

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AEMR
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AMCHAMS
AGMT
AADP
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BX
BT
BP
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CR
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CODEL
COPUOS
CIA
CFED
CARSON
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CN
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
EPET
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
ENIV
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXIM
ERNG
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IO
IT
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
IDP
ICTR
IEFIN
IRC
ITRA
ITALY
INRB
INTELSAT
IBET
IRAQI
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KIRF
KSEO
KVPR
KSEP
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KRIM
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KMFO
KMOC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KREC
KX
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTRE
MASC
MG
MARAD
MRCRE
MW
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NATIONAL
NGO
NR
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OECD
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PCI
PG
POGOV
PHUMPGOV
PEL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PMIL
POV
PRL
PDOV
PTBS
PRAM
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
ROOD
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SG
SPCE
SK
STEINBERG
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SEN
SANC
SWE
SHI
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
THPY
TP
TBID
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UY
UNCHR
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNMIK
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
USUN
USNC
UNIDROIT
UNO
UNCND
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE92, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09THEHAGUE92.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE92 | 2009-02-11 14:57 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0092/01 0421457
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111457Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2504
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2781
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0382
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000092
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010
REF: A. 07 THE HAGUE 2025
¶B. 08 THE HAGUE 0728
¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0078
...
191568,2/11/2009 14:57,09THEHAGUE92,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET,07THEHAGUE2025|08THEHAGUE728|09THEHAGUE78,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0092/01 0421457
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111457Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2504
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2781
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0382
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000092
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: GETTING TO YES POST-2010
REF: A. 07 THE HAGUE 2025
¶B. 08 THE HAGUE 0728
¶C. 09 THE HAGUE 0078
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew Mann for reasons
1.5
(b,d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Dutch plans for Afghanistan post-2010 are
evolving. Many in Parliament and the public think the Dutch
should withdraw completely in 2010 since their forces have
been on the ground with the U.S. since December 2001.
Despite confidence in their own efforts, the Dutch perceive
there is no winnable game plan for creating a stable
democratic Afghanistan. Nonetheless, current indications
from the government suggest the Netherlands may consider a
request for some sort of follow-on mission after 2010.
Getting to that ""yes"" will take extended, coordinated and
discreet engagement by all concerned. END SUMMARY.
Uncertainty about Dutch Deployment
----------------------------------
¶2. (S) In December 2007, the Dutch Parliament agreed to
extend its ISAF mission in Uruzgan for two years - until
August 2010, followed by a complete withdrawal of Dutch
troops under Task Force Uruzgan by December 2010. In private
conversations, senior government officials have emphasized
that the Dutch will stay on in some capacity in Afghanistan.
Official public statements, however, are less
forward-leaning. Foreign Minister Verhagen said during an
appearance in Parliament on November 19, ""the Netherlands is
lead nation, in Uruzgan until August 2010 and will then
cut down its presence and leave by December 2010."" He added
that the development relationship will continue for years,
but he would not make any observations about military
contributions after December 2010. At the same hearing,
Defense Minister van Middelkoop stated the Dutch ""do not have
the capabilities to sustain lead operations over several
years."" During a December visit to Afghanistan, he said the
Dutch were getting out of Afghanistan, even if incoming U.S.
President Obama called him 10 times to stay. Prime Minister
Balkenende later repudiated van Middelkoop,s remarks,
stating a request by the new administration would be given
careful consideration. The PM cautioned, however, ""A mission
with as many troops as currently in Uruzgan is going to be
difficult."" During his trip to Uruzgan on February 9, the PM
further stated ""We have always said that we will terminate
the leading role of the Netherlands in Uruzgan by 2010. But
that does not mean that we will turn our back on Afghanistan.
At least we will take responsibility after 2010 in the area
of development cooperation and strengthening the
administration.""
¶3. (C) In conversations with EUR/WE Director Pamela Spratlen
January 15, Dutch MPs from the leading parties that supported
the Afghanistan deployment in 2007 -- Labor (PvdA), Christian
Democrats (CDA), and Liberals (VVD) -- told Spratlen the
Dutch military needs a break from the Afghanistan deployment.
