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Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON260, THE NUCLEAR BAN AND NEW ZEALAND'S IDENTITY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06WELLINGTON260 | 2006-04-05 03:03 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHWL #0260/01 0950355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050355Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2611
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4358
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000260
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, AND EAP/ANP
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU
PACOM FOR JO1E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: THE NUCLEAR BAN AND NEW ZEALAND'S IDENTITY
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor
Katherine Hadda, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: For reasons of history and politics, New
Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation has become a core part of
the nation's psyche. The ban arose just as the country was
forging its post-colonial identity, and has become as
integral to many Kiwis as the Constitution is to us.
Although we may never be able to convince New Zealanders to
lift the legislation, we can and should continue to address
the anti-Americanism that has become linked with the policy.
This includes encouraging new areas of bilateral cooperation
that will enable Kiwis to see the positive benefits of our
relationship. We should also not let the anti-nuclear issue
be used as an argument against a closer relationship with the
United States. End Summary.
¶2. (C) U.S. officials are often struck by the strong
attachment many New Zealanders hold for their country's
anti-nuclear legislation. Whenever we try to discuss the
issue's relevance to our current operations in the Pacific,
or question the logic of the policy in a post-Cold War world,
the response of most Kiwis is that we are bullying New
Zealand. What we see as a policy discussion appears to these
New Zealanders an attack on their core identity. But how
could legislation passed just 20 years ago be so intrinsic to
a nation's sense of self? There are four main reasons:
history, geography, the search for identity, and politics.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
A Brief History Lesson: The Search for a Post-Colonial
Identity
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶3. (C) During the second world war, the United States
protected New Zealand, then a British dominion, from Japanese
invasion. By 1947, Britain had given New Zealand's
Parliament sole power to make laws for the country. With the
creation of the ANZUS defense alliance in 1951, both New
Zealand and Australia formally recognized for the first time
that their Cold War security depended primarily on the United
States, not Great Britain. Although even at that time an
anti-nuclear movement had begun here in response to U.S. and
others' nuclear testing in the Pacific, New Zealand remained
a strong ally of the United States and allowed U.S. naval
ship visits, including in later years those that were nuclear
armed or powered.
¶4. (C) Beginning in the late 1960s, many Kiwis became
uncomfortable with being U.S. allies. According to NZ
Historian Jock Phillips, while Americans took away
military/political lessons from the Vietnam War, New Zealand
came away with a new sense of national identity. Opposition
to the war was couched in nationalistic terms, because like
many Commonwealth countries at that time, New Zealanders were
carving out a post-colonial role. Because of the Vietnam war
and Britain's declining influence here, what arguably should
have been a rebellion against the UK was instead directed
against the United States.
¶5. (C) This desire to distance New Zealand from the United
States, and a growing hunger for a uniquely Kiwi identity,
were the backdrop against which the anti-nuclear movement
took center stage during the 1980s. By that time, American
testing in the Pacific had all but stopped, but French
testing in the region had created something akin to a mass
hysteria about all things nuclear in New Zealand. These and
other factors, including rising U.S.-Soviet tensions in the
early '80s, revived once more the anti-nuclear movement in
Australia and New Zealand. The demonstrators who opposed
U.S. warship visits to New Zealand at this time actually had
the environment on their mind more than the military.
National Party Prime Minister Robert Muldoon helped fan the
resentment by encouraging American ship visits, so that he
could point to the irresponsible nature of the demonstrators
and divert attention from the flailing post-oil shock
economy. The Labour Government that took power in 1984 and
initiated the anti-nuclea
r policy the following year also introduced radical economic
liberalization that induced real hardship for many Kiwis,
including core Labour supporters. Prime Minister Lange, too,
welcomed the diversion of anti-U.S. and anti-nuclear
sentiment from the problems of the day. Because of his own
political ideology he also had the secret agenda of wanting
to break New Zealand away from ANZUS, but was afraid the
average Kiwi voter would not accept this. Adopting the
pro-environment, moralistic stance of the anti-nuclear
movement gave him perfect cover to force a break in the
alliance.
