

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE1434, NETHERLANDS/EU: WHERE'S PLAN B? DUTCH BRACE FOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05THEHAGUE1434.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05THEHAGUE1434 | 2005-05-26 16:04 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
261646Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001434
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: WHERE'S PLAN B? DUTCH BRACE FOR
"NO" VOTE ON EU CONSTITUTION
REF: A. THE HAGUE 393
...
33343,5/26/2005 16:46,05THEHAGUE1434,"Embassy The
Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,05THEHAGUE393,"This record is a partial extract of the
original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
261646Z May 05
","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001434
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: WHERE'S PLAN B? DUTCH BRACE FOR
""NO"" VOTE ON EU CONSTITUTION
REF: A. THE HAGUE 393
¶B. 5/25 ""POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS"" E-MAIL REPORT
AND PREVIOUS.
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With polls showing a clear majority opposed
to ratifying the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Dutch
government is belatedly stepping up its efforts to obtain a
""Yes"" vote in the June 1 referendum. At the same time, Prime
Minister Balkenende is actively distancing his government
from the results of the referendum and seeking to shift
responsibility for dealing with a defeat to Parliament.
Opponents and supporters of the Treaty agree that voter
dissatisfaction with the Dutch and European political
establishment is a major motivation for ""No"" voters. Both
sides concede that a ""Yes"" vote is not completely out of the
question, and at least one recent poll suggests that the tide
might be starting to turn, but there is very little time to
turn the electorate around. The Balkenende government will
almost certainly survive a negative outcome, but such a
public defeat will provide a clear boost to
populist/nationalist politicians hoping to capitalize on
public discontent in the runup to parliamentary elections
scheduled for 2007. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) With all recent polls showing the ""No"" camp likely to
prevail -- possibly by 60 percent or more -- in the June 1
referendum on the EU's Constitutional Treaty, the Dutch
government is stepping up its ""Yes"" campaign while seeking to
minimize the political consequences of a defeat. In several
recent interviews, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende reminded
voters that the referendum was a parliamentary initiative
initially opposed by the two largest members of his coalition
government; a vote against the referendum, therefore, would
not be taken as a vote of no-confidence in his government.
Some observers give Balkenende credit for at least making an
effort in support of the Treaty despite his skepticism about
the referendum while the main opposition Labor Party/PvdA,
which was largely responsible for pushing the referendum
legislation through parliament, has been missing in action.
Far more, however, blame Balkenende and his government for
incompetently managing the issue from the beginning. Geert
Wilders, the maverick Dutch populist politician who has
become one of the most visible leaders of the ""No"" campaign,
told POLCOUNS on May 24 that the government's missteps had
probably done more to boost the ""No"" vote than any efforts by
opponents of the treaty.
WHY VOTE NO? BECAUSE WE CAN.
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Both camps agree that many ""No"" voters are basing
their decision on factors unrelated to the Treaty itself.
Frustration with Balkenende (whose personal popularity
ratings are at an all time low, hovering around 16 percent)
and anger at a perceived Dutch-European political elite that
pays little attention to the concerns of common citizens are
clearly fueling the ""No"" movement. A group of students from
Leiden University told the DCM on May 18 that they intended
to vote against the Treaty precisely because Balkenende was
""telling them to vote for it."" Strong supporters of the
treaty such as Lousewies van der Laan (foreign policy
spokesman for the Liberal Democrat/D-66 party) and Jan
Gooijenbier (a public relations/marketing expert brought in
to head the government's Referendum Task Force) admitted in
recent meetings with POLCOUNS that overcoming the public's
lack of confidence in the current Dutch leadership and EU
institutions has been the hardest hurdle for the ""Yes"" camp
to overcome. During his current bus ""tourNEE"" of the
Netherlands, Wilders claimed to have been surprised by the
""level of hate"" routinely expressed for Balkenende's
government, and agreed that for many the vote would be ""all
about a lack of trust."" The ""No"" campaign also draws
strength from an eclectic mix of parties on the left
(Socialist Party) and right (including the two small
Christian parties) worried that a strengthened EU will reduce
their ability to influence domestic politics, as well as a
host of single-issue voters opposed to Turkish accession,
increased immigration, and expansion of the EURO zone among
other issues.
