

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06VIENNA515, USG CONCERNS OVER AUSTRIAN BANKING OPERATIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06VIENNA515.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06VIENNA515 | 2006-02-17 19:07 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Vienna |
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 000515
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/AGS - WEYGANDT
NSC FOR EUROPEAN DIRECTORATE - WILSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL EFIN MNUC KCRM KTFN KNNP AU
SUBJECT: USG CONCERNS OVER AUSTRIAN BANKING OPERATIONS
Ref: a) vienna 350 b) vienna 309 c) 05 vienna 1760 d)
05 state 220738
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Scott F. Kilner for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
Introduction
------------
¶1. (S/NF) In view of continued Washington questions about
the operations of Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB) and Bank
Austria Creditanstalt (BA/CA) in several areas, this cable
attempts to consolidate all the information that this Mission
has regarding allegations and GoA responses. Embassy would
appreciate any additional information Washington agencies may
have regarding these banking concerns. The following message
has been cleared with all relevant agencies at post.
Summary
--------
¶2. (S/NF) The Austrian Ministry of Finance (MoF) told us
February 15 that Bank Austria/Creditanstalt (BA/CA) has
agreed to "stop doing business" with North Korean entities.
An Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) official told us
February 14 that the FMA was "uncomfortable" with Raiffeisen
Investment Holding AG's (RIAG) involvement in RosUkrEnergo
(RUE) and RUE's role in the Ukrainian-Russian gas deal.
However, the FMA is satisfied that an internal RIAG due
diligence and an outside due diligence by the U.S. risk
consulting firm Kroll revealed no derogatory information on
RUE's unnamed investors and no links to Russian organized
crime boss Semyon Mogilevich. Both the FMA and MoF
emphasized RIAG's commitment to expand operations in Eastern
Europe, maintaining that western commercial influences in the
region were beneficial to the countries. Embassy's Legatt
Office has been cooperating closely with Austrian law
enforcement authorities since summer 2005 on a multi-country
investigation of Mogilevich's money laundering activities in
the region. End Summary.
¶3. (S/NF) On February 14 and 15, EconUnit Chief followed up
on ref B and C discussions in separate meetings with xxxxx
from the Financial Market Authority's (FMA) xxxxx of the Ministry of
Finance's Financial Markets Directorate.xxxxx
reviewed the various USG concerns (ref D) in a systemic
manner. Both appreciated the information the USG had shared,
agreed to continue cooperation on a technical level regarding
USG concerns, and acknowledged that there was a political
component associated with these issues.
North Korea
-----------
¶4. (S/NF) xxxxx told us that following a meeting with
Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser the week of February 6,
Erich Hampel, the CEO of BA/CA, agreed to stop BA/CA's
business relations with North Korean entities. xxxxx
speculated that BA/CA probably made the decision to maintain
its good reputation.
¶5. WMD Proliferation Financing Issues
----------------------------------
¶A. (S/NF) USG Concern: Novin Energy Company, a firm
affiliated with Iran's nuclear program, was involved in a
payment from Creditanstalt to Mileace General Trading in May
2004 (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx reiterated information
discussed during Treasury U/S Levey's meeting with xxxxx,
the FMA's Executive Director (ref B). The
Iranian Mission to the International Atomic Energy had opened
a deposit bank account for Novin Energy Company at BA/CA.
According to xxxxx there have been no transactions that
aroused the FMA's suspicion. Periodically, there is a large
transfer to the Iranian National Bank. The FMA identified
only one payment to Mileace General Trading in New York for
an amount "under Euro 100,000."
¶B. (S/NF) USG Concern: Since 2001, Creditanstalt xxxxx has facilitated about a
dozen Iranian transactions, mostly nuclear-related (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx said the FMA was satisfied,
based on discussions with BA/CA, that xxxxx had not engaged
in any illegal or questionable activity. xxxxx is aware of
the sensitive nature of his position. He has over 10 years
experience in this position and works very closely with the
Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), xxxxx stated.
¶C. (S/NF) USG Concern: Syria was preparing to purchase
rocket motors for training aircraft from the Czech supply
company Omnipol. Financing was to be arranged with
Creditanstalt (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: BA/CA has no direct business
relationship with Omnipol. However, Omnipol does have an
account with HVB Czech, a subsidiary of BA/CA. According to
xxxxx HVB Czech needs BA/CA's authorization to transfer
amounts in excess of Euro 500,000. xxxxx maintained that
the only financing Omnipol has had through HVB Czech was for
the Czech Army's purchase of U.S. military equipment.
¶6. Terrorist Financing Issues
--------------------------
¶A. (S/NF) USG Concern: The Palestinian Association of
Austria (PVOE) maintained a Creditanstalt account as of early
¶2003. PVOE -- designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as
a terrorist entity and renamed the Palestinian Humanitarian
Association (PHV) -- collects donations on behalf of
HAMAS-affiliated charities in the Palestinian territories.
PHV's Internet website indicates that the organization
continues to maintain an account at Creditanstalt (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx stated that BA/CA had closed
all its PVOE accounts well before the U.S. designated PVOE as
a terrorist entity. xxxxx claimed that the FIU has
conducted two extensive investigations into PHV, which did
not turn up anything suspicious.
¶B. (S/NF) USG Concern: As of late November 2004, xxxxx ,
a former regime official now on the Iraqi
interim government's "Most Wanted" list, claimed to have
transferred a large sum of unspecified currency from the Arab
Bank in Amman, Jordan, to RZB to finance the Iraq insurgency
(ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx said that RZB has not
identified any accounts belonging xxxxx following a
thorough search that included numerous transliterations of
xxxxx.
