

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ROME1363, ISAF: NEXT STEPS FOR ITALY'S 1,000 TROOP COMMITMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ROME1363.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME1363 | 2009-12-11 16:04 | 2011-02-21 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO3901
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHRO #1363/01 3451639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111639Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2999
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0563
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0977
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0359
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3921
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4142
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3065
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001363
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF
SUBJECT: ISAF: NEXT STEPS FOR ITALY'S 1,000 TROOP COMMITMENT
REF: A. ROME DAILY REPORT 12/4/09
¶B. II...
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Dibble for Reasons 1.4
(B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. The Italian government has started the
Parliamentary approval process for its increased ISAF
commitments. On December 10, FM Frattini and MOD La Russa
briefed Parliament's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees
on the GOI's plans for a 1,000-troop surge in ISAF over the
next ten months. The Ministers asked Parliament to authorize
an average troop level of 3,700 in the second half of 2010
and La Russa pledged that the Italian contingent would not
exceed 4,000 troops and Carabinieri. The Defense Minister
also announced plans to send at least 3 more attack
helicopters, 3 transport helicopters and 3 additional C-27J
transport aircraft to support the ISAF mission. Senate
President Schifani told the Ambassador on December 9 that he
did not anticipate problems in Parliament, but that Italy may
have to make small adjustments to its troop levels in Lebanon
and Kosovo to accommodate the increase. Schifani, a
Berlusconi loyalist, told the Ambassador that the Prime
Minister had responded immediately to President Obama's
request for more troops because Berlusconi viscerally
believes in the importance of the transatlantic bond and sees
it as transcending personalities and politics. La Russa
stressed to parliamentarians the critical role that phone
calls from President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates played in shaping Italy's response. We are
aggressively reaching out to Parliamentarians and key
thinkers to express our thanks and encourage swift
Parliamentary action. Continued Washington outreach and
engagement with Prime Minister Berlusconi and top Italian
officials in the next two months are critical to bringing the
GOI's major recommitment to fruition in the context of
Italy's increasingly agitated political scene. End Summary.
Gradual Increase to 3,700, Not To Exceed 4,000
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (SBU) A week after the Cabinet's approval and the Brussels
pledge of an additional 1,000 troops for Afghanistan (Ref A),
FM Frattini and MOD La Russa briefed a joint session of the
Chamber and Senate Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees on
December 10 on the GOI's plan for Afghanistan. Frattini said
that President Obama's West Point speech set out a clear
18-month time frame for the surge and helped shape the
Italian decision: ""The beginning of international military
disengagement from Afghanistan will begin in July 2011,"" he
said. ""The decision is made. We will have to decide how to
implement it, not whether to implement it. It is a strategy
with a clear road map, a time frame, and objectives that must
be achieved within that time frame."" He backed President
Karzai's goals to have the Afghan Security Forces take over
security within five years, to fight corruption, and to
pursue reconciliation with insurgents prepared to accept the
Constitution. Italy is in Afghanistan, he said, to guarantee
its own national security because ""jihadist infiltrations
that we see in Europe and in Italy originate"" in the boundary
areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
¶3. (SBU) La Russa told the committee that NATO SYG Rasmussen
had asked PM Berlusconi for 1,600 troops, and that the GOI
had decided on the 1,000 figure after receiving telephone
calls from President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates. He said the GOI will seek Parliamentary authorization
for an increase in the average troop level from 2,795 (the
currently authorized annual baseline) to an average of 3,300
in the first half of 2010 and 3,700 in the second half.
Total troop levels will not exceed 4,000 in 2010, including
the 200 Carabinieri police trainers pledged so far, of which
60 are on the ground (in addition to 20 assigned to EUPOL).
(Note: 60 of these trainers will be formed into 3 POMLTs in
RC-West.) La Russa also announced plans to send 3 additional
combat helicopters to supplement the 6 already there, 3
transport and medevac helicopters to the 7 currently there,
and 3 C-27J air transports to the C130J already there. Italy
will also send improved Armored Personnel Carriers to RC-West
and add a Role 2 field hospital for Baghdis province. Four
AMX fighter aircraft have replaced the two Tornados deployed
to RC-West for reconnaissance missions. La Russa added that
further air and mechanized assets may be necessary to support
the creation of a fourth Italian ""battle group"" in RC-West.
Offset By Troop Savings in Kosovo and Lebanon
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (SBU) La Russa said reductions in Kosovo and Lebanon will
help compensate for the surge. He projected that 1,300 of
the 1,900 Italian troops in KFOR will withdraw by October
2010, and the GOI plans to draw down 200 troops from UNIFIL
when General Graziano turns over command to the Spanish in
February 2010; ""however, I hope that more countries will
become involved in Lebanon so that we may reduce our presence
further, while still keeping as our priority the level of
quality of our contingent.""
¶5. (C) Frattini and La Russa did not discuss funding for the
troop increase, although recent press articles on the draft
budget law have suggested that the GOI may tap into
additional monies expected from the fiscal amnesty law and
from excess funds in the pension reserve system. Although
Italian military planners have not yet fully developed a
detailed deployment scenario, our assessment is that the
Italian armed forces have the capacity to deploy the proposed
troops without serious budgetary or structural difficulties
(Ref B).
¶6. (SBU) The opposition Democratic Party (PD) remains
supportive of the overall strategy, although critical of the
government's rollout. PD Foreign Affairs spokesman Piero
Fassino said that the GOI should have informed Parliament
before making the December 3 announcement, criticized its
willingness to declare a withdrawal date before the start of
the new ""pacification process,"" and urged the government to
provide further details on its plans to reduce troops in
Kosovo and Lebanon.
Schifani: Berlusconi Did Not Hesitate to Say Yes to Obama
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Kicking off our outreach strategy to Parliament, the
Ambassador thanked Senate President Schifani on December 9
for Italy's contribution and expressed hope that the proposal
would move quickly through Parliament. Schifani, a
Berlusconi loyalist, was pleased that the Italian
announcement appears to have encouraged other ISAF members to
contribute more. He did not anticipate problems in
Parliament, where the GOI enjoys a comfortable majority, but
said that Italy may have to adjust slightly its troop levels
in Lebanon and Kosovo to accommodate the surge. He noted
that on December 2, Senators from the Northern League,
Berlusconi's junior coalition partner which has criticized
the Afghan mission in the past, voted in favor of the latest
decree authorizing Italian military missions abroad until the
end of 2009. Schifani told the Ambassador that the Prime
Minister did not hesitate to respond positively to President
Obama's request for more troops because the transatlantic
bond is a key element of his world view that transcends
parties, individuals and institutions.
Comment: Berlusconi Will Need USG Political Top-Cover in the
Months Ahead
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -
¶8. (C) Comment: Although Berlusconi enjoys a comfortable
parliamentary majority, his decision to announce the
contribution before consulting with Parliament leaves him
exposed to criticism both from within the governing coalition
and from the Center Left opposition. In addition, the fact
that Italy made the largest publicly announced ISAF troop
contribution -- and the absence of any firm troop commitment
by Paris or Berlin -- may prompt criticism that Berlusconi
overcommitted Italy during a time of economic crisis while
France, Germany and others held back. Faced with a growing
list of political troubles -- ongoing legal battles, his
growing open rivalry with Chamber of Deputies President Fini,
and uncertainty over the future of the Center Right coalition
-- Berlusconi can ill-afford to have his Afghan commitment
turned against him. We urge that Washington offer continued
and regular high level contact, particularly with Berlusconi,
Frattini and La Russa, to ensure that Italy's major
recommitment to the ISAF mission comes to speedy and
successful fruition. End Comment.
THORNE
"