

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AEMR
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AMCHAMS
AGMT
AADP
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BX
BT
BP
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CR
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CODEL
COPUOS
CIA
CFED
CARSON
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CN
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
EPET
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
ENIV
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXIM
ERNG
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IO
IT
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
IDP
ICTR
IEFIN
IRC
ITRA
ITALY
INRB
INTELSAT
IBET
IRAQI
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KIRF
KSEO
KVPR
KSEP
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KRIM
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KMFO
KMOC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KREC
KX
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTRE
MASC
MG
MARAD
MRCRE
MW
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NATIONAL
NGO
NR
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OECD
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PCI
PG
POGOV
PHUMPGOV
PEL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PMIL
POV
PRL
PDOV
PTBS
PRAM
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
ROOD
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SG
SPCE
SK
STEINBERG
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SEN
SANC
SWE
SHI
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
THPY
TP
TBID
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UY
UNCHR
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNMIK
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
USUN
USNC
UNIDROIT
UNO
UNCND
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BRASILIA28, WORKING WITH BRAZIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE - AN OPPORTUNITY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA28.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRASILIA28 | 2009-01-08 13:55 | 2010-12-09 09:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO6555
PP RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBR #0028/01 0081355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081355Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3261
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8893
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7077
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3318
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000028
C O R R E C T E D COPY - PARAGRAPHS RENUMBERED
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR OES/EGC - T.TALLEY AND D.NELSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS: SENV ENRG KGHG EAID EFIN BR
SUBJECT: WORKING WITH BRAZIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE - AN OPPORTUNITY
REF: (A) BRASILIA 1666 (B) BRASILIA 1159 BRASILIA 00000028 001.4 OF 003
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.
Brazil has a central role in the climate change arena, not only because it controls 70% of the Amazon rainforest, but also because it plays a pivotal role in the on-going UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. USG efforts to have India and China assume binding targets under the UNFCCC may hinge on the Government of Brazil (GOB),s position in these talks. For this reason, Mission Brazil suggests that the USG start an active campaign to allay the GOB,s concern about the effect that any eventual agreement will have on its ability to promote economic growth or about the possibility that a post-Kyoto agreement will expose them to potential trade sanctions or other punitive measures. Allaying the GOB,s concerns on this front will make it possible for the GOB to take a more helpful position in these negotiations.
¶2. (C) Now is a propitious time and the USG has the tools to shift the GOB toward a more helpful position in the UNFCCC negotiations. These tools include working with forward leaning state and local governments, facilitating technical assistance in forest management, and creating opportunities for more technology transfer. END SUMMARY.
BRAZIL IS KEY IN THE FIELD OF CLIMATE CHANGE
¶3. (SBU) Brazil has a dual importance in the field of climate change. First, massive deforestation has made Brazil, who has about 70 percent of the Amazon Forest in its territory, the fifth largest carbon emitter since 1950. For this reason, Brazil,s management of its tropical forests will have a marked impact on the climate.
¶4. (SBU) Second, the GOB has honed to an art the ability to block international negotiations when it disagrees with an outcome. Brazil,s potential spoiler role could undermine USG,s efforts to convince China and India (both non-Annex I countries to the UNFCCC) to take on emissions reductions targets. Brazil has strenuously opposed non-Annex I countries assuming reduction targets, citing the &common but differential responsibilities8 clause in the UNFCCC.
WHAT ARE BRAZIL,S PRIMARY INTERESTS?
¶5. (SBU) Growth, growth, growth. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his team have made economic growth the centerpiece of his second term (2006-2010). Lula wants to bring a modicum of economic prosperity to his base: the approximately 20 million people living in the Amazon region and the over 100 million more living in or near poverty in the rest of the country. A heightened emphasis on growth at the expense of environmental concerns was led to the departure in May 2008 of former Environment Minister Marina Silva (considered an inflexible, absolutist on key environmental issues) and her replacement by the more pragmatic Carols Minc. The GOB does not consider climate change an immediate threat to Brazil, and is not willing to sacrifice other priorities to address the problem.
¶6. (SBU) The GOB sees several areas of concern in the negotiations of the post-Kyoto framework. The GOB fears that there will be trade sanctions imposed on those countries that do not meet emissions reduction targets. They are worried that the Europeans would like to use a punitive regime to implement reductions. Moreover, they suspect that Europe (and to a lesser extent the United States) would use such trade sanctions as a non-tariff barrier to undermine Brazil and third world competitors. Since approximately 80 percent of Brazil,s emissions result from deforestation, Brazil would need to have confidence that it could adequately control the rate of clearing before it could agree to binding international targets. The jump in deforestation figures for the 2007/2008 period shows that the government,s grip over the Amazon remains weak (REFTEL A).
