

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AEMR
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
AGR
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AMCHAMS
AGMT
AADP
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BX
BT
BP
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CR
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CODEL
COPUOS
CIA
CFED
CARSON
CL
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CN
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
EPET
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
ENIV
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ESENV
ENNP
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXIM
ERNG
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IO
IT
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
IDP
ICTR
IEFIN
IRC
ITRA
ITALY
INRB
INTELSAT
IBET
IRAQI
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KIRF
KSEO
KVPR
KSEP
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KRIM
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KCGC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KMFO
KMOC
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPAI
KO
KVIR
KREC
KX
KR
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTRE
MASC
MG
MARAD
MRCRE
MW
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NATIONAL
NGO
NR
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OECD
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PCI
PG
POGOV
PHUMPGOV
PEL
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PMIL
POV
PRL
PDOV
PTBS
PRAM
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
ROOD
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SG
SPCE
SK
STEINBERG
SH
SNARCS
SAARC
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SEN
SANC
SWE
SHI
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
THPY
TP
TBID
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UY
UNCHR
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNMIK
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
USUN
USNC
UNIDROIT
UNO
UNCND
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04THEHAGUE1793, EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04THEHAGUE1793.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04THEHAGUE1793 | 2004-07-16 12:55 | 2011-01-25 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793
SIPDIS
IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON...
18800
2004-07-16
04THEHAGUE1793
Embassy The Hague
CONFIDENTIAL
04STATE153876
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001793
SIPDIS
IO FOR LAGON; DRL FOR KOZAK; GENEVA FOR DELAURENTIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2014
TAGS: PREL ECON PHUM KDEM AORC NL CH UN
SUBJECT: EU/US COOPERATION IN THE UNGA AND ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. STATE 153876
¶B. THE HAGUE 1737
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ANDREW SCHOFER, POLCOUNS, FOR REASONS 1.4
AND D
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch are deeply committed to the Transatlantic
Dialogue, a successful EU Presidency, and leadership during the UN Gene
Assembly that values USG input if not always agreeing with it. In
discussions with DRL PDAS Kozak and IO DAS Lagon on July12 - 13, Dutch
interlocutors acknowledged Chinese backsliding on human rights in the l
six months but did not expect this to influence EU thinking on lifting
China Arms Embargo. Dutch MFA and NGO officials remain terribly
troubled by Abu Ghraib and welcomed USG clarification regarding the
status of Guantanamo prisoners. The Dutch agreed to collaborate on a
US-EU package of agreed language to settle references to contentious
issues in Third Committee resolutions. USDel signaled new flexibility
UN Commission on Human Rights elections, prompting the Dutch to agree t
restart WEOG negotiations. Sudan, Chechnya, Iran, Burma, Turkmenistan,
and Zimbabwe seem likely subjects for Third Committee resolutions, whil
Belarus and Uzbekistan are not. End summary.
¶2. (U) China, Guantanamo, human rights and a range of United Nations
issues were the agenda in The Hague, June 12 - 13, for DRL PDAS Michael
Kozak's and IO DAS Mark Lagon's meetings with Dutch MFA officials. MFA
interlocutors included Special Ambassador for Human Rights Piet de Kler
Deputy Political Director Hermann Schaper, Human Rights Director Adanna
Adema, and Director of the UN Department Karel van Kesteren. The DCM
hosted an NGO reception and Lagon briefed a large group of university
students on U.S. Human Rights concerns and multilateral issues generall
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO AND BACKSLIDING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
¶3. (C) Amb. de Klerk will travel to China soon to review the human rig
situation. Schaper reminded USDel that the EU's embargo was a specific
response keyed to Tiananmen Square. It was not intended as retaliation
for human rights issues generally and was not imposed for military
considerations, although both concerns now prompt the USG push for
maintaining the ban. He admitted Chinese backsliding over the last six
months caused concern but stressed that this in itself was not a
sufficient argument for maintaining the embargo.
¶4. (C) The Dutch said that the next senior EU discussion of China in
September would focus on the last couple of years of Chinese actions.
EU will examine whether their China dialogue has made a difference on t
ground. The Dutch shared elements from the EU decision matrix:
a. The EU does not want the embargo to stand in the way of overall bett
relations.
b. Human rights is but one issue here; the question is more than is t
glass half full or half empty. There are more glasses on the table.
