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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE399, NETHERLANDS: LEAD TOPICS FOR PRESIDENT'S JULY 14
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE399 | 2009-07-06 15:30 | 2011-01-26 16:30 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/01/26/vs-nederlands-klimaatbeleid-meer-woorden-dan-daden/ |
VZCZCXRO8226
PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0399/01 1871530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061530Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000399
SIPDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO NSC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS: ECON EFIN MOPS OVIP PINR PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: LEAD TOPICS FOR PRESIDENT'S JULY 14
MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER BALKENENDE - SECOND OF
THREE CABLES
REF: THE HAGUE 395
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
Mr. President:
¶1. (C) As indicated in our overview cable, Dutch Prime
Minister Balkenende hopes to limit discussion to four major
topics during his meeting with the President:
Afghanistan/Pakistan; the economic crisis/G20; Middle East
Peace Process/Iran; and climate change. He will also mention
the New York 400 celebration, hoping you will agree to see
the Crown Prince at the White House in September. These are
discussed discussed below. Other possible topics are
discussed in a separate cable.
--------------------
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
¶2. (C) Balkenende will share his expectations on what the
Dutch can contribute in Afghanistan post-2010. We have
recently asked the Dutch to remain in Uruzgan after 2010 to
run the PRT in Tarin Kowt but not, necessarily, to remain as
lead nation in Uruzgan. We also want them to continue to
supply enablers and trainers for the ISAF mission as well as
providing financial assistance for ISAF initiatives.
¶3. (U) The Netherlands, past and current efforts put them at
the forefront of our Allies. The Dutch have been in
Afghanistan since December 2001. They are the lead nation in
Uruzgan with PRT Tarin Kowt and combat elements. They are
also mid-way through their second one-year command of
Regional Command South (RC-South) at Kandahar. Their
commitment includes 1,800 personnel and such critical
enablers as F-16s, helicopters, intelligence assets, special
forces, and medical units. In addition, they have devoted
more than 220 million euro (USD 305 million) in aid to
Afghanistan since 2006. On short notice, they hosted the
March 2009 UN Conference on Afghanistan which gained
international acceptance of our strategic review. They are
also proud of their growing international reputation for
their implementation of a 3-D approach (defense, development
and diplomacy) in Uruzgan.
¶4. (S) We understand Balkenende, Foreign Minister Verhagen,
and Defense Minister van Middelkoop have been drumming up
support in the Cabinet for continued deployment in Uruzgan
beyond 2010, scaling back to about 500 troops (providing
force protection for PRT operations in effect), relinquishing
lead nation status but still providing enablers and
development assistance. The stumbling block so far has been
the Labor Party leader, Wouter Bos, Deputy Prime Minister and
Finance Minister. Several factors make an extension a
difficult decision for Bos. A majority of the Dutch public
does not strongly support the military deployment, and
several politicians have pledged to pull Dutch troops out of
Uruzgan in 2010. Many MPs are also concerned about the
effect the deployment has on military readiness and
recruitment -- Dutch forces have a shortfall of approximately
7,000 personnel (out of a total of 43,000, a 16% shortfall).
The Dutch media report that the ISAF mission is not
successful in bringing security to the region and that Dutch
aid is ineffective (the Labor Party holds the development
portfolio in the Cabinet as well). There is also a growing
sentiment that the Dutch have done enough and it is time for
other countries, such as Germany and France, to do more.
¶5. (S) FM Verhagen recently told us, as well as U.S.
Ambassador to NATO Daalder, that the Labor Party could
probably support staying in Afghanistan in some role, just
not in Uruzgan (a step that makes no sense given the depth of
Dutch experience in Uruzgan). Labor Party staff indicated a
willingness to continue some sort of mission in Afghanistan
(even in Uruzgan) if the issue were framed in terms of
continuing Dutch development and stability efforts.
Balkenende, the Foreign Minister and others expressed to us
their frustrations caused by their Labor partners, and have
asked our help in bringing Labor around.
¶6. (S) In the President's discussions with Balkenende and
with the press (at the end of the meeting), the President may
THE HAGUE 00000399 002 OF 004
want to stress:
- our appreciation for the long-standing and significant
Dutch contribution in Afghanistan, specifically in Uruzgan;
- we see the Dutch as a valued partner in Allied efforts to
address a common threat in a dangerous region;
- while it is an internal decision by the Dutch whether they
stay in Afghanistan, we hope they will continue with other
Allies in ISAF as it implements its new strategy; and
- (perhaps most importantly), we hope they will continue
their stability and development efforts in Uruzgan to build
upon the Dutch achievements there.
¶7. (C) The Dutch welcomed the new U.S. strategic link between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they keep a low profile on
their generous aid programs in Pakistan. They have pledged
86.7 million euro (USD 120 million) in development aid over
the next three years, as well as 3.5 million euro (USD 4.9
million) in immediate aid for Pakistan,s internally
displaced persons. The Dutch are perplexed, however, by
Pakistan,s weak democratic credentials and disorganized aid
programs. Nonetheless, Foreign Ministry contacts have
indicated Balkenende may be prepared in the meeting to
announce additional aid to Pakistan.
----------
Guantanamo
----------
¶8. (S) In the President's private meeting, he may want to ask
Balkenende to accept Guantanamo detainees, but recognize
Balkenende and other Cabinet members have already said
publicly the Netherlands will not/not accept detainees. In a
July 5 radio interview, Balkenende said he expected the
President to ask the Netherlands to consider taking some
Guantanamo detainees, "We have already said no to this
request, but we will discuss the issue. There are legal
obstacles to taking in these prisoners. Still, he left the
door open, saying it was a complex issue and he is willing to
discuss it, possibly in a European context. On June 30, FM
Verhagen told us privately the Netherlands "will accept
detainees if that,s what it takes to close Guantanamo."
Taking detainees would be difficult and could cause the
government to fall because the decision would strengthen the
Dutch turn to the right, giving Wilders ammunition to feed
the flames of Dutch anti-immigrant fears. Given these
constraints, the Dutch have looked for other ways to be
helpful. FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of the
nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of force,
with an eye toward resolving the knotty legal issues
surrounding Guantanamo. The Dutch may also be willing to
support funding to transfer of detainees
to third countries.
-------------------
Economic Crisis/G20
-------------------
¶9. (SBU) The Dutch financial sector was hit hard by the
global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S.
mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The
government responded assertively with several measures to
assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by
nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and
spending a controversial USD 36 billion to bail out the new
Fortis/ABN AMRO entity, the Netherlands, largest bank. The
contagion in the financial sector has spread throughout the
Dutch economy, now in recession since the first quarter of
¶2009. After four consecutive years of GDP growth, the
economy is expected to shrink by 4.75 percent in 2009.
Exports are expected to decline 16.75 percent this year - a
precipitous drop for the Netherlands, small, open economy
which depends on foreign trade. Unemployment is rising and
likely will reach 9.5 percent by 2010. Balkenende,s
government introduced three economic stimulus packages
between November 2008 and March 2009, including subsidies for
clean energy projects, corporate tax breaks, expanded export
credit insurance facilities, and accelerated infrastructure
projects. The Cabinet remains committed to an incremental,
cautious approach of giving these stimulus measures time to
work before embarking on new ones. Meanwhile, the budget
surplus that the Netherlands enjoyed in recent years has
disappeared as a result of the stimulus programs, with a
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deficit of 6.7 percent of GDP expected by 2010. Balkenende
now faces the difficult question of how to promote economic
recovery while keeping the deficit in check.
¶10. (SBU) Balkenende remains a staunch believer in
international cooperation as the only means of bringing about
economic recovery at home and abroad. In keeping with the
Dutch tradition of multilateralism, Balkenende supports the
work of the G20 and expanded roles for the IMF and World
Bank. The Dutch champion much broader financial regulation -
and standards for corporate responsibility. They are keenly
interested in the plight of developing countries in the
economic crisis and continue to push the EU, UN, and
international financial institutions to develop programs to
address this issue. This focus is in keeping with the strong
Dutch tradition of assistance to the developing world. The
Dutch provide a fixed 0.8 percent of GDP - over USD 7 billion
- in development aid annually, making the Netherlands the
world's fourth largest aid donor as a percentage of GDP and
the sixth largest in absolute terms. Balkenende will seek
the President's views on the pace of economic recovery and
how the Netherlands can play a constructive role,
particularly to assist developing countries.
¶11. (C) Balkenende considers participation in the G20 a
critical measure of the Netherlands, international stature
and will push hard for an invitation to the Pittsburgh
summit. This is THE key deliverable he hopes to secure from
this meeting. (Note: Finance Minister Bos asked Treasury
Secretary Geithner for a G20 invitation during their June 29
meeting in Washington; the Secretary indicated the White
House would make a decision after the July 8-10 G8 summit.
