

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MOSCOW2542, BELYKH FACES ROUGH YEAR AHEAD IN KIROV
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MOSCOW2542.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MOSCOW2542 | 2009-10-08 06:06 | 2011-02-18 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
Appears in these articles: http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/12/03/kirov/ |
VZCZCXRO5065
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2542/01 2810612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 080612Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5027
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002542
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR KCOR RS
SUBJECT: BELYKH FACES ROUGH YEAR AHEAD IN KIROV
REF: MOSCOW 1389
Classified By: Classifi...
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002542 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR KCOR RS
¶1. (C) Summary: Our September 23-25 visit to Kirov revealed a newly-settled government slowly expanding its influence within the region. Strict limitations placed on Governor Belykh and his staff by local security services six months ago appear to have eased significantly, and the new government remains moderately popular despite friction between its youthful, moderate image and the conservative, paternalistic nature of the general population. Belykh must now make good on his promises to fight corruption, improve efficiency in government and attract investment and economic growth over the last nine months. This will involve serious clashes with both the corruption of local law enforcement and the vested interests of local power players. Despite being a former opposition figure, it appears that the priority of Belykh's long-term agenda is delivering at least 60 percent of the vote to United Russia in local elections 18 months from now. Achieving that level of support will require enormous political savvy on Belykh's part, and a string of impressive policy victories over the next year. In the absence of genuine support at the polls, Belykh's staff openly consider falsifying the vote count. End Summary. ----------------------------------- Region Returns to Business as Usual -----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Nine months into his term, Kirov Oblast Governor Nikita Belykh's honeymoon period is over. The fanfare (reftel) observed in the 100 days following his appointment and the visit of President Medvedev has abated, though the populace has remained guardedly optimistic in opinion polls. Journalists, private businessmen and members of the Governor's staff all stressed that Kirov is an extremely conservative and patriarchal region resistant to change. Sergey Bachinin, Chief Editor of the local daily Vyatskaya Nabludatel (Vyatka Observer), characterized Belykh as the "Little Colonizer." He has brought with him from Moscow a core team of young liberals who, while not alienating the population, have certainly not yet made progress shaking up the status quo. That said, both Bachinin and Nikolay Golikov, Chief Editor of the weekly Vyatskaya Osobaya Gazeta (Vyatka Free Paper), agreed that Belykh has generally lived up to the public's limited expectations thus far. Belykh and his team, they contend, are treading water with the local constituency, and must focus on concrete policy successes to make real inroads with the people.
¶3. (C) The closed nature of Kirov society stands as the single greatest obstacle to true reform. While pleased with the freedom of access they enjoy to the Governor, Bachinin and Golikov lamented the discomfort this openness and honesty engenders in the local population. The clan psychology of this previously closed region directly supports corruption and undermines attempts to fight inefficiency in local bureaucracies. Belykh advisors Aleksey Navalniy, Aleksey Kozmin and Vice Governor Maria Gaidar all stressed the inherent difficulty of penetrating a system where most decision-makers not only have long personal relationships, but are often closely related family members. Navalniy counted as one success Belykh's ability to maintain positive relationships with local elites, federal security services and the existing governmental structure of Kirov Oblast and City. He was quick to follow, however, that this cannot last. Belykh's agenda to pursue a fight against corruption, improve the efficiency and depth of social services, and deliver solid results in upcoming regional elections will severely strain these relations. --------------------------- Corruption vs. Inefficiency ---------------------------
¶4. (C) The fight against corruption is the most important short-term challenge facing Belykh. The source of corruption is the security services, which largely operate within a vertical leading back to Moscow, outside of the governor's purview. Navalniy stated that, even with Medvedev's visit, Belykh still lacks the bureaucratic clout to go after the local Siloviki. He reminded us of the scandal which followed our last visit to Kirov (reftel) in which the local FSB was infuriated that Navalniy had met with US government representatives. As he explained, this had much to do with the timing of the last visit; Belykh had begun his term only three months earlier and Medvedev had just left days before. MOSCOW 00002542 002 OF 003 Belykh clearly draws his mandate from Medvedev, while the local security services see their chain of command leading back to Putin. Both sides were pushing against each other to establish boundaries. While the confrontation has largely settled down, in no small part due to the appointment of former MVD General Sergei Karnaukov as an advisor to Belykh, there is still strong resistance within the security services to any local government interference.
¶5. (C) Maria Gaidar placed her experience with corruption in juxtaposition to her experience with bureaucratic waste and inefficiency. Her mandate covers healthcare and social services, two areas where she claims little corruption because there is little money. (Note: Gaidar was referring to money removed from the operating budget through waste, fraud and abuse. In contract, the regular payment of bribes in return for medical and social services is well known. End Note.) Her challenge stemmed instead from an inefficient patronage system based on personal connections which drives talented workers to leave Kirov for better opportunities elsewhere. Gaidar does not seem concerned with removing ineffective leadership, and is instead focused on identifying promising younger professionals and giving them broader responsibilities. This approach runs head long into the paternalistic psychology of Kirov. Resistance to her tactic of bypassing seniority in the face of vested interests remains her largest obstacle to structural reform.
