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Viewing cable 07THEHAGUE1364, NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DASD FATA'S JULY 13 VISIT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07THEHAGUE1364 | 2007-07-19 10:10 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1364/01 2001031
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191031Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9844
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2677
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0292
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001364
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM, SCA
OSD FOR DASD DANIEL FATA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DASD FATA'S JULY 13 VISIT
T...
115924,7/19/2007 10:31,07THEHAGUE1364,"Embassy The Hague",
CONFIDENTIAL,07THEHAGUE1340,"VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1364/01 2001031
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191031Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9844
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2677
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0292
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001364
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM, SCA
OSD FOR DASD DANIEL FATA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: DASD FATA'S JULY 13 VISIT
TO THE HAGUE
REF: THE HAGUE 1340
Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: During his meetings with Dutch officials on
July 13, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European
and NATO Policy Daniel Fata discussed the Dutch decision on
whether to extend in some capacity its ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. Dutch officials were receptive to Fata's
suggestion of an ISAF ""campaign plan"" to better link Afghan
Government priorities with ISAF's Operations Plan. Dutch
officials expressed appreciation for the extension of U.S.
helicopter support to January 2008, and Fata stressed the
importance for the Dutch and other Allies to solve this
potential helicopter support shortfall. Other issues
discussed included OEF/ISAF command and control issues, the
importance of strategic communication, and the EU training
mission to Afghanistan, as well as Kosovo and NATO AWACS
aircraft re-engining. Dutch officials also raised a draft
letter from Regional Command-South contributors to the Afghan
Government requesting increased access to detainees for the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Council. End summary.
Meeting with MFA Deputy Political Director
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Fata met with MFA Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts
on July 13. Per reftel, Geerts reported that the six key
ministers closely involved with the debate over whether to
extend the Dutch ISAF mission in Afghanistan gave Dutch
officials the ""greenlight"" to begin informal consultations
with NATO on extension options.
Meeting with Vice CHOD
----------------------
¶3. (U) Fata met with the Dutch Vice Chief of Defense (VCHOD),
Lieutenant General Rob Bertholee on July 13. The Director
for Plans and Policy, Rear Admiral Matthieu Borsboom, and the
Deputy Chief for International Military Cooperation, Colonel
Arie Vermeij also were in attendance.
¶4. (C) AWACS re-engining: Fata said Dutch MOD State Secretary
Cees van der Knaap recently raised with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Gordon England the issue of re-engining NATO AWACS
aircraft based out of Geilenkirchen, Germany to reduce noise
pollution in the Netherlands. Fata reiterated that the U.S.
Air Force has no requirement to re-engine these aircraft; a
surplus of original engines makes re-engining even less
cost-effective. Fata added, however, that if the Dutch could
successfully make the case at NATO that the aircraft must be
re-engined in order to reduce noise complaints, then the U.S.
would not stand in the way. VCHOD understood the U.S.
position, but said the issue was of high interest in
Parliament, and therefore would not go away.
¶5. (C) ISAF Extension in Afghanistan: VCHOD emphasized the
decision to extend was ""political"" in nature; there is no
reason not to extend from the military perspective. He
explained that in the Dutch political process, Parliament
wants to be ""deeply involved"" before, during, and after a
decision has been made. VCHOD emphasized that the current
two-year mandate until August 2008 will not be affected by
the current debate. But the possibility of extending beyond
the current mandate must be debated and decided now in order
for requisite military and financial planning to take place
in the event of a decision to extend.
¶6. (C) VCHOD mentioned four basic extension options:
withdrawal following termination of the current mission's
mandate, with NATO determining who will take over; partnering
with other Allies and stepping down as the lead; remaining in
Uruzgan as the lead but in a more limited capacity with
contributions and support from other countries; or remaining
in Uruzgan as currently deployed. VCHOD said he favored the
third option to remain in Uruzgan as the lead nation with
additional support from other countries; he did not consider
feasible the option to move the Dutch deployment to another
location in Afghanistan, such as in Regional Command-North or
East. He described the prevailing opinion within the
government as ""uncertain,"" but was confident wide government
support could be gained for an extension.
