

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08TRIPOLI166, LIBYAN PARLIAMENT CONVENES, CABINET CHANGES EXPECTED
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08TRIPOLI166.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08TRIPOLI166 | 2008-03-03 08:08 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO2750
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0166/01 0630808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030808Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3156
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3636
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000166
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PARLIAMENT CONVENES, CABINET CHANGES EXPECTED
REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 0071, B) 07 Tripoli 1033, C) Tripoli 106, D) 07 TRIPOLI 1053 TRIPOLI 00000166 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: The results of this year's General People's Congress (Parliament-equivalent), which commenced in Sirte on March 2, will be closely watched for signs that the Libyan leadership remains committed to economic reform and reengagement with the international community. Observers will also carefully weigh the expected new government's composition to gauge the relative positions of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his recently ascendant brother, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, the two sons of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi who are widely considered to be rivals to succeed their father. Among the cabinet officers rumored to be candidates for replacement are the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and several ministers in charge of domestic portfolios. End summary.
2.(C) Public media reports and private speculation among observers in Tripoli have focused considerable attention on the annual session of the General People's Congress (GPC - Parliament-equivalent), which commenced in Sirte on March 2, and the cabinet change expected to be announced at the event's conclusion. Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi launched this year's session with a lengthy speech in which he directed strong criticism at the government for failing to address the needs of the people. The last cabinet change, in January 2007 (ref A), was the second such shuffle in less than a year and was perceived to have shifted reform-minded individuals into key positions.
ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION KEY ISSUES
3.(C) While changes of government are common, the expected upcoming shuffle will be parsed closely for two principal reasons. First, it will be viewed as a sign of senior GOL leaders' commitment to economic and limited attendant political reform. Appointment of a cabinet perceived to be "reformist" (in the Libyan context) would be seen as an important signal that the leadership intends to support a program of reform and further reintegrating of Libya into the international community after two-plus decades of relative isolation. Second, the shape of the new government may help define the relative influence and position of two of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's sons - putative heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and recently appointed National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi - whom press reports and some contacts have argued are in de facto competition to succeed their father.
EASY ECONOMIC REFORM HAS BEEN DONE
4.(C) This year's annual GPC session comes at an important juncture. Initial announcements of economic initiatives and reform that followed Libya's December 2003 decision to abandon its WMD program and renounce terrorism have given way to the hard reality that considerable economic and administrative work remains to be done if Libya is to realize its development aspirations. A local business contact noted that the GOL has "already picked the low-hanging fruit" in terms of easy reform by allowing importation of more consumer products, privatizing banks, easing enforcement of draconian currency regulations and creating a legal framework (of sorts) for partnership with foreign investors and commercial entities.
PERCEIVED LACK OF REFORM COMMITMENT "KILLING" BUSINESS
5.(C) Recent developments like the imprisonment of well-connected businessmen last year, changes in commercial codes that effectively rolled back key reforms, and the increasingly apparent disconnect between the GOL's anti-corruption message and the business practices of senior apparatchiks have underscored the dissonance between the GOL's message and the reality on the ground. xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect), scion of a leading business family, characterized the prevailing "confusion" among senior GOL officials about the country's direction as "a crisis" for the business community. The lack of clear commitment to and, critically, implementation of, announced reform measures were "killing" new projects while investors waited to see how the perceived reform struggle plays out.
QUESTIONS ABOUT SAIF'S COMMITMENT, INFLUENCE
6.(C) Much of the debate centers on the role of the reformist camp's public face and purported champion, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect), xxxxxxxxxxxx, told P/E Chief in early January that events in the second half of 2007 had "seriously eroded" the business TRIPOLI 00000166 002.2 OF 004 community's confidence in Saif as a serious proponent of reform, and had raised questions about the real extent of his influence.
THE OLD GUARD DIGS IN
7.(C) In addition, senior officials brought in by Saif al-Islam to help implement reform measures have encountered serious opposition from regime figures skeptical about the strategic decision to re-engage with the West (and particularly the U.S.) and concerned that their livelihoods, which depend on the old, kleptocratic way of doing business, will be directly threatened by reform. Dr. Mahmud Jibril, Chairman of the National Planning Council and head of the affiliated Economic Development Board, was personally wooed back to Libya by Saif al-Islam to help implement reforms recommended in a Monitor Group report developed under the direction of Harvard University's Dr. Michael Porter. (Note: Jibril holds a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh and owns a successful business consultancy firm with offices in Cairo and London. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect), a U.S.-based, businessman with dual U.S.-Libyan nationality, told P/E Chief in early February that Jibril was "profoundly disappointed" by his limited ability to effect change and had submitted letters of resignation three times in the second half of 2007, but had been dissuaded from leaving.
