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Viewing cable 10TOKYO228, U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10TOKYO228 | 2010-02-04 09:00 | 2011-05-07 05:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXRO6124
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0228/01 0350900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040900Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9205
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9631
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2950
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3169
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8678
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1019
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2494
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9174
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7569
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 000228
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2030
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING
REF: SECDEF DTG 292154ZJAN10
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt; reasons 1.4 (b
/d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Initiatives for the Security Treaty,s 50th
anniversary, updates on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Host Nation Support (HNS),
Realignment/Futenma Replacement Facility, possible new
bilateral exchanges and F-X procurement were the main
Alliance issues discussed during the February 2 Security
Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting, led by EAP A/S Campbell and ASD
Gregson on the U.S. side, and MOFA DG for North America
Umemoto and MOD DG for Defense Policy Takamizawa on the
Japanese side. Regarding the 50th anniversary, both sides
raised the possibility of a new security declaration, a 2 2
(SecState, SecDef, and GOJ counterparts) meeting, and
trilateral engagement with India in 2010. DG Umemoto,
however, relayed Foreign Minister Okada,s decision not to
form an eminent persons panel to shepherd anniversary
activities. In terms of new exchanges, DG Umemoto called for
the start of formal bilateral dialogues on regional security
(focusing initially on China), extended deterrence, and
cyber-security.
¶2. SUMMARY cont'd: The Japanese side expressed support for
beginning HNS discussions at an early point with a view to
presenting a more efficient support package to the Japanese
public. ASD Gregson pressed for green energy technologies as
a possible component of a successor HNS agreement, and A/S
Campbell noted the political sensitivities of the HNS issue
during a time of FRF-related Alliance challenges. On the
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, A/S Campbell urged the
Japanese side to refrain from going public with FRF
alternative proposals before consulting with the USG. ASD
Gregson expressed concern that politicization of FRF
decisions are bleeding into other realignment projects,
particularly Iwakuni. DG Takamiza provided an update on F-X
procurement, noting that MOD has started a process to brief
the Defense Minister on the candidate aircraft, threat
assessment and procurement and delivery issues. DG
Takamizawa expressed concerns about barriers to F-35
information, Japanese industrial to participation in F-35
production, and rumors of delivery delays. End summary.
¶3. (U) The United States and Japan held a Security
Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting on February 2 hosted by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. Assistant Secretary of
State Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of Defense
Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson chaired the U.S. side, with Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Northern American Affairs Bureau Director
General Kazuyoshi Umemoto and Ministry of Defense Bureau of
Defense Policy Nobushige Takamizawa chairing for Japan.
Representatives from Embassy Tokyo, Pacific Command and U.S.
Forces, Japan joined the U.S. chairs, with representatives
from the Japan Joint Staff filling out the Japan side. A
full list of participants is at the end of the cable.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Quadrennial and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶4. (C) OSD Director for Japan Basalla drew on talking points
in Ref A to provide an overview of the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
ASD Gregson emphasized that the United States is not reducing
its presence in Northeast Asia, but rather expanding
throughout the Pacific the presence of its existing
alliances. The United States encourages the increase in
Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) presence and operations
around Guam and Asia. This will help protect sea lanes of
communication from non-traditional and conventional threats.
The USG seeks the expanded use of Guam for U.S.
military-Japan Self Defense Force training. This joint
TOKYO 00000228 002 OF 007
training, combined with Japan's increased experience with
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR),such as
with the JSDF deployment to Haiti, will demonstrate to the
region Japan's ability to react to humanitarian aid
situations and improve its national image. A permanent JSDF
presence on Guam to support the training would be
appropriate, ASD Gregson noted.
¶5. (C) JSDF Joint Staff Director for Plans and Policy MG
Koichi Isobe offered that the HA/DR missions match JSDF
capabilities and experience and are supported by the public
and politics in Japan, as evidenced by the quick Cabinet
decision on the Haiti dispatch. MOD Defense Policy DG
Takamizawa noted that a critical factor for Japan's HA/DR
operations will be having sufficient quick lift capability.
