

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AEMR
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AMCHAMS
AGMT
AADP
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BX
BT
BP
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CR
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CODEL
COPUOS
CIA
CFED
CARSON
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CN
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
EPET
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
ENIV
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXIM
ERNG
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IO
IT
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
IDP
ICTR
IEFIN
IRC
ITRA
ITALY
INRB
INTELSAT
IBET
IRAQI
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KIRF
KSEO
KVPR
KSEP
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KRIM
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KMFO
KMOC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KREC
KX
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTRE
MASC
MG
MARAD
MRCRE
MW
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NATIONAL
NGO
NR
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OECD
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PCI
PG
POGOV
PHUMPGOV
PEL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PMIL
POV
PRL
PDOV
PTBS
PRAM
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
ROOD
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SG
SPCE
SK
STEINBERG
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SEN
SANC
SWE
SHI
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
THPY
TP
TBID
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UY
UNCHR
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNMIK
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
USUN
USNC
UNIDROIT
UNO
UNCND
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS7424, SEGOLENE ROYAL'S VICTORY MOVES HER CLOSER TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PARIS7424.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS7424 | 2006-11-17 14:34 | 2010-12-01 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO2415
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #7424/01 3211434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171434Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3171
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007424
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV ELAB EU FR PINR SOCI ECON
SUBJECT: SEGOLENE ROYAL'S VICTORY MOVES HER CLOSER TO
PRESIDENCY
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Segolene Royal's overwhelming first-round
victory in the November 16 Socialist Party (PS) presidential
primary makes it official -- she will be the candidate of the
center-left in next year's presidential election, likely in a
tight race against the center-right's Nicolas Sarkozy. The
win is a testament to Royal's ability to confound France's
purveyors of conventional political wisdom and her own party
establishment. Both regularly underestimated her and
discounted her ability to go the distance. Royal's success
has been her ability -- as a Blair-like socialist -- to deal
with issues non-ideologically through the prism of their
impact on ordinary people, with a focus on concrete,
operational proposals that she is willing to jettison if they
prove unworkable.
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT. Royal has demonstrated these same
traits in the foreign affairs arena, where her recent
statements in support of the democratic government in Iraq
and against even a civilian nuclear program in Iran were met
with condescension by elites, but seem not to have hurt her
with PS voters. If she were to be elected President, we
would expect criticism of U.S. "unilateralism", environmental
policies, and more. But her years working in Mitterrand's
Elysee also portend an openness to pragmatic cooperation with
the U.S. End Summary.
THE PRIMARY ELECTION RESULTS
----------------------------
¶3. (C) On November 16, in an overwhelming vote of confidence
in her ability to win, over 60 percent of PS party members
endorsed Segolene Royal as their party's candidate in the
2007 presidential race. Of the 176,220 votes cast by PS
party members throughout metropolitan France, Royal received
106,839, former Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn,
36,714 former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius 32,667. Ever
since Royal launched her bid for the presidency, France's
purveyors of conventional political wisdom have been
discounting her ability to go the distance. Royal has proved
them wrong each time. The Sarkozy camp now understands it
will be facing a formidable opponent, whom they would
underestimate at their own peril. Throughout the race, Royal
displayed the energy, conviction, charisma, and physical
stamina that have made her a leading contender to be elected
France's next president.
A FIFTY PERCENT CHANCE OF BEING FRANCE'S
----------------------------------------
NEXT PRESIDENT
--------------
¶4. (C) Royal's clear-cut victory in the first-round of the
PS primary election confirms her as the unchallenged leader
of the center-left in France. It sets up a showdown between
her and Interior Minister Sarkozy for France's presidency in
¶2007. Analysts agree that if the dominance of the
presidential field by these two major candidates holds, the
second round run-off between them will be very, very close.
Though the unexpected -- including major missteps by these
leading candidates during their campaigns -- could still
reconfigure the electoral landscape, dislodging one or the
other becomes more and more difficult as the election draws
nearer.
FUSING HER POPULARITY (AND HER CURRENT
--------------------------------------
ORGANIZATION) WITH HER PARTY
-----------------------------
¶5. (C) Royal's primary victory gives her allies in the PS
unchallenged control of the party apparatus. Party chief
Francois Hollande, who is also Royal's long-time domestic
partner, will be instrumental in putting the party fully in
the service of Royal's campaign. The next step for Royal is
"making the party headquarters my campaign headquarters."
According to one of her closest allies in the party
hierarchy, her campaign strategy projects two key lines of
action: "continuing to be what has made her popular," while
bringing to bear the party's electioneering expertise and
energizing the party's dense network of elected officials
throughout the country.
¶6. (C) Royal's upcoming campaign will continue to feature
PARIS 00007424 002 OF 003
the personal characteristics on which her popularity is
founded, while also working to improve some of her weaknesses
as a candidate. She has shown a vulnerability to getting
rattled during TV appearances or before hostile publics.
Because she has not had top-level experience in some issue
areas, particularly foreign affairs, deepening her command of
these briefs will be a top priority.
