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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3440, NEW ISRAELI MOD DG ASHKENAZI OUTLINES HIS GOALS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TELAVIV3440 | 2006-08-29 16:19 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
null
Leza L Olson 08/30/2006 10:42:00 AM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 03440
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: IPSC PD IMO RES ECON RSO CONS DCM DAO AMB AID
ADM
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
CLEARED: DCM:GACRETZ, POL:NOLSEN, ECON:WWEINSTEIN, DAO:DOMEARA
VZCZCTVI306
PP RUEHC RUEHXK RUCPDOC RUEKJCS RHMFISS RHEHNSC
RUEKJCS
DE RUEHTV #3440/01 2411619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291619Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5966
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003440
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM A/S HILLEN
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER), PM, PM/DTCC
STATE FOR ISN/ECC DIRECTOR (VAN SON)
PENTAGON FOR USD EDELMAN AND ASD RODMAN
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (ANDERSON)
COMMERCE FOR UNDER SECRETARY DAVID MCCORMICK
NSC FOR LOGERFO
EUCOM FOR ECJ5-E POL-MIL OFFICER (KLOTHE)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: PREL ETTC MOPS MASS PINR SY LE IS
SUBJECT: NEW ISRAELI MOD DG ASHKENAZI OUTLINES HIS GOALS
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) New Israeli MOD Director General MGEN (Ret.) Gabi
Ashkenazi told the Ambassador August 24 that his first
priority is complete transformation of Israel's export
control system and restoration of U.S. trust in it. He
promised to personally involve himself in the legislative
process so that Israel's Defense Export Control Act can be
passed by the Knesset as quickly as possible. He indicated
that he is closely watching the work of the MOD's new Export
Control Division. Ashkenazi's second priority is to secure a
robust budget for the MOD and IDF. Ashkenazi reviewed
preliminary lessons learned from Israel's 34-day war with
Hizballah, stressing that the results were not as good as
they should have been. He suggested that neither side wants
a second fight, but said Israel needs to prepare for one that
could include Syria. Ashkenazi stressed that Israel supports
Lebanese PM Siniora, and indicated that Israel is grappling
with how to lift the blockade on Lebanon while preventing
Syrian re-supply of Hizballah. Ashkenazi promised to be as
helpful as possible on resolving the UXO problem in affected
areas in Lebanon, and in implementing the Agreement on
Movement and Access in the Occupied Territories. Ashkenazi
said he will remain involved in the routing of Israel's
security barrier, and expressed his belief that the western
barrier could be completed by the end of 2007. Advised by
the Ambassador of the USG decisions to extend loan guarantees
but reduce the amount available under them to offset GOI
funding of settlement activity, Ashkenazi urged the
Ambassador to inform the PM and Deputy PM of the cut.
Ashkenazi said he plans to visit the U.S. in September to
report on progress on the export control issue, and to thank
USG officials who helped Israel during its war with
Hizballah. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
MOD DG HELPS THE DEFMIN WITH "THE PROBLEM OF THE HOUR"
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶2. (C) Reviewing his goals for the MOD, Ashkenazi said that
he spends a significant amount of his time "helping the
Defense Minister on the problem of the hour," and on military
and security-related issues. Ashkenazi said that he first
met DefMin Peretz four months ago, when they discussed the
possibility of Ashkenazi working for the minister. "He was
sassing me out," Ashkenazi said. "I was in New York when the
war with Hizballah broke out. He called me 18 days into the
war and asked me to come, and so I did."
--------------------------------------------- -----------
PRIORITY ONE: RESTORE TRUST IN ISRAEL'S EXPORT CONTROLS
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) Ashkenazi said that the first of his main priorities
will be to restore the relationship between the USG and the
MOD: "I have learned from Toren, Yaron and the others. Our
special relationship is very important," he said. Ashkenazi
expressed his understanding that there are obligations that
Israel has to meet to restore the USG's confidence in
Israel's export control system: A) Israel has to pass
legislation making the necessary fixes to its export control
system; and B) the MOD has to stand up its new export control
division. Ashkenazi indicated that there are some "personnel
issues" that also must be discussed, but said he would like
to discuss them another time. (NOTE: He did not raise the
personnel issues after the meeting, or give any indication
about what they might be. END NOTE.)
¶4. (C) Regarding the export control legislation, Ashkenazi
said that the control order for dual-use items is ready for
inter-ministerial approval and should move ahead quickly. As
for the Defense Export Control Act (DECA), Ashkenazi said
that he has met with new MFA Director General Aharon
Abramowitz twice, and the two reached an agreement on the
draft, meaning that it is now ready for inter-ministerial
review by a committee headed by the Ministry of Justice.