----------------------
Nuclear Posture Review
----------------------
¶6. (S) Basalla provided an update on the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) using interagency-cleared talking points, noting
its release has been delayed until March 1 as a result of
serious and sustained U.S. leadership attention on the
contents. A key theme will be the U.S. commitment to reduce
the number of nuclear weapons and at the same time strengthen
deterrence and extended deterrence to reduce the potential
for conflict that would threaten the United States, as well
as its allies and partners. The United States is looking to
strengthen regional deterrence architectures and deepen
security cooperation, including with Japan. A key
recommendation in the NPR will be to retire the
nuclear-armed, submarine-launched Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile (TLAM-N), as it has been deemed redundant and would
require a costly replacement program. The United States has
sufficient other means to project nuclear power and the NPR
will indicate investments into the U.S. strategic deterrent
force. Non-nuclear strike capabilities and BMD also play
critical roles in regional deterrence and the United States
seeks continued and additional cooperation with Japan in
these areas. The United States is aware of Japan's interest
in these issues, as indicated by Foreign Minister Kazuya
Okada's letter to Secretaries Clinton and Gates, and is
looking forward to continued dialogue with Japan, Basalla
stated.
----------------------------
Extended Deterrence Dialogue
----------------------------
¶7. (S) ASD Gregson added that the United States has been
consistent and strong in its public messages, such as Deputy
Secretary of State Steinberg's statement following North
Korea's missile and nuclear activities in the spring of 2009,
that the United Stated would take every action possible to
reassure and defend its allies. The United States seeks to
expand the dialogue with Japan on extended deterrence issues.
This should include a GOJ visit to U.S. Strategic Command to
ensure Japan understands, to the extent possible, U.S.
deterrence plans and concepts, and to allow Strategic Command
to hear Japan's interests and concerns, ASD Gregson stated.
¶8. (S) MOFA DG Umemoto informed the U.S. side that Foreign
Minister Okada, who was not interested in the strategic
issues associated with extended deterrence when first taking
office, is now eager to start a bilateral dialogue on the
issue. MOFA would like to send a team to the United States
during the week of February 15 to begin formal discussions.
A/S Campbell stressed that there are three distinct issue
sets that must be managed: 1. extended deterrence, 2. nuclear
history (known as the ""secret agreements"" in Japan), and 3.
the ability of U.S. aircraft and ships to call at Japanese
ports without needing to confirm or deny the presence of
nuclear weapons.
TOKYO 00000228 003 OF 007
¶9. (S) DG Umemoto said nuclear propulsion is not much of a
concern in Japan, especially following the USS George
Washington's deployment, but nuclear weapons are very much
tied to the ""secret agreement"" issue. Japan does not want to
end up like New Zealand and needs to find a path forward that
allows U.S. operations and port visits to continue while also
responding to questions from the Japanese public. He also
noted that the Japanese public has high expectations
following President Obama's Prague speech, and so it will be
necessary to reconcile the contradiction between working to
reduce nuclear weapons and strengthening deterrence. The
public also needs to understand that reducing reliance on
U.S. nuclear weapons for Japan's security will mean an
increased reliance on U.S. and Japanese conventional forces,
DG Umemoto said. Both sides agreed on the need to draw up a
terms of reference and begin the extended deterrence dialogue
as soon as possible.
--------------------------------------------- -
50th Anniversary: Regional Security Assessment
--------------------------------------------- -
¶10. (C) DG Umemoto proposed that a key bilateral activity
associated with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security Treaty should be a Deputy Director
General/Deputy Assistant Secretary-led assessment of the
security environment in East Asia, with a specific initial
focus on China. The work should kick-off in March. Both
sides agreed on the benefit of including experts, which
should come from the interagency policy community, including
the National Security Council and the White House, as well as
the armed forces and intelligence community. A/S Campbell
recommended State and MOFA lead this assessment. MOD DG
Takamizawa offered that the assessment should incorporate
previous dialogues, such as the bilateral airpower dialogue.
The results could lead to renewed discussions on Alliance
roles, missions and capabilities, and also inform Japan's
revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and
drafting of the next 5-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, DG
Takamizawa said.
¶11. (C) A/S Campbell stated that, given North Korea's
activities, China's growing military, and increased
non-traditional threats, including extremism, piracy and
climate change, the United States and Japan face the most
challenging security environment in the history of the
Alliance. However, the messages to the public regarding
bilateral dialogues often gloss over this reality. DG
Umemoto agreed with A/S Campbell's statement that this needs
to change with an assessment of the regional security
picture so that the public better understands threats to
Japan. He also said FM Okada wants to discuss the security
environment with his counterparts as well and suggested this
topic could be part of a future 2 2 meeting.
--------------------------------
50th Anniversary: Cyber-security
--------------------------------
¶12. (S) DG Umemoto said cooperation on cyber-security would
be another activity to kick off during the 50th Anniversary
year. He expressed appreciation for the U.S. offer to
continue discussions on cyber-security issues, including
those related to China. ASD Gregson noted the importance of
getting real experts together, given the highly technical
nature of the subject. DG Umemoto suggested having a joint
cyber exercise at some point. ASD Gregson agreed, noting
that the United States was setting up a military command to
defend and combat threats to networks. DG Takamizawa said
Japan was not as far along as the United States and has had a
hard time assigning responsibility to the right agency, which
has hindered Japan's approach to the issue. A/S Campbell
replied that USG coordination on cyber security was not as
TOKYO 00000228 004 OF 007
developed as was believed. He suggested, and all agreed,
that the best path forward for progress would be a
DOD-MOD-led dialogue. DG Umemoto said Japan is also ready to
""upgrade"" the until now classified Bilateral Information
Security Task Force (BISTF) into a public working group on
information security that would build on BISTF's work to date.
------------------------
Wisemen's Group/Mini-SSC
------------------------
¶13. (C) A/S Campbell reiterated the USG,s interest in
forming a bilateral &wisemen,s group8 for shepherding
events related to the 50th anniversary of the security
treaty, an idea originally suggested by the Japanese Embassy
in Washington. DG Umemoto pointed out that FM Okada remains
firmly opposed to creating a formal group. As a practical
matter, the DPJ government is not able to identify sufficient
numbers of security experts outside the government with no
ties to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Although MOFA
had supported the idea at one point, the change in government
and the current political environment have rendered it
unfeasible, DG Umemoto said.
¶14. (C) DG Umemoto also called for discussions at the
upcoming mini-SSC on bilateral planning and each of the
sub-elements. While both sides have achieved considerable
progress in moving forward on individual sub-elements, senior
Japanese political leaders could not connect them together
well in the overall bilateral planning construct, Umemoto
noted. ASD Gregson responded that he supports discussing
bilateral planning at the mini-SSC, and suggested that both
sides explore and discuss further some of the key takeaways
from the recent Keen Edge bilateral exercise. OSD Director
for Japan Basalla suggested discussing bilateral training in
the mini-SSC, emphasizing that training is an issue that
crosses over both strategic and operational issues.
¶15. (C) A/S Campbell suggested that both sides try to
schedule another SSC in March, either in Washington or in
Hawaii, with perhaps a half-day set aside for a trilateral
meeting with India. DG Umemoto expressed support for the
idea, noting that the GOJ has been seeking trilateral
discussions with India and bilateral discussions with China.
A/S Campbell noted difficulties in pursuing a bilateral
summit between the President and Prime Minister Hatoyama in
April, adding, however, that considerable interest exists for
a Security Consultative Committee (SCC) &2 28 meeting.
Scheduling an SCC meeting sometime after the GOJ,s decision
on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in May would be a
good opportunity to announce the direction to be taken by the
U.S.-Japan Alliance, as well as to celebrate the hard work of
both sides on FRF. An SCC prior to a resolution on FRF,
however, could be difficult. DGs Umemoto and Takamizawa
noted difficulties in following such a timeline, as the Diet
would be in session in June and Defense Minister Kitazawa
would also need to focus on campaigning in the July Upper
House election.
