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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAGUA242, MARTINEZ CUENCA LAUDS U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ORTEGA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAGUA242 | 2007-01-26 22:10 | 2011-04-25 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua |
Appears in these articles: http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx |
VZCZCXRO0276
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0242/01 0262256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 262256Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8842
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0919
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000242
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR KDEM NU PREL
SUBJECT: MARTINEZ CUENCA LAUDS U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ORTEGA
GOVERNMENT
REF: 2006 MANAGUA 2077 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (C) In Sandinista-dissident Alejandro Martinez Cuenca's
recent meeting with the Ambassador, he applauded President
Bush's "magnificent" decision to call Ortega before the
inauguration, terming the gesture the "best antidote to keep
Ortega from straying" and to check Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez' influence. Martinez Cuenca characterized Ortega as
chaotic, anarchic, divisive, and adverse to the "carpentry of
government," while Ortega's wife Rosario is totally obsessed
with control. He believes that President Ortega's
"disastrous" inauguration and his government's efforts to
consolidate power through emergency legislation have cost
Ortega much of the political capitol he acquired following
the November election. He is confident that Chavez' ALBA
will not complicate CAFTA as it is not a trade agreement at
all. End Summary.
¶2. (C) On January 24, the Ambassador, DCM, and PolCouns met
with Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) dissident
Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, who applauded President Bush's
"magnificent decision" to call Ortega a few days before the
Sandinista leader's inauguration. Terming the U.S. approach
"the best antidote to keep Ortega from straying" and to check
Chavez' influence, Martinez Cuenca added that Foreign
Minister Samuel Santos and Ambassador-designate Arturo Cruz
have told him that they and President Ortega are very pleased
with our positive overtures thus far, including President
Bush's phone call, the bilateral meetings held with Ortega in
Managua and Quito, and Assistant Secretary Shannon's skillful
and constructive public remarks on the bilateral
relationship. Martinez Cuenca commented that additional
meetings, including an eventual meeting between the two
presidents in Washington would contribute greatly to the
positive bilateral relationship thus far. The Ambassador
thanked Martinez Cuenca for
his suggestions and assured him that we will seek other
opportunities for engagement.
Kafka Comes to Managua
- - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) Sharing his views on Ortega's inaugural ceremonies,
Martinez Cuenca opined that the events were "something out of
a Kafka novel." He was uncertain whether the numerous
protocol faux pas and delays were intentional, or rather,
part of the FSLN's proclivity for improvisation, disorder,
and informality, but clearly the outcome was disastrous.
Allowing Chavez to steal the show and to attack the United
States sent all the wrong signals, while inviting Iranian
President Ahmadinejad to visit Nicaragua on the heels of
Ortega's inauguration heightened anxiety, opined Martinez
Cuenca. Even though Ortega's remarks were measured and he
refrained from attacking the United States directly, Chavez'
intervention sparked alarm. Martinez Cuenca also criticized
Ortega for hosting Ahmadinejad, a leader of the Islamic
world's extreme right whose regime discriminates against
women and even makes them take separate elevators. As a
leftist, Martinez Cuenca was "insulted" by Ortega's honoring
the Iranian.
¶4. (C) Martinez Cuenca remarked that before the
inauguration, Ortega had taken the right course:
conciliatory messages and engagement with the international
community and domestic and foreign private sectors that
assuaged fears Ortega would reinvent the undemocratic
Sandinista model of the 1980s. However, between President
Ortega's inaugural fiasco and his government's efforts to
quickly consolidate power through emergency legislation,
Ortega has lost much of the political capital he acquired
after his election, observed Martinez Cuenca.
He attributed another mistake -- the decision to move the
Presidency to the Olaf Palme (whose refurbishment will
probably raise government costs rather than reduce them) --
to Rosario's affinity for symbolism. In sum, the Nicaraguan
government's (GON) only positive measure thus far is its
decision to cut the salaries of the Executive's senior
officials -- that and the appointment of Arturo Cruz
(Reftels) to represent Nicaragua in Washington.
Confirming Libyan Influence
MANAGUA 00000242 002 OF 003
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) As for Ortega's cabinet choices and other
appointments, Martinez Cuenca agreed that many of the new
ministers are not particularly qualified or experienced, but
they were selected for their loyalty. The Ambassador raised
concerns regarding Ortega's choice of personal secretary
--former Libyan/naturalized Nicaraguan Muhamad Muhktar
Lashtar. Martinez Cuenca confided that Lashtar arrived in
Managua in 1989 and reported directly to Moammar al-Ghadafi's
security unit that operates independently from the Libyan
government. Further, through Lashtar, Libyan monies have
maintained Ortega for years and Ortega's national and popular
council model is based on the Libyan "Green Book," claimed
Martinez Cuenca. However, if pressed, Ortega will likely
counter any criticism of his appointment of the Libyan by
rationalizing his appointment of former Amcit/naturalized
Nicaraguan Paul Oquist to head the President's "national
policy" advisory council "compensates" for Lashtar.
Law 290 and What to Do with Lenin?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶6. (C) Expanding on the topic of the revisions to Law 290
(delineates Executive responsibilities, lines of authority)
that the National Assembly passed earlier the same day
(septel), Martinez Cuenca opined that Oquist was likely the
author of this contentious initiative. He explained that
Oquist had left Nicaragua after Ortega lost the 1990 election
and his concept of Nicaragua had remained frozen in the past.
He surmised that Oquist took the old Sandinista regime's
antiquated organization chart and planned on transposing it
into the new government; revising Law 290 was the mechanism
to achieve this task. Martinez Cuenca believed that after
opposition parties and civil society objected to a number of
the more draconian changes that would consolidate Ortega's
power, the GON retracted somewhat, and eliminated some of the
more egregious revisions.
¶7. (C) Regarding the revision to Law 290 removing authority
over Nicaragua's defense intelligence unit (DID) from the
Ministry of Defense and shifting it instead to the Armed
Forces, Martinez Cuenca believed that this revision arose out
of a comprise between Ortega and Armed Forces chief
Halleslevens. After Halleslevens rejected Ortega's proposal
to appoint Lenin Cerna's wife Marisol Castillo to head the
Defense Ministry -- in large part because the military would
not accept Castillo's (and thus, Cerna's) control over the
DID, Ortega offered to shift DID authority from the MOD to
the military. With Hallesleven's objections resolved, Ortega
might appoint Castillo as Defense Minister, remarked Martinez
Cuenca. (Comment: While before the Law 290 revisions passed
the Defense Ministry was authorized to oversee the DID, in
practice, it was controlled by the military. Now the
relationship has been formalized.)
ALBA Does Not Contradict CAFTA
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¶8. (C) Martinez Cuenca gave the Ambassador unsigned copies
of 13 of the 15 agreements Nicaragua signed with Venezuela
earlier in the month. He explained that he obtained the
documents from the Venezuelan Ambassador after his numerous
attempts to procure the materials from the GON had failed.
Martinez Cuenca remarked that Chavez' ALBA does not
contradict CAFTA and is not a trade agreement at all; rather,
it is a statement of cooperation, a political device
promising all sorts of benefits to Nicaragua. However, if
Chavez' record for lots of talk and agreements and little
delivery plays out in Nicaragua, Ortega may come up
shorthanded and unable to meet his campaign promises to
Nicaragua's poor, he said, adding that Ortega may already
harbor doubts over Chavez' ability to deliver.
Not in Ortega's Interest to Free Aleman
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¶9. (C) Martinez Cuenca shared our view that Ortega will not
release Liberal Constitutional Party caudillo/convicted money
launderer Arnoldo Aleman because he can still exploit him.
However, Aleman's influence over his party remains a problem
and the main impediment to Liberal unity, opined Martinez
Cuenca, who added that Aleman's arrogance after winning the
presidential election in 1995 had prompted him to pact with
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Ortega instead of "consulting with the people."
Who's in Charge?
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¶10. (C) Martinez Cuenca downplayed somewhat the growing
fears that Ortega is bent on imposing an authoritarian regime
-- characterizing Ortega as "anarchic, divisive, and adverse
to the carpentry of government." Ortega's wife Rosario,
however, is another story; she is totally obsessed with
control, while Ortega thrives on chaos and takes great
delight in pitting members of his inner circle against one
another, he said.
Comment
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¶11. (C) Martinez Cuenca's assessment tracks closely with
ours and a number of other reliable interlocutors. His
approval of our stance thus far vis-a-vis the Ortega
government is encouraging, as he knows how Ortega and his
inner circle think and what motivates them. Chavez would
like nothing better than for us to enter into conflict with
Ortega and to reduce our footprint in Nicaragua. To the
degree we can successfully engage Ortega, his cabinet, and
FSLN lawmakers and cultivate common ground, we may be able to
offset Chavez's influence here.
TRIVELLI