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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANJOSE107, WHA/CEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO COST RICA:
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0107/01 0520027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210027Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0508
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 4429
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1147
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5028
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0054
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000107
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/CCA, WHA/PPC, WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, AND
INL/LP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: CS EFTA KSUM PGOV PINR PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: WHA/CEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S VISIT TO COST RICA:
REGIONAL ISSUES
REF: A. A) SAN JOSE 0018 AND PREVIOUS
¶B. B) SAN JOSE 0098
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor David E. Henifin per reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A senior MFA official candidly discussed a
wide range of regional issues with WHA/CEN Deputy Director
David Wolfe during the latter's February 9-11 visit to Costa
Rica. Wolfe's interlocutor contrasted Costa Rica's frosty
Nicaraguan relations with a warming trend with Panama, and
signaled that Costa Rica did not want to be "the last
country" in Cental America to establish full relations with
Cuba (under the assumption that El Salvador would do so
quickly after an FMLN election victory next month). The MFA
official also noted that the full regional summit and
ministerial schedule in April (Pathways, SoA) and May (EU-Rio
Group) complicated GOCR attendance plans. (The Casa
Presidencial later announced that President Arias will attend
the Summit of the Americas.) Overall, Wolfe heard the same
concerns and arguments Post has heard in recent months, but
direct and unfiltered. (Separately, FM Stagno echoed a
number of these views in a meeting with the Ambassador and
DCM on February 19.) Additional Merida and CAFTA-related
issues are reported in Ref B. Wolfe did not clear this cable
in advance. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) On February 11, Wolfe met with new Director of
Foreign Policy (P-equivalent) Alejandro Solano, who was
joined by Carlos Cordero, in charge of counternarcotics,
counter-terrrorisn and Merida issues for the Ministry. Wolfe
was accompanied by Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff.
¶3. (SBU) MERIDA: The GOCR welcomed Merida assistance, Solano
stressed, but believed that Central America was on the short
end. Concentrating CN efforts on Mexico in the north and
Colombia in the south would further "squeeze" drug
traffickers into Costa Rica and its neighboring countries,
concentrating the problem there. The "small" share of the
Merida pie for Central America needed to be expanded, in the
GOCR's view. Solano understood that Washington might be
reviewing overall Merida funding levels now. If so, Central
America (and Costa Rica) should receive a larger share.
Stagno made the same argument to the Ambassador and DCM on
February 19, and both suggested that a coordinated Cental
American regional for additional Merida funding might yield
more success than ad hoc bilateral efforts.
¶4. (C) NICARAGUA AND PANAMA: Solano reviewed GOCR concerns
about Nicaragua, especially as the global economic crisis
deepened. The Costa Rican embassy and consulates issued over
300,000 visas in Nicaragua in 2008, in a good year. How much
more immigration -- legal and illegal -- could Costa Rica
expect to see in a bad year? Solano described Costa Rica as
a "receptor" nation which did not want to close the door to
immigrants on the one hand, but could not afford to be
overwhelmed by a new flood from the north, on the other.
Nicaragua should take "co-responsibility" for regulating
migration to Costa Rica. In addition, as international
assistance was suspended or dried up because of President
Ortega's increasingly undemocratic behavior, Solano noted
GOCR worries that Venezuelan assistance might take up more of
the slack. He added that Costa Rican consuls had been
"direct witnesses" to the election fraud and ensuing violence
during the municipal elections.
¶5. (C) Mentioning the long-running Rio San Juan dispute
(which is to be decided by the ICJ in March) and the
nearly-dysfunctional Costa Rican-Nicaraguan bi-national
commission (which is unlikely to meet again until 2010),
Solano said that "99.9 percent" of his government's regional
foreign policy problems were caused by Nicaragua. In
contrast, he pointed to a distinct warming trend with Panama,
a country and people with whom Costa Rica shared many
"affinities." The border with Panama, although essentially
open in many areas, was the "safest" of Costa Rica's national
boundaries, he maintained, featuring extensive cooperation on
security and immigration issues.
¶6. (C) On a potentially related border issue, Stagno told the
Ambassador and DCM that there had been eight fishing boat
seizures by Nicaraguan authorities off Costa Rica's northern
Pacific coast since November 2008; four of these in January
alone. Although he acknowledged that Costa Rican fishermen
may have drifted into Nicaraguan waters, Stagno speculated
that the increase in seizures may be a move by the GON to
continue to stir up trouble along the border, in advance (and
regardless) of the ICJ ruling.