Ashkenazi said the review would have already taken place, but
was delayed when Justice Minister Haim Ramon resigned.
Ashkenazi talked with the Prime Minister and was told that
Acting Justice Minister Meir Sheetrit had been authorized to
oversee the review. The review process could start as early
as the week of August 28. Ashkenazi said he expects it will
take no more that 21 days for the committee to finish its
work. "It could take less, however, as Sheetrit is looking
at ways to streamline the committee's work," Ashkenazi added:
"I want to visit the U.S. one month from now with all of
these obligations behind me." Ashkenazi undertook to oversee
the legislation's transfer to the Knesset as quickly as
possible. He observed, however, that once it is placed
before the Knesset, it will take some time before it is
passed. The Ambassador responded that he had met one month
earlier with Knesset Speaker Dahlia Itzhik, and impressed
upon her the importance of having the DECA passed as quickly
as possible. The Ambassador added that she seemed receptive.
¶5. (C) Regarding the export control division, Ashkenazi said
that he had spent several hours with its director, Eli Pincu,
and reviewed the entire licensing process, meeting all of the
division's now-20 employees. "I know the entire process, and
the staff understand the sensitivity of their work and the
new procedures. There will be 30 employees eventually. The
new division is well-connected, and its people know their
jobs well. Now I just need to test the division to ensure
that it meets my expectations," Ashkenazi said.
--------------------------------------
MOD/IDF BUDGET WILL BE SECOND PRIORITY
--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Ashkenazi indicated that his next main priority is to
secure the best budget possible for the MOD and IDF. He
recounted how, on August 23, he "stunned" the Prime Minister
with his budget request: "The figures are huge, but we need
the funds."
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RESULTS OF WAR WITH HIZBALLAH SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (C) Ashkenazi said that the biggest lesson learned so far
after reviewing the management of the Israel-Hizballah War is
that the results "could have, and should have been better."
He acknowledged that there were failures that would have to
be fixed, and noted that IDF Chief of Staff LTG Halutz has
already drawn up a plan to make the fixes. Ashkenazi said
that the failures spanned many areas and resulted from many
reasons, most having to do with how the war began, how
targets were selected, and how targets were attacked.
Ashkenazi said, "We know what we need to do concerning our
reservists, our command and control, and our level of
readiness. We need to provide the reservists more training.
Our regular soldiers have also been too involved in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. We must also deal with the short-range
rockets and anti-tank guided missiles." Ashkenazi lamented
that, as a result of the war, Israel's internal political
situation has been upset: "It is hard to know what the
immediate future has in store for us. The current situation
is very fragile."
¶8. (C) Ashkenazi said that although "nobody wants a second
round in the immediate future," he believes that Israel needs
to prepare for a second round with Hizballah and Syria,
"because Syria must also pay for its role in this war." He
said that Hizballah needs to re-group and re-arm, and claimed
that it has "been instructed" to avoid conflict with the IDF
for now and focus on re-armament. (NOTE: Ashkenazi did not
indicate the source of such instructions to Hizballah. END
NOTE.) "Hizballah is not worried about the Lebanese Armed
Forces or the international force." The DG stressed that
because of this, it is crucial that UNSCR 1701 be implemented
to stop Syria's transfer of arms to Hizballah. Ashkenazi
claimed that new transfers are already taking place, and said
that Israel has not stopped the transfers because it does not
want to use force at this time.
¶9. (C) On Lebanon, Ashkenazi said that the GOI and Lebanese
PM Siniora share the same interests: "More so than other
people can understand." Noting that he had spent several
years himself in south Lebanon (Marjeyoun), Ashkenazi
stressed that Israel must assist Siniora, as nobody else can
take Lebanon "in the right direction." Ashkenazi noted that
he had met with UN Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen the week
of August 14 and discussed the lifting of Israel's blockade
on Lebanon. Ashkenazi claimed that Roed-Larsen "expressed
understanding" of Israel's concerns for enforcing the arms
embargo. Ashkenazi mused that perhaps the embargo should be
lifted in two phases. It could be lifted temporarily, and
then re-instituted if Israel sees transfers taking place, or
permanently lifted if the embargo holds. He added, "I think
and believe that we will control the Lebanon-Syria border."
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ASHKENAZI PROMISES TO HELP SOLVE UXO, AMA PROBLEMS...
