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Viewing cable 07PARIS2095, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 15 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LAVITTE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07PARIS2095 | 2007-05-22 12:12 | 2011-04-15 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO2774
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #2095/01 1421247
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221247Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7478
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002095
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS: PREL FR EUN ECON SENV PGOV NATO IZ IR AF TU
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 15 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LAVITTE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Deputy Secretary met informally May 15
with President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate,
Jean-David Levitte, to explore the U.S.-French foreign policy
agenda in advance of Sarkozy's assumption of office on May
¶16. Levitte cautioned against expecting dramatic changes in
French foreign policy, although there would be a change in
tone, while stressing that Sarkozy's top priorities would
include climate change and Darfur and reiterating Sarkozy's
opposition to Turkish EU membership. Levitte affirmed that
Sarkozy would want to pursue a stronger U.S.-French
relationship; that Sarkozy's comments on Afghanistan were
made in the context of wanting to help free a French hostage,
and did not represent a change in French policy toward its
NATO/ISAF commitments; and, that he would keep an initial
distance from Russia. Levitte confirmed his own expanded
mandate (to include African Affairs) as the President's
Diplomatic Advisor and Bernard Kouchner's selection as
Foreign Minister. In a May 16 meeting, prominent French
international affairs analysts did not believe Sarkozy's idea
of a Mediterranean Union would become a reality anytime soon,
especially if there is no progress on the Western Sahara, and
they predicted Sarkozy would show less "Gallic embarrassment"
on missile defense. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by the
Ambassador, held an initial meeting May 15 with
President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate (and
National Security Advisor-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte to
discuss France's probable foreign policy orientation under a
Sarkozy presidency. The meeting took place at the
Ambassador's residence, given that Levitte was meeting with
the Deputy Secretary in an unofficial capacity (Sarkozy was
officially installed as President on May 16). On May 16, the
Deputy Secretary exchanged views over lunch with noted former
Mitterrand advisor and Sarkozy friend Jacques Attali,
strategic affairs specialist Francois Heisbourg, and
Americanist Nicole Bacharan.
EXPECT CONTINUITY IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Levitte cautioned the Deputy Secretary at the outset
of the meeting against expecting dramatic changes in French
foreign policy under a Sarkozy presidency, although there
would be a change in tone. He hastened to add that he had
yet to hold extensive consultations with Sarkozy about his
foreign policy views. Levitte said he had had two meetings
with Sarkozy, but that they had focused primarily on
organizational issues rather than policy questions. Levitte
confirmed press reports that his mandate would be broader
than that of his predecessor, to include supervision of the
Presidency's Africa cell. Confirming that Bernard Kouchner
would be named as Foreign Minister, Levitte said he would
need to broaden his horizons beyond running an NGO (Medecins
sans Frontieres); both he and the MFA bureaucracy would
require a little time to adjust to one another.
U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS
---------------------
¶4. (C) Indicating that his own pro-U.S. orientation was
already well known, Levitte assured the Deputy Secretary that
Sarkozy was eager to work with the United States. That said,
France would insist on being treated as an equal partner, and
should be consulted as such.
CLIMATE CHANGE
--------------
¶5. (C) Levitte indicated that climate change would be a top
domestic and international priority for Sarkozy, perhaps his
top priority. The Deputy Secretary defended the U.S. record
on climate change, with the Ambassador pointing out a number
of technological advances the U.S. was making to reduce
emissions, or at a minimum the rate of growth of emissions,
despite our non-ratification of Kyoto. The Deputy Secretary
and the Ambassador stressed USG willingness to work together
with the Sarkozy government in a way that would further both
our interests.
AFGHANISTAN
-----------
¶6. (C) The Deputy Secretary requested a clarification of
Sarkozy's views on continuing French engagement in
Afghanistan, given the statements he had made to the effect
that France would not remain in Afghanistan permanently.
Levitte responded by acknowledging that France had interests
in Afghanistan, including two French-language schools, and
agreed with the U.S. on the continuing Taliban threat. He
explained that Sarkozy's statement should be understood
within the context of the government's then-ongoing efforts
to secure the release of French hostages, and did not
represent any change in French policy.
PARIS 00002095 002 OF 002
IRAQ
----
¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary stressed the important role the
ongoing regional conferences on Iraq could play in building
up international support for a sovereign Iraq. Levitte
promised that France would continue to participate in such
conferences at a suitably high level. He added that a
precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq also was not in
France's interest. He did not offer any specifics as to how
France might increase its support.
DARFUR
------
¶8. (C) Levitte emphasized the importance of doing more on
Darfur. He added that this was likely to be a very high
priority for incoming Foreign Minister Kouchner, in part
because it would give Kouchner, on an issue he personally
cares about, an opening to make an immediate impact on the
international stage. Levitte noted French deployments in
Chad and the C.A.R. as evidence of France's engagement and
stressed the potential for spillover. But it would be
difficult to do more militarily, as French forces were
stretched thin. For that reason, French efforts would focus
primarily on diplomatic action.
EU, TURKEY, RUSSIA
------------------
¶9. (C) In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary,
Levitte reviewed briefly Sarkozy's strategy for working with
the UK and Germany to push forward the idea of a simplified
treaty that could be ratified by member states without
recourse to a referendum. The Deputy Secretary asked about
Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey, reviewing the strategic
reasons behind U.S. support for eventual Turkish membership.
Levitte indicated that it would be very difficult to change
Sarkozy's views on Turkey. The Deputy Secretary urged the
French to keep an open mind and refrain at least from closing
the door completely. Levitte commented in passing that
Sarkozy would also take a tougher line on Russia, adding that
Sarkozy would not be in a hurry to visit Putin anytime soon.
MEETING WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ANALYSTS
-------------------------------------------
¶10. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary's meeting covered the French
political scene as well as foreign policy issues. The Deputy
Secretary reviewed U.S. thinking on Iraq stabilization, the
SIPDIS
Middle East peace process, Iran, Syria, and Latin American
free trade agreements. The international affairs analysts
noted Sarkozy's decision to strengthen the mandate of his
Diplomatic Advisor, subordinating not only the role of the
Africa cell, but also that of the President's military
advisor. This obviated the need to create a separate NSC
structure, an idea which has been apparently discarded.
Heisbourg described Kouchner and Sarkozy as "compatible" with
respect to their "interventionist" approach to international
humanitarian and human rights crises. Attali and Heisbourg
were skeptical that Sarkozy would change his hard-line views
on Turkish EU membership, and they predicted that Sarkozy's
vision of a Mediterranean Union would not progress given
political realities on the other side of the Mediterranean,
noting specifically Moroccan-Algerian relations, which would
not improve until a solution was found on the Western Sahara.
Heisbourg recommended U.S. efforts with Algeria, given
increasing American influence there. Heisbourg also
suggested that Sarkozy would be less afflicted by "Gallic
embarrassment" than his predecessors in dealing with issues
such as missile defense.
¶11. (U) This message was cleared by the Deputy Secretary's
party.
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http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON