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Viewing cable 06CAIRO4382, NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH AND DNSA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06CAIRO4382 | 2006-07-16 07:07 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 004382
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID MOPS KPAL EG IS
SUBJECT: NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH AND DNSA
ABRAMS' JULY 11-12 CAIRO MEETINGS
Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During a July 11-12 visit to Cairo, NEA Assistant
Secretary Welch and Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott
SIPDIS
Abrams along with the Ambassador met separately with Egyptian
Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman (sep channel), Foreign
Minister Aboul Gheit, Arab League Secretary General Amre
Moussa, and a group of Egyptian civil society activists.
Aboul Gheit discussed details of planned Strategic Dialogue
meetings in Washington July 18 (septel), the situation in
Gaza, and other regional issues. Aboul Gheit requested USG
assistance in opening the Rafah/Gaza border to permit
stranded Palestinians to return to Gaza, recommended working
with Turkey as a conduit to Syria, and agreed that Hamas
should not benefit from the current regional crisis. Aboul
Gheit proposed that Israel "forget the soldier (Shalit) for a
while," in order to de-escalate the crisis and diminish the
role of Hamas leader Khaled Misha'al. On Iraq, Aboul Gheit
said the GOE was devising a strategy to jump-start relations
with Baghdad, "short of sending an Egyptian Ambassador to
Baghdad." Aboul Gheit warned against allowing Iran to play a
role in "regional security arrangements," as a result of
P5/Germany nuclear talks. Aboul Gheit also criticized
Washington's decision to "keep the Arabs out of the picture"
on Somalia, and again warned against references to Chapter
VII in a UNSC mandate for Darfur.
¶2. (C) With Amre Moussa (just after hearing of a Hizballah
attack on northern Israel and kidnappings of two Israeli
soldiers), Welch and Abrams requested a clear statement from
the League criticizing the attack and calling for the
immediate return of the hostages, as well as Moussa's censure
of Syrian complicity. Moussa sought clarity on the attacks
before committing, but blamed Tel Aviv for the current
regional crisis. Moussa, who had recently met with Khaled
Misha'al in Damascus and just returned from a meeting of
Iraq's neighbors in Tehran, called for "getting back to
basics" on the regional peace process. The current "vicious
circle" won't be broken by additional violence, he warned.
With a group of six Egyptian civil society activists, Welch
and Abrams heard recommendations on how the U.S. could best
support reformers without tarring them in Egyptian public
opinion or having U.S. criticism become the main issue. The
group urged the USG to support democratic "principles" and
not to get pulled into debates over specific cases. End
summary.
----------------------------
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
----------------------------
¶3. (C) The meeting between A/S Welch, Abrams, the
Ambassador, and Aboul Gheit took place just before the
Hizballah attack on northern Israel and the kidnapping of two
Israeli soldiers. Aboul Gheit said Egypt is concerned with
the humanitarian impact of the Israeli incursion into Gaza,
the need to target Hamas rather than the general population,
and the opening of the Rafah border crossing. He
characterized the situation at the Egyptian border with Gaza
as desperate and claimed there were "no more than 800"
Palestinians stranded there (UN reps claim the number is in
the thousands within the wider border region). A/S Welch
noted USG concerns over the border crossings situation, and
said he and Abrams would discuss the situation in Israel and
Ramallah with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The U.S., he
said, would soon announce a USD 50 million donation to UNRWA
for humanitarian needs.
¶4. (C) Turning to Qatar's draft UN Security Council
resolution on the Gaza situation, Welch requested Egypt to
press the Arab Group in NY to stand down on the unhelpful and
unbalanced text. Aboul Gheit said Egypt and other Arab
regimes had to be seen as "doing something" to respond to
Israeli transgressions toward Palestinian civilians. Welch
asked for Egypt's advice on dealing with Syria on the ongoing
Gaza crisis. Aboul Gheit recommended multiple-channel
pressure on Damascus, and noted recent diplomatic efforts by
the Turks and Saudis. Aboul Gheit pointed out that the Turks
had credibility and influence in Damascus, but had been
"manouvered" by the Syrians into allowing Hamas to demand
"international guarantees" for protection if it releases the
Israeli soldier in Gaza -- a direct snub at Egyptian
mediation efforts. Similarly, the Saudi King was pressing
his idea of bringing Arab foreign ministers together, with
Hamas and Fatah leaders, to help them iron out a political
compromise to move beyond their current stale-mate. Aboul
Gheit suggested Israel "forget for a while" its kidnapped
soldier in Gaza, in order to lessen tensions and diminish
Hamas influence."
¶5. (C) Responding to a question on his Tehran visit with
foreign ministers of Iraq and its neighbors, Aboul Gheit said
he was pleased that the discussion was limited only to Iraq,
and that Tehran was not permitted to use the "Iraq card" in
its ongoing negotiations with the P-5/Germany on nuclear
issues. Aboul Gheit said the U.S. "did not play" in the
debate over whether or not to permit Tehran to host the
meeting. Welch noted the difficulty in preventing the Tehran
venue, once the Iraqi government indicated its decision to
attend. Asked about Egypt's willingness to support the Iraqi
government, Aboul Gheit said that he and Omar Soliman were
devising an engagement strategy, "short of sending an envoy"
to Baghdad. The murder of Egypt's Charge in Baghdad in June
of 2005, he said, almost led to his resignation -- a
situation he will not repeat. Pointing to the present
security situation in Iraq, Aboul Gheit said that Egypt could
not put itself under U.S. protection within the Green Zone.
Aboul Gheit also eschewed the possibility of allowing the
Iraqi expat community in Egypt to play a stronger, more
visible political role, due to the potential for inter-Iraqi
violence spreading to Egypt.
