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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06HELSINKI733, TFLEO1: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES LEBANON CRISIS WITH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06HELSINKI733 | 2006-07-31 15:03 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO5998
PP RUEHAG
DE RUEHHE #0733/01 2121545
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311545Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2229
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4628
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0245
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000733
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/NB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MEPP EUN FI
SUBJECT: TFLEO1: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES LEBANON CRISIS WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER TUOMIOJA
Classified By: Poloff David Allen Schlaefer for Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Ware met with Finland's Foreign
Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, on July 31. Tuomioja said that his
just-completed trip to the Middle-east confirmed his view
that Israel could not achieve its military goals, and that an
immediate cease-fire followed by a comprehensive settlement
along the lines of UNSCR 1559 were essential. Tuomioja
called the Rome Conference a success, and indicated that the
EU was poised to move quickly on plans for an international
stabilization force once a cease-fire was in place. France,
Spain, and Italy had agreed to contribute significant forces
to the proposed new UN mission. Tuomioja also said that
Damascus has indicated it was ready to help defuse the
crisis, perhaps by agreeing to the removal of Hizballah's
large rockets and launchers to Syria where they can be
monitored and neutralized. The Ambassador expressed regret
that Tuomioja had made offensive remarks in a Finnish news
magazine about American concern for Lebanese civilian
casualties; Tuomioja apologized for the remarks, stating that
he had been caught off-guard by reporters and did not mean to
imply any lack of American concern for the tragedy in
Lebanon. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Tuomioja told Ambassador Ware that he has been very
affected by his trip to the region last week. He said that
the suffering in Israel, Lebanon, and Gaza was
"extraordinary," and that a comprehensive solution was
imperative. He had met with myriad senior Israeli officials
and tried to correct any misinterpretation that Tel Aviv had
carte blanche from the international community to continue
offensive operations for another two to five weeks. Tuomioja
opined that although he was no military expert, he had to
believe that Israel would not (and could not) achieve its
military goals, and that a political solution was necessary.
Moreover, he feared that each new errant missile or bomb only
generated more sympathy in the Arab street for Hizballah and
Muslim extremism, and that moderate Arab leaders in the
region were increasingly anxious about this. The FM said
that he was displeased with media coverage of the Rome
Conference. In his opinion, it was not a failure, but useful
because "we focused on all the things that we needed to in
any case," and laid the groundwork for the meetings that were
taking place in New York and Brussels this week. Tuomioja
thanked the Ambassador for the important role the Secretary
had played.
¶3. (C) The Ambassador expressed condolences for death of
the Finnish peacekeeper in Lebanon, and then addressed
preparations for the Extraordinary Meeting of the General
Affairs and External Relations Council tomorrow in Brussels.
She agreed with Tuomioja about the efficacy of the Rome
Conference, and emphasized the broad agreement in Rome that
any cease-fire must be permanent and sustainable; it is
important that the cycle of violence be broken, and that any
agreement must include the disarming of Hizballah. If it
doesn't, the cycle will continue, and any cease-fire brokered
today would only be broken again in the near future, with
further civilian suffering and tragedy on all sides. Any
comprehensive settlement must address this, and incorporate
actions, not mere words. Citing the President's and
Secretary's expressions of concern for the suffering of the
SIPDIS
Lebanese people, the Ambassador reiterated U.S. regret for
the loss of civilian lives in both Lebanon and Israel. She
said the U.S. was looking forward to discussing the
composition of an international stabilization force with our
EU partners and asked the FM what his views on such a force
were.
¶4. (C) The FM agreed with the Ambassador that any lasting
settlement should be in line with UNSCR 1559; but he opined
that the civilian tragedy unfolding in Lebanon was such that
it was necessary to call for an immediate cease-fire first.
The details of any comprehensive settlement would be
difficult to negotiate, but the first step in resolving the
crisis was to stop the immediate violence, and that there was
broad agreement within the EU on this. Tuomioja remarked
that while it was impossible to physically eliminate
Hizballah, the group could be neutralized. Neither Syria nor
Iran had any interest in the current situation continuing or
escalating; in fact, the EU had "indications" that Damascus
was looking for an opportunity to help defuse the crisis,
perhaps by pressuring Hizballah to move its heavy missiles
and launchers into Syria where they could be effectively
controlled and further provocations stopped. The FM said
that he was encouraged by the Secretary's remarks that she
HELSINKI 00000733 002 OF 002
was hopeful that a cease-fire could be brokered by the end of
the week. He also repeatedly emphasized that any lasting
solution for Lebanon had to include Gaza as well.
¶5. (C) On the international stabilization force, Tuomioja
said that he had seen estimates of the amount of troops
needed ranging from 10,000 to 15,000; if indeed close to
20,000 troops are needed, it may be difficult to find them.
France, Spain, and Italy have indicated willingness to
contribute significant "battle-ready" forces. Turkey will
also likely contribute troops, but Tuomioja believed it
unlikely that Egypt or any other Arab country would
participate, although Indonesia and other non-Arab Muslim
countries might. Germany (due to historic sensitivities) and
the US and UK (due to political and security realities) could
not play leading roles in the stabilization force, and this
hurt the international community's ability to put a solid
force together. The FM said that it was imperative for the
force's credibility that it be a new UN mission (not UNIFIL),
and that the troops be properly equipped and trained to
defend themselves; EU publics should realize the danger
involved in the operation and the real possibility of further
casualties.
¶6. (C) The Ambassador then turned to media reports (first
reported in the Finnish news magazine Suomen Kuvalehti and
subsequently picked up by Reuters) that Tuomioja had alleged
that Americans were less worried about the fate of Lebanese
civilians than Europeans were. She said that the remarks
saddened and offended her, reminding the FM that more than
5000 Americans have died in the Global War on Terror. There
are also more than 3 million Americans of Lebanese ancestry,
and while the suffering of any people is abhorrent to the
U.S., the tragedy in Lebanon is particularly difficult for
Americans to countenance. Tuomioja apologized for the
remarks, stating that he had been taken by surprise by the
reporter's question and that the comments as published were
not what he intended or wished to say; nor had be been given
a promised opportunity to edit the story, during which he
would have removed the statement. The Ambassador told him
that the international media would now focus on every word.
¶7. (C) Comment: Tuomioja suggested that the EU is poised
to move quickly on the stabilization force once a cease-fire
is in place; but he also clearly indicated that finding
enough troops to flesh out the mission will likely be a
significant problem given limited EU capabilities. On his
remarks to the media, Tuomioja was apparently somewhat
distraught that his poorly chosen words were an issue at a
time when the US and EU needed to work together to solve an
emergent crisis. However, his long history of off-the-cuff
gaffes and rhetorical stumbles, as well as the lack of
staffing at senior levels in Finland's MFA, suggest he may
need help growing into the role of foreign minister of the EU
President country. Post recommends that senior EU officials
need to remind the foreign minister that his remarks will now
be interpreted as having been vetted by all member states.
¶8. (C) Comment, cont.: Within hours of the Tuomioja
meeting, the Ambassador saw Finland's Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs at a reception. The U/S said
that (please protect) Tuomioja, who has been Finland's
foreign minister for over 6 years, had just advised his
senior staff that he will not continue as FM after next
year's general election. End Comment.
WARE