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Viewing cable 09BUENOSAIRES134, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S G-20 PRIORITY: IFI REFORM
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BUENOSAIRES134 | 2009-02-09 10:10 | 2011-03-14 07:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires |
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1357238-evaluaron-echar-a-la-argentina-del-g-20 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1357239-gestiones-ante-el-gobierno-para-pedir-un-cambio |
VZCZCXRO6123
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #0134/01 0401007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091007Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2998
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0132
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0295
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1173
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0091
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0051
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1299
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0787
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0127
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1504
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0186
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0048
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1489
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0175
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0870
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE 3872
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000134
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD PREL PGOV AR BR MX
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S G-20 PRIORITY: IFI REFORM
REF: A. 2008 BUENOS AIRES 1520
¶B. 2008 BUENOS AIRES 1537
¶C. BUENOS AIRES 66
Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The GoA is focused intensely on G-20 meetings and
preparations, and will continue its push for reform of the
international financial institutions (IFIs), Economy Minister
Carlos Fernandez told Ambassador February 4. Fernandez said
the GoA will promote ""reasonable, serious, and prudent
reforms,"" arguing that the IDB needs a capital increase, the
World Bank needs to be more agile and rapid in its lending,
with more focus on growth, and IMF reforms must include
increased emerging market participation, greater monitoring
of developed economies, and ""faster use of its lending
instruments."" Fernandez denied that the GoA is interested in
IMF financing, but press reports allege this is the GoA's
primary motivation for seeking IFI reforms via the G-20. In
a separate meeting February 2 (septel), ex-Economy Minister
Domingo Cavallo suggested the USG encourage Mexico and Brazil
to coordinate G-20 positions with Argentina. However,
Minister Fernandez noted that the GoA is not at present in
formal communication with either country on G-20 issues.
¶2. (C) Comment: Fernandez took a reasonable line, but it is
clear the GoA wants more access to financing with few
conditions, and seems to believe it is speaking for many
other emerging countries on the topic. Fernandez, Finance
Secretary Lorenzino, and Central Bank Governor Redrado are
serious officials with whom we can negotiate, but the key to
getting the Argentines to play constructively in the G-20
process will be the attitude of President Cristina Fernandez
de Kirchner (CFK) and, to some degree, her Sherpa, Ambassador
to the U.S. Hector Timerman. The danger is that the
President and Timerman, who is not deeply versed in
economics, will take the G-20 Summit as an opportunity to
tout the Argentine model, lambaste the IMF, and focus on
getting more condition-free funding, rather than supporting a
constructive give and take while seeking their priorities.
In this context, some investment by Washington in bringing
Timerman and ultimately CFK along before the April Summit
could bear good fruit. Similarly, encouraging Brazil to work
with Argentina would also be a good way to encourage a more
constructive Argentine approach in our view. End Summary.
¶3. (C) The Minister's discussion of the state of the economy
and GoA concerns about the ""Buy America"" provisions in
pending U.S. legislation, as well as the Ambassador's
advocacy on behalf of U.S. companies and investors, are
reported septel.
-----------------------------
G-20 a priority for Argentina
-----------------------------
¶4. (C) Minister Fernandez emphasized to the Ambassador the
importance of the G-20 to the GoA. The Argentine leadership
highly values it, he said, and added that it is good for the
world to have a group that is broader than just the G-7. The
Ambassador encouraged the GoA to take a serious approach,
emphasizing Argentina's opportunity to play a key and
constructive role in finding solutions to the current crisis.
Fernandez said that he and other GoA officials are extremely
concerned about the fragile state of the world economy, and
particularly the fallout in Brazil, Argentina's major trading
partner. ""We haven't seen the floor of the crisis,"" he
worried, ""and global uncertainty is high and worsening.""
BUENOS AIR 00000134 002 OF 003
While arguing that Argentina is in better shape to weather
the storm than during past international financial crises,
Fernandez nevertheless said he sees the G-20 process as
essential to mitigating the global and regional impact of the
crisis.
¶5. (C) Fernandez said he sent his top subordinates -- Finance
Secretary Hernan Lorenzino and Economic Programming Secretary
Martin Abeles -- to the recent Deputies meeting, and
commented that the GoA is also participating intensively in
the working groups, particularly the two focused on IFI
reforms. He noted that the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) is
leading the Argentine participation in the working groups on
regulation and financial markets, which he termed ""mostly
developed country issues."" Fernandez said he would lead the
GoA delegation to the Finance Ministers meeting in March in
London. (Local press reports state that President Kirchner
will attend the April meeting.)
