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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07HELSINKI75, FINLAND'S 2007 ELECTION: CONSERVATIVES MAKE THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07HELSINKI75 | 2007-02-06 08:08 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO8948
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0075/01 0370838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060838Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4669
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0274
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2940
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000075
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S 2007 ELECTION: CONSERVATIVES MAKE THE
FIRST MOVES IN A QUIET CAMPAIGN
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
¶1. (U) January marked the unofficial opening of
Finland's Parliamentary election campaign, and most of
the country's eight political parties appear a bit slow
coming out of the gate. To be fair, the election is
still nearly two months away -- quite a long time, in
the Finnish context -- and most candidates and their
organizations are still in the early phases of defining
agendas. Some first-time candidates have started
pounding the pavement in their districts, but many
relatively "safe" incumbents admit to us that they are
unlikely to begin campaigning in earnest until as late
as the final four weeks before the vote. Electioneering
is always a low-key affair in this Nordic welfare state,
to be sure. The various parties' platforms differ
little, if at all; more importantly, clean campaigns,
respectful tactics and consensus politics are highly
prized by candidates and voters alike. Still, even
Finns have commented on what appears to be a notable
lack of urgency.
¶2. (SBU) But lest our readers think party politics are
actually boring in Finland, we begin our analysis of
March's Parliamentary elections with a look at the
Conservative Party (CONS) -- which, as an outsider
looking in, has certainly stepped out more boldly and
more colorfully than the other parties at this early
stage. CONS is Finland's third largest party, but after
four years in opposition it desperately wants to return
to government. Early polls, press gossip and rumors
within all the parties suggest, however, that the
incumbent Center Party (CEN) / Social Democratic (SDP)
coalition will be difficult to dislodge, and CONS
strategists admit that they face very long odds. The
governing CEN-SDP coalition has presided over good
economic times; the SDP boasts, by most accounts, the
nation's best electoral machinery; and CEN Prime Minster
Matti Vanhanen has rebounded in stunning fashion from
the thumping he took in last year's Presidential
elections to become Finland's single most popular
politician going into March's contest. Perhaps more
importantly, senior SDP and CEN politicians have openly
stated that they like the current working relationship
and believe it works for the country as a whole.
The Niinisto Factor
-------------------
¶3. (U) Still, CONS has made some early splashes. By far
the biggest has been the surprise candidacy of Sauli
Niinisto, the popular former finance minister and EU
central banker who almost scored a dramatic upset
victory in last year's Presidential election. Incumbent
Tarja Halonen (SDP), an icon in Finland with especially
strong support from women across the political spectrum,
was widely expected to win re-election in a landslide.
Niinisto's brash, energetic campaign focused on security
policy, entrepreneurship, Finland's "European" identity,
and a rejection of the isolationist or exceptionalist
strain in SDP politics. The Conservatives were
particularly successful in appealing to younger voters,
effectively countering a trend in which the SDP had been
the "hip choice" for younger Finns. After losing to
President Tarja Halonen by fewer than three percentage
points, Niinisto vowed to quit politics once and for
all. However, his unexpected return to the ring has
provided a shot in the arm for the Conservatives at the
polls, and even other party strategists expect CONS to
pick up at least two additional places in the 200-seat
Parliament on the strength of Niinisto's coattails
alone. Niinisto, a great campaigner, has chosen to run
in the Uusimaa district, Finland's largest and most
competitive -- and the home of Niinisto's biggest rival,
CEN Chairman and Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen.
¶4. (SBU) But if Niinisto's entry in the race has CEN and
SDP looking over their shoulders, it has also caused an
unwelcome disturbance within his own party. The
Conservatives' Party Leader is the young (35 years old),
capable and charismatic Jyrki Katainen -- but Niinisto
is the closest thing in Finland to a superstar. Except
in the rarest of circumstances, party leaders
automatically serve as prime ministerial candidates, and
both Katainen and Niinisto have gone to great lengths
publicly to make clear that Jyrki (often referred to in
the press as "Jyrki-Boy") is in charge. However, in a
recent poll in which voters were hypothetically asked,
"Who would make the best Prime Minister?", Katainen ran
a distant third. (Vanhanen clocked in at a whopping 44%,
compared to 12% for SDP Chair Eero Heinaluoma and a mere
HELSINKI 00000075 002 OF 003
9% for Katainen. Comment: Heinaluoma's poor showing --
and his widely-rumored unpopularity within his own party
-- also represent internal wild cards for the SDP and
will be examined septel.) More strikingly, almost a
third of self-identified CONS voted indicated a
preference for Niinisto as their PM candidate despite
his name not even being on the poll questionnaire.
