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Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS536, IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS EU ON PRIORITY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BRUSSELS536 | 2009-04-08 12:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | USEU Brussels |
VZCZCXRO2503
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBS #0536/01 0981223
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081223Z APR 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000536
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR P, S/SAGSWA, NEA/IR, ISN, EEB/ESC, S/CT, L, EUR,
INL
TREASURY FOR TFFC, TFI, OIA
EU POSTS FOR IRAN WATCHERS AND TFCOS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: ETTC KNNP PARM KTFN PTER EFIN KCRM KJUS KHLS
UNSC, IR, PINR, EUN, KPAL, KPAO
SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS EU ON PRIORITY
TARGETS
REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 205
¶B. B. BRUSSELS 41
¶C. C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468
¶D. D. BRUSSELS 101
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 1.4 (b), (d),
(e).
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: During a March 2-3 visit to
Brussels, Daniel Glaser, Acting Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes,
assured an uncertain European Union that the United States
remains committed to the dual track approach to Iran and said
we would welcome additional EU designations targeting Iran's
proliferation and sanctions evasion activities. Delivering
an unprecedented classified briefing to over 70 Middle East
and nonproliferation experts from all 27 EU states and
institutions, Glaser encouraged the EU to move forward on
specific designations to support the current international
framework targeting Iran's illicit conduct through financial
measures.
¶2. (C) EU Member States and officials uniformly praised the
U.S. information-sharing on sanctions and the U.S. policy
review. Capturing the predominant sentiment, the Czech
Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation
and confirmation that further EU measures "would be
consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
"are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
considerations." However, some EUMS were uncertain whether
they should move forward on pending designations before the
completion of the policy review. During the briefing and on
its margins, member states' concerns emerged over national
economic interests, unintended consequences (e.g., hurting
average Iranians, sanctions efficacy, Iran's regional role,
lawsuits, and international unity). Glaser's separate
consultations with representatives from the Council
Secretariat and Commission, and Ambassadors of the Czech
Republic (Presidency), UK, France, Germany, Spain, and
incoming EU-Presidency Sweden are reported septel.
¶3. (C) The content, tone, and timing of AA/S Glaser's
briefing impressed an appreciative EU audience as a sign of
the new U.S. Administration's seriousness about engagement
with Europe. The EU is predisposed to respond positively to
the new Administration's policy on Iran and wants its views
taken into account during the policy review stage.
Glaser's presentation kept the good feelings going, but also
helped bring EU experts down to earth in terms of specific
tasks on which the EU could usefully focus now. We hope the
briefing provides a basis for further USG lobbying in
individual EU Member States in capitals on pending EU
designations. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
-------------------------------
U.S. Message: EU Should Act --
2009 The Critical Year
-------------------------------
¶4. (S) On March 3, the Czech EU Presidency convened a formal
meeting of the EU-27 Iran and non-proliferation experts
(COMOG/CONOP) to receive a classified briefing from a U.S.
interagency delegation led by AA/S Glaser on measures in the
financial and transport sectors to counter Iran's illicit
conduct. The session lasted a little over an hour (40 minute
presentation followed by 30 minutes of Q/A). Given intense
EU interest and in order to set the political context for the
detailed technical briefing on specific U.S. designations
that followed, AA/S Glaser noted that the U.S. policy review
on Iran had not yet finalized, but it was already clear that
BRUSSELS 00000536 002 OF 004
the USG would remain committed to a dual track approach to
resolving the nuclear issue. Consequently, the United States
would welcome EU actions now to reinforce existing UNSCRs.
The EU should act quickly to designate additional high
priority proliferation targets.
¶5. (S) To be sure, "engagement" would be an important aspect
of a comprehensive strategy to dissuade Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. However, "engagement" alone is unlikely to
succeed. Diplomacy's best chance of success requires all
elements combining pressure and incentives to work
simultaneously, not sequentially. Our shared challenge is to
work together in finding the right mix of measures. Time was
not on our side. The international community must urgently
choose between several bad options facing us in 2009; none of
these options were without cost. Glaser pointed out that the
dynamic nature of the international financial system required
that targeted financial sanctions against Iran must be
continually adjusted to maintain, let alone increase,
pressure on Iran. Over time, targeted Iranian entities were
finding ways to evade sanctions via front companies and
facilitators. Without continuous active management on the
part of the international community, the measures taken thus
far would be rendered merely symbolic gestures.
¶6. (S) Glaser stated that the EU had an important, but
time-sensitive, opportunity to help diplomacy succeed by
targeting illicit Iranian conduct that contravened UN
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The international
framework for moving forward was already in place, under the
auspices of the UNSCRs and the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). ; we should continue to support and operate within
this framework. Glaser urged the EU not to Underestimate its
influence on the actions of other key countries and regions.
Priority Designation Targets
-----------------------------
¶7. (S) AA/S Glaser's formal presentation provided U.S. views
and specific intelligence on financial and transport entities
under active EU consideration for designation, including Bank
Mellat, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), Bank
Saderat, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL),
and Iran Air (the only entity not yet U.S.-designated, which
AA/S Glaser explained remains a potential target).
Separately, several EU contacts found our case against Bank
Mellat, EDBI and shipping companies to be particularly well
formulated.
----------------------
EU Audience, Reactions
----------------------
¶8. (C) All 27 EU Member States (EUMS) attended the Czech
Presidency-hosted classified briefing on March 3 in Brussels.
Indicative of the EU's high level of interest, all but
Slovakia sent their capitals-based nonproliferation working
group ("CONOP") technical expert in addition to their Middle
East regional expert (mixture of capitals- and
Brussels-based). This was the first time the USG was
welcomed to address this combined EU expert working group,
which meets ad hoc to decide on revising EU nonproliferation
measures against Iran. Permanent institutional staff
covering Iran, sanctions, and nonproliferation attended from
the EU's Commission and Council Secretariat. The EU's
Situation Center (SitCen), the community's intelligence
coordination unit, also sent several representatives.
¶9. (C) Capturing the main sentiment in the room, the Czech
Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation
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and confirmation that further EU measures "would be
consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
"are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
considerations." The Czechs and several others noted that
U.S. information-sharing was conducive to closer
transatlantic cooperation on Iran policy, predicting this
would directly influence internal EU debate on pending
designations of entities and individuals supporting Iran's
proliferation.
¶10. (C) Betraying some smaller EU states' resentment of the
EU-3 countries' (UK, France, Germany) prerogatives within the
Council on Iran policy, Cyprus pointedly thanked the U.S.
delegation for sharing information with the entire EU "so all
can take an informed decision," rather than being asked to
take action through a "leap of faith" when some EUMS have
information but the rest do not. "We also welcome that you
are stressing the dual-track approach," Cyprus added.
(Comment: The Cypriot intervention notwithstanding, the
Czechs took considerable risk just in hosting the U.S.
presentation. The EU remains prickly over direct U.S.
participation in their internal discussions and processes,
particularly after the bitter divides over Iraq. The Czechs
suffered some pushback prior to the event. End Comment.)
¶11. (C) At the conclusion of the briefing, a handful of
smaller EUMS raised concerns routinely featured in the EU's
ongoing internal debate over next steps. (Note: The EU-3 and
Italy refrained from speaking during the briefing in apparent
deference to the rest of the membership who do not enjoy
routine access to U.S. senior Iran policymakers. End Note.)
Unintended Consequences?
------------------------
¶12. (C) Poland, Cyprus, and Portugal asked about the impact
of current sanctions against Iran on the elite, the broader
population, and the deteriorating economy. Is the U.S.
concerned that further moves could trigger an anti-Western
backlash? Could we target political elites without
victimizing or burdening the general population? While
expressing support for targeted measures, Portugal and Cyprus
worried that strengthening sanctions before Iran's June
presidential elections could prove counterproductive by
radicalizing the electorate and leading to Ahmadinejad's
re-election. Cyprus flagged comments by Iranian human rights
activist Shirin Ebadi against sanctions and stressed that it
want to encourage Iranian moderates. Portugal asked whether
the United States has considered Iran's role in the region,
e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East.
¶13. (C) AA/S Glaser concurred that these are all important
questions, but pointed out that the international community
must choose among a set of bad options in a very compressed
timeframe. The international community must convey an urgent
sense of seriousness -- both to Iran and to other interested
regional stakeholders in order to change strategic
calculations and maximize the chance of a diplomatic success.
By law, U.S sanctions target those engaged in illicit
conduct, including proliferation and terrorist financing.
Targeting the Iran's access to the international financial
system offers the best chance of reducing harm to the average
population.
¶14. (C) As to the impact of sanctions, Glaser noted that
disaggregating the effect of international sanctions and
Iran's own disastrous economic policies would be nearly
impossible. Moreover, sanctions must be examined in the
context of an overall policy approach and not in isolation.
A more useful indicator is the perception of Iran's
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decision-makers, who view sanctions as problematic, raising
business costs, and necessitating evasive behavior: the
elite are reacting as if sanctions are having an impact.
Russia and China?
-----------------
¶15. (C) The Netherlands asked for U.S. views on the roles of
Russia and China. Cyprus referenced the importance of P5 1
unity to ensure Iran did not circumvent sanctions and promote
efficacy, adding "UN backing is the best way." AA/S Glaser
agreed, but argued that we were already required to implement
existing UNSCRs. This situation demanded a nimble response
to changing conditions, including deceptive practices by
designated entities. The U.S. closely consults Russia and
China, who must play their parts.
What Should the EU Do? Will U.S. Answer the Mail?
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶16. (C) The Netherlands asked what the U.S. explicitly
wanted from Europe in the diplomatic ("political") track, and
whether we plan to respond to the Iranian President's earlier
letters (to former President Bush). AA/S Glaser referred the
Dutch to State on matters of diplomacy. On the sanctions
front, he noted that the U.S. policy review should not be a
reason for the EU to stop reviewing its existing sanctions
for appropriate next steps. Given the tight timeframe, it
would be helpful for the EU to make similar designations to
those already included under existing U.S. sanctions
authorities.
The Saderat Problem
-------------------
¶17. (S//NF) In his presentation, AA/S Glaser noted UNSCR
1803 and EU Common Position identification of Saderat for
proliferation concerns, but explained that our domestic
designation falls under U.S. counter-terrorism authorities.
Although not raised by Member States in the formal briefing,
several EU contacts (UK, France, Germany, Council Secretariat
and Czech Presidency) had raised concerns that the EU would
not be able to act upon the U.S. basis for designation of
Bank Saderat (support for terrorist activity). The EU Common
Position imposing measures against Iran is strictly limited
to proliferation as a legal basis for inclusion on the list.
Support for terrorist financing is not grounds for inclusion.
(Comment: As the additional U.S. information presented was
exclusively limited to terrorist financing concerns, some
EUMS are questioning whether a sufficient proliferation basis
exists for Saderat's inclusion under EU Iran sanctions. The
EU does not/not yet have consensus to include Saderat in the
next round. End Comment.)
¶18. (U) AA/S Glaser has cleared this message.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
MURRAY
.