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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06PARIS1681, SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06PARIS1681 | 2006-03-16 15:03 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO1418
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1681/01 0751531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161531Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5250
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001681
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV ELAB PREL FR SOCI PINR EUN
SUBJECT: SARKOZY ADVISOR ON FIRST EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, END
OF VILLEPIN'S PRESIDENTIAL CHANCES
REF: PARIS 953
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Former Industry Minister and close Sarkozy
advisor Patrick Devedjian predicted March 15 that student and
labor union opposition to the First Employment Contract (CPE)
was spreading and might yet become a major test for the
government. In any event, he believed that PM de Villepin
was finished as a potential presidential candidate.
Devedjian blamed the current impasse squarely on Villepin's
impetuousness and autocratic methods, which, while leaving
the governing party (and Sarkozy) no choice but to support
him publicly, had given the opposition Socialist Party a
potent rallying call for coalescing against the government.
He thought it possible but not likely that Villepin would be
replaced, but ruled out a Sarkozy prime ministership as
"suicidal." Devedjian nonetheless judged that knowledge of
Sarkozy's "differences" with President Chirac and Villepin,
despite his official support for the government, would spare
him most of the electorate's wrath and leave him well
positioned to win the 2007 party nomination and presidential
elections. Devedjian saw Segolene Royal as the opponent to
be most feared on the left, although he thought she might
self-destruct if nominated by the PS, and believed that the
PS would probably prevent her from winning its nomination in
any case. Comment: Devedjian's views, reported here, are
four parts hard analysis, one part wishful thinking. End
comment and summary.
¶2. (U) Patrick Devedjian, former Industry Minister and close
advisor to Interior Minister and UMP President Nicolas
Sarkozy, met March 15 with Embassy reps from the U.S., the
UK, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and Russia to discuss the
state of play with respect to the First Employment Contract
(CPE) and its impact on the current government under PM de
Villepin, as well as the line-up for the 2007 presidential
elections.
CPE and spreading unrest
------------------------
¶3. (C) Devedjian described growing public opposition to the
First Employment Contract (CPE) and declared he "was not
optimistic" for the future, even if there was some hope that
unemployment figures would begin to improve again. He
predicted a turbulent period ahead -- beginning with the
large demonstration planned for March 18 -- which would last
at least one and one-half to two months, and judged that the
government's only real option would be to try to ride out the
storm in the hope that public opinion would eventually turn
against the protesters. Although the government had promised
a few amendments to the law to appease public opinion and was
now expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue, Devedjian
expressed concern that the manner in which the government had
proceeded had resulted in uniting, or in his word,
"coagulating," its adversaries. He concluded that
developments had now moved "beyond the CPE."
More important than unrest in suburbs
-------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Devedjian noted ironically that the students
currently protesting against the CPE were relatively
privileged and much more likely to find jobs than the
uneducated and unemployed youths in the suburbs whom the CPE
was intended to help. He saw nothing particularly unusual
about this state of affairs, saying this was what always
happened in France. He termed the November unrest in the
suburbs "a revolt without a message" (sans discours),
concluding that it was primarily a cultural revolt by
third-generation immigrants. At the same time, he argued
against multiculturalism, saying that the real problem lay in
France's failure to inculcate adequately French culture and
values into these unemployed youths and in the government's
long-time policy of effectively ghettoizing immigrant
populations in lieu of dispersing them throughout French
society. He called for some kind of affirmative action and
stressed the importance of demonstrating visibly that members
of a minority can make it to the top. In sum, he did not
appear to take last fall's suburban violence all that
seriously. While the images of the unrest were spectacular,
he said, they had little real (political) import.
Villepin to blame
-----------------
¶5. (C) Devedjian viewed Villepin's impetuous personality and
autocratic style as largely responsible for the current
impasse. Villepin's decision, during the recent debate in
the National Assembly, to let other ministers respond to
hostile questioning and distance himself personally from the
CPE would not succeed in attenuating this perception.
Devedjian blamed Villepin for his refusal to engage in
dialogue with the labor unions before proceeding -- in
PARIS 00001681 002 OF 003
particular with the generally pro-reform-minded CFDT that had
supported Raffarin's pension reforms, and which had now
turned against him. He criticized Villepin for repeating
Balladur's mistake of 1994 of singling out one specific
segment of the French public for reform, which to the French
electorate smacked of discrimination and violated the
principle of equality. Devedjian especially castigated
Villepin's recourse to article 49.3 of the constitution to
put a stop to parliamentary debate as "very dangerous" and a
blow to the strength of democratic institutions. He decried
France's "monarchical mentality," which viewed decisions in
terms of decrees and offered solutions before discussing the
questions.
UMP trapped, but Villepin finished
----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Devedjian described a UMP trapped by Villepin --
forced to support him on the CPE without enthusiasm because
it was obligated to support the government. He believed that
the government, having closed the doors to dialogue, no
longer had any escape paths. Villepin's decision not to
allow the opposition to debate the issue in parliament, if
only as a venting exercise, had ineluctably moved the debate
into the streets. Devedjian judged that the current unrest
would spell the death knell for Villepin's presidential
aspirations. If things got bad enough, he held out the
possibility that Chirac would have to appoint a new prime
minister, probably either Defense Minister Michele
Alliot-Marie or Employment and Social Cohesion Minister
Jean-Louis Borloo, while judging in the end that Chirac would
probably stick with Villepin. Devedjian firmly ruled out the
possibility of Sarkozy accepting the job as prime minister,
which he said would be "suicidal." He did not believe that
President Chirac would withdraw the law and suffer yet
another loss of face. But whether the CPE remains or is
jettisoned, Devedjian concluded, this would be the last
reform pushed through by the current government.
Socialists smell blood
----------------------
¶7. (C) Devedjian said that the Socialist Party (PS) had now
smelled blood and had come to the conclusion that its views,
and not those of the governing party, were more
representative of a majority of the French electorate.
Moreover, this was the latest in a string of setbacks that
included, inter alia, the failed referendum on the EU
constitutional treaty, growing opprobrium directed against
Chirac, and the recent wave of social unrest in the suburbs.
Sarkozy, he asserted, was the best positioned to overcome
this alienation, since the public and press largely
understood that he supported the government but was different
from it (solidaire mais different). This would remain so
despite efforts by PS presidential hopeful Dominique
Strauss-Kahn to paint Villepin and Sarkozy with the same
brush.
Sarkozy still the one to beat
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Devedjian expressed certainty that Sarkozy would be
nominated to represent the governing party during the first
round of the 2007 presidential elections, and that he would
fare well enough to be one of two candidates in the second
round. He judged that Sarkozy's law-and-order reputation
would ensure that most far-right National Front (FN)
supporters would vote for Sarkozy in the second round, adding
that the FN would die out with the passing from the scene of
Le Pen. Devedjian acknowledged that Sarkozy, having first
consolidated his right wing, would need to do more to attract
centrist voters. He argued there was still time for this,
noting that Sarkozy had already come up with a number of
proposals that one normally would have expected to originate
on the left, for instance that immigrant permanent residents
be allowed to vote in municipal elections.
Segolene Royal the best on the left
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Asked whom he feared most among the Socialist
candidates, Devedjian named Segolene Royal, citing the
difficulty of running against an "image". (Comment:
Throughout the discussion, Devedjian stressed the importance
of running on projects for the future rather than past
accomplishments; no one, he said, won elections out of
gratitude for what they had done. Jospin, despite his record
of reducing unemployment, was proof of that. End comment.)
Fortunately, he said only half in jest, the PS would likely
refuse her the nomination and thereby spare Sarkozy the need
to defeat her himself ("they will take care of her for us").
Devedjian said her candidacy could fall apart if she
continued to commit gaffes such as calling on regional
leaders to block government subsidies to mayors who apply the
CPE, which was against the law. Also making fun of her
repeatedly expressed admiration for British PM Tony Blair,
PARIS 00001681 003 OF 003
Devedjian judged that Royal, known for her support for family
values and the work ethic, tended "to demobilize" the
far-left, which would hurt her chances in the second round,
since Communist Party supporters would not vote for her.
(Note: Devedjian said that, to win, a party has to mobilize
its own voters and demobilize those of the opposition.)
Asked who would be the candidate if Royal did not run,
Devedjian named former PM Lionel Jospin. But he predicted
that Jospin's age and history would tend to work against him.
(Comment: By contrast, Socialists often predict that voters
will react "with nervousness" to the super-charged Sarkozy
and gravitate toward a more reassuring figure. End comment.)
Sarkozy's plans if elected
--------------------------
¶10. (C) Asked whether Sarkozy, if elected, would attempt to
push through a whole series of ambitious reforms in the early
months of his office, before French opposition to change
blocks further reforms, Devedjian said this would not be the
case. The one exception would be the judiciary, where he saw
a need for deep-reaching changes. He said he was also
interested in changing the constitution to abolish article
49.3 and reduce or abolish the possibilities for censure of
dissolution or the parliament. He believed a move to either
a more presidential (with the U.S. as model) or parliamentary
system (as in the UK) could be accomplished by amending the
existing constitution.
Devedjian's plans
-----------------
¶11. (SBU) Devedjian said he would expect to be a part of a
Sarkozy government, but he refused to speculate in what
capacity, although he subsequently launched into a discussion
of needed judicial reforms. (Note: Pundits predict Sarkozy
would name him as Justice Minister.) In departing, he
recalled warmly his February 3 meeting with EUR PDAS Volker
and Pol M/C (reftel).
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) Devedjian was friendly and animated, and in no hurry
to leave. Sarkozy's circle has come to the conclusion that
Villepin is now effectively finished as a potential
presidential candidate, even though this clearly also
represents wishful thinking on their part. Noteworthy was
Devedjian's judgment that the CPE may yet prove to be a major
test for the government, which contradicts the perception of
many that opposition to the CPE has not reached crisis
proportions. We'll know more following the March 18
demonstrations.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton