

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2566, MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2566.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2566 | 2006-08-08 16:04 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO4298
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2566/01 2201654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081654Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4951
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0039
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0918
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002566
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL
ROLE
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d)
.
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C) Ambassador and TDY poloff met with several Lebanese
politicians of different confessions on August 8 in order to
guage attitudes toward the draft UN resolution and sense
whether there is a strategy for moving ahead in Lebanon
following a ceasefire. In addition to Maronite former
President and Kata'eb party leader Amine Gemayel (septel),
meetings were with former Prime Minister Najib Mikati
(Sunni), Nabih Berri aide Ali Hamdan (Shiite), and Minister
of Telecommunications and Walid Jumblatt ally Marwan Hamadeh
(Druze). Mikati, Hamdan, and Hamadeh all believe that
Hizballah is ready for a cease-fire but that the success or
failure of the cease-fire deal, as well continued as
Sunni-Shia harmony, hinges on Speaker of Parliament and Amal
Party leader Nabih Berri. In a worrying development, Hamdan
said that his office had seen a list showing the Speaker as
the number one target for assassination. In a break from his
previous sentiments, Mikati said that it might be time to get
rid of President Emile Lahoud following a cease-fire and LAF
deployment to the South. He believes that Berri will sign on
to this plan. Hamadeh gave an overview of last night's
meeting of the Lebanese Cabinet which decided unanimously to
deploy 15,000 LAF troops to the South upon an Israeli
withdrawal behind the Blue Line. Our interlocutors gave
different descriptions - ranging from a heated argument to a
fraternal chat - of the August 7 meeting between Berri and
visiting Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim. All agreed
that, once the dust has settled from the conflict, the
majority of Lebanese will blame Hizballah for provoking the
destruction and the party will be politically weakened as a
consequence. End Summary.
"SOMEONE WANTS TO SOW TROUBLE IN LEBANON"
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Berri's senior foreign policy adviser called the
Ambassador for an urgent meeting early this afternoon.
Sitting in a cafe in the Phoenicia Hotel, without lights or
air conditioning due to power shortages, Hamdan motioned for
poloff to stop writing and whispered to the Ambassador, "We
have a list showing targets for assassination, and Speaker
Berri's name is at the top," adding that others mentioned in
the list include pro-Syrian MP Suleiman Frangieh and Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun. He did not bring a
copy with him, he said, since he did not want to remove it
from the office. Hamdan does not know who generated the
list, only saying that it is from "someone who wants to sow
trouble in Lebanon." Noting that Berri is the critical
backer of the GOL plan to deploy the LAF to the South, Hamdan
said that his assassination would likely cause the plan to
fail, leading to the collapse of the Lebanese government and
enflaming sectarian tensions, particularly among Sunni and
Shi'a.
¶3. (C) When asked about the Lebanese public's perception of
Hizballah, Hamdan said that "Hizballah had peaked" as an organization sometime before the kidnapping and killing of
IDF soldiers on July 12. As long as the conflict continues,
people will be supportive of Hizballah fighters, but "once
the dust settles, people will see" the destructive result of
Hizballah's unilateral adventurism. Hamdan predicted that
Amal will be in a much stronger position vis-a-vis Hizballah
following the conflict. Regarding the prospect of Berri
possibly lending his critical support to a constitutional
move to replace President Emile Lahoud, a step which Berri
has opposed in the past, Hamdan gave a guarded response,
saying that Berri hoped to reinitiate the "National Dialogue"
following a ceasefire and that the issue of the presidency
"perhaps might be reopened in that context." Hamdan also did
not give anything away regarding Berri's August 7 meeting
with Syrian FM Mu'allim, saying Mu'allim had "simply
expressed support for the government."
MIKATI SAYS TIME MAY BE RIPE TO GET RID OF LAHOUD
--------------------------------------------- ----
BEIRUT 00002566 002 OF 004
¶4. (C) Meeting in his downtown Beirut office, former Prime
Minister Najib Mikati, who in the past has held firm in his
belief that Lahoud would end up serving out his three-year
extension until August 2007, said that following a ceasefire
may be the right time to get rid of Lahoud. "I've always
thought he would stay until the end, but haraam if we need to
wait a whole year to launch Lebanon on its new path!"
