

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI5354, PM AND DEFMIN SCOFF AT LEFTIST CRITICISM OF U.S.
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI5354.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05NEWDELHI5354 | 2005-07-12 14:02 | 2011-03-28 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1576796.ece |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 005354
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR KSTC IN
SUBJECT: PM AND DEFMIN SCOFF AT LEFTIST CRITICISM OF U.S.
DEFENSE TIES; WE SHOULD, TOO
REF: NEW DELHI 5108
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: To place Left Parties' continuing attacks on the New Framework for US-India Defense in context, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have reassured critics that the agreement is in India's national interest, does not compromise Indian security or sovereignty and is consonant with India's regional and global aspirations. Unconvinced, Left parties have threatened to organize larger demonstrations against the agreement if the UPA government does not make some concessions, and continue to issue communiques assailing the UPA for continuing the Vajpayee government's pro-US policies. The Left's demonstrated ability to maintain momentum on this issue puts added pressure on the PM to manage a tightrope act: secure substantial deliverables during his visit to Washington without appearing to have compromised oft-stated Congress principles of independence and multipolarity. Notwithstanding the left's noisiness, most in India seem to support the Agreement. One senior Indian told us the left is fading fast. Another asserted that the PM is a big boy and can handle his internal problems; the U.S. - India defense caravan should keep moving forward no matter how many (socialist) dogs bark in Delhi. End Summary.
Mukherjee Faces Down Leftist Hysteria
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Mukherjee returned from the US determined to defend the agreement against Left criticism and was backed by the PM, but the unexpected virulence and determination of the Left criticism has compelled the UPA to devote considerable time and energy to respond to the allegations that the DefMin sold out.
¶3. (U) In an attempt to head-off the Left's threatened demonstration against the Framework Agreement only a few days before the PM's visit to the US, the DefMin met with CPM General Secretary Prakash Karat and his CPI counterpart A.B. Bardhan and others on July 7. The ""Times of India"" reported that the Left and Defmin made ""little headway"" in their discussion, with ""both sides sticking to their guns.""
¶4. (U) In his first interaction with the Indian media since returning from the US, DefMin Mukherjee on July 5 downplayed the Left's strong criticism against the agreement, stating, ""The Left parties have a particular ideological position with respect to the U.S. We have to keep in view that point."" Going on to address the Left's lengthy list of complaints (Reftel), he denied Left allegations that the framework would obligate India to participate in US-led operations outside the ambit of the United Nations. ""We have a clear perception that we will participate in multinational operations under the UN. That position has not changed. It is not necessary that after every mention of multinational, the word ""UN"" should be added."" The Minister also rejected another LF accusation, that the framework contradicted the principles of independence and multipolarity enshrined in the NDA's Common Minimum Program.
¶5. (U) On missile defense, the Minister's remarks were consistent with Congress' indigenously-focused approach, but did not rule out collaboration with the U.S. Mukherjee was categorical that India is not interested in purchasing a complete missile defense system, stating, ""There is no question of accepting a missile shield from anyone. What we are interested in is developing our own missile program and we are doing that."" The Minister noted that there were gaps in India's integrated guided missile defense program but New Delhi would only accept critical US inputs that bridged the deficiency. ""If we don't get them, fine,"" he added, indicating that India would then explore other avenues including indigenous development or via procurement other countries. Mukherjee also underscored what the UPA views as the hallmark achievement of his visit: US acceptance of India's desire for co-production and technology transfer.
Mukherjee Points Out the Advantages
-----------------------------------
¶6. (U) On July 8, Mukherjee underscored that the Agreement paves the way for India to ""bridge the critical gap in technology we have developed. He also rejected the Left's criticism that Congress was following its predecessor's foreign policy, noting that the policy to widen relations with the US had been formulated by the Congress Party in 1995.
¶7. (U) On July 11, Mukherjee again defended the Agreement, talking to Left leaders to explain the government's reasoning. For the first time, Mukherjee also defended the Agreement as being in India's national interest because it would ensure uninterrupted supplies of material in times of need and would ensure needed technology transfer.
And the PM Also Tries to Hose Them Down
---------------------------------------
¶8. (U) Buttressing Mukherjee's defense of the Framework Agreement, the PM dismissed the Left's criticism in an interview with ""The Hindu"" en route from the Gleneagles summit on July 6. Describing the agreement as ""an innocuous framework agreement,"" he added, ""It doesn't say anything that is against our national interest. It lists areas where the two countries can cooperate if they want to work together, so that does not mean any surrender of our sovereignty.""
But the Comrades Stick to their Kalashnikovs
--------------------------------------------
¶9. (U) Convinced that DefMin Mukherjee and the UPA are not responding to their criticism of the agreement, Left leaders held a public meeting on July 8 that the ""Asian Age"" called a ""precursor meeting to country-wide agitation."" During the meeting, CPM General Secretary Karat reiterated the Left's opposition to provisions of the Agreement, i.e., collaboration in multinational operations outside the ambit of the UN; missile defense; shared security interest to protect the free flow of commerce; and defense co-production. Karat warned the PM not to use his first official visit as PM to the US to ""please the US at the expense of an independent foreign policy,"" and called for the agreement to be ""disposed in the dustbin."" CPI General Secretary Bardhan, in turn, cautioned New Delhi not do Washington's bidding in the hope of securing a permanent berth in the Security Council. Asked what the Left's next move would be, Bardhan said in an interview with ""The Indian Express,"" ""we shall not resort to a loud country -wide campaign just now, but shall see if the UPA government listens to us.""
¶10. (U) Karat, who is now visiting China, expanded his criticism in a July 10 ""Asian Age"" editorial, in which he voiced strong disapproval of ""the recent tendency to make a holy cow of strategic and security issues"" by not consulting the Left on foreign policy. Accusing the former NDA government of entering into a ""strategic alliance"" with the US, Karat characterized the agreement as an extension of the BJP agenda and ""a major step to harness India to serve the US strategic goals in Asia,"" by going beyond the previous government's commitments. Karat also reiterated the CPI(M) Politburo's July 2 denunciation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, stating that the US was bent on using the Defense Framework Agreement and the PSI to ""get the Indian Navy to patrol the Malacca Straits and other international seas."" Taking credit for keeping Indian troops out of Iraq, Karat reminded the nation that it was the Left that ""rallied the Opposition against sending troops to Iraq at a time when the Vajpayee government was on the verge of deciding to do so."" He also implied that UPA treatment of the Left mirrored that of the BJP, noting that opposition leader LK Advani had advised the NDA government to avoid consulting with the Left on security and international affairs.
The Majority Supports the Agreement Anyway
------------------------------------------
¶11. (U) Despite the Left's vitriol, Indian media and strategic commentators have generally been supportive of the Agreement and dismissive of the Left's complaints. Well-known defense analyst Commodore Uday Bhaskar told PolMilOff on July 6 that the agreement had ""the potential to recast a rapidly changing bilateral relationship as well as highlight India's relevance in the evolving global strategic scenario,"" adding that the agreement only consolidated various initiatives undertaken by both countries in recent years. In a July 11 editorial entitled ""Foreign Non-Policy,"" ""The Indian Express"" stated that while Left opposition to the Agreement was to be expected, their fury was not. ""In its ideological opposition to any engagement with the US, the Left was not going to let facts come in the way. If a similar agreement were to be signed with Russia or China, the Left would have hailed it as a triumph for anti-imperialist forces.""
¶12. (C) In a July 11 meeting with the Charge, MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishankar warned that the Left
SIPDIS attack on Mukherjee had been more furious than expected, and cautioned us not to underestimate the challenge the UPA will face in accelerating defense ties.
EVEN LEFT-LEANING COMMENTATOR SAYS LEFT IS A SPENT FORCE
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶13. (C) Respected left-leaning gray-beard security analyst and Manmohan Singh confidant Prem Shankar Jha explained to us that the squawks of the left are mere symptoms; the root cause is their fear of the U.S. national security strategy that permits pre-emptive ""war without end"" against perceived threats. The left worries that the defense agreement is a way to drag India into our ""war without end"" just as we, in our perceived perfidy, already tried with the Vajpayee government in sending troops to Iraq. However, Jha said that he personally supported the defense agreement and had written to that effect in a column soon to be published in the Hindustan Times. Jha said the agreement was good for both countries, and that the PM would not have taken such a decision lightly. The PM, said Jha, is a serious and careful thinker who clearly saw the benefits of the defense agreement and decided that he would take the flack from the left and could defend the agreement well if pressed. In the final analysis, said Jha, the left is comprised of extreme reactionaries who have been frozen into utter and irrelevent rigidity. Their resistance to change is matched only by their fear that their iron rice bowls are being broken. They say no to everything the government proposes, but offer no alternatives. They refuse to join the coalition government, but sit on the sidelines and critique everything. Now that the Congress is feeling more confident, and the BJP is engaged in fratricidal warfare, the left parties risk being completely marginalized if Congress holds a snap election. The left will never do as well electorally again, predicted Jha, and their terror is reflected in their hysterical rhetoric. The Manmohan Singh administration will proceed with ties with the United States, Jha affirmed, no matter what the left says.
They're a Bunch of Self-Serving Bums, Anyway
--------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Respected senior diplomat Naresh Chandra told us July 12 that the left parties have nothing to offer except hysteria. Their electoral chances will never be so good again. They survive outside the coalition, giving them freedom to attack at will, while retaining political influence that allows them to reap financial benefit by fixing appointments, diverting patronage, and skimming percentages off of deals made through their rolodexes. The prospect of electoral victory in Kerala encourages them, but Manmohan and Sonia know how to handle them, and the United States, Chandra stressed, should not pull back or slow down because of winging from the left. On the contrary, he insisted, the U.S. should keep putting proposals on the table. Manmohan and Sonia will then decide what the system can bear. He did caution, however, that the U.S. can help the PM politically at home by carefully weighing how, where, and in what tone it announces new initiatives. Announcements made in Washington give the left an opening to accuse the Center of being stooges; announcements made by the GOI in Delhi yield less readily usable material for nay-sayers. Chandra said Congress' big problem is that, even though the left are ""Stalinists of the worst sort,"" it cannot attack them head-on because they ostensibly are on the same political side.
Comment: We'll Meet Them on the Hustings, Comrade
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶15. (C) The soft-spoken economist-turned DefMin may have earned some combat clout this week both for his efforts to allay the concerns of the Left, as well as for his willingness to fend off the Left's unrelenting attacks. The Left's ability and determination to maintain momentum on this issue, however, clearly caught the UPA by surprise. It should not have done so, as Communist opposition to the agreement is ideologically consistent. No Communist party can safely acquiesce to such an agreement, and the Communists, facing elections in their strongholds of Kerala and Went Bengal, are in no mood to compromise. The LF will not relent on its demand that the PM not renege on the traditional Congress commitment to national independence and the re-emergence of a multipolar world order to secure substantial deliverables from the US. While in the final analysis, we should ignore the left and proceed ahead at full steam, we should recognize that the UPA may require an occasional pause to let Indian public opinion catch up with the rapid pace of transformation in our bilateral relationship.
BLAKE "