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Viewing cable 09ROME638, FRATTINI TELLS AG HOLDER ITALY FAVORS ACCEPTING
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME638 | 2009-06-04 09:09 | 2011-04-27 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO0570
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRO #0638/01 1550959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040959Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4827
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000638
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IT
SUBJECT: FRATTINI TELLS AG HOLDER ITALY FAVORS ACCEPTING
GITMO DETAINEES
Classified By: cda elizabeth l. dibble for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
Summary
--------
¶1. (C) Attorney General Eric Holder (AG) discussed
resettlement of Guantanamo detainees with Italian Foreign
Minister Franco Frattini in Rome May 29 on the margins of the
G8 meeting of interior and justice ministers. Frattini said
the GOI ""profoundly shares"" the President's views on
Guantanamo and identified Italy as one of six EU member
states ""firmly in favor"" of accepting detainees. He shared
his positive assessment of the EU's legal framework to be
considered at the EU JHA ministerial meeting June 4,
including limitations on movements through the listing of
detainee names in the Schengen Information System. Frattini
also proposed that the USG seek a TransAtlantic statement of
principles on human rights and security in the fall under the
Swedish EU presidency as a capstone to the process.
¶2. (C) At a press conference May 30 following the G8
ministerial, Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said, in his
view, ""The European Union ... should reach a unanimous
decision and welcome, only if they so desire, those inmates
that can be put back in jail."" He expressed concern that,
absent detention in Europe, former Guantanamo inmates would
be free to move throughout the Schengen zone and thus
represent an unacceptable increase in terrorism risk. These
public comments, which are not in synch with internal EU
discussions or GOI policy, play to Maroni's political base;
he is a leader of the Northern League political party, which
is tough on security and anti-immigration.
Review of EU Arrangements
-------------------------
¶3. (C) Frattini opened by saying that the GOI was ""on the
same page"" with the United States. He noted that there were
still a number of EU members reluctant or hostile on the
issue of accepting Guantanamo detainees for resettlement,
naming Austria, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and
the Netherlands. They were ""raising doubts"" in Europe about
the whole undertaking, but Frattini assured the AG ""we will
persuade them"" ultimately. Frattini said Germany was
particularly problematic, with the atmosphere in the
Bundestag quite hot ahead of elections. However he
underlined that the EU was close to a solution that would
accommodate everyone. Frattini said he expected EU Justice
and Home Affairs ministers to reach agreement at their June 4
meeting (""we are 99 percent of the way there"") on a legal
framework which would lay out the conditions for individual
state solutions and proposals vis--vis the United States.
¶4. (C) Frattini described the basic elements of the
framework as: 1) a data-sharing arrangement among Schengen
and non-Schengen states; 2) a voluntary agreement between the
receiving states and the detainees setting terms and
conditions; and 3) a roadmap to integration of the detainees
where they were settled. On the first, once the United
States made a specific proposal to transfer a detainee
""cleared for release,"" that state would circulate the name
and any related data to the intelligence network of Schengen
and non-Schengen states for clearance. Any objections would
have to be on the basis of ""public order or national security
concerns,"" and would affect only the objecting state, i.e.,
that state could refuse circulation of the detainee on its
territory but could not veto such on behalf of any other
state. Flagging the detainee's name in the Schengen
Information System (SIS) would limit the detainee's rights of
movement in Europe, which seemed to be the solution, Frattini
said, to meeting everyone's concerns.
¶5. (C) On the voluntary agreement to be signed between the
receiving state and the detainee's lawyers, Frattini said the
agreement would reference the detainee's USG status as well
as host country conditions. Frattini noted he would have to
set ""preventative conditions,"" such as daily check-in with
local police and notification of any intent to travel. Each
case would have to be treated differently, with some,
perhaps, being forbidden to travel abroad at all. He noted
that Italy would not want to risk a detainee traveling to
Somalia or the Middle East and re-engaging in terrorist acts,
noting the substantial measures the GOI was obliged to put in
place to keep four Palestinians (the Bethlehem Church of
Nativity case) under surveillance since accepting them in
¶2002. As for integration of detainees, Frattini noted
approvingly of news that several detainees settled by the
United States in Albania were now opening legitimate
businesses, saying it was critical that any detainees
accepted by Italy be permitted to take up employment. He
ROME 00000638 002 OF 003
noted that Italy would require as part of the voluntary
agreement with the detainees that they agree not to sue the
United States in Italian courts.