There has been recent backsliding, but overall the situation has improv
over the last 15 years. The embargo was a response to Tiananmen Square
c. The EU does not expect to export its best weapons to China should t
ban be lifted, and it does not want European weapons to be used or
deployed against U.S. forces.
d. What effect would lifting have on the US presidential elections; an
would it lead to Euro-bashing that would embarrass the Dutch EU
Presidency, for example.
¶5. (C) PDAS Kozak disputed the Dutch assertions regarding China's
improved human rights record and shared recent examples of China's
unfulfilled commitments. A dialogue without results was pointless, he
stressed. Regarding Tiananmen, Chinese restraint from running people o
with tanks in recent years could not justify lifting. He suggested the
should take a closer look at the status of those who were punished for
Tiananmen, if resolution of that issue is the threshold for lifting.
¶6. (SBU) USDel and NGO reps, meeting later at the DCM's residence,
brainstormed ideas for trying to use public opinion to deflect what loo
like a pending EU decision to lift the ban. One idea that resonated wa
to hold a European NGO forum on the Chinese human rights situation earl
in the fall.
GUANTANAMO AND OTHER DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
¶7. (C) Dutch MFA officials and NGO reps remained terribly troubled b
what happened at Abu Ghraib and were clearly hungry for the latest
information on the status of all detainees (ref b). Discussions of the
new Cuba resolution in ECOSOC (ref b) led to thinking about how to a
discussion of how improve Dutch and EU public opinion, including
development of new public affairs products or informal visits to
Guantanamo by an EU or EU Presidency rep. USDel did not commit to thes
proposals but promised to study options.
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
¶8. (U) UN Priorities for 59 UNGA
The USG's UNGA priorities paper has inspired the EU to devise a concise
working paper of their own, the Dutch told us. They promised to study
UNGA priorities (septel) and offered to review the EU list with us late
in the week as well (septel).
¶9. (C) Working together at the UNGA - Third Committee
USDel committed to sending the EU a draft package of agreed language to
settle references in resolutions to contentious issues in the Third
Committee, including how to refer to the International Criminal Court,
death penalty, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among
others. The Dutch agreed to vet our draft at the EU's September COHUM
(working group on human rights) and to arrange a bilateral meeting, if
needed, to work out problems. This might be in Brussels on or about
October 1, or in Warsaw around the same time.
¶10. (C) Country specific issues included:
- Sudan: We agreed to wait to see what the Security Council would do
before considering Third Committee action to follow on the UNCHR
resolution. (Sudan is discussed in more detail below).
- Burma: We agreed there is a need to have Third Committee action.
- Turkmenistan: The EU wondered if it made sense to table another
resolution this year. Not doing so might send the wrong signal. On th
other hand, we are trying to streamline the UN agenda. The EU suggeste
we could run one last resolution and announce that henceforth we would
focus on action in the UNCHR.
- Zimbabwe: USDel offered to support any British action in New York if
they want to have a resolution there.
- Belarus and Uzbekistan: We agreed that there is no need for Third
Committee action since rapporteurs have been already been assigned.
UN REFORM
¶11. (C) Reformed and better UN
Geopolitical reality and strategic practicality inspire the Netherlands
devotion to the multilateral system with an active, constructive, and
reformed UN at the center, Schaper said. The upcoming review of the
Millennium Development Goals is a natural deadline for UN reforms. DAS
Lagon assured him that the US is as committed to building up the UN as
have been to reforming it, however we cannot single-handedly reach the
goal of a UN living up to its original purposes.
¶12. (C) The Dutch do not want UN reform to stall over Security Council
enlargement. They favor, eventually, one EU seat. The MFA working lev
however, opposes Germany's SC seat bid, but publicly the MFA has had to
along for now. On voting, the Dutch have proposed to SYG Annan a votin
weight system as follows: 1/3 based on being a member of the UN; 1/3
based on population; and 1/3 based on the total amount of assessed and
voluntary contributions to the UN.
¶13. (U) Community of Democracies/Democracy Caucus
In courting the wary Dutch to become involved, we reassured them that t
Democracy Caucus (DC) would augment, not compete, with traditional,
long-standing groups. Admitting the idea has theoretical merit, the Du
remained curious about how the Caucus would admit borderline members.
noted that UN PermRep Danforth cited the DC in his confirmation hearing
and thought it a useful tool not limited to use in human rights but als
good for development issues, UN reform, and so on.
UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTION FOR COUNTRY SPECIFIC CONCERNS
¶14. (C) UNCHR Elections
We signaled U.S. readiness to restart negotiations over an agreed WEOG
slate for UNCHR elections, with new flexibility on forgoing membership
two years, rather than one, out of 21. Van Kesteren, co-chair (with th
Canadians) of earlier negotiations on this issue, agreed to explore
restarting negotiations based on this welcome information. He added th
the U.S. might end up having to relinquish three years to get a deal.
added that, after the Security Council, membership on the UNCHR was a
valuable prize for many states. DAS Lagon reported the French seemed
prepared to work it out so WEOG could focus on substance and discourage
the current practice of vote trading with undesirable countries from ot
regions. Finally, van Kesteren fingered Austria as a problem country t
insisted on maintaining their position based on the established pattern
Commission membership.
¶15. (C) Sudan
The Dutch felt the time was ripe for a SC resolution on Sudan. There w
serious problems with both sides and sanctions might be appropriate. I
reviewing the earlier, troublesome Geneva negotiations on the Sudan
resolution and what to do in the Third Committee, the Dutch predicted N
York discussions would again be a triangle between the U.S., EU and
African Union (AU). USDel urged the EU to avoid surprises like the dea
it cut with the AU behind our backs on the last day of talks in Geneva.
We agreed it would be useful to try to split the AU members by peeling
South Africa and other AU members chafing under the AU's lowest common
denominator protection of Sudan. There was consensus not to let
discussion of the genocide question delay or thwart more immediate
action.
¶16. (SBU) NGOs suggested that finding a political solution should be m
higher on the agenda. The rep from Doctors Without Borders complained
that the NGOs are under new threats because both government and rebels
object to their perceived sharing of information from the field with th
outside world. PDAS Kozak regretted that information sharing caused
problems, and said it is important for the GOS to know we are collectin
facts so as to hold them accountable.
¶17. (SBU) Chechnya
NGOs believed the international community has increasingly abandoned
Chechnya and that the situation has become more criminalized in the las
four years. Dutch MFA officials had earlier admitted that the EU has a
bloody nose on this intractable issue. PDAS Kozak reassured NGOs tha
we raise Chechnya with the Russians all the time and have not let
terrorism get in the way of promoting human rights.
¶18. (C) Iran
The Dutch reported a meeting the EU had in Teheran three weeks ago wher
academics and officials discussed police, prisons, and the legal system
Discussions were much more uni sono than half a year ago since
opposition parliamentarians were absent. There are serious questions n
whether to continue the dialogue and there will be a decision by early
October, they told us. The Dutch reminded USDel that they see the
non-proliferation issue as part of a broader relationship with Iran tha
includes expanding business opportunities.
MEETING WITH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
¶19. (U) DAS Lagon had a cordial dialogue with 25 student leaders from
Dutch universities who asked about the U.S.'s lack of participation wit
the ICC, its support of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its
perceived unilateral approach to the war in Iraq, and its treatment of
human rights in the broader war on terrorism. Praising the EU's cultur
of dialogue as a model for other nations, Lagon cautioned that American
realpolitik is a reaction to a belief that the rest of the world has a
less mature approach to international relations. Lagon warned that tha
an extended process of seeking consensus often delayed urgent action.
Rejecting allegations of U.S. unilateralism, Lagon described America's
involvement in many multilateral efforts. Public diplomacy could rever
impressions of American unilateralism and build greater consensus for U
actions. He suggested exchange programs, greater awareness by American
politicians of their global audiences, and discussions such as the one
was currently having were important elements in such a strategy.
COMMENT
¶20. (C) Commitment to the Transatlantic Dialogue underlies much of the
Dutch UN agenda during their EU Presidency. Their exchanges with the
USDel were productive, showed flexibility and receptiveness to US ideas
and a drive to find consensus while doing their duty for national and E
positions. Their promise to work more closely on the Sudan human right
resolutions in New York was welcome and signaled good intentions on the
wider range of issues. On the other hand, their narrowing of the China
arms embargo debate to Tiananmen Square left us little room to argue th
larger human rights and military points of the issue. Immediately on
Guantanamo and longer term in general, the Dutch public remains recepti
to fresh public diplomacy efforts providing information they can use to
justify alignment with U.S. positions.
RUSSEL