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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2601, LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2601 | 2006-08-12 13:01 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO8980
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2601/01 2241301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121301Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5011
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0065
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002601
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON
AUGUST 11
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) Over the course of three hours in two meetings on
August 11, PM Fouad Siniora made steady, but incremental
movement toward accepting the most recent draft language of
the UN resolution. His strongest objections were directed
toward the specific use of chapter 7 to authorize the
multi-national stabilization force, and what he considered
insufficient language regarding Shebaa. Siniora said he
could not accept a direct call for chapter 7 authorization
for "UNIFIL plus," because Nabih Berri claimed to feel it
impinged on Lebanon's sovereignty. Siniora did, however,
tentatively agree that the UN resolution could use "chapter
7-type language" as long as it didn't specifically state it
was a chapter 7 authorization. Concerning the issue of
Shebaa Farms, Siniora acknowledged it was "a Syrian/Iranian
creation," but that did not eliminate the critical need to
specifically address it in the resolution. He listened
carefully to a suggestion that Shebaa might be treated in a
"side letter," as well as in the EOV language that would be
made by the Secretary, but still, he would not commit
himself. In the second meeting, Siniora finally agreed to
text changes that allowed a closing of the gap on what he
referred to as "Chapter 6.999" language and informed the
Assistant Secretary he would have a decision on the treatment
of Shebaa later in the evening. Finally, the Prime Minister
wanted assurances that Lebanon's "state of siege" would be
lifted upon cessation of hostilities. End summary.
¶2. (C/NF) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora at the Grand Serail for 90 minutes in
the morning and for a similar period late in the afternoon on
August 11. Senior advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola
Nouraddine attended both meetings, as did Deputy Legal
Counsel Jonathan Schwartz and poloff (notetaker). In the
morning meeting, the Prime Minister appeared to try to put
his guests on the defensive with a charge that none of his
requests for State Department assistance had really helped,
specifically referring to the on-going situation with
Lebanese JSF forces pinned down in the village of Marjaayoun.
The A/S pushed back hard and the meeting settled down to
business.
¶3. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary explained to PM Siniora
that both Lebanese and Israeli negotiators were insisting the
other side was somehow gaining all the advantage with recent
changes made to the draft resolution. This attitude was
seriously complicating the effort to close the gap. Siniora
retorted the Israelis were deliberately concealing the fact
that they had achieved a major political victory -- a
northern border that would be disarmed -- but were trying to
obtain even more.
¶4. (C/NF) Future Movement and parliamentary majority leader
Saad Hariri unexpectedly joined the participants in the late
afternoon session. MP Hariri voiced his concerns and opinion
on a number of issues, but for the most part played an
advisory role.
SHEBAA
------
¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora reiterated his earlier charge that the
Government of Israel was "blackmailing" his government on the
issues of Shebaa and the timing of IDF withdrawal from
Lebanese territory. He claimed GOI, in fact, realized they
were obtaining a considerable victory with the effective
disarmament of Hizballah -- and with it a secure northern
border. Siniora conceded in straightforward language that he
understood Shebaa was an Iranian/Syrian creation, but charged
that Israel's "intransigence" would put Lebanon back into the
tender mercies of the Iranians (and Syrians).
¶6. (C/NF) He re-emphasized his requirement that the draft
contain some language that would allow him to go to the
Lebanese people and say the end result was "somehow worth the
country's heavy price paid in lives, suffering, and material
loss." Lebanon, he said, has suffered for the West's proxy
war against Iran, so Lebanon deserves something in return.
He used the earlier U.S. statement that the status quo ante
was unacceptable, and argued that just treatment of Shebaa
would create the conditions to achieve that goal. He said
BEIRUT 00002601 002 OF 003
that somehow Shebaa must be put on the international agenda
-- which A/S Welch and the Ambassador argued had happened, at
least regarding delineation, with the existing language.
CHAPTER 7
---------
¶7. (C/NF) According to Siniora, it was Nabih Berri who was
the principal roadblock to using chapter 7 to authorize the
proposed international stabilization force, now viewed by the
Lebanese as "UNIFIL plus." Berri reportedly feels chapter 7
will enable UNIFIL to carry out significant operations
independent of the Government of Lebanon. The Assistant
Secretary explained that unless a robust international force
SIPDIS
could act with initiative and confidence, there were two
serious consequences: few nations would commit troops to
such a force, and the Government of Israel would have little
confidence the force could carry out its difficult mission.
¶8. (C/NF) The Prime Minister considered these reasons and
gave tentative (albeit reluctant) approval to the idea that
the resolution could use actual language that is typically
associated with Chapter 7 resolutions, but warned that it
would be extremely difficult for Lebanon to accept a specific
chapter 7 authorization.
¶9. (C/NF) At the close of the session, Siniora asked the
A/S to return for a final meeting later in the afternoon.