Mikati, who is close to Berri, believes that the Speaker will
be on board with this initiative. "He's good," said Mikati,
"He will be where we want him," mentioning that Berri
exchanged heated words with Mu'allim on August 7 and lectured
him on the Sheba'a Farms issue like "a professor to a
student." Mikati, a former Bashar buddy who fell out with
the Syrian leader last December, suspects Syria is using this
conflict to "try and hold some cards" regarding the
international tribunal which is being set up to try suspects
in the Hariri assassination.
¶5. (C) Turning to Hizballah, Mikati estimated the group had
suffered physical losses of only 25 percent. Though the
group still has plenty of reserves, they are ready to find a
solution to this conflict. While Mikati supports Hizballah's
fighters in the current conflict, he added that he wants to
see the group disarmed and hopes it will be weakened
politically following a cease-fire, but suspects they will
keep many of their arms even following a LAF deployment to
the South. "They will make a token handover of 500 to 1000
Katyushas to the LAF, send some back to Syria, and bury the
rest in underground bunkers." He said he could guarantee
that Hizballah would not launch any attacks for at least six
months following a ceasefire, allowing time to broker a
permanent political deal. He added that whatever the
outcome, Hizballah will portray itself as the victor, but
noted, "on the Lebanese political scene, it is better to deal
with Hizballah as a winner rather than as a loser." In
reality, Hizballah will emerge from this conflict weaker both
militarily and politically.
¶6. (C) Mikati, who has designs on some day regaining the
premiership, said that Siniora is under a great deal of
strain, as he demonstrated during his tearful August 7
statement during the Arab League ministerial. Siniora does
not believe himself to be a real leader, claimed Mikati, but
rather feels like a caretaker for Saad Hariri. In fact, the
deal for the LAF deployment was brokered between Nabih Berri
and Saad Hariri, with Siniora merely the mouthpiece.
However, Saad himself is naive and easy to fool, according to
Mikati, which is why Hizballah doesn't mind working with him.
This highlights the lack of real, uniting, charismatic
leadership of the Sunni Lebanese. In the event of a
Sunni-Shi'a clash, which Mikati thinks will grow more likely
as the conflict continues, the Sunnis will not be able to
face up to the more united and more armed Shi'a.
¶7. (C) On the prospect of 粑 successful LAF deployment to
the South, Mikati said that though the army is still weak and
fragmented, it does meet a minimum operational standard and
will be very well received in the South. It is important to
have international support for the army. Mikati described
the army commander Michel Sleiman, whom many perceive to be a
Syrian stooge but who played a critical role in avoiding a
violent crackdown on the huge anti-Syrian protests in Beirut
in March 2005, as "a honest and good guy." Regarding
humanitarian relief, Mikati expressed concern that, unless
the United States and others stepped forth quickly and
generously, Iranian money would fund most of the rebuilding
in the South.
"MU'ALLIM WAS LIKE AN ORPHAN"
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Meeting in the Ministry of Telecommunications
building, Marwan Hamadeh described the August 7 Cabinet
session which led to the unanimous vote in favor of deploying
the LAF to the South. According to Hamadeh, both Hizballah
ministers Mohammad Fneich and Trad Hamadi were present at the
meeting, though President Lahoud did not show up. Defense
Minister Murr had also not planned to attend, but Hamadeh
insisted that Murr show up. "There will be no meeting on
BEIRUT 00002566 003 OF 004
deploying the army without the Minister of Defense." When
Murr presented the deployment plan to the Cabinet, he said
that the LAF could not deploy "except in the conditions of
1992," meaning that all militias must be disarmed and
dissolved. Murr said that the LAF would not accept any armed
militias in the deployment area, on which point the Hizballah
ministers supposedly hesitated, but, "realizing that they
needed to catch this instant," ultimately they conceded.
Fneich also raised the Sheba'a Farms issue, but Hamadeh did
not elaborate on what was said. To avoid potential outbreaks
of violence, most ministers had also wanted to cancel all
protests until the end of the war, but this was vetoed by the
Hizballah ministers who (without a touch of irony) said that
"democratic life" should not be stopped.
¶9. (C) At one point in the session, according to Hamadeh's
account, Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel asked whether
the army is perhaps being tricked by certain Lebanese into
deploying into the South where it could then be dragged into
a war with Israel. Hamadeh described Trad Hamadi's reaction
to this question as "primitive, saying the army would become
a part of the resistance." The cooler Fneich appeared
embarrassed by Hamadi's outburst, and "had to shut him up."
Judging from the reaction of the Hizballah ministers, Hamadeh
wonders whether Gemayel's question was in fact right on
target and worries the Iranians and the Syrians may be
setting a trap for the LAF. Hamadeh agreed that Nabih Berri
would not be part of any game to trap the army, which Berri
has traditionally supported.
¶10. (C) Describing Mu'allim's visit to Lebanon, Hamadeh
said that Berri was "very frank" during their meeting and
that Mu'allim met with a cold reception at the Arab League
foreign minister's luncheon. "He was like an orphan
yesterday. Nobody came over to say hello at the luncheon, so
he left early, claiming he had a long road home." While the
Arab ministers ignored Syria on the issue of showing support
for Hizballah in the final communique, there were also
Lebanese protestors outside Mu'allim's hotel and Mu'allim was
told he was not welcome in the Lebanese coastal town of
Jbeil, forcing him to move his meeting with Lebanese FM
Salloukh. According to Hamadeh, Mu'allim left Lebanon "very
mad."
¶11. (C) Regarding the draft UN resolution, Hamadeh hopes
that the text can be "Lebanized" and the French prevailed
upon to accept relatively tough language regarding the
mandate of an international stabilization force. Hamadeh
said he would tell Siniora to push the French to accept,
while also getting assurances from Hizballah, via Berri, on
whether they would accept the stabilization force. Hamadeh
said that the time for the resolution is now, while Hizballah
could still save face. If the IDF advances to the Litani
River, then Hizballah may just decide to fight it out. While
acknowledging that Defense Minister Murr may have a hidden or
mixed agenda, since it is well known he has been dining
secretly with his ex-father-in-law Lahoud, Hamadeh believes
SIPDIS
that Murr sees himself playing "a historic role" in leading
the LAF back to the South, and can be counted on. Hamadeh
also noted that Amr Moussa had been a surprisingly positive
force during his recent visit to Lebanon, telling some
ministers not to stand against the international community in
rejecting a resolution.
¶12. (C) As an close ally of Walid Jumblatt, Hamadeh has
been on the anti-Lahoud bandwagon for some time. He thinks
Berri is now ready to support this effort, and that Michel
Aoun might also be brought on board if his Free Patriotic
Movement were offered positions in the new government.
Hamadeh stressed, however, that Aoun would not be offered the
Presidency.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C/NF) Several common themes emerged from our meetings
with Hamdan, Mikati, and Hamadeh, and also from our
discussion with Amin Gemayel (septel). It is clear that all
view Nabih Berri as the lynchpin holding this tenuous
agreement together and bridging the gap between Siniora and
BEIRUT 00002566 004 OF 004
Hizballah. Without him, the whole plan could collapse, with
the potential for a violent Sunni-Shi'a conflict and
escalation in the Hixballah-Israeli fighting. In this
context, the possible assassination of Berri would present a
nightmare scenario of government collapse and sectarian
strife, with Hizballah, having the most arms and best
organization, stepping in to fill the vacuum.
¶14. (C/NF) There was also full agreement that, in the event
of a ceasefire, Hizballah would emerge from this conflict in
a weakened political position, which Hamadeh and others vowed
to exploit. While a proposal to deploy 15000 LAF troops to
the South would have been unimaginable on July 11, it is now
the unanimously-accepted position of the Lebanese government.
This would be a significant feather in Siniora's cap, and
the government could take the lion's share of the credit for
negotiating a ceasefire which strengthens Lebanon, whereas
Hizballah would bear the brunt of the blame for provoking a
conflict which has left over a thousand dead and millions of
dollars of damage to Lebanon's infrastructure.
¶15. (C/NF) Finally, general feeling could swing towards
removing Emile Lahoud following a ceasefire. Again, Speaker
Berri would be the critical player in this, as the addition
of his Amal bloc to the March 14 MPs would provide the
two-thirds parliamentary vote needed to remove the President.
However, Berri will not move in this direction unless he
feels stronger vis-a-vis his fellow Shi'a in Hizballah, who
have leaned on Berri in the past to maintain unity in support
of Lahoud. Berri may gain this leverage if he is able to
successfully implement the planned LAF deployment and achieve
a lasting cease-fire.
FELTMAN