¶6. (C) Many New Zealanders consider Lange's performance at a
1985 Oxford Union debate to be a defining moment in their
modern history. Lange, who argued the position "Nuclear
Weapons are Morally Indefensible," for the first time gave
New Zealanders a confident and witty Prime Minister lecturing
the world on a position unique to their country. Kiwis most
applaud Lange's remark that he could smell the uranium on the
breath of the opposing young American debater. The line was
devoid of substance but to Kiwis that's beside the point: the
debate's significance was not intellectual but emotional.
New Zealanders were taking a moral stand worthy of the
country's Scottish missionary forefathers. Kiwis told
themselves they were a force in the world. For many Kiwis,
the Chernobyl disaster the following year vindicated the
anti-nuclear policy and it became law in 1987.
---------------------------------------
Where I Stand Depends on Where I Sit...
---------------------------------------
¶7. (C) The second factor behind the nuclear ban's continued
draw is size and geography. New Zealand is as large as
California, but it's population is just four million. It's a
standing joke among Kiwis that everyone knows everyone else.
The country's newspapers resemble those in small town
America. Every major car accident is reported.
Everyone who has ever passed through New Zealand is a New
Zealander. (The press consider recently released Iraq
hostage Harmeet Sooden a New Zealander, even though his
passport -- and the rest of the world -- identify the
Auckland University student as Canadian.)
¶8. (C) New Zealand's small, geographically isolated
population also prides itself on its self-sufficiency and
ingenuity. They have an apocryphal ability to fix anything
with some number 8 wire, and visitors are often struck by how
much of the country's food is locally produced. Kiwis'
no-nonsense pioneer spirit -- possibly aided by indigenous
Maori and Pacific island culture -- has also led to an
admirable insistence on egalitarianism. But this has the
downside of at times encouraging the impractical and
discouraging innovation. The Prime Minister flies on
commercial or charter flights, even within the country. The
media waxes indignant over the parliamentary pension that New
Zealand's High Commissioner in London draws on top of his
"high" NZD 125,000 (USD 75,000) salary. The country's "tall
poppy syndrome" -- an overwhelming desire to cut high fliers
down to size -- is legendary.
¶9. (C) As with many small towners, New Zealanders long to be
noticed. They often have to clarify for themselves and
outsiders how they differ from their larger and more
ebullient neighbor Australia (think Canada and the United
States). They are also painfully aware that as many as 20
percent of their fellow countrymen (25 percent of those with
advanced degrees) have chosen to live abroad, often
permanently. There's a nagging insecurity among many Kiwis
that their country is inferior. As a result they vigorously
point to its uniqueness. Many things, from Busy Bee toys to
Holden cars, are classified as "iconic" Kiwiana. The
anti-nuclear legislation, seen as both unique and a way to
cut the mighty United States down to size, is the most iconic
of all. (Many of us suspect that if we were to openly
applaud the ban -- or at least say it no longer mattered to
U.S. policy -- the legislation would lose some of its appeal.)
¶10. (C) Despite their country's small size, geographic
isolation makes New Zealanders feel invulnerable. The
military regards itself as an expeditionary force, and the
official charged with international policy at the Ministry of
Defense almost laughed out loud when Polcouns once suggested
New Zealand might one day appreciate the option of U.S.
military assistance. The lack of a geographic threat also
enables Kiwis to view the world with a sense of detachment
and a bit of moral superiority. Many feel their small
country's interests are best served by multilateral rather
than bilateral arrangements. New Zealand's UN Perm Rep
Rosemary Banks has told us that because former PM Frazier
helped create the UN, many Kiwis have an unrealistic view of
the country's influence in that body. They also have a poor
understanding of how much the multilateral system depends on
the United States. It fits New Zealanders' sense of moral,
multilateral destiny to try to set an example for the rest of
the world through the ant
i-nuclear legislation.
