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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON194, PM CLARK GOES TO WASHINGTON
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07WELLINGTON194 | 2007-03-02 04:04 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO2665
OO RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0194/01 0610455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020455Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3972
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 4773
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IMMEDIATE 0043
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY IMMEDIATE 0637
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 0573
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000194
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR EAP/FO AND EAP/ANP
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA
OSD FOR JESSICA POWERS
PHNOM PENH FOR POL/MCKEAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: PM CLARK GOES TO WASHINGTON
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires David J. Keegan,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Clark has announced to New
Zealanders that she will use her March 20-21 visit to
Washington to discuss key regional and world events with the
President and other Senior Officials. In reality, she has a
broader agenda as well: to improve the tone of her dialogue
with us and to send a message to the NZ electorate that
cooperating with the U.S. is normal and advances New
Zealand's interests. Now in her third term in office, Clark
has over the years developed a deeper understanding of the
breadth and benefits of the US-New Zealand relationship. She
recognizes that sound bites matter, and in response has begun
to modulate her public statements to be more positive about
the relationship. She also strenuously avoids saying
anything critical about U.S. policy. Although a strengthened
centrist domestic political opposition may motivate Clark to
be more open to us, most of her efforts to improve bilateral
cooperation have not been made public, indicating genuine
commitment. Over the past year, she has quietly filled a
number of key positions with officials who are well disposed
towards the United States, and she and her Ministers now
treat official meetings with us as opportunities to advance
common agendas rather than either public relations coups or
something to deny. The PM closely monitors and supports the
"Matrix" process as well as deeper US-NZ cooperation in
intelligence and other issues. She particularly appreciates
our cooperation in the Pacific and Antarctica. End Summary.
¶2. (C) A micro-manager, Clark will come to Washington
extremely well briefed on the issues. She will likely
suggest small but concrete ways to cooperate within the
boundaries of the Presidential Directive, such as by
regularizing our dialogue on scientific and Pacific Island
issues. She will probably announce that New Zealand will
extend its military deployments in Afghanistan through
September 2009. Clark will not seek any dramatic changes to
bilateral policy, which she recognizes would be more than
either side's system could bear. Nor will she make a heavy
pitch for an FTA as she did during her 2002 visit, instead
leaving that for Trade Minister Goff's trip to Washington
later this year.
¶3. (C) We should use this visit to urge continued tangible
commitments to the improving bilateral cooperation and NZ's
defense modernization. We should also elicit a greater
willingness to publicize our successes where possible. Clark
will be setting the pace for improving U.S.-New Zealand
relations for the foreseeable future. This visit provides us
an opportunity to encourage her to stay the course and to
resist negative pressures from those in her party who prefer
to keep us at arm's length.
---------------------------------------
MOVING UP THE LEARNING CURVE: WE MATTER
---------------------------------------
¶4. (C) With over seven years in office, Clark is now the
longest serving Labour Prime Minister in New Zealand history.
Although she has no clear successor and may run for an
unprecedented fourth term, she is clearly already focused on
her legacy. Arriving in office well to the left of the
political spectrum, Clark began her tenure by stressing New
Zealand's role as a small but principled player favoring
multilateral (ideally UN-based) solutions to the world's
problems. Since then, she has witnessed such events as 9/11,
cooperation between NZDF and US troops in Afghanistan, and
shortcomings of the UN system (such as its inability to react
to the 2005 Tsunami). As a result, she has over time focused
more on New Zealand's role in the Pacific region and its
relations with Australia and other bilateral allies.
¶5. (C) Through learning on the job, Clark has clearly
developed a more sophisticated understanding of the breadth
and importance of the US-New Zealand relationship. Her
desire to improve relations with the Administration may be
due in part to the influence of Foreign Minister Winston
WELLINGTON 00000194 002 OF 004
Peters, but we see evidence that Clark herself wants to
improve US-New Zealand ties. Contacts tell us she has
especially valued our close cooperation following the coup in
Fiji, and during her recent meetings with PM Howard she
praised EAP DAS Davies' trip to the Solomons. The Ambassador
reports that Clark is obviously impressed by our dedication
to environmental protection and generous support for New
Zealand activities in Antarctica, which she witnessed first
hand during this year's celebrations of US-NZ cooperation on
the ice.