¶6. (C) In a brief discussion of Egyptian behavior in
multilateral fora, Aboul Gheit said that it was important for
Egypt to show its independence and ability to speak its mind
in international fora. This approach enabled Egypt to
balance Iranian influence. "We cannot allow Iran to emerge
as the region's leader," he said.
¶7. (C) On Sudan and Somalia, Aboul Gheit chastised
Washington for "seeking to keep the Arabs out of the picture"
by excluding Egypt, Yemen, and Djibouti from the Somalia
Contact Group. After revealing a "weak position in Somalia,"
he stated, the U.S. would benefit by working with moderate
Arab states who have the necessary experience, influence, and
interests there. On Sudan he warned against references to
Chapter VII in a Darfur UNSC resolution, citing GOS
opposition, and saying Egypt could not participate in a
Darfur PKO under a Chapter VII mandate.
------------------------------------
Arab League Secretary General Moussa
------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Welch and DNSA Abrams' July 12 meeting with Arab
League Secretary General Amre Moussa focused on the breaking
events surrounding the Hizballah attack on IDF positions
along the Lebanon-Israel border, and the capture of two IDF
soldiers. Moussa said he planned to call Lebanese FM Siniora
to inquire about the events, but said he would neither reach
out to Damascus nor would the Arab League make a statement
until he knew all the facts surrounding the attack. Moussa
agreed that the hostage-taking was a serious escalation, but
cautioned the U.S. not to draw immediate conclusions about
Syrian complicity in the attack.
¶9. (C) Welch informed Moussa of details related to a July 12
morning attack by Hizballah on Israeli forces along the
western part of the Lebanon border, including 7 casualties
and 2 Israeli hostages. A visibly disturbed Moussa
acknowledged the seriousness of the developments, citing the
need to control escalation and to secure the release of the
soldiers. Welch and DNSA Abrams pressed Moussa on what the
AL would say and do about the attacks. Moussa said he would
contact Lebanese PM Siniora, and the AL would consider coming
out "energetically" against the Hizbollah action. Welch
stressed that if Hizbollah -- a member of the Lebanese
government -- was responsible for the attacks, the action
could legitimately be viewed as a government-to-government
action, essentially an act of war.
¶10. (C) Turning to Syria, Moussa said he did not think there
was a Damascus link -- hoped not, he added -- to the July 12
attacks, and again cautioned the U.S. against drawing
conclusions on Syrian complicity. Welch emphasized that
Damascus bears responsibility due to its complicity in the
continual re-supply of Hizballah from Iran that in turn
destabilized the region. Welch strongly urged the AL to
discuss with the Syrians the seriousness of not only these
developments, but also of its negative role in Gaza and Iraq.
¶11. (C) Moussa said he viewed the "chaos" in Gaza as a
repercussion of the "wrong approaches" taken by Israel and
the U.S. following Hamas' parliamentary victory. Moussa said
there was a possibility to give Hamas a chance to change its
policies, but it was "pushed into a corner from the first
minute" which "created chaos." Moussa said the AL had been
pressing Hamas to "be responsible," and added that it was
headed in that direction slowly-but-steadily, but Israeli
acts and U.S. pressure had "closed doors." Abrams pushed
back, asking what the Arab states had done to stop Qassam
rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel following the September
pull-out from Gaza. These attacks, he argued, undermined
Israeli confidence in a peaceful approach to the situation.
¶12. (C) Moussa said the internal chaos within the PA is
unacceptable, but "all is not totally lost" if the U.S.
worked with PM Olmert on a common approach that would show
some benefit to the Palestinians. Moussa added that this
"vicious circle" of attack and reprisal cannot be broken by
Israeli force alone. Moussa said he met with Mesha'al "for
two hours" recently in Damascus. He said it was a useful
meeting as Mesha'al explained the situation from a Hamas
perspective, conveying the sense of frustration and distrust
among the Palestinian people toward Israel. Moussa said the
logic of Mesha'al and Hamas was strong, and was met with
widespread sympathy in the region and beyond. Mesha'al had
described Turkish and Egyptian interventions for the release
of the Israeli soldier in Gaza, claiming that unfulfilled
Israeli promises of prisoner releases sowed doubt on any
similar offers now. Mesha'al reportedly said that prisoner
releases by PM Sharon consisted only of those already on the
verge of release, drug dealers, and common criminals, thereby
shaking his faith in future releases.
------------------------
Civil Society Roundtable
------------------------
¶13. (C) During a July 12 roundtable discussion at the
Ambassador's residence with a group of Egyptian civil society
representatives, discussion centered on frustration with both
the process and substance of GOE-backed reforms to date, and
questioning of ruling National Democratic Party "reformers'"
capabilities of implementing their proposed agenda. The
attendees were generally disappointed by recently-passed
press and judiciary laws, and warned of impending "crisis"
should the GOE demonstrate a similar disregard for the
consultative process when the upcoming constitutional
amendments package and Anti-Terror Law come before
Parliament. Participants urged the USG not to send "mixed
messages" regarding democratization in Egypt, and offered
differing suggestions for how the U.S. might best encourage
reform over the coming months, ranging from a request that
the U.S. provide "unwavering public support" through "focused
criticism of Egypt's human rights record and and slow pace of
democratization," to urging the USG to call on the GOE to
have "a dialogue with its own people." One attendee noted
that since national elections will not be held for several
years, the USG would be most effective be encouraging the
building of an "infrastructure of democracy," through
liberalization of the political party registration process,
increased flexibility for the judiciary and press, and a more
consultative process as the Anti-Terror Law and new
constitutional amendments move forward.
¶14. (U) NEA Assistant Secretary Welch and DNSA Abrams did
not have an opportunity to review this message before
departing post.
JONES