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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2545, TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2545 | 2006-08-07 06:06 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO2083
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2545/01 2190659
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070659Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4923
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0028
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002545
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS
THAT LAF (ASSISTED BY UNIFIL) IS UP TO THE TASK
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C/NF) A/S Welch's second meeting with PM Siniora in 24
hours clarified Lebanon's preferred sequence of events at
cease-fire. But the Prime Minister would not budge from his
"requirement" that the IDF withdraw from all Lebanese
territory, including Sheba'a. Siniora argued hard that
unless the Israeli occupation of Sheba'a ends -- even if the
initial transfer into UN custodianship extends into years --
the conflict will continue. He flatly stated, "there will be
no deal without Sheba'a." Siniora also urged the U.S. not to
allow Syria into the Sheba'a equation by forcing the issue of
"border delineation" into the agreement. PM Siniora defended
the adequacy of deploying LAF into the south at the time of
the cease-fire, as long as the LAF was assisted at first by
an augmented UNIFIL, and later by a multi-national
stabilization force. Concerning the immediate deployment of
LAF to the south, Siniora said Minister of Defense Murr had
confirmed the army would be ready to move early next week.
And he reiterated his claim that a mission-capable element of
several hundred foreign troops would also be ready to deploy
within days of the cease-fire. As the meeting concluded,
Siniora produced a map that showed relatively conservative
boundaries for what Lebanon considers Sheba'a in an attempt
to demonstrate the reasonableness of their demands. PM
Siniora also commented in passing on the kidnapped IDF
soldiers. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with PM Fouad
Siniora for nearly two hours at the Grand Serail early in the
afternoon of August 5. As with the previous day's meeting,
senior Siniora advisors Mohammad Chattah and Rola Nouraddine
attended the meeting, as did poloff (notetaker) and Jonathan
Schwartz from L. The meeting took place immediately
following the Assistant Secretary's meeting with Speaker
Nabih Berri.
¶3. (C/NF) PM Siniora expressed keen interest in the
reaction of Speaker Berri to the US/FR proposals presented by
the Assistant Secretary earlier in the day. When informed
that Berri was engaged, professional, and had even indicated
some flexibility on timing with regards to Sheba'a, Siniora
expressed relief that Berri was still on board with the
7-point approach.
BOILS DOWN TO TWO ISSUES
------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Although he professed that each of the 7 points
dealt with an important cause of the current hostilities, PM
Siniora stated that the negotiations would go nowhere unless
his Government could achieve two unalterable goals: the
"immediate" withdrawal of IDF forces south of the Blue Line
upon cease-fire, and a firm commitment on Sheba'a that would
remove Israeli presence.
INSISTS LAF IS READY TO MOVE
15,000 TROOPS SOUTH
----------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora stated that his Minister of Defense,
Elias Murr, had assured him that 15,000 LAF troops would be
ready to deploy to the south in a "matter of days." Murr had
assured the Prime Minister that the army was united and the
officer corps ready to (finally) fulfill their constitutional
responsibility. Siniora countered some skepticism by
insisting that the LAF was not the "ragtag" outfit some
experts have alleged. According to Siniora, the principal
reason it had never moved south was political, specifically
Syrian interests during the Syrian occupation, and since
then, the political leverage of Hizballah.
¶6. (C/NF) Concerning his proposal that an "augment force"
of several hundred mission-capable troops would strengthen
UNIFIL, which would be assisting the deployment of the LAF,
Siniora said he has already been in touch with the
Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to Turkey.
He believes he has their commitment to send troops for a
short-term mission. But he also acknowledged that the
presence of "non-Muslim" contingents (he mentioned Spain,
Italy, and even Russia) would be of great value -- especially
as the Muslim contributors would be from Sunni countries, and
BEIRUT 00002545 002 OF 003
the area of deployment was largely Shia. His immediate
objective is to win commitments for approximately 2,000
mission-capable troops to augment UNIFIL.
¶7. (C/NF) In response to an inquiry on whether Hizballah
would simply move aside as the combined LAF/UNIFIL force
moved in, PM Siniora pointed to Amal leader Nabih Berri's
recent statement that he would be "riding in the first
military vehicle" into the south, implying Berri would never
stick out his neck so far without knowing Hizballah's actual
intentions.
SHEBA'A FARMS REDUX
-------------------
¶8. (C/NF) Following a review of Israeli concerns with
including Sheba'a in the cease-fire agreement, PM Siniora
paused for effect, and then stated flatly that without
Sheba'a there would be no deal. He characterized the Israeli
position as being close to blackmail and then emotionally
declared that the Government of Israel "could bomb Lebanon
for another month" if it refused to deal with the disputed
territory.
¶9. (C/NF) Each time the Assistant Secretary posed a
possible alternative treatment of the Sheba'a issue, the
Prime Minister grew impatient and somewhat agitated. He
insisted the "international community is getting what it
wanted (presumably referring to UNSCR 1559) at a heavy cost
to the people of Lebanon." He argued that every party came
out ahead: the international community with a stable,
democratic Lebanon; the pro-reform people of Lebanon received
a disarmed Hizballah -- and the people of Israel a northern
border at peace. He completed his exposition with the charge
that if the Government of Israel does not leave Sheba'a now
(initially turning it over to the UN, per his 7-point plan),
it would never do so.
¶10. (C/NF) Following his somewhat emotional argument,
Siniora fell back into an appeal to the U.S. and the
international community not to allow Syria (and Iran) back
into a controlling position in Lebanon. He maintained that
if Sheba'a continues to remain in Israeli hands, Syria will
always control the situation. He continued that if the
international community put the land into the care of the UN,
Syria would have to behave in a responsible manner -- it
could no longer point to Israeli "occupation." Obliquely
referring to the inevitable moment when the international
community loses interest in Lebanon, the Prime Minister
warned, "If you leave Lebanon in the claws of Syria,
eventually it will crush us."
THE ILLEGALITY OF HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
----------------------------------
¶11. (C/NF) Concerning the critical element of Hizballah's
arms after the cease-fire, PM Siniora said that if the
agreement was drafted in accordance with the 7 points, only
the arms of the Government of Lebanon (LAF) or those it
authorized (UNIFIL and the multi-national stabilization
force) would be permitted in the south -- all other weapons
would be "illegal."
¶12. (C/NF) When asked why should this give the Government
of Israel any confidence -- indeed, what was different? --
Siniora responded that the war had changed everything: the
Lebanese people were now filled with "bitterness" and would
not permit a return to the status quo, the international
community was responding with a powerful stabilization force,
and the cease-fire agreement would be perceived as
comprehensive and just. Siniora implored that the time was
finally right, like a "hammer hitting hot, malleable metal."
COMMENTS ON IDF PRISONERS
-------------------------
¶13. (C/NF) Although PM Siniora stated unequivocally he did
not know where the two abducted IDF soldiers were, he
realized that it was very important to establish whether they
were alive. He acknowledged that on July 12, he had heard
what he considered credible information that they "were out
of the south" -- but that was the last word he had heard. PM
Siniora promised to ask (presumably Nabih Berri, who in turn
would have to ask others) about their condition.
BEIRUT 00002545 003 OF 003
¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Welch.
FELTMAN