""It would be suicide for parties at this table"" to extend
the Dutch mandate in Uruzgan beyond 2010, according to VVD
member Han Ten Broeke, though this ""doesn't mean we couldn't
be somewhere else... We made a promise to conclude in 2010.""
CDA Defense spokesman Raymond Knops said it is ""possible the
Dutch may contribute again in 2013 (after a two-year
QDutch may contribute again in 2013 (after a two-year
break)... We need some rest."" PvdA member Samira Bouchibti
nodded at these comments, adding, ""we have to explain to the
Dutch people why this matters.""
¶4. (SBU) Public support for the mission in Afghanistan is
tracked monthly by the Ministry of Defense with the long term
trend being basically stable (approximately 35-41% in favor,
30-37% opposed and 23-27% undecided). Recent short term
trends have been somewhat negative with January support at
30%; April 2008 at 25% was the lowest. A consistent majority
expresses pride in the Dutch troops in Uruzgan (60% in
January), but public interest in Afghanistan is diminishing.
Decision process
----------------
¶5. (S) The initial, informal and unofficial process of
deciding what to do after 2010 has begun at the senior levels
in the Ministries. A meeting of the ""Gang of Six""
(Balkenende (CDA), Verhagen (CDA), Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister of Finance Bos (PvdA), Minister for
Development Cooperation Koenders (PvdA), Deputy Prime
Minister/Minister for Youth and Family Rouvet (Christian
Union - CU), and van Middelkoop (CU)) to discuss post-2010
Afghanistan options was scheduled for January 29. It was
postponed and has not yet been rescheduled. Following a
request for post-2010 involvement (from NATO or the Afghan
government), the Foreign Ministry will notify Parliament and
with the Defense Ministry and Development Cooperation draw up
a plan of engagement. The Cabinet will review and approve
the plan, likely in the fall of 2009. The Cabinet will then
send a letter to Parliament formally notifying it of the
government's intent, initiating parliamentary review and
debate (likely in late 2009 or early 2010). The decision
will, as in 2007, follow an exhaustive review of key options
including total withdrawal, reduction of contributions,
reformation of forces, and repositioning of forces as well as
testimony by outside experts. Dr. Henk Ormel, Chair of the
Parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, told a
university audience Feb. 10 that the wording of the 2007
mandate to leave Uruzgan left plenty of room for a future
role in Afghanistan. He believes there will be a ""serious
national discussion"" in late 2009 on the appropriate role for
the Dutch focusing on defense, diplomacy and, especially,
development (the 3D approach).
KEY FACTORS FOR AFGHANISTAN POST-2010
-------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Robert de Groot, MFA Deputy Director General for
Political Affairs and the Ministry's point person on
Afghanistan, counseled the POL/ECON Counselor in December
2008 not to view any one official's comments in isolation.
He suggested we balance the Defense Minister's concern about
an exhausted military with the Foreign Minister's call for
greater resources for the military. He explained the
government told Parliament during the 2007 debate the
Netherlands would stop being the lead nation for Task Force
Uruzgan in 2010, ""that is all we promised."" Nevertheless, de
Groot said, before agreeing to a follow-on mission, the Dutch
would be influenced by:
- CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus's expected review of Afghan strategy;
- The U.S. overall plan for stabilizing Afghanistan (perhaps,
de Groot mused, we need a ""new platform - a post-ISAF Phase
III"" for the south);
- Canada's plans (since de Groot characterized its
government's announcement pulling out of Afghanistan in 2010
as more categorical than the Dutch position);
- The capacity of the Dutch military;
- The new administration's/NATO's request of allies (de Groot
thought very few allies had the capabilities to contribute
more, in a meaningful way, in Afghanistan);
- The ability of the Afghans to sustain development efforts;
and
- The willingness of the central government in Kabul to
address governance issues (e.g., corruption).
Declining Military Capabilities?
--------------------------------
¶7. (S) The Dutch were one of our first partners in
Afghanistan, contributing a Special Forces Task Group,
infantry troops and staff officers to ISAF in December 2001.
Qinfantry troops and staff officers to ISAF in December 2001.
