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Viewing cable 09SANJOSE298, VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 30 BILATERAL MEETING
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANJOSE298 | 2009-04-08 21:09 | 2011-04-18 20:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose |
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 AEX-00 A-00 CPR-00
INL-00 DEAE-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 DHSE-00
EUR-00 OIGO-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00
DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 PC-01 MCC-00
GIWI-00 ISNE-00 DOHS-00 FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00
USSS-00 NCTC-00 SHEM-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 /002W
------------------5021CD 082204Z /38
O 082154Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0746
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000298
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: CS EDU OVIP BIDEN JOSEPH PGOV PINR PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S MARCH 30 BILATERAL MEETING
WITH COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT OSCAR ARIAS
Classified By: DCM Peter M. Brennan for reasons 1.4(d)
CORRECTED TEXT.
¶1. (U) March 30, 2009; 0955 am; San Jose, Costa Rica.
¶2. (U) Participants:
USG:
The Vice President
Ambassador Peter Cianchette
Anthony Blinken, NSA to the Vice President
Brian McKeon, Deputy NSA to the Vice President
Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs, NSC
Craig Kelly, WHA PDAS
David E. Henifin (notetaker), Pol/Econ Counselor, Embassy San
Jose
COSTA RICA:
President Oscar Arias
Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias
Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno
Foreign Trade Minister Marco Vinicio Ruiz
Ambassador to the U.S. Tomas Duenas
Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Luis Diego Escalante
¶3. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging, 45-minute discussion,
President Oscar Arias stressed Costa Rican-U.S. friendship,
and the need for additional USG assistance for education,
counter-narcotics (including helicopters), as well as access
to the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) or similar
programs. He also called for a new, U.S.-led embargo against
high-tech weapons transfers to the hemisphere and described
the real enemies in the region as "poverty, disease and
illiteracy." Vice President Joseph Biden stressed the U.S.
administration's desire to craft a policy with the region and
not for it, and he underscored USG willingness to listen to
and learn from its friends and neighbors. However, before
the USG could help the region, it had to help itself; the
best way to do so was to re-energize the U.S. economy. On
security assistance, the Vice President expressed hope that
the regional Merida Initiative be continued and perhaps
expanded. On education, he invited Arias to work with him to
develop a regional policy for Central America. The Vice
President said the USG was willing to re-examine the MCC
program, but foreign direct investment would help Costa
Rica's economy more in the short term. Arias gave the Vice
President a letter to POTUS seeking education assistance, and
a detailed proposal to increase assistance for and
cooperation with Costa Rica. END SUMMARY.
---------------
OPENING REMARKS
---------------
¶4. (C) The Vice President stressed the importance of the
upcoming meeting with Central American leaders, and thanked
President Arias for hosting it. Arias noted that Presidents
Daniel Ortega and Manual Zelaya did not attend )- reportedly
pressured by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela -- and were
missing an important opportunity.
¶5. (C) The Vice President said that he understood, and had
traveled to Chile and Costa Rica "with eyes open." A change
in attitude, in relations with the hemisphere, was needed.
Thus, the primary purpose of his trip was to gain a sense of
what regional leaders were thinking as the hemisphere charted
its course through the economic crisis. VP Biden underscored
that the crisis was also an opportunity to make positive
changes. He told Arias that his meetings with other leaders
in Vina del Mar had been very good, with open discussion
exceeding his expectations.
--------------------------------------------- -
ARIAS: WE ARE YOUR OLDEST FRIEND, AND WE NEED HELP
--------------------------------------------- -
¶6. (C) Arias then launched into a lengthy presentation,
focusing mostly on his international agenda and Costa Rica's
needs for assistance. He noted that Costa Rica was the
"oldest" and "most consolidated" democracy in the hemisphere,
and a long-time friend and ally of the United States. Costa
Ricans liked the United States, and Costa Rica depended on
the U.S. economically, especially for trade, tourism and
high-tech investment which utilized Costa Rica's
well-educated labor force.
¶7. (C) However, despite these advantages, Costa Rica still
needed help. This is why Arias was pushing the Costa Rica
Consensus around the world, which seeks to direct more
foreign assistance to "successful" countries which focus on
"education, health care and environmental protection" instead
of armaments. Arias said it was "unfair" that Costa Rica
"was not poor enough" to qualify for programs like the
Millennium Challenge Account (MCC) while MCC recipients in
Africa, for example, spent considerable amounts on their
militaries.
--------------------------------------
THE REGION NEEDS MORE BOOKS, NOT BOMBS
--------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Arias explained that he was thus also pursuing an
international conventional arms trade treaty, so that
countries -- including some USG aid recipients -- would stop
buying weapons and instead channel additional resources to
education and health. He asked why any country would "sell
arms to human rights violators or dictators."
¶9. (C) Arias saw no need for significant arms purchases in
the hemisphere, and suggested that the Obama administration
consider re-imposing an embargo against high-tech arms
transfers to the WHA region, similar to what was in place
1977-1997. Arias recalled how he and former president Carter
had unsuccessfully lobbied then-president Clinton not to end
the embargo. The result, which permitted the USG to supply
F-16s to Chile, ignited a South American arms race,
eventually including Venezuela, according to Arias.
President Obama's leadership might influence the EU to stop
selling arms to the hemisphere, he added.
¶10. (C) The real enemies in the region, Arias continued,
were "poverty, disease and illiteracy." These could not be
confronted by spending more on arms, but on education, as
Costa Rica had been able to do since abolishing its military.
A seven-year average pupil retention rate was the most
serious threat to the region's security, in Arias, opinion.
Arias handed the Vice President a letter to POTUS requesting
additional USG assistance with education, in the form of
additional Peace Corps or Peace Corps-like volunteers to
teach English as part of Costa Rica's "Costa Rica Bilingue"
national project (which is being run out of the President's
office and which seeks to make the nation essentially
bilingual in English and Spanish by 2017). Education is a
priority for Costa Rica, as "it should be for the region," he
emphasized.
-------------------------
COSTA RICA IS "DIFFERENT"
-------------------------
¶11. (C) The countries in the hemisphere all differ, Arias
continued, but they faced common problems: poor educational
systems, low tax collection (which means fewer domestic
resources for government) and increasingly strapped social
safety nets. It was thus important for Vice President Biden
to visit Costa Rica, which was "different" from the other
Central American nations (i.e., more successful facing some
of its problems). Costa Rica, for example, dedicated six
percent of its GDP to education, and another eight percent to
health care.
--------------------------------
HELICOPTERS TO FIGHT TRAFFICKING
--------------------------------
¶12. (C) Despite the fact that Costa Rica does not have an
army, and its air unit includes "25-year old Cessnas," Arias
pointed to the GOCR's "region-leading" performance in drug
seizures. Facing an increasing threat from regional
narcotics trafficking, he said the GOCR needed helicopters to
supplement its airborne counternarcotics assets. Five
Blackhawks went to Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative,
he noted; "all we need is one". Arias commended the
Secretary's "courageous" acknowledgment in Mexico of U.S.
co-responsibility in fueling the illicit drug and arms trade
in the region.
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VP BIDEN: MUST FIX THE ECONOMY FIRST
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¶13. (C) In response, the Vice President noted that some
countries viewed the United States as "part of the problem,"
while others saw the United States as "the only solution" to
some problems. However, before the USG could help the
region, it had to help itself; the best way to do so was to
re-energize the U.S. economy. "When we stall, you all
suffer," he said. The administration was thus tackling the
urgent economic problems as methodically as possible.
¶14. (C) The Vice President explained that during the election
campaign, he and President Obama had established the goal of
truly helping the U.S. middle class, and not just improving
macroeconomic indicators. The same held true for Latin
America: the Obama administration wants the middle class to
be better off when it completes its first term. "We do not
want the hemisphere left behind," he said. In addition, the
U.S. administration realized it was time for new "rules of
the road" governing the international financial and banking
system.
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BUT ALSO TACKLE REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
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¶15. (C) At the same time, The Vice President acknowledged
that "restarting the economy" alone was not enough; the USG
recognized that the region faced a number of other shared
problems that required shared solutions, chief among them
drug trafficking and crime. Drug source or transit countries
that had once been reluctant to confront the drug trade,
since it was "not their problem," now faced serious domestic
consumption problems.
¶16. (C) Vice President Biden assured Arias that the USG well
understood that counternarcotics success in Mexico and
Colombia might press more trafficking and traffickers into
Central America. This was another reason the Merida
Initiative was so important. Depending on the future
domestic economic situation, the USG would like to see Merida
continued and perhaps expanded, he explained. However, the
Vice President reminded President Arias of the difficult
economic situation inherited by the Obama administration,
including a USD 1.3 trillion deficit. Additional USG
assistance may not come easily. The Administration first had
to stimulate the U.S. economy in order to stimulate the
global economy.
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FRESH LOOK AT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND EDUCATION
-----------------------------------------
¶17. (C) In response to Arias, suggestions, the Vice
President said the USG might re-examine the MCC program, in
order to focus it more on needy sectors of society, even in
countries that were doing fairly well, rather than solely on
individual countries in need. Overall, the attitude in the
United States towards foreign assistance was evolving, he
added. The best thing Costa Rica could do in the short run,
however, was to continue to attract foreign direct
investment; this provided the best added value to the
economy.
¶18. (SBU) On education, which was another major topic of the
U.S. election campaign and very important to the Obama
administration, the Vice President invited Arias to work with
him personally to develop a regional approach for Central
America. The Vice President cited this project as a
potentially good example of the USG's intent to develop
policy with the region and not for it. He added that the
administration also hoped to give the Peace Corps a
significant boost in Western Hemisphere countries and around
the world. This would help "capture the energy" of young
Americans eager to serve.
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CLOSING COMMENTS AND THE &BIDEN8 PLAN
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¶19. (C) Drawing the meeting to a close, the Vice President
lauded Arias as "an exception" and Costa Rica as a country
which "stands apart." This was a principal reason why the USG
had asked Costa Rica to host the Central American leaders.
"Now is the time for honesty and not diplomacy," the Vice
President added. The administration thus invited
"constructive criticism" from its friends and allies. The
Vice President reiterated that the administration had to
"first focus at home," but looked forward to working with
regional partners on regional problems.
¶20. (SBU) As the meeting broke up, Arias handed the Vice
President the GOCR's new, detailed, so-called BIDEN
(Bilateral Investment Development and Emergency Needs Plan),
which seeks additional USG assistance and cooperation for
development, drug interdiction/law enforcement, debt
restructuring, balance of payment stabilization,
competitiveness, investment, renewable energy development and
English language teaching. (The GOCR released highlights of
the plan to the media after the meeting.)
¶21. (U) The Office of the Vice President cleared this
message.
WILSON