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Viewing cable 09SANJOSE85, COSTA RICA AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SO FAR, SO GOOD, BUT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANJOSE85 | 2009-02-10 12:59 | 2011-03-21 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0085/01 0411259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101259Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0478
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000085
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC, EEB/IFD/OMA AND EEB/IFD/ODF;
PLEASE PASS TO TREASURY: SSENICH
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN EIND EINV PGOV PREL CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SO FAR, SO GOOD, BUT
CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Costa Rica's conservative financial system has
served it reasonably well thus far during the current global
financial crisis, but 2009 will likely be difficult. The GOCR knows
it must act intelligently as some fundamentals begin to deteriorate;
the Arias administration does not want its final year in office to
be colored only by the crisis. In the current account, the greatest
worries are (1) a deterioration of exports (which grew only four
percent in 2008 while imports increased 18.6 percent); (2) a slump
in tourism (which hit a record two million in 2008, but has been
dropping on a year-by-year monthly basis); (3) a likely drop in
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which thus far has helped to fill
some of the trade deficit; and (4) a reduction in foreign credit
lines (which have begun to tighten). The drop in petroleum prices
has been good news; in addition, the GOCR's countercyclical spending
helped fund a USD 117.5 million liquidity package to strengthen the
national banks in December, along with the "Shield Plan" announced
in January to assist the disadvantaged, labor, small business, and
the Central Bank. An IADB loan of USD 500 million should also help
the Central Bank, but the need to fund liquidity and to make credit
available on the one hand, while managing Costa Rica's high
inflation rate (nearly 14 percent for 2008) on the other, is an
ongoing source of economic tension. END SUMMARY.
---------------------------
NOT YOUR FATHER'S RECESSION
---------------------------
¶2. (U) In discussing prospects for the immediate future, Costa
Rican experts and businessmen often refer back to the country's
financial meltdown in the early 1980's. The comparisons are largely
quite positive. Since then, the Costa Rican economy has benefitted
greatly from globalization, with the export and banking sectors
becoming more efficient and diversified. Around the region in
general, consistent macroeconomic policy, self-designed rescue
packages, a competitive edge with commodities, and relatively strong
consumer demand positioned many economies -- including Costa Rica's
-- to better weather the current storm. Such globalization also
implies great vulnerability to problems originated elsewhere in the
world, however, and blaming globalization for "imported" problems
could again become a flash point issue for the opposition, as the
body politic continues to recover from the bruising fight to
institute CAFTA-DR.
--------------------------------------------- -
2008: MIXED RESULTS; 2009: MORE OF THE SAME?
--------------------------------------------- -
¶3. (U) The current picture is a mixed one, however, based on the
Central Bank's monthly index of economic activity. Overall
performance improved steadily in 2007 only to flatten at year's end,
and then, starting in March 2008, incrementally decrease. Not
surprisingly, the sectors associated with tourism and resort
development declined the most. The hotel sector posted a decrease
of 3.8 percent in 2008, while construction declined 6.2 percent.
Manufacturers fared the worst, with a drop of 8.4 percent. In
contrast, agriculture, which tailed off in 2007, experienced a
recovery in 2008. The service sector held its own in 2008 mainly as
a result of outsourcing professional services from other countries.
Hence, the net overall effect was a slight decline in economic
activity.
¶4. (U) Economic worries continued to figure prominently in survey
results. In the January 2009 CID-Gallup poll, three of ten
questioned cited employment, the cost of living, and the economy in
general as their key concerns. Four in ten reported the high cost
of living as their biggest worry, fueled by the inflation rate,
which crested at 14.4 percent in November 2008 and then eased to a
year-end-rate of 13.9 percent. (For comparison, the rate in 2006 was
9.4 percent and 10.8 percent in 2007, marking an upward trend.) As
for the future, noted banker Luis Liberman gloomily told the weekly
financial publication "El Financiero" there would be near zero
economic growth in 2009, with the current doldrums lasting up to two
years. The Central Bank recently ratcheted downward its 2009 GDP
growth projection to 2.2 percent. Though less negative than
Liberman, the Bank offered its recent statement on lowered
projections with much caution due to the uncertainty in export
markets, notably to the U.S.
