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Viewing cable 09STATE84305, PSI: ANNOUNCEMENT AND INVITATION TO ATTEND PSI
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE84305 | 2009-08-13 13:01 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXRO1429
PP RUEHDBU RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #4305/01 2251418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131359Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 4816
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2882
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1354
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3036
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 7917
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1110
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 5631
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2672
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0762
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 1168
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0969
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2895
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 2744
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 6725
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 6562
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0990
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 6169
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 7716
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2953
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 9681
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 1192
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 2958
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 9038
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9656
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0994
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3024
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 7256
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4938
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0735
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 7733
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6070
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 2418
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2771
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 8394
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 6197
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5810
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1930
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1461
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 6071
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0135
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 4570
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0205
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 084305
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL KNNP MO XD XF XG XI ZK ZR AS AR NZ
SUBJECT: PSI: ANNOUNCEMENT AND INVITATION TO ATTEND PSI
EXERCISE LEADING EDGE 2010
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------------------
¶1. In keeping with the PSI goal to improve
interdiction cooperation and capabilities through
the conduct of international PSI exercises, we wish
to inform all addressees about the upcoming US-UAE
hosted PSI Exercise Leading Edge 2010, and invite
them to participate or observe selected phases.
PSI exercise Leading Edge will take place in UAE,
25-28 January, 2010. Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE,
Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Iraq,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
UAE, Yemen, Djibouti, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and
Afghanistan have endorsed the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) Statement of Interdiction Principles
and are therefore welcome to fully participate.
Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan and India are encouraged to
endorse the PSI and are welcome to observe all parts of
the exercise. A key aspect of the Initiative is its
exercise & training program to practice WMD-related
interdiction actions and provide opportunities to
network with international counterparts and share
best practices.
¶2. Leading Edge is a USCENTCOM and USG Interagency (IA)
supported multilateral PSI exercise designed to develop
WMD interdiction capabilities with partner nations to
deter and disrupt illicit transfers of WMD-related
material, technology, expertise, and equipment, to
include addressing the challenges of suspect material
inspection, seizure, and disposition. The goals of
Exercise Leading Edge are to hone USG/USCENTCOM
interdiction processes, demonstrate the benefits of PSI
participation for regional partners and explore partner
nations' interdiction processes. Leading Edge 2010 will
be executed in two phases. Phase I executed 18-20
January 2010 will be a US-only distributed table top
exercise for the USG IA at multiple locations to explore
and exercise US-only command and control issues
associated with PSI related interdictions. Phase II,
co-hosted with the UAE, will be conducted in UAE 25-28
January, 2010. Phase II consists of three parts.
Part 1 is a multilateral ship boarding field training
exercise to demonstrate/share boarding, search and
seizure capabilities/best practices with participants
from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
STATE 00084305 002 OF 007
and UAE. Part 2 is a port exercise to demonstrate
customs/law enforcement capabilities and technologies
used to identify and seize proliferation cargo; build
a professional partnership among customs and law
enforcement personnel; and learn about port and vessel
operational issues from industry representatives.
Part 3 is a Table Top Exercise (TTX) that will examine
legal authorities currently available to PSI partners
for interdiction, detention, seizure, and disposition
under port-state and customs/law enforcement control
and identify seams and gaps in legal authorities that
may require further national action. Parts 2 and 3 of
Phase II are open to full participation from all
addressed nations.
¶3. Posts are requested to draw from the points in
paragraph 7 in discussions with appropriate host
government officials and to encourage host
government increased involvement in PSI activities,
including exercise Leading Edge 2010; para 7 below
may be left as a non-paper. In addition, if host
government requests or asks about travel funding,
please contact the USCENTCOM POC below along with your
recommendations. USCENTCOM has a limited amount of
funding available to provide airfare and hotel room
for military related personnel if a country cannot
otherwise be appropriately represented at the exercise.
¶4. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) countries have
already received an official invitation to participate
(BAH, KUW, OMN, QAT, UAE) or observe (IRQ, SAU, YEM,
EGP, JOR, LEB, AFG, KAZ, KYR, PAK, TAJ, TUR, UZB) in
Exercise Leading Edge, from Commander U.S. Central
Command, General David H. Petraeus in late February
and a letter of Modification from Director, Strategy,
Plans, and Policy, U.S. Central Command, Major General
Allardice, announcing a date change for the exercise
from October, 2009 to January, 2010. The distinction
between participant and observer in the Central Command
invitation letters is specific to Part 1 of Phase II
(the field training exercise). All PSI endorsing
nations are invited to fully participate in Parts 2 and
3 of Phase II and observe Part 1 with their full team.
