

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06HELSINKI903, GYMNICH
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06HELSINKI903.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06HELSINKI903 | 2006-09-08 06:06 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHHE #0903/01 2510626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 080626Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0075
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0051
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4676
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0624
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0026
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000903
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM FI IR IS RU EU
SUBJECT: GYMNICH
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers held informal
consultations in Finland Sept. 1-2, focusing on the
Middle East, Iran and Russia. In response to a press
report that alleged an EU Presidency call for
increased contacts with Hamas, Finnish FM Tuomioja and
others made several very strong statements confirming
that there will be no changes in the current EU policy
of non-contact unless Hamas fulfills the three key
demands of the Quartet. The ministers issued no
formal conclusions on Iran (in keeping with GYMNICH's
informal nature), but announced that High Rep Solana
would travel to Tehran "very soon" to seek
clarifications on the Iranian regime's response to the
P5 1's package of incentives and to tell Iran that it
has "very little time" to stop its uranium enrichment
program and come to the negotiating table. On Russia,
the ministers gave preliminary authorization to the
Finnish Presidency to begin laying the groundwork for
a new PCA agreement. Formal conclusions on Iran and
other issues can be expected during the GAERC Sept.
14-15. End Summary.
¶2. (U) Finland hosted the EU foreign ministers'
informal consultations (the "GYMNICH" meetings) Sept.
1-2 in Lappeenranta, 25 km from the Russian border.
By limiting the agenda to only three topics -- Iran,
the Middle East, and EU-Russia relations -- the Finns
hoped to return the GYMNICH to its original purpose:
that is, an informal brainstorming session designed to
permit ministers to exchange ideas "off the record,"
without the pressure of adopting formal conclusions.
High Rep Javier Solana praised the GOF for achieving
this goal, noting that the frank exchange of views
that occurred would help the ministers as they seek to
find consensus and adopt formal conclusions on these
very tough issues at the upcoming General Affairs and
External Relations meetings (GAERC) Sept. 14-15.
Poloffs from Embassy Helsinki and USMission EU
traveled to Lappeenranta to follow the GYMNICH.
Strong Statements on Hamas
--------------------------
¶3. (U) At a press conference to open the GYMNICH,
Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja made
surprisingly strong comments regarding EU policy
toward Hamas. Noting that, for the EU, the Roadmap
and a two state solution remain the only way forward
for lasting regional peace, Tuomioja emphasized that
the EU will establish no formal political contacts
with Hamas until and unless it fully complies with the
international community's three key demands, as laid
out by the Quartet: (1) an unqualified renunciation of
terrorism; (2) full disarmament; and (3) recognition
of the State of Israel. He added that "the EU must be
available to talk to anyone and everyone" who can have
an impact on the peace process, but took pains to
explain that in the case of Hamas this would only
involve -- at most -- informal, low-level exchanges
and no change from the formal non-contact policy.
Separately, Tuomioja also said that the EU would
continue diplomatic contacts with Syria, and that at
the August 2 extraordinary GAERC High Rep Solana
(along with Spain, Germany, and the Finnish
presidency) had been given a clear mandate to
communicate to Damascus the EU's expectation that
Syria must play a positive role in the regional peace
process. In response to a reporter's question,
Tuomioja also noted that the idea of sending
peacekeepers to Gaza was not on the GYMNICH agenda,
but "more pronounced activities" there could not be
ruled out if they could positively impact the peace
process.
¶4. (C) Tuomioja's surprisingly forceful comments on
Hamas came largely as an effort to clarify press
accounts (most notably in the Sept. 1 Financial Times)
alleging that he had earlier called for the EU to
establish contacts with Hamas. In addition to the
Finnish FM's public statements, other Finnish
officials stressed that in no way was Tuomioja calling
for such a shift in EU policy. U/S for Political
Affairs Markus Lyra assured Poloff that Tuomioja has
always stressed the need for Hamas to change before
the EU could consider formal contacts, and that
Finland fully supported strong EU pressure on Hamas to
accept the Quartet's three conditions. Nothing has
changed within the GoF or the EU on the issue, he
HELSINKI 00000903 002 OF 002
added. Likewise, on the margins of the GYMNICH,
Finnish Director General for Africa and the Middle
East Aapo Polho carefully explained that while
Tuomioja, Solana, and others believe that the EU must
talk to "anyone and everyone" who can positively
affect the peace process, there is a clear
understanding that upgraded relations with Hamas are
thoroughly out of the question. The EU will upgrade
relations with Hamas when it joins the unity
government that President Abbas has suggested, and "we
all insist" that Hamas cannot do so until it has fully
committed to the three requirements, Polho said.
Iran Has "Very Little Time"
---------------------------
¶5. (U) On Iran, Tuomioja, Solana and several other
ministers expressed deep concerns to the press about
Iran's poor response to the P5 1's package of
incentives and apparent unwillingness to negotiate.
They said that for the EU, diplomacy and negotiation
remain the preferred way forward, but they
acknowledged that it is now up to Iran to accept that
peaceful route, stop enriching uranium, and fulfill
the other requirements that will allow negotiations to
begin. When pressed by journalists as to why the
ministers had not issued forceful statements --
including demands for UN sanctions -- Tuomioja
explained that, by its very nature, the GYMNICH was an
informal event that did not involve formal
conclusions, and as such was "not the time or place to
take new decisions" regarding sanctions. However, he
explained, High Rep Solana would have "one or at the
most two" meetings in the next several days with
Iranian nuclear negotiator Larijani. The purpose of
these meetings would be not to negotiate or offer the
Iranians more time, but to seek clarifications
regarding the Iranian response, including conditions
for beginning actual negotiations. For his part,
Solana clarified that these meetings would not take
long, and that in terms of meeting the P5 1's demands
and coming to the negotiating table, Iran had "very
little time."
¶6. (C) Privately, members of Solana's staff and
Finnish MFA officials said that -- in addition to the
informal nature of the GYMNICH -- the ministers did
not say more on Iran because they did not wish to pre-
empt UNSYG Kofi Annan's trip to Tehran Sept. 3, or
Solana's trip the following week. Solana's
spokesperson told PolOff that the Sept. 14 GAERC in
Brussels was very likely the "time and place" at which
formal conclusions on Iran might be adopted, in light
especially of the Iranian response (or lack thereof)
to Annan's and Solana's outreach.
Russia
------
¶7. (C) The discussions on EU-Russia relations were
much more routine, with the GOF briefing the GYMNICH
on its efforts to pave the way for launching
negotiations aimed a forging a new EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) either
late in the Finnish Presidency or early in the German
Presidency. While acknowledging that some tough
issues needed to be addressed (including "coming to a
common understanding on energy policy"), Solana told
reporters that Europe's goal is to see Russia "not
merely as a problem, but as a partner." He pointed to
President Putin's attendance at the EU Informal Heads
of State and Government Meeting, which Finland will
host in October, as a positive step in that direction
and praised Finland's leadership. Separately,
Solana's FSU policy advisor Pirkka Tapiola told PolOff
that the Ministers focused on the question of how to
engage a more confident Russia. Three areas of
particular concern included the risks of Putin-style
"managed democracy," Russian foreign and security
policy including toward Iran, the Middle East, and
"frozen conflicts" and energy security.
WARE