----------------
ARIAS HAS A PLAN
----------------
¶5. (U) In a national address on January 29, President Arias noted
the "devastating dimensions" of the global financial crisis and
announced the "Shield" Plan to provide social protection and a
stimulus to the economy. Stressing four key beneficiaries --
families, labor, small business, and banking -- Arias outlined a
program of government assistance designed to "shield" the Costa
Rican economic and monetary system from worsening:
-- For families: institute measures to expand existing programs
that benefit poorer families and workers. Individual pensions under
a special system for disadvantaged families will be increased by 15
percent. The school-lunch program will be expanded to cover some
children and members of their families during weekends, and the high
school scholarship program that provides basic expenses to poor
students will likewise grow incrementally. The National Training
Institute will offer scholarships in coordination with companies to
provide additional training to workers who would otherwise be
released. In addition, the GOCR requested the state-owned banks
(all of which are run by Boards of Directors) to reduce the interest
rates of their smaller housing loans by two percent; one bank has
officially agreed and the others are expected to follow.
-- For labor: reform the labor laws (with legislative approval) to
liberalize the requirements on the number of hours per day and days
per week worked. The objective is to maintain employment levels,
but allow for a reduction in hours through greater work flexibility.
-- For small business: request the state banks and Banco Popular to
consolidate business debt, particularly for credit-dependent
organizations such as cooperatives, and to reduce interest rates by
two percent for loans targeted at micro, small- and medium-sized
businesses (PYMES). One bank has taken this measure and the others
are expected to follow.
-- For the general economy: secure an IADB loan of USD 500 million
in order to bolster the Central Bank in its role of backing the
state banks. Also secure a set of loans from international
institutions (para 12 below) to finance infrastructure. The Arias
administration estimates that 10 percent of the monies could be
spent in the next year.
-----------------------------------------
HEY MR. BANKER. . . CAN YOU SPARE A LOAN?
-----------------------------------------
¶6. (U) The next several months will reveal if credit tightening
threatens the Costa Rica economy. Costa Rica's public banks are the
biggest in the market, largely buffered from tightening in foreign
credit because they only derive about four percent of their
resources from foreign sources. Private banks, on the other hand,
were recently reported to derive 22 percent of their resources from
overseas. One contact at Citibank told us that headquarter banks
were cutting the flow of funds to subsidiaries in countries such as
Costa Rica and advising subsidiaries to look to other sources for
funds. Moreover, many private firms rely to one degree or the other
on foreign credit lines which have disappeared or become more
expensive.
¶7. (U) The public banks haven't helped matters since September 2008,
when they declared that they were too close to the 10 percent
equity/asset ratio required under Costa Rican law and therefore
adopted the policy of only lending funds paid in from outstanding
loans. Nonetheless, Alberto Dent, President of the GOCR's financial
services regulator (CONASSIF), shared with us that Costa Rican banks
were relatively well-capitalized, as the typical equity/asset ratio
in Latin America is eight percent. With respect to loan costs, the
premium above LIBOR increased from 50 basis points to 600 basis
points, Dent observed, greatly raising the percentage rate charged
to customers, which expands profit margins but strangles growth and
results in less liquidity.
-------------------------------
BANK SPENDING. . .THE SOLUTION?
-------------------------------
¶8. (U) Preceding the Arias announcement of the "Shield" Plan, the
GOCR injected capital into the public banks. The Legislative
Assembly (legislature) quickly passed a bill in December granting
USD 117.5 million to the three public banks (BNCR, BCR, BanCredito)
with the explicit understanding that they would then be able to lend
up to USD 1.175 billion relying on the expanded equity base. The
GOCR instructed public banks to dedicate the new resources to
housing and "productive" credit. The investment strategy was not
written, and thus could be modified as circumstances change. The
banks received these fresh resources in the last week of 2008.
However, this recapitalization may be less than meets the eye, as it
was made with non-coupon paying inflation-linked bonds that are not
marketable. While these bonds will add to the state banks'
regulatory capital, allowing more lending without violating the law,
they do not provide any actual liquidity. The banks' two percent
reduction in loan rates (see para 5, above) may encourage use of
those funds.
¶9. (U) A countertrend (and source of tension) to the need to create
liquidity is the Central Bank's tight credit policy due to
inflation. Facing the third worse inflation in Central America, a
weaker currency, and falling reserves, the Bank continues to raise
interest rates. President Arias' request to the state banks to
lower rates will provide only very modest relief, as the benchmark
"tasa basica" has risen from four percent to 11.50 percent since the
currency moved off the bottom of the currency exchange band in mid
¶2008.
-------------------------
UNEMPLOYMENT EDGES UPWARD
-------------------------
¶10. (U) From 2001 through 2006, unemployment in Costa Rica was 6.0
percent or higher. During the Arias Administration, the rate fell
to 4.6 percent in 2007. For 2008, the rate inched upward to 4.9
percent. The construction sector has clearly slowed down and laid
off large numbers of workers in recent months as a result of a
pullback in Pacific resort development. However, we are not aware
of any major lay-offs outside of the construction and tourism
industries. As recent as early 2008, Costa Rican officials were
quite concerned with major shortfalls in labor in the construction
and agricultural sectors. Both rely heavily on foreign labor,
largely Nicaraguans. Now, the GOCR predicts a labor surplus,
especially in northern Costa Rica, as Nicaraguans (and other foreign
workers), many undocumented, flee the economic uncertainty in their
own countries.
--------------------------------------------
RUN UP THE DEBT; BUILD UP THE INFRASTRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------
¶11. (U) In addition to a focused expansion of the money supply, the
GOCR stated its determination to engage in countercyclical spending
on infrastructure projects. A recent article in "El Financiero"
proclaimed "The Government's New Goal is to Contract More Debt".
The GOCR can reasonably aspire to do so, since Costa Rica's current
external debt of USD 3&GnFOQQg programs,
external credits may have little immediate impact since there is a
long lag between contract signing and project implementation.
External debt is indeed low, but this year the GOCR needs to
refinance a Eurobond that matures in May. Also, until very
recently, the doJnLRT2\Xanging its marketing
strategy: issuing short-term domestic currency and
dollar-denominated securities which resulted in a much better
response to its debt auctions. Nonetheless, funding for government
spending will remain challenging until monetary policy is relaxed.
------------------------------
REAL ESTATE (AND FDI) SLOWDOWN
-----------------------------
¶13. (U) The real estate sector, which is concentrated along the
Pacific coast and which accounts for about one third of Costa Rican
FDI, has suffered an abrupt reduction in activity. Due to a lack of
potential buyers (largely U.S. citizens looking for vacation or
retirement homes), projects have slowed or been suspended.
Companies looking to invest in Costa Rica have likewise placed their
decisions on hold. FDI reached USD 2.048 billion in 2008, but is
highly likely to drop in 2009, according to our sources. No one is
willing to predict the extent of the decline, however.
------------------------
A (DOWN) TURN IN TOURISM
------------------------
¶14. (U) The two-millionth tourist to Costa Rica in 2008, a member
of a family of seven from New Jersey, arrived to great fanfare in
the third week of December. While tourist numbers hit new records
last year, however, the year-on-year monthly number has been
declining since August 2008. The economic downturn in the US is
mainly to blame; 54 percent of Costa Rica's tourists each year are
American. The Costa Rican Institute of Tourism (ICT) is expecting
2007-2008 to show an increase of about seven percent, compared to an
increase of 12 percent 2006-2007. The Costa Rican Chamber of Hotels
(CCH) reports that three in ten hotels have already had
cancellations for 2009 of between five and forty percent of
reservations. At the opening of a new J.W. Marriott resort in the
prime beach destination of Guanacaste, Marriott officials commented
that the hotel occupancy rates in this region had sunk to about 25
percent.
--------------------------------------------- --
PETROLEUM PROGNOSIS: LOWER PRICES ARE GOOD NEWS
--------------------------------------------- --
¶15. (U) The recent precipitous drop in fuel prices has been a
bright spot, representing major foreign-exchange savings for the
country and a savings for the national budget. Statistics from 2008
indicated that, for every USD 10 drop in the petroleum price, Costa
Rica spent USD 197 million less on importing the product. While
Costa Rica produces most of its electricity from renewable sources
(more than 80 percent), the transportation sector is completely
dependent on fossil fuels, and Costa Rica has no fossil fuels
production at all. CONASSIF's Alberto Dent told us that the GOCR's
fuel cost planning for 2008 changed drastically from a projected USD
2.4 billion in June-July to USD 1.0 billion by the end of the year.
(COMMENT: Such a drop also greatly undermines the GOCR's original
stated rationale for joining Petrocaribe. Membership was still
pending at the end of 2008. END COMMENT.)
---------------------------------
COMMENT: WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN?
---------------------------------
¶16. (SBU) To date, Costa Rica has weathered the crisis better than
most countries, in spite of its close economic ties to the U.S.
(Costa Rica's GDP is approximately $30 billion and the two-way trade
relationship is valued at $8.5 billion.) Cultural conservatism and
a stricter financial regulatory environment have combined to provide
a natural buffer to most of the problems emanating from the ailing
U.S. economy. (Financial instruments such as mortgage-backed
securities and credit default swaps simply do not exist in the Costa
Rican financial system.) The coming year will reveal the
effectiveness of the GOCR's countercyclical spending programs, how
close of a "cause and effect" relationship Costa Rica has with the
U.S., and the result of the Central Bank's tight credit policy in an
environment hungering for credit liberalization. Government
officials, economists and most Ticos expect things to get worse, but
no one is sure precisely when, and how quickly. Here as everywhere
else, economics remains both a science and an art.
CIANCHETTE