

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LIMA4570, PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA'S EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LIMA4570.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA4570 | 2006-12-04 22:10 | 2010-12-16 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Lima |
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #4570/01 3382244
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042244Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3201
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T LIMA 004570
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PINR PGOV PE
SUBJECT: PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA'S EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL
HEALTH
REF: STATE 189857
Classified By: Ambassador J Curtis Struble for reason 1.4(C).
¶1. (S) This message is in response to reftel request for
information on the emotional and physical health of President
Alan Garcia. Our responses are slugged to the questions in
reftel paragraphs. We do not always have first-hand
information on the questions asked, a fact reflected in some
of our answers below.
¶2. (S) Garcia's overall health appears to be good.
Notwithstanding a strenuous work schedule, he has clearly
gained weight over the past several months. This shows (both
in press photos and private meetings) in his slightly larger
jowls and a growing paunch. Reports of manic depression or
bipolar disorder are impossible to confirm, but rumors in
this connection are widespread. For example, many of our
contacts (with purported first-hand knowledge) say that
Garcia has always been moody, disposed to sudden flights of
enthusiasm, plunges of bad humor, and abrupt changes of mind.
Many of the more damaging rumors appear to have their
origins in the latter part of Garcia's first term, when his
popularity plummeted and the political and security
situations spiraled out of control. According to some
reports, in response Garcia at one point fell into a deep
funk, locked himself behind closed doors and refused public
contact of any kind for days on end. While that report
continues to hound him, there are no indications that it
responds to a long-standing or deep-set dimension of his
psychological or emotional makeup.
¶3. (S) We do not have the names and/or specialties of his
doctors.
¶4. (S) We have no direct information with respect to
medications taken by the president. A number of our contacts
have told us (as though it were an established fact) that
Garcia takes lithium for anti-depression (anti-bipolar
disorder) purposes, but we cannot confirm the veracity of
these reports.
¶5. (S) There is no evidence that Garcia suffers from alcohol
or drug abuse. We understand he does drink socially.
¶6. (S) Persecution, real as well as imagined, has been an
integral part of the president's life. Garcia's father, a
founding member of APRA, was imprisoned for several years for
his political activism. The APRA has been the object of
political persecution during Peru's recent era of military
dictatorships (1968-80), its activities as anti-regime
"democrats" curtailed. Garcia himself chose to leave Peru
after his first term ended in 1990, partly out of fears of
persecution. After one year of exile in Colombia, he fled to
France on hearing reports that he was being pursued by
Fujimori henchmen either for assassination or kidnapping back
to Peru. More recently, as president, Garcia and his son
have been the targets of alleged kidnapping plots. These
experiences have broadly shaped his personal and political
outlook, and exacerbated an innate tendency to keep
information "close-hold," strictly limited to an intimate
circle of advisors.
¶7. (S) A master politician, Garcia has survived and thrived
via the indirect threat, ably playing rivals against one
another and undermining, with cold calculation, the political
bases of potential competitors, including those within his
own party. Garcia's APRA party is also well known as the
most effective political machine in Peru, complete with goon
squads that are dispatched to do various kinds of dirty work
on behalf of its leaders. We have no information that he has
ever issued explicit violent threats or the like. While
there are widespread reports that he is a difficult,
demanding boss and a moody person, we have no information
that he is abusive toward advisors or family.
¶8. (S) According to most reports, Garcia has an extremely
heavy work load and regularly takes on too many tasks. As a
man who lives and breathes politics, at the expense of most
other dimensions of his life, he often works late. It could
almost be said that work is all he does. Moreover, he is a
pure politician in the sense that he has never done anything
but the work of candidate or president, and it is all he
knows how to do. (He has written books, but most critics
understand that is not his gift.)
¶9. (S) Garcia has the reputation of being an acute
micro-manager and very demanding on his staff, even tasking
senior ministers in public and on the spot with various
responsibilities and duties. In the sense that he often
expects Ministers to divine and carry out his will rather
than to generate policy ideas or propose alternative
solutions, he demands the impossible. As for lofty ideas, he
appears to have learned lessons from his first term, lowering
expectations and focusing on pragmatic programs rather than
on large romantic visions. For example, he has no apparent
ambition to change the world, re-order political and economic
realities according to a new "vision" for Latin America, or
create the new socialist specimen or Bolivarian man. The
signal programs of his second term so far -- Sierra
Exportadora, Agua Para Todos, the Decentralization Shock --
amount in many ways to recombining and repackaging diverse
existing tactical poverty reduction schemes (including
USAID's PRA -- Poverty Reduction and Alleviation -- project)
than to pursuing an overriding lofty ambition. At the same
time, most observers see Garcia's strengths as rhetorical
rather than administrative, in inspiring with impassioned and
even poetic oratory rather than in overseeing (prosaic)
projects slowly through their step by step implementation.
¶10. (S) Garcia's public and private persona are, in many
ways, at odds. In public, he tends to strike the majesterial
presidential pose, chest thrust forward, head held high, arms
and hands gesturing in the formal, almost choreographed
manner of the leader. He is also prone to giving long public
lectures, reflecting a know-it-all and superior tone. All
this comes across as pompous and inflated. By contrast, in
private Garcia is a more informal, disarming and even
considerate figure. He is courteous and deferential with
visitors, and an excellent listener, often probing
interlocutors for more detailed information. One aspect on
which there is near universal agreement is that Garcia has a
colossal ego, which can blind him to the merits of good ideas
and alternatives that he himself has not generated. To some
observers, while he is unlikely to repeat the mistakes that
brought Peru close to ruin during his first administration,
the ego is Garcia's Achilles' heel and could have
counterproductive consequences to the current government,
especially if unchecked.
¶11. (S) Garcia's attention span appears to be good, and his
listening skills are excellent. We have no information that
he has difficulty in concentrating, gets confused or is
forgetful. As noted above, there are widespread reports of a
certain emotional volatility, but it is not clear that this
impairs his ability to think or to express himself clearly.
¶12. (S) We have no information about any periods of intense
energy or activity, racing thoughts or incoherence. We have
not noted any tendency to shake, blink or roll his eyes.
¶13. (S) While there are widespread reports that Garcia fell
into a deep depression near the end of his first term (as
noted above), we have no information that that corresponds to
a deep-set emotional characteristic or that it has recurred
regularly since that time. We have no information about talk
of suicide.
¶14. (S) We have no information regarding any decreased need
for sleep or food. A truly gifted orator, he never sounds as
though his speech were hurried or pressured, nor does it
follow a notably illogical flow.
¶15. (S) We have no information about his exercise routine or
diet regimen, nor any dietary restrictions due to ongoing
medications.
¶16. (S) We have no information regarding any compulsive
overeating, shopping, gambling or the like. That said, as
noted above, Garcia has manifestly gained weight since being
in office and is likely a consequence of his eating amply and
well. There are widespread rumors of Garcia's numerous
extra-marital sexual liaisons. Recently, Garcia publicly
acknowledged one of them, with Ms. Elizabeth Roxanne
Cheesman, with whom he had a young child. While he publicly
claimed that this relationship occurred during the brief time
he was estranged from his wife Pilar Nores, some observers
have suggested that it was much more enduring than he had
publicly let on.
¶17. (S) In the interim between the end of his first
presidential term in 1990 and the current term, which began
in July of 2006, Garcia has spent time both abroad and in
Peru. After leaving office the first time, in 1992 Garcia
fled to a kind of quasi political exile in Bogota, Colombia,
where he remained for one year. (Garcia harbors a deep
sympathy for Colombia dating back to that time.) From there,
he fled to France, where he lived for the following eight
years. (From this period, Garcia speaks excellent French and
has a strong personal sympathy for French society and life.)
He returned to Peru in 2001, following Alberto Fujimori's
resignation from the presidency. He was formally separated
from his wife in 2004-5.
STRUBLE