THE CORE OF THE "SEGOLENE PHENOMENON"
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) PS Party spokesman and long time Royal ally Julian
Dray recently enumerated to us the four personal
characteristics that make Royal so popular. They are the key
elements of "the Segolene story" that connects so powerfully
with such a wide electorate.
-- First, "She's a mom." Royal has raised four children with
Hollande. That experience, according to Dray, "gives
ordinary people confidence" that she might be genuinely
caring towards them also -- very different from the
subliminal sentiments towards ordinary people associated with
members of France's aloof and inbred political class.
-- Second, "She has a successful marriage." Even though
Royal and Hollande have never legally married, their
long-standing relationship is viewed as an exemplary "success
in love" -- and people admire that, wishing for the same in
their own lives.
-- Third, "She's a beautiful woman." This element of novelty
and of gender equality -- with a touch of feminist revanchism
in an electorate that is 53 percent female thrown in -- are
part and parcel of Royal's success.
-- Finally, "She's highly competent." Royal has
distinguished herself through her professional achievements.
Her rise -- notwithstanding her family's modest means and
very traditionalist social values (i.e. women become wives,
not presidents) -- through France's witheringly competitive
educational meritocracy, are recognized by voters as those of
an extraordinary individual, worthy of consideration for
France's highest office.
CRITICAL OF U.S. APPROACH, YET OFTEN
------------------------------------
STILL IN SYNCH ON SUBSTANCE
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Royal, as is to be expected from the standard bearer
of France's center-left Socialist Party, can be quite direct,
even harsh in her assessments of U.S. foreign policy
initiatives. As is the case nearly across the board -- left
and right -- among the members of France's political class,
Royal has made clear that she opposed the U.S.-led invasion
of Iraq in 2003, and what she saw as the high-handed U.S.
dismissal of multilateral, UN-led efforts to defuse the
crisis. However, in some of her more recent statements on
Iraq, Royal has clearly broken with the conventional wisdom
in France, particularly that of the French left. After a
meeting with Iraqi president Jalal Talibabi in Paris last
November 3, Royal told reporters that, despite all the
problems there, Iraq "is getting back on its feet." She
underlined that the Iraqi government, "not outsiders" should
decide "when the time has come" for withdrawal of foreign
forces from the country. Reflecting her penchant for seeing
war and peace problems in terms of their effect on the lives
of everyday people first (rather than in terms of balance of
power among states, regional stability, etc.), Royal stressed
the importance of "a swift reconstruction of that country,
which was so ravaged by dictatorship, so that the Iraqi
people who have suffered so so much (emphasis hers) might
recover their dignity and their self-confidence, and desire
to get back on the road to success."
¶9. (C) Repeatedly, in her pronouncements on international
issues, Royal has insisted on the legitimacy and pre-eminence
of the U.N. in acting against threats to international peace
and security. Royal's statements on the conflict in Lebanon
last summer, for example, reflected the view that ending the
suffering of the conflict's civilian casualties (on both
sides) should be the first priority, addressed by an
immediate cease-fire, to be followed by UN-mediated
disengagement, and the disarming of Hezbollah. In addition,
she proposed that former President Clinton be considered as a
special UN mediator for the conflict. A Royal advisor
pointed to this proposal as illustrative of her inclination
to personalize political issues. Royal's reaction to the
Israel-Hezbollah confrontation -- seeing the crisis first and
foremost through the prism of its impact on ordinary people,
PARIS 00007424 003 OF 003
while advocating the empowerment of the UN to seek a
longer-term solution -- reflect what is likely to be Royal's
approach to international conflicts. In Dray's words, spoken
as a close friend of Royal's for many years, "She's not
interested in the theory, and approaches problems in terms of
what's being proposed to solve them." If true, this would
certainly represent a refreshing break from the ingrained
French preference for the theoretical over the empirical.
¶10. (C) In her recent statements specifically about the
U.S., Royal has not been shy about criticizing what she has
repeatedly termed the "attitude" of the U.S. -- America's
willingness to act outside of the consensus of the
international community. Royal's America-bashing however,
concerns more the form of U.S. policy than its substance. In
fact, to the extent she has expressed herself on them, her
views on some key issues are in fact quite close to those of
the U.S. A striking example of this is the way Royal has
been the most outspoken of France's major political figures
about the danger posed by Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.
She has spoken explicitly about the threat to Israel's
existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the current
Iranian leadership, and has gone so far as to suggest that
Iran's civil nuclear program, because it is a stepping-stone
to a weapons program, is illegitimate in light of Iran's
reneging on its non-proliferation obligations.
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C) If elected -- and that is a big if that is still a
long way down the road -- Royal appears to be someone who
would approach world affairs pragmatically and would seek to
maintain a close, if critical, relationship with the U.S.
There may be a fresh opportunity for Washington policy makers
to take her measure if, as we know her staff is considering,
she goes through with plans to visit the U.S. at some point
before the end of January, when the presidential campaign
begins in earnest. End Comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON