

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09OTTAWA879, CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09OTTAWA879.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09OTTAWA879 | 2009-12-11 22:10 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa |
VZCZCXRO4231
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHOT #0879/01 3452221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 112221Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0150
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000879
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/A, S/SRAP, AND WHA/CAN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS EAID AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD
REF: OTTAWA 00429; OTTAWA 00725; OTTAWA 944; OTTAWA 940
¶1. (SBU) Summary. In its sixth quarterly report to Parliament on
Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, the government cited slight
progress - mostly on school construction, micro-finance, and polio
eradication -- in its efforts in Kandahar Province. Training and
mentoring of Afghan Security Forces - both army and police -
continues, with mixed results. Signature development projects move
forward, and border security dialogue between Afghanistan and
Pakistan is expanding, with Canadian facilitation. The media and
Parliament, however, remain more obsessed with allegations that the
government ignored credible reports of abuse of Afghan detainees
transferred by the Canadian Forces in 2006 to Afghan authorities
(ref c), and largely ignored the mostly discouraging news in this
latest report. End summary.
¶2. (U) Minister of International Trade and Chair of the Cabinet
Committee on Afghanistan Stockwell Day on December 10 released
the sixth quarterly report to Parliament - mandated under a March
2008 bipartisan motion that also extended the mandate of the
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2011 -- on Canada's
engagement in Afghanistan. Covering the period from July 1 to
September 30, the report painted an often discouraging picture for
the work of Canadian military and civilian units operating in and
around Kandahar. The report recognized that the widespread fraud
that characterized the Presidential election had raised questions
of credibility regarding the Karzai government, but praised the
willingness of the Afghan people to vote in the face of
intimidation as well as the efforts of Afghan security forces to
provide security. The report noted that Canada had achieved
progress toward "many" of its priority objectives in the province.
¶3. (U) The report, however, also highlighted that the quarter had
witnessed the "heaviest loss of life among the greatly expanded
coalition forces for any three-month period since 2001," including
eleven members of the Canadian Forces. The report admitted that
"the insurgents have seized the initiative, both in armed conflict
and by creating a crisis of confidence among the populace through
the equally important 'silent war' of fear, intimidation and
persuasion." It noted that August was also the "deadliest month
so far this year for Afghan civilian casualties." The report
welcomed that the August recommendations from General Stanley
McChrystal, Commander of the International Security Assistance
Force (COMISAF), had in many ways reflected the approach already
underway by Canadian Forces, notably, the "Village Approach"
exemplified by Operation Kantolo, which aims to protect the
population and create a secure environment in which governance and
development can take root.
Key Findings of the Report
Priority One: Training and Mentoring ANSF
¶4. (U) The Canadian objective for 2011 is for the Afghan National
Army (ANA) to demonstrate an "increased capacity" to conduct
operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts
of Kandahar Province, and for four kandaks (battalions) to be fully
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining near-autonomous
operations.. As of this quarter, however, only one of six kandaks
is "fully capable" -- unchanged from previous quarter, although
there is also a new kandak that has not undergone assessment. Only
one of the six kandaks or the ANA headquarters has an effective
strength of 70% or higher -- down from three kandaks at that level
last quarter. The report contended that the ANA nonetheless had
succeeded in shouldering greater responsibility for security in
Kandahar City and by independently executing 80% of security
operations on its own, as well as by leading more than 70%. This
exceeded the 65% goal for 2011, and is up from 45% for the June
2008 baseline period. (This was a benchmark that the government
had added only in the previous report.) However, in contrast to
the previous quarter when the ANA had an approval rating of 85% or
more in five out of six key districts, this was true in only one
key district during this quarter. Similarly, in this quarter,
OTTAWA 00000879 002 OF 004
there were no key districts in which the majority of Kandaharis
perceived security as improving, whereas there had been one in the
previous quarter.
¶5. (U) The Afghan National Police (ANP) performed well during the
elections, according to the report, providing security at polling
stations and assisting the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in
moving and securing elections materials. Canadian military and
civilian police in Kandahar City provided basic training for 679
ANP officers in preparation for the election, up from only 200 in
the previous quarter (although the report failed to report on the
total percentage of ANP in Kandahar with such training, unlike in
the previous report). There was progress toward the 2011 goal of
having 80 % of the ANP units capable of planning and executing
near-autonomous operations. Two (of 17) ANP units representing 12%
of the officers were assessed as capable of conducting basic law
and order operations with occasional assistance from international
advisors or police mentor team (Capability Milestone 2), up from
one in the last quarter.
Priority Two: Strengthening Afghan Capacity to Deliver Core
Services
¶6. (U) The report noted that the ability of the Afghan Government
to provide dependable basic services such as education, healthcare,
sanitation, roads, and water is a key test of its ability to gain
public confidence. Two of Canada's "signature projects" are
designed to reinforce the Afghan Government's institutional
capacity to deliver these services. Toward the 2011 goal of
building, expanding, or repairing 50 schools in key districts,
construction was completed during the quarter on seven schools, up
from zero during the last reporting period. Twenty-one schools are
currently under construction; no new school projects began this
quarter. This quarter, 13,500 individuals continued in various
literacy training programs, identical with the previous quarter.
