

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09STOCKHOLM552, NEW SWEDISH DEFENSE PRIORITIES: SWEDEN PUTS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09STOCKHOLM552.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STOCKHOLM552 | 2009-08-26 16:04 | 2010-12-02 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Stockholm |
Appears in these articles: http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/usa-bekraftar-svensk-natokoppling_5764589.svd |
VZCZCXRO1791
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0552/01 2381643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261643Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4668
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000552
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2019
TAGS: KPKO KVIR MARR NATO PREL EUN SW
SUBJECT: NEW SWEDISH DEFENSE PRIORITIES: SWEDEN PUTS
NEUTRALITY IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and
NATO Policy (DASD) James Townsend met with Ministry of
Defense (MoD) Director General for Political Affairs Johan
Raeder for bilateral defense consultations (BDCs) on July
17-18, the first such talks of what is expected to be an
annual event. Townsend also met with Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Director for Security Policy Nils Daag and with
MoD State Secretary Hakan Jevrell (the number two at MoD).
The BDCs focused on the new Swedish Defense Bill and explored
the possibility of expanding the level of U.S.-Sweden
defense-to-defense dialogue. The new Defense Bill ends
conscription, changing Swedish contingency planning from a
large force deployable in one to three years to a small
all-volunteer force deployable within a week to six months.
In a significant break with the past, it also changes Swedish
defense priorities, focusing on international threats to
Swedish sovereignty and regional security, not just threats
to its territorial integrity. In addition, Sweden's changing
security policy entails that any attack in the region would
be viewed as affecting Sweden too, and Sweden "will not
remain passive" in such an event. Raeder noted that the new
Defense Bill will be implemented in the 2010-14 time frame
with all changes to be completed by 2017.
¶2. (C) Daag and DASD Townsend discussed Afghanistan, with
Daag noting that for the foreseeable future most of the
increased EU activity in Afghanistan would be on the
civilian, not the military side. Jevrell expressed a desire
to address NATO-EU relations during the Swedish EU
Presidency, and views Afghanistan as an opportunity to expand
NATO-EU cooperation. Raeder argued for increased U.S.-Sweden
dialogue on Russia, as "one must understand Russia" to
understand defense issues in the Baltic Sea. End Summary.
U.S.-Swedish Defense Dialogue
-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Dialogue between U.S. and Swedish defense ministries
had been at a more strategic level in the 1990s, focusing on
topics like the Balkans and the Baltics, MFA Director Daag
noted. However, in recent years it had become "more
practical," dealing with procurement and defense trade
issues. Strategic talks remain important too, he implied.
While noting the criticism that the EU has not been doing
enough on major challenges like Afghanistan, Daag said that
it is important to remember that the EU,s European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) only began eight years ago. Sweden
would work to increase EU participation in Afghanistan during
its Presidency, he stated.
¶4. (C) MOD Director General Raeder commented that it would be
quite helpful politically if the United States were to
consult with Sweden on issues related to the Baltics,
Afghanistan, and Russia. Such bilateral cooperation
strengthens the legitimacy of GOS policy positions. Sweden
views itself as among the most stable partners in Afghanistan
and needs USG recognition of that to sustain the commitment
politically.
New Defense Posture
-------------------
¶5. (C) On June 16, Parliament passed the new Defense Bill.
The bill was initially scheduled for Parliamentary action
last year, but it was delayed after the Russian invasion of
Georgia. This extra time allowed security experts to review
the strategic assessments underpinning the conclusions in the
bill and to analyze Swedish needs for future contingencies.
The experts concluded that "a clear ability to rapidly deploy
forces" was essential, and that Sweden's current defense
capabilities--putting tens of thousands of troops into the
field one to three years after a mobilization decision is
made--was "obsolete." Instead, Sweden needs forces readily
available within one week to half a year, Raeder told DASD
Townsend. Due to this new posture, the Government of Sweden
has decided to take the controversial step to end
conscription and move to an all-volunteer force.
¶6. (C) Regarding Sweden's changing security policy, Raeder
underscored the new declaration of solidarity Sweden has
made: "we cannot foresee that a military attack would be
directed only at Sweden." Rather, aggression in the region
would affect more than one country. Therefore, "we will view
any attack in the region as affecting us too. If Denmark,
for example, were attacked, then Sweden will not remain
passive," he said. Similarly, if Turkey were to join the EU,
Sweden's policy is now that it could not
remain passive if Turkey were attacked; "of course, what we
STOCKHOLM 00000552 002 OF 002
can do there is different from what we can do here in our
region," Raeder said. Given these new policies of
solidarity, Sweden must be prepared to give and receive
military assistance.
¶7. (C) Swedish security experts also concluded that the
military material supply system needs to be more responsive.
Sweden can no longer afford to develop all defense systems by
itself; instead, it will need to buy more products "off the
shelf," including from other countries. "We will develop it
if we cannot find it overseas, but our first priority will be
to look in the international market," Raeder said, in a
marked departure from the postwar symbiosis between defense
industries and the military.
Changing Priorities
-------------------
¶8. (C) Sweden's new priorities for the armed forces have not
been discussed publicly, Raeder said. For years, Swedish
military forces were directed to: defend Sweden; uphold
Sweden's territorial integrity; engage in peacekeeping; and
support civil society in times of crisis. Under the new
policy, participation in peacekeeping operations obliges
Swedish forces to be ready to conduct operations in Sweden,
its region, and outside of its region. Protection of Sweden
has been extended beyond defending its territorial integrity,
to encompass national sovereignty as well, which can include
national sovereign rights outside of Swedish territory.
Raeder said "we now understand that our interests do not stop
at our national borders. Instead of protecting our ships
only in our waters, we now must be able to protect sea lines
of communication. We want armed forces that can conduct
operations nationally or internationally in support of our
sovereign rights." Raeder noted that the new Defense Bill
will be implemented in the 2010-14 time frame with all
changes to be completed by 2017.
EU and Afghanistan
------------------
¶9. (C) MFA Director Daag indicated that for the foreseeable
future most of the increased EU activity in Afghanistan would
be in the civilian activities. He noted that it is important
to put the "R" (reconstruction) back into "PRT" (Provincial
Reconstruction Team). Daag also raised the growing
importance of explaining to the Swedish public why Swedish
troops are patrolling in Afghanistan. "It must be clear that
what happens there affects us here," he said. Jevrell noted
that Sweden was "impressed" by the renewed American efforts
in Afghanistan, but conceded that many EU agencies were
skeptical of the ability of the U.S. to do the "civil side"
well. He agreed, however, that Afghanistan is an opportunity
to expand the NATO-EU partnership.
Russia
------
¶10. (C) Raeder said that "to understand the High North and
issues in the Baltic Sea (the U.S.) has to understand
Russia." He noted that, "for (Sweden), Russia is always
present." Raeder said that Sweden wants expanded dialogue
with the USG on Russia, "to share our views about what's
happening there." Sweden assesses that Russia has lowered
the threshold to use violence, though Moscow understands that
the Caucasus are not the Baltics. Jevrell noted that
different Nordic countries have different views on Russia,
conceding that there is a vigorous debate in Sweden on
Russia's regional role and intentions.
Nordic Solidarity
-----------------
¶11. (C) Peter Gothe, MoD Deputy Director-General and Head of
Department for Security and International Affairs, noted that
the Nordic foreign ministers have discussed military
solidarity, but their declaration was weaker than what the
Swedish MoD had hoped for. Denmark and Norway were hesitant
to go further, out of concern for their NATO obligations,
whereas the Finns were more positive. In reply to DASD
Townsend's question about why the Nordic nations felt the
need to issue a solidarity declaration now, Raeder explained
that the Nordic solidarity declaration arose from joint
defense planning, "which shows real intent, even more than
political statements."
¶12. (U) DASD Townsend has approved this cable.
BARZUN