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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON157, REQUEST FROM AMBASSADOR SWINDELLS FOR INTERAGENCY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05WELLINGTON157 | 2005-02-22 20:08 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Wellington |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000157
SIPDIS
NOFORN
FOR EAP/FO SCHRIVER; EAP/ANP KRAWITZ, ALLEGRA AND RAMSEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV NZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FROM AMBASSADOR SWINDELLS FOR INTERAGENCY
REVIEW
REF: WELLINGTON 56 (NODIS)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES J. SWINDELLS,
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (S/NOFORN) After the horrific earthquake and tsunami in
our region, there are far weightier U.S. foreign policy issues
to manage in Asia than our relationship with New Zealand.
But
I am writing to request that U.S. Government agencies
nevertheless conduct a quick review of our policies here,
specifically with regards to New Zealand's anti-nuclear
legislation. Conducting a review at this time could pay off,
as I believe that this country's upcoming elections and its
desire for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United
States
make 2005 the best opportunity we have had in twenty years to
convince New Zealand to reconsider its ban on
nuclear-propelled
vessels. At the very least, a review would develop a clear,
comprehensive, and consistent message to set the stage for
the
next four years of the Administration as well as the new
Government of New Zealand.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
A review should examine what we want from the relationship
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶2. (S/NOFORN) The nuclear ban has since its inception
colored
and limited our relationship with New Zealand. Over time,
the
United States has lifted some of its limits on bilateral
military and intelligence cooperation we imposed after the
ban was implemented in 1984. Our sense is that we have gone
as far as we can go on our own. A review should determine,
first and foremost, whether we should accept this status quo,
and if so, whether we should broaden the relationship in
other
ways or make it clear to New Zealand that no deepening of
ties are possible if the ban remains in place. And we must
decide how best to convey our message.
¶3. (S/NOFORN) As of now, New Zealand officials effectively
determine the issues for discussion in our bilateral
relationship. An example is their aggressive "forum
shopping"
among USG agencies and Congress to press for a US-New Zealand
FTA. At the same time, these officials argue that the
nuclear
issue is too sensitive even to discuss; that as the world's
only superpower we should just get over it and stop
"bullying"
this small country. The past is the past, they say. The
problem is, this is not about the past. Were other countries
to adopt policies similar to New Zealand's and forbid our
nuclear-powered ships to enter their ports, our efforts to
create a more mobile military would be seriously impaired
in Asia and beyond.
¶4. (S/NOFORN) Other red herring arguments that New Zealand
officials use to keep the nuclear issue off the table can be
similarly rebutted. For example, when I recently raised the
ban with Foreign Minister Goff, he argued that the New
Zealand
government is unable to revisit its nuclear policy because
the
public "will know we are only doing it because you asked us
to." This message makes painfully clear that the government
does not consider a U.S. request in itself a reason for
taking
action, a stance that both springs from and feeds into
deepening anti-Americanism here.
¶5. (S/NOFORN) A Foreign Ministry staffer later clarified
that Mr. Goff really meant that the public would oppose any
"bullying" from the United States on this issue. Those of us
familiar with New Zealand know that in this context "to
bully"
means "to publicly call for." But if the government has
already said publicly and privately it will not conduct any
review of the ban, what alternative remains for us if not an
overt call for them to reconsider?
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
A review should examine the cost to us and others of
New Zealand's Nuclear Ban and its declining
willingness/ability to work with us
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶6. (S/NOFORN) Other countries in the region, notably Japan
and Australia, have invested considerable political capital
in their alliance with the United States and do not bar our
nuclear-powered vessels despite formal anti-nuclear policies
and significant domestic opposition. We should not reward
our Kiwi friends at the cost of undercutting these important
allies. They and others in the region -- even tiny Fiji --
also contribute far more to support our military capabilities
around the world than does New Zealand.
¶7. (S/NOFORN) New Zealand's nuclear ban is concurrent with a
20-year failure to invest adequately in its military
infrastructure. In just the latest example, both of the
New Zealand Air Force C-130 aircraft that the government
generously sent to help carry aid and personnel to tsunami
victims broke down and were forced to undergo repairs before
resuming operations. While New Zealand officials point
proudly
to the large numbers of peacekeeping and other operations in
which their military participate, in most cases these
deployments consist of one or two liaison officers.