¶7. (U) Another 2011 goal for Afghan institutions is to have
completed infrastructure projects undertaken by locally elected
bodies in 75% of communities in key districts. The report cited
completed projects in 68% of key districts, up from 66% last
quarter. Canadian engineers made progress on technical aspects of
another "signature project," the C$50 million rehabilitation of the
Dahla Dam. When completed, this dam and irrigation system will
ensure reliable water delivery to four out of five Kandaharis and
support licit agriculture. A manufacturer for the gates and weirs
of the associated irrigation system was identified. The project
created 157 new seasonal jobs for a cumulative total of 355 (versus
199 last quarter), against a 2011 target of 10,000. In this
quarter, Kandahar already achieved Canada's 2011 target of loans
for 500 clients through the Microfinance Investment Support
Facility (against a March 2008 baseline of 30 microfinance loans).
¶8. (U) The report recognized that insurgent activity in Kandahar
nonetheless continued to hamper the efforts of both the
international community and Afghan Government to provide basic
services, however. Development partners can travel in key
districts only in armored vehicles with military escort. In other
areas, movement is not possible. While 60% of Kandaharis were
satisfied with the Afghan government's efforts to improve the
quality of life, this was a decline from 75% in the last quarter.
However, the percent of Kandaharis satisfied with the provision of
education grew from 44% to 47%, and those satisfied with employment
increased from 25% to 40% in this quarter. However, about 30 pct
had a favorable opinion of the Taliban, a "modest but steady upward
trend."
Priority Three: Providing Humanitarian Assistance to Vulnerable
People
¶9. (U) Canada's 2011 the goal is that humanitarian assistance
will be accessible to Afghan refugees and internally displaced
persons in Kandahar and nationwide. According to this report,
OTTAWA 00000879 003 OF 004
Canada's third "signature project" -- a campaign designed to
eradicate polio throughout Afghanistan in 2009, in partnership with
the World Health Organization and UNICEF -- inoculated another
380,000 children in Kandahar and another 880,000 nationwide. The
report admitted, however, that it will not be possible to eradicate
the disease in Afghanistan as projected by the end of 2009, and
that there were nine new cases in the quarter, with a nationwide
total of 22 new cases. Canadian funding helped the World Food
Programme to double its food aid from last quarter, reaching an
additional 1.5 million beneficiaries. Removal of landmines and
explosives cleared land in 11 villages (an additional 0.25 square
kilometers of land) during this period, bring the number of
mine-related civilian casualties to fewer than 50 per month, a 10
year low. Estimates are that at least 10,000 explosive hazards
remain, however, scattered across more than 1000 square miles of
Kandahar Province.
Priority Four: Enhancing Border Security and Facilitating Bilateral
Dialogue Between Afghanistan and Pakistan
¶10. (U) Canada's goal for 2011 is that Afghan and Pakistani
institutions will exercise "stronger capacity" to control the
border. The quarterly report cited two Joint Working Group
meetings under the Canadian-facilitated Dubai Process, which
brought together Afghan and Pakistani officials to identify
projects that would contribute to efforts in counter narcotics and
controlling the movement of people. (Two additional meetings on
customs and law enforcement took place after the end of this
reporting period.) Canadian-facilitated discussions also took
place along the Kandahar-Baluchistan border between Afghan and
Pakistani military officers. These Dubai Process meetings have
created a regular mechanism for advancing border cooperation.
Priority Five: Advancing Afghan Democratic Institutions
¶11. (U) Canada's hope for 2011 is that national, local and
provincial institutions in Kandahar will exhibit an "increasing
capacity" for democratic governance. Although the report
recognized the major concerns about irregularities and fraud
related to the Presidential election, it praised the work of the
Independent Electoral Commission and the Elections Complaints
Commission as examples of emerging capacity. It admitted, however,
that voter turnout was less than 40% in the elections. Training
for officials from Kandahar and 21 other provinces began during
last reporting period and continued in this quarter in preparation
for the establishment of long-term provincial strategic plans to
build capacity in conjunction with the Afghan National Development
Strategy.
Priority Six: Facilitating Afghan-led Efforts toward Reconciliation
¶12. (U) The report noted "no further results" on national
reconciliation, which will depend on the "will of the Afghan
people." Canada agreed to provide C$1.6 million to rebuild the
meeting hall of the Kandahar Provincial Council, providing space
for community gatherings.
Reaction in Canada
¶13. (SBU) While the media covered the December 10 release by
Minister Day, virtually all of the questioning related instead to
the on-going controversy over the treatment of prisoners handed
over to Afghan security forces by Canadian soldiers and what the
government knew when (ref c). Minister Day, and -- in a separate
press conference -- Justice Minister Rob Nicholson insisted that
the government would not comply with a December 9 House of Commons
motion (which the ruling Conservatives lost 145-143) demanding full
release of all relevant documents to the Commons. Minister Day
cited operational security, while Minister Nicholas cited legal
restrictions; both suggested individuals (including MPs) who wanted
OTTAWA 00000879 004 OF 004
access to such restricted documents would have to seek them in
court. The three opposition parties are united in seeking to
embarrass the government over this issue and have vowed to call
into session the Special Committee on Afghanistan even during the
holiday recess (which began December 10), but have indicated no
interest in debating the actual Canadian mission in Afghanistan and
the successes - or failures - of Canada's role as documented in the
quarterly reports. As noted in one editorial, the public
similarly has a "curiosity" deficit" when it comes to Afghanistan
nowadays.
JACOBSON