---------------------------
50th Anniversary: End State
---------------------------
¶16. (C) A/S Campbell asked, given the proposed bilateral
activities that include the extended deterrence dialogue,
regional security assessment and cyber-security cooperation,
what the GOJ sees as the end state for the 50th anniversary
of the Security Treaty. DG Umemoto said FM Okada sees the
process starting with the current discussions on planning for
the 50th anniversary commemoration, followed by the
abovementioned dialogues, and culminating in a joint
declaration that would articulate the Alliance in the 21st
Century. A/S Campbell noted that a joint declaration could
be possible, if the Futenma Replacement Facility issue is
TOKYO 00000228 005 OF 007
solved in a timely fashion. FM Okada has the same view, DG
Umemoto responded. A/S Campbell noted that President Obama
will stop in Guam in March on his way to Australia and
Indonesia. The stop should signal to Japan the importance of
Guam to Alliance transformation and the realignment of U.S.
forces, particularly the FRF plan. A/S Campbell also noted
the need to begin laying the ground work for President
Obama's trip to Japan in November.
-------------------
Host Nation Support
-------------------
¶17. (C) DG Umemoto called for both sides to begin the formal
process for conducting a comprehensive review of Host Nation
Support (HNS) as agreed in the current Special Measures
Agreement (SMA) on Host Nation Support (HNS) for U.S. forces.
He stressed that, from the GOJ,s perspective, comprehensive
review does not necessarily equate to drastic reductions in
HNS, but rather, managing HNS funds more efficiently by
examining all areas of use to demonstrate to the Japanese
public that HNS contributes to the defense of Japan. The
focus, DG Umemoto stated, should be on more efficient use of
HNS or on slight reductions with greater results. ASD
Gregson cautioned against portraying the comprehensive review
as &slight reductions,8 as some Washington observers could
misinterpret Japanese calls for &slight reductions8 as
calls for &less defense.8 He also stressed that the goal
for both governments should be to attain the greatest value
out of HNS, not to minimize cost.
¶18. (C) A/S Campbell sought DG Umemoto,s views on the idea
of extending current levels of HNS by one year and delaying
negotiations in order to avoid raising yet another
contentious bilateral issue. He pointed out that precedent
for such extensions exist, as the two goverments had done so
on two other occasions. DG Umemoto rejected the idea,
stressing that simple continuation of current levels of HNS
would be toocontroversial. He underscored that, precedent
notwithstanding, the new government would not support a plan
in which both sides did nothing to address perceived
inefficiencies in HNS spending. DG Umemoto noted, however,
that immediate changes to current levels of HNS are not
necessary, given both sides, respective budget cycles. A
five-year agreement, for example, that demonstrates changes
either at the end of the five-year period or sometime earlier
would allow for continuation of current HNS levels for a
short period, DG Umemoto said.
¶19. (C) A/S Campbell stressed that the contents of HNS
discussions ought to be kept out of the public. He also
noted that USG would integrate Assistant Secretary for
Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and his bureau more
deeply in the HNS negotiations, a bureaucratic change in the
USG,s approach to HNS. The USG wants to pursue periodic
senior-level talks led by the DOS Office of the Senior
Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements to review
progress made at the Director-level SMA negotiations in
Tokyo, as well as to address broader, strategic issues. ASD
Gregson suggested including renewable energy in the HNS
discussions, as utilities costs present a considerable
portion of HNS. He offered to send to Japan a DOD briefing
team to engage in discreet information exchanges on some of
the energy efficiency projects being pursued by DOD,
including the Office of Naval Research.
----------------------------
Futenma Replacement Facility
----------------------------
¶20. (C) DG Umemoto underscored that the &entire8 GOJ is
committed to finding a solution on FRF by the end of May, as
Prime Minister Hatoyama and other senior officials have
commented publicly. He noted that the ruling party,s
TOKYO 00000228 006 OF 007
consultations are progressing and stressed that the possible
alternatives do not exclude the current plans. He assured
the U.S. delegation that any alternative put forth by the GOJ
must meet U.S. military requirements and will, therefore,
require prior consultation with the USG. Referring to the
results of the Nago City mayoral elections (won by an
anti-FRF candidate), DG Umemoto pointed out that decisions on
FRF will be made by the GOJ, not local communities. He also
asked that the USG support the proposed visit to Guam by
members of the Coalition Working Group, with whatever
conditions or restrictions it wants to impose on them. The
members want to examine the current conditions in Guam to
inform their own deliberations. While the GOJ understands
U.S. concerns about possible ulterior motives of Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and People,s New Party (PNP) members
of the working group, MOFA would like the USG to agree to
support a multiparty delegation in principle, DG Umemoto said.
