

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON230, GNZ AIMS TO COOL EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. FTA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06WELLINGTON230.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06WELLINGTON230 | 2006-03-24 04:04 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHWL #0230/01 0830451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240451Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2568
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4350
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0041
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000230
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR-BWEISEL
STATE FOR EB/TPP/MTA-MBGOODMAN AND EAP/ANP-DRICCI
COMMERCE FOR ABENAISSA/4530/ITA/MAC/AP/OSAO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: ETRD PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: GNZ AIMS TO COOL EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. FTA
REF: A. WELLINGTON 40
¶B. 04 WELLINGTON 217
(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission David R. Burnett.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The New Zealand government is preparing the
public for the likelihood it will not attain free trade
negotiations with the United States any time soon. After six
years of pressing its case for such a deal, the Labour-led
government has turned its attention to agreements in Asia.
The government can be expected to attempt to immunize itself
against domestic political criticism that its failure to
secure an FTA is the result of Labour,s icy relations with
Washington. If pushed, Labour will likely trot out any and
all rationales for why an FTA is not in the cards to deflect
any accusations that it is at fault. End summary.
Into the future
---------------
¶2. (C) Trade Minister Goff in a March 15 statement implied
that, although New Zealand still desired a free trade
agreement (FTA) with the United States, it probably would not
get one. Goff pointed to the U.S. &strategy of negotiating
with larger economies8 and the limited time before Trade
Promotion Authority expires. It is perhaps the first time
that the government has shared with the public a realistic
appraisal of its chance for FTA talks with Washington. An
aide to Goff said the statement reflects the government,s
recognition that it needs to lower the public,s expectations
) expectations that the government itself had fed until
recently.
¶3. (C) An FTA with the United States had topped the Labour
government,s foreign policy objectives since it came to
power in 1999. But officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade have told post recently that they had
accepted the fact that an FTA was not in the works.
Why New Zealand wants a deal
----------------------------
¶4. (U) Studies predict that, under an FTA, New Zealand,s
merchandise exports to the United States ) already New
Zealand,s second-largest export market ) would increase 51
percent. The New Zealand government,s competitive envy at
seeing Australia sign an FTA with the United States in May
2004 only fueled its desire for a similar pact. Its chief
concern was that the U.S.-Australia FTA could draw down New
Zealand exports to the United States, as well as draw off
U.S. investment in New Zealand.
¶5. (C) New Zealand,s hopes for improved trade still ride on
the success of the Doha Round. (The Uruguay Round pumped an
estimated $6 billion into the New Zealand economy through
additional export revenue and tariff savings.) But New
Zealand is pursuing a &Plan B8 ) bilateral and regional
trade agreements ) should the WTO talks fall apart. It has
completed free trade deals with Australia, Singapore and
Thailand. It has agreed to a four-way partnership with
Brunei, Chile and Singapore, and it is negotiating FTAs with
China, Malaysia and the ASEAN countries. New Zealand
officials had hoped their pursuit of an FTA with China would
stimulate U.S. concern and interest in starting talks with
New Zealand on a trade deal (ref B).
¶6. (C) But the Labour government,s desire for an FTA with
the United States is now less a matter of economics and more
a matter of domestic politics. The lack of an FTA with the
United States makes the New Zealand government politically
vulnerable to accusations by opposition parties that it has
weakened ties with both Australia and the United States. An
FTA would show New Zealanders that Americans are not
disaffected by the Labour-led government, which is aware that
it &soiled the waters8 since President Bush took office,
said an international lawyer and former trade negotiator.
Ironically, reaching an FTA with China could call the
public,s attention to the government,s failure to achieve a
U.S. agreement, as well as raise questions on whether New
Zealand's economy would become dangerously dependent on a
much larger, undemocratic PRC.
¶7. (C) Over the last six years, the New Zealand government
has diligently recruited allies to its quest for an FTA. It
rounded up backing in Congress, with 65 members signing up as
"Friends of New Zealand8 supporting free trade talks.
(Goff's March 15 statement was in response to a letter
written by Senators John McCain and John Sununu encouraging
the President to launch FTA negotiations with New Zealand.)
