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Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1610, ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INSIDER ON GOA POLICY IN THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BUENOSAIRES1610 | 2006-07-20 14:02 | 2011-03-29 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires |
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1361157-la-relacion-con-chavez-al-desnudo |
VZCZCXRO6431
PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBU #1610/01 2011439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201439Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5293
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1674
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001610
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INSIDER ON GOA POLICY IN THE
REGION
REF: 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141
Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on
Secretary General of the Presidency (President Nestor
SIPDIS
Kirchner's chief of staff) Oscar Parrilli that included a
frank discussion on GOA policy in the region. Attempting to
clarify Kirchner's recent comments about the U.S. in Madrid,
Parrilli said that Argentina valued U.S. support during the
crisis and that Kirchner wanted a ""mature"" relationship with
the United States. Parrilli's comments reflected the view
that the GOA accepts the idea of the U.S. leadership in the
region, as long as it also benefits Argentina. The DCM
raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that Kirchner's close
relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and
Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant
for slandering President Bush and the USG made it difficult
for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations
with the GOA. Parrilli responded by saying the GOA's
relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics
and Mercosur. The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,
expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo
Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy
and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control
narcotrafficking. Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.
goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a
democratic framework and said that the two nations should be
very clear with Morales on counternarcotics. On the whole
question of hemispheric free trade, the DCM noted the U.S.
view that the Summit of the Americas was a success in the
sense that a majority of the region -- 29 countries -- said
that they wanted to continue discussions about creating an
FTAA. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on Secretary
General of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli that included a
frank discussion on GOA policy in the region. Oscar
Parrilli, President Nestor Kirchner's chief of staff, is a
key Kirchner insider (See Reftel). Parrilli has been a good
contact of the Embassy and is known for his calm disposition,
although he clearly shares the world view of the rest of
Kirchner's inner circle. Parrilli began the discussion by
remarking on the good personal relations the Casa Rosada has
enjoyed over the past three years with the Ambassador and
DCM. The DCM highlighted the strong background of incoming
Ambassador Wayne and corrected the misperception expressed by
some members of the GOA that Ambassador Wayne had praised
former President Carlos Menem during his recent confirmation
hearings.
¶3. (C) Attempting to clarify Kirchner's recent comments
about the U.S. in Madrid, Parrilli said that Argentina valued
U.S. support during the crisis and that Kirchner wanted a
""mature"" relationship with the United States. ""President
Kirchner has acknowledged this publicly in the past. Despite
our differences, the U.S. has come to Argentina's aid when
Argentina really needed it."" Parrilli said that Argentina,
in turn, can help ensure ""tranquillity"" in the region. He
said that at times in the past, the U.S. has not played the
leadership role necessary in the region. Parrilli said that
Kirchner was referring to this ""historic debt"" of the U.S. in
the region, not necessarily about current U.S. policy. ""What
Kirchner wants is a 'mature' relationship with the U.S.""
Parrilli further commented that ""what crashed in 2001 was not
the de la Rua government, but an economic model. The model
of having your economy owned by foreign interests. Countries
need to be able to defend their rights, their economy.""
(COMMENT: Parrilli's comments reflect the GOA view that they
acknowledge and accept the idea of the U.S. as the natural
leader of the region, but they want that leadership to act in
Argentina's and the region's interests. In particular, he
mentioned that the GOA would like to see more U.S. economic
assistance to the region. END COMMENT.)
¶4. (C) The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that
Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo
BUENOS AIR 00001610 002 OF 003
Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his
penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG made it
difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral
relations with the GOA. The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is
meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior
because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the
next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a
genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler."" The DCM said that
by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez,
Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's
views.
¶5. (C) Parrilli responded by saying that the GOA's
relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics
and Mercosur. Parrilli also said that the GOA does not agree
""with the message or the style of Chavez's attacks on
President Bush or the U.S."" Parrilli added, ""Our
relationship with Venezuela is not an axis. Argentina and
Brazil are the two main drivers of regional integration in
South America. We need to include the other big countries in
the region -- Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile -- in this
process.""
¶6. (C) The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,
expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo
Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy
and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control
narcotrafficking. Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.
goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a
democratic framework. Parrilli said that Morales is
defending and respecting the rights of the mainly indigenous
voters that elected him, who have been excluded from the
Bolivian political system until now. Parrilli added that ""we
have to hope that Morales is successful."" The DCM noted the
concern that the recent increase in Bolivian coca production
will lead to an increase in cocaine trafficking. Parrilli
agreed that the two nations should be very clear with Morales
on counternarcotics.
¶7. (C) On the whole question of hemispheric free trade, the
DCM noted the U.S. view that the Summit of the Americas was a
success in the sense that a majority of the region -- 29
countries -- said that they wanted to continue discussions
about creating an FTAA. The DCM said that the Mercosur
objections to the FTAA over agricultural issues at least
leaves room for discussion, while Venezuela was the only
country in the region to object to the FTAA on ideological
grounds. Parrilli responded by saying, ""In the past what you
were offering us in terms of free trade deals was not what
Argentina needed."" The DCM pointed to the benefits of free
trade and noted that NAFTA is no longer an issue for the left
or the right in both Canada and Mexico. ""NAFTA has been a
win-win for all countries involved.""
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COMMENT
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¶8. (C) Oscar Parrilli shares the leftist world view of most
of Kirchner's inner circle, but like other Casa Rosada
insiders, always appears friendly and cooperative in private
to Embassy officials. Parrilli clearly received the official
talking points on how to respond to questions about
Kirchner's recent statements on the U.S. in Madrid and on GOA
relations with Venezuela, as we have heard Parrilli's
comments on these two issues repeated on several recent
occasions by high-level GOA officials. This continues a long
pattern in the Kirchner administration where GOA officials
tell us what they think we want to hear in private, while
Kirchner's actions and public statements project a different
image to the rest of the world.
¶9. (C) Although Kirchner's inner circle may not diverge fromthe official line, engaging them is beneficial. Messages
given to them are immediately conveyed to President Kirchner,
and Kirchner uses them to deliver his message to the USG.
With President Kirchner often inaccessible and relying on an
BUENOS AIR 00001610 003 OF 003
ever-shrinking group of close advisors, engaging Kirchner's
inner circle is often the best way to maintain a dialogue
with the GOA. We believe it would be far worse for U.S.
interests to discontinue dialogue with some of the only
people that can still influence Kirchner. END COMMENT.
LLORENS
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