

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SOFIA1162, BULGARIA SPARRING AGAINST RUSSIAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SOFIA1162.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SOFIA1162 | 2006-08-15 13:01 | 2011-04-29 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlbelene.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/04/29/1082317_mrusna_energiia/ http://wlcentral.org/node/1722 |
VZCZCXRO0748
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #1162/01 2271336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151336Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2392
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0096
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0676
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0030
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0022
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0510
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0564
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 001162
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016
TAGS: ENRG ECON EPET PREL BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA SPARRING AGAINST RUSSIAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE
REF: A. SOFIA 632
¶B. SOFIA 310
¶C. SOFIA 202
¶D. SOFIA 190
Classified By: CDA Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY/ACTION REQUEST: Bulgarian leaders are
battling against the grip that Russia increasingly holds over
the energy sector here, but are struggling to strengthen
their position. President Purvanov and Prime Minister
Stanishev appear especially concerned; Minister of Economy
and Energy Ovcharov less so, perhaps due to his long history
of working with the Russian energy sector. None sees any
advantage in confronting Russia directly; all have strong
interests in maintaining good relations with Moscow. The
Russian energy web extends to gas, oil-pipeline construction
and the bidding to build a nuclear power plant at Belene.
Bulgarian officials are increasingly willing to stand up to
Russian pressure and they are open to alternative mechanisms
for meeting their energy needs, particularly if they involve
the EU and/or U.S. ACTION REQUEST: We strongly recommend a
September visit by DAS Matt Bryza to buck up the Bulgarians
and shape their strategic vision on energy diversity. We
encourage visits by other speakers or experts to buttress USG
energy policies. END SUMMARY
GAS: FORCED BY RUSSIA TO STRIKE A DEAL
¶2. (C) Some sobering statistics: Bulgaria gets 88 percent of
its gas and 73 percent of its oil from Russia. The
government wants to loosen Russia's grip especially on
Russian gas. It fears its only option may be to agree to
current Gazprom demands to increase the price on gas
contracts. Without such an agreement, the Bulgarians fear
they will lose an opportunity to lock in prices - and future
transit fees - at currently advantageous levels, and are
afraid the Russians will follow through on threats to divert
transit gas to Blue Stream. The current high energy prices
fuel concerns here that now is the time to make a deal.
¶3. (C) Ovcharov and Gazprom's Medvedev plan to meet in Vienna
on August 21 under the guise of "vacations" to try to
finalize a deal. Ovcharov told Ambassador Beyrle on August 9
that he was not sure if they could come to a final agreement.
He also said the Russians have agreed to a phased-in period
of price increases over five to six years, and an increase in
transit fees. Aside from the price, outstanding questions
include the quantity of gas to flow through Bulgaria to third
countries after 2010, and when to announce the increases:
either this summer when heating prices are not as sensitive
an issue, but which would come a few months before the
October 22 presidential election; or in late fall after the
election, but when the weather is cold and consumers are
already burdened with heating costs. Ovcharov also stressed
that Gazprom is pushing for a long-term agreement - possibly
20 years. In addition, Gazprom has indicated it would grant
more favorable financial terms in return for a stake in
Bulgargaz' pipeline, something Ovcharov has said Bulgaria
will not agree to.
¶4. (C) On the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (TGI),
Ovcharov offered that Bulgaria is interested in the project
and would try to hook up the relatively short 70-75 KM
distance from the Greek portion. He said Bulgaria has not
discussed this with Greece, but has talked with Turkey. As
for the origin of the gas, Ovcharov said the Kazakh PM told
him that Russia and Iran are working together to block a
Trans-Caspian pipeline, citing an old agreement that nothing
can be built on the Caspian without the agreement of all
parties. Ovcharov has spoken publicly about the threat of
Russian gas interests to Europe, and the need for European
countries to be part of a common energy policy. But he has
also said recently that Bulgaria must take care of its own
problems, which requires it to negotiate with Kazakhstan,
Turkey, Egypt and Algeria for long-term solutions, as well as
Gazprom immediately.
B-A PIPELINE: CAT AND MOUSE WITH THE RUSSIANS
¶5. (C) Ovcharov told us not to expect activity soon on the
SOFIA 00001162 002 OF 003
Burgas-Alexandropoulous (B-A) oil pipeline. The Russians are
analyzing the financial aspects of the project, preparing
feasibility studies, and are again pushing Bulgaria and
Greece for 90 percent Russian ownership, leaving 5 percent
each for the host countries. Bulgaria wants to step up and
build the pipeline, Ovcharov told us, but not at all costs,
and not for only a 5 percent share. Bulgaria sees its
interests as strategic, and calculates that its participation
in the pipeline could give a bit more leverage in gas and
nuclear plant talks.
¶6. (C) Ovcharov also said that Bulgaria and Greece will float
the idea of constructing the pipeline without Russian
participation. Ovcharov recognizes that it will be nearly
impossible to get financial backing without the promise of a
Russian supply, but the GOB feels it is worth exploring -
particularly in order to push Russia back off its recent grab
for 90% control of B-A. Bulgaria also holds out some hope
that Chevron might be interested in the project. On Caspian
Pipeline Company (CPC), Ovcharov told us he met recently with
the Russian Minister of Energy who said Russian interest in
CPC is to expand output, not to change the ownership model.
BELENE NUCLEAR PLANT: RUSSIAN OFFER IS LEADING
¶7. (C) The GOB closed the Belene bid review process on July
¶22. Even before seeing the final recommendations from the
National Electric Company, which, along with U.S. company
Parsons Engineering is coordinating the bid process, Ovcharov
requested the two bidders provide better prices and faster
timetables. Ovcharov is particularly interested in new
prices from the Russian bidder, Atomstroyexport, and their
sub-contractor for the Instrumentation and Control (I and C),
Framatom, whose numbers are more than twice Westinghouse's
offer for the I and C portion of the Skoda bid. Ovcharov is
confident he will get acceptable prices, but has threatened
to reconsider the viability of the project if not. When
Ambassador Beyrle described the strengths of the Westinghouse
proposal, along with its successful experience on the
Kozloduy nuclear plants here, Ovcharov agreed, but mentioned
"Framaton/Arveal and the EU" with a resigned shrug. Ovcharov
also stressed that Bulgaria was not negotiating with Gazprom
on the Belene deal.
¶8. (C) Ovcharov has pointed to the technical superiority of
the Atomstroyexport proposal, calling it "cutting edge," such
as the one Russia is building in China. He described the
Czech offer as fine, but asked why Bulgaria should settle for
20-year old technology. It is unclear, however, whether the
GOB would allow a "mix-and-match" by switching Westinghouse
in as the I and C portion of the plant. The real risk in
this situation is if Gazprom bank or another Russian energy
player were to become a major financial stakeholder in Belene
- something that the GOB currently says will not happen. The
GOB hopes to begin final negotiations with the winning bidder
in early September.
THE HIDDEN INTERESTS
¶9. (C) Gas supplies, the B-A pipeline and construction of
Belene are intertwined. Russian interests, most pointing
back to Gazprom, are involved in the three major energy
projects, and Gazprom has also expressed a desire to obtain
the Bulgargaz distribution grid if that were to be
privatized. Ovcharov has denied that there is any linkage
between the projects, but most observers find that hard to
believe. In addition, rumors are rampant that organized
crime figures, Bulgarian and Russian, are involved with
high-level GOB officials in bid-rigging, shakedowns and other
illegal behavior in the energy sector (septel to follow.)
Ovcharov, who studied in Moscow and has spent much of his
professional career working with Russian energy interests,
took pains to describe to us measures he is taking to limit
the activities of such players. His protestations are at
least in part self-serving given the murky world behind the
closed doors of a non-transparent negotiation process.
COMMENT
¶10. (C) While Bulgaria is a small player in Europe's energy
market, its role as a possible hub or transit country for
SOFIA 00001162 003 OF 003
Eastern gas and oil is potentially large. The increasing
hunger of Gazprom and other Russian interests to play a
larger role in almost all aspects of the Bulgarian market
makes it very difficult for Bulgaria to isolate the Russian
pieces in this Rubik's Cube.
¶11. (C) We regularly stress to the President, Prime Minster
and Minister of Energy the need for Bulgaria to diversify
energy sources away from Russia. They agree, but are at
pains to figure out how. Without a coordinated and serious
European effort to address what appears to be a comprehensive
strategy of Russia and/or Gazprom to reassert its interest in
the region, small countries such as Bulgaria may never be
able to escape the Russian energy orbit. We strongly
recommend a September visit by DAS Bryza to offer our
strategic vision and energy outlook to help stiffen
Bulgaria's resolve in the face of unrelenting Russian
pressure.
KARAGIANNIS