

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA322, IAEA LEADERSHIP TEAM TRANSITION AND U.S. INFLUENCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA322.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09UNVIEVIENNA322 | 2009-07-07 15:03 | 2011-03-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | UNVIE |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUNV #0322/01 1881559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071559Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9792
INFO RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000322
SIPDIS
FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN
DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6
NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
ALSO FOR LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2019
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA LEADERSHIP TEAM TRANSITION AND U.S. INFLUENCE
IN THE AGENCY
REF: A. UNVIE 148
¶B. UNVIE 102 (NOTAL)
¶C. UNVIE 089
¶D. UNVIE 076
Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The IAEA transition that will come as DG
ElBaradei's term ends November 30 provides a once-a-decade
opportunity to overcome bureaucratic inertia, modernize
Agency operations, and position the new director general for
strong leadership from the DG's office. Yukiya Amano's
arrival as DG will undoubtedly see some turnover at the
Deputy DG level, but we see a mixed picture as to the depth
and breadth of change in senior management changes further
down. Despite whatever intentions Amano may harbor upon
taking office, a renewal in some key positions will take
time, as several senior IAEA officials recently received
promotions or extensions of their contracts, or both. This
"burrowing in" will ensure continuity of some experienced
leaders but may also confront the next DG with fixed networks
of collaboration that resist supervision. Identifying a
desirable DDG for Nuclear Safety and Security should be a top
U.S. priority. End Summary.
DG Succession a Reform Opportunity
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) The entry into office of Ambassador Yukiya Amano as
IAEA Director General (to a four-year term to begin December
1, 2009) should trigger a reordering of senior management
posts throughout the Agency over the months that follow.
IAEA departments are headed by the six Deputy Directors
General, all of whom are under contract into 2010. We
understand from the Japanese Mission that Amano would want
most senior personnel to remain in place for some time, to
brief him in and provide a smooth transition. However, some
turnover of the current DDGs in the first year of Amano's
term is to be expected and encouraged. A combination of (not
always ironclad) IAEA-mandated retirement for positions below
the D level at age 62 (60 for those hired before 1990),
national and gender balance, and other factors complicate
what should otherwise be the appointment of the most
qualified people, committed to modernizing the Agency for
anticipated challenges and for adopting new modes of
networking, financing, and building excellence in fields
where the Agency should be the lead. The current roster of
DDGs, profiled below, requires our consideration in this
light.
¶3. (C) Safeguards (SG), Olli Heinonen, Finland - By
tradition this department is not be held by an NPT nuclear
weapons state. Heinonen's current contract runs through
summer 2010 and he has told Msnoff in the past he expected to
retire at that time, based largely on personal considerations
(but see next para). After the DG's slot, the DDG/Safeguards
position is the most important at the IAEA to achieving
high-priority U.S. national security objectives related to
Iran, DPRK, Syria, and the generally rigorous application of
IAEA safeguards globally. DDG Heinonen has played a
particularly important role under ElBaradei by working to
keep key safeguards investigations on an appropriate
technical path. The DDG/Safeguards position will remain
essential under Amano's leadership, however, as we expect the
new DG to apply less of a political filter to the conduct of
safeguards investigations. Thus, the decisions of the
DG/Safeguards on Iran, Syria, and other sensitive cases may
be the de facto final word for the Agency's safeguards
approach in the states about which the U.S. cares the most.
¶4. (C) Mission assumes the USG would welcome extending
beyond 2010 the close and constructive relationship we have
had with Heinonen, and we have queried Heinonen as to his
availability. He said early this past spring he did not
discount the possibility he could stay until 2012, but not
longer. He plans to review his situation over the summer
"once the dust has settled" from the DG election and it is
more apparent what other personnel changes will take place in
the DG's office and other senior ranks of the Agency. In
light of Heinonen's ongoing personal decision process,
Mission recommends we confine within the USG any early
thinking about possible replacements. Mission will continue
to touch base with Heinonen on his thinking as it
evolves.
¶5. (C) Management (MT) - Incumbent David Waller, U.S., in
the job since early 1993, recently reaffirmed to Charge he
wishes to remain under a new contract. As in analogous
positions in the UN system, there is long tradition for the
U.S. holding this job, which has potential oversight of all
IAEA programs as well as management policies and budgeting.