New Zealand benefits from our deterrence as much as do
others in the region, yet has been unwilling to be anything
approaching a true partner in the effort.
¶8. (S/NOFORN) In fact, the policies that have caused
New Zealand to avoid pulling its weight internationally
reflect ideological drift and lack of vision. The government
articulates no clear definition of non-economic foreign
policy
interests other than a stated commitment to international
organizations and peacekeeping, especially in the region.
Even on these stated interests, New Zealand's practical
contributions often fall short of the mark.
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
A review should examine whether and how to raise our desire
for a review of the nuclear ban
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶9. (S/NOFORN) I simply do not consider credible New Zealand
officials' insistence that the public will not tolerate any
discussion of a repeal of the ban. It is true that if you
asked them today, a majority of New Zealanders probably would
oppose a reversal of the nuclear policy. But I have found
many senior citizens and younger Kiwis are actually open to
the idea. To the extent others are not, it is largely
because
the Government has for its own ideological and political
reasons been unwilling to discuss the issue honestly.
¶10. (S/NOFORN) After U.S. aircraft carriers were called into
assistance after the recent tsunami, readers' letters to a
major local newspaper highlighted the fact that because of
the country's nuclear ban similar U.S. assistance would not
be possible here in the wake of a natural disaster. These
readers called for the ban to be lifted.
¶11. (S/NOFORN) In fact, there has been some preliminary
debate about the ban here. Two previous reviews -- one
commissioned by the National Party-led Government in 1992
and one by the National Party in early 1994 -- found there
was no scientific basis on which to bar nuclear-powered
vessels from New Zealand. As Dr. Andrew McEwan, the
country's
foremost nuclear scientist has pointed out in a recent book,
New Zealand's "nuclear free" status is something of a
fiction,
given that there are about 2500 importations of nuclear
reactor-produced material into New Zealand each year for
x-rays, radiation treatments, and other purposes. (This
does not include imports of things such as smoke detectors
and certain watches that also contain radioactive materials.)
¶12. (S/NOFORN) Although the National Party has been the only
party to examine seriously the possibility of ending the
country's nuclear ban, in my view Labour is best placed to
reverse the legislation. When in power in the '90s, National
failed to take any action on the ban, preferring not to spend
political capital to do so. As an opposition party, they can
do even less. At this time, polls continue to show Labour as
the likely victor in the general election that will probably
be held this September. But the real reason we should urge
the Labour government to reexamine the ban is that, as the
original authors of the law, it is their party that would be
most likely to win a public mandate to change it. Many of
the original players who created the ban in all its
inflexible
glory are in power today, including Prime Minister Clark.
¶13. (S/NOFORN) The Prime Minister has shown that she can
push
through highly sensitive pieces of legislation. During my
time in New Zealand, she has carried the day on laws as
controversial as nationalization of the foreshore and seabed
and a Civil Union Bill. She has called for a review of the
country's constitution that could profoundly alter New
Zealand's relationship to the UK. All these issues created
heated debates and dominated the front pages, yet the
government prevailed throughout. In short, where this
Prime Minister has the will, she finds the way. In the
case of the nuclear ban, she does not have the will because
she does not think she needs to reopen this issue. I have
begun to include in my speeches a request that New Zealand
reconsider its policy, and I will continue to do so. But
only a move by the government in this direction is likely
to gain traction with the public.
¶14. (S/NOFORN) This election year may be the best time to
convince New Zealand officials it is in their interest to
reconsider the ban. Significantly, the Prime Minister and
her team have not hesitated to raise the nuclear issue
themselves, when stating publicly in implicit election
promises to local businesses that an FTA with the United
States
is inevitable and that New Zealand's bans on nuclear arms
and propulsion simply don't matter to us anymore. Indeed,
PM Clark made this link at a recent speech to the pro-FTA
U.S.-New Zealand Business Council. In this election year,
the Prime Minister and her cabinet doubtless also see a
U.S.-New Zealand FTA as a valuable means to counter criticism
from both the right and left that the government is
negotiating
FTAs primarily with developing countries (such as Thailand)
and
those who abuse human rights (notably China).
