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Viewing cable 09SEOUL672, MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09SEOUL672 | 2009-04-27 06:06 | 2010-11-30 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Seoul |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0672/01 1170635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270635Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4147
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5773
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9637
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5865
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1817
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4294
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of
the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile
military rhetoric over the last several months are related to
the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the
DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX A second priority was to achieve improved
Relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only
potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that the
Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level
announcements over the past several months (such as the March
8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the
four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen
since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military
asserting control over the country, because the military
could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the
Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a
phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show
that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had
to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a
law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic
disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression."
There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the
DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and
wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down
this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG
was not particularly worried about the specific threats to
the South contained in the statements because they saw the
statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any
case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were
to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
¶3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim
Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008
stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed
stronger leadership." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that before the stroke, KJI
was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he
suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become
obsessed with creating political stability to allow an
orderly succession, though XXXXXXXXXXXX did not claim to know who was
next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch
the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of
KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the
renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that
would pave the way for succession.
¶4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from
8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired
National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first
established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had
since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had
the lead on succession, XXXXXXXXXXXX believed. KJI brother-in-law
Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for
succession preparation, not only because he was married to
KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim
Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having
effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall
2008 recovery period.
¶5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National
Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh
Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative
terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who XXXXXXXXXXXX
thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and
special operations institutions under his control at NDC.
One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department,
which Oh has headed since 1989. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also referred to an
April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that
"Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External
Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been
moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control,
saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which
formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during
the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming
more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the
South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the
succession period. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed that changes to the
DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would
also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to
frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a
"strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK
authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically
and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic
side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
¶6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order
meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed
conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well
aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and
would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK
knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would
prevent it from achieving surprise, so XXXXXXXXXXXX was reassured that
no direct military provocation was imminent.
-----------------------
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the
above situation, XXXXXXXXXXXX answered indirectly, saying that the
main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to
maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was
the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S.,
because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security
and economic problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this push for improved
relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S.
as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities'
agenda. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement
with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance
for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration
had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress;
and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second
chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming
for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to
create the need for dialogue.
¶8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what
happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX was convinced that
the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while
seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his
recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even
keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating
further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about
land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was
potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached
carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative
and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal
steps. Like other ROKG officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the need
for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues
related to North Korea.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that China would seek to prevent
U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a
smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S.,
China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK
nuclear weapon test.
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Mt. Kumgang
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¶10. (C) As an aside, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented on the July 2008 shooting
death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that
KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact
with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed,
so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten
discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those
exercise periods.
STEPHENS