

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3079, ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TELAVIV3079.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TELAVIV3079 | 2006-08-08 08:08 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
null
Carol X Weakley 08/08/2006 04:49:20 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley
Cable
Text:
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 03079
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: AMB AID ADM RSO CONS IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM
DAO
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
CLEARED: DCM:GACRETZ, POL:NOLSEN
VZCZCTVI676
OO RUEHC RUEHLB RUEHFR RUEHNO RUCNDT
DE RUEHTV #3079/01 2200836
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080836Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5433
INFO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0693
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8795
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0140
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3850
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003079
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA, IO/UNP, L
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS LE IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT
DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) In their August 6 meeting, Israeli FM Tzipi Livni told
NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch that Israel could not
approve of the draft UN resolution in its current form.
Making impassioned, emotional appeals, she more than once put
forward the following reasons:
-- In Israel's view, the resolution leads to negotiations
over Shebaa Farms, a territory disputed between Syria and
Lebanon. Livni asserted that the international community has
no right to make Israel a party to the dispute, and make
Shebaa Farms an irritant in the Israel-Lebanon bilateral
relationship. Livni also asserted that -- if the resolution
were approved -- Lebanon would press first for a resolution
of Shebaa Farms at the expense of all other matters for
resolution. In this case, Livni said, Lebanon would get what
it wants, fail to follow through on anything else, and
Hizballah aggression would be rewarded.
-- In Israel's view, the draft resolution will allow Lebanon
to place conditions on its assent to the political framework
envisioned in operative paragraph six (OP6). She suggested
that a weak Lebanese government will make its agreement
conditional on something that Israel would not be able to
accept, and thereby shift the international community's focus
onto Israel as the intransigent party.
-- In Israel's view, the two-resolution approach is flawed.
As the second resolution concerning the multinational force
(MNF) is, as Israel understands, almost complete, it and the
first resolution should be combined.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY, CONTINUED: FM Livni instead strongly pushed
for the draft UNSCR to call for full implementation of UNSCR
1559s and 1680 -- especially as they concern disarming
militias and delimiting Lebanon's border with Syria. She
stressed that Israel has no quarrel with Lebanon, and wants
to see the Siniora government succeed -- if necessary with
appropriate help from the international community. She
argued that the international community's undertakings need
to recognize and focus on the fact that the conflict started
when Hizballah attacked Israel from Lebanon's territory. The
conflict, she asserted, is between Hizballah and its backers,
and Israel -- not between Lebanon and Israel. FM Livni also
expressed disappointment at the news that France has been
tapped to organize and lead the multinational force (MNF)
envisioned to enter southern Lebanon after a cease-fire. She
repeatedly probed for information on what the Europeans --
and EU High Representative Solana -- were doing to comprise
an MNF, and wondered aloud if NATO is considering whether to
deploy the NATO Response Force (NRF) to the region.
Assistant Secretary Welch briefed FM Livni on his meetings in
Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
ISRAEL REJECTS MAKING Shebaa FARMS AN ISRAEL-LEBANON ISSUE
--------------------------------------------- ------------
¶3. (S) With media representatives present, FM Livni opened
the meeting by cautioning everyone not to believe what the
newspapers write: "Israel is not satisfied with the draft UN
resolution as it stands." After the media reps departed the
room, Livni reiterated to the Assistant Secretary that Israel
-- like Lebanon -- does not approve of the current draft of
the resolution. Over the next hour and a half, FM Livni made
repeated, impassioned appeals to the Assistant Secretary not
to allow the draft UN resolution to address the long-standing
Shebaa Farms territorial dispute. First, she argued that
Shebaa Farms is a territorial dispute between Lebanon and
Syria. As such, Israel has no right to be involved in it,
and does not wish to have it placed on its bilateral agenda
with Lebanon. She argued that IF/IF Shebaa Farms were
returned to Lebanon in any kind of post-conflict resolution
-- and Israel were implicated in the return -- then Syria
might attack Israel, arguing that Israel had no right to hand
the territory over to Lebanon.
¶4. (S) FM Livni also returned to what she said were the GOI's
initial objections to addressing the Shebaa Farms issue in
the first place -- that return of any disputed territory as
part of a resolution to the current conflict would be
tantamount to rewarding aggression. Hizballah, she claimed,
would grow stronger, and terrorists in the region would be
emboldened, perceiving that their aggression had paid
dividends. Asking for five minutes to lay out the Israeli
position on Shebaa Farms, Livni continued: "In past
discussions between Israel and the U.S., it was clear that
Shebaa Farms would be the end of a process -- full
implementation of (UNSCR) 1559. Now, it is being put as
something to start with! I am so fed up with weak leaders
who want to get something good without implementing their
deals." She wondered aloud what would happen next -- perhaps
Hizballah would press for return of the West Bank? Pounding
the table, Livni said, "Surely the U.S. and other Western
governments are not naive enough to believe Hizballah's
statements that it exists because of Shebaa Farms. Iran is
the reason why Hizballah exists. Iran, Syria, the
Palestinians and Hamas are watching us. We will be sending
the wrong message. They will see that they get something by
killing Israelis. I do not care about Siniora's 'blah blah'
about how this is something for him. If Shebaa Farms are
returned to Lebanon, Hizballah will merely take up another
cause. It exists solely to advocate for and execute the
destruction of Israel. This is about our existence, not
Shebaa Farms. Shebaa Farms is a Syria-Israel conflict. I
ask you, do not lead us to a situation where the end of this
conflict becomes a victory for Hizballah."