When he confirmed that A/S Welch was meeting next with Berri,
Siniora asked that three points be emphasized with the
Speaker: the proposal to handle chapter 7 authorization, US
suggestions regarding Shebaa, and an explanation of how the
period between cessation of hostilities and the actual
cease-fire would be "refereed."
SECOND MEETING BEGINS WITH SHEBAA
---------------------------------
¶10. (C/NF) At the outset of the second meeting, Siniora
stated that both sides were "now at the moment of truth."
The Assistant Secretary suggested that instead of focusing on
a line-by-line review of the proposed text, it would be far
better to nail down two issues that the Secretary believed
were the last major gaps in the soon-to-be-introduced
resolution: Shebaa, and control of the borders to prevent
weaponry from reaching Hizballah, especially in the interim
period between cessation of hostilities and a full cease-fire.
¶11. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary made it clear that
trying to force additional Shebaa language into the
resolution at this point would be a "deal breaker." In fact,
A/S Welch noted, the French-proposed bracketed language
regarding Shebaa in the draft resolution had to be dropped,
in order to help ensure Israel won't reject the resolution
outright. He conveyed to Siniora the Israeli contention that
Olmert's government had gone as far as it could. The
advantages of mentioning Shebaa in the Secretary's upcoming
EOV, as well as the ability of the UN SYG to use the
resolution's language to deal with the issue in a serious way
appeared to influence the Prime Minister, who said he would
consider the argument in the hope that, what he could not get
from the resolution, he could point to in the Secretary's EOV.
CONTROL OF THE SY/LE BORDERS
----------------------------
¶12. (C/NF) Siniora agreed that the period between the
cessation of hostilities and full cease-fire would be
"precarious," principally because Hizballah was expected to
withdraw and allow the LAF and UNIFIL to flow into the area
south of the Litani. This process, already difficult, would
be made immeasurably more so if Hizballah was able to
re-supply its depleted stock of weaponry from its suppliers
in Syria. For this critical reason, the Assistant Secretary
noted the arms embargo language of the draft resolution and
asked the Prime Minister to consider ways to strengthen the
border crossing points with elements of the expanding UNIFIL
force, or some other means, perhaps with technical assistance.
¶13. (C/NF) The Prime Minister stated he wanted nothing more
than to see Hizballah disarmed and their supply of weaponry
severed. While Siniora pointed out there would be political
risks involved, he also noted that the resolution's draft
language (OP-13) provided an opening for such assistance, and
BEIRUT 00002601 003 OF 003
said he would consider ideas. But Siniora was reluctant to
ask UNIFIL to help.
COORDINATING UNIT AT UNIFIL
---------------------------
¶14. (C/NF) Concerning Siniora's request that someone act as
a referee during the fragile interim period before the
international augmentation force shows up, the Assistant
Secretary noted that Nabih Berri suggested using the 1996
SIPDIS
cease-fire agreement as a model for rules-of-engagement. He
argued, however, that even though this was a creative
approach, it would be preferable to stick with the
resolution's draft language, specifically that no offensive
operations would be permitted. Additionally, the pressure in
the admittedly problematic interim period would be eased
considerably once "UNIFIL plus" deploys in force.
¶15. (C/NF) In order to facilitate the monitoring function
and telescope the deployments of LAF and "UNIFIL plus" into
short a period as possible, the Assistant Secretary proposed
that a "coordination unit" be immediately established at
UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, which would serve as a nexus
where both violations and deployment issues could be
coordinated and resolved. Although PM Siniora was clearly
uncomfortable with the idea of IDF and LAF officers
discussing issues, he accepted the argument that some form of
coordination center, with UNIFIL as referee, was necessary.
CLOSE, BUT NO CLOSURE
---------------------
¶16. (C/NF) With helo flight constraints exerting serious
pressure on the time remaining, Mohammad Chatta finally
brought up the "siege" of Lebanon. With Siniora and Hariri
in apparent agreement, the senior advisor stated that both
the Beirut airport and the maritime ports of Lebanon had to
open as soon as possible, preferably upon cessation of
hostilities. Not only was it a critical necessity to
re-supply the country now entering its fifth week of war, but
it was a sensitive sovereignty issue that would greatly
affect the perception of a just peace.
¶17. (C/NF) A/S Welch stated that he understood the
ramifications, but emphasized that "verification" of cargo
was an inescapable issue. PM Siniora indicated that while
some form of international inspection was acceptable, the
naval and air blockade of his country had to be end
immediately.
HOW WILL LEBANON REACT TO RESOLUTION
------------------------------------
¶18. (C/NF) PM Siniora said that if a resolution was brought
before the Security Council that night, he and Berri would
study the final language and then decide whether to "accept
it, or refuse all or part of it." The Siniora government
plans to hold a special session of the Council of Ministers
on Saturday, August 12, to discuss and presumably
endorse/reject the UN resolution.
¶19. (U) A/S Welch did not review this cable, but authorized
its release.
FELTMAN