

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08WELLINGTON392, NEW ZEALAND - HOSTED PSI EXERCISE MARU
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08WELLINGTON392.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08WELLINGTON392 | 2008-11-19 04:44 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO4316
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0392/01 3240444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190444Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
INFO RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 1800
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5330
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0764
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000392
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR PREL PTER NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND - HOSTED PSI EXERCISE MARU
WELLINGTON 00000392 001.2 OF 004
¶1. (U) Summary: In September 2008, the United
States participated in the New Zealand-hosted
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise,
MARU, in the Hauraki Gulf and the port of Auckland,
New Zealand. MARU was the thirty-sixth PSI exercise
since the inception of the initiative in 2003. The
exercise included the participation of Asia-Pacific
nations and many global PSI partners. MARU was
unique among PSI exercises in that it incorporated
live exercise play into a table top exercise
focusing on post-interdiction disposition issues.
Additionally, MARU had a strong customs and law
enforcement focus, with military support
highlighting the interagency nature of PSI
activities. Plenary sessions allowed discussion of
issues such as legal standards for action, and
intelligence sharing, by representatives of the 29
countries present. End summary.
¶2. (U) From September 13-19 2008, the New Zealand
Customs Service (NZCS) hosted the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise MARU in Auckland.
The 31-member USG delegation included
representatives from several parts of the Department
of Defense, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), the FBI, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S.
European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Seventh Fleet,
and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Consulate General
Auckland also played an active role, with the
Consular Chief acting as a group leader for plenary
discussions, and the Ambassador paying a visit to
the U.S. delegation's task force workroom.
Including the United States, there were eight
countries participating in the exercise, eleven
countries observing which have formally endorsed the
PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and ten
countries observing which have not endorsed these
PSI principles.
--------------------------------
Exercise MARU Overview and Goals
--------------------------------
¶3. (U) Exercise MARU consisted of several phases,
including live exercises (LIVEX) dealing with
maritime interception and interdiction, LIVEX port
search demonstrations, and a tabletop exercise (TTX)
gaming phase exploring post-interdiction disposition
issues. The exercise also included substantial
outreach efforts to the attending non-endorsee
delegations and an industry workshop dealing with
trade security. Objectives for the exercise
included:
- To demonstrate the law enforcement approach of
PSI, which includes the interdiction, investigation
and prosecution of proliferators attempting to
circumvent domestic and international laws.
- To give PSI partner countries an opportunity to
participate in a maritime interdiction operation
involving interception (location), surveillance
(tracking), and interdiction (ship-boarding).
- To advance understanding of issues related to
interdiction, flag state consent, diversion,
liability, proliferation network investigation, and
the gathering of evidence to support prosecution.
- To raise the profile of weapons of mass
WELLINGTON 00000392 002.2 OF 004
destruction (WMD) proliferation issues in the Asia-
Pacific region and to enable non-PSI states to
understand better the initiative and its
contributions to nonproliferation.
- To advance industry engagement and technical
outreach regarding PSI.
- To advance understanding of information and
intelligence sharing at national and international
levels.
¶4. The exercise was the first of its kind in several
respects, including that it was the first PSI
exercise to include TTX game play that dealt
primarily with the decision-making process after the
interdiction of a shipment of proliferation concern.
--------------------------------------------- -------
The Live Exercise and its Corresponding TTX Scenario
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶5. (SBU) MARU followed a general scenario designed
to test the exercise objectives, using the transfer
of proliferation-related dual use materials between
two countries of concern (RED and GREEN) as the core
of its storyline. Intelligence and information
gathered by the participating countries indicated
that COUNTRY GREEN was attempting to procure
materials, equipment, and technology necessary for
its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs
from COUNTRY RED. To avoid detection of the
transfer of these goods (which would be in violation
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
against the two countries), the WMD components were
transported by an indirect route, transshipping
through several countries, and repackaged in new
containers to mask the origin and final destination.
The materials included Missile Technology Control
Regime-controlled aluminum powder, metal sheets and
ball bearings, as well as various hazardous
chemicals. In addition to trying to conceal the
transfer of materials by a circuitous route, the
materials had also been given false end-users and
had been improperly manifested.