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The Continued Search for a Common Identity
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¶11. (C) In the twenty years since the anti-nuclear
legislation was implemented, New Zealand has become a much
more heterogeneous society. In 1975 and again in 1987, the
country changed its race-based immigration policies. As of
the 2001 census some 30 percent of New Zealanders were Maori,
Pacific Islanders, Asian, African, or Middle Eastern. In
recent years, Maori have become more vocal about their
historic grievances and continued lag in key social
indicators such as income and health. The increased ethnic
mix and debate over the proper compensation for Maori have
raised a lot of questions here about what it means to be a
New Zealander.
¶12. (C) Recently, a guide showing EAP A/S Hill around the
national museum was asked whether the country sees Maori
culture as a common bond. He immediately answered that it
was the country's nuclear ban that made it unique. The
probable reason for that non sequitor is that in today's New
Zealand, people see both Maori culture and the anti-nuclear
policy as means of uniting Kiwis and differentiating the
country from others. The Labour government in particular has
used the search for a uniquely Kiwi identity -- including
being Maori, clean, green, and anti-nuclear -- to its
advantage. A junior Labour MP tells us Prime Minister Clark
sees this as part of her legacy.
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Politics
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¶13. (C) Some of the anti-nuclear legislation's creators,
including Prime Minister Clark and Defense Minister Goff, are
in Government today and remain personally attached to the
policy. Their sentimental attachment aside, the ban has also
proved useful for them politically. The Labour government
continues to cast itself as the guardian of the policy, and
the opposition National Party as closet U.S. poodles who
would immediately scrap the legislation if elected. There is
some evidence that such claims won Labour votes during the
last election campaign. But as we have previously reported,
National was never likely to be able to overturn the
legislation anyway because it is such a lightning rod issue.
Further, National is now close to declaring that it supports
maintaining the ban. In this way, the Nats hope to eliminate
it as a source of strength for Labour.
¶14. (C) The truth is that since 1994 no NZ Government of
either party has ever really had to pay a high price for
maintaining the anti-nuclear policy, whereas scrapping it
would cost a government dearly at the polls. There were no
U.S. bases in New Zealand at the time the anti-nuclear
legislation was passed, and so unlike Australia no potential
economic loss from a military split. Unlike France, which
successfully gained the release of the agents behind the
"Rainbow Warrior" bombing by threatening economic sanctions,
the United States has not been able to change New Zealand
policy through bans on high level political and military
contacts. In future reporting, we will explore further the
impact of these U.S. policies in New Zealand.
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Where Do We Go From Here?
-------------------------
¶15. (C) The anti-nuclear legislation is not going anywhere
soon, as most New Zealanders have a strong identification
with the policy and there is no political leadership calling
for a change. New Zealand's future energy shortages may force
an eventual rethink on the nuclear ban, but for now most
analysts see this as unlikely given the options of solar,
wind, and other technologies that are more in keeping with
New Zealanders' "clean and green" self image.
¶16. (C) Nor would a decision to explore the use of nuclear
energy necessarily mean New Zealand would allow U.S. naval
ship visits, even on paper. The ban -- and U.S. reaction to
it -- has been used by its masters to become a surrogate for
New Zealand nationalism (and, by extension, anti-American
sentiment). Even if Kiwi officials were to decide it would
be in their interest to change the policy, they'd have a hard
time doing so.
¶17. (C) But although the ban is tough to address directly,
the underlying anti-Americanism does not have to be. We have
found that by shifting the conversation from the ban to New
Zealand's overall security interests, we have encouraged New
Zealanders to take a broader look at US-New Zealand
cooperation in the region and around the globe. Media
coverage of New Zealand's participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative has been quite breathless, for example.
While previously this was due to misreporting that the U.S.
had changed its policy limiting joint exercises, there now
seems to be genuine interest in New Zealand's contribution to
this US-led multilateral effort. We can and should continue
to look for more such ways to encourage our Kiwi counterparts
to cooperate with us on issues of bilateral and regional
interest. We should also act -- within our broader interests
-- to keep the anti-nuclear issue from being used against
those of all political stripes who want a closer relationship
with the Un
ited States.
McCormick