

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04BRUSSELS3782, U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRUSSELS3782.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04BRUSSELS3782 | 2004-09-08 14:36 | 2011-05-12 09:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brussels |
Appears in these articles: http://kaztag.kz |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 003782
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS LAURA KENNEDY, EUR/CACEN, EUR/ERA TOM
LERSTEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV EAID GG AM AJ KZ KG TI TX UZ EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU CONSULTATIONS ON CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA
(COEST)
REF: USEU TODAY 09/02/04
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 1 EUR DAS Laura Kennedy held
semi-annual consultations with the EU on Caucasus and Central
Asia (COEST). Caucasus discussions concentrated on
establishing a political process to resolve the South Ossetia
conflict (Kennedy met separately on South Ossetia with Heikki
Talvitie, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus,
who had just returned from the region -- see ref), and on
reviewing the issues in play in Nagorno-Karabakh with an eye
toward developing a comprehensive plan to move forward.
Regarding both conflicts, interlocutors focused on getting
the Russians to play a positive role and work with, rather
than seek to exclude, the OSCE. COEST participants
consistently emphasized the need for promoting regional
cooperation in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. On
Central Asia, both sides agreed on the importance of building
civil society and coordinating U.S. and EU promotion of
democratic reform and development assistance. Noting this
summer's terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan, the EU said the
Uzbeks had asked them to designate Hizb-ut Tahrir as a
terrorist group (the U.S. has not designated Hizb-ut Tahrir).
END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------------
SOUTH OSSETIA: STARTING A POLITICAL PROCESS
-------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Jan Lucas Van Hoorn, Director of the Southeast and
Eastern Europe Department in the Dutch MFA (the Netherlands
is the current EU president), said the key in South Ossetia
was to keep hostilities from flaring up and introduce
confidence-building measures. He supported Tbilisi OSCE HOM
Roy Reeve's idea of setting up confidence-building working
groups focused on key issues. After those groups had made
progress, added van Hoorn, then a higher-level process could
begin, either via the Joint Control Commission (JCC) or by
reviving the Baden process, as proposed by the U.S. Van
Hoorn noted that the EU would have its Cooperation Council
meetings with all three Caucasus countries on September 14.
On September 13, Dutch FM Bot and EU HighRep Solana would
have dinner with the three FM's from Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Van Hoorn implied that the EU intended to raise
and endorse Reeve's CBM proposal at these meetings.
-------------------------------------
MEANING OF SOUTH OSSETIAN "AUTONOMY?"
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Van Hoorn lamented the lack of clarity on how the
Georgians planned to flesh out the concept of autonomy for
South Ossetia. He said Georgia should be encouraged to make
progress on defining the autonomy for Ajara; that would send
an important, positive signal to the South Ossetians and the
Russians. Kennedy noted the difference between the
situations but agreed that the definition of autonomy was a
crucial element for the future of South Ossetia. She
underlined the role of positive public signals; she said, for
example, that supportive statements such as Georgia had made
to the Russians regarding the recent hostage-taking in North
Ossetia could go a long way toward defusing the tensions with
Russia that were complicating the search for a solution in
South Ossetia. We had consistently urged Saakashvili to
cease inflammatory rhetoric. Now that he had disengaged
militarily, we need to push the Russians to engage
politically.
-----------------------------------
ABKHAZIA: PROGRESS AFTER ELECTIONS?
-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) On Abkhazia, Kennedy suggested that the U.S. and the
EU explore the possibilities for new movement after the
October Abkhaz elections, perhaps by revitalizing the
"Friends of Georgia" process. Van Hoorn agreed, but said the
Dutch experience as 2003 OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CiO) had
been that Abkhazia is "the hardest nut to crack" of all of
the conflicts in the region. He suggested that Georgian
public acceptance of the concept of dual Georgian/Russian
nationality for South Ossetians and Abkhazians could lead to
progress in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Kennedy
cautioned that such a move would reward the Russian policy of
liberally granting Russian citizenship in those regions, and
could be unacceptable to the Georgians.
