

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANJOSE277, COSTA RICA: TREASURY CONDUCTS FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANJOSE277.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SANJOSE277 | 2009-04-05 19:07 | 2011-03-21 16:04 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0277/01 0951939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051939Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0713
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000277
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR INL/LP KBROWN AND MAHERN;
ALSO FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC:AWONG, AND EEB/ESC/TFS
TREASURY FOR SSENICH, CCORREA, AND CGAMBLE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: TREASURY CONDUCTS FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT
ASSESSMENT
REF: 2008 San Jose 0930
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (U) A three-person team from the Department of Treasury's Office
of Technical Assistance (OTA) met with key GOCR officials on
financial crimes and enforcement issues from March 23-27. The team
arrived, at the request of the Central Bank President, to find an
environment ripe for financial crimes due to untaxed and unregulated
casinos, legalized prostitution and increased narco-trafficking.
The OTA team met with government agencies ranging from financial
institutions to law enforcement agencies to customs.
¶2. (SBU) In the near term, OTA can provide workshop-type training to
government officials on the challenges of standing-up a legislative
and regulatory framework to govern casinos. Later, the visiting
team, led by Carlos Correa of OTA, will prepare an assessment which
can be used to draft the terms of reference for launching an OTA
Financial Enforcement program in Costa Rica.
¶3. (SBU) Though U.S. Treasury funds support the assessment team's
current work, funds supporting a Financial Enforcement program in FY
2009 are not available. Thus, Post has proposed using State INL/LP
"bridge funding" during FY 2009 and the first quarter of FY 2010 to
launch the program and make the best use of reform-minded officials
in the current government. Costa Rica often does not qualify for
assistance based on strictly socio-economic measures. However, the
GOCR has the absorptive capacity and the willingness on this issue
-- due to the involvement of the Ministry of Finance (an agency with
a track record of success with OTA programs) -- to improve the
financial crimes environment in Costa Rica. We strongly believe
that this new OTA program is worth the investment, and as soon as
possible. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
PROVIDING THE BROAD PERSPECTIVE
-------------------------------
¶4. (U) In response to a request letter from Costa Rican Central Bank
President Francisco de Paula Gutierrez, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury authorized an assessment of Costa Rica's systemic
vulnerabilities to financial and economic crimes. Carlos Correa
(Assistant Director of Economic Crimes), Carl Gamble (Regional
Director, Latin America), and Rick Hector (Senior Advisor, Internet
& Casino Gaming) met with a wide range of officials in the Costa
Rican Government, beginning with the Central Bank President and also
including:
-- Alberto Dent, President, National Council of Financial System
Supervision, CONASSIF;
-- Cecila Sancho Calvo, Director of Private Bank Supervision, and
Nidia Varela Cordoba, Director - Department of Private Bank
Inspection, Superintendency of Financial Entities (SUGEF);
-- Juan Jose Flores, Superintendent, and Eddy Rodriguez Cespedes,
Assistant Superintendent, Superintendency of Securities(SUGEVAL);
-- Ana Lorena Brenes, Procuradora General (similar to a solicitor
general), and Tatiana Gutierrez, Solicitor of Public Ethics under
the Procuraduria General, Ministry of Justice;
-- Jenny Phillips, Vice Minister - Income Administration, Jose
Adrian Vargas, Treasurer, Desiderio Soto, Director - Customs, and
Carole Quesada Rodriguez, Director - Internal Affairs Unit, Ministry
of Finance;
-- Marcela Chacon, Vice Minister, Ministry of Public Security;
-- Jorge Rojas, General Director, and Francisco Segura, Sub
Director, the FBI-equivalent Judicial Investigative Agency (OIJ);
-- Marta Acosta, Sub-Controller, Office of the Controller General;
-- Andrea Murillo, Director, Office of Technical Assistance and
International Relations, Jose Cabrera - Organized Crime Unit
Prosecutor, Patricia Cordero - Economics Crime Unit Prosecutor, and
Walter Espinoza - Narcotics Unit Prosecutor, Office of the Attorney
General; and
-- Mauricio Boraschi, Director, and Robert Quiros, Manager -
Financial Intelligence Unit, Costa Rican Institute of Drugs (ICD).
--------------------------------------------- -
COMPLEX GOCR STRUCTURE COMPLICATES ENFORCEMENT
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (U) Embassy San Jose purposely designed a meeting program that
delivered a broad panorama of perspectives for the visiting OTA
team. In general, Costa Rican governance is characterized by a
diffusion of authority and multiplication of control mechanisms,
which is relevant to the area of financial crimes. Government
structure blurs the familiar Executive-Legislative-Judicial
relationship by a number of "autonomous" and "semi-autonomous"
institutions reporting to one or more of the three principal
branches of government. Two examples make the point:
-- the Office of the Controller General reports to the legislative
branch but has very specific powers to exercise management control
over every internal auditing department in the government; and
-- the Judicial Branch houses virtually all criminal investigation
work (by OIJ) and all prosecution (Attorney General), although the
Executive Branch houses the major financial intelligence in the ICD
which is part of the Ministry of the Presidency.
-----------------------------------
NEAR TERM STEPS: CASINO REGULATION
-----------------------------------
¶6. (U) In the near term, the OTA team agreed to provide documents
regarding key aspects of casino regulation. However, OTA Advisor
Hector cautioned that reference materials only hint, at best, at the
enormity of the undertaking to stand-up a regulatory body supported
by (1) well-crafted legislation which specifies which ministry/
agency has the authority to enforce gambling law, (2) regulations,
and (3) "sub-regulations" or standard operating procedures for
gambling enterprises.
¶7. (SBU) Costa Rica is particularly vulnerable to money laundering
activities originating in the gaming business since gambling is
neither taxed nor regulated in Costa Rica. The standing casino law
on the books dates from 1922. OTA is willing to return Hector and
his Casino & Gaming Team to Costa Rica for a short training session
for the GOCR to learn about the necessity, as advisor Hector
described, to "regulate (gambling) all the way" since legislating
and regulating the gaming industry is an "all or nothing"
proposition.
--------------------------------------------
MEDIUM TERM STEPS: ASSESSMENT TEAM ANALYSIS
--------------------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) The OTA assessment report will be very useful to Embassy
San Jose, as we focus more closely on the key issues associated with
financial and economic crimes; the report will detail the
vulnerabilities of the Costa Rican financial system to criminal
activity. More importantly, the report will recommend the basis for
collaboration with the GOCR on a financial enforcement/economic
crimes OTA program. Thus, U.S. Treasury and the GOCR can use the
report to draft a terms of reference agreement which would serve as
the basis for a formal OTA program in Costa Rica.
-----------------------------------------
LONG TERM STEPS: PROPOSED OTA PROGRAMING
-----------------------------------------
¶9. (U) Once OTA releases its report (with clearances from the
Embassy and key officials in the GOCR), Treasury will add Costa Rica
to its list of possible projects for support in calendar year 2010
by Treasury International Assistance Technical Agreement (TIATA)
funds. However, due to the late timing of the delivery of President
Gutierrez's letter (October 2008), Treasury could only provide funds
for an assessment team report, not a full program, in FY 2009. If
selected, Costa Rica could thus have to wait for at least seven
months -- from release of the final report in May to the end of
December - before receiving the OTA financial enforcement program.
-----------------------
STATE INL POSSIBILITIES
-----------------------
¶10. (U) In the interest of starting a program sooner than CY 2010,
Embassy San Jose sent INL/LP a proposal outlining a program for
"bridge funding," i.e. funds to launch a program in FY 2009 or first
quarter of FY 2010. The nature of such an OTA advisory program
would be "intermittent," that is one or two advisors would travel to
Costa Rica for two weeks once every two months. If the INL support
began as early as mid-July 2009, then Post projects a cost of USD
130,000 for six trips (through the end of CY 2010). If program
support was restricted to the first quarter of FY 2010, then Post
projects a cost of USD 65,000 for three two-week trips.
------------------------
BRIDGE FUNDING RATIONALE
------------------------
¶11. (SBU) The impetus to start a program during FY 2009 or the first
quarter of FY 2010 directly relates to the timeline of the Arias
Administration. With elections scheduled for February 2010 and a
new government taking office on May 1, the current government is
likely to lose much of its effectiveness and focus by the end of CY
¶2009. The current leadership in the Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Justice, OIJ and the Costa Rican Drug Institute are committed to
reform, but many of the incumbents will change when the new
administration takes power in May, 2010. (The leadership of the
Central Bank, CONASSIF, SUGEF, SUGEVAL, and the Office of the
Controller remain in office past the 2010 elections.) Furthermore,
tackling casino legislation and regulation, though daunting, merits
starting a Financial Enforcement program as soon as possible since
the vulnerabilities to money laundering, which are significantly
compounded by growing narco-trafficking activity in Costa Rica
(reftel), are wide open; virtually no supervision exists.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (SBU) The visit by the OTA team reinforces our continued
commitment to start a Treasury OTA Financial Enforcement program in
Costa Rica. Economic crime challenges will only grow thanks to
Costa Rica's "three-point program on vice": untaxed and unregulated
casinos, legalized prostitution, and growing narco-trafficking.
(Costa Rica increasingly serves as an intermodal transshipment point
for drug trade between South America and North America and Europe).
The latter point is compounded by traffickers paying in product,
which has produced a local drug addiction problem. Combine these
three "vices" with the lax legal environment (e.g., casino
legislation from 1922), and opportunities abound for money
laundering and terrorist financing.
¶13. (U) Though Costa Rica does not often qualify for USG assistance
since it ranks relatively higher than its Central American neighbors
on socio-economic measures, it merits assistance in this case
because of the capacity of the relevant institutions (the Central
Bank and the Ministry of Finance) to absorb USG assistance, apply
the benefits, and post demonstrable results. The Ministry of
Finance is a case-in-point as it has successfully applied the
benefits of OTA programs on tax administration and budget management
and continues to do so with debt management. A Financial
Enforcement program would encourage inter-ministerial coordination
-- vital to pursuit of economic crimes -- and bolster Costa Rica's
efforts to significantly improve its security environment.
CIANCHETTE