¶6. (C) Vice Governor Oleg Kozakovtsev stressed that bringing foreign investment to Kirov was a key policy goal as only foreign capital investment could modernize local industry, particularly forestry. Recognizing that the region was in serious economic crisis, he expected a large budget deficit in the coming year. He mentioned three times that our Ambassador should visit Kirov and bring with him a delegation of American businessmen. Some members of Belykh's team, however, are not so optimistic. Navalniy was openly negative about opportunities in the area and felt that any visit by a foreign delegation would be 'a dog and pony show,' nothing more. Kozmin was quick to interrupt that he thought the forestry industry did show great potential, but admitted it would take enormous investment. --------------------- Obligations to Moscow ---------------------
¶7. (C) The first potential breaking point for Belykh's administration will be the upcoming regional election in 18 months. It has been made clear to Navalniy that, in order for Belykh to maintain support from Medvedev, he will have to deliver at least a 60 percent return for United Russia. Polling shows that actual support for United Russia is closer to 42 percent. With 9 percent supporting the Communist Party and 4 percent supporting LDPR, nearly half of the electorate is undecided. Polling was conducted by a Perm organization that Belykh trusts, but neither Navalniy nor Kozmin were willing to name. Navalniy stated bluntly that Belykh had two options available to maintain Kremlin support: deliver 60 percent of the vote to United Russia legitimately, or else rig the election.
¶8. (C) In order to raise approval ratings in the next 18 months legitimately, all advisors agreed that Belykh must make serious gains against corruption as well as stimulating the economy of the region. As noted above, pursuing these goals will involve direct clashes with local interest groups - not least of which the security services. The Governor appears able to maintain his approval rating for the foreseeable future while avoiding confrontation, but there is clearly a feeling among his staff that he must begin strong reforms soon or risk running out of time to demonstrate clear success before election season begins. There is also agreement that he needs more time to gauge the political atmosphere and attract allies to his cause before taking on serious opponents. Belykh will need to show incredible political savvy over the next year and a half to achieve these goals. ---------------------------------------- Players in the Kirov Regional Government ----------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Governor Belykh's team includes the following insiders: Vice Governor Sergey Scherchkov focuses on economic issues. He is from Perm, where he served as a Duma member when Belykh was Vice Governor; MOSCOW 00002542 003 OF 003 Vice Governor Maria Gaidar focuses on health care and social services. She is from Moscow, where she has long ties with the now defunct Union of Right Forces. She had decided to pursue graduate work in the US before this opportunity in Kirov arose. She stated that she still plans study in the US, and mentioned that she did not like living in Kirov; Vice Governor Arzamatsev is a former businessman and entrepreneur from Krasnoyarsk, formerly a member of the Union of Right Forces; Vice Governor Oleg Kozakoltsev focuses on the budget, economics and business development. He is the only Kirov native in Belykh's circle, but was not involved with the last administration. He was brought into government by Belykh; Alexey Novilny, a lawyer, advies Belykh on political matters. He seems particularly focused on polling and the upcoming elections. He is based in Moscow, and expressed a clear desire to get out of Kirov, which he described as boring. He is taking classes to improve his English with the stated aim of studying in the US; Aleksey Kozmin advises Belykh on economic issues. The extent of his influence is unclear; and Sergei Karnaukov, is a retired MVD general now acting as an advisor to the Governor on relations with the security services. He does not appear to have a long-standing relationship to the rest of the team, but is trusted by Belykh. The following government members were singled out in meetings as having been part of the inefficient old guard under previous Governor Nikolay Shaklein, and are viewed by Belykh's inner circle as obstacles to the Governor's drive toward transparency in government: Vice Governor Eduard Alekseyevich Noskov coordinates activities of the executive branch with regard to the economic sector and business development; Vice Governor Aleksander Pavlovich Gortskin focuses on energy and housing; and Aleksey Alekseyevich Kotlyatchkov is head of the Department of Agriculture and Food. ----------- Speculation -----------
¶10. (C) When asked about the influence of Belykh's opposition background, Bachinin laughed and replied that there is no opposition in Russia and the Union of Right Forces was a club for intellectuals. He views Belykh's governorship as a Medvedev program, just as the Right Cause political party is a Medvedev program. This stands in direct contrast to United Russia, which is clearly a Putin product. Bachinin speculated that Medvedev might be grooming Belykh as a future Prime Minister. When asked about this point, Navalniy agreed that Belykh was never part of the opposition in the same way as Garry Kasparov. He also views this arrangement with Belykh as a well-conceived power move by Medvedev, and not a "liberal experiment" aimed at bringing greater democracy to Russia. In his mind, Medvedev is building a cadre of effective leaders as a counter-balance to Putin's United Russia machine. Belykh made a pragmatic decision that it was better to be governor than to be nothing. This was the basis for a deal with Medvedev which is keeping Belykh out of Moscow and, perhaps more importantly, out of any serious opposition. ------- Comment -------
¶11. (C) Under Medvedev's patronage Belykh has settled into Kirov and laid out an ambitious agenda for the year. It has been made clear, however, that Medvedev's support comes with caveats for United Russia: Belykh must deliver in the upcoming elections. If he is able to take on vested interests and demonstrate clear policy victories to the electorate, he may then be able to secure the necessary 60 percent. If he is unable to navigate Kirov's political and bureaucratic waters, 18 months from now he may find himself having to admit failure and suffer the political consequences - not an option that he would consider lightly. Beyrle