The Management DDG is the Agency's second-in-command, and
Waller is usually the Acting DG when ElBaradei travels
outside Vienna. His role has been especially critical in the
ongoing debate over budget and resources. The Japanese
Mission tells us Japan understands the management DDG to be
the "American seat" and that Amano would personally favor
keeping a U.S. national in this role. In the latter years of
the ElBaradei administration, DDG Waller has not always
exercised influence over programmatic areas or staffing as
the USG had hoped. On staffing, however, the history of
top-floor overrides of the Agency's own recruitment process
predates the current leadership. The true final say and veto
power on personnel appointments, down to the level of program
manager jobs, resides with the DG, but this was true in the
Hans Blix era as well. In broader management terms, the
Agency has made significant but uneven progress in reform,
measured for example against the UNTAI agenda: "little to no"
progress on disclosure of internal audits to member states or
whistleblower protections; "some" progress on an independent
ethics function, implementation of IPSAS, and on program
support costs (a running sore with USG); better performance
on independence of internal oversight, financial disclosure
by senior officials, and public access to information about
the agency.
¶6. (C) Safety and Security (NSNS). Incumbent Tomihiro
Taniguchi, Japan, informed UNVIE's Nuclear Safety Attache
early in 2009 that he was under contract through November
2010 and intended to stay; Taniguchi's DDG colleague Olli
Heinonen affirmed to us in late March his understanding that
Taniguchi wants to remain perhaps even beyond that date.
However, after his election on July 2, DG-designate Amano
told Russian IAEA Governor Berdennikov and U.S. Charge that
Taniguchi would step down concurrent with Amano's succession
to the DG's office, emphasizing that "Japan is a modest
country" and would not seek to hold the DG and a DDG slot
concurrently. (Note: Taniguchi's early departure would be a
matter of appearances for Japan; there is no legal provision
barring a DDG serving under a DG of the same nationality. End
note.) Taniguchi has been a weak manager and advocate,
particularly with respect to confronting Japan's own safety
practices, and he is a particular disappointment to the
United States for his unloved-step-child treatment of the
Office of Nuclear Security. Moreover, of the twenty-four
management positions in the department, the U.S. holds only
one, a P-5 position as head of the Incident and Emergency
Center. That is, there are no U.S. managers anywhere in the
IAEA's safety and security technical areas.
¶7. (SBU) This DDG position requires a good manager and
leader who is technically qualified in both safety and
security. The DDG needs to be an activist to
institutionalize and insist on broad member state acceptance
of nuclear security -- preventing terrorist or criminal
diversion of material from civil nuclear facilities -- as a
core Agency mission. However, the DDG must also have a
strong safety background. The department can and should
exercise a direct and substantial impact of the levels of
safety and security in all of the Member States. This
department is writing draft safety and security legislation
and draft regulatory and security guidance documents that are
being used by Member States to create their nuclear programs.
"NSNS" performs safety and security peer reviews of
facilities and provides recommendations for improvements. It
also performs an enormous amount of training on all areas of
safety and security. As Washington colleagues have pointed
out, the new DDG must instill a culture of cooperation with
other Agency elements, including Nuclear Energy and Technical
Cooperation, in order to improve these services. We are
aware of differing views in Washington on the advisability of
"elevating" nuclear security, potentially as a separate
department (ref D), an idea that Iran now advocates. Our
bottom line is that the U.S. should push for technical
competencies in both safety and security.
¶8. (C) Technical Cooperation (TC), Ana Maria Cetto, Mexico.
TC is the department most in need of a change in culture and
process. It administers assistance projects as entitlements,
in which the proposals of the beneficiary states rather than
an independent analysis of development needs and capacities
are decisive. Although some of her subordinates are much
stronger, Cetto's reputation is as an enabler of TC's
"entitlement" approach. Ms. Cetto, the only female DDG at
present, may be prepared to depart in 2010. The United
States should encourage selection of a manager committed to
implement the management structures put in place by Cetto's
predecessor, which have become mere formalities under Cetto.
Japan knows that China is interested in returning to the
ranks of the DDGs, and the Chinese may have a strong
candidate for the TC DDG position who is currently serving as
TC Director for Asia. If the Chinese secure this position,
the new incumbent would likely be male, creating an
imperative for the purpose of gender balance to appoint a
woman to another of the DDG positions (see also para 17,
below).
