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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA179, FOREIGN MINISTER SANTOS STRUGGLES TO JUGGLE THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA179 | 2007-01-23 15:03 | 2011-04-25 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx |
VZCZCXRO5847
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0179/01 0231556
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231556Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8725
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0902
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000179
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER SANTOS STRUGGLES TO JUGGLE THE
DEMANDS OF HIS NEW JOB
REF: A. MANAGUA 0155
¶B. MANAGUA 0153
¶C. MANAGUA 0127
¶D. MANAGUA 0106
¶E. 2006 MANAGUA 2741
¶F. 2006 MANAGUA 2691
¶G. 2006 MANAGUA 2673
¶H. 2006 MANAGUA 2624
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Samuel Santos
(Refs. E-H) is struggling to juggle the demands and
impositions of anti-U.S., populist, authoritarian-minded
allies against the concerns and expectations of the U.S. and
other like-minded governments. We reminded Santos that any
dangers posed to our security here by Iran or any other
government would seriously test U.S.-Nicaraguan cooperation.
Santos insisted that the GON will "not permit Iran to
threaten the U.S. presence here," but offered no response to
our concern that President Ortega's personal secretary is
reportedly Moammar al-Ghadafi's nephew and linked to
Ghadafi's personal intel network. Santos -- who is a wealthy
and pragmatic entrepreneur -- appears to be a "bantamweight"
in the scheme of Ortega's political power structure, although
he enjoys some punch through his apparent close relationship
to Rosario Murillo. We can expect him to be helpful within
his operational limitations, while he will likely attempt to
shirk or downplay the seriousness of any contentious issue we
raise with him. End Summary.
Santos Finds MFA in "Disarray"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) Responding to PolCouns' January 17 phone call to the
Foreign Ministry to request copies of the recent bilateral
agreements the new Nicaraguan government (GON) recently
signed with the Venezuelan and Iranian governments, Foreign
Minister Samuel Santos invited PolCouns to meet with him at
the Foreign Ministry later in the day. PolCouns found Santos
sporting the apparent official office attire of the new
Ortega government: a Guayabera-style, white-linen,
long-sleeved, four-pocket shirt and dark slacks. ForMin
Santos started by fretting over how his predecessor had
erased all computerized records and hard drives, leaving him
no institutional memory. He was "shocked by this sorry state
of affairs" because he had met with former Foreign Minister
Caldera on several occasions to facilitate the transition
process and had not expected this unfortunate situation.
Santos claimed that he had found a recording on his phone
instructing everyone to "erase all documents," but was
uncertain whether other ministers were in the same
predicament.
Assuming Responsibility for Inaugural Faux Pas
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) Foreign Minister Santos -- who was relieved that the
presidential inauguration was over -- admitted that the new
Nicaraguan government (GON) had made "several mistakes" in
the inaugural event (Ref. D). PolCouns, who thanked him for
moving the U.S. delegation out of the sun and into shelter to
await the start of the inaugural ceremonies, remarked that a
number of people in the audience had complained about the
almost two-hour delay apparently prompted by Venezuelan
President Chavez' late arrival. Santos acknowledged
"inconveniences," but then hastily deflected Chavez' role in
the delay and assumed "personal responsibility" for the
problems. He recounted how Chavez had warned he might arrive
later than expected, and thus the Nicaraguans should have
changed the onset of the ceremonies to a later hour.
Agrement on Track
- - - - - - - - -
¶4. (SBU) Polcouns confirmed that we are processing the
agrement (Refs. A-C) request for Nicaraguan
Ambassador-designate Arturo Cruz, adding that we will prepare
a briefing for Cruz, similar to the one presented in December
(Ref. F) to Daniel Ortega's technical transition team.
Pleased with the news, Santos opined that Cruz is an ideal
choice for the job. He added that his meetings with
Assistant Secretary Shannon and NSC Senior Advisor Dan Fisk
MANAGUA 00000179 002 OF 003
in early January had been cordial and helpful and he looks
forward to another visit to Washington in the near future.
As for the meeting with Secretary Leavitt, President Ortega
and his team believed it had been "extraordinary." Touching
on an eventual visit of President Ortega to Washington,
Santos said he prefers that Washington "take the initiative."
In Search of the Elusive MOUs
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Polcouns turned to the subject that had prompted the
meeting: our request for copies of the agreements President
Ortega signed with his Venezuelan and Iranian counterparts
during their recent visits to Managua. Santos replied that
the documents are in the Presidency. He immediately called
the Presidency to request them. (Note: To date, we have not
received the documents.) Santos outlined the "justification"
for the accords, explaining that they serve to "remove the
five bottlenecks" that lie between Ortega's campaign promises
and his ability to deliver on them:
--Resolve Nicaragua's energy crisis.
--Increase cement production for hydroelectric projects and
housing for the poor.
--Improve water distribution and access.
--Provide free education to all Nicaraguans.
--Ensure all Nicaraguans can access free health care.
Iranians offer Housing, Private Sector "Cooperation"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) According to Santos, Iranian assistance will focus
primarily on housing developments for poor Nicaraguans,
cooperation in generating hydroelectric power, and the
promotion of private sector to private sector "cooperation."
He conceded that President Ahmadinejad's visit to Managua had
not produced any tangible outcome except the establishment of
embassies in each others' capitals. He recognized that the
Iranian leader agreed to "consider" forgiving Nicaragua's
$152 debt, but had made no pledge, although he did promise to
consider swapping the debt for "development projects" in
Nicaragua.
¶7. (C) PolCouns voiced our concerns regarding the
establishment of an Iranian embassy in Managua, reminding
Santos that we will have a serious bilateral issue on our
hands that could test U.S.-Nicaraguan cooperation if the
Iranians exploit Nicaragua to endanger our security. Santos
noted the message and insisted that the GON will "not permit
Iran to threaten the U.S. presence here." Polcouns also
conveyed our concern over President Ortega's appointment of
Libyan-Nicaraguan Muhammad Lashtar (reportedly Moammar
al-Ghadafi's nephew and linked to Ghadafi's personal intel
network).
¶8. (C) Foreign Minister Santos next recounted how
Ahmadinejad had "assured" him that U.S.-Iranian relations are
actually "quite good," not like they are portrayed on the
international stage. PolCouns interjected, reminding the
Foreign Minister that the U.S. official position on Iran is
clearly known, as is the UN Security Council's. Further, the
EU shares our concern over Iran's efforts to become a nuclear
power. Santos, who quickly acknowledged that Ahmadinejad may
have been manipulating the situation, proceeded to downplay
the Iranian president's intervention in Managua, asserting
that in his remarks, Ahmadinejad did not directly attack the
United States, but instead, referred to "imperialism" in
general.
¶9. (C) Referring to Ahmadinejad's interview in left-leaning
Nicaraguan daily El Nuevo Diario (septel), PolCouns remarked
that there was little reasonable or accurate in the article;
the Iranian president's implying that the Holocaust never
occurred is an unacceptable revisionist fabrication and an
example of why Ahmadinejad's word is untrustworthy. Polcouns
recounted that her family had relatives who perished in the
Holocaust. Santos hastened to offer his view that
Ahmadinejad "was wrong on this point" and said he did not
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agree with Ahmadinejad's position.
¶10. (C) Santos then recounted his "surprise" when
Ahmadinejad told him the Iranian government recognizes the
new Iraqi government and that bilateral relations are
cordial. PolCouns clarified that the Iranian-Iraqi
bilateral relationship given both governments are Shi'a
dominated. Noting that the former Nicaraguan foreign
minister had told us the GON never broke diplomatic relations
with Iraq, she suggested that Santos consider meeting with
his Iraqi counterpart to discuss the possibility of reviving
relations. Santos appeared amenable to the idea and said he
will pursue it.
¶11. (C) Santos then shared his astonishment when the Iranian
president told him that Saddam Hussein was a "monster" and
was responsible for the murder of thousands of Iraqis and
Iranians. Polcouns shared her "surprise" that the FSLN
needed the Iranian president to recount this fact to believe
it when it has been common knowledge for years that Hussein
committed gross atrocities against his people. She
referenced Ortega's December 30, 2006 communique referring to
Hussein as Iraq's legitimate president, which made no mention
of the atrocities he committed against his own people --
while it accused the "occupation" of committing a "cruel
genocide."
Venezuelans Deliver Tangible Assistance
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶12. (C) While Santos conceded that Iran was equivocal on
debt forgiveness, he asserted that Venezuela's commitment is
tangible -- citing the fact that President Chavez had
condoned Nicaragua's $32-million debt. He related how
Chavez's assistance to the FSLN had started over two years
ago -- including urea and oil donations and "other
assistance." Polcouns raised the incongruence between
Chavez' ALBA and his stated plan to help Nicaragua and other
poor nations by offering favorable loan terms on Venezuelan
crude -- while he hurt the poor in his attempts to raise
world oil prices. Santos conceded that Chavez is "looking
out for his own interests," and his support for Nicaragua is
"not free." He explained that part of the urgency to boost
Nicaragua's agricultural production is to swap beans and
other agricultural commodities to the Venezuelans for oil.
Making Deals with God and the Devil
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶13. (C) Expanding on the topic of foreign assistance, Santos
elaborated that Nicaragua cannot afford to refuse Venezuelan
or any other foreign assistance. However, it does not
behoove Nicaragua to meddle in conflicts between donor
governments; the GON will work with everyone and encourage
donors to settle their differences elsewhere, asserted
Santos, who cited Nicaragua's relations with both Taiwan and
China as a case in point.
Comment
- - - -
¶14. (C) Santos -- who is a wealthy, pragmatic entrepreneur
-- appears to be a "bantamweight" in the scheme of Ortega's
political power structure, although he enjoys some punch
through his apparent close relationship to Rosario Murillo.
We can expect him to be helpful within his operational
limitations, while he will likely attempt to shirk or
downplay the seriousness of any contentious issue we raise
with him. For all the Sandinista government's
anti-imperialist rhetoric and assertion that Nicaragua will
not fall into the orbit of any other country, the GON appears
to be in a rush to auction Nicaragua's sovereignty and
national pride to the highest bidder -- at this point,
Chavez.
TRIVELLI