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Viewing cable 09HELSINKI127, FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY: EU AN END POINT OR
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09HELSINKI127 | 2009-04-02 10:10 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO7647
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0127/01 0921059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021059Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4901
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0089
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0973
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000127
SIPDIS
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: EU FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY: EU AN END POINT OR
WAY-POINT?
REF: HELSINKI 79
Classified By: CDA Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Media attention on the Finnish Government's
(GOF) quadrennial defense and security white paper focused
more on the "strong case" in favor of Finland's possible NATO
membership than the fact that the document places primary
importance on the European Union's role in promoting
security. According to the GOF, the EU can combat a variety
of threats - weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource
scarcity, climate change - through its policies (crisis
management, neighborhood) and "key role" in certain sectors
(energy, transport). The white paper places particular
importance on a "European solidarity" that would be
strengthened by ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Reliance
on the EU as a security promoter reflects wide public support
for an EU security role and offers traditionalists a
counterweight to NATO as the primary source of security in
Europe. For others, including Foreign Minister Stubb and
counterparts in the National Coalition Party, focus on the EU
as font of security also provides a way-station on the route
to eventual NATO membership. Ultimately, any decision
regarding NATO membership is at least three years down the
line, and will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU,
and on the political will of the next government to take
Finland into NATO. End summary.
NATO gets the attention ...
---------------------------
¶2. (C) Upon the January 23 release of Finland's quadrennial
defense and security white paper, the media focused on its
treatment of Finland's possible NATO membership (REF). The
paper addresses Finnish-NATO relations in greater depth and
more positively than the 2004 version; in a March 11 briefing
on the paper for Embassy personnel, Defense Ministry
officials emphasized the positive evolution of successive
post-Cold War white papers' description of those relations.
The paper states "strong grounds exist" for Finland's
membership, but nevertheless concludes that the option to
join will remain open. (NOTE: President Halonen has ruled out
Finland's NATO membership during her tenure. END NOTE.)
¶3. (U) The paper highlights another important reason to
pursue NATO cooperation (if not membership) - the U.S.'s role
as sole remaining superpower and the most important NATO
member. The paper departs in small but significant ways from
prior treatment of the U.S. and the transatlantic
relationship. Reflecting the U.S.-EU tensions over Iraq, the
2004 version refers to a U.S. readiness to act unilaterally,
"bypassing well-established cooperation forums," and
neutrally refers to "fostering" bilateral relations. The
2009 version dispenses with unilateralist references and
explicitly identifies the need for Finland to maintain close
relations with the U.S.
... but EU gets top billing
---------------------------
¶4. (U) The media gave significantly less heed to the
organization given the most prominent attention in the paper:
the European Union. The paper describes the EU as "a
fundamental security policy choice" because EU integration,
enlargement, neighborhood policies and a "solid EU-Russia
partnership" have strengthened Finland's security. In a March
12 briefing on the paper for the diplomatic corps, MFA Under
Secretary Markus Lyra stressed the EU's importance in
combating a broad range of threats, including crises and
conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource
scarcity and climate change. According to the paper, the EU
affects security policy through such means as development of
policies related to crisis management and internal security,
and being a "key actor" in fields like energy and transport.
¶5. (C) For the GOF, "European solidarity" appears to be
fundamental to the security benefits the EU provides, as the
paper states EU Member States (MSs) belong to "a close-knit
political grouping" that shares "the will to act in unison."
The Lisbon Treaty's "solidarity clause" would not create a
new obligation, rather it would reinforce existing
"instruments and capabilities" and strengthen mutual
solidarity. For Finland, a strong sense of solidarity
reflects "the readiness to defend the other Member States by
all available means," such that "Finland will provide
assistance to the other Member States and expects others to
HELSINKI 00000127 002 OF 003
act likewise." In his briefing Lyra stated that Finland's
participation in crisis management operations, like the
currently EU-led operation in Chad, demonstrates their
willingness and ability to assist other MSs.
