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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV1009, U.S.-ISRAEL JPMG FOLLOW-UP: ISRAELI RESPONSE TO
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 001009
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN HILLEN
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER) AND PM/RSAT (ROBINSON)
STATE FOR PM FRONT OFFICE (RUGGIERO) AND PM/DTC (TRIMBLE)
PENTAGON FOR ISA ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER RODMAN
PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (JAMES ANDERSON)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS US XF IR IS MILITARY RELATIONS ISRAEL RELATIONS
SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL JPMG FOLLOW-UP: ISRAELI RESPONSE TO
U.S. PROPOSED DEFENSE SALES TO REGION
REF: A. STATE 36515
¶B. TEL AVIV 92
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).
¶1. (C) On March 2, Israeli MOD POL-MIL Bureau Senior
Coordinator for Strategic Dialogues and Defense Cooperation
Rami Yungman passed poloff the nonpaper in paragraph six --
Israel's response to a U.S. presentation on proposed defense
sales to the Middle East that was made at the January 11
U.S.-Israel Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) meeting.
Yungman said that the Israeli response fulfills one of the
action items agreed by the U.S. and Israeli delegations at
the JPMG.
¶2. (S) Yungman said that the Israeli non-paper (classified
SECRET - RELEASABLE TO THE U.S.) can be broken into two
SIPDIS
parts. The first part lays out Israeli principles regarding
defense sales to the region, and how Israel defines the
Qualitative Military Edge. Yungman admitted there is very
little new in this part in comparison to a similar non-paper
the Israelis passed to the U.S. in November 2004. He also
said that the first part reveals strong similarities among
U.S. and Israeli views. The second part contains Israel's
response to proposed U.S. defense sales to the region, item
by item. Yungman stressed that Israel is grateful and
appreciates that it can discuss with the U.S. America's
proposed defense sales to the region. He said that if the
USG has any questions about the Israeli non-paper, it should
bring them forward.
¶3. (S) Yungman then reviewed Israel's view of the status of
the remaining action items from the JPMG, based on a list of
action items:
¶A. Israeli response to U.S. nonpaper -- Done (see paragraph
six).
¶B. Status report of export control system transformation --
Israeli MOD DG Jacob Toren will visit the U.S. during the
first week of April. Assuming the DPAG takes place during
his visit, Toren will make a presentation on this topic. In
the meantime, the transformation continues. The MOD is
trying to work out the budgetary implications with the
Israeli Treasury Ministry. The MFA and MOD are finishing
work on draft legislation that will be presented to the
Knesset once it reconvenes.
¶C. Closing the case on night vision goggles -- Yungman said
that the Israeli defense industry representative at the
Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., Nir Ben Moshe, reported
that on March 1, he had received a letter from DTSA Director
DUSD McCormick characterizing the night vision goggle (NVG)
issue as "closed" with respect to regular NVGs, and noting
U.S. readiness to re-start NVG sales to Israel. McCormick
reportedly wrote that additional clarification is needed from
the Israeli side about thermal equipment. Nir Ben Moshe told
Yungman that he has agreed to meet with State PM/DTC
representatives to discuss next steps. Yungman said that
Israel hopes that the thermal equipment issue will be
resolved soon.
¶D. and E. Deepening discussion on Strategic Dialogue issues
and the Iran threat -- Yungman said that MOD POL-MIL Bureau
Chief Amos Gilad would pursue this further during his visit
to the U.S. the week of March 6, and that MOD DG Toren would
also raise this issue during his visit. Yungman suggested
that the U.S. and Israel might form small teams of experts
"to go deeper" on these issues.
¶F. Deepening discussion on the Global War on Terrorism --
Yungman said that Israel proposed to raise this at the DPAG.
¶G. MFO helos -- Yungman said the MOD Budget Office is working
this issue right now. (NOTE: We know from an earlier
discussion with Toren that MOD would prefer to provide
support in the form of in-kind assistance, maintenance and
services. END NOTE.)
