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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06MEXICO456, MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MEXICO456 | 2006-01-27 20:08 | 2011-04-05 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/eu-dudaba-de-la-viabilidad-del-pri/ |
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
50972
2006-01-27 20:41:00
06MEXICO456
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
05MEXICO7426|05MEXICO7612|06MEXICO251
VZCZCXRO4837
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0456/01 0272041
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 272041Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8549
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000456
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MX
SUBJECT: MADRAZO AIMS FOR THE SENSIBLE CENTER
REF: A. A) 05 MEXICO 7612
¶B. B) MEXICO 251
¶C. C) 05 MEXICO 7426
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS:
1.4(B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: Roberto Madrazo, candidate of the PRI-led
Alliance for Mexico, has kicked off his campaign by trying to
position himself as the candidate of the political center.
Madrazo used the month long holiday break to smooth over the
divisions in his fractious party, restructuring his campaign
so as to put the full weight of the party machinery behind
it. He has succeeded in integrating into his campaign
structure -- at least for the moment -- key rivals from
within the PRI's ranks. He also released his long promised
personal financial statements, eliciting little negative
publicity for their delayed release, or for the remarkably
high reported net worth of this lifelong public servant. Yet
despite his efforts, Madrazo remains third in all recent
opinion polls, lagging by a considerable margin in at least
one. And his success in forging party unity will be sorely
tested in the months ahead, when the PRI finalizes its
legislative lists: in order to win the support of his critics
within the party and maintain the loyalty of his allies, he
has made far more promises of political rewards than he will
be able to keep. The publication of the PRI's legislative
lists in March may end up disappointing some key supporters
and fomenting party disunity just as the campaign enters its
most intensive phase. End summary.
Staking Out the Middle Ground
-----------------------------
¶2. (SBU) On January 15, Roberto Madrazo Pintado officially
registered with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) as the
presidential candidate of the Alliance for Mexico, consisting
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Green
Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM). Madrazo used the
opportunity of his post-registration rally -- his first
public appearance as the Alliance's candidate -- to stake out
the center of the Mexican political spectrum. Before a
partisan crowd, he spoke about the importance of ending
poverty and reducing inequality, while eschewing the cadences
of class conflict preferred by his left-wing rival, Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). He addressed the issue of
migration in relatively moderate terms, noting that while the
proposed border fence (ref A) offended Mexicans, the
migration problem had to be resolved first and foremost in
Mexico, through economic growth and job creation. He said
the next administration would need to devote its efforts to
restoring Mexico's economic competitivity, strengthening the
rule of law, and reducing poverty and inequality. In
subsequent campaign appearances, Madrazo has continued to
tack to the center, dismissing Felippe Calderon as a
"neoliberal," and AMLO as a "populist" and a "demagogue."
Papering Over Differences in the PRI
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) During the campaign "cease fire" declared by the IFE,
Madrazo worked intensively behind the scenes both to
restructure his campaign and to achieve unity -- or at least
the appearance of unity -- within the PRI. Contacts in the
party largely concur that he has been fairly successful in
winning at least the token support of his erstwhile critics.
Francisco Guerrero, Chief of Staff to Senate President
Enrique Jackson, told poloff that several key leaders of the
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish
acronym) faction have closed ranks with the candidate, an
assertion supported by other contacts. Many of the
supporters of former rival Arturo Montiel have been
integrated into the Madrazo team, most notably Montiel's
former campaign manager and PRI heavyweight Manuel Cadena.
Senate President Enrique Jackson, another leading member of
TUCOM, has signed on to a senior advisory role in the
campaign, and Nuevo Leon Governor Natavidad Gonzalez has
publicly backed Madrazo as well.
¶4. (C) At this point, it appears the only two major PRI
figures who remain fully outside the fold are Sonora Governor
Eduardo Bours and teacher's union leader Elba Esther
Gordillo. Jose Alcalde, a political analyst with ties to the
PRI, told poloff that Bours reportedly was contemplating a
PRD offer to defect; whether or not true, the influential
governor has not concealed his desire to undermine Madrazo's
campaign. As for Gordillo, she and Madrazo appear to have
settled into a temporary stalemate in their long-simmering
feud. The PRI suspended its effort to formally evict her
from the party, fearing that, according to PRI Deputy Jose
Alberto Aguilar, doing so would cause it unnecessary
political damage. For her part, Gordillo appears content to
MEXICO 00000456 002 OF 003
remain a titular member of the PRI, while openly supporting
the candidate of the New Alliance party, her protege and
former PRI deputy Roberto Campa. We suspect Gordillo is more
likely to break this uneasy stalemate than is Madrazo, and if
she does, Aguilar believes it would cost the PRI most, but
not all, of the 16-20 deputies who are loyal to Gordillo.