¶C. (S/NF) USG Concern: The Vienna-based NGO Irakhilfswerk
in Osterreich instructs donors to send funds to Creditanstalt
(ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx characterized Irakhilfswerk's
websites as distasteful, e.g. with gruesome pictures of
wounded or dead U.S. military personnel. Nevertheless,
xxxxx said an extensive investigation by the Austrian
security services (BVT) revealed that Irakhilfswerk does
indeed use collected funds for charitable work in Iraq, e.g.,
purchasing medicines and clothing. xxxxx said the FMA
continued to monitor Irakhilfswerk accounts closely.
¶7. Money Laundering Issues
-----------------------
¶A. (S/NF) USG Concern: Following the recent U.S. sanctions
on Banco Delta Asia (BDA), there are indications that North
Korea moved several million euros from BDA to Creditanstalt
in October 2006 (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx restated information in ref C,
stressing that the FMA had no evidence that the BDA had ever
had an account with BA/CA. However, there was one payment
transfer in the amount of Euro 7 million that originated from
a Macao trading company via the Bank of China and Dresdner,
which BA/CA transferred to the Sberbank in Moscow. The FMA
admitted it did not know what the payment was. Other
payments from BA/CA's few North Korean accounts were
typically to international entities active in North Korea,
such as UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the Swiss Development Agency.
xxxxx emphasized that the FMA exercised additional
surveillance regarding North Korean financial activities
through the Austrian banking system.
¶B. (S/NF) USG Concern: U.S.-indicted crime boss Semyon
Mogilevich probably uses RZB and its subsidiary Raiffeisen
Investment Holding AG (RIAG) as a front to provide legitimacy
to the gas company that we suspect he controls, RosUkrEnergo
(RUE). RUE makes direct payments of $360,000 annually to
each of two RIAG executives in "consulting fees." We assess
that the payments probably are bribes for RIAG to maintain
the front for Mogilevich (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx acknowledged that the
non-transparency surrounding the gas deal had become a major
political issue in Ukraine and Russia. The FMA is
"uncomfortable" that an Austrian bank is in the middle of the
controversy. The FMA, xxxxx continued, had had "intense
discussions" with RZB/RIAG, but could not uncover any legal
improprieties. RIAG also conducted a strenuous due diligence
review of the unnamed RUE investors. Neither RIAG's internal
due diligence nor an independent due diligence by the U.S.
risk consulting firm Kroll had revealed derogatory
information or links to criminal activity, including to
Seymon Mogilevich (ref A). Regarding the RUE payments of
$360,000 to RIAG executives, xxxxx maintained that the
payments, in the names of the four RIAG executives on the RUE
Coordination Committee, went directly into a RIAG account, to
which none of the executives had access. RZB General Legal
Counsel told xxxxx January 30 that the Kroll Report found "no
link between the undisclosed investors and Mogilevich."
(Note: Embassy is working with RIAG to obtain a copy of the
Kroll report. End Note.) xxxxx speculated that RIAG's
primary objective is to prepare RUE for a January 2007 IPO on
the FTSE.
(S/NF) Embassy Note and Comment: Embassy's Legatt Office has
been cooperating closely with Austrian law enforcement
authorities since summer 2005 on a multi-country
investigation of Mogilevich's money laundering activities in
the region. Embassy suggests that Washington agencies
carefully consider this on-going investigation in regard to
further intervention with various GoA entities on
Mogilevich's links to RUE. End Embassy Comment.
¶C. (S/NF) USG Concern: RIAG holds a 61% stake in Priorbank,
Belarus' largest foreign-owned bank. Priorbank maintains
close ties to the Lukaschenko regime (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx noted that
Raiffeisen had been active in Eastern European markets, some
less democratic than others, for many years. Raiffeisen
believed that western commercial engagement, rather than
isolation, had had positive effects in undemocratic countries
(ref A). He noted that EBRD is a 13.5% shareholder in
Priorbank. xxxxx noted that there were no international
financial or trade sanctions against Belarus or senior
Belarussian officials.
¶8. Suspicious Activity Reports
---------------------------
¶A. (S/NF) USG Concern: U.S. banks reported 75 and 217
suspicious activity reports (SARs) since the late 1990s
involving BA/CA and RZB, respectively. Some transactions
involve shell companies used by criminal groups (ref D).
(S/NF) GOA Response: xxxxx said the Austrian FIU did not
believe that the quantity of SARs filed since the late 1990s
was especially high, especially for BA/CA. xxxxx said RZB
believes the overwhelming majority of its SARs stem from its
major U.S. dollar clearing operations throughout Eastern and
Central Europe. xxxxx added that the FMA had met with the
CEOs of BA/CA and RZB to heighten the banks' awareness of USG
concerns.
Statistics on BA/CA and RZB
---------------------------
¶9. (U) Bank Austria Creditanstalt (BA/CA) maintains 1,521
offices and branches, including 1,121 in Central and Eastern
Europe, South East Europe, and the CIS countries. In 2004,
its balance sheet assets totalled 146,516 million Euros. It
has 31,300 employees, of whom 21,100 are in Central and
Eastern Europe, South East Europe and the CIS.
¶10. (U) Raiffaisen Zentralbank (RZB) has 987 offices,
including 970 in Central and Eastern Europe, South East
Europe and the CIS. It had balance sheet assets of 67,946
million Euros in 2004. It employs 27,200, of whom 24,500 are
in Central and Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe and the CIS.
McCaw