While our contacts within CONS have nothing but respect
for Katainen, some strategists are already whispering
about the potential need for a change in leadership if
CONS has any hope of returning to government. Power
struggles are not common or welcome in Finnish politics,
but one may indeed loom for the Conservatives.
BOURGEOIS COOPERATION OR, MY FRIEND'S BEST ENEMY
--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (SBU) Leadership squabbles notwithstanding, CONS has
also managed to roil the waters by resurrecting a call
for a "non-socialist" alliance -- or "bourgeois
cooperation," as the Finns are fond of saying -- to
defeat the SDP. A year ago, after finishing a lonely
third in the Presidential elections, PM Vanhanen shocked
the SDP by asking CEN voters to back Niinisto, despite
his close relationship with his SDP coalition partners
and his renowned cooperation with President Halonen.
The move almost gave Niinisto the victory. This time,
the "non-socialist" trial balloon was floated by
Conservative MEP Alex Stubb (a close personal friend of
Niinisto), who called on CONS and CEN to join forces
with two small parties -- the Swedish People's Party
(SPP) and the Christian Democrats (CDP)-- to form a
right-leaning coalition. Stubb even offered as a model
the coalition that unseated the SDP in Sweden last year.
(NOTE: Unlike in much of Europe, the CDP is tiny in
Finland, currently holding six seats in parliament.)
¶6. (SBU) "Bourgeois cooperation" may ultimately be a
tough sell. A Finland-Gallup poll quickly revealed that
while 42% of voters favor an SDP-CONS governing
coalition, only 18% supported CONS-CEN combination. Our
contacts in the small SPP and CDP tell us they are not
overly interested in being swallowed up by what would
amount to a big party alliance, and without them CEN and
CONS would both have to increase significantly their
share of seats in Parliament (in which case, the CDP and
SPP would probably be happy to jump on the bandwagon).
More importantly, the only thing that really unites CONS
and CEN in Finland is the desire to beat the SDP.
Generalizing grossly, Center Party voters are rural and
agricultural; very conservative on social issues;
adamantly opposed to nuclear power, EU enlargement and
Finnish NATO membership; and staunch supporters of high
taxes and the welfare state, so long as they translate
into farm subsidies and good rural transportation
infrastructure. Generalizing again, Conservative voters
are overwhelmingly urban and business based; arguably
Finland's most liberal on social issues; pro-nuke, pro-
EU and even pro-NATO; and staunch supporters of the
welfare state, so long as there are the appropriate tax
breaks for entrepreneurs. And in the end, CEN and SDP
have made good bedfellows over the past four years and
show every sign of wanting to continue that
relationship. (Comment: Another small-party wild card
will be the Greens, who badly want to get into
government -- possibly as a replacement for the SPP.
Septel will look in further detail at the small-party
dynamic.)
SDP TEMPERS FLARE
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¶7. (SBU) The idea nonetheless prompted emotional
responses from the SDP. Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja
-- who has emerged from Finland's EU Presidency as an
enormously popular candidate who could create some
coattails of his own -- told journalists that he was not
interested in an SDP-CONS government and accused the
Conservatives of having turned "hard to the right" since
the 2003 election. SDP Interior Minister Rajamaki
stepped outside the bounds of Finnish consensus politics
by stating publicly that a CEN-CONS coalition would
offer policies and values that "threaten primarily
Finland's internal security." As for the CEN reaction,
PM Vanhanen has played down any discussion of
"bourgeois" cooperation (his stunt in the Presidential
elections notwithstanding), although few observers have
failed to notice that his senior advisor for economic
affairs has been one of the few outspoken CEN voices
arguing in favor of a CONS-CEN alliance.
COMMENT
HELSINKI 00000075 003 OF 003
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¶8. (U) The Finnish campaign will likely pick up steam
once the current Parliament finishes its final session
in early February and the parties begin going at it in
earnest. In particular, a series of televised debates
will give voters the opportunity to take a closer look
at the men and women who would be Finland's next PM, and
to hear their parties' platforms and positions on key
issues. Subsequent telegrams will look at the
personalities and strategies of the other large parties,
the role of the small parties, key personalities, and
impacts on US interests.
WARE