¶6. (C/NF) Recognizing that her Government had initially
resisted improving the U.S. relationship, Clark has since the
2005 election appointed to key positions a number of
officials well disposed towards working with the United
States. In addition to Foreign Minister Winston Peters
(arguably a marriage of convenience), she has appointed
Warren Tucker as Director of the NZ Security Intelligence
Service (NZSIS), Bruce Ferguson as Director of the Government
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Roy Ferguson as NZ
Ambassador to Washington; and John McKinnon as Secretary of
Defence. Together with Peters and Simon Murdoch, second in
command at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these officials
have improved their agencies' coordination on U.S. policy and
instructed staff to be helpful to us wherever possible. For
example, NZSIS had for months resisted housing equipment
needed to implement a possible HSPD-6 agreement with the
United States. Soon after his arrival, Tucker ordered NZSIS
to be the host, paving the way for negotiations.
¶7. (C) Clark has been more mindful of the public side of our
relationship as well. She participated in the Embassy's 4
July reception even though she never attends national day
events. She was also gracious guest at a media-covered
reception at the Ambassador's residence last May in honor of
her favorite Kiwi composer. Mindful that her 2003 remarks
about the Iraq war have not been forgotten, Clark now slaps
down her Cabinet Ministers for similar offenses. When on
January 12 Duty Minister Jim Anderton issued a blistering
critique of the President's plan to send more troops to Iraq,
Clark quickly disavowed the comments and removed Anderton
from duty within the day. She was roundly criticized in the
media for her actions, but did not budge. After confirming
her visit to Washington on March 1, a reporter asked what
Clark would say if the President asked her views on the war.
Clark merely said she doubted that would happen, adding that
New Zealand is not in Iraq and it would be "gratuitous to
offer any advice."
----------------------------------
CLARK REALLY DOES WANT CLOSER TIES
----------------------------------
¶8. (C) Some observers claim Clark only wants to mend fences
with the United States to wrest center ground from the
opposition National Party, which is gaining in the polls. We
doubt this is her main motive. For one thing, polling
suggests up to half of all Kiwis believe New Zealand does
not need a closer relationship with the United States, and
the anti-American sentiment in the left side of her own
caucus is well known. Although Labour is losing ground in
opinion polls, Clark is far from being in such crisis that
she needs to change her foreign policy to get votes. New
National leader John Key is charming and confident, but has
been in Parliament for only five years and his practical
agenda remains fuzzy. In contrast, while many Kiwis consider
Clark cold and some question her integrity, we have yet to
meet any who regard her as anything less than competent. The
majority seem proud of the way she has helped forge a new,
modern identity for the country: clean, green, multicultural,
multilateral, creative, and yes -- nuclear free. Nor is
there a chance of the type of leadership putsch within Labour
that has plagued National in recent years.
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WE BENEFIT FROM STRONGER COOPERATION, TOO
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¶9. (C) New Zealand is small, but concrete improvements in
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bilateral cooperation over the past year, including via the
"Matrix" process initiated in Bangkok last year, have brought
tangible, positive gains for U.S. interests. We continue to
cooperate closely on events in Fiji and have come to value
the views of Kiwi officials regarding events in E.Timor, the
Solomon Islands, and Tonga. We are increasing
behind-the-scenes dialogue on N.Korea and Iran, both of which
have diplomatic relations with New Zealand. The "Matrix"
process has also been helpful in enabling both sides to stay
joined up in response to other events, such as ensuring that
the recent fire on board a Japanese whaling vessel in
Antarctic waters would not lead to an environmental disaster.
¶10. (S/NF) Improvements on the defense and intelligence side
have also borne fruit. As Minister in Charge of the NZSIS and
GCSB, Clark is read into all major operations involving U.S.
intelligence. She understands the implications of a
post-9/11 world for New Zealand's security. She also
realized after the Fiji coup that New Zealand had become too
reliant on Australian intelligence. Clark grasps that NZ
must "give to get" and that some of our cooperative
operations -- such as monitoring radicalizing Kiwi jihadists
-- strengthen her country's security. But she also has been
willing to address targets of marginal benefit to New Zealand
that could do her political harm if made public. Over the
past year, she has supported increased counterterrorism
cooperation with us.
¶11. (C/NF) While the Presidential Directive still limits our
defense relationship, New Zealand's push since 2004 to
modernize its forces have improved our ability to work
together in those areas in which we can cooperate. In
support of NZ military activities in the Pacific Islands,
Timor Leste, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, there have been more
high-level U.S. military visits to New Zealand over the past
6 months than in the previous two years. This March alone,
there will be visits by two Admirals for maritime security
consultations with New Zealand, France, and the UK, as well
as a yearly call by PACAF Commander General Hester. There
have been more U.S. military waivers for multilateral
exercises including the NZDF as well. Unlike in the past,
the PM and her Government have focused on the substance
behind these visits and exercises instead of touting them to
the press as a sign that NZ's nuclear ban no longer matters
to the United States. New Zealand continues to be an active
participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, has
helped explain the importance of this effort to Pacific
Island states, and will for the first time host an
Operational Experts Group Meeting in Auckland March 26-28.
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Key Issues
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¶12. (C/NF) Regional/Global Security: In her public
statements announcing the visit, Clark has said that she
hopes to discuss with senior US officials common interests in
counter-terrorism/Afghanistan; regional security and good
governance in the PICs and E.Timor; and DPRK, Iran and other
nonproliferation issues. Although she told a journalist that
Iraq is unlikely to come up, MFAT staff tells us that she
knows that this is a major issue on the mind of the
Administration. They also say she is likely to raise
concerns over China's role in the Asia Pacific region. Clark
will likely announce during her visit that New Zealand will
extend its deployments to Afghanistan through September 2009,
the longest extension since the Afghan war began. She may
also propose that both sides agree to regular consultations
on Pacific Island issues. We agree this could send a
positive public signal about our joint work in the region,
although in reality fast moving events make it a certainty
that we will continue to communicate in real time as well.
We would also have to ensure that the search for agenda items
and "deliverables" did not overwhelm our constructive
dialogue.
¶13. (S/NF) Intelligence: Although it will be obviously
impossible to publicly highlight the exact nature of NZ's
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intelligence cooperation during Clark's visit, she
undoubtedly would appreciate having it acknowledged behind
closed doors. We should also encourage New Zealand to agree
to some public recognition of the HSPD-6 MOU that we
understand will be signed during the visit. A public signing
ceremony the Embassy hosted when we concluded the US-NZ
Regional Alert Movement agreement received positive press
play here, which indicates that not all intelligence
cooperation issues are tabu to Kiwis.
¶14. (C) Environment and other issues: Since the Antarctic
celebrations in January, Clark has become more aware of the
close level of cooperation between US and NZ scientists both
on and off the ice. She may propose new areas for
cooperation in Antarctica and suggest both sides review the
US-NZ Science and Technology Agreement to consider possible
new joint research efforts. GNZ officials were struck by
parallel references to climate change and sustainable energy
in both the President's and PM's opening statements to their
legislature this year, and Clark may raise this as well. She
may also propose cooperation on efforts towards sustainable
fisheries. Clark will almost certainly acknowledge U.S.
leadership in WTO Doha negotiations.
¶15. (C) The Public message: Clark will deliver three
speeches while in the United States. Unlike her speech there
in 2002 on New Zealand's desire for an FTA, Clark's address
in Washington will present a more positive focus on overall
US-NZ relations. This reflects both her understanding that an
FTA is not possible for now and her desire to speak to the
broader relationship. Clark will deliver a second speech in
Chicago covering WTO and economic issues (including a soft
FTA pitch) and a third in Seattle on innovation in New
Zealand.
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COMMENT
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¶16. (C) PM Clark will continue to set the course for
improved US-NZ relations. It is clear there will be no
change in New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy in the medium
term; even the new opposition leader John Key has announced
that the National Party wants to maintain the ban. National
also continues to be vulnerable to accusations of being too
close to the United States, which cost it significant support
at the 2005 election. If elected in 2008, the Nats will have
more political room to work with us if they can build on
progress made under this Government towards better US-NZ
ties. A re-elected Labour Government will do the same. This
visit provides a chance to encourage Clark to set the bar
high. We may have setbacks along the way, but the better our
mutual understanding of what each side can expect from each
other, the less likely that these hiccups will undermine our
progress. End Comment.
Keegan