

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07PARIS3237, FRENCH MFA PUTS SARKOZY'S JULY 10-11 NORTH AFRICA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07PARIS3237.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07PARIS3237 | 2007-07-31 14:02 | 2011-02-21 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170211/tunisie-wikileaks-portrait-dune-diplomatie-francaise-soumise-au-regime- |
VZCZCXRO6992
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #3237/01 2121431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311431Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9233
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 003237
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER PBTS ETRD FR AG TU MO
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA PUTS SARKOZY'S JULY 10-11 NORTH AFRICA
TRIP IN CONTEXT
REF: A. (A) TUNIS 949
¶B. (B) ALGIERS 1004
¶C. (C) RABAT 1128
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, for reas
ons 1.4. (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: President Sarkozy's first visit outside
Europe July 10-11 to Algeria and Tunisia underscored his
determination to proceed with his still vague Mediterranean
Union initiative, establish his own relationships with the
leaders in those countries, and pave the way for state visits
in 2007 and 2008. Neither stop yielded much in the way of
""deliverables."" This was most apparent in Algeria, where
images of Bouteflika's warm reception reportedly contrasted
with disagreements over Sarkozy's refusal to atone publicly
for the sins of France's colonial rule. Both sides agreed to
suspend further work on a treaty of friendship started under
President Chirac. An agreement on diplomatic visas
contrasted with disappointment over a bilateral accord on
civilian nuclear development and a lukewarm reception to the
Mediterranean Union idea. In Tunisia, Sarkozy dealt with the
sensitive issue of human rights himself in private meetings
and limited press statements even at the risk of sending a
mixed message in terms of his break with his more tolerant
predecessor. Tunisian leaders voiced greater enthusiasm for
the Mediterranean Union, which, according to our MFA
interlocutors, reflects profound unhappiness over the
Barcelona Process. The GOF was unhappy about Morocco's
last-minute cancellation of what would have been the third
leg of the North African tour but plans to proceed with a
state visit there in October. End summary
¶2. (C) We spoke recently to the French MFA's Algeria and
Tunisia/Libya desk officers about President Sarkozy's July
10-11 visits. As noted in refs A and B, the visit was more
of a symbolic opportunity to get to know the respective
leaders and lay down some preliminary markers for formal
state visits to follow in late 2007 and possibly early 2008.
The much ballyhooed but little understood Mediterranean Union
idea also featured in the discussions both to ensure the
leaders had some conception of the proposal as well as
understood Sarkozy's personal commitment to implementing his
still inchoate vision of what France hopes will be an
important regional grouping.
Algeria: Forget the Past -- Please
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) Algeria desk officer Jay Dharmadhikari provided an
elaborate overview of the framework in which France places
its bilateral relationship with Algeria, stressing how it is
divided into consular (especially visas), security,
economic/commercial, and political dossiers. In the context
of the visit, however, he stressed that Presidents Sarkozy
and Bouteflika got into little detail and did not accomplish
a great deal in terms of concrete deliverables.
--Visas: As noted in ref B, Paris eased visa restrictions
for diplomatic passport holders but insisted on holding the
line for everyone else (including ""service"" passport holders
who include military and security as well as other government
personnel). France has very little leeway, he explained,
vis-a-vis the other Schengen partners, which always rankles
the Algerians. The most France could do was promise to
""study"" the matter further.
