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Viewing cable 05PARIS7352, FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS7352 | 2005-10-27 11:11 | 2011-04-29 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
id: 43788
date: 10/27/2005 11:12
refid: 05PARIS7352
origin: Embassy Paris
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05PARIS5211|05PARIS7124|05STATE192336
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007352
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR VE BL CO
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND
BOLIVIA STATEMENT
REF: A. STATE 192336
¶B. PARIS 7124
¶C. PARIS 5211
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: MFA DAS-equivalent for South America
provided a frank and unapologetic readout October 24 of
French policy toward Venezuela and the recent visit of
President Chavez. The MFA highlighted France's economic
interests in Venezuela, downplayed concerns about human
rights, regional stability, and arms purchases, and professed
to view Bolivian elections with more concern than those to
take place in Venezuela. According to the MFA, GoF strategy
is to act discretely to steer Chavez to act responsibly and
to counsel prudence rather than confrontation. The one
exception is on Iran, where FM Douste-Blazy delivered a
strong message to FM Rodriquez Araque warning against
dealings with Iran given its interest in acquiring nuclear
technology. The MFA said it was only interested for the
moment in selling spare parts for French-origin equipment
already in Venezuela but hinted at an interest in other arms
sales.
¶2. (C) Separately, the MFA affirmed that the French agreed
in substance with the Bolivia Support Group text, but
indicated it would await and support an EU statement. End
Summary.
¶3. (U) Deputy Political Counselor and Poloff met October 24
with MFA DAS-equivalent for South America Michel Pinard and
Venezuela Desk Officer Lionel Paradisi to seek a readout of
Venezuelan President Chavez's October 21-22 visit to Paris
and his meetings with President Chirac as well as Foreign
Minister Rodriguez's meetings with French FM Douste-Blazy.
They also raised ref A demarche on the Bolivia Support Group
statement.
France's Economic Interests
---------------------------
¶4. (C) Pinard highlighted at the outset extensive French
economic interests in Venezuela, adding that Chavez had met
with a broad array of public and private sector
representatives in order to encourage increased French
engagement in Venezuela. Chavez, he said, was seeking to
diversify its partners in the oil industry and had met toward
that end with Total, which already has a 5 billion USD
investment in Venezuela. Other discussions focused on
possible French involvement in the transport sector, social
housing, and student exchanges (Colombian students in France
number 1800, as opposed to only 200 French students in
Venezuela). Pinard indicated that the situation in Haiti had
been discussed in the context of Chavez's Petro-Caribbean
initiative; queried by Deputy PolCouns whether France had any
concerns about Venezuelan use of oil diplomacy, Pinard
characterized it as completely beneficial, arguing that Haiti
was not a country likely to become Chaviste or Bolivarian in
its outlook simply because of oil provided at favorable
prices. Pinard nonetheless asserted that French associate
membership in the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization
(ACTO) on November 24 would provide a useful balancing
factor. The only critical note was Pinard's acknowledgment
that the GoF had counseled Chavez on the need for judicial
guaranties for companies to preserve international
investment.
Chavez Here to Stay
------------------
¶5. (C) Pinard noted that he recently met with a member of
the Venezuelan NGO Sumate and had carefully listened to that
organization's concerns about human rights and democracy in
Venezuela. However, he characterized Sumate essentially as
an oppositionist political organization. The problem with
the opposition, Pinard continued, was that it lacked
organization and provided no real alternative or direction;
moreover, the various opposition groups were united only in
their opposition to Chavez. Pinard downplayed our concerns
about human rights and civil society, stating that, while
France remained watchful of the situation, it saw no reason
for immediate alarm. He dismissed Chavez's famed
revolutionary speeches as mere rhetorical fireworks that were
part of the region's political traditions, and said there was
no real threat behind the rhetoric.
Colombia a Bigger Problem
-------------------------
¶6. (C) Pinard expressed GoF frustration that the Uribe
government in Bogota had not been able to achieve greater
progress in its efforts to secure a humanitarian exchange of
prisoners with the FARC. This was a French priority that
included private GoF interactions with the FARC, Pinard said.
If the Israelis could negotiate with Hizbollah for a
prisoner exchange, he reasoned, then Colombia should be able
to do the same with the FARC. Pinard indicated that the
French had asked for Venezuelan help in passing messages to
both the Uribe government and the FARC to press them to seek
a military accord that would allow for the humanitarian
exchange of prisoners. The FARC posed a problem for
Venezuela as well, Pinard said, given its activities along
the border. Pinard said he knew that there were some in the
Venezuelan government who, despite their claims that they
were no longer associated with the FARC, still had ways of
communicating with the organization. It was through these
channels that Pinard hoped to have the Venezuelans press the
FARC to come to the bargaining table with the Colombian
government.