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶10. (C) Without prompting, Ashkenazi asked how Israel could
be more helpful in the post-conflict situation. The
Ambassador replied that humanitarian organizations would
benefit from any maps that the IDF could provide identifying
where unexploded ordnance may be located. Ashkenazi promised
to deliver any such maps to the embassy's defense attache
office for onward distribution. (NOTE: DAO Tel Aviv noted
later in the day that UNIFIL had received and distributed
these maps. END NOTE.) Ashkenazi said that Israel shot more
that 100,000 artillery shells into Lebanon, and also used
some multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) that contain
cluster munitions.
¶11. (C) The Ambassador also urged Ashkenazi to personally
involve himself in implementation of the November 2005
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) brokered by Secretary
Rice. The Ambassador recounted that DefMin Peretz had
committed to making progress on the agreement. Ashkenazi
replied that he is committed to the DefMin's policies, and is
working on the AMA. He said he is thoroughly familiar with
the AMA's background and history, that he receives regular
updates, and that he had recently met with USSC General
Dayton to discuss it and problems with the border-crossing at
Karni.
--------------------------------------------- -------
...AND TO PUSH FOR COMPLETION OF THE WESTERN BARRIER
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶12. (C) Noting that he was responsible for the security
barrier in his previous position, Ashkenazi said that he will
remain involved in the routing of the barrier: "I am dealing
with the seamline and its outcomes. We will fix it in some
places, and in other places, we will be forced by the Supreme
Court to fix it. My aim is to close (complete) the fence.
We save lives if we close the gaps." Ashkenazi expressed
confidence that Israel can finish work on the western side of
the barrier by the end of 2007. Expressing amazement that
gaps remain around the overpasses near Maccabim and Modi'in,
Ashkenazi said that he will take steps to secure agreement
between Israeli and Palestinian landowners in those areas so
that the gaps can be filled in. He added that his guiding
principle for making route decisions was to put the fence
where there are "many Israelis and few Palestinians."
¶13. (C) Ashkenazi agreed with the Ambassador that it would
make sense to reduce checkpoints in the West Bank as gaps in
the barrier are closed. Regarding the barrier around
Jerusalem, Ashkenazi said he expects some difficulties, but
said he felt he can buy time if he manages to close the
barrier on the east side of Jerusalem. Ashkenazi also
foresees that he will face some difficulties filling in the
gaps near the village of Kedar, near Ma'ale Adumim, and in
the stretch of wall south of Jerusalem on the way to
Bethlehem. In some areas, he plans to erect the barrier
along the green line, and then erect a second protective
barrier around settlements along the line. He said that this
is what was done in Tulkarim, that it would be a cheap way to
fill in a gap quickly, and could also demonstrate to skeptics
that the fence is a temporary security measure, and not meant
to establish facts on the ground.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
ASHKENAZI ALARMED BY CONDITIONALITY ON LOAN GUARANTEES
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶14. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question as to whether
the GOI plans to remove illegal settlements and outposts,
Ashkenazi said that the GOI cannot realistically address the
issue at the moment. "The GOI is committed and capable," he
explained, "but cannot do it now." When the Ambassador
proposed that Ashkenazi consider budget cuts for settler
activity in order to forestall equivalent reductions in
extended U.S. loan guarantees, Ashkenazi and MOD POL-MIL
Bureau Head Amos Gilad -- who sat alongside Ashkenazi in the
meeting -- expressed surprise that the U.S. is prepared to
reduce loan guarantees to offset what Israel spends on
settlement activity. Ashkenazi undertook to explore further
the issue of funding for settlements, and stressed that
Olmert's government "wants to go beyond any previous
government" when it comes to reducing the settler presence in
the West Bank. When and how, he suggested, depends on
timing: "When the Prime Minister mentioned convergence
during the war, he was savaged." The Ambassador cautioned
that as long as Israel has budget difficulties and seeks US
assistance, the USG will watch carefully what the GOI cuts in
its budget. If Israel continues spending on settlement
activity, then the USG is required by law to reduce loan
guarantees accordingly. However, if subsidies for
settlements are eliminated, this would no longer be an issue.
Ashkenazi expressed understanding, and urged the Ambassador
to raise the matter with the PM Olmert and the Deputy PM
Peres: "It is a big deal. We cannot have any
misunderstanding on this."
-------------------------------------------
ASHKENAZI ON HIS PROPOSED VISIT TO THE U.S.
-------------------------------------------
¶15. (C) Ashkenazi said that he has three main goals for his
upcoming visit to the U.S.:
A) to review the steps the MOD has taken to transform
Israel's export control system;
B) to thank the officials who helped to supply Israel with
its emergency requests for military equipment during the
Israel-Hizballah War. Ashkenazi noted that he had already
thanked, by telephone, Defense Under Secretary Edelman and
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Hillen; and
C) to share with his interlocutors the GOI's views about the
future after the war with Hizballah.
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JONES