The High Price of Unity
-----------------------
¶5. (C) While Madrazo has managed to paper over differences
with most of his critics in the PRI, this semblance of unity
came at a high price, a price that will come due in March,
when the party finalizes its national lists for the
legislative elections. Francisco Guerrero told poloff that
in order to secure the support of those senior PRI leaders
who initially opposed his candidacy, Madrazo presumably
promised many of them high-ranking spots on the party's
electoral lists. He undoubtedly has made similar promises
not only to his numerous long-term supporters, but also to
other assorted party luminaries.
¶6. (C) Moreover, according to the terms of the PRI's
alliance with the Green Ecological Party of Mexico (PVEM),
four of the Senate list's top eight spots have been set aside
for PVEM candidates. In fact, the Senate list affords
relatively few opportunities to reward political allies.
While the party can list 32 candidates, only the most
optimistic of Madrazo supporters would be satisfied with a
position outside of the top 12; in the last legislative
elections, the PRI succeeded in electing only 12 senatorial
candidates from its national list, and this year's race
promises to be more competitive. Guerrero suspects -- and
other contacts tend to agree -- that the electoral lists will
leave some Madrazo supporters very dissatisfied, creating the
possibility of major dissension in the party just as the
campaign enters its most intensive phase.
Counting on the Machine
-----------------------
¶7. (SBU) Unlike the campaigns of his two principal rivals,
which are managed separately from their party apparatus, in
December, the Madrazo campaign integrated its operation with
that of the PRI party apparatus, even physically moving the
campaign's offices to the PRI headquarters. PRI president
Mariano Palacio Alcocer has agreed to serve concurrently as
Madrazo's campaign manager, to ensure that the full weight of
the PRI political machine is employed on behalf of his
campaign. According to campaign media advisor Ady Garcia,
the campaign has set up a number of regional and thematic
directorates, to ensure that the regional PRI operations are
well-coordinated.
¶8. (C) The party appears to be counting on its
well-organized nationwide political machine to give it the
margin of victory in this election. The PRI boasts of having
between 9 and 10 million hard core loyalists, of whose
unconditional support the party is confident. Assuming this
large base holds, our contacts observe that Madrazo would
need to win over far fewer uncommitted voters than his rivals
in order to win the election. They believe that their
party's superior political machine will pick off enough
uncommitted voters to swing the election to Madrazo.
Transparency Starts at Home
---------------------------
¶9. (SBU) To the surprise of many, on January 18, Madrazo
actually complied with a longstanding promise to release
information concerning his personal finances. His financial
statement revealed that this lifelong public servant has a
net worth of approximately USD 3 million, including four
luxury condominiums in Mexico City, all purchased in 2004,
other properties in the capital and in his home state of
Tabasco, and a Porsche automobile (among others) worth
approximately $100,000. He further revealed that his wife --
the widow of the scion of one of Mexico's wealthiest families
-- owns a luxury condominium in Williams Island, Florida.
One issue that remains murky, at least in press accounts
surrounding the release of Madrazo's financial statement, is
his ownership of a second Williams Island luxury condo. This
property sparked controversy last fall (ref A), when Reforma
reported that Madrazo had purchased the property through a
British Virgin Islands company. Recent press reporting has
stated that Madrazo rents this condominium and has an option
to purchase it; the reporting does not confirm whether
Madrazo controls the offshore company that owns the condo, as
earlier reporting strongly suggested.
Comment: Where are the Loyal PRI Voters?
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MEXICO 00000456 003 OF 003
¶10. (C) A consummate political operator, Madrazo appears to
have been fairly successful in uniting his party -- at least
to the public eye -- and surviving to wage the general
election campaign. However, by making profligate promises of
political rewards, he has set himself up for a possible
crisis in March, when the party's electoral lists will be
published, and he will have to make good on those promises.
Indeed, many in the party are questioning the wisdom of
promising four of the party's top eight Senate spots to the
PVEM, a party that historically has drawn only approximately
5 percent of the national vote. Madrazo may need to draw on
all of his formidable political skills to navigate the
intra-party crisis that the publication of the legislative
lists could provoke. On the other hand, the candidate has
built a long political career on the practice of making
promises he knows he may be unable to keep, and he may be
counting on his ability to pull this off one more time.
¶11. (C) With nearly six months to go until Election Day,
this is very much a three-way race and it is entirely
possible that it will remain that way until the finish line.
Although Madrazo is lagging for the moment, the PRI's
organizational advantages are considerable and many in the
party are so hungry to return to power, they will use every
tactic at their disposal -- no matter how ignoble -- to win.
In a closely fought, three-way race, the final advantage
might go to the candidate who makes the fewest mistakes, a
dynamic that could tend to favor the highly experienced
Madrazo. Nevertheless, we have trouble reconciling PRI claims
of a 10 million vote rock solid base with Madrazo's polling
in the low to mid 20 percent range. We cannot help but
wonder whether even for many formerly loyal PRIistas, a vote
for Madrazo is a bridge too far, or if the candidate simply
has no traction whatsoever beyond his base. End comment.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
GARZA