LEADER'S HEALTH THROWS SPOTLIGHT ON SUCCESSION ISSUE
8.(C) As important as economic and reform equities is the political import of the expected cabinet shuffle. Media reports and local observers have dwelled in the past eight months on whether the perceived recent rise of Muatassim al-Qadhafi, Muammar al-Qadhafi's third son by his second wife, represents a threat to Saif al-Islam's previously uncontested role as heir-apparent. (Note: Saif al-Islam is Qadhafi's eldest son by his second wife. End note.) Citing conversations with unspecified members of Qadhafi's family, France's former Ambassador to Tripoli, Jean-Jacques Beaussou, told the CDA and P/E Chief in early December that Muammar al-Qadhafi suffered a series of strokes in May 2007, calling into question how much longer the Leader would be able to rule and focusing attention on the critical issue of succession (see ref B for further reporting on complications related to Qadhafi's reported stroke).
MUATASSIM & SAIF: RIVALS OR ALLIES?
9.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect), head of a wealthy, well-known family, told P/E Chief in early February that Qadhafi deliberately tapped Muatassim as National Security Adviser to create an alternate locus of power to Saif al-Islam and to "strategically stir the political pot". Muatassim can act as an ally to Saif al-Islam or, if he demonstrates sufficient capability, could emerge as a viable alternative successor.
MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI: HEDGING HIS "STRATEGIC BET"
10.(C) Saif al-Islam's publicly reformist message endears him to Western observers and would-be Libyan reformists, said xxxxxxxxxxxx, while Muatassim is perceived to be a more traditional figure who appeals to important military and tribal leaders. By advancing both simultaneously and perpetuating ambiguity about their places in the pecking order, al-Qadhafi is able to better balance two key constituencies - pro-Western reformists and traditional old guard elements - while the struggle over reform and change plays out. The problem, xxxxxxxxxxxx noted, is that al-Qadhafi's approach is fundamentally tactical and not strategic; in typical fashion, al-Qadhafi has effectively hedged his December 2003 "strategic bet" to give up WMD and terrorism by fostering the perception that a traditional "strong man" (Muatassim) may take the reins of power. Two influential, longtime members of the Revolutionary Committees - xxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxx - who are peers of Muammar al-Qadhafi, recently told xxxxxxxxxxxx they had been "extremely dissatisfied" with reforms attributed to Saif al-Islam, but were cautiously optimistic that Muatassim could become a leader they could live with.
HANDICAPPING THE FIELD TRIPOLI 00000166 003.2 OF 004
11.(C) Among the cabinet officers, the Prime Minister-equivalent, Foreign Minister-equivalent, Secretary for Education, Secretary for Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent), Secretary for Economy, Trade and Investment and the Secretary for Manpower, Training and Employment are widely rumored as candidates for replacement. As reported ref C, a considerable portion of the GPC will be devoted to televised interrogation of cabinet officers by GPC members, who will ostensibly determine whether cabinet members have faithfully carried out the GPC's policies and effectively served the interest of the Jamahuriya. Recalling his experience as Prime Minister in 1979-1981, MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi told the CDA and P/E Chief on February 24 that the GPC usually "closely consulted" Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi about any proposed cabinet changes. Qadhafi -- ever Delphic -- sometimes, but not always, offered opinions about the proposals. Post notes that cabinet changes have in the past transpired in stages, with some positions left unencumbered and new appointments made in subsequent tranches.
PRIME MINISTER TO BE SACKED?
12.(C) There is wide consensus that al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Secretary of the GPC (Prime Minister-equivalent), will be SIPDIS removed. Speculation centers on three candidates to succeed him: AbuzaidDorda, Chairman of the Housing and Infrastructure Board; Dr. Mahmud Jibril, Chairman of the National Planning Council; and Dr. Muhammad Siala, Deputy Foreign Minister.
13.(C) A number of well-place contacts say Dorda is the leading candidate for the job. Dorda has been the very public face of Libya's massive infrastructure development program, barnstorming provinces to announce housing and infrastructure programs. He is genuinely popular, so much so that Qadhafi - concerned that Dorda was becoming "too popular" - allegedly started rumors in December 2007 that he would lose his HIB position in the upcoming cabinet shuffle. A schoolteacher by training, Dorda is a longtime apparatchik who has ridden a reputation as an anti-corruption crusader up the ranks (see ref D for his remarks at a recent contract signing). Contact xxxxxxxxxxxx, who considers him a friend, described him as "an unreconstructed socialist" who is "intrinsically suspicious" of capitalism. Former U.K. Commercial Counselor Trevor Hines characterized Dorda as being "among the worst" regime figures because he "claims to be supportive of economic reform and is forever announcing new reform measures, but in the end is as obstructionist as any of them". Confident, popular and given to sanctimony, Dorda could be a difficult interlocutor for the U.S.
