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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09WELLINGTON104, LABOUR DOOMED TO WANDER NEW ZEALAND'S POLITICAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09WELLINGTON104 | 2009-04-23 19:07 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO7659
PP RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0104/01 1131949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231949Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5844
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000104
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/ANP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2024
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NZ
SUBJECT: LABOUR DOOMED TO WANDER NEW ZEALAND'S POLITICAL
WILDERNESS?
Classified By: Acting DCM Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Since the November 2008 election that
ousted the Labour-led government of former PM Helen Clark,
the Labour Party has struggled to define itself in opposition
to attract positive media attention as well as the public's
interest. So far the Labour Party has failed on both counts.
The National Party of John Key retains high public approval
ratings in the polls so far this year, and the government
continues to find ways to work constructively with the minor
political parties (ACT, United Future, Maori Party) that have
supply and confidence agreements with National. Of note,
National recently signed an MOU with the left-wing Green
Party. Even Labour Party faithful have questioned how the
Labour Party leadership has managed the transition from party
in power to party in opposition. Most worrisome to Labour
however, was a recent newspaper editorial that already ruled
out Labour's chances for victory in 2011, relegating Labour
effectively to the political wilderness in the near term.
End Summary.
Did Labour Listen to Voters Last November?
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) In the aftermath of the Labour Party's defeat at the
polls in November 2008, the party took quick action that
Labour party leadership thought would mitigate damage to the
party's morale and set the stage for a strong opposition role
for the party. Helen Clark announced on election night that
she was stepping down as party leader and deputy party leader
Michael Cullen quickly followed suit. These resignations
paved the way for a relatively speedy transfer of the Labour
Party leadership mantle to Phil Goff, with Annette King as
his deputy. The leadership transfer was largely accomplished
behind closed doors and Labour Party MPs filed before the
media to endorse the decision and declared themselves a
unified and rejuvenated opposition bench. Some pro-Labour
analysts decried the backroom deal approach to leadership
selection, and were disappointed that the party had barely
let the election dust settle before naming long-serving MP
and Clark contemporary Phil Goff as leader. Others thought
the selection of Goff and Labour's depiction of him and
Annette King as fresh faces was unconvincing -- particularly
compared to the relatively large influx of young talented
National MPs.
¶3. (C) Mainstream media also criticized Labour's approach
to opposition politics, noting that the party had refused to
acknowledge the electoral drubbing received at the polls.
One commentator noted that Labour seemed intent on believing
that the public had simply grown bored with Labour and in a
fit of madness, voted in the National Party. Once voters
realized the error in their ways, they would return Labour to
power, the reasoning went. Other analysts pointed out that
the party seemed oblivious to Labour's failed policies that
had alienated voters, and that without some public allowance
that Labour had lost touch with the electorate, it would be
difficult for Labour to reconnect with voters. In response
to some of the media criticism, Phil Goff commented that
Labour would do some internal review, but journalists also
noted that the behavior of Labour MPs in Parliament suggested
that some were unaware they were no longer in government.
¶4. (SBU) At the Labour Party caucus meetings in March,
Labour discussions centered on decrying the National Party's
secret agenda, seemingly unaware that those stale accusations
did not work in the lead up to the 2008 election and would
fail to resonate with voters so far in 2009. In fact, public
opinion polling continues to give National and PM John Key
even higher support numbers than National received at the
polls last November. And even though Clark stepped down as
party leader and secured a UN job, she still outpolled Phil
Goff in preferred PM polling.
But Some Backpedalling Taking Place
-----------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Despite Labour's efforts to downplay its policy
missteps under Helen Clark, Labour has quietly backpedalled
on a few key, signature Labour issues. Labour signed on to
the National government's wholesale repeal of the Electoral
Finance Act, which the Labour Party had promulgated to limit
campaign finance contributions and make political donations
more transparent. However, the legislation was cumbersome,
overly complex, and was heavily criticized by the public, the
Human Rights Commission, and the legal profession. More
recently, Labour allowed that some accommodation to Maori
over the Foreshore and Seabed legislation may be reasonable.
(Note: Labour's support for the Foreshore and Seabed Act
WELLINGTON 00000104 002 OF 002
spawned the Maori Party, as Maori within the Labour Party
felt that Labour had betrayed their interests in passing the
controversial legislation. End Note.)
Greens Sign MOU with National
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) On April 8, the Green Party and National signed an
MOU that lays out a framework for engagement on areas of
policy agreement. Some areas of engagement, e.g., energy
efficiency, regulation of the pharmaceutical/natural remedies
program, have already been formalized in an appendix of the
MOU. How the MOU would function in practice will start with
the Greens identifying a policy area of common ground with
the GNZ, and then seeking further discussions with
government. The process could allow the Greens access to
official advice on the issue (which ordinarily would not be
available to parties outside government). The outcome could
allow for the Greens to have some influence on policy or
legislation. The MOU signing stands in stark contrast to
statements by Green Party officials prior to and after the
election that stated the Greens would not work with National.
¶7. (C) As political analysts scratched their heads over the
meaning of this seeming capitulation by the Greens, it
appeared that National's strong post-election showing and
Labour's inability to generate public interest pushed the
Greens to seek a modus vivendi with National in order to stay
politically relevant. We asked a Labour Party source if the
MOU meant the Greens had reconciled themselves to the old
adage, "if you can't beat em, join em," and if this move
politically isolated Labour even further. Our source, a
Labour policy advisor, was relaxed about the MOU and noted
that Labour has regular and in-depth contact with Green Party
leader Jeannette Fitzsimmons; however, Fitzsimmons is
stepping down as co-leader soon and Labour is unsure how well
the good historical relationship between the two parties will
continue with Russel Norman and the new (as yet undetermined)
co-leader.
Looking Ahead for Labour
------------------------
¶8. (C) An April 16 Dominion Post editorial critical of
Labour's continued reliance on old party faces predicted that
National would remain in government for at least two terms, a
prediction that many have voiced in private but had not
stated publicly. The editorial also noted that Labour will
not be able to woo back voters -- the electorate will need to
first become disenchanted with National. If Labour is not in
a position to be viewed as a viable alternative, they could
still lose out in winning back the public. Labour has
dismissed the editorial and blamed the editorial staff for
being anti-Labour. However, we understand that Labour
privately is already laying the groundwork for further
resignations before the next election so that more younger
Labour candidates can come forward, laying the groundwork for
a National-style rejuvenation.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Even in defeat, Helen Clark continued to cast a long
shadow over the future of the Labour Party, despite her
generally low profile after tranferring the leadership to
Phil Goff. With her departure for New York, effective
rebuilding can begin, but is likely to be done slowly and
without fanfare for fear of endangering the Clark legacy,
which many in Labour will find difficult to let go. Most
analysts agree that Labour needs an influx of new blood;
however, simply promoting younger Labour Party personalities
may not be enough to change voting patterns without a
fundamental rethink of how some of Labour's policies were
rejected by the electorate and that a more centrist approach
to governance (as National has done) may be needed. The
Labour Party also tends to attract its membership from the
ranks of academics, unions and government workers.
National's younger candidates, in contrast, typified the
cross section of younger New Zealand professionals and middle
class families -- and were candidates who attracted important
swing voters in urban centers where Labour traditionally had
strong support. Whether Labour can field a similar broad
range of younger candidates among its traditional
left-of-center pockets of support is in question. The party
will also need to revamp its current parliamentary list,
which is replete with tried, tested, and largely defeated
Labour Party stalwarts. End Comment.
KEEGAN