

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TOKYO2946, AMBASSADOR'S DECEMBER 21 LUNCH MEETING WITH VICE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TOKYO2946.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TOKYO2946 | 2009-12-30 07:07 | 2011-05-04 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo |
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKO #2946/01 3640735
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300735Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8458
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9121
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T TOKYO 002946
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, DOD FOR OSD/APSA, PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5,
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2019
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PINR JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S DECEMBER 21 LUNCH MEETING WITH VICE
FOREIGN MINISTER YABUNAKA
Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt per reasons 1.5(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The ROKG sees hints of movement from the
DPRK but that it will not offer any inducements to the DPRK
without meaningful action from the North Vice Foreign
Minister Mitoji Yabunaka told the Ambassador on December 21.
Foreign Minister Okada's upcoming travel abroad will include
stops in Russia, Turkey, and Burma as well as a possible
January Washington trip. Yabunaka himself would plan to
travel to Washington in advance of an Okada visit. On Futenma
replacement and alliance management, Prime Minister Hatoyama
confirmed to Secretary Clinton in Copenhagen that the current
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan would be the fallback
if no other alternatives are found. Yabunaka also expressed
his view that informal U.S.-Japan dialogue would be
preferable to a more formal structure during this time of
political transition and uncertainty. Yabunaka opined that
Prime Minister Hatoyama keeps his own counsel on some issues
and that reticence to express his own views with advisors can
create false impressions. Nonetheless, Yabunaka is optimistic
regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, noting that public support
remains strong, adding that media outreach could be effective
in persuading and informing both the media and public.
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Chairman Ichiro Ozawa,s role
in policy formation remains unclear but Ozawa is well aware
of the impression that he wields great influence. Yabunaka
confirmed that Japan would deliver a strong message to Iran
during the visit of Supreme Council for National Security
Secretary General Seed Jalili. End Summary.
Yabunaka Travel to Korea
------------------------
¶2. (C) Yabunaka reported on his weekend trip to South Korea's
Cheju Island for meetings with his ROKG counterpart. The
ROKG believes that there are hints of movement by the DPRK
but will not respond absent meaningful action from the DPRK
to address the nuclear issue. Yabunaka noted that this
stance was a change from the government of former President
Roh Moo-hyun, which Yabunaka suggested would have been more
forward-leaning in responding to hints of a thaw in progress
with the DPRK.
¶3. (C) Yabunaka said he had been frank with his ROK
counterpart in discussing the broader aspects of the
U.S.-Japan alliance, including the current domestic political
situation in Japan surrounding the new DPJ-led government,
political dynamics, and the debate over Futenma replacement
and the realignment road map. Yabunaka added that the ROK had
undergone similar domestic political turmoil in 2003 in the
transition from President Kim Dae-jung,s administration to
that of Roh. Yabunaka said the ROKG understood the
""seriousness and the urgency"" presently surrounding
U.S.-Japan alliance management but stopped short of saying
the ROKG was ""concerned.""
Foreign Minister Travel
-----------------------
¶4. (C) Foreign Minister Okada will be traveling extensively
in late December and early January. He will travel to Russia,
Turkey, and Burma. He would like to meet with the Secretary
in January. Yabunaka proposed that he travel to Washington
himself the first week of January to meet with the Deputy
Secretary and prepare for Okada,s trip.
Hatoyama Confirms FRF as Fallback
---------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yabunaka said Prime Minister Hatoyama confirmed to the
Secretary in Copenhagen that if the GOJ review of FRF
alternatives to Henoko did not yield viable proposals, the
GOJ would return to the 2006 FRF agreement. Recent newspaper
reports characterizing Hatoyama,s discussion with the
Secretary had been inaccurate, he stressed.