¶7. (SBU) The GOB is also concerned by proposals for a sectoral approach. GOB officials believe the sectoral approach could lead to significant constraints on the Brazilian economy. Here again the GOB sees the hidden hand of competitors in the developed world, where the mature industries are looking for ways to impede the rise of new competitors in the developing world. BRASILIA 00000028 002.4 OF 003
¶8. (SBU) Brazil has looked favorably on other aspects of the climate change discussions that either do not threaten or could even boost economic growth. Thus, the GOB presses hard for technology transfer and financial assistance to the developing world. It also has promoted its Amazonas Fund, where international contributors provide Brazil with funding ) but with no strings or oversight ) to help conserve the Amazon Forest (REFTEL B).
THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
¶9. (C) Brazil could take one of three approaches to the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations: - The Spoiler: This is GOB,s current approach, which is to seek to prevent developing countries from assuming binding international obligations. - The Passive Partner: The GOB is willing to have China and India assume binding obligations, but does not use its influence to accomplish this end. - The Active Ally: The GOB works with the USG to establish mechanisms to constrain emissions by developing countries. While it would be ideal to have the GOB working side-by-side with the USG in the international negotiations on a post-Kyoto agreement, it is more important that the GOB does not block a deal satisfactory to the USG.
FIRST A REASSURING CAMPAIGN
¶10. (C) A critical element for changing the GOB,s approach to the negotiations is convincing them that the new regime, whether through overall emissions targets or by sectoral means, will not impede the GOB,s drive to expand the economy. The USG and Europeans should launch a campaign in Washington, Brasilia, and in European capitals (to the Brazilians) to convince the GOB of this important point. The USG should also reach out to other stakeholders such as state and local governments, civil society groups, and opinion makers who can help allay the fears of the federal government.
THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR COOPERATION
¶11. (C) With adequate assurances over their prospective economic growth, we are at a propitious time move the GOB to a Passive Partner or even an Active Ally role in these negotiations. Minister Minc has signaled willingness for Brazil to take a more ambitious approach toward climate change. Minc is close to the President,s powerful Chief of Staff, Dilma Rousseff, which could enhance his ability to influence the results of inter-ministerial debate. At the same time, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Everton Vargas (who has the lead within the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) on climate change) is expected to leave in February 2009 to become the Brazilian Ambassador in Germany. Under Secretary Andre Amado is taking over climate change negotiations for the MRE. This change may provide the USG with a greater opportunity to influence the GOB position in the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations. This opportunity is particularly important because the MRE, rather than the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), has retained the dominant role within the GOB on these negotiations.
¶12. (C) Equally important is the divide between the more forward leaning state governors of the Amazon region and the federal government. The governors have been working on climate change and environmental initiatives that are more aggressive than those of the federal government. Their efforts demonstrate a growing sentiment within Brazil that more can be done to combat climate change. These governors could be potential partners with the USG in efforts to influence the GOB's position.
SUGGESTED ACTION PLAN
¶13. (C) USG and other developed nations have several tools at their disposal to encourage the GOB to adopt a more helpful approach in these negotiations. The USG should help to the GOB to address its economic concerns by providing technology transfers/sharing (such as with energy efficiency, clean energy, or biofuels); and financial assistance. The USG could start by building on existing mechanisms, such as the 2007 biofuels MOU, but the USG should also look for new opportunities to continue and expand these endeavors.
¶14. (C) The USG should simultaneously take action to persuade influential players in Brazil,s elite circles to weigh in for a more constructive approach. These players include state government leaders, national legislators, the business community, Non-Governmental Organizations, opinion leaders, and prominent scientists. This outreach could be accomplished through existing ties (such as those that the Mission has developed with the governors of the nine states in the Amazon region); building relationships between Brazilian legislators, scientists, and business leaders and their US counterparts; promoting and facilitating exchanges between Brazilian and US experts; and increasing contact and communication with opinion leaders and Brazilian NGOs with a focus on the compatibility of US and GOB interests in climate change negotiations.
¶15. (C) The USG should also leverage its technical, scientific, and economic resources to help the GOB tackle its deforestation problem. This could be accomplished by facilitating technical exchanges with the U.S. Forest Service, the National Park Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Management with an aim of helping strengthen Brazil,s ability at the national, state and local levels to manage better its forests in a sustainable manner. The US could also provide financial assistance and scientific and economic analysis to help the GOB better understand current trends in deforestation and the likely impact of any policy changes.
¶16. (C) Finally, the USG should continue to promote state and municipal activities to reduce deforestation. Helping these governments could produce positive results that could be replicated elsewhere in the region. SOBEL