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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PANAMA156, PANAMA: MARTINELLI MAINTAINS LEAD BUT LOSES GROUND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA156 | 2009-02-23 20:08 | 2011-04-11 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Panama |
VZCZCXYZ0021
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0156/01 0542019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 232019Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3029
UNCLAS PANAMA 000156
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: MARTINELLI MAINTAINS LEAD BUT LOSES GROUND
TO HERRERA
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. Democratic Change (CD) opposition presidential candidate
Ricardo Martinelli lost six points in the polls, shortly
after naming former Panamenista Party presidential candidate
Juan Carlos Varela as his vice presidential running mate and
thereby cementing a grand opposition "Alliance For Change"
movement, according to Dichter and Neira's presidential poll
for the week of February 15. Martinelli still maintained a
12 point lead over Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD)
candidate Balbina Herrera, whose stalled campaign appeared to
have been kick started, rallying for a five point gain since
February 1. Martinelli probably also took a hit for not
participating in a debate hosted by a television broadcaster
on February 10; Herrera "debated" solo responding to
questions from journalists. Former President Guillermo
Endara, heading his Moral Vanguard for the Nation (MVN)
party's ticket, stubbornly remains in the race but is trapped
in no man's land at five percent and received fewer votes
than the number of mock ballots left blank in Dichter and
Neira's poll. For all intents and purposes, Panama now has a
head-to-head race for its presidency.
------------------------------------------
Momentum Shifts As Martinelli Loses Ground
------------------------------------------
¶2. When asked who they would vote for if the 2009 elections
were held today, 49 percent of respondents to Dichter and
Neira's latest presidential poll said they supported
opposition candidate Martinelli and 37 percent said they
supported ruling party candidate Herrera. Herrera has gained
five points since February 1, climbing slowly from 32 percent
of voter preference the first week to 33 percent the next,
then gaining steam to finish with 37 percent last week, her
highest numbers since January. Opposition golden boy
Martinelli lost six points, falling from 55 percent in the
first week of February to 53 percent the next, and dropping
still further to 49 percent in the week of February 15, as
some voters clearly migrated to the Herrera camp. It remains
to be seen whether the latest numbers reflected a momentary
dip in the polls for Martinelli or signalled the beginning of
a downward trend. Martinelli's dip in the polls as well as
Herrera's gradual ascent came in the wake of Martinelli's
formation of a grand opposition "Alliance for Change" and his
refusal to debate Herrera on February 10; Herrera "debated"
solo responding to journalists' questions.
¶3. Contrary to Dichter and Neira's more recent data, the
three other monthly polls indicated that Martinelli pulled
further ahead of Herrera in February, but only by three to
five points. The three other polls also showed that Herrera
gained from three to five percent of voter preference in the
last month: According to IPSOS, Martinelli now leads by 17
points, up from a 12 point lead in January. Martinelli
gained ten points to win 51 percent of voter preference and
Herrera gained five points to capture 34 percent of voter
preference. (Polling took place February 6 to 8 and included
1,040 people. The margin of error was three percent.)
According to SigmaDos, Martinelli led by a more modest eight
points in February, up from a five point lead in January.
SigmaDos gave Martinelli 48 percent of voter preference,
representing a six point gain from January, while Herrera
garnered 40 percent, a three point gain for her from the
previous month. (The poll included 1,428 people and had a
margin of error of 2.6 percent.) According to Unimer,
Martinelli led by 22 points in February, up from 18 points in
January. Unimer gave Martinelli 50 percent of voter
preference, up seven points from January, and Herrera held
28.5 percent of voter preference, up three points from
January. (Polling took place February 4 to 6 and included
2,500 people. The margin of error was 2.8 percent.)
---------------------------
Herrera Base Remains Strong
---------------------------
¶4. Herrera has maintained the strongest base of committed
voters since Dichter and Neira's polling began in January.
In the latest poll for the week of February 15, when asked
who they would vote for if elections were held today, 31
percent of PRD party members said they would vote for
Herrera, while 25 percent of CD party members would vote for
Martinelli. Herrera also rallied the highest number of
committed voters according to the SigmaDos monthly poll,
where of those who support Herrera, 91 percent said they
would definitely vote for her. Of those who support
Martinelli, 86 percent said they would definitely vote for
him. When asked in the second week of February if they
believed that the National Assembly would be dominated by the
parties that supported Herrera or the parties that supported
Martinelli, 40.3 percent stated that the parties that
supported Herrera would dominate, while only 33.8 percent
stated it would be parties who supported Martinelli.