Fellow EU Members comment on Finland's position
--------------------------------------------- --
¶6. (C) Speaking to Finnish perceptions of the EU, Dutch DCM
Thomas van Leeuwen told Polchief that in the absence of
membership of a military alliance like NATO, and with a
sizable number of Finns uncertain about or opposing NATO
membership, the Finns must necessarily look to the EU.
Polish Political Counselor Stanislaw Cios told Polchief that
in several bilateral meetings in Helsinki in February GOF
officials emphasized the role of the EU as a "security
promoter." Cios said both sides agreed that demonstrating the
willingness and ability to participate in crisis management
operations signals an expectation and acceptance of similar
assistanc. Cios also described frustration about the EU,
ith the Finns complaining of a lack of strategic tinking
and cooperaton; for example, on Afghanisan, they complained
that at the political level E officials are focused on and
distracted by techical matters like the number of ciilian
slots for police trainers, something best left for the expert
level. (NOTE: In a March 11 conversation with Charge, Lyra
said some GOF officials are frustrated by the strong
influence of France, Germany and the United Kingdom within
the EU, and by the failure of the Lisbon Treaty to come into
force. END NOTE.)
Security role for EU: necessary and sufficient?
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) Across the coalition government and the political
spectrum, there is a consensus that the EU plays a necessary
role in advancing Finland's security interests. Polls show
the public strongly considers the EU to be an important
factor in increasing Finland's security. Whether the "EU
factor" is sufficient depends on two things: (1) whom one
asks, and (2) how one defines threats. On the former,
roughly half of those polled feel Finland should remain
militarily non-aligned, reflecting a deeply-ingrained sense
that Finland will always "go it alone" militarily and a
concern about having to fight "someone else's war" as part of
an alliance. Regarding threats, the white paper adopts a
broad concept of threat that includes, for example, energy
scarcity and climate change. For Finns who eschew military
alliances, who deem military threats to Finland a distant
prospect, and as see a strong EU role in addressing climate
change and other challenges, the EU is a final destination.
Within the coalition government, the center and center-left
members - Center Party (of PM Vanhanen), Green Party and
Swedish People's Party - more so than the center-right
National Coalition Party (NCP) contain the strongest EU
support.
¶8. (C) The NCP largely represents a different view, one that
acknowledges an important role for the EU while arguing for
the fundamental importance of NATO and Finland's eventual
NATO membership. For supporters of this view, the EU might
be seen as an enduring and integral component of a
multi-faceted security policy, or more simply a way-station
on the path to NATO membership. For them, the EU also serves
as a useful tool to reassure NATO skeptics, given the
considerable overlap of EU and NATO goals and membership (a
point included in the white paper). For some, the question
of the EU's role is moot: As Lyra told Charge, regardless of
the emphasis some officials place on the EU, the medium- to
long-term burden of maintaining an army of 250,000-350,000
soldiers dedicated to territorial defense was the strongest
argument for Finland,s entry into NATO.
Comment
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¶9. (C) Embedded in the paper's text is the debate within the
GOF about how to define the center of gravity in Finland's
security policy. The media coverage of the white paper
suggested a "NATO or EU" divide, given the tendency among
government officials or others to emphasize the importance of
one or the other. Certainly, one sees the influence of the
more transatlantic-oriented NCP in the paper, reflected in
the more positive treatment of NATO and the U.S., though U.S.
language also reflects a general openness to the new
Administration. EU supporters also had their say (as Lyra
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said, the paper contained more favorable NATO language "but
then the politicians got in the way"). Nevertheless, the
differences within the GOF regarding the weight and
importance of the EU and NATO are not stark or polar.
Ultimately, any Finnish decision regarding NATO membership
will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU, and on
the configuration of the next coalition government, the
stance of the next President and the collective political
will to take Finland into NATO without a majority supporting
membership. End comment.
BUTLER