--France's colonial legacy/treaty of friendship: An
essential point in Sarkozy's visit to Algiers was repeating
as president his contention that France and Algeria needed to
put the past behind them as much as possible. This meant no
French ""repentance"" for past sins dating back to the colonial
period. Dharmadhikari underscored that Bouteflika and other
Algerians expressed their view that France should not expect
to wipe the slate clean and move on. Although French media
made much of the reputed ""burial"" of what became in Chirac's
last two years a controversial draft friendship treaty
between France and Algeria, Dharmadhikari said only that the
treaty is on indefinite hold and could be revived later
should conditions warrant. (Comment: We note that Sarkozy's
""no repentance"" line resurfaced in a speech he gave in Dakar
July 26 that, inter alia, urged all Africans to look beyond
their sense of grievance over the colonial past and focus on
the real problems that confront them today. End comment)
--Economic/commercial ties: One of France's longstanding
priorities with Algeria, according to Dharmadhikari, is
promoting commercial and investment ties. He complained,
however, that French businesses continue to have problems
with bureaucratic red tape and other institutional and
non-institutional barriers to conducting business. Reform,
PARIS 00003237 002 OF 003
especially where it applies to reviewing and revising
protectionist regulations and retooling inadequate judicial
mechanisms for dispute resolution, remains a slow and
uncertain process. When asked how much assistance France
provides to help Algeria in these and related fields (such as
assistance for WTO accession), Dharmadhikari demurred,
indicating that virtually all French assistance flows through
the EU so that aid is delivered multilaterally.
--Civilian nuclear development: Dharmadhikari acknowledged
that France did not get very far pushing its desire to sell
civilian nuclear equipment to Algeria on this trip. He
faulted inadequate preparation for the visit (presumably on
the Algerian side) more than Algerian disinterest in the
idea. Dharmadhikari noted our signature of an accord
recently with the Algerians and hoped that the USG and GOF
could consult formally about nuclear cooperation with Algeria.
--Western Sahara and Boutef's health: During the meeting
between the presidents, the emotional subject of France's
colonial legacy kept coming up along with the desire to
continue cooperating closely on security issues (primarily
terrorism). On the Western Sahara, Dharmadhikari stated that
Bouteflika complained about France's tilt in Morocco's favor
but Sarkozy refused to be drawn into a detailed discussion of
the subject and insisted the substance of French policy had
not fundamentally changed. Bouteflika seemed relatively
healthy and engaged, though not enough to alter Paris' view
that he will be lucky to survive to the end of his current
term in 2009.
--The Mediterranean Union idea, Dharmadhikari confirmed, did
not excite the Algerians. He characterized their reaction as
lukewarm but not dismissive. Dharmadhikari opined that
Algeria's reaction was based on a realistic calculation that
such a grouping made no sense and would not work as long as
Moroccan/Algerian ties were so antagonistic. Dharmadhikari
further thought that Algeria was being true to its tendency
not to favor any gathering or international initiative that
it was neither leading nor instigating.
--Reinforcing the relationship's ""political direction:"" One
positive outcome from the visit Dharmadhikari cited was
agreement by the two presidents that the intergovernmental
mechanisms handling the details of the bilateral relationship
needed to be reinforced. Specifically, the two sides agreed
that their respective prime ministers would oversee the work
of their ministries and thus give a political aspect to the
functional work they undertook. This should provide better
accountability and ensure that the state visit expected in
November truly delivers concrete results (such as an
agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation).
Tunisia: All Smiles and Some Nervousness
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Tunisia/Libya desk officer Christian Reigneaud had a
less stressful time preparing Sarkozy's visit to Tunis. The
Tunisians, he said, were warm and there were almost no
contentious issues to discuss. Human rights was the
exception, and in that sense the French delegation quickly
picked up Tunisian nervousness about how Sarkozy, as opposed
to Chirac, would deal with them. In the end, Reigneaud
explained, Sarkozy exercised discretion in confining his most
critical comments on human rights to his one-on-one with Ben
Ali. Reigneaud claimed that Sarkozy did discuss specific
cases, including the subsequently released dissident lawyer
Mohammed Abbou. (Comment: French newspapers reporting
Abbou's release referred to reports that Sarkozy had raised
his specific case while in Tunis. Interestingly, and perhaps
partly because of the overwhelming and breathless coverage of
France's role in the ""Bulgarian medics"" case and Sarkozy's
visit to Libya, the GOF did not seek credit for Abbou's
release. End comment) The general tenor of Sarkozy's
general talking points to Ben Ali, Reigneaud assured us, were
along the lines of ""we do not want to see anything threaten
Tunisia's internal stability but believe that Tunisia must be
confident enough of its economic and social strengths to open
up.""