¶7. (C) CUBA: The GOCR had seen little real change (and did
not expect much) under Raul Castro, Solano explained, and
expected Fidel's influence, and those of hard-liners such as
FM Perez-Roque, to continue. He added that Costa Rica tried
to work with Cuba on select issues in multilateral fora,
including in the UN Human Rights Council, but this was often
difficult. Solano said the GOCR "shared USG doubts" about
the Council, but still hoped its operations could be
improved. Hinting at a future change in policy (Ref A), he
acknowledged that Costa Rica did not want to be "the last
country" in Central America to establish full relations with
Cuba. This is based on the MFA's judgment that if FMLN won
the March-April elections in El Salvador, the GOES would and
establish ties to Cuba shortly thereafter.
¶8. (C) Stagno also reprised this argument to the Ambassador
and DCM on February 19, and questioned them intently for any
authoritative indication of a change (i.e., a softening) of
USG policy vis-a-vis Cuba. Stagno added that Cuba at least
behaved predictably in multilateral fora, and sometimes more
so than Costa Rica's Central American neighbors. Although
skeptical of significant collaboration with Havana, Stagno
explained that Costa Rica had worked with Cuba on select
multilateral issues in the past, and hoped to continue to do
so in the Rio Group. "Better to have Cuba in, than out," he
stressed.
¶9. (C) VENEZUELA (PETROCARIBE): Solano confirmed that Costa
Rica still intended to join Petrocaribe during the
organization's next ministerial, although the urgency had
diminished with the drop in oil prices. Given the cyclical
nature of petroleum price fluctuations, however, it is better
in the GOCR's view to lock in the low-interest Petrocaribe
arrangement now, than to have to scramble for it later,
according to Solano. (He and key legislators who also met
with Wolfe confirmed that the National Assembly would have to
approve the Petrocaribe deal. This could further slow
accession.)
¶10. (SBU) SUMMITS AND MINISTERIALS: On Pathways, Costa Rica
"shares the USG's vision" of "expanding the frontiers of
trade," Solano told Wolfe. CAFTA is just one of the tools to
do this. The Arias administration retained its deep interest
in Asia-Pacific relations, he added, hoping to join APEC.
The crowded international meeting calendar in April-May
complicated GOCR attendance plans, but Solano said that Trade
Minister Ruiz would likely attend the Pathways Ministerial;
FM Stagno's plans had not been confirmed. Solano thought
that President Arias probably would attend the Summit of the
Americas (and this was confirmed by an official announcement
on February 16).
¶11. (SBU) With the Ambassador and DCM on February 19, FM
Stagno noted President Arias' planned attendance at the SoA,
and wryly asked how the White House would handle "32 requests
for bilaterals" with POTUS. Stagno also evinced surprise
that the new US Administration was continuing the Pathways
process. The Ambassador and DCM stressed the continued USG
commitment to Pathways, and encouraged Stagno and Ruiz to
attend.
¶12. (C) OTHER HEADLINES: Solano also made the following brief
observations to Deputy Director Wolfe:
-- The UNSC: Important enough to Costa Rican foreign policy
objectives, even beyond the Arias administration, that the
GOCR was considering running again for a non-permanent seat
in 2012;
-- Colombia: Costa Rica enjoyed outstanding relations with
Colombia, but President Uribe would generate a serious
"credibility" problem for his country if he pressed to remain
in office another term. Latin America needed not only
positive examples of democratic governance, but also of
democratic transition;
-- El Salvador: The GOCR was less concerned about "centrist"
FMLN presidential candidate Mauricio Funes than about his
party, which might push him far to the left, once in office.
This could upset the current political "equilibrium" in
Central America;
-- Honduras: The Zelaya administration may have started off
with the right intentions, but had now become unpredictable
political "jello"; and
-- Central America Overall: The GOCR's main worries (in rank
order) were thus Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and
Guatemala (because of the deteriorating security situation
there). Panama, "a complete partner," remains the bright
spot in the region, and Belize is Costa Rica's best ally in
SICA.
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Solano's tour d'horizon gave Wolfe an
unvarnished review of some of the concerns and arguments we
have heard in recent months. Solano was obviously reflecting
his Minister's views, since Stagno covered so much of the
same ground eight days later with the Ambassador. The "more
Merida" refrain has been echoed consistently from President
Arias on down; we continue to believe, however, that Costa
Rica is in line to receive about as much assistance as it can
absorb effectively. The continuing warming with Panama may
provide additional opportunities for CN and other law
enforcement-related cooperation. Neither Costa Ricans nor
Panamanians consider themselves fully part of Central
America, and that self-styled sense of "uniqueness" may
actually draw the two countries closer together on some
issues. For the record, however, we have to differ with
Solano on border cooperation. The border with Panama may be
friendlier, but the only "hard" border crossing in the region
is at Penas Blancas, with Nicaragua, where law enforcement
units cooperate fairly well together, even if the two
governments do not.
CIANCHETTE