

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE1173, COSTA RICA: NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH CHINA BRING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE1173.
VZCZCXYZ0030
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #1173/01 1692239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182239Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8304
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0130
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4061
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0448
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0072
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 001173
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, EAP/CM, CA AND PRM;
SOUTHCOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SNAR CVIS XK CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: NORMALIZED RELATIONS WITH CHINA BRING
ECONOMIC AND IMMIGRATION CONCERNS
REF: A. SAN JOSE 01106 (NOTAL)
¶B. SAN JOSE 868 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)
Classified By: ADCM David E. Henifin per 1.4 (d).
¶1. SUMMARY (U) Costa Rica's June 1 recognition of the PRC and
consequent break in diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Ref A)
have brought worries about the financing of ongoing
assistance projects (previously funded by Taiwan) as well as
immigration concerns at a time when illegal Chinese traffic
is taxiing immigration authorities. Greater Chinese
involvement in Costa Rica may also bring Chinese drug
trafficking, a point we have raised already with FM Stagno.
While cabinet ministers (and President Arias) point to
prospective trade benefits, the Legislative Assembly
(Asamblea) is scrambling to replace the lost Taiwanese
funding. Immigration authorities expect increased arrivals
of Chinese nationals, and are concerned about possible
Chinese mafia involvement. The GOCR was clearly not prepared
to face the practical consequences of its political decision
to embrace China. END SUMMARY
NEW FRIENDS, NEW MONEY?
=======================
¶2. (U) Costa Rica's partnership with Taiwan included
financial aid such as low-cost, long-term financing, or
outright aid, such as capital costs for construction, police
equipment, vehicles, and motorcycles. As recently as May 30
(on the eve of the secret negotiations in Beijing which
sealed the PRC recognition deal), the GOCR had included in a
supplemental budget request to the Asamblea the amount of
7,792 million colones (USD 15,130,000) for construction of
the Naranjo-Florencia highway, which was predicated on
Taiwanese funding. Minister of Finance Guillermo Zuniga
pulled back the budget request on June 8. The Asamblea is
now scrambling to secure loans, or to transfer funds from
other sources to fill the gap.
¶3. (U) Zuniga has hinted publicly about a possible credit or
bond purchase from the Chinese, but cautioned that these are
only "options"; no firm details have been concluded.
Minister of Foreign Trade Marco Vinicio Ruiz announced that
the first Chinese-Costa Rican trade fair might take place in
October. President Oscar Arias stressed the trade prospects
with China, reminding an audience on June 8 that he had long
noted the importance of free trade agreements with Singapore
and South Korea, as well as China.
¶4. (U) Meanwhile, the PRC has moved quickly to fill the
diplomatic gap voided by Taiwan. Ambassador-designate Wang
Xiaoyuan arrived from his previous post, Montevideo, on June
¶13. Described by the local media as an excellent Spanish
speaker and a Latin American "expert" with experience in
Mexico, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, and Spain, Wang is
expected to present a copy of his credentials to FM Bruno
Stagno on June 18. His official credentialing ceremony with
President Arias will come later.
OUR CONCERNS: TRAFFICKING IN DRUGS AND PEOPLE
============================================= =
¶5. (C) On the Costa Rican side, Stagno,s Chief of Staff,
Antonio Alarcon, was dispatched to Beijing to oversee the
embassy opening there (although we understand he will not
remain as ambassador). A confident-sounding Stagno told
Ambassador Langdale on June 11 that the Arias administration
expected the controversy about the sudden switch in relations
to die down in a few weeks. "The decision has been made," he
stressed. Stagno asserted that the recognition timing was
partly driven by regional dynamics. The GOCR was under the
impression that other Central American countries, including
Nicaragua, were considering recognizing China. Costa Rica
did not want to be in the position of "following Nicaragua"
on this issue. This was "not just about trade," According to
Stagno.
¶6. (C) While acknowledging Costa Rica,s right to recognize
China, the Ambassador noted two concerns. First, given the
history of Chinese trafficking in persons to and through
Costa Rica, normalized relations would likely increase that
flow. The GOCR should be vigilant to likely visa fraud.
Second, Chinese drug traffickers are active elsewhere in the
region, particularly in the methamphetamine trade. The GOCR
should be prepared for this as well. Stagno thanked the
Ambassador for these warnings.
GOCR CONCERNS: IMMIGRATION
==========================
¶7. (C) Immigration Director Mario Zamora told Pol/C and
Poloff on June 11 that he had no advance warning of President
Arias,s decision to recognize China. He immediately grasped
the potentially negative implications, given Costa Rica,s
recent history as a trans-shipment point for illegal
immigrants mostly seeking their way to the United States, and
as a destination for Chinese workers paid slave wages in
Costa Rica (Ref B). They arrive via land, air, or by boats
from Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Any of the boats
are not seaworthy and, while they may not necessarily be
headed to Costa Rica (they prefer landingsin Guatemala to
continue their trip North) they re found in Costa Rican
waters or become disable here. Zamora said there are 72 PRC
citizens curently awaiting deportation (many of them were
arivals by boat while some were found in safehouses n Costa
Rica). According to Zamora, the GOC hasalready acceded to
pay for this group of illegalimmigrants to return (by air)
to China.
¶8. (C Zamora estimates there are at least 10,000 PRC
ationals legally residing in Costa Rica. This numbr could
easily double with the amount of undocumnted illegal
immigrants or in-transit Chinese. Te increase in illegal
Chinese arrivals during th four-month period earlier this
year when Colomba relaxed visa requirements for PRC citizens
was a troubling case in point. The influx of PRC citizns to
Colombia (with repercussions throughout th region) grew more
thanten-fold during that brief period, according to Zaora.
Showing us some passports, he added that 23of the Chinese
nationals currently waiting for dportation from Costa Rica
had legal entry stampsinto Colombia dated March 2007.
¶9. (SBU) Currenty, PRC travelers to Costa Rica are Category
4 aplicants, the most restricted requiring a limited(90-day) MFA-approved visa
to enter Costa Rica. Zaora
maintains this prerequisite will remain in efect, as it is
not based on the level of diplomatic relationship. Haiti and
Cuba, for example, ar in the same visa category. Zamora
anticipates hinese pressure to ease visa requirements (as
ha already appeared in the local media) and he seemsready
to stand firm. If the Chinese claim they need additional
business visas, he said, then CostaRica should see an influx
of genuine businessmenand investors from China. Zamora told
us he hasrequested a meeting with FM Stagno to discuss the
Chinese visa issue and other immigration implications from
recognition.
FRAUDULENT ID CARDS, CHINESE MAFIA ALSO WORRISOME
============================================= ===
¶10. (SBU) The illegal Chinese immigrant issue is exacerbated
by quality problems in the alien identification card issued
by the GOCR. Zamora said the original contract was awarded
to the local representative of a US-based firm, "Lasercard".
The end product did not meet the GOCR specifications or the
quality standards of the company resulting in rapidly fading
photos and vital data in the cards. (Zamora showed us
examples.) The faded cards are often passed to illegal
immigrants who place their photo and data on the same, while
the legal holder gets a legitimate replacement of his faded
card. The result is an active illegal market for these
identifications, which could easily be used by Chinese
obtaining seemingly legal cards to secure their status as
immigrants. Zamora added that the government is currently
addressing these problems and seeking redress from the
company.
¶11. (SBU) The potential involvement of Chinese mafia-type
smuggling organizations (such as the Han Garcia Clan of
Mexico) also concerns Zamora. Should these groups become
more active in Costa Rica, the result could be more violence
associated with trafficking. Zamora,s office is working hard
to identify such groups and/or attorneys involved in the
illegal immigration trade. Zamora is also well aware of the
lax passport procedures now in effect in Venezuela, which
could be exploited by Chinese or smuggling organizations
sending Chinese via airline service from Caracas. Zamora
added that in the past, secondary inspection by airport
immigration officers has been able to detect counterfeit
travel documents, resulting in exclusion and deportation of
the travelers.
COMMENT
=======
¶12. (C) The GOCR was clearly not prepared to face the
practical consequences of its political decision to embrace
China. Like Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal
(Ref A), Zamora was kept in the dark, despite his key
portfolio. He is painfully aware of the impending
immigration problems associated with China,s recognition and
seems determined to hold his ground. However, Zamora may be
unable to resist the political pressure to elevate China
eventually to a Category 3 country. This would permit Chinese
with US or EU visas to enter/transit Costa Rica without MFA
review and a Costa Rican visa, and would not be good news
from our perspective.
WEITZENKORN