

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10HELSINKI15, COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH EASIER SAID THAN DONE:
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10HELSINKI15.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10HELSINKI15 | 2010-01-13 16:22 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO7020
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0015/01 0131622
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131622Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5366
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000015
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS: AF FI MOPS PGOV
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH EASIER SAID THAN DONE:
FINLAND'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
REF: A. HELSINKI 458
¶B. HELSINKI 447
¶C. HELSINKI 441
¶D. HELSINKI 378
¶E. HELSINKI 360
Classified By: P/E Chief Scott Brandon, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Finnish government is justly proud of
its contributions to crisis management operations. In the
last decade alone it has deployed military and civilian
personnel to the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and
Afghanistan as part of missions under UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO
auspices. Finnish leaders from ministers down to the
ground-level can recite the mantra of the "comprehensive
approach" to crisis management. Finnish soldiers and
civilians alike recognize the need to employ military,
diplomatic, and development tools in a coordinated manner in
order to bring stability to areas in crisis. The GOF has
formalized this approach through a number of initiatives,
including the publication of its first official comprehensive
crisis management strategy, its first guidebook for
harmonizing security and development policy, and the
establishment of a center of expertise in comprehensive
crisis management.
¶2. (SBU) However, the impending removal of all Finnish
civilians from its PRT in Afghanistan and the apparent lack
of operational coordination between those responsible for
development, diplomacy, and defense in Helsinki may indicate
that Finnish practice has not caught up to theory. GOF
interlocutors point to bureaucratic and legal obstacles to
interagency (and intra-agency) cooperation, as well as a lack
of qualified volunteers for OMLT and police training missions
in dangerous locales. On the bright side, the GOF has
internationally-recognized military and civilian institutions
training personnel for crisis management operations. These
institutions and the USG would benefit from partnerships
between U.S. and Finnish crisis management trainers and
researchers. END SUMMARY.
----------------------
COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
----------------------
¶3. (U) November 9 saw the publication of Finland's first
official strategy for comprehensive crisis management (NOTE:
This document is still only available in Finnish. END NOTE).
The culmination of a year-long interagency effort led by the
MFA, the strategy's stated goal is to enhance Finland's
effectiveness by ensuring that all available tools, including
military, civilian, development cooperation, and humanitarian
assistance, are coordinated in order to achieve success.
Finland is increasingly involved in challenging areas
(Afghanistan, Chad, and Darfur are mentioned) in which its
personnel are subject to hostile actions by some in the local
population, something Finns have rarely if ever experienced
in their long history of peacekeeping (see reftel E).
¶4. (U) The strategy proposes several lines of action in order
to improve Finland's effectiveness in crisis management.
Firstly, Finland seeks to strengthen the EU's role as a
crisis management actor alongside other multilateral bodies
such as NATO, the UN, and the informal Nordic group of
nations. Second, it outlines a national strategy
coordination group to be established under the leadership of
the MFA consisting of personnel from relevant ministries
(Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior) supplemented with
experts from outside government (NGOs, think tanks). This
group would monitor and assess crisis management operations
throughout the cycle from warning signs of an impending
crisis to outside intervention, conflict resolution, and
reconstruction.
¶5. (U) Lastly, the strategy recommends improvements in the
recruitment of Finnish military and civilian personnel to
take part in crisis management. Finland has had difficulty
finding sufficient volunteers for all of its positions in
Kosovo, Chad, and Afghanistan. With no legal mechanism to
compel overseas service and a small standing military, around
half of its deployed forces are reservists who need to be
incentivized to leave their civilian careers for deployments.
Time spent overseas is seen by some police as harmful to
their prospects for promotion and Finland only recruits
police over thirty years old for its law enforcement training
and advising positions. Finland's shortage of female police
officers (only around 20% of the police force is female) also
makes it difficult to field sufficient female police trainers
overseas.
--------------------
HELSINKI 00000015 002 OF 003
PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES
--------------------
¶6. (C) MFA Security Policy and Crisis Management Unit
Director Timo Kantola, who led the interagency drafting
effort, emphasized to us that the strategy makes it clear
that civilian efforts are just as important as military ones,
something which has often been lost in the media and
political spotlight placed on Finland's overseas military
deployments. Finnish Defence Forces Operations Chief Major
General Raty picked up on the same theme in a December 10
meeting with AMB when he decried the lack of civilian experts
at the Swedish-Finnish PRT in Afghanistan. He returned from
a recent visit there seeing an unmet need for more
international civilians to mentor and support Afghan civilian
officials, especially in the police. Ad hoc mentorship of
police by Finnish soldiers is not sufficient. While the
government constantly "talks" about a comprehensive approach,
Raty does not see it in actual GOF decision-making.
¶7. (SBU) According to Raty, Kantola, and others, Finland
faces three main challenges in balancing its diplomacy,
development, and defense pillars in crisis management
operations:
-- (SBU) Legal Limitations: The separate statutes
authorizing military and civilian participation in crisis
management are inconsistent with one another and hinder
cooperation in the field. As an example of these problems
Kantola pointed to the withdrawal of all four of its civilian
personnel from the Swedish-Finnish PRT as of December 31 due
to frictions regarding their chain of command and security
standards (see also reftel C). The laws are not flexible
enough to allow for changing legal and political bases for
operations, such as have occurred in Chad and Georgia, making
it difficult for Finnish personnel to remain committed to an
operation when it changes from UN- to EU-led, for example,
without time-consuming additional legislative action back in
Helsinki. The laws also provide strict limits on the use of
force which hinder operations in nonpermissive environments.