¶6. (SBU) In the scenario, the materials had been
sent in four identified containers from COUNTRY
RED's procurement network in Asia to Singapore by
the vessel Redstar. Following this, three of the
containers were loaded on the vessel MV Seabreeze,
destined for transit through the Port of Tauranga in
New Zealand next, before being transshipped once
again to ports in Europe, from which the
proliferation network of COUNTRY GREEN would then
again re-route the cargo to GREEN. However,
intelligence and information gathered from several
countries determined while the shipments aboard the
Seabreeze were in transit that it would be necessary
to locate, track, and board the vessel. A decision
was also made within the scenario that it would be
necessary to divert the Seabreeze to the Port of
Auckland rather than allow it to continue to
Tauranga. The corresponding live and tabletop
exercises explored: the operational capabilities to
perform these actions; the necessary international
cooperation and information sharing involved; the
ramifications for this type of interdiction
including the ability to conduct a criminal case
against the involved parties; further investigation
of the proliferation network; and the costs of
interdiction, including which parties would be
liable for these costs.
WELLINGTON 00000392 003.2 OF 004
---------------------
The Tabletop Exercise
---------------------
¶7. (SBU) In the weeks prior to Exercise MARU, and
continuing through the LIVEX, participant countries
(with the exception of France) were involved in a
table-top game which built further upon the
activities being demonstrated in the live exercising
phases.
¶8. (SBU) Before the exercise, participant countries
received scenario "injects" with information and
intelligence related to the COUNTRY RED and COUNTRY
GREEN proliferation networks, including intelligence
on the transfer of shipments and associated
individuals and front companies connected to the
networks. The injects contained information limited
to only certain countries, forcing participant
administrations to determine if they wish to share
the intelligence further with other countries based
on its potential sensitivity. The injects continued
on September 15, 16, and 17 as the LIVEX was going
on, and reflected a series of situation updates
based on actions occurring within the LIVEX about
the shipment of the three suspect containers aboard
the MV Seabreeze, and also occurring with a fourth
container identified already in New Zealand. This
latter container was held and intended for export by
the New Zealand-based front company (SCIFO Ltd NZ)
associated with the other three inbound suspect
containers (and was likely the fourth container from
the Redstar, illegally transited to NZ with its
origin hidden). This fourth container was inspected
and determined to contain controlled dual-use
strategic goods including radial ball bearings and
stainless steel sheets, which were not properly
licensed for export.
¶9. (SBU) During the tabletop exercise, the seven
participating countries manned country-room
operations centers, and communicated with one
another and with the Exercise MARU Ops Center by
computer message and occasional interpersonal
interplay. The focus throughout the game play was
to gain sufficient information from other playing
countries to build as strong a case as possible
against the proliferation network involved in the
illicit movement of the WMD-related materials. In
this effort, the exercise players dealt with and
shared potentially sensitive intelligence which
might well not be obtained, or released in court, in
the real world.
---------------------------
Plenary Session Discussions
---------------------------
¶10. (SBU) Throughout the week of the exercise,
additional activities enriched the experience of all
countries involved, participating and observing
states alike. An example was an industry workshop
dealing with trade security. Perhaps of most use
overall were the plenary sessions held in the last
two days, which discussed independently issues that
the countries participating in the TTX were dealing
with, and which finally served as a summation of the
whole week's activity. Some of these central
questions were:
-What domestic and international authorities do
governments have to divert, board, and search a
WELLINGTON 00000392 004.2 OF 004
vessel?
-What domestic and international legal authorities
do governments have to detain goods and claim
jurisdiction?
-What evidence are countries properly relying on to
divert, board, search, and detain goods, and how can
countries address the issues of information
classification and intelligence sharing?
-What information can or should be shared with the
media through the investigative process?
Participant countries played the strongest role in
attempting to answer these questions, explaining
their respective decision-making process, and the
various laws and authorities used within that
process.
-------
Comment
-------
¶11. (SBU) By all accounts, Exercise MARU was a
resounding success. The Ambassador and the Acting
Consul General in Auckland visited the virtual U.S.
Ops Center, and were impressed with the complexity
of the exercise and the quality of the U.S.
involvement. The field visits to New Zealand
military installations, and especially the at-sea
boarding exercises, contributed a strong sense of
immediacy. But the tabletop exercise was the major
revelation, as it brought to focus the very real
issues that would have to be confronted while states
were trying to balance combating the threats of
today's world with maintaining the legal norms that
make our societies worth preserving. There was a
tremendous spirit of collegiality among the several
hundred people assembled, which spoke well of what
they had accomplished together, and what these
continuing efforts could accomplish still.
MCCORMICK