

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08SANTIAGO221, CHILE'S SPOKESMAN PREFERS URIBE TO CHAVEZ
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SANTIAGO221.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08SANTIAGO221 | 2008-03-07 20:06 | 2011-04-06 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Santiago |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSG #0221/01 0672006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072006Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3366
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1979
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0222
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0843
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1686
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 5726
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5491
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3953
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1824
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
id: 144905
date: 3/7/2008 20:06
refid: 08SANTIAGO221
origin: Embassy Santiago
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07SANTIAGO1983|07SANTIAGO417|07SANTIAGO458|08SANTIAGO194|08SANTIAGO207|08SANTIAGO70
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSG #0221/01 0672006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072006Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3366
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1979
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0222
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0843
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1686
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 5726
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5491
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3953
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1824
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000221
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON ECPS CO VE EC CI
SUBJECT: CHILE'S SPOKESMAN PREFERS URIBE TO CHAVEZ
REF: A. SANTIAGO 194
¶B. SANTIAGO 207
¶C. 07 SANTIAGO 1983
¶D. SANTIAGO 70
¶E. 07 SANTIAGO 417
¶F. 07 SANTIAGO 458
Classified By: Paul Simons for reasons 1.4 (B&D)
¶1. (C) Summary. Government spokesman Vidal told the
Ambassador the GOC considered Uribe an ally, and an
alternative to Chavez in South America. This friendship made
the current Colombia/Ecuador conflict "complicated" for the
GOC given Chile's historical respect for the inviolability of
settled borders. He also commented on Chilean internal
politics, expressing confidence in the ruling coalition
Concertacion's chances of winning 2008 municipal elections.
Vidal was critical of Chile's "right-wing" press as unfair to
the GOC. The Ambassador advocated for the U.S. ATSC digital
television standard. End summary.
¶2. (U) The Ambassador met with Secretary General of the
Government Francisco Vidal on March 6. Vidal, who is a
Minister and the Administration's spokesperson, was appointed
in December after the previous Secretary General, Ricardo
Lagos Weber, stepped down to run for the Senate. Vidal held
the same position under former President Ricardo Lagos. The
Ambassador was accompanied by E/POL Counselor and E/POLoff.
GOC Perspective on Colombia and Ecuador
---------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Vidal described the tension between Colombia and
Ecuador over Colombia's incursion into Ecuadorian territory
(refs A & B) as "complicated for the Chilean government."
Chile, he said, in a clear allusion to its ongoing dispute
with Peru, obviously considers borders and sovereignty issues
sacrosanct. However, the GOC's friendship with Uribe is also
important. Uribe, he said, is an ally in providing a
non-"Chavista" model for South America. As spokesman, Vidal
had been asked the GOC's opinion on Chavez's role in this
conflict, but explained he refused to answer to avoid
escalating the tension. The GOC might, however, speak out
more on Chavez's "interference" in the months ahead when the
situation is more calm. (Note: Foreign Minister Foxley
already issued a veiled criticism of Chavez's interference in
a statement earlier this week - ref B. End note). The
Ambassador acknowledged Chile's helpful role in working with
Brazil and others to de-escalate tensions. He and Vidal
agreed that the Organization of American States had been
helpful in defusing the crisis.
ATSC Digital Television (DTV) Standard
--------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) As part of the Embassy's full-court press to all
relevant decision-makers (ref C & D), the Ambassador
advocated on behalf of the ATSC standard for DTV, and gave
Vidal a one-page fact sheet on the advantages of ATSC. The
Ambassador noted the principal ATSC advantages of low cost
and reliability, and its rigorous field-testing in the
demanding U.S. market. He encouraged the GOC to select a
standard carefully so as to avoid another public relations
crisis like Transantiago (Santiago's mass-transit system; ref
E & F), eliciting a laugh from Vidal. Vidal offered no
substantive response on the merits of the ATSC system.