¶5. (C/NF) When asked about the one-on-one that Sarkozy had
with Ben Ali, Reigneaud replied that it concerned problems
France has encountered in its bilateral security cooperation.
Tunisia had been upset about French security service contact
with a prominent Tunisian dissident in exile (NFI) and
believed French intelligence had provided support for his
criticisms of Ben Ali and his family from France. Sarkozy
set the record straight, and France was hoping this important
liaison relationship, focused heavily on terrorism, would get
back on track.
PARIS 00003237 003 OF 003
¶6. (C) By contrast with the Algerians, Reigneaud described
the Tunisians as ""ecstatic"" about the Mediterranean Union
concept. This reflects disappointment with the Barcelona
process, he explained, and possibly the desire to find a more
solid anchor working principally with France than the EU to
promote regional cooperation. Anything that would reduce the
scope for the Nordics and other northern Europeans to
complain about human rights was also something Tunisia
welcomed.
¶7. (C) As with Algeria, the French are looking ahead to a
yet-to-be finalized state visit in late 2007/early 2008.
Reigneaud said the well-established bilateral commissions
would start working on deliverables, and he thought Prime
Minister Fillon and/or FM Kouchner would visit in the not too
distant future.
Morocco: The Stop Not Made
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Dharmadhikari and Reigneaud confirmed the irritation
at senior levels of the GOF over Morocco's request that
Sarkozy not include Rabat in this tour. They gave all the
reasons cited in ref C, most of which have come out in the
French media. The last-minute nature of the cancellation was
more irritating than the cancellation itself, according to
our interlocutors. Dharmadhikari, who handles the Western
Sahara portfolio, said the Moroccan decision reflected the
sort of impulsive and arbitrary style the GOF has gotten used
to from King Mohammed. It would have no long-term effects on
that bilateral relationship, but it did serve as a firm
reminder of the sensitivities France has to balance between
Morocco and Algeria.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Sarkozy's choice of the Maghreb as his first
non-European trip as president surprised many but has been
explained away by recalling that his desire to establish a
Mediterranean Union was one of the specific things Sarkozy
referred to in his statement immediately after being elected.
Even though the union still seems more of an idea Sarkozy
has been nursing for some time, and not a carefully
thought-out vision (we are still not sure where this
initiative is being handled bureaucratically in the GOF), he
clearly wanted to be seen taking the concept to those leaders
whose help he needs to bring it to life. Morocco's
last-minute cancellation, therefore, was a setback to
Sarkozy's desire to be seen moving quickly to make good on
one of his initiatives.
¶10. (C) In Algeria, the reality behind the smiles and warm
interaction between Bouteflika and Sarkozy in front of the
cameras was probably sobering but important. Sarkozy likely
appreciates how much he has to make up for in terms of the
damage done to France's ties with Algeria over the past two
years. Nevertheless, Sarkozy's determination to look to the
future and not dwell on the sins of France's colonial past
cannot have gone over well with a veteran of the Algerian
liberation struggle like Bouteflika. The state visit should
reveal whether the two leaders' generational difference over
this symbolic point translates into substantive obstacles to
the better ties both say they want. In Tunisia, Sarkozy
wanted to mark a break from the heavily personalized and much
criticized relationship Chirac had with Ben Ali. His desire
to keep the most contentious part of the bilateral
relationship away from public view, however, inadvertently
sent the wrong signal. His delegation snubbed Tunisia's
independent civil society, and his state secretary for human
rights was forced to endure ridicule in the French media for
having been invisible in Tunis and only meeting the head of a
Tunisian human rights group in Paris after the visit. Ben
Ali and his cohorts, on the other hand, were probably
relieved to have gotten off as lightly as they did and
probably hope that the schizophrenia of the later Chirac
years (Douste-Blazy reputedly despised and would not visit
Tunisia for its human rights record) will not be repeated.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
PEKALA