¶4. (C) The fact that this will be the first national
referendum in modern Dutch history, and that it is
technically non-binding, has also played strongly into the
hands of the ""No"" camp. According to Gooijenbier, the
government's own polls suggest that many voters see the
current referendum as an opportunity to vent retroactively on
earlier decisions made without their input, such as switching
from the guilder to the EURO (a move many blame for
subsequent inflation) and EU expansion (including possibly to
Turkey). The polls also show that most voters believe that
their vote in a non-binding referendum will not be taken
seriously, and therefore feel comfortable casting ""protest""
vote without regard to consequences. (Note: Although the
referendum is legally non-binding, most political parties
have announced formula under which they would ""accept"" the
results; the Christian Democrats, for example, insist on a 30
percent turnout with 60 percent opposed; others, such as the
Liberal Democrats (pro) and Socialists (con) will accept any
result regardless of turnout or margin of victory.) Recent
statements by opposition leader Wouter Bos suggesting that a
""No"" vote could lead to a second referendum were quickly
seized upon as further evidence that the political
establishment will ignore the people's will if faced with a
negative vote. Foreign Minister Bot's suggestion in
parliament on May 23 that those wavering about the Treaty
should stay home rather than vote no further reinforced the
view that the government just doesn't ""get it.""
OVERSOLD AND UNDERWHELMED
-------------------------
¶5. (C) The ""Yes"" camp has been plagued from the beginning by
disagreements over strategy and message. While some advised
minimizing the impact of a negative outcome by seeking to
reduce turnout (ref a), others -- including Justice Minister
Donner and Economic Affairs Minister/Deputy Prime Minister
Brinkhorst -- engaged in scare tactics, suggesting that a
""no"" vote could return Europe to an era of chaos and war no
seen in the past 60 years. Not surprisingly, the public
reacted negatively to both tactics. The media and public
have also been quick to point out apparent divisions within
the cabinet, as when Finance Minister/Deputy Prime Minister
Zalm reportedly refused to join the rest of the Cabinet in
personally handing out pro-treaty leaflets outside the Prime
Minister's office. (Balkenende recently began hosting daily
strategy sessions with key cabinet officials, including Bot,
Zalm, Brinkhorst, and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Atzo Nicolai to ensure all agree on a single, coordinated
message.) Even more damaging has been the failure of the
government and the opposition PvdA party to develop a
coordinated strategy in favor of the Treaty. During a recent
meeting with Ambassador Sobel and POLCOUNS, Wouter Bos openly
admitted that he found it distasteful to be seen cooperating
with the government as the head of the opposition, even
though a vote against the treaty would essentially harm both
as members of the political ""establishment.""
¶6. (C) The government was restrained from campaigning
aggressively in favor of the Treaty both by Dutch tradition
and by the referendum legislation, which tasked the
government with administering the referendum in a neutral
fashion. As noted ref. a, the ""revelation"" that the
government had established a contingency fund of 1.5 million
Euros to counter negative campaigning triggered a
mini-scandal in parliament. The government's over-reliance
on ""information"" -- its first pro-Treaty hand-out consisted
entirely of excerpts from the Treaty text -- and speeches by
government officials to pitch the treaty backfired, with
voters reacting indifferently to the first and negatively to
the second. Farah Karimi, a Green-Left member of parliament
and one of the three original sponsors of the referendum
legislation, told POLCOUNS on May 26 that most members of
parliament ""never dreamed"" that the Dutch public would reject
the treaty, so did not make any provisions for a ""pro""
campaign.
THE FRENCH CONNECTION
---------------------
¶7. (C) All parties agree that the results of the May 29
referendum in France will influence the Dutch vote, but
opinions vary on exactly how. Arno Brouwers, a journalist
for Volkskrant, jokingly told POLCOUNS that a French ""Non""
could be the only thing that would convince the Dutch to vote
""Ja,"" as it would give Dutch voters a new target for
expressing their frustration. Geert Wilders similarly
suggested that some ""no"" voters might reconsider their view
of the Treaty if the French reject it, reflecting the
commonly-held view that what is good for France in the EU is
generally bad for the Netherlands. A more likely scenario,
however, is that a negative result in France would convince
many voters to remain home on June 1, lowering overall
turnout but probably raising the ""no"" percentage. According
to Gooijenbier, the government has developed two campaigns to
follow the French vote referendum. If the vote is positive,
the government will stress that ""280 million Europeans are
already in favor of the Treaty;"" if not, then the theme will
be along the lines of: ""Don't let the French tell you how to
vote."" According to the British Embassy, Prime Minister
Balkenende has also quietly asked Prime Minister Blair to
weigh in with Dutch voters following the French vote, either
by traveling to the Netherlands (doubtful, according to the
UK Embassy) or by recording a direct appeal for broadcast.
