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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA10826, GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER ON PARAMILITARY LINKS TO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA10826 | 2006-11-29 22:29 | 2011-02-20 12:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0826/01 3332229
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 292229Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1088
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 7288
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 8468
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 8383
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 4516
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9521
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0351
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 9788
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0987
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 5174
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 4257
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 2210
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0128
RUEHBO/USMILGP BOGOTA CO IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1402
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010826
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PTER CO CS CU FR NO SP SZ
SUBJECT: GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER ON PARAMILITARY LINKS TO
GOC OFFICIALS, ELN AND THE FARC
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo said
the GOC is committed to uncovering the truth about
paramilitary links to Colombia's political, economic, and
military elites, but warned that the process would produce
substantial political and institutional costs. He is urging
President Uribe to reach out to opposition political parties
in an effort to agree on a unified approach to manage the
institutional damage resulting from the revelations. He does
not expect any breakthroughs at the next round of ELN talks,
but hopes to make progress on substantive issues. Restrepo
said the GOC has authorized the accompanying countries to
convey to the FARC that the GOC will not agree to talks on a
humanitarian accord unless the FARC halts terrorist actions,
makes a good faith gesture such as providing proof of life,
and puts forth a viable proposal. End Summary
Revelations of Colombian Congress-Paramilitary Ties
¶2. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo told us
November 22 the GOC supports the ongoing judicial
investigations of links between Colombian Congressmen and
paramilitary leaders. The peace process aimed to produce the
truth about paramilitary crimes*including their links to
regional political, economic and military elites*and the
revelations will continue. This is key to helping Colombia
break with its past. Still, he said the GOC is paying a high
political cost, since many of the congressmen involved are
members of President Uribe's coalition. The GOC's failure to
capture paramilitary leader Vicente Castano and other
paramilitary fugitives, its inability to prevent the
emergence of new criminal groups, and the Fiscalia's slow
implementation of the Justice and Peace Law are exacerbating
this problem.
¶3. (C) Restrepo said the danger is that opposition political
parties will continue to exploit the exposure of
paramilitary-political class links for purely partisan
advantage. This will not only damage President Uribe and his
government, but will also severely undermine the credibility
and effectiveness of Colombia's public institutions.
Restrepo said he is urging President Uribe to try to agree
with the opposition Liberal and Polo Democratico parties on a
unified approach to manage the institutional damage resulting
from the investigations. He recognized that such a deal
would require the GOC to offer the opposition concrete
advantages, including government positions and a commitment
to pursue the investigations wherever they might lead.
Restrepo said such an agreement would be difficult to
achieve, especially given the personal bitterness between
many political leaders, but said it would be worth it to
structure the public political debate.
Paramilitary Leaders in La Ceja and New Criminal Groups
¶4. (C) Restrepo said the paramilitary leaders in La Ceja
"feel trapped" and cannot agree on a common strategy.
Leaders such as Jorge 40 and Macaco are losing control over
their organizations, and fear the newly emerging criminal
groups. Omega, Jorge 40's main military leader, was killed
on November 18 in Medellin by narcotraffickers intent on
seizing 40's territory. Restrepo said La Ceja group is
looking to Vicente Castano for leadership. The November 6
letter by Castano accusing the GOC of violating its deal with
the paramilitaries was drafted in consultation with the La
Ceja detainees, and the group is increasingly unwilling to
cooperate with the JPL process. Restrepo doubted that more
than 50 paramilitaries would eventually ratify their
willingness to confess under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL).
He said the GOC would subject those who do not ratify to the
ordinary justice system, including extradition, but warned
this would involve security, political and legal risks.
¶5. (C) Restrepo said Vicente Castano offered to meet with him
November 21 under specific conditions, but he had refused.
Restrepo said the GOC is searching for Castano, but it would
be difficult to locate and detain him. The paramilitary
leader has deep pockets, operates his businesses through
multiple intermediaries, and is prepared to spend years on
the run. Restrepo said the GOC faces similar difficulties in
combating new criminal groups. Narcotraffickers*including
the FARC*are linking up with former paramilitary mid-level
commanders to build their own military capacity. The rural
police, or carabineros, have captured 460 members of these
groups, but have been unable to destroy a single organization
or to arrest their growth. Restrepo claimed current
counternarcotics efforts are ineffective, making it difficult
for the GOC to halt the formation of new, narco-based,
paramilitary groups.
ELN
¶6. (C) Restrepo does not expect the next round of talks in
Havana in December to produce any breakthroughs, but hopes to
make some progress on substantive issues. The GOC will try
to use the ELN's desire for international funding to press
for ELN commitments on a ceasefire and a halt to kidnapping.
It is unacceptable for the ELN to continue kidnapping, which
it does at the rate of a victim a week, while talks continue.
He would meet with ELN negotiators Antonio Garcia, Francisco
Galan, and Juan Cuellar, as well as the accompanying
countries, in Caracas on November 23 to lay the groundwork
for the Havana meeting. Restrepo reiterated his fear that
the ELN is not serious about an agreement, and is only using
the talks to strengthen its ties with civil society and the
international community. He conceded, however, that the GOC
is not prepared to break off talks at this point.
¶7. (C) Restrepo complained the GOC receives little help from
other participants in the negotiations. The accompanying
countries*Spain, Norway and Switzerland*routinely yield to
the ELN or adopt a neutral stance. For example, the ELN
claims it has a commitment from Norway to provide it with
500,000 Euros with no strings attached. The soft approach of
the accompanying countries toward the ELN complicates his
efforts to use international funding as leverage in the
negotiations. He said the guarantors are "unreliable" and
have no influence over the ELN. Lastly, Restrepo noted that
the civil society participants are all ELN sympathizers or
GOC critics.
FARC
¶8. (C) Restrepo said he met with representative of the three
accompanying countries*Spain, France and Switzerland*in
Paris in early November to explain the GOC's decision to
break off overtures to the FARC after the group's October 19
bombing in Bogota. He also outlined the GOC's position that
no talks on a humanitarian accord could occur until the FARC
suspended terrorist actions, made a good faith gesture such
as providing proof of life, and put forth a viable proposal
for discussion. Restrepo said the French were initially
critical of the GOC position, but later voiced understanding.
He said the GOC approved a request by the countries to reach
out to the FARC to convey the GOC stance. Restrepo added
that President Uribe had also authorized political operator
Alvaro Leyva to do the same.
¶9. (C) Despite these contacts, Restrepo doubted the FARC
would respond favorably. The FARC continues to believe it
can outlast President Uribe. With each Colombian legislator
tied to the paramilitaries, the FARC feel politically
stronger vis--vis the GOC. The recent mistrial in the Simon
Trinidad case further inflated the FARC's sense of its
political power. Moreover, FARC success in infiltrating
territory vacated by the paramilitaries has strengthened its
military position on the ground and made the group even more
intransigent.
¶10. (C) Restrepo said the GOC has "great hopes" that
increased use of high technology weapons*coupled with
improved intelligence*will enable it to kill or capture a
FARC secretariat member, thereby forcing the FARC to begin
serious negotiations. He said a GOC success against a
Secretariat member would be a serious blow to the group's
SIPDIS
mystique and image of invincibility. Still, Restrepo said
such an action alone would be unlikely to bring the FARC to
the negotiating table.
WOOD
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