¶9. (C) Nuclear Energy (NE), Yury Sokolov, Russia - With the
right mix of expert authority, impartiality, and material
assistance, this department can play an even greater role in
ensuring that wherever nuclear power is developed, it is done
so responsibly, safely, securely, with proliferation
consciousness and safeguards by design. Agency veterans
recall the NE department was established by hiving off
nuclear energy from the earlier department of nuclear energy
and safety, which was led by a Russian DDG. As reported in
ref B (captioned), the Russian Federation will likely be
determined to retain this DDG position regardless of
Sokolov's personal availability.
¶10. (C) Nuclear Sciences and Applications (NA), Werner
Burkart, Germany - Burkart has indicated he will leave the
Agency at the completion of his current contract, which we
understand to be November 2010. Burkart is generally viewed
as a nice guy and skilled scientist but an unambitious
bureaucratic leader. He advocates rationalizing staff and
structures that he finds wasteful. One example -- for
technical cooperation (TC) projects in which his department
or NE are required to assign project officers, the parallel
TC project officers are, like those in NA and NE, typically
from a nuclear engineering background, and consequently apt
to cut out their redundant counterparts in the technical
bureaus. A second example -- the IAEA's laboratory
structure, including the safeguards analytical laboratory
(SAL), falls organizationally under NA (i.e., for management
and personnel policies) as a service to the Safeguards
Department, but is paid for with safeguards funds. A
transfer of the SAL to the Safeguards Department, which
Burkart supports, is underway, based on a recommendation by a
Canadian management consultant.
The DG's Outer Office - Perpetuating Team ElBaradei?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶11. (C) As IAEA Secretariat staff consider the future under
a DG Amano, many are musing about "Who runs the agency?" in
that circumstance. We reported ref C that a Spring 2009
STAFFDEL visitor heard from Secretariat officials the concern
that a Japanese corporate model of management and internal
communication could come to the Agency. However, speaking
with Charge on July 2, Amano emphasized (unprompted) that it
would not be his intention to pack his inner office with
Japanese nationals, as "that would send the wrong message."
Whatever their presumptions about the changes ahead, several
senior IAEA officials have secured their positions in the
Agency for a period into the post-ElBaradei era. Among those
burrowing in are some of the Mission's most frequent and
policy-relevant interlocutors (and ElBaradei's high-level
troubleshooters), some of whom have not always been helpful
to U.S. positions.
¶12. (C) In early February 2009, Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary,
chief of the Office of External Relations and Policy
Coordination (EXPO), was promoted to the title of Assistant
Director General (ADG) while retaining his function running
EXPO. Cserveny shared with DCM that his contract was
extended through 2013. The ADG title is considered a
"personal promotion" according no enhancement of authority,
and it would likely return to disuse after Cserveny's tenure.
As background, current DG ElBaradei held the same title
while he was EXPO chief 1993-7. While Cserveny is viewed as
a partisan of ElBaradei, we know him to be a consummate
bureaucratic survivor who is likely to tack strongly towards
Amano in the new structure.
¶13. (C) In late 2008, Cserveny's deputy Tariq Rauf of Canada
received a personal promotion, from the P-5 to D-l level, and
contract extension through 2011. As in the case of his boss,
Rauf's job duties remain the same. The practice of granting
"personal" D ranks to senior P-5 personnel is not uncommon in
the Agency. Rauf's title is Head, Verification and Security
Policy Coordination within EXPO. Among other duties, he is
the coordinator of Secretariat efforts to develop mechanisms
for IAEA-administered assurance of nuclear fuel supply to
states that may suffer a politically-motivated cutoff, e.g.,
an international nuclear fuel bank. Despite his usefulness
on this particular issue and in routine scheduling and
information exchanges, Rauf is not wholly trustworthy and is
viewed as close to Russian interests. Also, he has been an
unhelpful presence on Iran. Amano is aware of all this, and
Rauf will be significantly weakened by the change in DG.
¶14. (C) Among others staying on is the Director of the
Office of Legal Affairs, Johan Rautenbach, whose contract in
late 2008 was extended through 2011. Cautious to the point
of reticence in most settings, Rautenbach generally projects
an image of standing apart from the political fray. However,
he has been known to render legal opinions in furtherance of
his "client's," i.e., ElBaradei's, interest, and involves
himself unhelpfully in Agency-internal debates over tactics
in the conduct of sensitive safeguards investigations.
Rautenbach's Amcit
deputy, safeguards expert Laura Rockwood, is also likely to
stay on.
¶15. (SBU) Other key Mission interlocutors will or may move
from current roles under a new DG. One significant loss will
be that Kwaku Aning of Ghana, who intends to depart the IAEA
at the end of 2010. Aning holds the D-2 position as
Secretary of the Policy Making Organs (chief interpreters of
rules of procedure and the drafters of most chair's or
rapporteur's summaries). This is the only D-level position
held by a G-77 country. British national Graham Andrew,
Special Assistant to the DG for Science and Technology, is
under contract through August 2011. He has told Msnoff
privately he would like to support the next DG over a
transition period and beyond, but would move to other duties
in the Agency for the duration of his contract if required.
Andrew would need a new contract to stay in the Agency beyond
August 2011 to 2013, when he would reach the IAEA retirement
age (62). ElBaradei's Chef d'Cabinet, Dutch diplomat Antoine
Van Dongen, also has been extended through 2010. Having
known ElBaradei since their time together at NYU Law School
in the 1970's, Van Dongen is a strong ElBaradei loyalist
whose role in an Amano cabinet remains to be determined.
Comment and Recommendation
--------------------------
¶16. (SBU) Mission enjoys an excellent relationship with U.S.
DDG Waller and counts him as an asset. He provides insight
into Agency operations and is an interpreter and advocate of
the Agency to important audiences, for example from the U.S.
Congress. Waller has been highly successful in bringing
Amcits into positions in his department, though much less so
in other departments. In Management the U.S. currently holds
two Director positions, one D-1 and one D-2, and five Section
Head positions, with a total of 24 Amcits working in the
department. The signals from both Waller and DG-designate
Amano are that we may rely on Waller remaining in this
function for the time being, should Washington so decide.
¶17. (C) The expected departure of DDG Taniguchi requires
that we search for a compelling individual to lead the safety
and security department in fashioning and institutionalizing
(politically and financially) the IAEA role in combating
nuclear terrorism and embedding safety culture in the
(potentially) fast-growing global nuclear power sector. The
safety and security of nuclear facilities and material around
the world over the next ten years will be very important to
the U.S., involving potential issues of regional security,
energy policy, and growth in the commercial nuclear industry
at home and globally. It is in our interest to be directly
involved in the selection of a next DDG through whom we can
increase the complement of U.S. nationals performing these
crucial functions. There are rumors that Canadian Ambassador
Marie Gervais-Vidricaire is interested. As she lacks
technical experience, this would not be a helpful outcome
from the perspective of our subject-matter experts, but the
USG could be in an awkward position if confronted with a
determined request for support from Ottawa. Also on the
Vienna scene there are rumors that France, a country with a
heavy technician presence and influence already in the safety
and security areas, may move to build upon this predominance.
¶18. (C) With regard to the DDG/Safeguards, Olli Heinonen,
Mission recommends that we remain discrete but open to an
extension of his tenure should he seek it and similarly
discrete in USG-internal brainstorming on potential
successors. Relevant to our deliberations on the Safety and
Security as well as Safeguards Departments, ref A examined
approaches to staffing, reviewed current opportunities for
American citizen employment at professional levels across the
Agency, and noted some key positions for which U.S. citizens
would not be eligible (due to national balance or traditions
against staffing from nuclear weapons states) but where U.S.
interests require that competent incumbents fulfill those
roles.
¶19. (C) In weighing replacements for DDGs Cetto and Burkart,
leading Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Applications,
respectively, we must try to address the overlap in their two
Departments that has created stubborn redundancies and
inefficiencies. These have not been resolved despite years
of investigations, reports, and recommendations. Both
Departments have fierce political defenders in the G-77,
preventing serious reform efforts (particularly in the case
of TC). Mission recommends we pay vigorous attention to the
future leadership of these two Departments, as the only way
to fix their management will be from the inside.
PYATT