

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON943, GNZ SAYS FIJI TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT IS TAKING NO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06WELLINGTON943.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06WELLINGTON943 | 2006-11-29 07:07 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO1665
OO RUEHMJ RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0943/01 3330714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290714Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4632
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0101
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0622
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0542
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0482
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000943
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EUR/RPM, AND EAP/ANP
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD JESSICA POWERS
PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV FJ NZ
SUBJECT: GNZ SAYS FIJI TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT IS TAKING NO
CHANCES
REF: WELLINGTON 938
Classified By: DCM David J. Keegan. Reasons: E.O. 12958, 1.4
(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Fiji Prime Minister Qarase and Commodore
Bainimarama today met for two and a quarter hours at Government
House in Wellington. New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT) characterized the meeting as a "considered and
serious discussion" of Bainimarama's nine demands, with
substantial progress made on each issue discussed. The most
difficult issue was Fiji's domestic legislation. Qarase's
position that due process and constitutionality be followed
clashed with Bainimarama's demands. While the meeting was on
the "upper end" of GNZ expectations going into the meeting, MFAT
remains uncertain about any real outcomes. Deputy Secretary
Alan Williams, who participated in the meeting, said that
Bainimarama privately indicated he would delay any actions until
at least mid-day on December 4 to give Qarase time to show
"signs of earnest movement" The challenge remains for Qarase to
find an adroit way to satisfy the military without exceeding
what his domestic political base will tolerate. PM Qarase
departed New Zealand at 3 p.m. on a Royal New Zealand Air Force
plane. Bainimarama was scheduled to depart at 6:05 on an Air
New Zealand flight.
¶2. (C) MFAT at this stage is making no assumptions that the
meeting will alter the Commodore's plans for a December 4 coup,
and will be working to encourage both sides to show continued
flexibility as PM Qarase and Commodore Bainimarama return to
Suva. In the meantime, MFAT is proceeding to plan for all
contingencies, and has authorized departure for any NZ High
Commission dependents who wish to leave Fiji. End summary.
¶3. (C) Today, Fiji's Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase met with
commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Frank
Bainimarama at Government House. The meeting resulted from the
efforts of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and Foreign
Minister Winston Peters to advert a coup in Fiji (reftel). The
talks lasted about two and a quarter hours, after which
Bainimarama left to catch his commercial flight back to Suva via
Auckland. PM Qarase left for Fiji via a Royal NZ Air Force
plane.
¶4. (U) In a press release he read to the media a few hours after
the meeting, FM Peters said that the talks had been
"constructive" with a "positive character." He added that New
Zealand hosted the meeting because it recognizes "that resolving
the current situation in Fiji is fundamentally important to its
future, and to the future of the wider Pacific."
¶5. (C) MFAT Deputy Secretary Alan Williams was the fourth
participant in the talks. He told the DCM after Qarase and
Bainimarama had departed that the meeting saw "a really good
substantive, detailed, and serious discussion focused on the
nine Fijian military demands" -- once the ice was broken. He
noted that this had been the first conversation between the two
in nine months, a painful reminder of the depth of their
antagonism. In the days prior to the meeting, both Foreign
Minister Peters and Williams had engaged both leaders in an
intensive series of preparatory discussions by telephone. New
Zealand's first objective in the meeting was to avoid giving
Bainimarama any pretext for walking out in the wake of his
threat the day before to the media to make this a five-minute
meeting. Once the meeting shifted to a substantive discussion,
PM Qarase showed flexibility, while insisting on due process and
constitutionality. Bainimarama was hard-nosed, but substantial
progress was made on each of the issues discussed.
¶6. (C) The most difficult issue was FijiQs domestic legislation,
specifically two laws increasing the control by indigenous
Fijians, in one case over foreshore areas (the "qoliqoli" bill),
and in another over native land titles. Both laws confront the
complex interplay of private and communal ownership in Fijian
law. Bainimarama wants both bills to be struck down. Qarase has
agreed to accelerate a constitutional review of this
legislation, and New Zealand has promised to assist.
WELLINGTON 00000943 002 OF 002
¶7. (C) As the meeting concluded and both leaders prepared to
depart, MFAT arranged for Bainimarama to avoid the media as he
boarded his plane in Wellington and then transferred to a
Fiji-bound flight in Auckland. The objective was to give Qarase
sufficient space to shape the public perception of the meeting
and signal that he is prepared to reach out to the military, the
media, and civil society in ways that will give Bainimarama
reason to conclude that further steps toward a coup are not
warranted.
¶8. (C) Williams said that he had an extensive conversation with
Bainimarama as the two left the meeting and proceeded to the
airport for Bainimarama's flight. The Commodore remains heavily
skeptical of the Fijian government, but said that he is prepared
to test the government by waiting until mid-day on December 4
before deciding whether to proceed with a threatened coup. He
said that he is looking for "signs of earnest movement." The
question, Williams suggested, is whether both sides, but
particularly Qarase, are sufficiently astute, adroit, and
determined to bridge the divide between the two sides.
Recognizing that many of the issues raised by Bainimarama are
valid, Williams says he wonders whether the PM can open a public
dialogue that deals with legal issues and the aftermath of the
2000 coup in ways that persuade many in the military to step
back. Williams confessed he is "less than overconfident" about
whether a coup can be avoided.
¶9. (C) Other MFAT staff commented separately to Emboffs that it
was not an easy meeting, but that outcomes were at the "upper
end of (our) expectations." MFAT is uncertain about whether the
meeting will really achieve anything or how either party will
characterize their exchange. GNZ does not intend to speak
publicly about the substance of the meeting, leaving that to
Qarase and Bainimarama. In the meantime, Foreign Minister
Peters has made it clear to both that he is prepared to reengage
if there is space to do so. Tomorrow, New Zealand will be
talking to Qarase to urge him to move quickly to show that he is
using the window before December 4 to render the question of a
coup moot. But MFAT officials are planning for all
contingencies, and MFAT Consular Affairs informed post that it
has authorized evacuation of any NZ High Commission dependents
who wish to leave Fiji.
¶10. (C) Flying to Auckland en route to Suva for a
previously-scheduled TDY just as the talks were taking place, a
staff member from our Defense Attachi's Office sat next to New
Zealand Defence Minister Phil Goff. Goff was upbeat about the
talks, but said he would not be surprised if they failed. He
said that if a coup did take place, it would most likely be
confined to Suva -- adding that its scope would depend on the
mentality of rioting mobs. Goff expressed concern that a coup
could get out of hand quickly and spread to Nadi and other
places.
McCormick