Italian Political Support and Advice
------------------------------------
¶6. (C) AG Holder expressed his deep appreciation for GOI
support of U.S. efforts to bring about an orderly closure of
Guantanamo. He noted that FM Frattini had sketched out a
highly creative approach within the EU to tackle the Schengen
movement issue, and applauded Italy's role in that effort.
Frattini underlined that the Italian government's point of
departure was not legal but political - to show solidarity
with the Obama administration. He noted that the GOI
""profoundly shares"" the President's views on Guantanamo.
With that in mind, he suggested that the United States
consider a political-level TransAtlantic declaration of
principles later in the year, to frame the issue. He
sketched a three-step process: the legal recommendation by
EU JHA ministers on June 4; the EU Foreign Ministers' embrace
of it on June 15; followed by an EU/US Foreign Ministers
meeting in October/November in which ministers would issue a
declaration of Transatlantic principles on human rights and
security, under the Swedish EU presidency. Frattini noted
that such a declaration would be a capstone for the efforts
now under way to lay the legal groundwork for individual
states to work with the United States on transfers. It would
provide the political wrapping for all states and would be a
good signal to the European public, as well. Frattini
offered to raise the issue informally with Swedish FM Bildt,
whom he will see on a visit to Stockholm shortly, and asked
the AG to float the idea in Washington.
¶7. (C) Frattini also said that a number of people,
particularly in Germany, were demanding to know why the U.S.
could not itself take the small number of detainees thus far
identified for transfer (50). Frattini said he told his
colleagues regularly that it was critical that Europe showed
it could be a co-producer of security, not just a consumer.
It was time to share the burden, having criticized the
previous administration so harshly over Guantanamo's
existence.
¶8. (C) Frattini told the AG he had established a restricted
working group within the GOI (chiefs of staff of the MFA, MOJ
and MOI, plus Italian intelligence). In order to facilitate
its work and avoid surprises, Frattini asked that the USG
informally pass to this group the names of any potential
detainees for transfer to Italy ahead of a formal request.
He also asked that the USG share any models it had used for
voluntary agreements, noting he understood the United States
had worked out a draft in transferring some 14 detainees back
to the UK. He asked whether the United States had released
any detainees into the U.S. and whether the AG had shared any
specifics with other European governments. The AG said no to
both questions.
¶9. (C) In closing, Frattini underscored that there were six
European countries (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland,
Switzerland) ""firmly in favor"" of taking detainees. He said
that they would continue to cooperate closely together and
with the United States. These countries ""should set the
example"" by expeditiously moving to individual agreements
with the United States. once the EU framework was agreed
upon. Frattini confirmed that ""we are ready to do so.""
Separate Treatment of Tunisian Detainees
----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) In a short aside, Frattini said he and others in the
GOI well recognized that the case of the two Tunisian
detainees requested by Milan magistrates for trial in Italy
and the larger Guantanamo issue were wholly separate, and
should be dealt with as such.
Interior Minister Complains Publicly
------------------------------------
¶11. (C) Echoing previous objections on security grounds of
accepting Guantanamo detainees, Interior Minister Maroni told
the press May 30 that he believes the EU must unanimously
agree to accept the detainees and that they should ""be put
back in jail."" Maroni argued it would not be acceptable ""for
me"" if they are free to move within the Schengen zone.
Maroni, speaking on the margins of the G8 meeting of justice
and interior ministers, said the United States had not yet
made a formal request, no detainees had been identified, and
that Italy is considering taking ""not more than two or three.""
ROME 00000638 003 OF 003
Comment
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¶12. (C) In his meeting with AG Holder, Frattini was forceful
and adamant in expressing GOI desire to work closely and
collaboratively with the United States, both in shaping EU
opinion and in working out future bilateral arrangements on
individual detainee cases. Notwithstanding Frattini's
helpful leadership on this issue within the GOI and at the
EU, he faces some political pushback from within the
government. The outspoken and powerful Interior Minister
Maroni and his Northern League political party have been
successfully pushing an anti-immigration line within the
government. Maroni has been vocal on several occasions about
his skepticism about the wisdom of the EU and Italy taking
Guantanamo detainees. In his initial phone conversation
congratulating President Obama on his election, Prime
Minister Berlusconi offered Italian assistance in resolving
the detainee issue. During the President's upcoming meeting
with the Prime Minister, it would be helpful to thank
Berlusconi for his government's efforts thus far but also
secure his recommitment to accepting detainees.
¶13. (C) Frattini also advised AG Holder not to attend the
June 4 JHA ministerial because he thought those countries
opposed to the United States on this issue would simply use
his presence as an opportunity to criticize the United States.
¶14. (U) The Department of Justice has cleared this cable.
DIBBLE