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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07HELSINKI321, FINLAND'S NEW GOVERNMENT: TURNING A PROMISING NEW
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07HELSINKI321 | 2007-05-04 13:01 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO5765
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0321/01 1241321
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041321Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3307
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4771
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4707
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0306
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000321
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MOPS MARR EUN FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S NEW GOVERNMENT: TURNING A PROMISING NEW
TONE INTO SUBSTANCE
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
------------------------
¶1. (C) Finland's new center-right government is eager to
reverse the malaise that often typified US-Finnish
relations after 2003, and from the Foreign Minister on
down a palpable shift in tone is already evident.
Trans-Atlanticists have replaced notorious US-skeptics
at the MFA, the MOD and elsewhere, offering us the
chance to make real progress on several US regional
security and freedom agenda initiatives. We now see
enhanced Finnish participation in Afghanistan, in
NATO-related security operations, and even in Guantanamo
resettlement as very real possibilities.
¶2. (S) However, to achieve our goals we must move with
some caution. Key ministers are sincere in saying they
want to work with us, but the thorny task of undoing a
legacy of entrenched "allergy" to NATO and knee-jerk
opposition to American foreign policy will not happen
overnight -- especially with President Halonen still in
place for the next five years. With her Social
Democratic allies now in opposition, the President's
hand is weakened, but her skepticism toward US policy
remains resilient and many of our key goals run contrary
to her instincts. Our job, as we see it, will be to
help the new center-right government solidify
cooperation on our key agenda items, without putting
Halonen in a position where she feels boxed in and
assumes an aggressive, defensive posture. End Summary.
NEW TONE, NEW OPPORTUNITIES
---------------------------
¶3. (C) Finland's center-right government has been in
office for fewer than two weeks, and already the new GOF
has indicated to us in clear terms that its highest
priorities include strengthening the relationship with
the United States and reversing the malaise that has
characterized the bilateral relationship over the past
four years. Within the new coalition, the Conservative
Party (KOK) has taken over nearly all the key foreign
and security policy ministries, and the change in tone
is already abundantly clear. Foreign Minister Ilkka
Kanerva (who replaced Erkki Tuomioja, perhaps the
biggest cynic in the previous GOF regarding US policy)
has already met briefly with Secretary Rice at the
NATO FMs' meeting in Oslo; visited the Embassy for a
briefing on key issues (Reftel A); and sent his
political advisor to meet our political section for a
frank discussion of how to improve US-Finnish ties.
Defense Minister Jyri Hakamies became the first MOD in
Finnish history to openly announce that he favored
Finland's joining NATO (after replacing Seppo
Kaariainen, a staunch opponent of NATO membership). And
politicians from all parties -- as well as senior civil
servants at the MFA and MOD -- have described the new
government platform as unambiguously positive toward the
US, and a clear departure in terms of tone from that of
the previous government.
CONCRETE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS
-----------------------------------
¶4. (S) In addition to adopting a new tone, the new GOF
has already signaled a willingness to move forward on
several initiatives of direct interest to the US. Over
the medium- to long-term, we see concrete opportunities
in the following areas:
-- AFGHANISTAN: Greater Finnish participation in NATO
operations in Afghanistan appears feasible, to include
additional troops and, over the longer term, leadership
of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). We do not
expect the new GOF to reverse its predecessor's decision
not to offer lethal equipment for Afghan security
forces, as it would provoke an early confrontation with
President Halonen; however, we see opportunities for
non-lethal donations and will pursue them. Afghanistan
will continue to be a major recipient of Finnish
reconstruction and development aid, and the Finns will
continue their successful model of targeting aid in
support of PRT activities.
-- NATO RESPONSE FORCE: The new GOF sees the logic of
participating in the NRF, both as a complement to EU
Battlegroup activities and as a means of advancing
Finland's international crisis management goals.
Finland has Battlegroup commitments through summer 2008,
but may be willing to participate in an NRF thereafter.
HELSINKI 00000321 002 OF 003
Notably, President Halonen's initial pessimism toward
the idea has softened.
-- STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CONSORTIUM: The new GOF appears
eager to join Sweden as the second non-NATO participant.
Budgetary issues remain to be worked out, but MOD
sources are pleased with the new government's interest
in this initiative.
-- GUANTANAMO RESETTLEMENT: The previous GOF was a
sharp critic of the US facility at Guantanamo, but
consistently rejected our requests to address the
problem by resettling detainees. Legal hurdles still
exist, but the new government has quietly shown the
political will to explore resettling a small number. It
is imperative that the Department obtain from the
Pentagon requested information about the circumstances
and reasons for the detainees' incarceration for this
issue to move forward.
-- MANPADS: We are hopeful that Finland will transfer
several decommissioned SA-18s to the US. The
willingness of the GOF to entertain our request
promptly again indicates the shift in tone we are
seeing.
¶5. (C) In addition to these concrete initiatives that
are already in progress, Finnish civil servants and
political appointees have reached out to us to inquire
about other areas in which we could possibly cooperate.