PSI endorsing nations are encouraged to send country
specific playing teams consisting of 3 to 5 experts from
the customs/law enforcement, legal (customs and/or law
of the sea/ship boarding), and operational (maritime
law enforcement or Ministry of Defense) communities.
Observer nations and any country unable to send this
team make up will still be involved with every aspect
of TTX play in a larger multinational team. The
Government of UAE is also intending to issue official
STATE 00084305 003 OF 007
invitations to regional partners and select other nations
to attend and participate in the exercise.
¶5. FOR EMBASSIES BEIRUT, CAIRO, NEW DEHLI, AND ISLAMABAD.
Washington is seeking to ensure Lebanon, Egypt, India,
and Pakistan take advantage of this opportunity to learn
more about the PSI by attending the exercise Leading Edge
as observers. Pakistan's CJCS has already accepted
USCENTCOM's invitation. Posts are requested to invite
these host governments to send a delegation to attend
exercise. Additionally, and in advance of the exercise,
Washington would like these countries to endorse the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP) (the text of
which is available at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm.
At posts discretion, posts are requested to
approach appropriate levels of host government and
urge endorsement of the PSI. In particular, please
inform host governments that PSI endorsement is a
condition for full participation in PSI exercises.
Posts may draw from points in paragraph 7 and
8, which also may be left as non-papers. Posts may also
leave the sample diplomatic note in paragraph 9 with
host government.
---------------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POCS
---------------------------
¶6. All action addressees are requested to deliver the
documents below to host governments by 21 August, 2009,
and report delivery by 28 August, 2009. Replies by email
are acceptable but must be received to below POC,s NLT
28 August 2009. Points of contact are Sean Pascoli
(USCENTCOM CCJ7 Exercise Planner pascolsw@centcom.mil
813-827-4074) for matters pertaining overall exercise
planning and logistics, Mike Perron (DHS/U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, 202-344-2501,
Michael.a.perron@dhs.gov) for matters pertaining
Phase II PORTEX AND TTX planning, and Carlos Guzman
(202-647-6320, GuzmanCS@state.sgov.gov. The Department
greatly appreciates Embassies' assistance. Please also
continue to report reactions as received.
End action request.
---------
NONPAPER
---------
¶7. Begin points/non-paper:
STATE 00084305 004 OF 007
-- We value our close collaboration on many
nonproliferation issues and look forward to working
together to deepen our Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) cooperation.
-- On April 5, 2009, in Prague, President Obama expressed
his support for the PSI. The USG is committed to making
PSI a durable and effective initiative over the long term
by improving states' capabilities to stop illicit
shipments of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their
delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.
The USG views this effort as a joint endeavor among
PSI partners.
-- In keeping with our shared desired to prevent
WMD-related proliferation, we wish to inform you of
the upcoming US-UAE hosted PSI Exercise, Leading
Edge 10, and invite you to participate.
-- Exercises are a key component of the PSI. They help
states improve their WMD related interdiction
capabilities.
-- PSI participants, including Middle East, Maghreb,
and Central Asia regional partners, are being invited
to participate in the PSI Exercise Leading Edge 2010
to work with other PSI participants to further develop
and improve capabilities to stop shipments of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials from
being transferred to and from states and non-state
actors of proliferation concern.
-- Exercise Leading Edge 2010 will be conducted in the
UAE from 25 to 28 January 2010 in three parts.
-- Part 1 is a Gulf Cooperation Council focused
multilateral field training exercise to
demonstrate/share boarding, search and seizure
capabilities/best practices.
-- Part 2 is a port exercise to demonstrate customs/law
enforcement capabilities and technology used to identify
and seize proliferation cargo; build a professional
partnership among customs and law enforcement personnel;
and learn about port and vessel operational issues from
industry representatives.
-- Part 3 will culminate Phase II and Exercise Leading
Edge with a Table Top Exercise (TTX) that will examine
legal authorities currently available to PSI partners
for interdiction, detention, seizure, and disposition
under port-state and customs/law enforcement control
STATE 00084305 005 OF 007
and identify seams and gaps in legal authorities that
may require further national action.
-- For Part 3, PSI endorsing nations are encouraged to
send country specific playing teams consisting of 3 to 5
experts from ministries involved in international
security-related decision-making, nonproliferation,
and export controls (to include international and
customs law, operational intelligence, law enforcement
and customs operations, military interdiction
policy/processes, border security, international
trade and finance, exercise planning, and
policy/diplomacy communities). Observer nations and any
country unable to send this team make up will still be
involved with every aspect of TTX play in a larger
multinational team.
-- We invite you to attend the exercise and seek your
decision to participate, preferably with representation
by appropriate officials described above.
-- If you agree, U.S. officials will provide you more
details on PSI Exercise Leading Edge 2010. For planning
purposes, nations specifically invited to participate
in Part 1 by CDR USCENTCOM and all other nations planning
to materially support Part 1 with Naval assets, boarding
teams, or related equipment, etc. should send 1 or 2
representatives to the Leading Edge Final Planning
Conference in UAE 3-5 November and should arrive no
later than 24 January 2010 for exercise execution.
-- We believe that your government's decision to actively
participate in PSI exercise Leading Edge 2010 would
deepen (INSERT HOST COUNTRY NAME) regional
counter-proliferation cooperation, intensify your
participation in PSI, and strengthen your position
as a regional leader.
¶8. Begin points FOR Lebanon, Egypt, India, and Pakistan ONLY:
-- Many other countries in the region have endorsed PSI,
including Afghanistan, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE,
Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Tunisia,
Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Yemen, Morocco, and Libya.
-- In the six years since the inception of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 95 countries
from every region of the world have endorsed the PSI
Statement of Interdiction Principles.
STATE 00084305 006 OF 007
-- As a result, the PSI has become the hallmark of
strong nonproliferation credentials.
-- On April 5 in Prague, President Obama expressed his
support for the PSI. The Obama Administration is
committed to strengthen and expand the PSI, to ensure
it remains effective over the long term in improving
states' capabilities to stop illicit shipments of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.
-- The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles does
not entail any legal or operational obligations.
Nonetheless, endorsement of the Statement of Principles
provides a clear indication of a country's strong
nonproliferation credentials, and also acts as a
strong deterrent to proliferators seeking to abuse
states' sovereign territory by trafficking WMD and
missile-related materials and items.
-- Endorsement of the PSI is a signal that a state
takes its UN obligations seriously, including those
in UNSCR 1540. This resolution identified the
proliferation of WMD as a threat to international peace
and security. It also identified cooperative efforts
as one way in which states could implement their
obligations to counter WMD and missile proliferation.
-- Active participation in the PSI can assist countries
with fortifying their economic systems and assets
(such as ports, industries, etc.) against exploitation
by illicit traffickers of WMD and related items, as
well as other illicit materials.
-- To date, the PSI partner countries have conducted
over 37 operational interdiction training exercises
(air, maritime, and ground) involving more than 70
nations. These exercises are a key element of the PSI
in increasing the interoperability of PSI participants,
improving interdiction decision-making processes and
procedures, and enhancing the interdiction capacities
of all participating states. The PSI partner states
continue to work together by sharing information,
conducting exercises, and carrying out interdictions
that improve our ability and readiness to disrupt and
counter proliferation activities.
-- We welcome your Government's participation in
the PSI.
-- We urge your government to endorse the PSI Statement
of Interdiction Principles through a diplomatic note to
the United States or another PSI partner state prior to
STATE 00084305 007 OF 007
Exercise Leading Edge, which will give you the
opportunity to participate actively in this and future
PSI exercises.
End Points/Nonpaper.
----------------------
SAMPLE DIPLOMATIC NOTE
----------------------
¶9. Begin text of sample diplomatic note endorsing the PSI:
The Government of (country) welcomes and fully supports
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 4
September 2003 Statement of Interdiction Principles
(SOP).
This endorsement reflects (country's) willingness to
cooperate in preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and
related materials. (Country) is committed to upholding
the PSI SOP and looks forward to participating, to the
extent possible, in future PSI-related activities.
(Additional language on your government's commitment to
non-proliferation and particular efforts your government
would like to undertake, etc., may be inserted as desired.)
End Sample Diplomatic Note
CLINTON