Kid Gloves, Except on Iran
--------------------------
¶7. (C) Chavez was skilled in using international criticism
of his regime to his domestic political advantage, according
to Pinard. As a result, the French approach was one that
privileged discrete counsel to Chavez over open criticism or
confrontation. Comments like those made recently by Pat
Robertson (despite his position as simply a private citizen)
only played into Chavez's hands, Pinard argued. When
queried, Pinard said that only on Iran had the French
delivered a strong message to Chavez. Specifically, French
Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy had been clear with his
Venezuelan counterpart, Ali Rodriguez Araque, that Iranian
pursuit of nuclear military weapons capability was
unacceptable.
Arms Sales
----------
¶8. (C) Asked directly whether the French, like Russia and
Spain, were interested in arms sales to Venezuela, Pinard
acknowledged that the subject had arisen. Venezuela
currently has 1960's-era French tanks, Mirage fighters, and
older model helicopters, according to Pinard, and France was
interested in supplying spare parts and refurbishing the
equipment. Asked again directly whether France was
interested in the sale of more modern equipment, Pinard
initially protested that "Venezuela is not interested in
buying the Rafael," but then conceded that the general
subject of future arms sales had been raised, although this
was an issue the French would have to study. Pinard was
categorical that Chavez's arms acquisitions were not a threat
to his neighbors, however, as Pinard was convinced that
Chavez could have no possible interest in an external war.
When Deputy PolCouns rejoined that arms build-ups were, at a
minimum, instruments of influence, Pinard speculated that
Chavez was more concerned with managing Venezuela's internal
situation. Pinard argued that purchases of heavy arms were
intended primarily to placate bored generals, whose support
Chavez needed internally; he nonetheless conceded that this
would also give Chavez more clout within South America.
Asked about light arms, such as the Kalishnakovs being
purchased from Russia, Pinard suggested they had less to do
with arming a population against external forces than with
arming Chavez supporters to put down any internal
insurrection.
EU Observers in Venezuela, Support for Elections in Bolivia
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶9. (C) When asked about French support for EU observers in
upcoming Venezuelan elections, Pinard indicated that he did
not know what decision Brussels had reached, but that the GoF
recognized a potential need for election observers, "although
the only risk would be in the margin of victory by which
Chavez would win." Pinard argued that it was in fact more
important to send observers to Bolivia, where the results of
elections were less than certain. In response to ref A
points (provided on October 17), Pinard stated that the GoF
fully agreed in substance with the statement of the Bolivia
Support Group. However, for reasons of bureaucratic form,
the GoF is waiting for the EU statement. Again citing
bureaucratic technicalities, Pinard did not know if EU
observers would be possible for Bolivian elections (he
implied that the system of EU allotments might force it to
abandon observation of elections at another location), but
indicated that he believed it was important to have a
presence there.
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) France sees no downside for now in pushing its
economic interests over human rights and other
considerations, especially since U.S.-Venezuelan tensions
offer possibilities for new sales. We thus can expect the
French to continue to pursue investment and arms sales
opportunities. French toughness on Iran is more a reflection
of its own involvement in the EU3 negotiations than its
concerns about Venezuela per se. The only surprise was just
how warmly Chavez seems to have been welcomed. Pinard
attributed this to a friendship that has developed between
members of the GoF and Chavez, as well as genuine
appreciation for Venezuelan assistance following the deaths
of 162 French passengers of an airliner that crashed in
Venezuela over the summer. There are also personal factors:
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin spent part of his
childhood in Venezuela, and Chavez's back-slapping,
"Caribbean" expansiveness is a match for Chirac's, according
to Pinard.
¶11. (C) French attitudes towards Colombia and Venezuela seem
mirror images of U.S. views. GoF attempts to bring Venezuela
into Colombian negotiations with the FARC are disturbing, and
appear to be driven almost entirely by the GoF's focus on the
captivity of Franco-Colombian Ingrid Betancourt. The
presence of Chirac at an October 24 solidarity concert for
Betancourt, Villepin's personal involvement in a failed 2003
attempt to negotiate her release, and the reported civil
union of MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Daniel Parfait
to Betancourt's sister auger poorly for any real change in
French policy until the situation is resolved. End Comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Hofmann
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