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Viewing cable 05BUENOSAIRES159, CODEL DODD VISIT TO ARGENTINA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05BUENOSAIRES159 | 2005-01-21 18:06 | 2011-04-03 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires |
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1362536-clima-de-derrota-frente-al-narcotrafico |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 000159
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN ETRD PHUM AR
SUBJECT: CODEL DODD VISIT TO ARGENTINA
REF: BUENOS AIRES 138
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Summary: (C) During their 24-hour visit to Argentina
January 12-13, CODEL Dodd, accompanied by Ambassador
Gutierrez, held informative and wide-ranging discussions with
President Nestor Kirchner, Minister of Interior Anibal
Fernandez, Deputy Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana, and Central
Bank President Martin Redrado. In addition, prior to their
arrival in Buenos Aires, the CODEL visited the Tri-border
region of Argentina where they were briefed on GOA
counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities. All of the
interlocutors expressed their satisfaction with the overall
state of U.S.-Argentine relations. In particular, they noted
that cooperation with the U.S. on counternarcotics and
counterterrorism issues was excellent. During a luncheon
hosted by the Ambassador attended by a number of independent
political and economic analysts, the CODEL was told how the
U.S. Administration had been particularly helpful to
Argentina during the recent economic crisis, prompting
Senator Dodd to state that the U.S. clearly had devoted
considerable attention to support Argentina which is not what
he thought prior to his visit. End Summary.
¶2. (U) Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn), Bill Nelson
(D-Fla) and Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) had a brief but busy
schedule during their visit to Argentina. CODEL Dodd was in
Argentina to discuss political and economic trends in general
and counternarcotics and counterterrorism cooperation in
particular. In a last minute addition to the schedule,
President Kirchner also received the delegation (reftel).
--------------------------------------------- ---
Interior Minister Fernandez Praises Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) In his opening remarks, Interior Minister Anibal
Fernandez praised the level of cooperation the GOA has
received from the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. He noted
this cooperation was of ""high quality"" and ""value added"" that
included ""shared information, sources and common action."" He
said this work continued on a day-to-day basis with a
constant exchange of information. However, when asked by
Senator Nelson if the cooperation was enough, Fernandez
responded, ""No, it's never enough. We can do a lot more.""
¶4. (C) In response to a question on cooperation with Paraguay
and Brazil on counterterrorism issues, Fernandez said there
had been a lot of progress on common policy under the
MERCOSUR umbrella but that joint work with its two neighbors
was not as extensive as the GOA would prefer. With Paraguay,
the problem was one of capacity, while with Brazil it was a
question of willingness to cooperate. Fernandez, though,
said the GOA was working to overcome difficulties with Brazil
and that a common policy on counterterrorism was gradually
emerging.
¶5. (C) Fernandez said his ministry was focusing on three
major transnational themes: terrorism, narcotics trafficking
and smuggling. In response to these challenges, the GOA had
set out to define and create a common policy and response
both at the federal and provincial level. A critical
component of this common policy would be to reach a consensus
in judicial terms on rules of procedure to fast-track
investigations and prosecutions in these areas. Fernandez
said that by February 1, the GOA would have a special strike
force unit within the Attorney General,s office to deal with
these issues. A second critical component of the GOA,s
efforts would be directed at coordinating the actions of the
intelligence community on narcotics and terrorism
investigations.
¶6. (C) When Senator Dodd asked about reports that Colombians
were increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking in
Argentina, Fernandez, at first, expressed skepticism. When
told by an Embassy DEA representative attending the meeting
that Colombians were behind a number of major narcotics cases
currently being investigated by both Argentine and U.S.
authorities, Fernandez agreed that ""Yes, it,s possible.""
The Minister then said he was more concerned with the
corrupting power of the money that goes along with
trafficking than with who was actually running the drugs. He
said drug seizures alone did not really capture the depth of
the problem in Argentina. Fernandez, referring to two recent
local drug lab seizures, added that drugs are not just
reaching Buenos Aires, they are being processed here. In a
somewhat somber conclusion to the meeting, Fernandez opined
that ""we can,t win (the fight against drug traffickers);
what I don,t want is to lose badly.""
--------------------------------------------- ------
Taiana: GOA Will Continue to Work Regional Issues
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶7. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Taiana underscored to CODEL
the GOA,s intention of remaining actively involved in
promoting human rights and democratic institutions in the
hemisphere. Asked by Senator Chafee about relations with
Venezuela, Taiana said the GOA had attempted to fashion a
""moderating role"" designed to reduce tensions within
Venezuela. He noted that Kirchner had met with opposition
leaders and factions during both of his visits to Venezuela.
Taiana said he had discussed with Assistant Secretary Roger
Noriega the question of human rights in Venezuela and how the
GOA and the U.S. might work together in this area. Taiana
mentioned in particular his concern about legislation either
enacted or being considered by the Venezuelan legislature
impacting on human rights. Senator Nelson commented that
President Chavez claims he wants a new relationship with the
U.S.; but what he really wants is the public relations
benefits of better relations while continuing to crack down
on the press, property rights and packing the Supreme Court.
¶8. (C) On other regional issues, Taiana told the CODEL that
the GOA was firm in its commitment to Haiti. ""We can,t turn
our backs or look at the cost. We can,t fail."" He said it
was important that Latin America make a significant
contribution and work to improve basic security and to build
democratic institutions in Haiti. Taiana said that friendly
and cooperative relations with Brazil and Chile were now
Argentina,s highest priority and that this change of culture
from one of confrontation to one of cooperation with these
two nations represented one of the greatest accomplishments
of Argentina,s 22 years of democracy. In his concluding
remarks, Taiana reiterated the GOA,s commitment for a
successful Summit of the Americas which Argentina will host
this November. He noted that the Summit would focus on the
interrelated themes of creating jobs, fighting poverty and
increasing democratic governance.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
BCRA President Redrado Discusses Macroeconomic Issues
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶9. (SBU) Central Bank (BCRA) President Martin Redrado told
the CODEL that Argentina,s economic history could be
summarized by the phrase, ""overspending and
overindebtedness."" He then claimed that the world was now
seeing for the first time in Argentina fiscal discipline, a
realistic floating exchange rate, prudential monetary policy,
and ""productive integration with the rest of the world.""
Argentina had a consolidated fiscal surplus of 5.2 percent of
GDP in 2004, including 4.3 percent of GDP in the central
government plus almost another one percent in the provinces.
Argentina,s floating exchange rate is important for the
""productive integration"" of the Argentine economy with the
rest of the world. The BCRA held inflation to 6.1 percent in
2004, below the originally targeted range of 7-11 percent.
Redrado also recognized that the country still needed to
""address public utility and energy prices and adapt to a new
regulatory framework"" or there ""won,t be any investment"" and
to obtain a successful debt restructuring with ""a strong
response from the creditors.""
¶10. (C) Senator Dodd asked Redrado to what extent he thought
there was tolerance in the body politic for badly needed
structural reforms. On the debt restructuring, Redrado
emphasized that this was not in his area of responsibility,
but speaking as a private economist he thought that the
strong participation of domestic pension funds, banks and
industry would produce a participation rate of at least 45-50
percent. After that, he thought it was a question of how
much manpower the participating banks had to persuade the
foreign bondholders to participate in the restructuring.
Powerful investors like Soros have the option of going to the
courts, unlike individual bondholders, and will win, but even
then, they will not be able to collect because, unlike
Venezuela, Argentina does not have assets abroad. From what
he saw in the foreign exchange market, he thought investors
wanted to go to emerging markets to take advantage of the
difference in yields, and this increased the likelihood of a
successful debt exchange. More specifically, he said that
the spread between the yields on emerging market bonds and
U.S. Treasuries was now only 350 basis points, or 3.5
percent, which was the narrowest spread that there had been
in 10 years.
¶11. (C) On tax reforms, Redrado said that President Kirchner
was fiscally conservative, to the point of blocking some
changes. Redrado wanted to eliminate the distortionary
financial transactions tax, which encourages people to
operate in the informal economy. However, whenever he tried
to eliminate the tax, President Kirchner would ask, ""With
what are you going to replace it?"" On revenue sharing,
Redrado said Argentina has a federal government with central
tax collection and subsequent distribution of revenues to the
provinces, which prevents the development of fiscal
responsibility in the provinces. ""There is a move toward
decentralization,"" he said, ""but this is hard to do
politically."" There is also a feeling that it is not worth
the effort, so progress will be limited to reforms such as
""the elimination of distortionary taxes in due time."" On the
renegotiation of public utility and energy prices, Redrado
said ""the sooner, the better"" but it is unlikely this will
occur in an election year. Price increases that do occur
will be limited to private companies, and will not affect
residential users. Redrado explained that President Kirchner
is ""willing to go over the heads of the political structure""
to appeal to the people and is therefore especially sensitive
to the public's reaction to potential price increases.