--------------------------------------------- ------
A review would enable us to consider what
New Zealand does contribute, and how long
even these small efforts can be sustained:
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶15. (S/NOFORN) As noted, I have stressed both in public and
in private to New Zealanders that the nuclear ban does still
matter to us. But frankly, messages from Washington to
New Zealand officials are not always consistent with this
long-term view. Policymakers have been understandably
focused
on soliciting New Zealand's cooperation in the war on
terrorism,
Iraq, World Trade Organization (WTO) talks, and other issues.
While these are all obviously of the greatest importance, our
failure to at the same time honestly tell New Zealand that
the
nuclear ban remains important to us has enabled New Zealand
officials to claim that the issue is irrelevant in light of
their other contributions. Meanwhile, they continue to
lobby heavily for an FTA, including through the New Zealand
Caucus that will be launched in the U.S. House of
Representatives next month.
¶16. (S/NOFORN) In their approaches to the Embassy, to
Administration officials, and the Congress, New Zealand
Government officials stress that because of their country's
efforts in areas of interest to us, New Zealand should be
considered for a trade agreement. We are likely to soon hear
that New Zealand is to extend its contribution to Operation
Enduring Freedom, for example. We are of course grateful for
all of New Zealand's contributions. But in my view
New Zealand has benefited already from its actions.
For example, New Zealand's own interest in WTO talks is
obvious, given the country's dependence on exports and its
low domestic trade barriers. Sending combat engineers to
Iraq has enabled the giant New Zealand dairy exporter,
Fonterra,
to bid on lucrative Iraq-related contracts. New Zealand and
U.S. troops in Afghanistan can participate in joint training
and exercises that we have not otherwise allowed since
New Zealand pulled out of ANZUS.
¶17. (S/NOFORN) I don't mean to imply that New Zealand has
participated in these efforts solely for its own gain. But
I believe that pushing them harder on the nuclear issue would
have little impact on New Zealand's already limited
willingness
to engage with us around the globe. The cost to us if
New Zealand were to pull out from these efforts would be
another thing an interagency review would need to consider.
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A review should examine what we could offer in return for a
credible review/lifting of New Zealand's nuclear ban:
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶18. (S/NOFORN) U.S. officials have strenuously avoided
linking New Zealand's proposal for an FTA with our desire
that the nuclear ban be ended. And indeed, the two are
linked only in the sense that if our countries are truly
friends, New Zealand should not expect it can press hard
for an FTA and prevent us from even mentioning the nuclear
ban. But in practical terms I have observed that our
preferences for FTA partners are often made along a continuum
of countries' economic and trade potential and our overall
foreign policy interests. Certainly, if there were
significant economic benefits I would strongly support a
U.S.-New Zealand FTA, and have told this to the government
here. An interagency review might consider whether it
would make sense to conduct a feasibility study for an
FTA if New Zealand removes its nuclear ban.
¶19. (S/NOFORN) We could also have a review to determine
what changes in language in the New Zealand legislation
would be enough to satisfy our concerns, as well as what
possible changes in our "neither confirm nor deny" policy
we might be willing to consider were the ban lifted.
The interagency group might also consider allowing a
non-nuclear naval ship visit to New Zealand, for example
to support our operations in Antarctica, if the government
announces a formal review of its nuclear policy. The
Prime Minister has long encouraged such a visit, but we
have rightfully resisted the invitation in light of the ban.
¶20. (S/NOFORN) We must be realistic. Even if New Zealand
lifted its nuclear ban, it will not return any time soon to
being the ally it once was. For example, political officials
here fear a loss of popular support if New Zealand returned
to ANZUS, and those at the senior levels worry about the
budgetary and personnel requirements needed to rejoin the
alliance. But New Zealand's agreement to take a second
look at its nuclear ban would at least open the door to
exploring where both sides want the relationship to go.
-----------
Conclusion:
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¶21. (S/NOFORN) These are just some of my ideas of what an
interagency review might accomplish, and what we should
be aiming to do here in New Zealand. I would very much
like to come to Washington and discuss this idea further,
ideally before the upcoming interagency review of the
Administration's FTA negotiating agenda for the next four
years. Please let me know if my staff and I can provide
any more information to you in the meantime.
¶22. (S/NOFORN) New Zealand may be small, but with a little
bit of time and teamwork, I think we can steer the bilateral
relationship in a direction that is more positive to U.S
interests. Now is the time to try.
Swindells