¶21. (C) A/S Campbell said the USG would agree to support the
visit in principle. He pointed out that the USG would
continue to maintain that the current FRF plan remains the
best approach, that the USG is prepared to engage on the
issue with the GOJ, that it seeks expeditious results, and
that any decisions on FRF must be made bilaterally. A/S
Campbell also noted that the U.S. side would respond strongly
if the Japanese side were to go public with unilateral FRF
alternative proposals before consulting with the USG. DG
Umemoto pointed out that the Realignment Roadmap is not
limited to FRF and urged both sides to make progress on other
areas of realignment. ASD Gregson responded that while the
Roadmap goes beyond Futenma, the politicization of FRF is
bleeding into other realignment projects, particularly
Iwakuni.
---
F-X
---
¶22. (S) DG Takamizawa reported that MOD had held the first of
four internal meetings to bring the Defense Minister and Vice
Ministers up to date on the F-X (Japan's next fighter
aircraft) procurement. The remaining meetings will focus on
why the F-X is necessary, the security environment, candidate
aircraft (F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18E/F, F-15X and the
Eurofighter) and procurement timelines for each aircraft.
Meetings will be held every other week until end of March or
early April. MOD is planning to reach out to other countries
that have the candidate aircraft to determine their rationale
for procurement. MOD will be looking at F-X procurement not
just from the perspective of replacing the aging F-4
squadrons, but also with a view to replacing Japan's F-15s
and countering the growing multilayered China threat. This
could lead to fewer resources for the F-X and more for other
assets, such as submarines for instance, depending on Japan's
assessment of the threat. Domestic industrial participation
will also be a factor, as Japan's indigenous F-2 line will
soon be shut down, leaving Japan with no domestic fighter
production program. MOD's assessment is that, if the F-35 is
selected, there would be no room for Japanese industrial
participation. Moreover, MOD would also not be able to
purchase indigenously produced missiles for the F-35. DG
Takamizawa assessed that MOD will request funding for the F-X
in the JFY2011 budget, although perhaps without specifying a
platform.
¶23. (C) A/S Campbell affirmed that the United States is
committed to providing as much information as possible so
Japan can make the right decision. DG Takamizawa said
getting information has been a difficult and frustrating
process, while noting the information security issues
associated with the Joint Strike Fighter. MOD has accepted
that it will not be able to receive radar cross section (RCS)
data on the F-35 and will try to determine why other
countries decided to purchase the platform prior to receiving
TOKYO 00000228 007 OF 007
RCS data. DG Takamizawa expressed concern about delivery
timelines, indicating he had heard rumors that there were two
to three-year delays. ASD Gregson said it is important to
dispel rumors and have people with accurate information
provide Japan with an update on the current status.
¶24. (U) Meeting participants:
State Department
----------------
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Kurt Campbell
Embassy DCM James Zumwalt
Robert Luke, Embassy Political Minister Counselor
Kevin Maher, EAP/J Director
Joseph Young, Embassy Political-Military Unit Chief
Nirav Patel, EAP Special Assistant
Mark Tesone, EAP Special Assistant
Simon Lee, Embassy Political Military Officer
Dan Cintron, Embassy Political Military Officer
Defense Department
------------------
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson
Brig Gen William Uhle, PACOM Deputy J3
Suzanne Basalla, OSD Director for Japan
COL Jeffrey Wiltse, USFJ J5
LCDR John Bradford, OSD Country Director for Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
---------------------------
North American Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto
North American Deputy Director General Koji Tomita
Embassy of Japan Minister Akiba
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director Funakoshi
Senior Japan-U.S. Security Coordinator Arai
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Div. Dep. Director Okazaki
Ministry of Defense
-------------------
Defense Policy Director General Nobushige Takamizawa
Japan Joint Staff Policy and Plans Director MG Isobe
Defense Policy Deputy Director General Tetsuro Kuroe
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Div. Director Serizawa
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Dep. Director Araki
¶25. (U) A/S Campbell's and ASD Gregson's staff cleared this
cable.
ROOS