-----------------------------
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC REFORM
-----------------------------
¶5. (C) Both sides agreed that continued pursuit of economic
reform was a key factor in increasing political stability in
Georgia and the Caucasus in general. Aid channelled through
the Millenium Challenge Corporation -- with its emphasis on
reform -- was key in Georgia. Also, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline would be vital to the future of Georgia
not only as an energy corridor, but also as an example to
other investors of the attractiveness of doing business
there. Kurt Juul, Head of Unit for South Caucasus and
Central Asia in the External Affairs Directorate of the
European Commission, said Commission President Romano Prodi
planned to underscore the importance of economic reform when
he visits the region on September 16. Both sides agreed on
the importance of sending a clear message to Georgian
President Saakashvili that he must not divert his focus from
the need to follow through on his economic reform
initiatives.
------------------------------------------
NAGORNO-KARABAKH: STATE OF PLAY AND RUSSIA
------------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Van Hoorn noted that the September 14 EU Cooperation
Council meeting with the three Caucasus countries would take
place just before the CIS Summit in Astana. Now that
Azerbaijan's President Aliyev has been in office for a year,
the EU hopes to see a clear indication that he will make
progress, van Hoorn asserted. He added that Armenia was
concerned, with good reason, about being excluded from the
development of infrastructure in the region.
¶7. (C) Kennedy noted that the Azeri and Armenian foreign
ministers had met in Prague earlier in the week. U.S. Minsk
Group Co-Chair Steve Mann had reported on a positive meeting;
its focus on technical matters -- access issues, for example
-- was useful. Perhaps after another similar session, the
parties could consider an overall plan. The Azeri foreign
minister seemed to be growing into his role. Kennedy agreed
that the Astana meeting between the leaders was the next key
step.
¶8. (C) COEST participants discussed the need to watch
carefully Russian President Putin's upcoming meeting with his
Armenian and Azeri counterparts in Astana. Putin had
essentially invited himself, possibly intending to cut the
OSCE and the Minsk Group out of future negotiations. Michael
Swann, South Caucasus and Central Asia Desk Officer in the EU
Council Secretariat, remarked that some -- especially in
Azerbaijan -- had "had it" with the Minsk Group, and might
thus be receptive to Putin's efforts to sideline it. Van
Hoorn underscored that the EU would have to provide
Azerbaijan and Armenia with a clear message in support of the
Minsk Group at the upcoming Cooperation Council. Kennedy
added that we also needed to urge the Russians at all levels
to endorse the OSCE and the Minsk Group -- of which Russia is
one of the co-chairs. Van Hoorn said he expected the EU
would take this up at the November 11 EU-Russia Summit in The
Hague.
-----------------------------
CAUCASUS: A REGIONAL APPROACH
-----------------------------
¶9. (C) COEST participants consistently emphasized the need
for a regional -- vice country-by-country -- approach to both
the Caucasus and Central Asia. As Juul portrayed the
Commission point of view, the U.S. and the EU have regional
assistance programs, but interactions with the recipients
tend to focus on individual countries -- this provided each
with the opportunity to blame its problems and failings on
its neighbors. Taking a collective approach and working with
recipient countries as a unit could help break this pattern,
he suggested. On the Caucasus specifically, he commented
that Commission President Prodi's September 16 meetings with
all three leaders (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) would
provide the best near-term opportunity to reinforce messages.
He pointed to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as an
example of the EU -- or at least Commission -- interest in
addressing the region more broadly. Energy would be a
particularly important agenda item in EU discussions with
these three countries, he said. Armenia's nuclear power
plant -- now run by Russians -- was unsafe; the EU had been
trying for years to get it closed. According to Juul, the
Commission was prepared to convene a donors' conference to
raise funds for alternate energy sources; he had hoped the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) would be a source of
contributions, but it appeared that the MCA was focused on
poverty reduction instead.
------------------------------------
CENTRAL ASIA: BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) On Central Asia, both sides agreed on the difficulty
and importance of helping to build civil society. Swann
commented that the EU had to deal with "substandard
governments and substandard civil society" -- the governments
were suspicious of efforts to reach out to NGOs and other
groups, while NGOs and the press tended to take irresponsible
actions that aroused further government suspicion. The U.S.
and EU, suggested van Hoorn, needed to call all parties on
their behavior -- and to encourage further contact between
government and civil society representatives.
