

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON274, THE TWO WORLDS OF MIDDLE EARTH: NEW ZEALAND'S
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05WELLINGTON274.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05WELLINGTON274 | 2005-04-01 04:04 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Wellington |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000274
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: THE TWO WORLDS OF MIDDLE EARTH: NEW ZEALAND'S
STRATEGIC POLICIES
REF: A) WELLINGTON 0234 B) WELLINGTON 0233 C)
WELLINGTON 0157 D) 04 WELLINGTON 0470 E) 04
WELLINGTON 0173
Classified By: Ambassador Charles J. Swindells; reasons 1.5 (B and D)
¶1. (S/NF ) Summary: Foreign and defense policies in New
Zealand are the product of an internal debate between two
worlds. The first world -- most military, intelligence,
foreign affairs and business professionals, and a handful of
politicians -- values its relationship with the United States
and still sees New Zealand as a U.S. ally. The other world
-- most politicians, media, academics and much of the public
-- views the United States with suspicion or hostility and
sees New Zealand as non-aligned. These worlds meet in the
person of Prime Minister Clark, who alone controls the
defense and intelligence portfolios within cabinet, and who
can always call on the "other-worlders" in the Labour caucus
to rein in her long-time rival, Foreign Minister Goff. This
matters to the United States, because the Prime Minister uses
military and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. -- and
high-level visits in particular -- to give the illusion in
some circles in Washington that New Zealand is still an ally,
while maintaining as much as possible New Zealand,s
non-aligned policies and the PM,s anti-American image at
home. Post's ability to bridge the gap between these two
worlds and effect needed policy changes requires a clear,
consistent message both here and in Washington of USG
interests and priorities. End Summary.
¶2. (SBU/NF) Since New Zealand left ANZUS in 1987, its
foreign and defense policies have been formed by an internal
debate between two worlds. The first includes most military,
intelligence and foreign affairs professionals, and a few
politicians. This world understands that New Zealand can be
greatly affected by events outside the South Pacific and
therefore must help shape events despite its small size and
geographic isolation. This world recognizes that as a small
country New Zealand cannot by itself impact world events, and
sees the United States as the greatest source of global
stability and positive change. By extension, even though
this world may disagree with the United States on specific
policies, it still sees New Zealand as a U.S. ally, and is
eager to play a role, however small, supporting us around the
globe. Washington policy makers deal almost exclusively with
first-world New Zealand.
¶3. (C/NF) The other world -- made up of most politicians,
the media, academics, non-governmental organizations and a
slight majority of the public -- also believes that New
Zealand's small size means its own actions cannot by
themselves effect international change. But this world sees
the United States as a source of global corruption and
instability: a bully, inimical toward small nations (and
toward New Zealand in particular, because of its "heroic"
defiance over the nuclear issue). It views any cooperation
with the United States with suspicion or outright hostility.
The other-worlders believe that New Zealand,s small size,
geographic isolation and "internationalist" foreign policy
protect it from harm. U.S. officials are seldom exposed to
the other New Zealand except through Embassy reporting,
though occasionally meetings lift the veil, as when Minister
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Marian Hobbs indicated
to U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Jackie
Sanders that elimination of all U.S. nuclear arms was as
important to world security as was blocking Iran's nuclear
program (Ref B).
¶4. (S/NF) These two worlds meet in the person of Prime
Minister Helen Clark. The Prime Minister holds the
intelligence portfolio, and provides extremely limited
briefings to her cabinet colleagues on the extent to which
New Zealand cooperates with the United States in this area.
Senior Foreign Affairs and Defence colleagues (strictly
protect) tell us only Foreign Minister Goff, Finance Minister
Cullen and (possibly) Economic Development Minister Anderton
have any inkling of U.S.-New Zealand joint intelligence
activities. The Prime Minister also runs defense policy.
She appointed a loyal, self-professed "peacenik," Mark
Burton, as Defence Minister. Burton, who devotes most of his
time to his other ministerial portfolio, Tourism, defers all
decisions on defense matters to the Prime Minister. The PM
Clark's control over foreign policy is less absolute, but she
occasionally outflanks Foreign Minister Goff on the left by
stirring up her largely other-world Labour Party Caucus.
¶5. (C/NF) New Zealand,s absence from the Coalition in Iraq
is a good example. We are told that Foreign Minister Goff,
while not a strong supporter of the Coalition, worried that
New Zealand,s absence would have significant economic and
political ramifications. (Comment: Goff also has an Amcit
nephew serving in Iraq and another soon to graduate from West
Point. End Comment.) PM Clark stoked anti-American
sentiment in the Caucus, leaving Goff isolated in Cabinet
discussion of New Zealand,s participation. Senior MOD
officials (strictly protect) tell us it was not until Finance
Minister Michael Cullen pointed out in a subsequent Cabinet
meeting that New Zealand's absence from Iraq might cost NZ
dairy conglomerate Fonterra the lucrative dairy supply
contract it enjoyed under the UN Oil for Food program, that
the PM found a face-saving compromise and sent combat
engineers in a non-combat role to Basra, where they were
embedded with British forces. By then, however, the PM had
so stirred up anti-war sentiment that she had to expend a lot
of political capital to get Caucus and Cabinet support for
this time-limited deployment. The PM deftly managed the
dust-up, while GoNZ officials quickly cashed in on New
Zealand's presence in Iraq, receiving repeated expressions of
thanks from senior USG officials (possibly because they had
so little else to discuss with visiting NZ dignitaries).
¶6. (S/NF) Prime Minister Clark's tight control of the
bilateral security relationship allows her to play up New
Zealand's support for USG objectives to Washington while
avoiding significant, potentially controversial policy
changes at home, changes that would strengthen the
relationship in the long term. This tactic has been an
important element of New Zealand's charm offensive in pursuit
of a U.S.-NZ Free Trade Agreement (FTA). NZ officials admit
in private that they have not come up with compelling
economic arguments that would interest the USG in an FTA
negotiation, so they are working hard to make the case that
New Zealand's "strategic" importance to the U.S. -- the PRT
and SAS deployments in Afghanistan, growth in intelligence
cooperation, and sending combat engineers to Basra -- merits
an FTA. The Prime Minister's meetings with senior USG
officials, including flag-rank officers and members of
Congress, are carefully scripted to that end, and she has
made it very clear that she resents the Ambassador's use of
country team pre-briefings to reveal her government's "other
world" policies to U.S. visitors (Ref A).
¶7. (C/NF) But whether New Zealand should or should not have
an FTA with the United States is only one issue in a diverse,
complex bilateral relationship. The FTA discussion has been
useful mainly because it has focused public attention on New
Zealand's relationship with the United States and has raised
public questions about the country's lack of strategic policy
direction. PM Clark's balancing act between New Zealand's
two worlds shows how little has been done here since New
Zealand left ANZUS to shape an agreed vision of the country's
foreign and defense policies. We have been told by senior
MOD and NZDF officials (strictly protect) that their efforts
to update the badly outdated 1999 Defence White Paper, which
underlies military spending priorities through 2009, was
rebuffed because the Prime Minister did not want to re-open
contentious debate in the Labour Party Caucus on the
direction of New Zealand's security policies. The general
consensus among the otherworlders that New Zealand's
influence is greater working through the United Nations,
because of the UN's "moral authority," is too vague to
constitute a clear vision for most Kiwis. Further, recent
events highlighting UN ineffectiveness and corruption have
shaken the faith of New Zealanders in their strict
internationalist approach to global issues.
¶8. (C/NF) Even some otherworld Kiwis, particularly
journalists and academics, are beginning to wonder publicly
if New Zealand has not cut itself adrift in increasingly
dangerous seas. But while the first-world solution to this
policy incoherence would be to get rid of New Zealand's
anti-nuclear legislation and return to ANZUS, this would be a
bitter pill for the otherworlders to swallow. And, of course,
a full-court press from the U.S. Embassy on the subject would
allow the Clark Government to dismiss our concerns as "U.S.
bullying." Still, our first-world contacts continue to
encourage us to, in the words of a senior MOD official
(strictly protect), "help us get out of the hole we have dug
for ourselves." Therefore, we have worked hard to reach
beyond our customary first-world contacts with explanations
to other-world New Zealand of how the nuclear propulsion ban
keeps New Zealand's relationship with the United States (and
to a large extent, with Australia) stuck in the Cold War era.
We have used media backgrounders and classroom discussions
to ask what kind of relationship New Zealand wants with the
United States in the future, and what its government might do
to convince us that it is serious about a forward-looking
security relationship. We have worked with the Australian
High Commission and the Japanese Embassy to reiterate our
message that New Zealand cannot continue its current policy
drift without consigning itself to irrelevance in the South
Pacific, let alone the rest of the world.
¶9. (S/NF) These and other outreach efforts will have little
impact if our message differs from what the Kiwis hear in
Washington. Ambassador Swindells requested a reality check
of the bilateral relationship (Ref C) to ensure that what we
say here is what Washington has agreed we should say. We
strongly support the desire of many in Washington to do all
we can to help our first-world Kiwi friends, and to benefit
from any assistance they can offer us. We also understand
that in the short-run, policy success may be judged by how
many players we get to the table, though in the long haul,
success depends on what they bring to the game. We just want
to make sure all of our Washington clients understand that we
are being asked by many of our first-world friends to help
them help themselves in moving from ideologically motivated,
self-congratulatory policies to a clear vision of New
Zealand's role in the world and of how our bilateral
relationship might move forward, consistent with that vision.
Burnett