Despite these shortcomings, since the laws were only passed
in the last couple of years, the government does not yet feel
the time is right to revisit them.
-- (C) Friction between Development and Crisis Management: A
few weeks after the government's comprehensive crisis
management strategy was published, the MFA published a white
paper entitled "Development and Security in Finland's
Development Policy". The last page of the white paper
contains a venn diagram in which the large oval labeled
"development cooperation" has a smaller overlapping oval
labeled "civilian crisis management", indicating none too
subtly the perspective of the authors from the Department for
Development Policy. The explanation below the diagram notes
that "nearly 90% of funding for civilian CM operations comes
from Overseas Development Assistance." The control that the
development side of the MFA has over funding has been
problematic given its uneasy working relationship with the
"policy" side of the bureaucracy. PRT activities in
Afghanistan, considered to be crisis management, are handled
by the latter but development projects and aid to NGOs in
Afghanistan by the former. Foreign Minister Stubb (NCP) and
Development and Trade Minister Vayrynen (Center) are from
different generations and backgrounds. While Stubb is a
confirmed supporter of ISAF and our strategy in Afghanistan,
Vayrynen has swayed from supporting the withdrawal of all
Finnish forces from ISAF to touting the work of Finnish NGOs
in Afghanistan (many of which receive grants from the
development budget) (see reftel E for context of Vayrynen's
remarks on ISAF). Raty identified Vayrynen's skepticism
regarding cooperation with NATO, ISAF, and even the EU as a
significant obstacle to realizing a comprehensive approach in
Finland's crisis management efforts.
-- (SBU) Getting the Right People in the Right Place:
Kantola repeated oft-heard concerns about finding sufficient
volunteers to staff Finland's present level of civilian and
military commitments. Regarding Finland's inability to fill
its 30 OMLT slots in Afghanistan (22 of which are vacant),
Kantola explained that Finland was not well prepared for
missions in which its military personnel must operate without
their own infrastructure and with a completely different
mindset than that of a "peacekeeper." (See reftel B for more
on recruitment problems.) There has been a recent uptick in
military volunteers for overseas operations, with the Defense
Ministry reporting that applications increased from 125 in
October to 329 in November. Afghanistan is the "most
desirable" destination according to the ministry. The
increase is attributed to an increase in salary as well as
improved insurance coverage.
HELSINKI 00000015 003 OF 003
--------------------------------
SUCCESS STORIES: FINCENT AND CMC
--------------------------------
¶8. (U) One of Finland's strengths is its training of military
and civilian personnel. This is conducted by two
institutions, one military and one civilian, which have been
joined together into a "center of expertise" in comprehensive
crisis management since November 2008. The Finnish Defence
Forces International Centre (FINCENT) has a 40 year history
of training Finnish and international military personnel,
having originated as a UN training center and now providing
training through NATO/PfP and EU-approved courses as well.
Crisis Management Centre Finland (CMC), jointly-administered
by the Interior Ministry and MFA, is the civilian half of the
center of expertise. 600 students of 50 different
nationalities participate in some 50 training courses per
year at CMC. CMC leverages its co-location with a major
rescue services training facility in order to provide
realistic field training exercises to complement its
classroom instruction.
¶9. (U) As a part of the informal European Group on Training
(EGT), CMC has been a pioneer in developing standards for
training of civilians across the EU, resulting in the
creation of the "Certified EU Civilian Crisis Management
Course" designed to ensure that civilians taking part in any
EU crisis management mission have certain minimum
competencies. Of those trained in this "101" level course at
CMC, two-thirds are Finns. Besides its training activities,
CMC also has a research and development unit which both
collects "lessons learned" about the effectiveness of its
training and leads the development of new curricula.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (SBU) Recent scandals regarding the poor information flow
at the highest levels between the Defense Ministry, Foreign
Ministry, Interior Ministry, Prime Minister's Office, and the
President have resulted in stacks of critical editorials but
little else (see reftel A). As long as authority for foreign
and security policy remains divided between the President and
the government, further breakdowns seem likely. While we can
do little to improve the state of affairs at the top of the
government, we can take advantage of willing partners at the
operational level.
¶11. (SBU) Post has visited both FINCENT and CMC and observed
training at the latter. These institutions are open to
increased cooperation with U.S. partners. In the short run,
such cooperation could pay dividends in Afghanistan, where
hundreds of personnel from the EU's EUPOL police training
mission operate alongside U.S. military and civilian
personnel. In the long run, exchanges of faculty, students,
and researchers involved in civilian crisis management
training could improve both the willingness and capacity of
the EU to operate alongside U.S. military and civilian
elements.
¶12. (SBU) Post is working to promote exchanges between the
U.S. Institute of Peace and National Defense University in
Washington and CMC and FINCENT in Finland and welcomes ideas
from Washington and other EU posts with institutions focusing
on civilian crisis management. Finland participated in the
S/CRS-sponsored Stability Operations Training and Education
Workshop in October 2009 and would be receptive to proposals
to build on the discussions there.
BUTLER