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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1104, IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BAGHDAD1104 | 2009-04-24 16:21 | 2010-12-05 12:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO8615
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1104/01 1141621
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241621Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2832
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001104
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR PGOV MOPS ECON IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN
REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 853
¶B. BAGHDAD 342
¶C. BAGHDAD 762
¶D. BAGHDAD 383
¶E. BASRA 17
¶F. BAGHDAD 1103
¶G. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Iranian response to the drawdown of U.S.
military forces in Iraq, and Iraq's evolving relationship
with Iran, will influence the climate for U.S. engagement
with Iran on our range of interests. The Iranians may see
the drawdown as an opportunity to strengthen their hand in
Iraq, akin to the opportunities they perceived after the fall
of Saddam in 2003. But they appear to have learned that
their proxy violence and efforts to strong-arm Iraqi
politicians generated more ill-will than influence. Iraqis
are now pushing back against malign Iranian influence. The
GOI cracked down on Iranian-backed militias and signed
long-term partnership agreements with the United States last
year, while this year Iraqi voters rewarded nationalist Iraqi
politicians in the provincial elections. At the same time,
Iraqis are buying Iranian products, accepting Iranian
investments, and welcoming Iranian visitors. The political
relationship between the countries is maturing, although
still scratchy.
¶2. (S)(Summary continued) Iran in 2009 faces more
constraints in Iraq than it did in 2003. We expect the
Iranians will respond to the U.S. military drawdown under
these new constraints with violence targeted more closely at
the United States, more diplomatic outreach to Iraqi
politicians, and continued focus on trade and investment.
Consistent with ref A, our response must be targeted as well:
a vigorous response to security challenges, regional
diplomacy to help Iraq integrate with its neighbors and
internationally, and increased assistance to Iraq to build
its political and economic capacity to resist malign
influence from Iran. END SUMMARY.
---------------
New environment
---------------
¶3. (S) The Quds Force (QF) -- the external operations arm of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -- has directed
Iranian policy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam in 2003. The
IRGC-QF used its leverage with Shi'a political parties such
as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) to influence evolving Iraqi domestic politics, while
providing extensive logistical support and training to the
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and other extremist groups.
Tripartite discussions between the USG, GOI, and Iranian
government in Baghdad in 2007 made no immediate breakthroughs
toward reducing Iranian sponsorship of violence.
¶4. (S) The heavy-handed Iranian intervention backfired,
however, when the violent and undisciplined JAM alienated
many Iraqis, who also came to resent Iranian political
interference. In 2007, SCIRI changed its name to the Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to distance itself from its
Iranian and revolutionary origins, while PM Maliki's Da'wa
party has staked out a nationalist political position. With
ISCI's backing, Maliki directed Iraqi security forces to
challenge JAM control of Basra and Sadr City in 2008,
succeeding with the extensive but quiet assistance of MNF-I.
This success, along with growing popular distrust of Iran and
Iranian influence, contributed to Da'wa's strong showing over
ISCI in January 2009 provincial elections (ref B). Among
other recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the
Qother recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the
Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement with the
USG despite Iranian objections.
¶5. (S) Dynamics other than the U.S. military drawdown will
affect Iranian influence in Iraq in coming years. Iraqis
will continue to accept legitimate Iranian investment and buy
Iranian electricity and manufactured goods as Iraqi domestic
production struggles to rebuild. Iranian agricultural produce
will continue to fill Iraqi markets as Iraqi farmers recover
from conflict, neglect, and a drought that has limited
production. The number of Iranian pilgrims and tourists,
already in the hundreds of thousands annually, will increase
with improvements in Iraqi security and tourism
infrastructure. As the Iraqi-Iranian bilateral relationship
matures with its positive advances and disputes, the
BAGHDAD 00001104 002 OF 003
governments will seek to deepen their cooperation on issues
such as de-mining, petroleum development and border security,
although disagreements over border demarcation and water
rights will continue to cause friction (ref G).
¶6. (S) Just as Iraq will try to strengthen relations with
its Arab neighbors and Turkey to balance Iranian influence,
Iran will maintain regional influence through relations with
Syria and domestic influence in Iraq through its TV
broadcasts into Iraq and relations with Shia political
parties, the Kurds, and in fact any Iraqis who will have
them. Ultimately, Iraqi nationalism and self-reliance are
the most effective long-term defenses against Iranian
domination, and the degree and nature of Iranian influence in
Iraq will be determined less by the level of U.S. military
forces in Iraq than by the Iraqi political and economic
capacity to balance Iranian influence and channel it into
mutually beneficial areas.
