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Viewing cable 09ANKARA477, TURKEY: DECONSTRUCTING PKK AMNESTY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ANKARA477 | 2009-03-27 14:02 | 2011-04-07 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara |
VZCZCXRO2353
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0477/01 0861445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271445Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9262
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA//
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000477
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2029
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: DECONSTRUCTING PKK AMNESTY
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4(b,d)
This is a joint Embassy Ankara/Consulate Adana Cable.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent statements by Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani and KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani about amnesty for PKK
militants are significant, particularly since their comments
were not roundly denounced by Turkish officials. While
suggesting leniency for PKKers poses political risks for any
Turkish leader, if the GOT wants to resolve this decades-old
insurgency, it needs to facilitate the demobilization of some
3,500 PKK fighters and permit at least some of them to
reintegrate into society. For Kurds in southeastern Turkey,
"Amnesty" (a term that may have outlived its usefulness in
Turkey's political discourse) is considered a sine quo non
for ending the conflict and many in the Turkish establishment
also see it as a necessary evil. There is no shortage of
international experience in addressing demobilization; ideas
discussed previously in Turkey include a phased approach
stretched out over several years; establishment of a
streamlined legal process to judge fighters who turn
themselves in; and plans to offer PKKers permanent sanctuary
in Iraq and/or Europe. END SUMMARY
TALABANI SAYS "AMNESTY," NO ONE REACTS BADLY
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Istanbul by Iraq President
Talabani and then during President Gul's historic visit to
Baghdad March 24-25, Talabani and KRG PM Barzani reintroduced
the issue of an amnesty for PKK fighters as part of a deal in
which the PKK would declare an end to its armed struggle.
Unlike previous similar statements by Iraqi Kurds, Talabani's
comments did not elicit strong knee-jerk negative reactions
from Turkish authorities. Gul merely noted that discussions
on the amnesty issue had not been "on the agenda" during
meetings between GOT and Iraqi officials and that it is
"Turkey's domestic problem to deal with."
¶3. (C) Amnesty proposals are almost as old as the PKK
conflict itself and numerous "repentance" schemes have been
introduced, but none has brought closure to the conflict
because they were not accompanied by other measures
addressing Kurds' desire for legal recognition of their
identity, cultural/linguistic rights and economic
development. By the same token, a political initiative on
the Kurdish issue that did not include provisions for
reintegrating militants would fail to win significant support
in the Southeast and would likely be sabotaged by the PKK.
¶4. (C) Kurdish leaders in Turkey's Southeast believe that
finding a means to demobilize the PKK's estimated 3,500
fighters, most of whom are in the mountains of southeastern
Turkey and northern Iraq, is the key to restoring peace in
the region. In western Turkey, however, the issue of amnesty
has largely been taboo as politicians are wary of appearing
soft on the PKK. The current lull in fighting ) no Turkish
soldier has been killed by the PKK this year ) could present
an opportunity for bold moves, including an amnesty, once
Turkey emerges from election campaigning for March 29 local
elections. Many PKK sympathizers now tell us openly that
amnesty, i.e. an honorable defeat, is now their top priority.
¶5. (C) Those favoring some form of amnesty/reintegration can
be divided into at least three categories:
--PKK Fighters and Sympathizers. In addition to insurgents'
obvious interest in protecting their own equities, an amnesty
would (in their minds) bestow legitimacy on their "struggle"
and the status of the PKK as an "army." Perhaps equally
important for the hard-core militants is their (vain) hope
that imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan would also benefit from the
ANKARA 00000477 002 OF 004
amnesty, either immediately or in the future.
--Pragmatic Kurds. The majority of Kurds in the Southeast,
including those who oppose the use of violence, recognize
that a means of allowing PKK fighters to return to their
families is necessary. GUNSIAD (an influential regional
business association) captured this mainstream sentiment in a
2006 statement calling for both a PKK cease-fire and an
amnesty. GUNSIAD President Sahismail Bedirhanoglu told us
that an amnesty need not be universal, but it is essential
because thousands of families have relatives in the hills.
Pragmatic Kurds recognize that the PKK is a liability to
their aspirations, but understand that an agreed-upon
demobilization is needed to marginalize the PKK and
ultimately make it disappear. Some AKP politicians from the
region share this view.
--Pragmatic Turks. Many in the Turkish establishment
understand that a successful counter-insurgency campaign
against the PKK requires offering an exit strategy for the
militants. The prospect of demobilization would also
strengthen those in the Kurdish political movement who favor
pursuing their goals peacefully. One Turkish nationalist
politician, Mehmet Agar, articulated this view during the
2007 election campaign, saying that the PKK "should be
involved in politics instead of holding weapons in the
mountains."
TREACHEROUS POLITICAL WATERS
----------------------------
¶6. (C) The amnesty issue is the Bermuda Triangle of Turkish
politics -- it's a dangerous issue bounded by three mutually
suspicious institutions: a powerful, yet insecure AKP that
wants to resolve the Kurdish issue, but also fears taking
actions that expose it to attacks from Turkish nationalists,
particularly before local elections that will take place
March 29; the military, which harbors existential fears about
giving too much grounds to Kurds' ) let alone the PKK's )
political aspirations, but also has no credible "military"
solution to this seemingly endless and costly conflict; and
the Kurds' own dysfunctional politics, in which the PKK,
still clinging to Abdullah Ocalan and his outdated ideology
of a violent liberation struggle, remains the most powerful
force ) and the biggest obstacle to improving the lives of
ordinary Kurds. Nonetheless, a majority of Turks probably
would support a solution that ended the violence, preserved
Turkey's territorial integrity and avoided the perception
that the state had caved in to terrorism. A number of
constituencies understand that demobilization must be part of
such a package, even if they are reluctant to say so
publicly.
