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Viewing cable 07NAHA47, DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA AGREES TO PRESS AHEAD ON FRF PLAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07NAHA47 | 2007-03-12 08:08 | 2011-05-04 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Naha |
VZCZCXRO7033
PP RUEHNH
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS7247
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHNH #0047/01 0710833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY PARA MARKINGS AD8EE562 TOQ3200)
P 120833Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0236
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0783
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0311
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0271
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0001
RUEHWW/BAGHDAD GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0726
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000047
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - REPLACED SBU WITH C PARAMARKINGS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/12/2032
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINS PREL JA IZ
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA AGREES TO PRESS AHEAD ON FRF PLAN
CLASSIFIED BY: KEVIN K. MAHER, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. CONSULATE
GENERAL NAHA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA TRAVELED TO OKINAWA FOR
A ""PRIVATE"" BUT WIDELY REPORTED MEETING WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO DISCUSS THE WAY FORWARD ON IMPLEMENTING THE FUTENMA
REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF) PLAN THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE
TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE OCTOBER 2005 AND MAY 2006 SECURITY
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS. MINISTER KYUMA AGREED TO
REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS THE GOVERNOR IN TERMS
OF THE GOVERNOR'S REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO THE PLAN. WE AGREED TO
PERSUADE THE OKINAWA GOVERNOR AND NAGO MAYOR TO ACCEPT THE
CURRENT PLAN WITHOUT REVISIONS. MINISTER KYUMA SAID JAPAN FULLY
SUPPORTS THE U.S. ON IRAQ, AND THAT HE IS FULLY COMMITTED TO
GETTING THE DIET TO PASS LEGISLATION EXTENDING JAPAN'S
PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) I HAD A MUCH-PUBLICIZED LUNCH MEETING WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER KYUMA SUNDAY AFTERNOON IN OKINAWA. HE DECIDED TO
CANCEL OUR SCHEDULED GOLF OUTING DUE TO ALL THE PUBLICITY.
INSTEAD, WE HAD A 2 AND A HALF HOUR LUNCH IN A LOCAL RESTAURANT,
FOLLOWED BY AN HOUR AT MY HOUSE FOR COFFEE AND TO LOOK AT THE
VIEW OF MCAS FUTENMA WHILE HE KILLED TIME WAITING FOR HIS FLIGHT
BACK TO TOKYO. HE DID NOT MEET WITH GOVERNOR NAKAIMA OR NAGO
MAYOR SHIMABUKURO, EVEN THOUGH I OFFERED DURING LUNCH TO CALL
THEM AND INVITE THEM OVER TO THE HOUSE. SO IN THE END, AS WAS
WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE DEFENSE MINISTER CAME TO
OKINAWA ON A ""PRIVATE VISIT"" JUST TO MEET ME IN MY ROLE AS
CONSUL GENERAL.
¶3. (C) THE MEETING WAS POLITE BUT A LITTLE HEATED AT FIRST.
HE BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT WE HAVE HEARD EARLIER ABOUT DELAYING
ANY DECISIONS ON FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF)
IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL AFTER THE APRIL 22 BY-ELECTION. KYUMA THEN
ARGUED STRONGLY THAT WE NEED A FIFTY-METER REVISION IN THE FRF
PLAN IN ORDER TO GET GOV NAKAIMA TO AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT. I RESPONDED THAT WE DO NOT,
AND THAT TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT IS A MISTAKE AND
A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION IN OKINAWA.
¶4. (C) WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF REVISIONS, I SHOWED
KYUMA THE MAP WE AGREED AT THE DPRI MEETING OF APRIL 13, 2006
(WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR THE ROADMAP'S MORE GENERAL MAP), AND
EXPLAINED ALL THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH EACH OF THE
SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING THE RUNWAY IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS. I ALSO
EXPLAINED THAT NONE OF THESE ARE NEW IDEAS - ALL HAD BEEN VETTED
AND DISCARDED AS UNWORKABLE TECHNICALLY AND/OR POLITICALLY. I
STRESSED WE HAD ACCEPTED THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL, A PROPOSAL THAT
WAS THE BEST CONSENSUS THE GOJ ITSELF COULD REACH INTERNALLY.
¶5. (C) I TOLD KYUMA THAT FRANKLY SPEAKING, BASED ON MY OWN
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOJ IN
THE DPRI PROCESS, THE GOJ COULD NOT MAINTAIN THIS CONSENSUS ON
FRF IF WE WERE TO START A DISCUSSION ON MAKING ANY ADJUSTMENT AT
ALL TO THE PLAN. HE RESPONDED THAT AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER,
HE COULD MAKE THE DECISION AND MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS HIMSELF.
I THEN TOLD HIM THAT, AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING RUDE, I DOUBT
ANYONE COULD, INCLUDING HIMSELF, AND AGAIN EXPLAINED THAT MANY
OF THE PEOPLE ASKING FOR ADJUSTMENTS ARE DOING SO IN THE
ABSTRACT, WITHOUT ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEMS EACH
NAHA 00000047 002 OF 004
PROPOSAL PRESENTS.
¶6. (C) WE SPENT QUITE A WHILE STUDYING THE MAP OF THE FRF AND
GOING OVER EACH OF THOSE PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, MOVING TOWARDS
THE OCEAN RUNS INTO THE ISLANDS, MOVING TO THE LEFT INCREASES
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ON THE SEA GRASS, MOVING TO THE RIGHT PUTS
IT INTO DEEPER WATER AND MAKES CONSTRUCTION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
HE SEEMED TO GET THE PICTURE, AND ADMITTED THAT GOVERNOR
NAKAIMA'S AND MAYOR SHIMABUKURO'S CALLS FOR ""REVISIONS"" ARE
MERELY FOR FACE-SAVING, SINCE THEY HAVE MADE THESE CALLS IN
PUBLIC.
¶7. (C) I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WERE
TO SUGGEST ANY CHANGES TO THE AGREED PLAN, WE THEN ALSO COULD
EXPECT TO HEAR VOICES FROM WITHIN THE U.S. FOR CHANGES AS WELL.
FOR EXAMPLE, SOME IN THE MARINE CORPS WANT A LONGER RUNWAY.
""THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE,"" HE REPLIED, ""SINCE WE'VE ALREADY AGREED ON
1800 METERS."" I TOLD HIM THAT IS EXACTLY THE POINT, WE HAVE
ALREADY AGREED ON THIS PLAN. BUT IF THE GOJ STARTS ASKING FOR
CHANGES, HOW CAN WE PREVENT SIMILAR CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM THE
U.S. SIDE AS WELL? WE ARE TRYING TO MAINTAIN AND MOVE FORWARD
ON A DELICATE CONSENSUS ABOUT A PLAN AGREED AFTER MANY HOURS OF
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. REOPENING THAT CONSENSUS BY MAKING
CHANGES TO THE RUNWAY LOCATION WILL ONLY DESTROY THAT CONSENSUS,
DELAY THE ENTIRE PROJECT, AND PUT THE ENTIRE REALIGNMENT PLAN
FOR OKINAWA AT RISK.
¶8. (C) I TOLD HIM IT'S LIKE THE GAME IN JAPANESE ARCADES,
""MOGURA TATAKI"" (WHACK-A-MOLE, THE GAME IN WHICH MOLES KEEP
POPPING UP FROM HOLES AND YOU KEEP HAMMERING THEM DOWN). THAT'S
WHAT WE'RE DOING NOW, TRYING TO KEEP THIS PROJECT ON TRACK. HE
SMILED AT THIS, AND THE MOOD SEEMED TO LIGHTEN AT THAT POINT.
¶9. (C) I THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN MY VIEW OF THE SITUATION
IN OKINAWA, AND WHY I THINK WE CAN BRING GOVERNOR NAKAIMA AROUND
TO GET HIS COOPERATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
AND HIS REQUIRED APPROVAL FOR THE LANDFILL. IN MY VIEW, NAKAIMA
WANTS TO GET THIS SETTLED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO HE CAN FOCUS
ON ECONOMIC ISSUES IN OKINAWA. BUT UNFORTUNATELY HE MADE
PROMISES IN THE CAMPAIGN WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THEIR REAL
MEANING. NOW HE IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT, AND RECENTLY IS
SHOWING MUCH MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM
THOSE PROMISES.
¶10. (C) THE ""NEGOTIATED OVER OUR HEADS"" ISSUE IS SETTLED -
THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM HAS TAKEN CARE OF THIS COMPLAINT.
THE ""CLOSED STATE IN THREE YEARS"" IS FIXED AS WELL - ALL NAKAIMA
WANTS IS A STATEMENT FROM KYUMA THAT THE GOJ WILL MAKE BEST
EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DANGER AT FUTENMA; HE DOESN'T EVEN WANT TO
HEAR HOW.
¶11. (C) THAT LEAVES THE ""V"" PLAN. RECENTLY THE GOVERNOR HAS
REPEATED TO THE PRESS THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE VIEWS OF NAGO
CITY. SO, I EMPHASIZED TO KYUMA, I'M CONFIDENT THAT IF WE BRING
MAYOR SHIMABUKURO AROUND, THE GOVERNOR WILL COME AROUND AS WELL.
AND I THINK WE CAN BRING SHIMABUKURO AROUND.
¶12. (C) I MET FRIDAY WITH THE THREE KU-CHO (DISTRICT MAYORS)
OF THE NAGO CITY DISTRICTS DIRECTLY AROUND CAMP SCHWAB. AFTER
DISCUSSION SIMILAR TO THAT ABOVE, AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE
ACTUAL PLAN FOR FRF, THEY ALL SAID THAT THE PLAN WE HAVE AGREED
TO IS OK FOR THEM, WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS OR ADJUSTMENTS. THEY
CLAIMED IT WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE HAD ACTUALLY EXPLAINED THE
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PLAN TO THEM (AT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN THE APRIL 13, 2006 MAP),
AND THAT ALL THEY HAD SEEN BEFORE WAS THE MORE GENERAL MAP
ATTACHED TO THE ROADMAP.
¶13. (C) BUT, THEY SAID, WE'VE BEEN ASKING THAT THE RUNWAY BE
""PLACED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AWAY FROM THE TOWNS TOWARDS THE
OCEAN"". IN OUR VIEW, THEY CONTINUED, THE ROADMAP PLAN OF MAY
2006 IS JUST A CONCEPTUAL PLAN, SO NOBODY KNOWS WHERE THE ACTUAL
BASELINE IS FOR THE RUNWAY LOCATION. SO COULDN'T THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS JUST MAKE PUBLIC THE DETAILED FRF MASTER PLAN, AND
WITHOUT ACTUALLY MAKING ANY CHANGES, STATE THAT IT HAD BEEN
""ADJUSTED"" OR ""SLIGHTLY REVISED (SHUSEI IN JAPANESE)""? I
RESPONDED THAT NO, WE COULD NOT SAY THAT. EVEN STATING THERE
HAD BEEN A REVISION, EVEN IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN, WOULD OPEN UP
THE CAN OF WORMS ABOUT MAKING CHANGES TO THE PLAN, AND PUT THE
CONSENSUS AT RISK, SINCE WE COULD EXPECT CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM
OTHER DISSATISFIED PARTIES AS WELL.
¶14. (C) HOWEVER, I SUGGESTED, HOW ABOUT IF, WHEN WE MAKE
PUBLIC THE MASTER PLAN, AS IT IS NOW WITHOUT ANY CHANGES, BOTH
GOVERNMENTS WERE TO STATE SOMETHING LIKE ""IN AGREEING ON THE
ROADMAP AND THE MASTER PLAN BOTH GOVERNMENTS GAVE STRONG
CONSIDERATION TO LOCAL VIEWS AND THE DESIRE THAT THE RUNWAY BE
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE TOWNS, AND WE HAVE PLACED THE
RUNWAYS AS FAR TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE."" WE CANNOT SAY WE
HAVE CHANGED THE PLAN, BUT WE COULD TRUTHFULLY SAY WE HAVE
PLACED THE RUNWAY AS FAR TOWARDS THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE, SINCE
THAT IS IN FACT WHAT WE DID IN AGREEING TO THE PLAN IN THE MAY
1, 2006 ROADMAP.
¶15. (C) THE THREE KU-CHO LIKED THIS APPROACH, AND SAID THEY
WOULD MEET SOON WITH MAYOR SHIMABUKURO TO TRY AND PERSUADE HIM
TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT PLAN, AND ALSO TO ASK HIM TO PERSUADE
NAKAIMA. MY STRONG IMPRESSION, WHICH I CONVEYED TO KYUMA, IS
THAT THEY ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT LOSING OR HAVING DELAYS IN THE
ECONOMIC PROMOTION MEASURES.
¶16. (C) BASED ON THIS CONVERSATION, I TOLD KYUMA I THINK WE
CAN BRING THE MAYOR AND GOVERNOR AROUND. THE BIGGEST MISTAKE WE
COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY AT ALL ON THE POINT
OF REVISIONS TO THE PLAN. LANGUAGE SUCH AS THAT ABOVE COULD BE
USED BY NAKAIMA TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WE HAVE TAKEN HIS VIEWS
INTO ACCOUNT, BYPASSING THE ISSUE OF ASKING FOR REVISIONS. I
NOTED TO KYUMA THAT THE LANGUAGE OF ""PLACING THE RUNWAYS AS FAR
TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE"" IS LANGUAGE THAT THE GOVERNOR
HIMSELF HAS USED WITH ME IN EXPLAINING HIS REQUESTS TO THE GOJ.
THE GOVERNOR THEREFORE COULD EXPLAIN THAT THE MASTER PLAN HAS
TAKEN HIS VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION.
¶17. (C) KYUMA RESPONDED THAT HE IS NOT AS OPTIMISTIC AS I
THAT NAKAIMA CAN BE PERSUADED WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS TO THE PLAN,
BUT HE AGREED THAT HE WOULD NOT EXPRESS ANY FLEXIBILITY TO THE
GOVERNOR (DESPITE WHAT WE KNOW HE HAS BEEN SAYING IN PUBLIC, AND
PERHAPS IN PRIVATE). I TOLD KYUMA I WOULD BE MEETING WITH MAYOR
SHIMABUKURO AND GOVERNOR NAKAIMA SHORTLY TO TRY AND PUSH THEM
FORWARD.
¶18. (C) I MENTIONED TO KYUMA THAT THERE ARE RUMORS IN OKINAWA TO
THE EFFECT THE NAGO CONSTRUCTION MAGNATE NAKADOMARI IS
PRESSURING THE NAGO MAYOR TO MOVE THE RUNWAY TOWARDS THE OCEAN
IN ORDER TO GET MORE LANDFILL WORK FOR HIS COMPANY. KYUMA SAID
HE IS AWARE OF THOSE RUMORS, BUT NOTED THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE
THE FACT THAT SUCH RUMORS ARE WIDELY CIRCULATING WOULD IN ITSELF
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PUT AN END TO THIS PRESSURE, SINCE NAKADOMARI'S INVOLVEMENT
WOULD BE WIDELY KNOWN, AND LEGAL ISSUES WOULD ENSUE. (NOTE:
KYUMA DID NOT TELL ME HE HAD MET PRIVATELY THAT MORNING WITH
NAKADOMARI, ALTHOUGH REPORTERS WHO WERE STAKING OUT HIS HOTEL
TELL ME THAT HE DID.)
IRAQ
¶19. (C) WHEN I ASKED KYUMA WHAT HIS MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE IS NOW
WITHIN MOD, HE REPLIED IT IS HIS EFFORT TO GET EXTENSION ON
JAPAN'S SPECIAL LEGISLATION FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. HE NOTED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW IT
WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO DELAY THE ATTACK ON IRAQ, BUT
NEVERTHELESS JAPAN FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. IN IRAQ, AND HE
PERSONALLY IS FULLY COMMITTED TO GETTING AN EXTENSION TO THE
LEGISLATION. HE ASSURED ME HE WILL GET THIS DONE. IT IS A
SENSITIVE ISSUE POLITICALLY IN JAPAN, HE SAID, BECAUSE THE
EXTENSION WOULD COME VERY CLOSE TO THE TIME OF THE UPPER HOUSE
ELECTIONS IN JULY. THIS IS ONE REASON, HE EXPLAINED, THAT JAPAN
HAS DECIDED TO DELAY THE 22 MEETING. HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO
WASHINGTON WHEN STILL EMPTY HANDED ON FRF IMPLEMENTATION
DECISIONS AND IRAQ LEGISLATION EXTENSION, SO IT IS BEST TO DELAY
THE 22.
¶20. (C) PRESS. KNOWING THERE WERE MANY REPORTERS OUTSIDE
WAITING FOR OUR DEPARTURE, WE AGREED THAT KYUMA WOULD SIMPLY SAY
HE HAD COME TO OKINAWA TO HEAR ""THIRD PARTY VIEWS"" (MINE) ON THE
SITUATION IN OKINAWA. WHEN TALKING TO THE PRESS, HE SAID THAT
THE CONSUL GENERAL HAD STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PEOPLE OF
OKINAWA ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, WITH BASE ISSUES THIRD ON THE LIST OF
CONCERNS. HE ALSO SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER WE HAD
DISCUSSED REVISIONS TO THE FRF PLAN THAT ""THE U.S. VIEWS ARE
WELL KNOWN."" IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS I TOLD THE PRESS ""WE HAD
A WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ISSUES AFFECTING OKINAWA.""
WITH RESPECT TO FRF AND REALIGNMENT, I SAID ""BOTH AGREED IT IS
IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENT THE REALIGNMENT PLANS AS QUICKLY AS
POSSIBLE, SINCE THE REALIGNMENT PLAN IS VERY MUCH TO THE BENEFIT
OF OKINAWA. I AM CONFIDENT THAT MOST OKINAWANS WHO UNDERSTAND
THE PLAN SUPPORT THIS.""
¶21. (C) ALL IN ALL IT WAS A MOST INTERESTING AFTERNOON WITH
KYUMA. I NOTE THAT DURING THE ENTIRE MEETING NOT ONCE DID KYUMA
MENTION MOD VICE MINISTER MORIYA, EVEN THOUGH MORIYA HAS PLAYED
THE KEY ROLE WITHIN MOD ON FRF. I HAD THE IMPRESSION KYUMA HAD
MADE THE ASSUMPTION HE NEEDS TO OFFER REVISIONS TO NAKAIMA
WITHOUT REALIZING THE REAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH REVISIONS, AND
WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE FLEXIBLE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE
GOVERNOR IS HEADING. I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS THOSE DIFFICULTIES
BETTER NOW. HOPEFULLY HE WILL REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY
TO THE GOVERNOR SO THAT THE GOVERNOR CAN BE PERSUADED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE CURRENT PLAN.
MAHER