

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD70, IRAQI PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BAGHDAD70.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10BAGHDAD70 | 2010-01-11 15:03 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #0070/01 0111553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111553Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6076
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000070
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/I. NSC FOR PHEE AND VROOMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: IR IZ KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: IRAQI PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSS
IRAN-IRAQ BORDER DISPUTE, ELECTIONS, AND SECURITY WITH
CODEL MCCAIN
REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 3334
¶B. B) BAGHDAD 0028
Classified By: DCM ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Senators John McCain (R/AZ), Joseph Lieberman
(I/CT), John Barrasso (R/WY), and John Thune (R/SD) on
January 5, 2009 held meetings with Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to discuss the
recent Blackwater ruling, upcoming Iraqi national election,
and Iraq's regional relations. In separate meetings, both
Talabani and Abd al-Mahdi discussed the status of Iraqi
relations with Iran relative to the Fakkah oil field
incident. Additionally, Talabani commented on the
seriousness of recent demonstrations inside Iran and
cautioned the U.S. against showing public support for the
Iranian opposition, which could undermine their credibility.
For his part, Abd al-Mahdi discussed the need for Iraqi
elections to be seen as transparent and legitimate, and noted
the importance of a timely government formation period. With
regard to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, Abd
al-Mahdi acknowledged progress made in strengthening the
Iraqi Army, but stressed the importance of not overestimating
Iraq's capabilities. He called for the U.S. and Iraqi
governments to reassess the current security situation and
revise the security agreement accordingly after the new Iraqi
government is established. End Summary.
----------------------------------
REPERCUSSIONS OF BLACKWATER RULING
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) President Talabani remarked that he hoped the incident
would not affect the relationship between Iraq and the U.S.
and commented that even in Iraq, courts are independent and
sometimes issue decisions that those in the government do not
agree with, but such rulings must be obeyed regardless. The
Vice President stressed the importance of an appeal as the
Iraqi people are looking for justice. Abd al-Mahdi noted
that in a separate incident one of his personal guards was
killed by an intoxicated Blackwater employee.
----------------------------
THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER DISPUTE
----------------------------
¶3. (C) Abd al-Mahdi commented that Iraqi relations with Iran
are at a low point, noting that what the Iranians did in
Fakkah was a mistake. (Ref A) He said that both countries
acknowledge that the Fakkah oil well is in a disputed area,
because of the unclear border between Iran and Iraq, but he
believed the situation was returning to normal as evidenced
by the Iranians removing their flag from the field. The Vice
President stressed that because of Iraq's shared border with
Iran, it is very important to maintain good relations between
the two countries, just as the same is true for Iraqi
relations with Turkey and Syria. He believed that Iraq could
not risk its future by entering into a new conflict with
Iran. Abd al-Mahdi stated that Iraq cannot wage war against
its neighbors, and said that the more problems Iraq has with
its neighbors, the more they must negotiate to overcome those
problems.
¶4. (C) Talabani commented that the 1975 Algiers Agreement (on
border delineation) is the root of many problems surrounding
the Iran-Iraq border. The President commented that in some
places the Iranians are moving toward the border because of
what they see as laid out in the 1975 Agreement, but said
Qwhat they see as laid out in the 1975 Agreement, but said
that the Iraqis do not recognize the agreement because it was
formalized under the Saddam regime.
---------------------------------------------
TALABANI: U.S. SHOULD BE MINDFUL OF IMPACT OF SUPPORTING IRAN
OPPOSITION
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) When asked about the ongoing demonstrations in Iran
and whether such events pose a real threat to the Iranian
regime, Talabani said that the current demonstrations are
very serious and represent the division among the political
leaders and religious authorities trickling down to the
street level. The President commented that Iran has a
diverse population, with differences among all groups running
deep with a long history. He stressed that it was not that
the Iranian regime was weak, but rather that the opposing
side was strong. Talabani said that the Iranian opposition
included both experienced Iranian politicians, to include
Mousavi, Rafsanjani, and Karrubi, and important religious
figures. He also commented that whereas the demonstrations
at first were attacking Iranian President Ahmadinejad, they
have now shifted to being against Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Talabani said that the Iranian government feels threatened.
In response, Iran has threatened to use any force necessary,
and was presently trying to pass a law in the Parliament to
hang those found to be against the regime. Talabani also
commented that historically major leadership changes in Iran
begin in the main cities and spread throughout the country.
He opined that what is currently transpiring is reminiscent
of past major changes in Iran. However, he believed that
unlike in previous scenarios, the current regime is able to
threaten people without any fear of a third party stepping
in. Talabani said for example that the Shah was somewhat
tempered by his fear of the U.S. intervening, but that no
such moderating force presently exists.
¶6. (C) With regard to any possible show of U.S. support to
the Iranian people, Talabani cautioned that the U.S. must
consider how the Iranian regime could use a show of U.S.
solidarity toward the Iranian opposition to further label the
opposition as agents of the U.S.
¶7. (C) Referring to his conversations with Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad, Talabani said that the Syrians deny suicide
bombers enter Iraq via Syria and say they support Iraqi unity
and security. Talabani opined that certain parts of the
Syrian regime were supportive of such terrorists. Talabani
also commented that none of Iraq,s neighbors are happy about
Iraq's success and do not want a strong, united Iraq, as they
fear Iraq as a model of democracy in the region and Iraq,s
ability to assume its share of the oil market. However,
Talabani stated that regardless of the positions held by its
neighbors, Iraq will continue to advance in achieving its
goals.
--------------------------------------------- -----
ABD AL-MAHDI HINTS FASTER GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN 2010
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶8. (C) Adil Abd al-Mahdi in response to an inquiry into his
assessment of the upcoming Iraqi national election said that
he believed that elections are always good, especially in a
country working to move past a history of tyranny and
dictatorship and embrace democracy. He hoped to see a
transparent and legitimate election, free from foreign
interference, and noted that the provincial elections
demonstrated that Iraq is moving in the right direction with
this regard. The Vice President believed that holding a
successful national election would help to further stabilize
the Iraqi political system. He hoped that participation in
the election would be as high as that of previous elections,
but acknowledged that turnout could be somewhat less. Abd
al-Mahdi commented that the four-month delay in forming a
government following the previous national election was
damaging to Iraq and sent the wrong message to Iraq's
enemies. He noted that Iraqi blocs currently are engaged in
Qenemies. He noted that Iraqi blocs currently are engaged in
negotiations in an effort to minimize the length of the
government formation period.
¶9. (C) Abd al-Mahdi said he believed "popular mobilization"
was the best method to campaign for the national election,
whereby candidates get out to visit various neighborhoods and
go house to house engaging the Iraqi population. The Vice
President also commented that campaigning will utilize both
radio and television, and that during this campaign season
there would also be several debates. Abd al-Mahdi noted that
elections in 2010 will differ from the previous national
elections, in that the Iraqi people will vote for individuals
as opposed to lists, which he believed was a positive change
and would result in less polarization. Additionally, he
observed that there were good and respected names on the
candidate lists.
¶10. (C) When asked, Abd al-Mahdi acknowledged that he is a
contender for the prime ministership, but noted that as is
the case in all elections, the election outcome and alliances
formed would ultimately determine the next prime minister.
(Comment: It was evident that Abd al-Mahdi clearly remembers
the role that the U.S. Ambassador played in preventing him
from becoming Prime Minister in 2006 because of his ties to
Iran. End Comment.)
----------------------------------
TALABANI: SHIA LISTS WILL DOMINATE
----------------------------------
¶11. (C) President Talabani when queried as to his election
predictions said that he believed the winning bloc would
either be Maliki's State of Law or the Iraqi National
Alliance (INA), with Allawi's list coming third. Regarding
the Kurdish bloc, Talabani said that the PUK and KDP lists
will be united, but that all Kurdish parties will be working
to advance themselves. However, he stated that regardless of
election outcome, the Kurds will remain a united force in
Baghdad.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
ABD AL-MAHDI CAUTIONS AGAINST OVERESTIMATING IRAQI FORCES
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶12. (C) In response to an inquiry into concerns surrounding
the U.S. withdrawal and the readiness of the Iraqi Army (IA)
to fill that void, Abd al-Mahdi said that there are less
fears of this prospect than there were two years ago. The
Vice President acknowledged that there are good signs of
development in the IA, but said he thought all parties
overestimated progress made and said he would qualify the
current situation in Iraq differently than some of his
colleagues would. He said that two months ago others within
the GOI believed Al-Qa'ida was finished and argued for the
removal of T-walls, but that he believed Al-Qa'ida was not
finished, but rather would spread if left to its own devices.
Abd al-Mahdi believes the GOI and U.S. government must
reassess the current security situation in Iraq and the next
Iraqi government and the U.S. should revise the security
agreement accordingly, especially in light of recent attacks
targeting government buildings in the center of Baghdad.
¶13. (C) The Vice President said that logistically and
strategically we are winning the war, but that all parties
must remain aware that this reality could shift. Abd
al-Mahdi stressed that we should not "underestimate our enemy
or overestimate our forces." He said that with all of the
positive developments in Iraq, one can see a certain light at
the end of the tunnel, but that Iraq can do better in all
areas, from regional relations to countering terrorism.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
SECOND ROUND OF OIL BIDDING, ABSENCE OF U.S. COMPANIES
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶14. (C) President Talabani expressed disappointment that more
American companies did not participate in the second round of
oil biding in Iraq. Talabani said that for many years he has
encouraged President Bush, and now President Obama, to
support U.S. companies' investment in Iraq, noting that the
U.S. administration was always waiting for the Iraqi oil law
to be adopted by parliament prior to encouraging such
investment. (Ref B)
¶15. (U) CODEL McCain cleared this message.
HILL