Internal Chilean Politics
--------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Joking with the Ambassador about the fact that the
Ambassador had already met two Ministers of Interior during
his three months in Chile, Vidal predicted Bachelet's third
cabinet would stay through Bachelet's term. He expressed
confidence that the ruling center-left Concertacion coalition
would win the municipal elections in October 2008, in part
due to support from the Communist Party, but was less
confident about the December 2009 presidential election.
Vidal noted that the center-right Alianza coalition's only
hope of Presidential victory was in the first round -- if no
candidate gained a first round victory, the expected shift of
Communist party votes to the Concertacion candidate in the
second round would probably ensure a Concertacion victory.
¶6. (C) Vidal lamented the bitterness of the current political
debate in Chile and the lack of any concrete policy proposals
from the opposition. Alianza was "exaggerating" problems of
corruption and Transantiago, and that the press, "owned by
the right," would never print a pro-government story. He
pointed out that state-owned newspaper La Nacion has a Sunday
readership of around 35,000 compared to El Mercurio's almost
350,000 and La Tercera's 300,000. (Note: Actual figures are
La Nacion: 17,000; El Mercurio: 263,000; and La Tercera:
222,000. End note). Despite Chile being ranked equal to the
U.S. in corruption levels by Transparency International, and
Transantiago is improving, Concertacion is portrayed by the
press as ineffective and corrupt.
¶7. (SBU) Vidal expressed some concern about the world
economy, but said Chile's reserves (thanks to GOC saving and
high copper prices) would protect it from a crisis.
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Vidal, who is close to both Bachelet and former
President Lagos, was brought in to help increase order within
the GOC and improve coordination with the Concertacion
political parties. He is a lightning rod for the opposition,
who believe he epitomizes the arrogance and "corruption" bred
under 18 years of Concertacion governments. A master
politician who is smooth as silk, Vidal was very positive
about the GOC's relationship with the USG and expressed views
very similar to our own on the conflict between Ecuador and
Colombian and his concern over Chavez's interference. His
views reflect a growing consensus within the GOC in support
of free trade and increasing concern about Chavez's influence
in the region.
Biography of Vidal
-------------------
¶9. (U) Vidal (54) replaced Ricardo Lagos Weber as Secretary
General of Government on December 6, 2007. He is a
third-time minister, previously serving under former
President Lagos as Minister of Interior (succeeding Insulza
when the latter resigned to run for OAS SecGen) and Secretary
General of Government (2001-2005). As Minister of Interior,
he oversaw security and intelligence services. More
importantly, he directed President Lagos, three-minister
"political committee" (Interior, Secretary General of the
Presidency, and Minister/Spokesman) to shepherd Lagos,
legislative agenda. President Bachelet,s ability to restore
order to La Moneda will depend in part on Vidal,s
willingness to defer to current Interior Minister Perez Yoma,
as well as his ability to cooperate with Perez Yoma and
Minister Viera-Gallo -- a political heavyweight in his own
right and no shrinking violet.
¶10. (C) He is a long-time political associate of former
President Lagos and the two remain very close. He is also
close to President Bachelet, who appointed him as director of
TVN (National Television) shortly after she assumed the
presidency. Vidal is respected within the Concertacion
coalition and is described by Concertacion contacts as
ambitious, politically shrewd and loyal. He was accessible
to the Embassy and generally supportive of bilateral security
and intelligence cooperation during his brief stint as
Interior Minister at the end of the Lagos presidency.
¶11. (U) His academic and NGO positions include Dean of the
Economic Science and Administrative faculty of Universidad
Central (1998-1999) and Executive Director of Chile 21
Foundation (1994-2000), a center-left think tank that advises
Socialist Party and Party for the Democracy government
officials, political figures and members of Congress.
¶12. (U) A member of the PPD, Vidal served as the party's
vice-president from 1996 to 2000. Vidal is a professor of
history and geography with a master's degree in history from
the University of Chile. Vidal does not speak English.
SIMONS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================