Since then, they have served as co-lead of ISAF headquarters
(Feb.-Aug. 2003), lead at PRT Pol-e-Khumri (Baglan Province
2004-2006), command of Regional Command-South (Nov. 06-May
07; Nov. 08-present), and lead of PRT Tarin Kowt and Task
Force Uruzgan (Oct. 06-present) as well as contributing
F-16s, attack and transport helicopters, intelligence assets
and trainers. As recounted to visiting EUR/WE Office
Director Spratlen by the MFA, the Dutch military, a volunteer
force, is currently under strength (only 34,000 personnel out
of an authorized 41,000), and Afghanistan has taken its toll.
Yet, by August 2010, the Dutch military will be even more
experienced and heavily invested in the mission in
Afghanistan. While certain elements may have had ""all they
can handle,"" the Dutch will retain significant capabilities
to contribute to the overall ISAF mission in Afghanistan:
command and staff elements; Operational Mentoring and Liaison
Teams (OMLT); Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT);
logistical support elements; limited battle group elements;
close air support assets; intelligence, surveillance,
targeting and reconnaissance (ISTAR) elements; and staff
billets. At the same time, other elements such as armored
engineers and helicopter transport may not be combat-ready
and, therefore, could limit the operations of the battle
groups.
Progress in Afghanistan Governance and Reconstruction
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (S) The greatest single threat to Dutch engagement is the
perception there is no coherent, winnable game plan for
creating a stable, democratic Afghanistan. Dutch confidence
in their military and civilian engagements at the local
levels in Uruzgan remains strong. The Dutch, however, are
frustrated by the ""bungling"" of the central government in
Kabul. The Dutch question their own involvement in an
international coalition that appears incapable or unwilling
to develop a legitimate, sustainable Afghan government.
Decision Makers
---------------
¶9. (S) As in 2007, the important players within the Cabinet
on this issue are Balkenende, Verhagen and, to a lesser
extent, van Middelkoop. Koenders, interested in Afghan
development and governance issues, will be key to convincing
Bos to give Labor/PvdA support in the Cabinet to any
post-2010 engagement plan. Parties of the left -- D66, the
Socialist Party (SP), and Greenleft -- will likely oppose any
continued involvement. The conservative Freedom Party (PVV)
and the VVD will need to be convinced that any decision is
clearly in the best interest of the Dutch. Although the
ruling coalition parties (CDA, PvdA and CU) control enough
votes in parliament to approve any Cabinet action, Dutch
political tradition requires more than a simple majority to
approve such an important action. The government will need
the support of additional parties.
Comment and First Steps
-----------------------
¶10. (S) Comment: Embassy The Hague believes the Dutch will
ultimately stay in Afghanistan for two primary reasons: to
complete the mission and maintain a seat at the table as a
""responsible shareholder"" for international peace and
security. It is paramount the Dutch view any post-2010
engagement as partnering toward a viable Afghanistan solution
and not a continuation of a failing strategy (hence de
Groot's desire for a ""post-ISAF Phase III"" plan). A strategy
that provides credible steps towards a central government
that is responsive to the citizenry and capable of providing
security will provide the Dutch with political cover to make
commitments post-2010. Any sense the government is a patsy
of the U.S. or that Afghanistan is descending into chaos will
not garner the necessary public or parliamentary support.
¶11. (S) Comment Cont,d: The Dutch see themselves as our
partners in Afghanistan and not mere supporters of U.S. goals
there. U.S. engagement, from working level contacts to
parliamentary and public outreach and high level contacts,
will be necessary to confirm to the Dutch they are a key
partner with influence whose consultations are meaningful and
have an impact. Our engagement must be discreet, sensitive
and timely. During the run-up to the December 2007 decision
to extend the Uruzgan deployment an extra two years, the
Qto extend the Uruzgan deployment an extra two years, the
Dutch did not want a heavy visible USG presence and privately
urged the U.S. to ""trust us"" on getting the extension. The
Dutch will want quiet but active consultations and
collaboration as a partner with the U.S. We have suggested
(reftel C) using important events for the NY400 celebration
as a reason for high level visitors to come to the
Netherlands in 2009, conduct public outreach and quietly
engage Dutch officials and parliamentarians on Afghanistan.
At the outset, there will be two critical efforts - ensuring
PvdA support within the Cabinet for any follow-on mission and
getting additional parties, support once a Cabinet plan is
submitted to Parliament. End comment.
