

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI349, IRAN: TEHRAN SHOW TRIAL AGAIN CITES USG EXCHANGE PROGAMS AS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09RPODUBAI349.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09RPODUBAI349 | 2009-08-25 08:08 | 2010-12-29 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai |
VZCZCXRO0306
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDIR #0349/01 2370814
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 250814Z AUG 09
FM RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0502
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0503
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000349
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SCUL IR
SUBJECT: IRAN: TEHRAN SHOW TRIAL AGAIN CITES USG EXCHANGE PROGAMS AS
"VELVET REVOLUTION" TOOLS
REF: IRAN RPO DUBAI 50
DUBAI 00000349 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The inclusion of USG public diplomacy programs
and IRPO in a recent indictment read during the second show
trial in Tehran is not a new allegation of US plotting for the
overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Such claims have been made
before, most recently in January, and contain many accurate
details about the programs, but leap wildly to conclusions of
intrigue and far-ranging conspiracies. IRIG responses to our
exchange programs have varied, from tacit acceptance to
obstruction to arrests and intimidation of participants. In the
current climate, the inclusion of US programming in a laundry
list of the "usual suspects" is not surprising, but it may
reflect heightened suspicions of an embattled leadership. With
the situation in Iran so unsettled, we believe it would be
prudent for IRPO to delay any pending exchange programs until
there are clearer indications of IRIG intentions toward the
programs and the participants. End Summary.
¶2. (C) On August 15, Iran's Revolutionary Court held the second
trial of defendants arrested following street protests over the
results of the presidential election. Prosecutors read a
22-page indictment that described a far-flung conspiracy among
domestic opposition groups and foreign governments. Included in
the indictment were direct references to the USG, the Iran
Regional Presence Office and its officers, VOA, and several NGOs
that have worked with the Department. (Note: A copy has been
e-mailed to NEA/IR.)
Round up the Usual Suspects
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) The indictment alleged, among other things, that Western
powers had sought soft overthrow in the guise of public
diplomacy because wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in conjunction
with Iran's military power had made the military overthrow of
the IRIG impossible. Public diplomacy and by extension "soft
overthrow" sought to influence attitudes of the Iranian public
toward their government and impose Western values to bring down
the IRIG. Although the indictment accurately described public
diplomacy and many of its functions, prosecutors went further in
alleging that the aims of the US public diplomacy program was to
create and broaden rifts between the people and IRIG, to
pressure the Iranian government to change its behavior and to
portray America "as Iran's only savior." Participants in US
programs were also intended as sources of information, analyses
and intelligence about Iran, according to the indictment.
(Note: The indictment also devoted considerable attention to
the British Council, the British Embassy in Tehran and BBC
Persian, even more than was directed at us.)
¶4. (C) The indictment specifically mentioned IRPO, two previous
IRPO directors and IRPO's current deputy director. IRPO is
"modeled on the Riga [station]" which was set up to engineer the
collapse of the Soviet Union, according to the indictment, and
its goals in Dubai are to attract the Iranian elite and convince
them to act against the interests of the Islamic Republic. In a
description of the International Visitor Leadership Program
(IVLP) run by IRPO, which included details on visa processing
and logistical arrangements, the indictment noted that
participants had returned "impressed" by their trips to the US
and often volunteered to help with future exchange groups.
Iranian authorities also seemed to have conflated public
diplomacy programs with separate democracy programming in
describing US regime overthrow efforts and referred to other
Iran Watcher posts' in London, Baku and Istanbul as being
involved in these programs. Additionally, Iranian authorities
cited VOA, the Department's Digitial Outreach Team, as well as
NGO's Meridian House International, the Aspen Institute and
Freedom House as having some part in trying to undermine the
Islamic Republic.
¶5. (C) The IRIG has accused IRPO of being the instrument of
regime change before. Semi-official and IRGC-affiliated Fars
News published an interview with an unnamed counterintelligence
official in January that was nearly identical to the details in
the indictment. These details have most likely been gleaned
IVLP participants, who have either provided them in seeking
permission from their employers to participate, and we believe
DUBAI 00000349 002.2 OF 003
that often this information is relayed to various security
agencies, or during interviews conducted by security officers in
Iran upon their return.
¶6. (C) This latest accusation also follows IRIG arrests of AIDS
researchers, Arash and Kamiyar Alaei, documentary filmmaker
Mohammad Ehseni, and Sylva Hartounian, an employee of IREX, in
¶2008. Arash Alaei and Ehseni were alumni of IRPO IVLPs, while
Hartounian was working on a maternal and child health exchange.
Another IVLP participant was subsequently harassed so much by
Iranian intelligence that she fled the country, as she was no
longer able to lead a normal life. Another former IVLP
participant fled Iran, and was subsequently resettled in the US,
after learning he was targeted for arrest. Other participants
have had their passports seized and were temporarily banned from
traveling outside Iran. During fall 2008, Iranian authorities
obstructed four IVLP programs by intimidating or threatening
participants so that they withdrew from the programs (reftel).
A Change in Attitude
---------------------
¶7. (C) In May, however, we heard from IVLP participants and
separately through a contact with access to IRIG sources that
the IRIG had no opposition to these programs. Arriving in
Dubai to receive their visas, participants in three programs
conducted over the summer told us that they had experienced no
trouble or harassment from the IRIG and were enthusiastic over
the possibility of developing working relationships with their
American counterparts. These programs proceeded without
problems, even during the election and its aftermath, except two
folk musicians sought asylum in the US rather than return to
Iran.
Comment
----------
¶8. (C) The inclusion of our IVLP programs and IRPO in the
indictment are supporting pieces of the IRIG's larger objective
of presenting election unrest as a product of a sweeping
conspiracy. They are convenient "evidence" of a US bent on
"velvet revolution," and some elements within the IRIG -- most
likely in the IRGC -- believe in such a plot, or see the
utility in using them to foster such belief. At a minimum their
inclusion serves as a warning to reformists and others who would
be more open to better relations with the US at a time when the
regime is under pressure from within. At the same time, there
are factions within the IRIG who understand the true nature of
these exchange programs. We have heard that there are those
within the IRIG, specifically in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, and even the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security, who have been supportive
of these programs or at least had no objection to them in the
past. Our success in bringing nearly 250 Iranians to the US,
including those who traveled this summer during the election,
indicates that there have been conscious decisions by the IRIG
to allow the programs to go forward, perhaps as a sign of
Iranian interest in better relations. It appears, however,
that after the election those who see them as a threat are again
dictating the Iranian response.
¶9. (C) By the Iranians' own admission in the indictment, these
exchange programs have been successful in their stated goals,
and we believe public and cultural diplomacy continue to provide
opportunities for engaging the Iranian people and even some
segments of the IRIG. In the event relations improve in the
future, these activities can be one of the most immediate ways
we could advance a bilateral relationship.
¶10. (C) Amid the current raised suspicions and flux within the
IRIG, however, we should be cautious in proceeding with further
exchanges out of concern for the safety of the participants.
There are real risks involved to anyone thought to be serving
DUBAI 00000349 003.2 OF 003
USG interests, and we think that right now, the risks have risen
substantially in the current atmosphere. With the situation in
Iran so unsettled, we believe it would be prudent to delay any
pending IVLP exchange programs until there are clearer
indications of IRIG intentions toward them. (NOTE: To
insulate our public diplomacy programs and maintain IRPO's low
profile, IRPO has had no involvement in civil society and
democracy programs run by the Department. Our recommendation
only extends to IVLP exchange programs.)
EYRE