End note.) Dutch participation in the Washington and London
summits were major wins for the Netherlands; Balkenende will
argue that the Dutch deserved those invitations, and that the
practice should continue. The Dutch point out the
Netherlands is the 5th largest economy in the EU, the 16th
largest in the world, and has the world,s 11th largest
financial center. The Dutch are particularly supportive of
the G20,s calls for anti-protectionist trade and investment
policies, reform of financial supervisory structures,
including a prominent role for the new Financial Stability
Board, increased supervision of hedge funds, and more
restrictive remuneration policies. Balkenende will argue
that the Netherlands, open financial sector has been
significantly damaged by the crisis; the Dutch have the
knowledge and experience to play a constructive role in G20
efforts to reform the international financial architecture
and spur economic recovery; the precedent for their G20
participation has already been set; and they, therefore,
deserve a seat in Pittsburgh.
--------------
Climate Change
--------------
¶12. (C) Balkenende is keenly interested in climate change and
pushes the Netherlands to address the issue through
ambitious, coordinated, global action. We expect him to
praise renewed U.S. leadership on climate but he probably
will not stray from the common EU position -- still hoping
for a more aggressive medium-term U.S. mitigation target.
The GONL has committed to a 30 percent reduction in
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 relative to 1990.
They want other top emitters to display a "comparable effort"
in mitigating climate change, but they privately acknowledge
that even a 20 percent U.S. cut by 2020 is unrealistic. We
share much common ground with the Dutch on this issue. They
see an international carbon market, heavy private sector
involvement, and broad access to clean technologies as key
parts of the solution. They support robust financing for
developing countries that undertake
serious mitigation commitments, and will insist such aid be
allocated efficiently, accountably and transparently.
¶13. (C) Balkenende will likely explain how tackling climate
change is vital to the Netherlands, as over 60 percent of its
population and economic activity is located below sea-level.
The devastation of Hurricane Katrina was a wake-up call for
the Dutch. Yet despite their best intentions, Dutch rhetoric
far outstrips their deeds. Yale,s 2008 Environmental
Protection Index ranked the Netherlands 55th worldwide,
placing it in the bottom fifth of EU countries. (Note: The
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United States ranked 39th. End note.) The latest UN figures
reveal the Netherlands reduced its total GHG emissions by
only 2 percent between 1990 and 2006, leaving it a steep hill
to climb to achieve its ambitious 30 percent target by 2020.
Local energy experts admit the Netherlands has no chance of
achieving the EU,s 20 percent renewable energy target by
¶2020.
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Middle East/Iran
----------------
¶14. (C) The Dutch are eager to play a constructive role in
the Middle East Peace Process. The Dutch participate in the
Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms smuggling.
Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting
the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same
time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid
in Gaza, and they are substantial donors to Gaza economic
development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million
euro (USD 100 million) in 2008. FM Verhagen makes regular
trips to the region (he was last in Israel at the end of
June) and is considering hosting a 2010 conference in support
of peace efforts. They will be anxious to find ways to
support our efforts in the region. They also welcome the
U.S. decision to engage Syria and have been holding off
expanding their ties with Syria until there is greater human
rights progress.
¶15. (S) On Iran, the Dutch are tough-minded and have pushed
the EU to prepare a coordinated response to Iran,s crackdown
on protestors and the media. On the nuclear issue, the Dutch
strongly support the UN sanctions regime and quickly follow
up on efforts to curtail proliferation activities. Before
the election crisis, the Dutch embassy in Tehran reported
that sanctions were starting to work. The embassy also noted
that acquiring nuclear capacity enjoyed wide support
throughout Iranian society. The Dutch are willing to deepen
U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on information sharing on Iran.
---------------------------------
New York 400 - Crown Prince Visit
---------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) The Dutch government is spending almost $10 million
this year to highlight four hundred years of Dutch-American
friendship. This commemorates the 400th anniversary of the
exploration of Manhattan and its river system by Henry
Hudson, an English seaman working for a Dutch company. The
quadricentennial (known as "NY400"), with programs in New
York and Amsterdam, weaves our shared history into what will
be our shared future, expanding awareness of our
similarities: our pioneering spirit and the values of
freedom, democracy, openness, creativity, entrepreneurship,
diversity and tolerance. In September, Crown Prince
Willem-Alexander and his wife, Princess Maxima, will visit
New York to participate in NY400 activities. The Prime
Minister will ask if you can receive their Royal Highnesses
at the White House. The Dutch stress the Crown Prince will
likely be king soon (it is widely anticipated Queen Beatrix
will abdicate within a year) and this would be an opportunity
for the President to meet the Crown Prince in the context of
the NY400 festivities. The Crown Prince is a champion around
the world for clean water and sanitation as a public health
initiative.
¶17. (U) A cable with brief discussion of other potential
topics is being sent septel.
GALLAGHER