14.(C) Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi reportedly asked Dr. Mahmud Jibril in mid-December whether he would accept the position. Jibril, citing former PM and fellow would-be reformer Shukri Ghanem's disappointing experience as a cautionary tale, told xxxxxxxxxxxx that he does not want the job; however, rumors persist that he'll be tapped as "window dressing" for the reformist camp. Explaining his reluctance, Jibril described the job as more titular than functional, and said the higher profile only brings greater risk. xxxxxxxxxxxx dismissed the likelihood that Jibril would be named PM, saying it is understood that he "does not want it" and "is not committed enough" to do the job. Nonetheless, xxxxxxxxxxxx told the CDA on February 28 that Jibril would/would be tapped as next PM. Smart, cosmopolitan and one of the most strategic thinkers among Post's interlocutors, Jibril would be pro-reform and would likely favor continued re-engagement with the U.S.
15.(C) The names of Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad Siala and Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi have also been connected with the PM's post. xxxxxxxxxxxx describes Siala, as "a good man" and "an able technocrat", but says he is widely perceived as being "not strong enough" for the job. Rumors that Saif al-Islam could be tapped peaked late last year, but recent consensus has it that it would be "too early" for him and that he may be tapped to encumber a new, non-Cabinet level, economic development coordinator position.
FOREIGN MINISTER - TOUGH TO CALL
16.(C) Foreign Minister-equivalent Abdulrahman Shalgham has been widely rumored to be on the way out since last summer's TRIPOLI 00000166 004.2 OF 004 denouement of the long-running Bulgarian medics' case. There were reports after his early January visit to Washington that he had fallen further out of favor over the perception that he had been sufficiently tough in arguing Libya's position in his dealings with USG officials. Shalgham's departure could mean the departure of his pro-U.S. Secretary for the Americas, Dr. Ahmed Fituri. Fituri told the CDA recently that if Shalgham goes, he will, too. MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari told P/E Chief February 20 that perceptions of Shalgham's Washington trip were "mixed", but nonetheless argued that there was "a 90 percent chance" that Shalgham would remain as FM. Stressing the importance of the U.S. account, he said that if Secretary Rice had visited Libya before the GPC, as had been SIPDIS originally planned, it would be a certainty that Shalgham would keep his job.
¶17. (C) If Shalgham goes, the consensus in most quarters is that Deputy FM Muhammad Siala would move up to take the FM post. Siala is a smart, cosmopolitan, technocrat who understands and appears to be genuinely committed to economic reform; he also favors reengagement with the U.S. and the West. Although not the politician that Shalgham is, he is in some respects more thoughtful and would likely be a capable and sympathetic interlocutor. xxxxxxxxxxxx told P/E chief in late December/early January that he had heard reports from unspecified senior RevComm members that External Security Organization Chief Musa Kusa could be moved up to become FM; however, more recently he said the idea seemed to have died and that Kusa could be sent abroad as ambassador to a large western country. AND ROUNDING OUT THE FIELD ...
¶18. (C) On other portfolios, xxxxxxxxxxxx told P/E Chief that if an associate of Saif al-Islam is tapped to be PM, Muatassim's camp could be given the position of Speaker of the Parliament, with RevComm figure Abdallah Othman replacing Ahmed Ibrahim. To balance out the RecComm cadres' influence, Secretary for Education Dr. Abd al-Kader al-Baghdadi, a RevComm fixture, would lose his seat. The Minister for Public Security, Brigadier General Salleh Muhammad Rajub al-Messmari, will almost certainly lose his seat thanks to the behavior of his adult son. He will likely be replaced by his deputy, Omran Hmeid, who has effectively been the acting Minister since al-Messmari fell from grace late last summer. Minister for Manpower, Training and Employment Matuq Matuq, a regime fixture who has held numerous cabinet positions and who has been the bane of international oil and gas companies - one contact described him as "a troglodyte" - may be pushed to the Housing and Infrastructure Board - technically a non-cabinet post - if Abuzaid Dorda moves up to become PM. Secretary for Economy, Trade and Investment Dr. Ali al-Essawi has been mentioned as being on the way out; however, reviews of his performance are mixed and we've heard no informed speculation as to who might replace him.
STEVENS 0 03/03/2008