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Viewing cable 09QUITO177, ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO177 | 2009-03-11 23:11 | 2011-04-11 20:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/11/1/1355/cable-196401.html |
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0177/01 0702343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3E4B70 MSI2349-632)
O 112343Z MAR 09 ZDS ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8032
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4103
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3451
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3097
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4187
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0430
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS
UNYIELD...
id: 196401
date: 3/11/2009 23:43
refid: 09QUITO177
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08QUITO783|09QUITO103
header:
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0177/01 0702343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3E4B70 MSI2349-632)
O 112343Z MAR 09 ZDS ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8032
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4103
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3451
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3097
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4187
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0430
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS
UNYIELDING
REF: A. 08 QUITO 783
¶B. QUITO 103
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Correa government ramped up its
rhetoric against Colombia in recent weeks, spurred by a
desire to defend itself against accusations of
narco-politics, the first anniversary of the March 2008
Colombian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, and Colombian
remarks. The GOE was delighted by OAS SYG Insulza's
statement that there was no basis for accusations of GOE ties
with the FARC. To reinforce that perception, the Correa
administration agreed to an opposition proposal for an
investigative commission. End Summary.
CONDITIONS FOR RESTORING TIES
¶2. (SBU) A January 23 MFA press release listed five
conditions Colombia must meet before Ecuador would
re-establish diplomatic relations, which were broken
following the March 1, 2008, Colombian attack on a
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp near the
town of Angostura in northern Ecuador:
-- Ending the "information campaign" that charged the GOE
with ties to the FARC,
-- Committing to an effective military presence in the border
area,
-- Providing the information the GOE requested regarding the
March 2008 attack,
-- Proceeding with the handover of information from the
computers found at the site of the attack, and
-- Supporting UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
efforts to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador.
¶3. (C) These conditions are consistent with the GOE's past
position. President Correa had set forth three conditions,
which effectively covered the first four above, when he met
with OAS Secretary General Insulza on July 30, 2008 (Ref A).
GOE officials have mentioned the demand for Colombian support
of UNHCR on other occasions.
¶4. (C) The third condition above, the demand that Colombia
provide information on the attack, is based on GOE suspicion
of U.S. involvement. Correa alluded to this when he
discussed the conditions vis-a-vis Colombia in his February
28 TV/radio address, "We do not know what planes dropped
those bombs, which were North American bombs." In a press
interview published March 10, FM Fander Falconi was more
explicit, saying that the reason for setting this condition
was to establish whether there was involvement of a third
country (read the U.S.). He did not reject the idea that the
GOE would have to break relations if a third country were
involved, depending on the extent of the involvement.
GOE RHETORIC SPIKES AGAIN
¶5. (SBU) The allegations over GOE officials' and former
officials' ties to the FARC (Ref B), which some of the
Ecuadorian media and opposition are referring to as
narco-politics, prompted President Correa in mid-February to
defend the GOE by casting dispersion on Colombia. Implicitly
recalling Colombian accusations last year that the GOE was
linked to the FARC, Correa said those Ecuadorians who speak
of narco-politics in Ecuador harmed the country and weakened
its dignified position against the abuses of an aggressor
neighbor country, where there was narco-politics.
¶6. (SBU) As the one-year anniversary of the attack in
Angostura approached, President Correa emphasized the GOE
conditions for re-establishing relations with Colombia. In
his February 28 TV/radio address, he said that Ecuador "wants
to renew relations (with Colombia), but only on a foundation
of dignity and respect." Correa added one more condition:
that Colombia pay compensation to the family of Ecuadorian
Franklin Aisalla, who was killed in the attack.
¶7. (SBU) The GOE tone hardened further after Colombian
Defense Minister Santos on March 1 defended attacks on
terrorists in other countries as a legitimate act of
self-defense, and a Colombian radio station reported that two
FARC leaders lived in northern Ecuador. During a March 2
press conference with three cabinet ministers defending the
GOE position, Coordinating Minister for Internal and External
Security Miguel Carvajal condemned Santos' comment and blamed
problems between the two countries on the GOC's reliance on
"the Bush doctrine." Also on March 2, Correa reportedly
stated that if Colombia continued with the policies voiced by
its defense minister, that this time it would find Ecuador
prepared; he told Colombia not to mess with Ecuador, saying
the GOC should start in its own country if it wanted to
pursue and attack terrorists. The MFA sent a diplomatic note
to the OAS March 3 asking that Insulza express to the GOC the
necessity of providing Ecuador precise information about the
location of the FARC high command members allegedly enjoying
safe haven in Ecuador. (Note: Reportedly without the
benefit of specific Colombian information, the Ecuadorian
National Police on March 11 announced a major success, the
detention of FARC leader Sixto Cabanas, alias Domingo Biojo,
in Esmeraldas province. End Note.) The GOE seemed somewhat
mollified by the fact that President Uribe did not back
Santos' statements, with Carvajal calling Uribe's move a
positive gesture.
ECUADOR PLAYS UP INSULZA STATEMENT
¶8. (C) Meeting separately on February 26 with President
Correa and FM Falconi, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel
Insulza sought to find a way to maintain a channel of
dialogue between the GOE and GOC, but apparently made no
progress. During an event the evening of February 27 with
OAS ambassadors, Insulza called the mediation effort
complicated, noted that the "cartilla de seguridad"
(guidelines for cooperation between the two militaries) was
still functioning at certain levels, and suggested a bigger
power (apparently referring to the U.S.) bring the GOE and
GOC together. He told the Ambassador privately that he
judged the two countries could get past some of the GOE's
conditions, but not others, and that the GOE still insisted
that the bombs used last March had to have come from another
country (meaning the U.S.).
¶9. (C) Insulza appeared to side with the GOE earlier on
February 27 at a press conference during a visit to
Esmeraldas province in northern Ecuador, accompanied by FM
Falconi and Minister Carvajal. According to MFA press
statements, Insulza told the press he did not believe the GOE
was, or had been, linked to an irregular armed group, be it
the FARC or any other, and that everything that had happened
since the March 2008 attack had only served to confirm that
conclusion. The MFA press statements quote Insulza as
stating, "This is a subject that should not be in discussion.
Unfortunately, I see in this country those who still put
this in doubt, but I believe it is an error. President
Correa has given clear signs of his attitude and point of
view with respect to the FARC and all of this type of
subversive organization." According to the MFA, Insulza also
credited Ecuador with making a very significant security
effort in its northern border area. During the trip to the
border, Insulza received a military briefing, met with a
group of refugees, and overflew the region in a helicopter.
¶10. (C) The GOE sought to highlight the refuge it provided
Colombian refugees during the February 19-20 visit of U.N.
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Craig Johnstone, who
met with the GOE and traveled to the northern border region.
According to an MFA press bulletin, Johnstone announced that
UNHCR would provide $22 million in assistance in 2009 for relief
programs for Colombian refugees in Ecuador. (Note: This appears
to be an MFA error, since the UNHCR Ecuador budget is significantly
less. We have asked UNHCR to clarify funding levels for the MFA.
End Note.) Johnstone also noted that between 2000 and 2008, Ecuador
received over 56,000 requests for refugee status,
primarily from Colombians, of which 20,956 have been approved.
Johnstone expressed appreciation for USG contributions during
a February 19 meeting with the Ambassador.
NEW INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION AND NEW CONTROLS
¶11. (C) In an effort to reduce further its political
vulnerability in light of the alleged narco-political
scandal, the GOE has agreed to form a new investigative
commission. The idea was proposed by Cesar Montufar of the
opposition National Democratic Agreement movement, who
recommended formation of an independent commission of
nonpartisan citizens who would investigate the March 2008
Colombian attack and alleged ties of government officials and
former government officials to illegal armed groups.
Candidates are to be presented by universities, the media,
the Roman Catholic Church, indigenous organization, retired
military, etc. President Correa will then appoint the
citizens commission from among these candidates.
¶12. (C) Meanwhile, the GOE has announced steps to reinforce
security in the northern border area. Minister Carvajal said
March 6 that carrying arms in the five northern provinces
would be forbidden until new licenses were issued, with
tougher criteria to qualify. In addition, fifteen new
security posts (five military and ten police) are to be
established, and the number of military in the region
increased significantly. The worst security situation,
according to Carvajal, is in Esmeraldas province. In making
this announcement, Carvajal blamed the region's security
problems on individuals linked to Colombian paramilitary
groups and criminal gangs, not the FARC. (Comment: The GOE
likely lacks the resources to carry out the plan Carvajal
announced. End Comment.)
¶13. (C) Some Ecuadorians, even those on the left, have urged
a change in policy toward Colombia. One is former FM
Francisco Carrion, who supported the GOE position on Colombia
violating its sovereignty, but now calls for direct dialogue
between the two governments. Another is Socialist Party
member and Andean Simon Bolivar University professor Enrique
Ayala Mora, who argues that the break in relations has been
prolonged too long and that it threatens to irreversibly ruin
relations with a neighbor and historical partner in the
Andean Community. But these voices are few and easily
ignored by the GOE.
COMMENT
¶14. (C) The animosity President Correa and his ministers
exhibit toward Colombia underlines how intractable this
diplomatic conflict remains. The renewed allegations of FARC
ties to the Correa government are adding more fuel to the
fire. We doubt that the Correa government will make any
effort to achieve reconciliation while it is campaigning for
the April 26 election, and see appointment of the
investigative commission as only another attempt to convince
voters that the GOE is not hiding anything. Given that the
two governments have largely isolated trade (which continues
unimpeded) from other problems, Correa appears to believe he
has more to gain by drawing out the dispute than seeking a
meaningful resolution.
HODGES
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