

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05PARIS1667, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER VEDRINE ON "DECISIVE YEAR"
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS1667.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS1667 | 2005-03-14 11:11 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001667
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KWBG IS SY LE IZ IR FR EUN
SUBJECT: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER VEDRINE ON "DECISIVE YEAR"
FOR U.S. POLICY
Classified By: Ambassador Howard H. Leach for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine told
Ambassador Leach March 11 that Europe was beginning to ask
itself whether the Bush Administration's pursuit of democracy
and reform in the Arab world and elsewhere might be bearing
fruit. Elections in Iraq and the Palestinian territories,
the Orange revolution in Ukraine and the pro-democracy
opposition movement in Lebanon had even the most skeptical
European governments adjusting their policy towards the U.S.,
with France under Jacques Chirac at the top of the list.
Nevertheless, Vedrine said that the jury was still out and
that the last half of 2005 would show conclusively whether
U.S. policy in Iraq, in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace,
and for the restoration of Lebanese democracy would be
successful. He also cautioned that "brutal" U.S. tactics in
the Arab world could as easily lead to confrontation and
chaotic change. He foresaw potential "serious conflict" with
Iran, unpredictable consequences if the Basher al Assad
government were to fall in Syria, and a degradation in
U.S.-European relations if Israeli Prime Minister Sharon
tries to make Gaza first Gaza only. Vedrine described
Russian President Putin as a partner for the West, albeit
imperfect. He was sympathetic to U.S. strategic concerns in
East Asia related to EU plans to lift the China arms embargo.
Finally, Vedrine offered some thoughts on France's 2007
presidential race. End summary.
¶2. (C) Former Foreign Minister Vedrine, who served in
Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's 1997-2002
"co-habitation" government under President Chirac, told
Ambassador Leach over lunch March 11 that the European visits
of President Bush and Secretary Rice had done much to improve
the tone of U.S.-European relations. Even more important
than the atmospheric changes we're now seeing is the growing
discussion in Europe whether Bush Administration policy in
support of democracy and reform in the Arab world and
elsewhere is beginning to bear fruit. Successsful elections
in Iraq and the Palestinian territories and the Lebanese
opposition's push for Syrian withdrawal stand as significant
accomplishments. In none of these cases, however, is success
assured, Vedrine cautioned. The last half of 2005 would be
decisive for U.S. policy in Iraq, it would see whether PM
Sharon was prepared to implement his Gaza withdrawal plan and
begin to pull back from the West Bank, and it would reveal
whether Lebanon would be able to free itself of Syrian
domination.
¶3. (C) Of these challenges, Vedrine identified the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process as central. Progress here
could dramatically improve U.S. relations with the Arab
world. But continued U.S. pressure on Israel will be
critical to success. The U.S. must insist that Israel give
the Palestinians a real prospect of forming a viable state.
If Sharon stops all movement once the Gaza withdrawal is
complete, the situation will rapidly degrade and
U.S.-European relations will suffer, Vedrine said. Vedrine
agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that both Israelis
and Palestinians should be encouraged to take steps towards
peace. But he said that their capacities to respond were
different. Israel was a strong democratic state and its
elected government would be able to implement any commitment
it made. The Palestinian Authority, by contrast, lacks most
of the attributes of a state and is little able to impose its
authority on rejectionist groups in the territories.
Palestinian President Abbas "needs more than just pressure,"
Vedrine said, he needs to be able to show results. Peace is
in Israel's interest, so it must be prepared to continue its
negotiation with the PA, even if it is attacked. Israel
"cannot allow terrorists to dictate the agenda."
Undoubtedly, Sharon has a political problem, but so did
Itzhak Rabin, who did not allow inevitable isolated terrorist
attacks to deter him. Vedrine said he personally liked
Sharon, found him truthful, and believed therefore that one
could work with him. But encouraging him to move beyond the
Gaza withdrawal would fall to the U.S.; Europe could be
helpful in assisting the Palestinians to manage affairs in
Gaza once the Israelis left.
¶4. (C) Iraq, said Vedrine, presented a different set of
challenges. The legislative elections had been a success.
If the U.S. could also make a success of the efforts to
reconcile Sunnis and Shiites over a constitution -- the more
important issue for Iraq's future -- most Europeans would be
prepared to acknowledge that U.S. policy had been right all
along in Iraq. Asked whether he perceived any concrete,
supportive steps in Iraq from Chirac, Vedrine said he thought
the French president would be prepared to offer any form of
assistance short of military. But, Vedrine cautioned, the
U.S. "has not won yet." There is still a danger that Iraq
will descend into civil war or that a fundamentalist Islamist
government will take power. The jury is still out. Just as
in Iraq, America's "brutal policy" in Syria and Lebanon could
lead to positive change -- "or to disaster."
¶5. (C) The Bashr al-Assad regime in Syria was "incapable of
reform," Vedrine said. Bashar, himself, was a prisoner of
the system and not in complete control. His survival, like
Syria's, was dependent on maintaining Damascus' hold on
Lebanon. Economically and politically, this was essential.
The U.S. and France had to understand that getting Syrian
forces out of Lebanon would be just the first step.
Moreover, it is not clear that the Lebanese will be able to
bring sufficient pressure to bear to do this themselves.
They are also fearful that should they try, Syria will exact
a heavy price. Therefore, Vedrine said, the U.S. and France
have to understand that if we start down the path of pushing
the Syrians, "we will have to go all the way." Reaching a
good solution for Lebanon "will require regime change in
Syria," Vedrine said, but pursuit of that policy in Syria
would be just as complex and uncertain as it has proved in
Iraq. If the current regime stays in power, however, "we
won't change a thing" in Lebanon.
¶6. (C) The U.S. and France should be honest with each other
about what we seek in Lebanon and we should carefully think
through consequences. France, for example, does not agree
with the U.S. policy of bringing about democratic change in
the Arab world. Chirac's policy towards Lebanon is not
determined by any commitment to ideology -- democratic or
otherwise. When former Prime Minister Hariri argued the
necessity of placating Syria, Chirac followed him. When
Hariri decided shortly before his assassination to oppose
Syria, Chirac moved to opposition with him. Vedrine said he
personally was attracted to the democracy doctrine. There
have been lots of examples of attempts to transform the Arab
world, Vedrine said, and none of them has been successful.
Nevertheless, the idea of promoting freedom and building
democracy was "seductive" and "tempting," Vedrine said, while
adding that his attitude was not typical of that of the
French political class, which tended to be much more
skeptical. Vedrine said he has argued in speeches that the
U.S. fails to understand the complexities of the world,
whereas Europe fails to understand the world's toughness. On
balance, the advantage probably goes to the U.S., because
Europe's need to delve into the complexities of issues acts
as a brake on its will to act.
¶7. (C) Asked for his thoughts on Russian President Putin's
turn towards authoritarian rule, Vedrine argued for
pragmatism. Putin remains an important partner for the West,
albeit an imperfect one. He is rational, even "cold" in his
analysis of events, "and this can be useful," Vedrine said.
The subject, he added, is one that divides Europeans, along
classic old Europe/new Europe lines. France, Germany, Italy,
the UK and other older EU members generally see Putin's
Russia as a partner and a source of energy products. Former
Warsaw Pact EU members neighboring Russia, with their direct
experience of Soviet rule, are much more wary.
¶8. (C) After asking whether U.S. political differences with
China would lead us to impose trade sanctions on Beijing,
Vedrine deployed some fairly standard French talking points
in defense of EU plans to lift its arms embargo on China.
Vedrine argued that there would be no rush to sell lethal
weaponry to China if the embargo were lifted, asserting that
the EU's Code of Conduct, which has been strengthened, would
provide sufficient checks on European sellers. Vedrine
seemed to shift, however, when the Ambassador noted Beijings
big increase in weapons acquisitions in recent years, and its
ratcheting up of tensions over Taiwan. Vedrine acknowledged
that, unlike Europe, the U.S. had strategic interests and
commitments in East Asia, and recognized the consequences for
the U.S. if the Asian military balance was disturbed. He
suggested that the U.S. and Europe talk with each other
seriously about a long-term joint strategy for dealing with
China. He also suggested that Japan might well decide to
consider whether it needed a nuclear deterrent as China
expanded its ambitions and capabilities in the region.
¶9. (C) Finally, Vedrine addressed European and domestic
political issues. He said that he believed French voters
would back the EU constitution in the May 29 referendum. He
said he expected a high rate of abstention, and a small but
clear win for the yes. A "no" vote would send France into a
"psychological crisis" because the country heretofore
regarded as a central driving force of European integration
would be seen by fellow Europeans as a "traitor" to the
cause. In reality, however, the constitution draft offers
only marginal improvements over the current Nice Treaty
arrangements, and thus a no vote "would not be the end of the
world." Turning to France's 2007 presidential elections,
Vedrine said he expected the Socialist Party candidate to be
either party First Secretary Francois Hollande or Former PM
Jospin. Hollande, despite having been at the helm of the
Socialist Party through two electoral victories this year
(regional and European elections) and an internal party vote
in favor of supporting the EU constitution, is still not the
unchallenged leader of the party. If, as the election
approaches, Socialists perceive that they will not be able to
defeat the center-right candidate, there could well be a move
to draft Jospin, which Hollande himself could support. On
the center-right UMP side, Vedrine said it could well be that
Chirac and UMP party president Nicolas Sarkozy both run, thus
splitting the center-right vote. Such an outcome,
hypothetically, could produce a second round contest between
Jospin and the candidate who knocked him out of the second
round voting in 2002, far right National Front leader
Jean-Marie Le Pen. In order to avoid such an outcome,
Vedrine said he thought Chirac could ultimately withdraw and
allow Sarkozy, France's most popular politician, to be the
center-right standard-bearer.
Leach