--------
Drawdown
--------
¶7. (S/NF) While it initially criticized the Security
Agreement, intelligence reporting indicates that Iran is
beginning to take advantage of the new constraints on U.S.
military forces. Iranian officials have pressured the GOI to
close the Mujahedin-e Khalq's Camp Ashraf since the GOI
assumed security responsibility for it on January 1, as well
as release IRGC-QF officers detained by MNF-I in January 2007
as MNF-I turns detainees over to the GOI. (Note: MNF-I and
Embassy intend to hold the officers as long as legally
possible. End note.) Even as Iran publicly emphasizes
diplomatic and economic engagement in Iraq (ref C), the
IRGC-QF continues to support violent extremist groups such as
Kata'ib Hizbollah (KH), and Iran may have played a role in
the recent movement of the extremist group Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq
(AAH) away from the political reconciliation process. MNF-I
analysts expect extremists to continue to use increasingly
deadly weapons supplied by Iran against U.S. forces this year
as U.S. forces move outside the cities and present targets
with little risk of collateral damage. MNF-I also expects
extremists to respond to the drawdown with attacks on U.S.
forces in an attempt to take credit for the U.S. departure.
¶8. (S) Likewise, the Iranian government will continue to
publicly portray the drawdown as a victory for the Iraqi
people and defeat for the United States, perhaps placing it
in the context of other U.S. military disengagements such as
Lebanon in 1984 and Somalia in 1993. After the Security
Agreement was approved, Iranian officials portrayed it
positively, emphasizing the stipulation that Iraq's territory
will not be used to attack a neighbor and that U.S. forces
would leave by the end of 2011.
¶9. (S) This public posturing may play on fears we've heard
from Basra to Anbar to Kurdistan that the U.S. drawdown will
create a vacuum that Iran will attempt to fill. But if Iran
adopts too high a public profile, it risks further backlash
because of nationalistic Iraqi pride as well as economic,
political and cultural grievances. For example, a Shia
member of the Council of Representatives warned us recently
of the pernicious effects of Iran on Shia religious doctrine,
seeking USG support for a media outlet for Iraqi Shi'a
clerics who will resist Iranian theology (ref D). Contacts of
REO Basra blame the rising price of housing on Iranian real
estate; likewise, Iranian agriculture is blamed for
undercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting
Qundercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting
Iranian claims to reinstate the 1975 Algiers Accord about the
Shatt al-Arab, and it is blaming Iranian dams for sharply
cutting water supplies reaching northeast. Maliki and his
team do not trust the Iranians and their militia games --
Basra being a prime example, but also Sadr City and AAH.
¶10. (S) While some Iraqi fears of Iranian influence are
exaggerated, IRGC-QF operatives do expect a more permissive
operating environment as U.S. forces draw down (ref F). At
the same time, the drawdown will remove some threats the
Iranians perceive near the Iran-Iraq border. An Iranian
Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) shot down by U.S. forces in
February was sent to scout two such targets: Camp Ashraf and
a U.S. military base. In the absence of such perceived
threats, and distracted by economic woes and internal
discord, it is possible that Iran will become less
preoccupied with security threats from Iraq. However,
considering Iran's long history of confrontation with Iraq,
its unease about enduring Iraqi-American cooperation, and its
BAGHDAD 00001104 003 OF 003
delegation of Iraq policy to the belligerent anti-American
IRGC-QF, Iran will likely continue to support extremists in
Iraq, perhaps building extremist groups into a Lebanese
Hezbollah-style political-military organization as a hedge
against a resurgent Iraqi central government.
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New challenges, USG response
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¶11. (S) We will continue to assist the Iraqi government in
developing that capacity through political, diplomatic,
economic, rule of law, and security cooperation as outlined
in Embassy and MNF-I's Joint Campaign Plan and the Mission
Strategic Plan. Among current initiatives: the Local
Governance Program to strengthen local government
administrative capacity and civic engagement; assistance for
Iraqi farmers to develop the agricultural sector; training
for the Central Bank's Money Laundering Unit to combat
financial crime; engagement with Iraq's neighbors to
strengthen its regional integration; and advice for Iraqi
officials on an information strategy to respond to malign
Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Success in these
efforts requires a whole-of-government approach, and
sufficient funding for non-military initiatives is vital.
(Note: Ref F outlines a USG strategy for maintaining pressure
on the IRGC-QF in Iraq as U.S. military forces draw down.)
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Comment
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¶12. (S) The view of Iran from Iraq is shaped by complaints
from Iraqi businessmen about Iranian competition, warnings
from Iraqis on the street about Iranian expansionism,
whispers from Iraqi politicians about Iranian influence, and
the occasional sound of Iranian munitions whistling overhead.
While none of these need necessarily affect the USG approach
on engagement with Iran, Iran's response to the drawdown of
U.S. military forces in Iraq will not improve the climate for
talks. In fact, elements of the Iranian government opposed to
engagement with America may use the instigation of violence
in Iraq as a spoiler. However, the Iraqi government and
Iraqi people are not as vulnerable as they were in 2003; they
are increasingly willing and able to defend their own
interests. Continued strengthening of the Iraqi-American
partnership will improve their capacity to counter and
balance Iranian influence, and keeping Iraq informed of our
progress on engagement with Iran will allay concerns that
Iraq's national interests are on the table.
BUTENIS