--------------------------------------------- -------
GoA Pushes IFI/MDB Reform, Denies Need for IMF Loans
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶6. (C) Fernandez reassured Ambassador that the GoA is
promoting ""reasonable, serious, and prudent"" IFI reforms, but
noted that these were crucial given the IFIs' collective
""failure to predict the crisis"" and subsequent ""failure to
respond (adequately) to it."" While reserving his strongest
criticism for the IMF, Fernandez commented that the World
Bank moves too slowly to respond to crises. He argued that
it needs to become more agile and rapid, and complained that
there was not enough talk in the G-20 working group on World
Bank and multilateral bank reform about supporting emerging
market growth and increasing financial support to emerging
economies. With regards to the IDB, Fernandez praised its
efforts, but called for a capital increase. (The Ambassador
noted that Argentina is currently the largest recipient of
IDB funding, but Fernandez did not comment on the unspoken
implication that the GoA would presumably be a main
beneficiary of increased IDB lending.)
¶7. (C) Fernandez argued that IMF monitoring efforts had
failed to predict the current crisis, and he panned the
Fund's efforts to assist countries in trouble. For example,
he pointed out, the IMF provided financial support to
Iceland, but only after its economy had imploded. While
highlighting the need for ""fortifying its financing
mechanisms,"" Fernandez mostly underlined the need for greater
emerging market participation (and ""greater voice"") in the
governing of the IMF. He also accused the IMF of focusing
monitoring efforts almost exclusively on developing
countries, and noted that the current crisis highlighted the
need for the IMF to improve its monitoring of developed
economies. (Comment: GoA officials have voiced these same
criticisms on numerous prior occasions; see Ref A.)
¶8. (C) Fernandez acknowledged local sensitivities related to
the IMF (given the GoA's demonization of the IMF for its role
in the 2001/2002 crisis). Therefore, he noted, the GoA is
supporting IMF reform in order to help other emerging
economies and, for its own part, has no intention or need to
return to the IMF for financing. Nevertheless, press reports
on the meeting speculated that that the GoA expects to use
the G-20 as a means to achieve IFI reforms that would allow
it to access low-conditionality IMF credits, given that it is
desperate for funds and has no access to either international
or domestic financing.
¶9. (C) Responding to Fernandez's question on whether the U.S.
will support broad reforms of the IFIs, EconOff noted USG
support to date for increased emerging economy voting rights
and ""voice"" in the IMF, as well as USG support to date for
BUENOS AIR 00000134 003 OF 003
IFI reform in the G-20 process. Fernandez acknowledged that
the GoA had been one of the few IMF members to vote against
the last IMF reform effort (in May 2008), which increased
developing country representation and ""voice"" on the
Executive Board, and even admitted that the GoA had cast its
vote mainly because its voting share declined as a result of
the reform. Nevertheless, he called the reform ""marginal,""
and stated that current efforts need to go farther.
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Coordination with Other LatAm G-20 Members
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¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with the Ambassador on February
2 (reported septel), ex-Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo
suggested that one way to moderate Argentina's approach to
the G-20 and broader approach to economic policy would be to
encourage greater coordination of positions among Mexico,
Brazil, and Argentina. He said he had already recommended
this to his Mexican and Brazilian colleagues in the G-30:
ex-President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo, current Mexican
Central Bank President Guillermo Ortiz Martinez, and
ex-President of Brazil's Central Bank, Armenio Fraga Neto.
(The G-30, a private group focused on deepening understanding
of international economic and financial issues, issued a
report on January 15 on financial reform, which Cavallo said
is aimed at influencing G-20 discussions.) Cavallo also
urged the Ambassador to push for a USG initiative to promote
such coordination among the three countries, particularly on
G-20 positions. (Comment: Minister Fernandez did not offer
hope that the GoA would pursue this option on its own, and
stated that at this point the GoA is not in formal
communication with either country on G-20 issues, although
the G-20 comes up in Argentina's regular informal discussions
with Brazil.)
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Comment
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¶11. (C) Cavallo's idea is a good one and worth pursuing.
Brazil and Mexico could have a very positive effect on
Argentina's position, which was not very constructive at the
last G-20 Summit. Unfortunately, President CFK tends to
launch into grand rhetoric about the Argentine model, the
failure of the IFIs, and the financing needs of emerging
economies. Her Sherpa, Ambassador Timerman, often echoes
these sentiments and has little grounding in economics. In
addition to the positive influence that Brazil (especially)
and Mexico could have on Argentine behavior, CFK is very
anxious to get off to a good start with President Obama. We
believe some time invested by senior officials with Timerman
and a well-timed call or message from the President to CFK
could have a big impact on Argentine performance at the G-20
(and elsewhere, such as in the Summit of the Americas). End
Comment.
WAYNE