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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2588, LEBANON: SINIORA DISCUSSES LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2588 | 2006-08-10 12:12 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO6769
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2588/01 2221212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101212Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4989
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0057
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0935
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002588
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA DISCUSSES LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION
REF: A. BEIRUT 2583
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C) PM Siniora and senior advisers Mohammad Chatta and
Rola Noureddine met with Ambassador Feltman and poloff
(notetaker) on the morning of August 10. Ambassador Feltman
reviewed the latest U.S. draft resolution with Siniora (Note.
Siniora had a meeting immediately afterwards with French
Ambassador Emie to review the latest French draft, which
differs on some points with the U.S. version. End Note).
While not committing the GOL to anything, Siniora and Chatta
reviewed the various concerns to do with the following
issues: a beefed-up "UNIFIL-plus" under Chapter VII, the
timetable for the various deployments and withdrawals, the
rules of disengagement during the critical time period
between the passing of a resolution and LAF/"UNIFIL plus"
deployment, arms smuggling, the blockade of Lebanon,
coordination between the LAF and IDF via UNIFIL, the
conditions for a permanent ceasefire, and Sheba'a Farms and
border delineation. Siniora promised to study the issues and
discuss with the Cabinet and meet with the Ambassador later
today to give a more fulsome GOL position. End Summary.
CHAPTER VII
-----------
¶2. (C) Referring to preliminary paragraphs 9 and 11,
Ambassador Feltman stressed that the U.S. proposes a first
resolution under Chapter VII authority, whereas the French
want to hold that until a second resolution. But, either
way, Lebanon faces the Chapter VII issue. Siniora said that
the essential Lebanese issue with Chapter VII concerns
Lebanon's sovereignty. Siniora worries that Chapter VII
would allow a UNIFIL-plus force carte blanche in undertaking
operations in its area of operations, without referral to the
GOL. Siniora prefers that there be a "consensual
relationship" whereby the GOL would have to consent to any
operation. Siniora asked whether language might be added to
the resolution in order to formalize this "consensual
relationship" so that there could be "no independent,
proactive action" by the UN. Shatta suggested specifically
the following: "The work of the force and its operations will
be with the consent of the Lebanese government." Siniora
noted that Hizballah and the Syrians have said they would be
against a force under Chapter VII authority, even if it were
under the UNIFIL rubric, which meant that it would be
difficult to get the Cabinet on board with this idea.
However, if language were added to make the force more
"consensual," then Siniora promises he "will try to sell it"
in the Cabinet. He also asked for more "balance" in OP11, by
making explicit what is implicit about UNIFIL-plus also
monitoring and verifying the Israeli withdrawal.
TIMETABLE AND INITIAL DEPLOYMENT SIZE
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Siniora noted that the "cessation of hostilities"
called for in OP1 would be followed by a "precarious period"
before the deployment of LAF together with UNIFIL-plus.
Siniora wants to have a clear understanding in the resolution
of what action would be considered a violation of the terms
of the cessation of hostilities during the interim period,
and under what mechanism would these be monitored. "We want
to be specific about what action is a vioaltion and what
action would not cause a collapse in the arrangement, and who
would be the referee." Siniora, in a subsequent phone call
to the Ambassador, was more specific. He said that he
worries that the Israelis will have a far different
definition of what constitutes "defensive action," and the
Israelis will, essentially, continue activities that would
provoke Hizballah rocket fire. What, Siniora asked, stops
the Israelis, "who will say that everything is 'defensive'"?
¶4. (C) Understanding that, according to the U.S. draft,
Israel and Hizballah would withdraw more or less
simultaneously with the joint deployment of the LAF and
UNIFIL-plus (Note. The French draft proposes an initial LAF
deployment on top of the current UNIFIL force triggering an
initial, largely-symbolic IDF withdrawal. End Note), Siniora
BEIRUT 00002588 002 OF 003
also asked for a precise statement regarding the timetable
and troop numbers. Siniora asked how many UNIFIL-plus and
LAF troops would need to be on the ground for the Israelis to
begin their withdrawal. While saying that the LAF will be
deploying in sizable numbers, Siniora mused about whether an
initial deployment of 3000 LAF troops would be enough to
trigger the Israeli pullback. As for timing, Siniora said
that the initial LAF deployment should "not take more than a
couple of days", but that, when the time coems for the
critical deployment/withdrawal phase, there needed to be a
"zero hour" for starting the clocks ticking (Comment.