¶7. (C) ISAF Campaign Plan: Fata argued the need for an ""ISAF
Campaign Plan,"" which he envisioned as a three- to five-year
plan for how ISAF helps the Afghan Government achieve its
goals. Such a document could be used to help explain the
mission to host nation governments, plan for future
supporting force structure, set benchmarks, and act as a
blueprint for action. By providing a clear explanation of
the mission and goals, it might also encourage other non-NATO
nations to come in with contributions. Fata said that SACEUR
had already tasked JFC Brunssum and COMISAF to work up a
draft. VCHOD supported the idea, and pointed out that it
would provide better continuity within ISAF, rather than
having the mission description and goals change every time
there was a new lead nation.
¶8. (C) Helicopter Support: VCHOD expressed appreciation for
the U.S. decision to extend its helicopter support in
Afghanistan until January 2008. Fata replied that this is an
important issue for SecDef, and that SecDef told Allies at
the June NATO Ministerial he expected the Alliance to develop
a plan to generate the required helicopter support by the
time of the next NATO Defense Ministerial in October. Fata
asked what steps the Dutch were taking to alleviate this gap.
VCHOD said the GONL supports the call for more helicopter
support, but he did not think the helicopters could or should
come from the Netherlands. In addition to Apache attack
helicopters, he said the Dutch have three Chinooks
permanently deployed in Afghanistan, while two additional
Chinooks had been lost in the deployment. The GONL has
agreed to purchase six new Chinooks, but these will not be
available until 2009. The VCHOD recently approved an
increase in flying hours, but cannot raise the number of
airframes. He said the Dutch are looking at lease options,
including for Russian helicopters and fixed wing aircraft,
but aircrews are limited. He added that ""eighty percent"" of
all Dutch helicopter missions in Afghanistan are flown in
support of other Allies. Fata emphasized that the Dutch
should be working with Allies to address this potential
shortfall; VCHOD suggested NATO was working to address it
now.
¶9. (C) OEF/ISAF Issues: VCHOD raised ISAF Command and Control
(C2), noting he was ""happy at this time."" Previously there
had been concerns about ""dual-hattedness"" blurring the
distinction between ISAF and OEF, but he could ""live"" with
the current arrangement. From an ISAF perspective, he said,
there must be coordination, not command and control, with OEF
missions. VCHOD stressed European sensitivities to linking
ISAF and OEF -- a C2 structure might make perfect military
sense but is politically problematic. He also commented that
the COMISAF headquarters structure is too large, and does not
function as well as it could due to the lack of fluent
English capability by many officers on the staff. That said,
all operational slots are filled by the U.S. and the UK,
which he claimed was a Dutch concern. He emphasized that the
Netherlands is making a major contribution in the south, and
therefore wants to have a general officer in an operational
billet at COMISAF headquarters, such as Chief of Staff or
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
¶10. (C) Kosovo: Fata raised the necessity of contributing
troops should the political process in Kosovo continue to
deteriorate, and asked if the Dutch could make such a
contribution. VCHOD said the Dutch have only a few officers
in billets in the headquarters. He was unsure of the Dutch
reaction should UN Security Council discussions prove unable
to resolve the situation. He suggested that if other
countries are pulling out of KFOR due to the inability to
obtain a UN mandate and subsequent EU mission, it would be
unlikely that the GONL would make a decision to contribute
additional troops.
Interagency Lunch
-----------------
¶11. (U) Fata attended a Dutch interagency lunch hosted by MOD
Director for General Policy Affairs Lo Casteleijn on July 13.
Dutch attendees included MFA Director of Security Affairs
Robert de Groot, and Rear Admiral Borsboom.
¶12. (C) ISAF Campaign Plan: Fata suggested a ""ISAF Campaign
Plan"" as a means to link the Afghan government's national
strategy with the ISAF Operations Plan. This relatively
short document could provide a blueprint of goals and
priorities for the next three to five years, while at the
same time, provide a method to measure achievements and
demonstrate success. The plan should be made public, and
used to help explain to both Afghan and Allied parliaments
and public what ISAF is trying to accomplish. The plan could
also help focus forces and resources, and pinpoint areas in
which forces could be stepped up or down. Finally, the plan
might provide interested countries a better sense of where
and in what capacity they might make a positive contribution.
¶13. (C) Casteleijn supported the proposal, noting benefits
from the perspective of the Dutch extension debate. De Groot
also expressed interest, but cautioned the plan not include
explicit reference to reconstruction -- ""that is not ISAF's
responsibility,"" he said. Focusing on Afghan Security Force
benchmarks, he suggested, would be appropriate. OSD ISAF
Coordinator COL Vogl suggested reconstruction operations be
included in some capacity, especially as many European allies
are making the case to their respective parliaments that ISAF
is providing a supportive role for reconstruction operations.
De Groot said the campaign plan could be interpreted as an
""exit strategy,"" with eventual turnover to Afghan
authorities. He agreed with Casteleijn that the plan would
make a ""political statement"" -- as such, it should also
address collateral damage. Fata suggested that the NATO
Senior Civilian Representative might act as the plan's
""validator,"" and work with President Karzai to articulate his
goals in the plan.
¶14. (C) Strategic Communication: Casteleijn raised the
importance of NATO improving strategic communication and
public outreach. He said that press conferences are frequent
in Kabul, but such information is lost before it ever reaches
capitals. He called for better ISAF guidelines regarding
reporting casualties -- for example, ISAF confirmed that NATO
soldiers had been the target of a suicide attack in Tarin
Kowt before Dutch authorities were able to contact their
families. While ISAF had not disclosed the nationality of
the soldiers involved, ""all family members know that the
Dutch are serving in Tarin Kowt -- we need time to break the
news to the families."" At the same time, de Groot said, the
Dutch understand that ISAF needs to act quickly to counter
the message of the Taliban in the press -- these pressing
needs conflict with one another.
¶15. (C) Fata mentioned the need to get the message out on
reconstruction projects, and noted ISAF laminate cards
contain the latest facts on reconstruction efforts -- such
cards could be better used. De Groot said ""data alone""
seldom does the trick; the GONL sends the latest figures on
their reconstruction efforts to the Dutch parliament, but
such information is often dismissed as propaganda. Instead,
he said the GONL is working with film crews to interview
""ordinary"" Afghans who are willing to express gratitude for
the Dutch mission, and hope that NATO will stay. De Groot
said President Karzai also has to do more to publicly commend
ISAF. He said the Dutch have tried to tabulate over the past
month how many times Karzai had spoken positively about ISAF
and could not find many instances. De Groot said Karzai
often commends ISAF in private, but never in public.
¶16. (C) Helicopter Support: Fata reiterated SecDef's
challenge that Allies develop a plan to generate the
necessary helicopter support by the October NATO Defense
Ministerial. He understood the Dutch have limited
capabilities, but questioned what the Dutch were doing to
work with others to solve the potential helicopter shortage.
Fata noted that SecDef may likely raise this issue with Dutch
Defense Minister van Middelkoop during his trip to Washington
in September. Casteleijn acknowledged the message -- ""we are
carefully listening,"" but suggested this was a NATO problem,
and not just a Dutch one. Fata argued the Dutch should be
taking an active role in talking to Allies who are not
risking forces in the south -- if these countries will not
commit helicopters, then perhaps they might contribute
financially for helicopter maintenance and support.
¶17. (C) EU Training Mission: De Groot commented on the
planned EU training mission in Afghanistan -- while the
mission may appear ""very little"" in comparison to U.S.
efforts, it represents a step in the right direction that
could potentially grow. Fata related a phone call from
Robert Cooper, the EU's Director for External and
Politico-Military Affairs, requesting U.S. assistance in
providing intelligence and leasing NATO-interoperable radios.
Fata noted that the U.S. does not want the EU mission to
fail, but the request was ""awkward"" when one considers how
many EU members are also members of NATO. De Groot suggested
that the request could be viewed as an attempt to get the USG
involved with the EU mission.
¶18. (U) De Groot passed to Fata a draft letter from Regional
Command-South contributing countries to the Afghan Government
requesting greater access to detainees for the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Council. De Groot noted that all
RC-South contributors had approved the letter, except the
United States, and asked if any progress had been made in
Washington on reviewing the letter.
¶19. (U) DASD Fata has cleared on this cable.
GALLAGHER