Informal Dialogue Preferable
----------------------------
¶6. (C) Regarding the shape of U.S.-Japan consultations on
alliance issues over the coming months, Yabunaka suggested
that an informal dialogue would likely be preferable to a
more formal structure such as a two-plus-two. He noted that
informal meetings could allow political leaders on both sides
to reach basic understandings on key issues, review overall
security strategy in East Asia, and demonstrate the new
government,s seriousness on security matters. Given a
sometimes steep learning curve faced by some DPJ leaders on
the details and rationale behind U.S.-Japan security policy,
a formal structure could be more risky as the Hatoyama
administration and/or ruling coalition political leaders
could take positions based on incomplete or erroneous
understandings of alliance issues and options. An informal
process could be an opportunity to educate leaders over the
course of the next year, with an eye toward the President,s
November 2010 visit to Japan. The President,s visit would
be a opportunity to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the
alliance in a more positive atmosphere, having laid the
groundwork through close consultations during the course of
the year.
Assessing Hatoyama on Security Issues
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Yabunaka noted that the Prime Minister,s advisors had
a variety of views but that their private advice to him
remained private. Hatoyama,s own views are sometimes
difficult to read. With the Prime Minister often offering
little in the way of comments that challenge a policy view or
analysis, Hatoyama advisors are sometimes left with the
impression that he has agreed or accepted a particular
position when, in fact, he has not. This tendency toward
reticence contributes to some ambiguity and confusion
regarding the Prime Minister,s views. Yabunaka said it
would be beneficial for the U.S. to go through the basic
fundamentals of security issues with the Prime Minister,
noting that engagement with China and others has its place,
but that the U.S. and Japan had to provide a foundation for
security as well. He added that it was important to impress
upon Hatoyama that strong U.S.-Japan relations did not have
an indefinite ""shelf life"" and that the Hatoyama
administration could not simply set the alliance aside in
favor of domestic politics without consequences. The
alliance needs continued care and nurturing.
Cause For Optimism
------------------
¶8. (C) In terms of educating DPJ policymakers regarding the
importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Yabunaka said that he
was optimistic, citing Foreign Minister Okada,s deeper
understanding of security issues since assuming office.
Moreover, recent public opinion polls indicated that 65
percent of the Japanese public supports the U.S.-Japan
alliance. Message and messenger were also important as well,
he added. For example, Secretary Gates, direct style in
addressing Futenma during his October visit had not played
well in Japan. On the other hand, President Obama is very
popular among Japanese, and that popularity could be
leveraged in promoting the alliance.
Media and Public Outreach
-------------------------
¶9. (C) Despite public support for the alliance in principle,
Yabunaka said that neither the general public nor some in the
media understand security issues very well. He added that
newspaper editorialists and the business community have a
reasonably good understanding of the issues but that
television commentators and politicians did not have as
strong a grasp of security issues. Efforts to educate the
latter group could be worthwhile, he added. In particular,
he cited the examples of several influential and popular
television commentators who might respond well to outreach.
Ozawa Role
----------
¶10. (C) Although DPJ Chairman Ozawa,s role in
decision-making by the Hatoyama government remains somewhat
unclear, Yabunaka said that Ozawa,s worldview is clear and
well-defined. The notion that Japan only obeyed the wishes
of the United States was deeply ingrained in Ozawa,s mind
Yabunaka said. Noting Ozawa,s recent trip to China along
with some 650 DPJ members, he said that Ozawa had been
disturbed that the trip had been cast as if he had been
""paying tribute to China."" Yabunaka said Ozawa,s inability
to foresee how such a trip would be portrayed in the media
reflected Ozawa,s occasional shortcomings in managing his
message. That said, Ozawa is aware of his perceived role as
the hidden power in the DPJ, reportedly telling PM Hatoyama
that if he were to become involved in the Futenma issue, the
media would portray Ozawa as dictating the DPJ position.
Iran
----
¶11. (S) In response to a query from the DCM, Yabunaka
confirmed that Japan would deliver a strong message to
visiting Iranian Supreme Council for National Security
Secretary General Saeed Jalili that Iran should return to
negotiations and respond positively to the P5 plus 1
proposal. Yabunaka noted that Deputy Foreign Minister
Kenichiro Sasae had breakfast with Jalili that morning and
that he and Foreign Minister Okada would be delivering a
consistent, clear message to Iran that it must meet its
obligations. Yabunaka also said Japan would express its
willingness to host P5 plus 1 discussions with Iran if that
would facilitate progress.
ROOS