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Viewing cable 09RABAT179, MOROCCO HAS CONFIDENCE IN NEW UN WESTERN SAHARA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09RABAT179 | 2009-02-27 18:06 | 2011-04-21 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rabat |
VZCZCXRO5352
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0179/01 0581843
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271843Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9754
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2507
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0415
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0906
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000179
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PBTS UNSC AG WI MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO HAS CONFIDENCE IN NEW UN WESTERN SAHARA
ENVOY, BUT MORE NEEDED AMONG THE PARTIES
REF: A. ALGIERS 0191
¶B. RABAT 0172
RABAT 00000179 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The UN Secretary General,s Personal Envoy
Christopher Ross appears to have had a positive visit to
Morocco, February 17-21. At a roundtable hosted by Charge,
Ross outlined a flexible approach, as reported by Algiers
(Ref. A) that seeks to build confidence between Morocco and
the Polisario, before a fifth round in Manhasset, so that
another failure did not undermine the credibility of the
process. Local &friends8 diplomats doubted there could be
much movement before the Algerian election, but this would be
a good time to prepare. Partly through his linguistic
facility and experience, Ross seems to have already some
hearts and minds among the Moroccans, and he may have already
won more confidence from the King than ever enjoyed by his
predecessor. During a farewell outbrief on February 26, UN
Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara head Julian
Harston told Charge and other P-5 Chiefs of Mission that the
current confidence-building measures are not building
confidence among negotiators, that Algeria does not appear
ready for a summit with Morocco, and that Moroccan respect
for human rights in the territory appears to have declined in
the last few weeks, an impression that we share. End
Summary.
¶2. (SBU) Charge hosted a roundtable of diplomats/experts for
the UN Secretary-General,s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara
Amb. Christopher Ross on February 19. The participants
included UK Ambassador Tim Morris, Spanish DCM Alfonso
Portabales, French PolCouns Frederic Clavier, Charge, A/DCM
Millard and PolCouns. With Ross were UN Staffers Denise
O,Brien (DPA) and Mikkel Brohold (DPKO) and UN Resident
Representative Mourad Wahba.
¶3. (C) Ross opened by noting the warm welcome he had
received since his arrival. Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi
had hosted a dinner for him with all the heads of the major
parties and several ministers. He also had met with Foreign
Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri along with Director General for
Studies and Documentation (DGED) (external intelligence
chief) M. Yassine Mansouri and separately with Interior
Minister Chakib Benmoussa. He felt he had to overcome some
Moroccan suspicion over his long years in Algeria.
------------------------
Need for more confidence
------------------------
¶4. (C) Ross said the long wait for &confirmation8 had
given him time to reflect. The Moroccans talk of
consolidating past progress, but this seemed to refer just to
certain key words, like realism. In fact, the four Manhasset
rounds had produced no real progress. Another unproductive
round could risk undermining the credibility of the process.
He was suggesting a small, quiet meeting directly between
Morocco and the Polisario, perhaps in Spain, to begin to
discuss issues. He would not go to Mauritania because of the
coup but had justified this to Nouakchott on logistical
grounds.
¶5. (C) Ross added that he was also interested in enlarging
the scope of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). The
existing UNHCR family exchange program was successful, but
there needed to be more political confidence. He thought
Morocco should renew the direct contacts with the Polisario
in Rabat that took place many years ago under King Hassan II.
One of the problems with the negotiations is that while the
Polisario folks are the same, the Moroccan negotiators have
changed; they no longer know each other. He had also
suggested that Morocco either keep CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould
er Rachid out of the talks or at least muzzle him. Polisario
representatives maintained Kalihenna,s role in the talks had
been a provocation. Ross said he underscored to Fassi Fihri
that, like it or not, Morocco had to remember that the other
party in the talks was the Polisario. The goal must be to
attract them to a political solution. There were many types
of autonomy, including that of Iraqi Kuridstan. He solicited
ideas for additional CBMs.
¶6. (C) Ross said his meeting with Interior Minister
Benmoussa was upbeat. Benmoussa had briefed on Morocco,s
broader regionalization and decentralization plans, for which
Sahara autonomy was just the leading edge. He urged Ross to
convey that the autonomy offer is sincere, not just words.
RABAT 00000179 002.2 OF 003
¶7. (C) Ross said that in addition to working the Sahara
issue, UNSYG Ban Ki Moon had charged him with attempting to
improve relations between Morocco and Algeria. He planned to
propose to Algeria a reinforcement of existing cooperation on
security matters as well as working on other peripheral
issues. He believed it was premature even to address the
closure of the border. While human rights issues were
important, they were not part of his mandate. He personally
thought it was not sensible to include human rights in the
MINURSO mandate, but perhaps there were other UN agencies
that could take on the issue. Any approach would have to
address conditions on both sides.
----------------------
Diplomats, Assessments
----------------------
¶8. (C) French Political Counselor Frederic Clavier said the
situation was asymmetric between Morocco and the Polisario
and the key was Algeria. In his view, the Moroccan public is
heavily engaged, and a major setback on Western Sahara could
hurt the country,s stability. In Algeria, however, the
issue was between Bouteflika and the generals, not the
public. Clavier thought France could not accept any
independent state that would not be able to secure its
territory. He thought 2009 would be a year of transition due
to the Algerian elections, and he anticipated no movement
before 2010. He feared that Algeria would try to move
discussions back to UNSCR resolution 1754 rather than the
current 1813, with its focus on a political solution.
¶9. (C) British Ambassador Timothy Morris said Western Sahara
was a concern for HMG, which is focused on iron-clad support
for the SYG and only a cool approach to the autonomy
proposal. UK interest is focused on the security question,
and HMG was looking at ways to bring the GOM and Algeria
together on this, as part of a broader Sahara/Sahel strategy.
¶10. (C) Spanish DCM Alphonso Portabales said the visit of
the Spanish (de facto) Deputy Foreign Minister underscored
Western Sahara,s importance to Spain both as a security and
political issue. Spain would be happy to support additional
CBMs and host informal contacts, track two events or indirect
CBM events. He noted a possible example could be the
multiple varieties of autonomy exercised by the Spanish
regions, including exercise of foreign relations and
assistance. He noted some subtle progress on the diplomatic
front. A flight from Rabat to Tindouf, as Ross would make on
his Spanish-provided aircraft, would not have been possible
two years before. He believed that the human rights issue
was important, but Spanish information suggested conditions
in Tindouf were no better than in the Western Sahara.
¶11. (C) Charge appreciated Ross,s briefing and noted that
the new U.S. administration had not refined its views on this
issue but that USG support for the Secretary General,s
efforts to find a political solution would continue. It was
important to consider views of the Sahrawis in the territory,
not just those he would see in Tindouf. He urged Ross to
visit the territory and meet, not only MINURSO, but a wide
selection of the Sahrawi political spectrum. Moreover, the
Charge indicated that we believe the Moroccans could now
improve their own position by creating more political space
in the Western Sahara for organizations whose members were
known Polisario sympathizers, and it would be useful for Ross
to encourage the GOM. PolCouns added that a recent EU
parliamentary delegation had been able to meet publicly with
some of those dissidents, a small but important opening that
could be expanded. This also could give the Personal Envoy a
better measure of the extent of self-government the Sahrawis
themselves desire.
¶12. (C) Ross got his bottom line from Morocco only on the
following day when he met King Mohammed VI, as reported from
Algiers (Ref A). Press coverage of the visit and his overall
tour was largely upbeat. Ross met the Prime Minister in a
traditional Moroccan jelleba and wore a Fassi shawl when
meeting the King, eliciting a smile in the official photo.
These touches, along with his use of Arabic in meetings and
with the press were highly praised.
¶13. (C) In subsequent briefings for the Parliament and also
with the press, a range of senior government officials
praised Ross and underscored GOM determination to pursue the
negotiations with Algeria and the Polisario.
RABAT 00000179 003.2 OF 003
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Harston,s Farewell
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¶14. (C) On February 26, Ambassador Morris hosted a farewell
coffee for P-5 Chiefs of Mission plus Spain with UN Special
Representative for Western Sahara and MINURSO head Julian
Harston, who is returning to Belgrade. Harston described his
farewell calls on the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Interior as upbeat, and he said he felt that he was leaving
MINURSO in better shape than he had inherited it two years
ago. He declared that he has recommended that the UN reduce
the size of the military contingent, given the fact that
there are probably only 500 Polisario fighters on the eastern
side of the berm in contrast with the 10,000 to 15,000 the
Polisario claimed to have under arms. He noted that Morocco
still maintains 60,000 to 80,000 troops in the territory.
¶15. (C) The Russian Ambassador asked if MINURSO,s name
should be changed since a referendum appears unlikely, and
Harston responded that he thought that would be more trouble
than it was worth and that to his knowledge UN peacekeeping
operations never changed names -) even if the mission
changed. Harston opined that Algeria holds the key to a
settlement. A summit followed by meetings of experts could
be a good format, but Algeria is not ready for a summit.
Harston also said that the CBMs are useful for the Sahrawis,
but they are not building confidence among the negotiators
and, thus, are not advancing peace. As for human rights,
Harston felt that respect has declined since the change of
Walis in January. Finally, he said he believed that an
independent Western Sahara is unrealistic because the
territory has no real economy, and the limited fishing and
tourism along with fruit and phosphate production offer
little for a viable state.
¶16. (C) Comment: Harston is leaving on better terms with
the GOM than he enjoyed during his tenure. Ross,s
linguistic skills and cultural sensitivity appear to have
helped win the hearts and minds of the Moroccans, and
overcome their residual suspicions-based on his spending far
more time in Algeria than here. Both in senior officials,
public pronouncements and the Foreign Minister,s private
comments to Charge, the Moroccans seem to be giving a bit
more acknowledgment to a role for the Polisario than in the
recent past. That subtle shift, along with the message from
the King (reported reftels) suggests that Ross is already
having an impact, at least from the Moroccan perspective. He
does seem to have won more confidence from King Mohammed VI
than was ever enjoyed by his predecessor, Peter Van Walsum.
The UNSYG seems to have done well in choosing a regional
specialist for this role. We hope that he will do as well in
choosing Harston,s replacement. End comment.
¶17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
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Jackson