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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA1067, ORTEGA,S FIRST 100 DAYS -- AUTOCRATIC TRENDS DRAW
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VZCZCXRO7160
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1067/01 1152235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 252235Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9973
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1072
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0044
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MANAGUA 001067
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHA/CEN, DRL, NEA, USAID FOR AA/LAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL KDEM NU SNAR IR
SUBJECT: ORTEGA,S FIRST 100 DAYS -- AUTOCRATIC TRENDS DRAW
CONCERN
REF: A. MANAGUA 1028
¶B. MANAGUA 0583
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: In its first 100 days, President Ortega's
government was characterized by a blur between party and
state; autocracy and secrecy; dependency on Chavez; disregard
for law and human rights; the dismissal of thousands of
government employees; and, a pointed effort to financially
"starve" independent media and threaten certain foreign
business interests. The administration's most resounding and
uncontested success was its refusal to back the Japanese on
whaling, while the downtick in electrical blackouts came at a
steep price: political and economic bondage to Chavez. The
announcement of free health and education looked good on
paper, but these sectors lack the required infrastructure,
qualified personnel, and material resources to provide
adequate services. The National Police's flawed interception
of a Mexican drug cartel was partly due to its failure to
coordinate with the DEA. We also note a downturn in
cooperation from airport, immigration, and customs
authorities in terms of access and information sharing.
¶2. (C) Ortega exploited every available media opportunity to
laud Chavez and their common allies Cuba and Iran, while he
criticized the United States for being the root cause of
narcotrafficking, failing to compensate Nicaragua for mining
its harbors in the 1980s, violating human rights in Iraq and
Guantanamo, and releasing Posada Cariles on bond. Countries
on good terms with the United States also came under fire,
even Brazil for having the "moxy" to cooperate on ethanol.
The rudderless opposition was increasingly vocal, while
Nicaragua's frightened business elite curried Ortega's favor
and avoided confrontation. Signs emerged that left and
right-leaning civil society and political leaders are
starting to coalesce to counter Ortega's authoritarian
tendencies and apparent ambitions to turn Nicaragua into an
autocratic, populist regime. Sandinista dissidents tended to
be the most vigorous critics of the government, while to
Ortega's delight, Liberals spent most of their time
bickering. The opposition faces a foe flush with Chavez
petrodollars, thus far free from the scrutiny of the National
Assembly -- the only partially independent government
institution remaining. End Summary.
Whales the Most Solid Beneficiaries
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) During its first 100 days, Ortega's government was
characterized by the blur between party and state; a close
association with the Chavez axis; autocracy and secrecy;
disregard for rule of law and human rights; the dismissal of
thousands of government employees; and, a pointed effort to
financially "starve" independent media and threaten certain
foreign (and domestic) business interests. Likely, Ortega's
most resounding and uncontested success was his refusal to
back the Japanese on whaling. The downtick in electrical
blackouts was welcome, but came at a price: the Venezuelan
diesel burning gensets produce some of the country's most
costly power, whether or not Nicaragua has to pay for them.
While the government decided to negotiate a new IMF deal,
Ortega also declared that Nicaragua will be "IMF free" within
five years through a home grown, Chavez-financed "Zero
Poverty" initiative, whose centerpiece is a project that
provides chicks and a pregnant cow and pig to poor families.
¶4. (C) The new government's decision to reduce senior-level
government official salaries and offer free health and
education for all citizens sounded good on paper, but thus
far has produced dubious results. Cynical Nicaraguans claim
that Ortega's cuts in the salaries of senior officials will
also force out high-level civil servants, who do not support
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Those who
remain will ultimately receive bonuses or supplemental FSLN
salaries behind the scenes. (Note: This was a common
practice during previous governments.) Skeptics also note
that inadequate infrastructure, insufficient personnel, and a
scarcity of a number of basic medicines make Ortega's
promises for free education and health care ring hollow.
¶5. (C) The spate of education and health worker protests for
MANAGUA 00001067 002 OF 005
higher wages and the Ortega administration's heavy-handed
response in some cases, also drew well-merited fire from
human rights organizations. In its 100-day report, the
Nicaraguan Human Rights Center (CENDIH) -- a left-leaning,
traditionally pro-Sandinista human rights NGO -- lambasted
Ortega for allowing an armed mob led by a Cuban-Nicaraguan to
raid one of the secondary schools and physically remove its
besieged director while the National Police looked on.
Similarly, the inaction of the Ortega government in
responding to the right-leaning Permanent Human Rights
Commission's (CPDH) repeated pleas for protection after a
number of its leaders received death threats caused CENIDH to
question the new government and prompted it to file an appeal
on behalf of the CPDH before the OAS Inter-American Human
Rights Commission (IAHRC). Ortega's insistence on running
the Presidency from FSLN headquarters, which is also his
private residence, drew considerable fire as well.