It lobbied for and won U.S. business endorsement, partly
through the United States-New Zealand Council. John Wood,
who recently ended his term as New Zealand ambassador to the
United States, even made the FTA the defining goal that would
mark his success in Washington (and misled his Prime Minister
over the likely odds the United States would agree to
negotiations). Many New Zealanders consider the
government,s contribution of troops in Afghanistan and
engineers in Iraq as part of the outreach aimed at bringing
the United States into FTA negotiations.
But it has mixed feelings
-------------------------
¶8. (C) Insiders say that Prime Minister Clark has appeared
sometimes testy in private, expressing exasperation over
Washington,s failure to agree to FTA talks. The government
is sensitive to being perceived as &begging8 and is aware
that it has worn out its welcome with U.S. government
officials on this issue, according to Goff,s aide.
¶9. (C) But there may be another reason for that testiness,
said a trade economist who has advised the government on its
trade policy. Lurking just under the surface is a
"schizophrenia8 that comes from Clark,s innate discomfort
with free trade and her preference, as a Labour idealist, for
a government-interventionist approach to the economy.
¶10. (C) Moreover, PM Clark and others in her government worry
about the concessions New Zealand might need to make to seal
a free-trade deal. Among their concerns is a desire to
preserve the government-run system for purchasing
pharmaceuticals, according to the economist. Because of that
desire, Heather Simpson ) the Prime Minister,s chief of
staff, close confidante and a former health economist )
opposes the FTA talks. The New Zealand government would be
hard-pressed to meet likely U.S. demands that it open the
drug-purchasing system to greater competition and choice.
That would be costly, and health care expenses already are
the largest component of the New Zealand budget (ref A).
¶11. (C) The government also knows that U.S. dairy interests
would defend their turf against New Zealand,s efficient
competitors. New Zealand officials acknowledge that they
stand to gain more from an FTA than the United States. With
very few tariffs, the New Zealand market already is
relatively open. Aside from increased access to the drug and
telecommunications sectors and possibly a wider ban on
parallel imports, the United States has little to gain.
The public,s response
---------------------
¶12. (C) The New Zealand public accepts as an article of
faith that a deal would boost the New Zealand economy.
However, after so much talk over so many years, many New
Zealanders have become jaded to the prospect, a university
business professor said. Most of the domestic pressure for a
U.S. FTA comes from a small section of New Zealand business
) notably, the dairy cooperative Fonterra. Most of the
country,s businesses are small and rely little on exports.
In addition, both the horticulture and meat industries are
more frightened by the concessions that New Zealand might
make than attracted by the benefits they might reap, an
industry leader said. Only a muted public response, if any,
is expected to the government,s scuttled hopes for an FTA.
¶13. (C) And, even if there were political repercussions, the
Labour government can always shift the blame to the United
States, the international lawyer said. Goff in his March 15
statement said, &The decision to negotiate an FTA however
rests with the US Administration.8 The Labour government
can blame its anti-nuclear policy and its opposition to the
war in Iraq as reasons why the United States will not engage
in talks. Such explanations are likely to wash with New
Zealand voters, many of whom hold strong anti-nuclear and
anti-Iraq war views. (For this reason, EAP A/S Hill's public
remarks that the United States will make its FTA decision on
economic factors alone were well-timed and very useful.) In
any event, the public largely holds the New Zealand
government blameless for the lack of FTA negotiations,
according to the lawyer. Labour's political opponents also
need to tread carefully. The National Party is mindful that
it may fare no better in securing an FTA should it win the
2008 election, a former diplomat said.
¶14. (SBU) However, if Australia reaps large gains from its
FTA with the United States, public attitudes could change in
New Zealand.
Comment
-------
¶15. (C) In the near term, New Zealand government officials
will continue to press us in private meetings for an FTA, but
in a more low-key way. They also will continue to publicly
call for FTA negotiations with the United States while at the
same time lowering the public,s expectations. Post believes
we should stick with our current response, saying that the
possibility of negotiations is not foreclosed. Keeping the
option open gives us flexibility should circumstances change
and make an FTA in our interest ) and deniability should the
New Zealand government pin the blame on the United States.
McCormick