The option of canceling the Dutch referendum is not on the
table.
ENOUGH TIME TO TURN THE TIDE?
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Despite most polls showing a growing a clear majority
opposing the treaty, both camps are stepping up their
campaigns in the final days before the referendum. The
government, having recently defeated a court action intended
to prevent it from spending additional funds on the ""Yes""
campaign, has just budgeted an additional 7 million Euros for
an intense pro-Treaty print and radio advertising blitz,
according to Gooijenbier. (Gooijenbier noted that he had
also proposed television advertising, but that the Cabinet
decided engaging in ""partisan"" television advertising was ""a
bridge too far."") Familiar national figures, including all
four living former Prime Ministers, have started to campaign
actively in favor of the Treaty. Gooijenbier cited a May 23
poll showing a slight decrease in the number of ""No"" voters
(from 60 percent to 57 percent) and increase in ""Yes"" voters
(from 40 percent to 43 percent) although they still
constituted a majority) as evidence that Dutch voters might
be starting to ""wake up and pay attention"" to the possible
consequences of a negative vote. Van der Laan, who last week
predicted a ""colossal no"" in a press interview, privately
suggested that the government might just barely pull ""a
rabbit out of a hat"" but was not optimistic. Wilders also
conceded that a dramatic turnaround in voter sentiment was
not out of the question, and put the chances of a ""Yes"" vote
at about 20 percent.
THE DAY AFTER
-------------
¶9. (C) Partly to convince voters to take the referendum
seriously, the government has deliberately refrained from
engaging in debate over what would happen in case of a ""No""
vote, and in fact appears to have no ""Plan B."" Parliament
will almost certainly insist on a debate on the Treaty --
which is already in Parliament and should be ratified before
November 2006 -- within days of the referendum, regardless of
the outcome. If there is a negative result, the government
will probably argue that it has done its duty and any further
steps are the responsibility of Parliament, which forced the
referendum on the government in the first place. Balkenende
has stated for the record that he and his government will not
resign in the event of a negative result, although some
observers speculate privately that State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Atzo Nicolai, as the Cabinet member directly
responsible for European integration issues, might choose to
leave the government. A Nicolai resignation would probably
not bring down the government, however, as under the
coalition agreement his party (Conservative Liberal/VVD)
could replace him from its ranks. Unless turnout is so small
as to be absolutely meaningless, any effort to proceed with
ratification following a ""No"" vote would provoke a more
serious political crisis, as coalition partner the Liberal
Democrats/D-66 is on the record refusing to accede to such a
plan. Most likely, the government and parliament will decide
to delay definitive action for some period of time to see how
the Treaty is received in other European countries holding
referenda.
COMMENT:
-------
¶10. (C) On paper, the pro-Treaty coalition is impressive: 85
percent of parliamentarians, all major unions and employer
associations, most major media, and many notable public
figures have come out in favor of the Treaty. The fact that
these traditional sources of influence have failed to produce
a positive majority is viewed by many as proof that the
populist ""revolution"" against the traditional political elite
begun by Pim Fortuyn continues to be a major factor in Dutch
politics. While a ""Yes"" vote is not impossible, there is
very little time left to turn around a deeply skeptical and
angry electorate, and the government has so far shown little
skill in guiding public opinion effectively. There is little
question that Balkenende's coalition government will survive
a ""No"" vote in the short term, as all three partners are down
in the polls and desperate to avoid early elections. That
said, a highly visible defeat in the referendum would clearly
undermine Balkenende's standing among his European colleagues
and would heighten the domestic perception of him as a weak
and ineffectual leader. Although the Labor Party/PvdA, as
the main opposition party in Parliament, might gain a few
poll points at Balkenende's expense, the real winners are
likely to be populist, nationalist figures like Geert
Wilders, who will seek to transfer the anti-establishment,
anti-EU votes into a real political force prior to the 2007
elections.
SOBEL
",