¶H. Bodinger Channel -- Yungman said that the four cases the
channel is handling right now are being reviewed by the MOD's
security directorate, MALMAB. MALMAB will soon release a
detailed report to the Israeli MOD.
¶4. (S) Yungman also noted that the Israelis are traveling to
other countries for their annual Strategic Dialogues. Within
the next few months, Israeli delegations will visit France,
Germany and the UK. Turkey will send a delegation to Israel
in July. The MOD was represented in a delegation that
traveled to India for Israel's Strategic Dialogue with India
in December. The Indians will send a delegation to Israel in
September to follow up. Yungman said Israel also has talks
that are not quite at the SD level -- but are similar -- with
Jordan and Egypt. He added that Israel DefMin Mofaz would
soon travel to Germany and Romania.
¶5. (S) Yungman noted that the Israeli side hopes to receive
answers to outstanding requests to the U.S. to review Israeli
bids on security contracts for the Olympic games in China.
Yungman said that 18 requests had been sent to the U.S. side
over the last six months, and that Israel had received six
replies to date. Yungman said that Israel hopes that the
response process will be expedited, and noted that MOD DG
Toren -- as he promised to USD Edelman and Assistant
Secretary Hillen -- personally reviews the requests before
SIPDIS
they are forwarded to the U.S.
6 (S) Begin text of Israeli non-paper, as submitted:
SECRET (RELEASABLE TO THE U.S.)
February 2006
Non Paper
Potential Significant Weapons Transfers - Israel's Response
(Reply to U.S. Non Paper submitted to JPMG No. 38, Tel-Aviv)
General
-------
The longstanding obligation of the U.S. to preserve Israel's
qualitative military edge is greatly appreciated. The status
updates on the advanced weapon transfers to Arab countries is
an important basis for our discussions on this subject. In
the first part of this reply, we would like to reiterate
several fundamental principles that form the basis of our
position on how best to retain Israel's military qualitative
edge. In the second part, we will make specific reference to
the proposed transfers of designated weapon systems to the
different Arab countries.
Basic Principles
----------------
In light of the basic strategic asymmetry that exists between
Israel and its neighboring Arab countries, the preservation
of our qualitative edge is a fundamental pillar of Israel's
national security strategy and deterrence capability. Israel
is increasingly concerned with the narrowing of the
qualitative gap by potential adversaries as a result not only
of the transfer of cutting edge U.S. weapons and technology
to the region, that also involves training and guidance, but
also with the aggregative effect that the combination of
these weapon systems and technologies have. These
substantially improve the operational capabilities (air and
naval in particular) of the Arab armed forces, and their
potential to challenge IDF's major capabilities and systems,
which in turn may in the long run influence also their
intentions. In addition, we are worried that some of the
capabilities may, under certain circumstances, fall into the
hands of terror elements.
In relating to the term "qualitative military edge," Israel
refers to its ability to sustain credible military advantage
that provides deterrence and if need be, the ability to
rapidly achieve superiority on the battle field against any
foreseeable combination of forces with minimal cost.
The Israeli assessment as to the threat posed to its QME by
the transfers of advanced capabilities to Arab countries is
analyzed according to two basic dimensions:
¶A. The type of weapon system. Initially, Israel focuses on
the threats emanating from advanced capabilities that weapons
systems provide rather than on the nature of the platforms
(consequently submarines and UAV/UAS, for example, are not
considered merely as platforms but rather as sophisticated
weapon systems).
¶B. The combination of these advanced capabilities with the
countries involved.
With regards to the kind of capabilities that advanced weapon
systems provide, we differentiate between 4 levels of threat:
¶A. Category 1 - Offensive self-guided systems with precise
and effective standoff capabilities that threaten Israel's
homeland. These include JDAM, JSOW, HARM, ATACAMS, HARPOON
Block-2 (with sea to shore capability), and other systems of
this nature. These capabilities - even in small numbers -
introduce an element of instability into the strategic
equation. In the case of confrontation, Israel would be
forced to carry out pre-emptive offensive action against such
capabilities in order to maintain its defensive capabilities.
¶B. Category 2 - Capabilities that can penetrate Israel's Air
and Sea space and undermine Air and Sea superiority. These
include Submarines, AMRAAM, advanced UAS such as the PREDATOR
and other systems of this nature.
We consider the capabilities belonging to categories 1 and 2
to pose a paramount strategic threat to Israel's qualitative
advantage. This, due to their offensive nature, advanced
technology and the lack of suitable solutions to counter them.
¶C. Category 3 - Capabilities influencing fighting attrition
ratios. These include AH-64D LONGBOW systems, TOW 2B,
JAVELIN, and other systems of this nature.
Israel considers these qualitative weapon systems, platforms
and munitions, especially in large numbers, to pose a threat
to the Israeli military operational concept, increasing the
cost of confrontation in terms of casualties, equipment,
economy, deterrence image, etc.
¶D. Category 4 - Weapon systems that can be utilized by terror
activists. These include shoulder-fired SAM's (such as
STINGER), tactical UAV/UAS's, advanced ATGM's and other
systems of this nature.
Regarding countries involved, Israel makes a distinction
between states considered to be a present threat and others
which present a risk. In this context, Israel would like to
comment specifically on three cases:
¶A. Egypt: Israel attaches great importance to its Peace
Treaty with the Arab Republic of Egypt and considers it a
strategic asset. Israel believes that this policy is shared
by Egypt as well. At the same time, Israel is concerned with
Egypt's quantitative and qualitative military build-up and by
the potential risk it poses to the Israel Defense Forces.
The risk emanating from Egypt comes as a result of several
disturbing trends:
a) Egypt's quantitative and qualitative military build-up
aimed at addressing its perception of Israel as its
overriding "threat of reference."
b) A shift in Egypt's military thinking to a western
offensive doctrine combined with operational capabilities and
war plans.
c) A "cold peace" policy and the message this policy conveys
to the Egyptian people and armed forces that Israel is still
a potential adversary.
The combination of these trends can prove explosive given a
regime change and taking into account the worst case
scenario. In addition, since the IDF's ORBAT is not being
built against Egypt, Israel would need a long period of time
in order to be able to address and counter effectively a
change in the Egyptian intentions. Therefore, and taking
into consideration U.S. interests, Egypt should not be
provided with systems that may give it an advantage on the
battlefield, while Israel is busy countering other threats.
¶B. Saudi Arabia: Has a long record of hostility against
Israel, supporting terror, participating in most of the
Arab-Israeli wars, avoiding contacts with Israel and opposing
rapprochement between Israel and the Gulf Arab states.
Following 9/11 terror attacks, information has been revealed
exposing the depth and nature of Saudi involvement in
supporting terror networks that threaten Western as well as
Muslim governments.
At present, there is also a fear for the stability of the
Saudi regime, posed by the same terror elements that the
regime previously supported. The combination of highly
advanced weapon systems in the hands of an unstable regime
calls for a reassessment of the U.S. arms sales to Saudi
Arabia.
In addition, since August 2004, the Saudis have been
conducting unusual and sometimes aggressive air activity from
the Tabuq airfield (it should be recalled that the deployment
to Tabuq constitutes a fundamental violation of promises
given to Israel). Saudi interceptors have been repeatedly
scrambled in response to routine Israeli air activity in the
Eilat Gulf, including the stalking by 2 F-15 Saudi planes of
the Israeli PM flight on it's way to Sharem El-Sheikh summit
(Feb. '05).
This pattern of Saudi air activity could be interpreted as
indicating hostile intentions, and combined with geographic
proximity and accumulative effect of advanced capabilities
such as F-15 S, AMRAAM, JDAM, LANTIRN ER and LINK 16 - is a
real threat and a cause of grave concern. The combined
effect of these systems provides Saudi Arabia with long-range
strategic attack capabilities, that they are unable to get
from any other source.
¶C. Jordan: Israel treats Jordan as a special case. Israel
views Jordan as a strategic partner, due to its unquestioned
contribution to regional stability and the special
relationship shared on the security level, which is
characterized by transparency and openness, unlike the
relationship with Egypt. Israel continues to be committed to
the integrity, security and welfare of the Hashemite Kingdom,
and has contributed directly and indirectly to this end.
However, due to the geographic proximity and potential
strategic changes, Israel cannot afford a narrowing of the
qualitative gap between the IDF and JAF. Israel similarly
cannot risk the equipping of Jordan with SAM or other systems
covering its entire airspace and potentially risking the
Israeli Air Force and the Israeli civilian aviation.
Israel's Position on the U.S. Non Paper
---------------------------------------
In light of the above mentioned principles, we wish to refer
to the specific details of the U.S. Non Paper presented on
the eve of the recent JPMG meeting in Tel-Aviv.
Egypt
-----
¶1. HARM - Israel vehemently objects to the deal. We request
not to authorize the transfer of the system under any
circumstances (even if Egypt signs a CIS/MOA). This
offensive anti-radiation standoff munition falls in the first
and most severe threat category to Israel's QME, and is
solely aimed against Israel's capabilities.
¶2. AMRAAM; Shoulder-fired Stingers - Israel strongly objects
to these deals, even if they are currently on hold (pending
Egyptian signature of a CIS/MOA).
¶3. TOW 2B, Apache Longbow - Israel is thankful to the U.S.
for not releasing these systems ("not likely to be released"
category).
¶4. PAC III - Israel requests that any future deal, if signed
will guarantee that the systems will not be deployed in the
Sinai Peninsula (such deployment will be considered a
flagrant violation of the security annex of the
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accord).
¶5. Sale of 200 M10915 155 MM Self propelled Howitzers; 25
Avenger Fire Units; 50 T55-Ga-714a turbine engines for the
CH-47D - Israel has no objection to these deals.
¶6. Osprey class mine hunter Coastal Ships - Israel has no
objection to such a deal. We would like to know if the
systems will include under-water detection and weapon systems.
Saudi Arabia
------------
¶1. 165 Link 16 (MIDS)/Low volume terminals and 25 JTIDS
terminals - This system will significantly upgrade the Saudi
air-force attack and interception capabilities and will allow
it to access real-time information on Israel. It will
therefore increase the threat to Israel, posed anyway by the
permanent F-15 deployment in Tabuq. Israel requests that the
system will be "downgraded" and will not include the
following capabilities: connection to
American/Egyptian/Jordanian sensors, access to data on
Israeli air space; and interface to air-to-air and
air-to-ground attack systems, and ground control systems.
¶2. LANTIRN ER Targeting System Capability - The release of
the advance configuration of the system will upgrade the
air-to-ground capabilities of the Saudi air force allowing it
long-range attack capabilities with a very low flight
profile. Israel requests to "downgrade" the capabilities of
the system by limiting its low altitude flight and
Geo-coordinates production capabilities.
¶3. JDAM; JSOW - Israel strongly objects to the release of
these systems to Saudi Arabia. The combination of AMRAAM
systems, LANTIRN ER and JDAM/JSOW systems on F-15 will
establish long range attack capabilities constituting a
substantial threat to Israel.
¶4. 500 AIM120C AMRAAM - Israel requests to slow down the pace
of the delivery of the systems, because such a high quantity
constitutes a "critical mass" that poses in itself a
considerable threat.
¶5. Avionics upgrade kits and services to C-130/H aircraft -
Israel has no objection to the deal.
The Gulf States
---------------
Israel would have preferred that the U.S. not pursue the sale
of state of the art weapons to the Gulf States, which could
transfer them to adversaries in case of a regional conflict.
However, considering wider American interests in the region,
Israel has chosen not to object to the particular deals
listed in the Non Paper. That said, Israel is concerned that
the release of certain advanced weapon systems to Gulf
States, such as ATACAMS, JDAM, JSOW, HARM, Predator, will be
a precedent for a future release to Egypt.
End text of Israel non-paper.
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