--------------------------------------------- -------
CENTRAL ASIA: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, COORDINATING AID
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶11. (C) Kennedy solicited EU support for several assistance
projects in Central Asia. Money was still needed to complete
the bridge from Tajikistan into Afghanistan and the road
leading up to the bridge, she said, and an EU contribution
would be appreciated. The EU declined to respond directly,
but noted that the EU would sign its Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan in October. Juul
pointed out that again, the key was a regional approach; and
Afghanistan is also a part of the region. He said the
Commission was trying to get the Central Asian countries to
work together wherever possible on poverty reduction,
fighting drugs and crime, and governance.
¶12. (C) Key to the regional approach, Kennedy pointed out,
was the OSCE. Kazakhstan's desire for 2009 OSCE Chairmanship
offered the U.S. and EU the opportunity to press for
political reform and better respect for human rights. An
important near-term indicator would be how Kazakhstan
conducted its September elections. Van Hoorn agreed, saying
Kazakhstan today was a poor candidate, but the decision
doesn't need to be made until 2008. In the meantime, the EU
has not reached a "common position" on Kazakhstan's bid but
will wait and see how it evolves. Given Russia's concerns
with the OSCE, he said, it would be "interesting" to have a
CIS country as chairman. However, he noted that Kazakhstan
had signed the CIS statement critical of the OSCE; he added
that the EU had pointed out to the Kazakhs that this was
inconsistent with seeking the OSCE chairmanship. Van Hoorn
said Commissioner Patten had leaned heavily on Kazakhstan
during his March visit on issues such as the proposed media
law and elections. The media law has since been withdrawn,
and Van Hoorn concluded that U.S. and EU efforts can lead to
changes in Kazakhstan.
¶13. (C) It was also important that Turkmenistan, despite its
autocratic dictatorship, not be isolated. A central factor
in keeping engaged with Turkmenistan would be to find a
successor for the OSCE HOM in Ashgabat, Paraschiva Badescu,
who could be equally effective in pressing for human rights
and civil society. Kennedy urged U.S.-EU cooperation in the
search for the right successor; the worst signal that could
be sent to Ashgabat would be if no qualified candidate could
be found.
¶14. (C) Returning to the topic of civil society and
coordinating assistance, Kennedy urged the EU to support
independent media in Kyrgyzstan by funding the Freedom House
printing press there. Juul noted that the Commission's TACIS
program was not structured for this type of assistance, but
Van Hoorn and the Council Secretariat were receptive to using
the EU's COEST Working Group to identify possible EU member
states who could provide bilateral assistance. (USEU
subsequently provided the EU Council with a non-paper
outlining the need for donors to support independent media in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and with details on the road spur
between the Afghan border and the Tajik town of Dusti.)
------------------------
UZBEKISTAN AND TERRORISM
------------------------
¶15. (C) EU representatives were very interested in how
Tashkent had reacted to the U.S. decision earlier this year
not to certify Uzbekistan, and sought U.S. views on the
likelihood of instability in a post-Karimov era. Kennedy
noted our hopes to continue to engage Uzbekistan on the
reform front; we hoped to send a senior official to discuss
economic reform. Noting this summer's terrorist attacks on
US and Israeli embassies, Van Hoorn asked whether we had
added a group called Hizb-ut Tahrir to our list of terrorist
groups; he said that the EU would consider this soon but he
was not himself convinced that the group should be so
designated. Van der Togt opined that there are no legal
grounds for banning them in most other EU countries,
especially given the group's vague message -- it is hard, he
said, to determine exactly what the organization stands for
or intends to do. Van der Togt added that the Uzbeks raise
this group with the Dutch "all the time" in meetings. (NOTE:
Uzbekistan has also approached the U.S. repeatedly with the
same request, but the USG has not designated the group as a
terrorist organization. END NOTE.)
¶16. (C) COMMENT: In the course of discussions, Kennedy
suggested that the agenda for the next COEST meeting include
a more detailed discussion of coordination of development
assistance and offered to include a representative from
EUR/ACE on the U.S. delegation for that purpose. The EU
welcomed the proposal. END COMMENT.
¶17. (U) This message has been cleared by EUR DAS Laura
Kennedy.
SCHNABEL