Siniora's estimate of the time needed for the LAF deployment
is more realistic than that offered by Defense Minister Murr
in his meeting with A/S Welch yesterday (reftel). End
Comment).
COORDINATION WITH IDF VIA UNIFIL
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) In this context, the Ambassador urged that the LAF
should begin coordinating on an operational level with UNIFIL
headquarters in Naqoura, with UNIFIL coordinating in turn
with the Israelis. If army chief Michel Sleiman were to meet
with UNIFIL chief Alain Pellegrini to present the LAF
deployment plan in detail, and were to ask UNIFIL to pass the
information on to Israel, this would go a long way to
convincing the Israelis of the GOL's seriousness. Israel
needs to have confidence that the LAF is a competent,
professional organization. Siniora said that Defense
Minister Murr had already met with Pelligrini, adding that he
would consider the Ambassador's suggestion to begin
operational coordination and share the LAF deployment plan
with UNIFIL.
CEASEFIRE
---------
¶6. (C) Siniora also wants to have a clear reference in this
resolution to implementing a permanent ceasefire, rather than
the current mention in operative paragraph 13 that a "later
resolution" will consider "steps to contribute to the
implementation of a permanent ceasefire." He added that he
envisions that the simultaneous deployments/withdrawals will
be the trigger for a permanent ceasefire, and wants something
to this effect in the resolution. "This has to be stated
clearly in this resolution, not referred to a later
resolution." Siniora called the Ambassador two hours after
the meeting to stress this point again and suggested adding a
clause under OP 11 that UNIFIL-plus will assist in monitoring
this ceasefire.
ENDING THE BLOCKADE/ENSURING AGAINST ARMS SMUGGLING
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (C) Siniora said that he wants the Israeli siege of the
ports and airports to be lifted immediately following the
"cessation of hostilities." However, Siniora still has
trouble with the wording in operative paragraph 5 of the
draft, particularly the word "verifiably" since this seems to
impose a supervisory authority over Lebanon. He approves of
the language in OP 11 (e) since this would be at the GOL's
"request." The Ambassador stressed that the Israelis will
not lift the blockade without an effective mechanism in place
to stop arms smuggling, and suggested there are commercial
firms that can help with monitoring. Siniora said that this
is again a sovereignty issue and that "we have to be careful
not to break things." He added that the seaports and
airports would not be such an issue - "one can make
arrangements" - but that the "informal land crossings"
(Comment. Siniora is likely referring to the much debated
military roads linking Syria and Lebanon. End Comment) are
the greatest concern. Avoiding a clear answer, Siniora
promised to talk with MoD Murr and "think creatively" to find
out what is "palatable from a sovereignty point of view."
SHEBAA FARMS
------------
¶8. (C) Siniora noted that nothing had changed in the
Sheba'a Farms language in OPs 7 and 9, and suggested again
that the resolution instead ask SYG Annan to put the
territory under UN trusteeship pending delineation of the
border. The Ambassador explained the political and
BEIRUT 00002588 003 OF 003
procedural impossibility of getting Israel to agree to such a
formulation now. Shatta urged that this would not be a
commitment one way or another, but would make the direction
on Shebaa a little clearer and "flag it out." Siniora asked
whether the USG could provide a side letter regarding
Sheba'a.
OTHER CONCERNS
--------------
¶9. (C) Siniora, reviewing his handwritten notes taken while
reading the U.S. draft, suggested again adding another clause
under OP 11 that UNIFIL-plus will monitor Israel's
withdrawal. While he understands the mention of resolutions
425 and 426 in OP 11 is an implicit reference to this,
Siniora prefers an explicit reference that this is part of
the mandate of the force.
¶10. (C) Siniora still objects to the mention under OP7 to
respect for the "territorial integrity of Israel," since for
the Lebanese this implies recognition of the State of Israel.
The Ambassador pushed back that this was not the implication
of the text. Siniora argued strongly that the first bullet
under OP7 be dropped altogether, as the second bullet on
respecting the Blue Line is sufficient and would not set him
up for criticism.
¶11. (C) Shatta is concerned by the referral in OP13 of a
later resolution which may consider "further enhancements to
the mandate" of UNIFIL-plus. He wants to know if these
enhancements could include allowing UNIFIL-plus to act
without the consent of the GOL.
FELTMAN