¶6. (C) Opposition media continued to feel the heat. As
government-sponsored advertising dried up, some media outlets
were forced to lay off employees, including journalists. In
President Ortega's latest public appearance the evening of
April 23, he launched a five-minute tirade against "the other
media, we know who they are, who are guilty of censorship and
attempting to limit freedom of expression." He praised all
Nicaraguan television stations for covering the event, except
for one, Channel 2, which he did not mention by name, but
blasted for refusing to broadcast unedited versions of
Ortega's increasingly frequent and long diatribes.
Daniel Slips Some in the Polls
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) According to an M and R poll released on April 24
(septel), President Ortega's popularity slipped somewhat in
comparison to the results of a February Cid Gallup poll. In
the April poll, 42.5% of the respondents opined that that
Ortega is leading the country in the right direction, down
from 57% in February. While 27.9% believe the president's
performance is good to very good, 63.7% believe he is doing a
fair to terrible job. First Lady Rosario Murillo received
lower marks: only 22.7% believed her performance is good-very
good. Over 64% of the respondents either do not support or
have their doubts about the government. Over 50% of the
April respondents questioned Ortega's authoritarianism,
including 26.6% of the Sandinista respondents. About 78%
rejected Ortega's substitution of the state seal with a
psychedelic party-based emblem, 77.8% opposed presidential
reelection, 73.3% disapproved of Cardinal Obando's
participation in the Ortega government, and 70% think Ortega
has not delivered on his campaign promise to reduce
unemployment.
Economic Picture, Business Climate
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (C) As promised, Ortega has made few changes to fiscal
and monetary policy since taking office, and the government,
of its own volition, is negotiating a new program with the
IMF. By most accounts, consumer demand has remained strong,
tax receipts are up, and people continue to deposit money
into their bank accounts. Large investments announced before
the elections, most noticeably ITG/Cone Denim's $100 million
textile plant, are going forward. Exports continue to grow
in number and volume as the result of CAFTA and Central
American economic integration. Ortega's presence is felt on
his "Zero Hunger" program (which has yet to take shape),
"free education and health care," and forging cooperative
agreements and off-budget financing with "new friends."
(Note: Free and universal education and health care systems
have been in place in Nicaragua for years. The difference
now is that the Ortega government has eliminated the system
of supplemental payments for school supplies, medicines,
etc.).
¶9. (C) This otherwise bright picture contrasts with the
consistent drum beat of Ortega's political message that
liberal economic policies have not worked and that the role
of government must be enhanced. Ortega compares the
fraternal, socialist nature of his relations with Venezuela,
Cuba, Bolivia, and Iran with the self-interested,
capitalistic nature of the United States. This has been
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coupled with an agency-by-agency review of the activities of
the previous administration to drum up accusations of
corruption and discredit "neoliberalism." Highly educated
technocrats who do not support the FSLN have been forced out
of key positions in economic ministries and replaced by party
hacks. Major government contracts with the private sector
have come under review, especially foreign companies in the
energy sector, with frequent revelations to the press that
one or the other contract is null and void. La Prensa
recently reported on an internal government document
proposing that all public services in which the private
sector participates be "renationalized".
¶10. (C) The result has been that investors, both domestic
and foreign, have begun to re-evaluate their presence in
Nicaragua. Ortega's political discourse and embrace of
self-declared enemies of the United States is unsettling.
Legal challenges to long-standing government contracts raise
questions about the motivation of government, the rule of
law, and the sanctity of contracts. While foreign investors
with ongoing concerns continue to do business, they have
started to consider contingencies. Others who once
contemplated Nicaragua have put their investment plans on
hold. The perception of rising political risk is affecting
business decisions. (Comment: Three different Nicaraguan
investors have told us that they have been shifting their
holdings and assets outside of the country, mostly to Costa
Rica and the United States.)
Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran Can Do No Wrong
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¶11. (C) Ortega consolidated his alliance with Venezuela,
Cuba, and Iran. While the Venezuela and Cuba connection drew
some criticism, of even more concern was Ortega's association
with Iran following the Iranian President's visit to Managua
on the heels of Ortega's inauguration in January. Then
during the Iranian Foreign Minister's "surprise" visit to
Managua on April 22, Ortega publicly endorsed Iran's efforts
to enrich uranium and rejected the UN-imposed sanctions.
(Note: To date, the National Assembly has not ratified the
GON's agreement with the Government of Iran. Nicaraguan
Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS),
and many Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) National Assembly
deputies oppose the agreement, in large part because of the
clause that stipulates mutual support in international fora.)
"Gringo Bashing" is Back . . .
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (C) President Ortega exploited every available media
opportunity to laud Chavez and their common allies Cuba and
Iran, while he criticized the United States for being the
root cause of narcotrafficking and much of the region's other
criminal activities, failing to compensate Nicaragua for
mining its harbors in the 1980s, violating human rights in
Iraq and Guantanamo, and releasing Posada Cariles on bond.
Countries on good terms with the United States -- including
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Colombia also came under fire, and
to a lesser degree, Mexico and Brazil -- the latter for its
"moxy" in cooperating with the United States on ethanol.
.. . And Bilateral Cooperation Dips
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) The Nicaraguan National Police's (NNP) recent
interception of a Mexican drug cartel (septel) at first drew
rave reviews, but then the facts came to light. Instead of
cooperating in operational planning as it had in the past,
this time, the NNP failed to share critical information
before mounting the operation. Their lack of cooperation and
information sharing resulted in the arrest of insignificant,
low-level "laborers and enforcers" for the Mexican
trafficking organization. Due to the flawed police
intervention and lack of evidence, these subjects will
probably be released shortly. The preemptive arrests of
these individuals could jeopardize current investigations and
future operations throughout Central America. Similarly,
cooperation from airport, immigration, and customs
authorities also declined, specifically increasingly limited
access to facilities and information, including eliminating
our access to the immigration data base. Since Ortega took
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office on January 10, there have also been no resolutions of
property claims filed by U.S. citizens.
Divide and Conquer
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¶14. (C) One of President Ortega's overarching objectives was
to keep the opposition divided, and encourage new fissures
within the church and private sector. As part of these
efforts, Ortega revitalized his political power sharing pact
with PLC leader/convicted money launderer Arnold Aleman as a
means to deter PLC unity with the ALN. In March, the
Nicaraguan government released Aleman on country-wide "house
arrest" and PLC and FSLN caucuses voted jointly for a slate
of judicial appointments, all along party lines. In April,
"pact" caucuses made revisions to money laundering
definitions and sentence terms that, if passed as is, could
allow Aleman to walk free by December. Ortega's insistence
that Archbishop Obando y Bravo head a new "peace and
reconciliation" council caused the Vatican and local church
authorities to scramble -- clearly pitting Archbishop
Leopoldo Brenes against Obando y Bravo. Similarly, Ortega
attempted to drive a wedge between economic heavy hitters
like Carols Pellas and the owners of medium enterprises by
courting the former and attacking the latter.
Opposition
- - - - - -
¶15. (C) Despite the growing skepticism, even alarm,
political opposition leadership remained largely rudderless,
while the once-fearsome business class curried Ortega's favor
and avoided confrontation. Sandinista dissidents tended to
be the most vigorous critics of the government, while to
Ortega's delight, Liberals spent most of their time bickering
amongst themselves. Nonetheless, there were some encouraging
signs that left and right-leaning civil society and political
leaders are starting to coalesce to defend Nicaragua from
Ortega's apparent ambitions to turn the country into an
autocratic, family-run regime under Venezuelan President
Chavez's sphere of influence (Ref. A). On the legal front,
ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses drafted a joint bill that would
establish the Taiwanese-donated "Mamon" building as the
official Office of the Presidency, the site of the Bolanos
presidency. ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses also inserted a
clause in the 2007 national budget reiterating the
requirement that government to government transactions be
included in the budget and subject to Assembly scrutiny.
Discord and Discontent within Ortega Ranks
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶16. (C) While Ortega attempted to sow discord among his
rivals, his own party unity has also come under strain.
First Lady Rosario Murillo appeared to be in the middle of
much of the discord and discontent. Nicho Marenco, the Mayor
of Managua was told to mind his own business after he
publicly suggested that the Presidency operate in
installations separate from FSLN headquarters and most
recently indicated that he might not run for the presidency
in 2011 because he feared for his life. During the period,
three ministers, all female, were summarily fired, while
Ortega insisted on defending the most controversial figure,
Education Minister Miguel de Castilla, despite education
sector work stoppages and calls for his resignation. The
Minister of Culture was fired after questioning Ortega's gift
to Chavez of valuable poems written by famed Nicaraguan poet
Ruben Dario. The Minister of Family's dismissal appears to
be linked to a personal spat between economic advisor Bayardo
Arce and Murillo.
About Ortega's Health
- - - - - - - - - - -
¶17. (C) Rumors continued to percolate regarding President
Ortega's health. According to stepdaughter Zoilamerica
Narvaez, for years now Ortega has traveled to Cuba for blood
cleansing treatments to treat a rare cholesterol problem.
CENIDH's Vilma Nunez commented that as Ortega ages, these
ozone blood cleansing procedures must be administered more
frequently and are less effective. Other contacts claim
Ortega suffers from a form of lymphoma or leukemia. Heart
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trouble and high blood pressure round out Ortega's reported
health problems.
Comment
- - - -
¶18. (C) The opposition confronts a power-hungry foe flush
with Chavez petrodollars, thus far free from the scrutiny of
the National Assembly -- the only partially independent
branch of government remaining. If the Ortega administration
replaces private Albanic with state-owned Petronic to run its
oil operations, then by law these revenues must be included
in the national budget and the National Assembly is required
to monitor the agreement. The growing rejection of Ortega's
abrasive rhetoric may eventually prompt him to tone down his
public discourse. Nonetheless, we expect Ortega's natural
belligerent instincts towards the United States will continue
to surface and Chavez will continue to pressure him to
confront us.
TRIVELLI