We have suggested several areas of the US Freedom
Agenda, including a more pro-active role in fostering
democracy and civil society in Russia and the Caucuses;
more direct engagement with the US on Muslim outreach
and combating extremism; increased support to
Belorussian dissidents through the International
Humanities University in Vilnius; support for former
Finnish President Ahtisaari's plan for Kosovo; real
leadership in Europe on combating trafficking-in-
persons; and support for continued EU engagement with
Turkey and keeping the accession process alive (note:
the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, is a
Finn).
TOP DOWN CHANGE
---------------
¶6. (C) The GOF's proactive approach in reaching out to
us is the most evident sign that it truly intends to
reinvigorate the bilateral relationship. However, it
will take some time for many of these initiatives to
take shape. New ministers understand that they must
find a way to undo the legacy of their predecessors -- a
legacy that in many cases was marked by skepticism
toward US policies and a pronounced Finnish political
"allergy" toward NATO. Many senior diplomats and career
MFA and MOD civil servants have openly expressed to us
their enthusiasm for the new government's emphasis on
improving trans-Atlantic relations. FM Kanerva and MOD
Hakamies have emboldened these officials, with Kanerva
actually instructing MFA personnel to be more proactive
contacting the Embassy. Indeed, trans-Atlanticists
within the ministries tell us that the stage is set for
cooperative and constructive engagement with the US on a
range of issues. However, bureaucratic cultures do not
change overnight. In addition, the Conservative Party
is big on enthusiasm but short on experience, having
last held the post of Foreign Minister in the 1930s.
HANDLING HALONEN
----------------
¶7. (S) A far bigger challenge for both the GOF and us
will be President Halonen. During her first six years
in government, she and Foreign Minister Tuomioja
promulgated a foreign policy line that emphasized EU and
Russian relations over trans-Atlantic ties; extreme
caution toward NATO; an increasingly knee-jerk
resistance to many US foreign policy initiatives,
especially in the wake of the Iraq War; and, in the case
of Tuomioja, a penchant for unnecessarily antagonizing
Washington even on issues where we agreed. Tuomioja is
now in opposition, while the new government's platform
highlights "the trans-Atlantic relationship" as among
Finland's most important; specifically calls for steps
to improve and strengthen ties to the United States;
and, while stopping short of calling for Finland to join
NATO, removes references to Finland as a "non-aligned
country."
¶8. (S) That said, Halonen still retains constitutional
HELSINKI 00000321 003 OF 003
responsibility for formulating Finnish foreign policy --
a power she has interpreted broadly as a virtual veto
over any issue she chooses. Both the new government
platform and her Social Democratic allies' departure
from government have weakened her hand, but they have
not weakened her potential for side-tracking some
initiatives of importance both to us and to the new GOF.
On security policy issues in particular, Halonen remains
the leader of the SDP's anti-NATO wing (which currently
dominates SDP leadership but is not necessarily the
majority) and is likely to greet some of the GOF
initiatives listed above with skepticism. KOK leaders
tell us they can work with Halonen, who has developed a
reputation for reacting harshly (and often publicly) to
proposals she initially disagrees with, and then
softening her stance and responding well to internal
dialogue. However, senior MFA and MOD officials also
caution that she can be aggressive when she feels boxed
in and could be quick to veto initiatives if pushed too
hard or too quickly.
THE US ROLE
-----------
¶9. (C) The change of government in Finland is certain to
yield results on a range of issues that are favorable to
US policy goals. Kanerva's early handshake with the
Secretary in Oslo and the possibility of an S-Kanerva
SIPDIS
meeting in June have emboldened the government, making
leaders feel that their early effort to change the tone
has been noticed, and offering them encouragement to
begin managing their trans-Atlantic agenda through the
president's office.
¶10. (S) At the same time, we must do our part not to box
Halonen in. For example, the new government's decision
not to press for a lethal weapons donation for
Afghanistan is a clear attempt to avoid an early
confrontation with her, and is one we should respect in
hopes of making progress elsewhere in Afghanistan.
Likewise for protocol issues. The S-Kanerva meeting in
June is clearly important, and the GOF will play it as a
meeting of counterparts. However, Halonen remains
extremely sensitive about the fact that she has not
secured a long-requested meeting with President Bush;
while this is appropriate from Washington's point of
view given the President's other priorities, we should
tread carefully because the Finns will continue to raise
this. It will serve the interests of the US and the new
GOF better to begin rebuilding the bilateral
relationship at the foreign ministers' level, gauge the
new government's progress in working with Halonen to
deliver on items important to the US agenda, and
determine later if meetings above the S level are
warranted. To be sure, the GOF's new trans-Atlanticist
program represents a sea-change in tone and emphasis
as regards Finland's foreign and security policy;
however, it's an uncharted sea for the Finns, and the
government and foreign minister will need our help in
translating that tone and good intent into substance.
WARE