---------------------------
Effect of Varela as VP Pick
---------------------------
¶5. Martinelli's selection of former presidential candidate
Juan Carlos Varela of the Panamenista Party (PP) as his
vice-presidential running mate appeared to give him an
initial boost in the Dichter and Neira poll, taking him from
46 percent of voter preference in the last week of January to
55 percent in the first week of February, representing a nine
point gain. However, Martinelli's numbers have steadily
declined since then, indicating that voters may not view the
alliance favorably on further reflection. In the first week
of February, when asked if an alliance between CD and
Panamenista Party was intended to benefit the country or was
an electoral strategy to win votes, 50.8 percent of
respondents felt that it was a strategy to win votes. In the
most recent Dichter and Neira poll for the week of February
15, the same period corresponding to a four point drop in
voter preference for Martinelli, when asked whether they
believed that political alliances were principally for the
benefit of the country or the politicians, 61.4 percent said
that they were for the benefit of the politicians. There was
no significant boost in numbers as a result of the
Panamenista Party joining the CD, the Patriotic Union (UP),
and Movement of Liberal Republican Nationals (MOLIRENA) in
the Martinelli-led "Alliance for Change." Dichter and Neira
showed a six point loss and, according to the monthly polls,
Martinelli made a modest three to five point gain over
Herrera from January to February.
--------------------------------
Importance of Candidate Platform
--------------------------------
¶6. When asked in the second week of February whether the
candidates' platforms were important or irrelevant when
voting, a whopping 85.7 percent of those polled responded
that they were indeed important. This sentiment on the part
of voters may have played into Martinelli's recent six point
slide. Martinelli's refusal to participate in the February
10 presidential debate gave Balbina Herrera an hour of prime
time media coverage to sell her platform, and was viewed by
320,000 Panamanians. Just after the debate, according to the
Dichter and Neira poll for the week of February 15, when
asked whether they approved or disapproved of Martinelli's
failure to participate in the debate, 66.3 percent of voters
indicated their disapproval; voter preference for Martinelli
dropped another four points during this time.
------------------
The Navarro Effect
------------------
¶7. When asked in the second week of February whether they
believed that criticism of incumbent President Martin
Torrijos by Herrera's VP running mate and PRD National
Executive Committee (CEN) member Juan Carlos Navarro helped
or hurt Herrera's presidential ambitions, 70 percent of
respondents stated that the criticism had a negative effect.
Interestingly, when asked the following week who in the PRD
party would be in the best position to unify the PRD after
the elections, 31.6 percent of respondents felt it would be
Herrera, while a virtually equal number felt that Juan Carlos
Navarro would be a better unifier, at 31.2 percent.
------------------
Voters Pessimistic
------------------
¶8. When asked in the second week of February whether the
country was or was not on a good path, 64.4 percent of
respondents felt that Panama was not on a good path, while
only 29.8 percent felt that the country was headed in the
right direction.
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Technical Data
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¶9. Third Dichter and Neira February poll: Dichter and Neira
conducted 1,226 interviews of men and women over the age of
18 who are residents of Panama. The poll was conducted
nationally, except in the remote and difficult to reach
Darien Province and indigenous people's autonomous regions
(comarcas). Interviews were conducted face-to-face in
individuals' homes from Friday, February 13 to Sunday,
February 15. Sampling was multi-staged. The first stage
distributed the total sample according to population by
province as well as rural and urban precincts, and in the
second stage blocks were randomly selected and homes were
first randomly and then systematically selected. The margin
of error for the poll was assessed at /- 2.9 percent with a
confidence level of
95 percent.
¶10. Second Dichter and Neira February poll: Dichter and
Neira conducted 1,229 interviews of men and women over the
age of 18 who are residents of Panama. The poll was
conducted nationally, except in the remote and difficult to
reach Darien Province and indigenous people's autonomous
regions (comarcas). Interviews were conducted face-to-face
in individuals' homes from Friday, February 6 to Sunday,
February 8. Sampling was multi-staged. The first stage
distributed the total sample according to population by
province as well as rural and urban precincts, and in the
second stage blocks were randomly selected and homes were
first randomly and then systematically selected. The margin
of error for the poll was assessed at /- 2.9 percent with a
confidence level of 95 percent.
STEPHENSON