¶7. (C) In 2007, the GOT floated some trial balloons
suggesting a new amnesty law was under consideration, but
nothing was ever formally proposed. Meanwhile, according to
press reports, the rate of PKK fighters turning themselves in
seems to be increasing and the judiciary is showing leniency
to most who surrender. In 2008, the Turkish military
distributed leaflets urging PKK fighters to "Make your
decision and leave the organization. Go to the nearest
military unit or police station. You will be welcomed with
love." Prior to his promotion as CHOD, Ilker Basbug was
quoted as saying young PKKers who have not been involved in
violence should be "pardoned," though he opposes a general
amnesty. As CHOD, Basbug has avoided public comments about
the campaign against the PKK, but he is widely believed to be
more pragmatic than his predecessors. This is borne out by
comments made during a March 19 briefing to resident defense
attaches by a senior TGS J2 official, who responded to a
question about amnesty by stating that all options are on the
table. Such sentiment represents a marked change in TGS
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policy from that of recent years, when the military did not
look favorably upon amnesty, nor consider it a viable option.
Despite this more pragmatic approach, TGS acceptance of a
possible amnesty will likely depend upon how it is calibrated
for ordinary PKK rank-and-file, those who have been involved
in causing the deaths of Turkish soldiers and/or civilians,
and senior PKK leadership.
FIND THE RIGHT WORDS
--------------------
¶8. (C) When Turkish policymakers take up this issue again,
they should avoid using the terms "amnesty" or "repentance."
Because the term amnesty implies a government pardon for
crimes (and in Turkey's legal tradition is used regularly to
commute the sentences of "ordinary" criminals) a different
term should be used to address PKK terrorists to make the
initiative more politically acceptable. The term
"repentance," meanwhile, raises hackles on the other side.
Turkey's repentance laws, which were introduced for defined
periods between 1985 and 2003, resulted in the surrender of
1,900 fighters. These laws, however, required those turning
themselves in to provide intelligence to the authorities; not
surprisingly, this approach never won the approval of the PKK
leadership and it exposed the beneficiaries to reprisals from
their former comrades.
OPTIONS
-------
¶9. (C) Several ideas on demobilization have been floated
during the conflict with the PKK and are likely to be
considered again:
--A phased approach. According to author Jonathan Randal, in
1993 President Turgut Ozal was considering a three-tiered
amnesty proposal under which rank-and-file volunteers who had
not committed acts of violence would be allowed to rejoin
society immediately; middle-ranking fighters would be given
amnesty after two years and senior leaders (including Ocalan,
who was at large at the time) would need to wait five years.
Ozal died before acting on the proposal. Such an approach )
which could not include Ocalan ) would have the advantage of
maintaining leverage over time on the PKK and guarantee that
it adheres to promises to disband. An additional
"preliminary phase" could be introduced into this scenario:
the granting of an amnesty or promise of non-prosecution for
the 10,000 plus residents of Makhmour refugee camp in
northern Iraq; mostly women, children, and senior citizens
who are not seen as a direct security threat to Turkey but do
serve as a source of support, and perhaps as a recruiting
pool, for the PKK. Discussions on the closure of the camp
took place 2004-2007, but ended in spring 2007, just prior to
national parliamentary elections, when the GOT decided it
politically unsustainable to accept for resettlement such a
large number of PKK sympathizers/supporters. Successful
reintegration of a large non-combatant population such as
that located at Makhmour could help to convince fighters at
Kandil and elsewhere that the GOT truly has turned the page
on the past.
--Judicial Scrutiny/Probation. A variation on the "Ozal
Plan" would expand the role of the courts in the process,
requiring those wishing to benefit to undergo a streamlined
judicial proceeding. Depending on circumstances, such as the
individual's rank in the PKK and responsibility for violence,
the person could be put on probation for a period of years
and/or barred from participation in politics or access to
certain public services.
--Go West/East. According to some media reports, another
option under consideration is for PKK members to go into
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permanent exile in Iraq or (unnamed) Scandinavian countries.
The GOT would then drop demands that these individuals return
to Turkey to face justice. To keep the number of exiles
manageable, low ranking fighters would still likely need to
have the option of returning to Turkey. This plan is also
attractive because it would keep many PKK ring-leaders
abroad, thereby reducing the influence of terrorist and
criminal elements on Kurdish politics within Turkey. (The
receiving countries may be less enthusiastic about this
idea.) This has been a de facto demobilization method for
many years as hundreds of PKK members have escaped the
organization and now live in Iraq or Europe.
--Ocalan's Detention. For PKK representatives and for many
in the DTP, Ocalan's imprisonment will be at or near the top
of the amnesty agenda. Proposals include ending Ocalan's
solitary confinement by allowing him to do time with other
PKK prisoners or placing him under "house arrest." While the
government could probably alter Ocalan's detention regime,
even considering early release would be politically
impossible. For any negotiation to succeed, the PKK will be
forced to accept that their leader will not benefit from any
program for the foreseeable future.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: The recent military successes against the
PKK and the diplomatic success of building bridges with the
KRG puts the GOT in a strong position to attempt to achieve a
lasting settlement to the Kurdish issue. Demobilization will
be key to any settlement. Without it, a majority of Kurds
will doubt the GOT's sincerity in solving the process. And
successful demobilization will require a settlement that wins
the PKK's explicit or implicit endorsement. Otherwise, the
PKK can be expected to perpetuate the conflict as there will
always be hundreds of youths willing to go the mountains to
join the struggle ) however hopeless it has become.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey