

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PANAMA15, PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PANAMA15.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PANAMA15 | 2009-01-07 20:08 | 2011-04-11 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama |
Appears in these articles: http://www.padigital.com.pa/periodico/edicion-actual/wikileaks-panama-interna.php?story_id=1036419&codeth=1593 |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHZP #0015/01 0072022
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 072022Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2817
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2737
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1963
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T PANAMA 000015
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: NEW MOGJ MINSTER LAYS OUT PLANS
REF: PANAMA 00008
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Security has become the government's weak spot, newly
appointed Minister of Government of Justice Dilio Arcia told
the Ambassador December 19. He described plans to address
gang violence, including tougher sentences and implementation
of community policing initiatives. In discussing the FARC
presence in the Darien, Arcia said that increased mobility
for GOP police forces was key, as Panamanian forces could not
arrive quickly enough to confront FARC incursions. He also
spoke about the need to improve governance in the Darien. He
reaffirmed GOP policy that the U.S. should not have a
permanent physical presence in the Darien, and forcefully
asserted his and the President's authority to decide on any
increase in temporary presence or qualitative change in the
nature of USG presence. He and his Vice Ministers described
recent outreach to the Embera Indians, following a FARC
incursion into their autonomous comarca. They also discussed
forthcoming equipment upgrades, including the arrival of
helicopters in February and March. End Summary.
----------------------
It's the Crime, Stupid!
----------------------
¶2. (C) Dilio Arcia, who was appointed Minister of Government
and Justice on November 18 replacing Daniel Delgado, met with
the Ambassador and EMBOFFs on December 19, together with Vice
Minster of Public Security Rodrigo Cigarruista and Vice
Minster of Government Severino Mejia. Arcia said that his top
priority was to develop and implement policies to confront
the crime wave affecting the country. He complained that the
political opposition was using the security issue to
politically weaken Martin Torrijos' government and Balbina
Herrera's presidential campaign. He said security had become
the "weak spot" of the government. Arcia complained that
Panama was being overwhelmed by the effects of "Plan Mexico."
(Comment: Arcia was referring to the Merida Initiative. End
Comment) He said foreign drug traffickers were hiring local
gangs to kill people as a result of lost drug shipments
seized by the authorities in Panama. He said the MOGJ, the
Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office were working
together on an anti-gang strategy, that would focus on
combating illegal weapon possession. The MOGJ proposed an
increase in the penalty for weapon possession to four-six
years, so that preventive detention could be used against
offenders. (Note: Under the current Penal Process Bridge Law,
which is in effect until the judicial system switches over to
the new adversarial law system, preventive detention can only
be requested for crimes that carry a prospective sentence of
four years or more. The current sentence is two-four years.
End Note) Arcia said this will allow gang members caught with
guns to be investigated for other crimes while in detention.
He said the police needed to focus on the retail sale of
drugs, the main source of funds for the gangs.
------------------
Community Policing
------------------
¶3. (C) Arcia also asserted that the MOGJ was interested in
implementing community policing programs. He emphasized
getting NGOs and business groups to work with the police,
citing a pilot program in the province of Veraguas he said
had been successful and an existing program called "Vigilant
Neighbors." He also praised the Integral Security Program
(PROSI), which is an IDB-funded crime prevention program that
focused on building up recreational infrastructure in poor,
gang prone neighborhoods. He also stressed the need to bring
in other elements of the GOP, like the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Social Development to help develop a
coordinated GOP strategy to prevent kids from finding their
way into gangs. Arcia complained that prisoners were
continuing to run their criminal operations from prison, and
said he would like to see a program to build new prisons that
were smaller and easier to control and improve the old ones.
--------------------------------------------
To Forward Deploy, or Not to Forward Deploy?
--------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the Darien,
Cigarruista said Panama was primarily a transit and R&R zone
for the FARC, though he also noted the 57th Front charged
tolls for cargo being smuggled into the Darien. Arcia said
Panamanian police forces needed greater mobility to be able
to deal with the FARC effectively. He said even if the
security forces heard about incursions, they could not get to
the scene quickly enough to do anything about it. He asserted
that with the National Frontier Service (SENAFRONT) police's
separation from the Panamanian National Police (PNP), Panama
would now have a permanent presence along its borders, noting
that 350 new police graduates would make it possible to keep
SENAFRONT police deployed on the borders, and not bring them
into Panama City to reinforce the PNP, as had often happened
in the past. Arcia said the plan was to concentrate large
groups of SENAFRONT police in a few places, and then respond
quickly by helicopter to any reports of incursions. Mejia
said the Darien was a big, tough area to patrol and that it
could only be patrolled by helicopters and boats. He said
that to be effective, SENAFRONT needed to deploy closer to
the border and that to do so they needed helicopter lift
capability. Asked by the Ambassador if SENAFRONT would then
be moved closer to the border, Cigarruista said they would
not/not be deployed on the border, but would observe and
react from bases further back. Mejia stressed that the GOP
had great cooperation with Colombia, and that the GOC would
help them. Arcia interjected that the situation was far from
imminent hostilities, noting that the main threat from the
FARC was their use of Panamanian territory for R&R, drug
trafficking and kidnappings. Mejia agreed, noting the FARC
was not looking to start a two-front conflict, while
Cigarruista noted that Panama also did not want a regional
conflict. He said the GOC would support them, but that the
answer would be the extension of Panama's effective control
over its own territory. Arcia said the extension of effective
governance was the key, and that the GOP was going as far as
to consider the development of new towns in the Darien as a
solution to the difficult challenge of providing essential
services in such a thinly populated area.
--------------
Need any Help?
--------------
¶5. (C) EMBOFF asked about the deployment of SOUTHCOM Joint
Planning Assistance Team (JPAT) and Counter Narco-Terrorist
(CNT) training teams currently in-country to the Darien to
support the development of SENAFRONT. (Note: These teams are
currently forbidden by the GOP to train SENAFRONT police in
the Darien, thought they are permitted limited "technical
assessment" visits. All USG training for GOP police deployed
to the Darien takes place in training areas closer to Panama
City. End Note) Arcia said the GOP did not want a permanent
U.S. physical presence in the area that might create
misunderstandings. Mejia said an increased U.S. presence
depended on SENAFRONT Director Commissioner Frank Abrego.
Arcia immediately and forcefully cut Mejia off, and said
Abrego could recommend such a change to him, the Minister, or
directly to President Torrijos, but could not/not decide this
on his own. Arcia justified this assertion of authority by
saying that he was a lawyer, and wanted to make sure
everything was "legal".
--------------------------------
Taking Care of the Little People
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Arcia said they had met with indigenous leaders in
the Darien (Embera) to assure them they would not be
abandoned by the GOP, following a recent FARC incursion in
their territory (see reftel). He said the President himself
had gone to Puerto Indio to meet with the Gran Cacique of the
Embera and had promised that the GOP would have a presence in
their areas. Mejia said the MOGJ would train the Embera
"police" - traditional Embera figures who help maintain
internal order in the Embera semi-autonomous comarcas - to
get intelligence for them, and would set up meetings for them
with SENAFRONT police to increase cooperation. Arcia said
they had explained to the Embera that despite their
semi-autonomy in their comarcas, they were Panamanians under
the security responsibility of the President. He said a GOP
official in the past had decided to withdraw the police from
the comarcas, but that following the recent incursion, the
Embera were ready to cooperate with the GOP.
------------------------
New Equipment on the Way
------------------------
¶7. (C) Cigarruista said that the MOGJ was refurbishing 5
Bell-212 helicopters, and the first one would be delivered on
March 1, after which two more would be delivered each month
and a half. He also said that another new helicopter the MOGJ
had bought would be delivered on February 15. He said two new
boats would also arrive in February for the National
Aero-Naval Service (SENAN). Mejia noted that SENAN assets,
especially the helicopters would be used for multiple
missions, including search and rescue, moving teachers into
remote areas, disaster relief, and flying foreign
dignitaries, in addition to law enforcement. Cigarruista
said Panama had an immediate need for helicopters, especially
for maritime patrol and border support. He added that Panama
was buying six small target acquisition radars that had sea
and air capability for $4.5 million. He said they also
planned to use radars of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP)
that could see 180 n.m. into the sea and air. He said the ACP
was only using 30% of its radar capacity, so the SENAN would
be able to use them as well. Mejia said the MOGJ was
interested in acquiring mobile computers for the police to
give them the information to "enact a plan," and not just
react to crime. Cigarruista noted that the MOGJ was working
on a computer system to amass crime data that could then be
used to target areas of high crime in real time, similar to
the COMPSTAT program used by U.S. law enforcement agencies.
He said the MOGJ needed assistance to bring in experts to
train their personnel in how to interpret the data so they
could use it effectively.
-------
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) Arcia's embrace of community policing is a welcome
change from Delgado. Arcia is in many ways the anti-Delgado,
focusing on urban crime and community outreach, while Delgado
framed the issue as a choice between democracy and law and
order, and did not really care what civil society thought.
Arcia has been quoted in the papers calling for NGOs and
community involvement in the fight against crime. This brings
the MOGJ in line with Post, as we are both now focused on
urban police reform and anti-gang programs. While the reason
for Arcia's embrace of community policing might be to help
undo some of the political damage Delgado and Torrijos
himself did, it is a further step towards institutionalizing
the idea of community policing as the best way to respond to
Panama's crime/gang problem.
¶9. (S//NF) This meeting also reinforced the fact that MOGJ
does not have operational control of the security forces in
Panama. While Arcia was quick to point out that Abrego could
not decide on increased cooperation with the U.S. on his own,
he added a telling line that he had to check with him - or
the President. In reality, it is Torrijos and the National
Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS), under Erik
Espinosa and his deputy Javier Fletcher, who really control
the operations of the security services. The confusion shown
here among Mejia and Cigarruista about how far forward the
SENAFRONT would deploy indicates they might not be the ones
who would decide. The heads of the PNP, SENAFRONT and the
SENAN all report directly to Torrijos, who then delegates
operational control and oversight for major operations to
Fletcher. Under Delgado MOGJ had the political weight to
challenge Espinosa/Fletcher, but under Arcia this influence
is likely to wane. The real mission of the MOGJ is to
administer these services and buy supplies, a limited mission
in which the MOGJ's effectiveness is highly questionable.
Post will continue to coordinate training issues with the
MOGJ and the service chiefs in parallel, but high-level
planning for law-enforcement operations will continue to be
done through Fletcher or the service chiefs.
STEPHENSON