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Viewing cable 06CANBERRA1940, AUSTRALIA DECLINES FIJI'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06CANBERRA1940 | 2006-12-05 06:06 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Canberra |
VZCZCXRO6231
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHBY #1940/01 3390644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050644Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6417
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 1297
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0920
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE IMMEDIATE 3575
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH IMMEDIATE 2056
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY IMMEDIATE 1570
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CANBERRA 001940
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP, EB, CA, P AND IO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS AS FJ NZ
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DECLINES FIJI'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY
INTERVENTION; PLANS TO CUT DEFENSE TIES AND IMPOSE TRAVEL
BAN ON BAINIMARAMA AND SUPPORTERS
REF: STATE 195037
Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole, for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Australia declined a request by Fijian Prime Minister
Qarase for Australian military intervention to prevent a coup
by the RFMF Commander Bainimarama. In reaction to events,
the Australian Foreign Minister announced December 5
Australia would suspend defense ties with Fiji, including
imposing a travel ban on Fijian military personnel and any
others involved in the "creeping coup." Meanwhile, senior
Australian and New Zealand officials discussed with visiting
EAP/ANP Director Steven McGann coordinating policy responses
to events in Fiji during a December 5 Canberra-Wellington
digital video conference, outlining the range of sanctions
under consideration by both governments. End Summary.
------------------------------
AUSTRALIA REFUSES TO INTERVENE
------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Howard told the press December 5 that
Fijian Prime Minister Qarase had telephoned him that morning
to request Australian military intervention to prevent a coup
by Fijian military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama.
Howard said he had declined the request because it was "not
in Australia's national interest" to intervene, adding that
he could not countenance Australian and Fijian troops
fighting one another on the streets of Suva.
--------------------------------------------- --
OA TO SUSPEND DEFENSE TIES, IMPOSE TRAVEL BAN ON COUP
PERPETRATORS
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (SBU) In Parliament December 5, Foreign Minister Downer
strongly condemned the attempted overthrow of a
democratically-elected government, deploring the behavior of
both Bainimarama and Fiji President Iloilo in supporting the
RFMF chief in what he termed a "creeping coup." Warning that
the international response to a coup would be "swift and
sharp," Downer announced Australia would suspend defence ties
with Fiji as soon as it became apparent that the Prime
Minister could not longer govern. The suspension of military
and defense cooperation would include a ban on all travel of
Bainimarama and his family members, Bainimaram's supporters,
and any others who might be part of an unconstitutional
government. He alluded to the UN Secretary General's warning
that Fiji might be removed from peacekeeping operations, and
said the GOA would consider taking other steps against an
illegal government in Fiji as well, possibly to include
recommending suspension from the Commonwealth and removal of
Fiji from the chairmanship of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).
(Other steps under consideration by Australia are detailed
in para 6 below.)
--------------------------------------------- --
U.S.-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DVC ON POLICY RESPONSES TO FIJI
COUP
--------------------------------------------- --
¶4. (C) Earlier on December 5, visiting EAP/ANP Director
Steven McGann held a DVC with Australia's DFAT Pacific
Division First Assistant Secretary David A. Ritchie and New
Zealand Deputy Foreign Secretary Alan Williams with the aim
of discussing trilateral coordination of policy responses to
a possible coup in Fiji. McGann noted the United States
would need to consider carefully when to declare events in
Suva a "coup," which would trigger immediate suspension of
all aid under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations
Appropriation Act. The U.S. might initially declare that "an
unlawful or unconstitutional change of government" had taken
place, which would allow flexibility in ending assistance to
CANBERRA 00001940 002 OF 004
coup perpetrators while maintaining assistance to the
civilian population.
-------------------------
NEW ZEALAND'S PROPOSED STEPS
-------------------------
¶5. (C) Prime Minister Clark shared the U.S. view, Williams
explained. Rather than wait for a formal announcement of a
coup by Fiji, New Zealand planned to take steps upon unlawful
removal of the Fiji government's authority due to
"unconstitutional actions by the military in Fiji." Three
immediate steps the GNZ planned to take, subject to approval
by Prime Minister Clark, were:
-- Imposing travel bans on RFMF officers and their families,
as well as others involved in the coup;
-- Supporting Commonwealth sanctions, including possibly
expulsion from the Commonwealth;
-- Suspending bilateral defense ties, except for maritime
patrols aimed at illegal fishing or humanitarian operations
such as search-and-rescue missions. The latter step would
include suspending military visits and training. (Note: As
this cable was in preparation, Prime Minister Clark announced
implementation of the steps above. See also Ref A.)
¶6. (C) Beyond the immediate actions, New Zealand was
considering other sanctions, including: suspension of
high-level contacts; a freeze on the recent labor mobility
initiative announced at the PIF that would permit Fijians to
work in New Zealand; other immigration measures, such as
suspending Fiji's eligibility under the access quota;
targeted cessation of aid that directly assisted the Fijian
government (but not aid for the "lower-end" population); a
sports ban; removing Fiji as chair of the Pacific Island
Forum (PIF), and freezing of financial assets. Williams said
New Zealand was not prepared to invoke trade sanctions or to
recall either its High Commissioner or its Defense Attache
from Suva, except for consultations.
---------------------------
AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE TO COUP
---------------------------
¶7. (C) Australia was considering similar sanctions, David
Ritchie said, although the GOA did not envision their phased
implementation. Australian sanctions under consideration
that had been endorsed by FM Downer included:
-- Imposing travel bans on Fijian coup perpetrators and those
recruited to an interim government;
-- Suspending defense cooperation, including funding and
technical support for the Pacific Patrol Boat program;
-- Ending technical assistance to the RFMF;
-- Expelling Fijian students at Australian military training
academies;
-- Recommending Commonwealth sanctions;
-- Removing Fiji as chair of the PIF (noting this was up to
PIF Secretary Greg Urwin);
-- Seeking further statements from the UN Secretary General
and UN Security Council;
-- Urging other countries to impose sanctions. (Ritchie
noted France and approached the GOA, indicating it wished to
cooperate in putting pressure on Fiji.)
-- Imposing financial sanctions on Commander Bainimarama;
-- Urging the UN to name a Special Representative to Fiji;
-- Urging withdrawal from United Nations peacekeeping
operations; and
-- Examining further actions/sanctions under the Biketawa
Declaration.
--------------------------------------------- ----
U.S. REDLINE ON REMOVING FIJI FROM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶8. (C) McGann stressed Washington's concern that parties not
rush to remove Fiji's participation in UN peacekeeping
operations, noting the importance of Fiji to UN peacekeeping
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operations in Baghdad and elsewhere. Williams acknowledged
the need to ensure that important peacekeeping operations,
such as in Baghdad and Darfur, not be hindered, but drew
attention to the impact such suspension might make on the
Fijian military, which is highly dependent on PKO
remittances. Moreover, he pointed out, the effect of
reducing military assistance to Fiji would be to degrade the
RFMF's capability, thus making Fiji less acceptable for
peacekeeping operations. The United Nations itself would
need to make a determination whether poor discipline of
Fijian troops or adverse impact caused by conditions in their
home country might disqualify them from PKO participation.
Ritchie concurred, adding that Australia might consider
stopping payments to Fijian military elements under the
Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands (RAMSI). Williams agreed, saying it would remove
Fiji's credentials as an upholder of good government, but
cautioned that such move not expand into UN PKO issues. He
supported retaining the Fijian police component in RAMSI.
¶9. (C) McGann outlined USG considerations and options for
responding to the situation in Fiji, including possibly
endorsing the suggestion that Fiji be removed as PIF chair.
Unlike New Zealand and Australia, which saw value in issuing
statements in advance of a coup, the U.S. did not want to
make any pre-emptive statement, but wanted to act when an
unlawful change had occurred, including imposing travel bans
and other steps. McGann said the U.S. would not recall its
Ambassador to Suva, who would be key in coordinating the U.S.
response. McGann said EAP DAS Davies planned to convene
countries represented at the Nandy PIF to outline U.S. steps
in detail. Ritchie said the GOA planned to call PIF
countries together for a briefing on the afternoon of
December 5. Williams noted the importance of seeking views
of India.
¶10. (C) In the midst of the DVC, Williams relayed breaking
news that Fiji President Iloilo had announced that the
military could take over the government; the Australian and
New Zealand participants concluded that the President was
acting outside his constitutional authority and that their
governments would likely make statements later in the day.
All agreed to continue close coordination, including with
other countries that had been represented at the PIF.
---------------------
EMINENT PERSONS GROUP
---------------------
¶11. (C) In a discussion about the Eminent Persons Group
(EPG), McGann said the United States was not prepared to
nominate a representative in advance of a coup but could
issue a statement associating the United States with the
EPG's objectives of urging adherence to the rule of law.
The U.S. might be interested in participating in a post-coup
EPG that sought to restore constitutional government, he
added. Williams questioned whether the EPG would have any
utility, but pledged New Zealand support it if the current
Fijian Government asked for an EPG to visit. He listed
several suggestions by PIF Secretary Greg Urwin regarding
composition of the EPG. (Note: Ref A was not received until
after the DVC. Embassy will convey substance separately to
First Assistant Secretary Ritchie.)
--------------------------------------------- --
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND ACCEPT INVITATION TO FEBRUARY 1
SUBREGIONAL CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE
--------------------------------------------- --
¶12. (SBU) Williams and Ritchie accepted McGann's invitation
to participate in the United States subregional Chiefs of
Mission conference in Honolulu on February 1.
¶13. (U) This message was cleared with Embassy Wellington.
EAP/ANP Director McGann did not have an opportunity to review
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this message prior to his departure from Canberra.
MCCALLUM