¶5. (S) Pressed by the Assistant Secretary to address Israel's
specific concerns with the language, Livni repeatedly
returned to operative paragraph six (OP 6 -- which she
claimed places obligations on Israel to resolve issues that
previously were to be resolved by Lebanon) and operative
paragraph seven (OP 7) in the draft text, which she said
envisions the UN Secretary General securing assent from
Lebanon and Israel for a political framework. Livni
explained that Israel's fear is that the return of Shebaa
Farms is perceived by the government of Lebanon as part of
the political framework. Israel envisions a worst-case
scenario in which Lebanon conditions its assent to the
political framework on Israeli fulfillment of something that
it cannot fulfill -- or worse, the return of Shebaa Farms.
In this case, Israel would appear to be the intransigent
party. One could, she said, imagine a scenario in which
Shebaa Farms were returned, and then the weak Siniora
government decides not to take action on any of its
"obligations," including complete execution of UNSCR 1559.
Livni summarized -- Lebanon gets something for nothing.
Hizballah -- which started this war -- is rewarded for
aggression. Israel is hereafter saddled with obligations
based on a war that it did not start.
¶6. (S) Livni stressed that prior to the outbreak of the
fighting, there was a series of UNSCRs that concerned
Lebanon: 425 (Israel's withdrawal behind a UN-mandated
line), 1559 (disarmament of militias) and 1680 (calling on
Syria to delimit its borders with Lebanon). Accepting
Assistant Secretary Welch's clarification that expectations
laid out in 1559 were not "obligations" set on Lebanon's
government, Livni nonetheless argued that it needs to be made
clear that the conflict has evolved out of unfulfilled
resolutions calling for action by countries in the region
other than Israel. Israel, she asserted, has executed all
that it has been called upon to do in the resolutions. It
should not, she stressed, be burdened with any actions as the
result of a conflict that it did not initiate. "The way to
resolve this conflict," she said, "is to return to 1680. If
the government of Lebanon does not want it, then tough luck!
We need to refer to full implementation of 1680. We want you
to agree to the idea that Shebaa Farms will be dealt with
only after 1559 is fully implemented."
--------------------------------------------- -------------
ISRAEL DOES NOT LIKE 1ST RESOLUTION; USING TWO RESOLUTIONS
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶7. (S) Livni also wondered aloud why the U.S. and France had
decided on a process involving two UNSC resolutions -- the
first calling for a cease-fire, and the second mandating the
insertion of a multinational force (MNF) into southern
Lebanon. If Israel understood correctly that 90 percent of
the second resolution had already been composed, Livni
wondered why the U.S. would not just combine the two
resolutions together. She complained that separating the two
left the process open-ended, starting with a cease-fire that
could ultimately prove indefinite -- a return to the status
quo ante. Livni stressed that Israel is "willing to give the
keys" to the MNF, and is not trying to buy more time for the
IDF: "We do not need more time to allow our forces to be
attacked by Hizballah. From the beginning, we have said we
are willing to leave Lebanon. We do not, however, want to
face another UNIFIL again."
¶8. (S) Assistant Secretary Welch clarified that the first
resolution calls for a cessation of hostilities -- something
considerably different than a cease-fire. He confessed that
he did not have any details to share on the MNF itself,
noting only his understanding that France has taken upon
itself the role of organizing whatever MNF eventually enters
southern Lebanon. As for the step-by-step nature of the
process, the Assistant Secretary explained that potential
troop contributors to the MNF needed to have Israel's and
Lebanon's commitment to the framework political agreement
before their governments could consider assigning forces to
the MNF. No country, he said, could be expected to place its
troops in southern Lebanon without the consent of the parties
to their presence. He added that raising an MNF takes time,
and noted that France postponed the first meeting of the
force generation conference that was scheduled to take place
in New York earlier in the week. Responding to the FM's
re-statement that Israel would prefer one resolution and the
opportunity to "insert more details" regarding the arms
embargo, the MNF's rules of engagement and the Syria-Lebanon
border, the Assistant Secretary stressed that re-opening the
matter posed greater danger than continuing with the current
process.
--------------------------------------------- ----
A/S WELCH BRIEFS LIVNI ON HIS MEETINGS IN LEBANON
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶9. (S) The Assistant Secretary shared with Livni the results
of his August 4-5 meetings in Lebanon with PM Siniora, former
economy minister Marwan Hamadi, Druze leader Walid Jumblat;
the UNSYG's Personal Rep, Geir Pederson; Lebanese
Parliamentary Speaker Nabi Berri, and Maronite leader Natal
Malawi. Stressing that he had met with representatives from
all of Lebanon's confessions, the Assistant Secretary
characterized the meetings as very professional.
Specifically, he told FM Livni that:
-- Berri sees himself as able to represent Shia interests,
and is willing, but does not feel obligated, to do so. He is
providing considerable help to PM Siniora, who relies upon
him to keep the Shia in line with the GOL. Berri indicated
his willingness to be an intermediary to Hizballah.
-- Lebanon's Druze are plugged into all the issues and assert
that a Shia figure needs to take the lead to stop the
conflict. The Maronites as a group are more divided in their
views, but are more anti-Hizballah, anti-Syria and anti-Iran
than the other confessions.
-- Jumblat claimed that the IDF is not making much headway
against Hizballah and needs to keep up pressure on the group.
All of the Assistant Secretary's interlocutors understood
that it is helpful to have Hizballah "militarily pressured."
-- His Lebanese interlocutors had reached a common view on
reparations. They also asked for U.S. help on reconstructing
bridges.
-- All of his interlocutors shared a common view on Shebaa
Farms, including the importance of the issue and the view
that its resolution would deprive Hizballah of its claim for
its resistance. All want to see Shebaa Farms returned as
part of a political change and victory over Hizballah. They
do not need all of the territory returned, and they do not
want delimitation, as this would give Syria a veto. They do
not insist that Lebanon control the returned territory, or
that all Lebanese displaced persons and refugees return.
They would agree to full demilitarization of the returned
portion. All agreed on the seven points contained in the
Lebanese cabinet's understanding. All expect a specific
proposal from Israel regarding withdrawal.
-- All of his interlocutors perceive that the international
community is pressuring Lebanon to make peace with Israel.
The Lebanese want an armistice agreement to provide them
cover so that they can carry out any undertakings with
Israel. Progress has been made on the principles of an
armistice. If the Lebanese can obtain the principles and
elements that they desire, they would quickly agree. They do
not like the draft resolution in its current form as it does
not address withdrawal. (NOTE: The Assistant Secretary
stressed that he might have more influence on the Lebanese if
he could return to them with withdrawal language acceptable
to Israel. END NOTE.)
-- Like the Israelis, the Lebanese are not happy with the
lead role France has appointed itself in organizing the MNF.
-- All said that they cannot ask for or approve a
multinational force under a Chapter 7 mandate, but can accept
one if it is imposed on Lebanon. They are planning for the
deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) immediately
upon withdrawal of the IDF -- even if the MNF is not yet in
place. Berri implied that Hizballah would agree, and
volunteered to personally lead a vanguard of 10,000-15,000
troops into the south. All shared the Israeli view that
there should be no space between Phases One and Two. The
Lebanese view, however, is that as long as the IDF remains in
Lebanon, it should expect the fight to continue. All of the
Assistant Secretary's interlocutors preferred that the IDF
withdraw right away, and noted that the growing plight of
displaced persons increases the scope for Iranian and Syrian
interference. PM Siniora has been in touch with potential
Islamic troop contributors -- including Malaysia and
Indonesia -- and wants the bulk of Muslim MNF troops to be
Sunni.
-- All accept that there should be no arms in the area of
operations except those held by the LAF and MNF. They accept
the responsibility to stop weapons re-supply, and are willing
to accept some UNIFIL role in monitoring this. (NOTE: FM
Livni responded that "This is most important for Israel right
now." END NOTE.)
-- All agreed that Iran and Syria want to continue the fight.
-- All of his interlocutors were very realistic on the
prisoner issue. They want to see it referred to in the draft
resolution, but will not make their agreement to the
resolution conditional on it. Responding to Livni, the
Assistant Secretary said that he had no more information on
the condition of the Israeli soldiers being held prisoner.
He recounted that PM Siniora had told him that right after
their abduction, he had been told that they were safe and
"out of the South." Siniora had also said very empathetic
things about how prisoners would be cared for under Islamic
law.
¶10. (S) The Assistant Secretary said that the USG's goal is
to aim for a vote on the draft resolution on August 8, and
that Secretary Rice would relocate to New York the evening of
August 7 in support of that aim. FM Livni wondered aloud
whether Israel or Lebanon could alter the timetable. The
Assistant Secretary replied that UNSYG Annan would likely
press ahead, notwithstanding any Lebanese or Israeli
reservations.
¶11. (C) The U.S. side was represented by Assistant Secretary
Welch, State Deputy Legal Adviser Jonathan Schwartz,
Ambassador Richard H. Jones, DCM Gene Cretz, and Pol-Mil
Officer Michael Keays (notetaker). The Israeli side was led
by Foreign Minister Livni and included her Chief of Staff,
Daniel Pinhasi, MFA Director General Aharon Abramovich and
MFA Adviser Tal Becker.
¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by NEA Assistant Secretary
David Welch.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES