Transport Committee) informed ASD Vershbow
that the first C-17 was on schedule for delivery and would
depart California on August 11 with an ETA at AUAB O/A August
¶15. In addition, BG General al-Malki mentioned his
disappointment at the delay of the pilot training program,
which will further delay the aircraft from becoming
operational. In response, ASD Vershbow reassured him that
USG would work to resolve the issue.
¶5. (C) COS al-Attiyah expressed his concern to ASD regarding
the C-17 LAIRCM. The COS stated that he was greatly
disappointed over USG disapproval of Qatar's application for
LAIRCM. Al-Malki pointed out that other nations had acquired
the system and that Qatar's exclusion added to his
frustration. The COS said he did not want to elevate the
matter to Qatar's civilian leadership. He believed that
Qatar's leaders would question the benefits of the
U.S.-Qatari military relationship if the concern were to be
raised.
¶6. (C) ASD Vershbow responded that a letter would be
forthcoming from SECDEF explaining that Qatar would be
receiving the same aircraft as received by the United States
Air Force (USAF). Vershbow further clarified that the LAIRCM
was an additional add-on, for which transfer to Qatar had
been disapproved. Vershbow recommended that Qatar pursue
other options, noting he was unaware that other nations had
access to the LAIRCM system for transport aircraft. ASD
Vershbow said he would look into the matter, adjust the
SECDEF letter as necessary and respond formally to the GOQ.
COS and al-Malki stressed Qatar's desire to use aircraft
jointly with the U.S. and Coalition Forces.
IRAN
----
DOHA 00000502 002 OF 003
¶7. (C) ASD asked the COS to recount his visit to the Islamic
Republic of Iran. COS briefed that his first visit to Iran
was short in duration. The Qatari delegation praised
President Obama's Cairo Speech while in Iran and urged the
Iranians to take steps to avoid isolating themselves
internationally. Further, the Qataris suggested that the
Iranians seek engagement and rapprochement. ASD Vershbow
said this was the right message, and those who have contacts
with Iran should use every opportunity to persuade Iranian
leaders to end their destabilizing behavior.
¶8. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated the need for Iran to take
steps to convince the international community that it was not
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and to end its support
for Hamas, Hizballah, and other extremist groups. He said
we understand why Qatar, because of its close proximity and
its economic and political ties to Iran, felt the need to
engage with Iran. Qatar should help the Iranians to avoid a
conflict with the U.S. and the international community,
remarking that "friends do not let friends drive drunk."
¶9. (C) COS al-Attiyah responded that while Iran expresses a
desire privately to change its behavior, these could be
meaningless platitudes. The COS reiterated that the GOQ
opposes any Iranian pursuit of a military nuclear capability,
noting that it would destabilize the region. COS further
suggested that the USG continue its own dialogue with the
Islamic Republic. COS al-Attiyah closed the discussion by
making clear that, with respect to Iran, "while we're
neighbors, we're not friends." He summed up his recent visit
to Tehran as an overture to maintain open channels of
communication with Iran.
LEBANON
-------
¶10. (C) ASD asked if the GOQ had a response to an earlier
request to the Prime Minister by Secretary Gates to help fund
the transfer of 55 M1A1 tanks from Jordan to Lebanon. COS
said he was aware of the request, but that no decision had
been made. He added that he had discussed the issue during a
recent CHOD conference with Jordanian and Lebanese
representatives.
HAMAS
-----
¶11. (C) ASD Vershbow raised Qatar's ties with Hamas, and told
the COS that Hamas needs to be encouraged to rejoin the
Palestinian Authority and the Peace Process. He added that
there should be "no blank checks, no checks at all," for
Hamas. ASD suggested that Qatar was in a position to
influence Hamas; if Qatar helped bring about a change in
Hamas's behavior, it could enhance the U.S.-Qatar strategic
relationship. COS undertook to relay that message to the
Amir and Crown Prince. While the COS underscored that Qatar
wants a good relationship with the U.S., he noted there were
times when USG decisions sent a different signal, such as the
USG's decision on LAIRCM. COS al-Attiyah rhetorically asked,
"Are we friends or not?"
YEMEN
-----
¶12. (C) ASD Vershbow asked if Qatar, or the GCC as a whole,
would be renewing efforts to help solve the troubles in
Yemen, citing Qatar's previous mediation efforts. COS
al-Attiyah responded that GOQ had engaged Yemen in the past,
but noted that maintaining productive dialogue is difficult,
given Yemen's economic plight and decentralized tribal
society. The COS added that the GOQ was unsure how Yemeni
President Saleh plans to curtail the violence there. He also
noted that there is little military cooperation between the
Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) and Yemen, but that he would make
the GOQ leadership aware of the ASD's interest. The COS said
that the GCC had earlier presented a "unified package," but
its efforts in Yemen had failed. COS al-Attiyah recommended
that this subject be addressed at the Manama Dialogue in
December.
NSS and CIP
-----------
¶13. (C) ASD commended the COS on the upcoming
CENTCOM-GOQ-Naval War College effort to develop a National
Security Strategy. Qatar and others in the region need to
place more emphasis on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
added the ASD. COS al-Attiyah agreed and said he was looking
forward to this effort. (Note: OMC Qatar will escort an
interagency Qatari delegation back to Tampa August 11-13 to
DOHA 00000502 003 OF 003
begin this process.)
CLOSING REMARKS
---------------
¶14. (C) COS ended the discussions by stating that he valued
the U.S.-Qatar relationship. The GOQ was committed to the
friendship forged between the two nations, he said. COS said
he is looking forward to the P4 visit and expressed his
desire to invite the P4 to his beach house as schedules
permit.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Qatar clearly registered its disappointment in not
receiving LAIRCM for its C-17. We believe this could fester
into an open wound in the vital U.S.-Qatar security
relationship. The Chief of Staff is particularly sensitive
about the issue, since Qatar's senior leadership (the Amir
and Crown Prince) holds him responsible for maintaining a
close and productive U.S.-Qatar military relationship.
However, given the Qatari leadership's perception of the
Chief of Staff's inability so far to get LAIRCM, senior
leadership may start to question the Chief of Staff's
assurances about the strength of the U.S.-Qatar military
relationship. End Comment.
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Alexander Vershbow.
LeBaron