¶12. (S) Getting to Yes: Dutch leaders will appreciate an
understanding of both their domestic politics and their
international contributions. Guidance from Washington on the
changing strategy in Afghanistan, including growing
deployments and expectations for Allies, will be essential.
Post has already convened an Afghanistan Working Group
involving POL, DAO and PD to develop a game plan for
engagement and monitor developments. Embassy The Hague will
continue to analyze and report on political developments in
the Netherlands and how those events affect prospects for the
Dutch post-2010 development. We will look for opportunities
for Washington leaders to engage Dutch decision-makers (e.g.,
having the USNATO ambassador as the guest of honor at
Dutch-American Friendship Day in April; inviting General
Petreaus to speak at the May 24 commemoration services at the
Netherlands-U.S. cemetery at Margraten; having Special
Representative Holbrooke visit Uruzgan and/or The Hague as he
reviews U.S. strategy for Afghanistan; arranging an early
meeting between Minister Koenders and the new USAID
Administrator and senior Department officials on development
issues). The upcoming meeting between the Secretary and FM
Verhagen is an excellent opportunity to lay out what we want
the Dutch to do post-2010 and how we can help get them to
that decision.
¶13. (SBU) The following talking points will be a ""living
document"" updated regularly for use with Dutch officials:
- WE VALUE OUR PARTNERSHIP: We are proud to be partners with
the Dutch in promoting a safe and secure Afghanistan and know
that you have consistently punched above your weight in
Afghanistan. (NOTE: The Dutch have been more involved in
Afghanistan than many in NATO that have more capabilities.
They were part of the initial ISAF forces and continue to
contribute vitally important enablers. END NOTE.)
- WE RECOGNIZE YOUR SACRIFICE: We are grateful for your work
and recognize your sacrifices in extended command in the
south and lead of Task Force Uruzgan. We know your
leadership has stretched your military capacity. (NOTE: The
Dutch made a difficult political decision to retain the lead
in Task Force Uruzgan in 2007 and extended their commitment
for two years as lead nation; Dutch Major
General de Kruif is the Commander of Regional Command South.
The Dutch have suffered 18 casualties in Uruzgan, including
the son of Chief of Defense General van Uhm. It has been
reported that as much as half of the military forces are
either in Afghanistan, preparing to go to Afghanistan, or in
a recovery mode from deployment at any one time. END NOTE.)
- WE SHARE THE SAME GOALS FOR AFGHANISTAN: The President is
committed to a 3D approach in Afghanistan. Your leadership
in the use of development funds has been impressive in
improving the lives of Afghan citizens. (NOTE: The Dutch
have long been advocates of the 3D approach and strongly push
the development aspect in their efforts in Afghanistan.
Kathleen Ferrier, a skeptical CDA MP, actually used the three
words of democracy, defense and development to describe her
view of what is needed in Afghanistan. She and many in the
Dutch arena feel they actually initiated the concept. We can
use this language to build Dutch support. END NOTE.)
- WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE CHALLENGES: As Vice
President Biden said in his Wehrkunde speech in Munich, we
are at a tenuous stage in Afghanistan, and we cannot afford
Qare at a tenuous stage in Afghanistan, and we cannot afford
to backslide. This makes every contribution from our Allies
all the more important. Adding to the urgency of the
situation are the upcoming Presidential elections in August;
we must all do everything in our power to head off potential
violence if the Taliban pull out all the stops to derail the
process, as we expect them to do. With this in mind, we plan
to significantly increase our efforts in Afghanistan and urge
Allies to join us in meeting the need for additional
diplomacy, development and defense assets. We are planning
on an extensive infusion of our forces as reinforcements, not
replacements for current forces from all troop contributing
nations already in Afghanistan. (NOTE: Some in the
Netherlands have begun to believe that with the significant
additional U.S. forces there is no longer a need for their
own forces in theater. END NOTE.)
- WE BELIEVE DUTCH CONTRIBUTIONS ARE CRITICAL: Dutch
experience in running successful PRTs and the irreplaceable
local knowledge you have gained in Uruzgan are of crucial
importance to ISAF. Additional U.S. capabilities in the
region may offer some relief to strained elements of your
military, but we all need to continue to work together in
Afghanistan to give a coordinated 3D approach time to work.
GALLAGHER