

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AEMR
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AMCHAMS
AGMT
AADP
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BX
BT
BP
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CR
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CODEL
COPUOS
CIA
CFED
CARSON
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CN
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
EPET
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
ENIV
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXIM
ERNG
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IO
IT
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
IDP
ICTR
IEFIN
IRC
ITRA
ITALY
INRB
INTELSAT
IBET
IRAQI
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KIRF
KSEO
KVPR
KSEP
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KRIM
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KMFO
KMOC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KREC
KX
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTRE
MASC
MG
MARAD
MRCRE
MW
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NATIONAL
NGO
NR
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OECD
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PCI
PG
POGOV
PHUMPGOV
PEL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PMIL
POV
PRL
PDOV
PTBS
PRAM
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
ROOD
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SG
SPCE
SK
STEINBERG
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SEN
SANC
SWE
SHI
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
THPY
TP
TBID
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UY
UNCHR
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNMIK
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
USUN
USNC
UNIDROIT
UNO
UNCND
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS537, IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER CONSULTS KEY AMBASSADORS IN BRUSSELS REF: A. BRUSSELS 205 B. BRUSSELS 41 C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468 D. BRUSSELS 101
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRUSSELS537.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRUSSELS537 | 2009-04-08 12:24 | 2011-02-02 21:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | USEU Brussels |
VZCZCXRO2508
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBS #0537/01 0981224
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081224Z APR 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000537
SIPDIS NOFORN
STATE FOR P, S/SAGSWA, NEA/IR, ISN, EEB/ESC, S/CT, L, EUR, INL TREASURY FOR TFFC, TFI, OIA EU POSTS FOR IRAN WATCHERS AND TFCOS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: ETTC KNNP PARM KTFN PTER EFIN KCRM KJUS KHLS
SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER CONSULTS KEY AMBASSADORS IN BRUSSELS REF: A. BRUSSELS 205 B. BRUSSELS 41 C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468 D. BRUSSELS 101
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 1.4 (b), (d), (e).
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On March 2 and 3 Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Daniel Glaser briefed EU-27 non-proliferation and Iran experts on U.S. sanctions against Iran's illicit conduct in the areas of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. On the margin of the formal briefing (reported septel), Glaser consulted senior EU officials and Ambassadors of Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic, UK, France, and Germany. All interlocutors stressed the importance of direct communication of the U.S. stance to EU countries beyond the E3 or E3
¶1. The minority opposed to revising EU Iran sanctions includes Austria, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and perhaps Romania. EU-3 Ambassadors and Solana's Deputy Robert Cooper privately encouraged the USG to approach these hold-outs bilaterally. Such engagement would remove the opposition's excuse of "not knowing what the U.S. thinks" and change their calculus for bucking EU consensus, especially if they feel they might be "singled out" by the new U.S. Administration.
¶2. (S//NF) AA/S Glaser's separate conversations with key EU stakeholders underscored that Iran sanctions are one of the most sensitive and controversial EU measures under the Common Foreign Security Policy. The last round took nearly a year to negotiate. Even straightforward EU political decisions usually take several months, with a minimum additional month to complete the necessary legislation. Consulting all 27 EU Member States (EUMS) bilaterally at a senior political level may prove essential to secure support for additional designations and new measures in synch with our operational timelines. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
--------------------------------------------- --------- Bilateral Side Meetings: EU Advice on Common Refrains --------------------------------------------- ---------
¶3. (SBU) In advance of the formal presentation to the EU-27, on March 2 and 3 Treasury AA/S Danny Glaser, Treasury Policy Advisor Timothy Dorsett, State ISN Defensive Measures Team Chief Anthony Ruggiero, and USEU officers also met separately with Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors from the Czech Republic (EU Presidency), UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden (incoming EU Presidency). The delegation also consulted the political directors for EU external relations from the Council Secretariat (Robert Cooper) and Commission (Deputy Director General Karel Kovanda). Several shared messages and common themes arose.
Missing U.S. Voice Needed to Get EU Decision On Track --------------------------------------------- --------
¶4. (S//NF) All interlocutors underscored the significance of the U.S. delegation's presentation to all 27 EUMS. Czech Presidency PSC Ambassasdor Ivo Sraamek believed that AA/S Glaser's presentation would strengthen the negotiating position of the "80 to 90 percent (of member states) who are convinced there should be a tougher, bigger stick, beyond the UN resolutions." Sraamek called on the USG to provide "urgently needed" impetus to move the EU forward on sanctions. In this regard, he looked forward to hearing from Secretary Clinton at the FM's troika meeting on March 6. BRUSSELS 00000537 002 OF 004 Signaling the EU's intense interest in supporting the U.S. policy review, French Deputy PSC Rep Didier Chabert noted that the EU was waiting to hear how the EU side can help the U.S and noted Glaser's particular credibility on the sanctions file. Both the French and the Germans stressed the need for the USG to "confirm (our) commitment to the double-track approach."
¶5. (C//NF) German PSC Ambassador Clements von Goetze also noted that this extraordinary large format briefing was the most efficient way of ensuring the U.S. message is transmitted directly to all EU capitals. Furthermore, it served as a "real" signal of USG commitment to the "stick side" of the dual track approach. He urged the USG to share as much factual information as possible with EU experts in order to shore up the efforts of EU foreign ministries who were "having difficulty" convincing economic ministries that next steps should be based on criteria already in existing regulations. Other Member States were "suspicious" of the EU-3, who could use the supporting information and political messages from Washington.
Single Out but Understand the EU Foot-Draggers --------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C//NF) The Czechs (please protect) and Brits both suggested that the USG should seek to bilaterally "single out" and "isolate" EU sanctions opponents in order to achieve the necessary EU consensus for tougher measures. This would be helpful to change the internal EU dynamic. Moreover, the Czechs stressed the need for high-level messages during early contacts with the EU, including, for example at Secretary Clinton's troika meeting on March 6, to say what the new Administration expects from the EU on the second track.
¶7. (C//NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX(strictly protect) noted that Sweden's negative stance had lent other EU sanctions opponents credibility. This "group of eight" included Cyprus and Greece (for cargo interests); Luxembourg (claiming cargo but really for banking interests); Spain and Sweden (taking a legalistic, need for UN consensus approach); Austria (also very legalistic, with concerns over both banks and cargo); Portugal (for economic reasons), and the newest addition of Romania (unspecified reasons). Several contacts pointed to Cyprus as a particular problem. (Comment: Luxembourg insists to USEU that no banking links are involved, but that their primary economic interest is indeed Cargolux's vibrant trade route to Iran, ironically including its major transportation of American-made cigarettes. They also share Sweden's preference for an explicit multilateral UN route. Luxembourg and other small states bristle that their EU counterparts "willfully" ignore their genuine concerns, perhaps increasing their obstinancy. End Comment.)
¶8. (C//NF) Other UK contacts (please protect) noted that in recent EU debates, it became clear that the "problematic" EU countries did not grasp that "the second track was needed to get the first track to work." The UKDel also cautioned that the term "robust implementation" was now code for overzealousness in EU chambers. Moreover, some EU member states worried that the "U.S. is now trying to be the 'good cop'" to curry economic favor later with Iran. Glaser assured the UK (and other contacts) that the United States is sympathetic to the issue of losing business to competitors, having applied trade sanctions on Iran for over two decades, but countered that this would be a much easier problem to have a year from now than the one currently facing us. BRUSSELS 00000537 003 OF 004
Timing is an Issue ------------------
¶9. (C//NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (please protect) worried that the EU would await the outcome of the U.S. policy review in April, then the P5 1 letter to Iran by May, and then Iran's June elections before finally taking up "next steps" in July (which "realistically means September" by EU culture). Cooper said he would stress the urgency of action now to EU PSC Ambassadors at their March 3 meeting (septel). The new EU slogan (Ref A) is being echoed by EU delegations big and small. "Iran needs to fear the stick and feel a light 'tap' now," Cooper asserted. AA/S Glaser agreed, noting the stick could escalate beyond financial measures under a worst case scenario. Cooper thought this point important to make with EU counterparts, deriding that these sanctions are steps the EU should have taken a year ago.
"Legal" vs. "Aspirational" --------------------------
¶10. (C//NF) Cooper lamented that the collective EU culture views decision-making through an excessively legalistic lens, rather than a "great power" aspirational one. Thus he continually reminds the smaller EUMS that the situation is dangerous and unabated will lead to nuclear war in the Middle East. "Focus on protecting the international financial system from abuse," he suggested, rather than strategic goals of increasing pressure on Iran or showing a unified international stance against the nuclear program. "We can't say the banks are not a part of it. Under the spirit and letter of UNSCRs, they are as much a part of the proliferation as the engineers," he emphasized. Tell the Council that "this is illegal conduct, it is dangerous, and sanctions are a part of a strategy for success." Exacerbating the EU's "legalistic" culture were the increasing number of legal challenges to various EU sanctions regimes, including three cases by Bank Melli and its UK subsidiary pending in the EU's Court of First Inst ance.
Spain and Sweden: Bilateral Consultations Count --------------------------------------------- ---
¶11. (C//NF) The delegation met separately with Spain and Sweden, two countries seen as linchpins to the "no" contingent, in advance to preview the formal presentation. (Comment: This may explain why Spain and Sweden did not raise concerns publicly at the main event, perhaps taking their cohorts by surprise. Those who did speak up may have felt more conspicuous and isolated in raising concerns to the U.S. without Spain and Sweden chiming in per usual as a buffer. Some of the hold-outs may wonder how their image is coming across to the new U.S. Administration. End Comment.)
¶12. (C) Both the Spanish and Swedish PSC Ambassadors evinced skepticism about the results thus far of the P5 1 process and the dual track approach. Olof Skoog (Sweden) questioned sanctions' effectiveness, noted they were hurting (Swedish) national economic interests, and asked for information about Iran's attempts to circumvent sanctions activity. He expressed full support for the U.S. policy review, and said the EU wanted to support us with "input, especially on the multilateral side, where Iran could be 'engaged' on regional issues such as Iraq, Middle East and Afghanistan." Sweden and Spain questioned Russian and Chinese commitment to stated international objectives, noting that it was essential to bring them on board." Carlos Fernandez-Arias (Spain) also BRUSSELS 00000537 004 OF 004 stressed the importance of having Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and others support as well.
¶13. (C) The Spanish Ambassador asserted that persuading Iran to stop its nuclear quest would require "transparency, trust, confidence, and verifiability in the region." Iran's willingness to make sacrifices for strategic reasons was an important factor. Questioning whether the "proper incentives" had yet been found, he assessed that Iran may need to see a change in tone more than substance, and may be motivated more by wanting regional respect (see Pakistan post-nuclear capability) than any profound hatred of Israel. "When Iran says they have the power to stop Hamas, we should say 'Do it, and then we'll believe you.'"
¶14. (C) AA/S Glaser agreed that tone was important but stressed the need for the right balance on substance during this vanishing window of opportunity to alter Iran's strategic calculus. He assured interlocutors of our commitment to the dual track. We needed more EU pressure -- consistent with existing UNSCRs -- to help it succeed. Capturing both Swedish and Spanish interest, Glaser explained why designations were necessary to prevent circumvention of existing measures.
¶15. (C) Glaser readily agreed that Russia and China were very important on this issue; their flexibility in the previous week's FATF statement calling for countermeasures signaled their potential for cooperation. In any case, Glaser cautioned against taking a "lowest common denominator approach" to implementing UNSCRs.
Commission Role, Analysis, and Questions ----------------------------------------
¶16. (C) Commission (DG RELEX) interlocutors downplayed their role in the Iran sanctions debate, asserting that their role is mostly limited to administering the paperwork and stressing unity. The Commission saw the Council as divided between those, "like the UK, pushing for more sanctions come hell or high water," versus others worried mostly about hurting their core economic interests by telling companies to cut links while third countries backfill their lost business. Additional EUMS concerns include straying from the multilateral (UN) context, staying focused on targeting proliferation sensitive activities, and heading too far into embargo territory. (Comment: USEU has also heard a similar concern about embargos from DG Trade as at least as far back as 2007.)
¶17. (C//NF) Comment: Indicative of how little attention the Commission pays to its responsibility for monitoring EU sanctions implementation, Political Director Kovanda was surprised to learn at the meeting from his sanctions staffer that the EU has ten separate measures against Iran, after asking Glaser whether the three UNSCRs were being observed without any gaps. Kovanda's office is in part legally responsible for determining how well the EU's own measures are being observed, but has devoted no resources to this question. End Comment.
¶18. (U) AA/S Glaser has cleared this message. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED MURRAY .