¶12. (C) On monetary policy, Redrado said that there was a
great deal of stimulus at the beginning of the year coming
from measures like increased payments to retirees, higher
wage payments, and postponed tax payments. The BCRA
compensated by raising the BCRA interest rate from 2.5 to
2.75 percent. Redrado thought Minister of Economy Roberto
Lavagna had implemented these measures in order to lower the
consolidated fiscal surplus when he had to present the debt
exchange to the country,s creditors. Redrado said the BCRA
wanted to tell the market that it would err on the side of
conservatism, dealing with ""inflation first, and the exchange
rate second."" If there was a problem with the exchange rate,
he said, the GOA could use its surplus to buy dollars as it
had done in the past. On relations with the IMF, Redrado
said the IMF had ""made a mistake"" in not asking for a higher
primary fiscal surplus in Argentina,s current IMF agreement.
Consequently, the GOA should commit to a higher surplus in
the renegotiation of the current IMF agreement, but should
""not tie our hands"" as to how to use the surplus.
¶13. (C) Redrado said that he was sensitive to the things that
are of interest to the U.S. He said that he was concerned
about how the financial system could be used for money
laundering to finance terrorism and that he had asked the
Ambassador for technical assistance to tell the BCRA what it
was doing right or wrong. (Note: During January 10-15 a U.S.
Treasury technical assistance team visited Argentina to
assess Argentina's anti-money laundering capability and
possibilities for USG technical assistance in this area.)
Redrado expressed particular concern about the use of
Argentina,s money exchange houses for money laundering,
since he did not have enough inspectors to inspect either the
money exchange houses or banks in the provinces. Redrado
added that he had just issued a BCRA resolution that
permitted the BCRA to freeze financial accounts due to
suspicious activity.
-------------------------------------------
Lunch with Economic and Political Analysts
-------------------------------------------
¶14. (C) In order to provide a different perspective on
Argentine political and economic developments, the Ambassador
hosted a luncheon for the CODEL with a number of prominent
independent analysts. The main topic of the discussion was
Argentina,s ongoing debt rescheduling offer and the
country,s expected renegotiation of its existing IMF
agreement. Daniel Artana, Director and Chief Economist of
the Latin American Economic Research Foundation, was cautious
about the potential outcome of the debt rescheduling, noting
that even if all of the creditors accepted the offer,
Argentina would still have a large debt burden, which he
estimated at 80 percent of GDP. On the positive side, he
noted the GOA had delivered much better fiscal results than
in the past and would not have to go to the debt market for
the next few years. Artana also thought that Argentina could
obtain a new IMF agreement in the second quarter of 2005.
¶15. (C) Senator Dodd asked how the U.S. role during
Argentina,s recent economic crisis had been perceived. The
lunch participants agreed that the U.S. role had been and
continues to be very positive. Javier Finkman, Chief of
Economic and Risk Research for HSBC Bank Corporation,
described the U.S. as ""a friendly voice for Argentina"" and
praised U.S. support in the G7 and the IMF. Political
analyst Jorge Castro, president of the Argentine Institute of
Strategic Planning, said that the USG had been the GOA,s
""main supporter"" during the last 18 months. Senator Dodd
said he was pleased to hear that the U.S. role had been
constructive, since prior to his visit he had been convinced
that this had not been the case.
¶16. (C) Another topic of discussion was the contrast between
the faster than expected economic recovery and the
persistently high level of individuals still living below the
poverty line. Economist Artana noted that the economy would
soon be back to where it was during its previous peak in
¶1998. Nevertheless, poverty and structural unemployment had
doubled during the same seven-year period. In addition, two
out of four of those employed work in the informal sector,
and a third works for the public sector. Political and
military analyst Vicente Massot observed that Argentina is a
""very peculiar country"" where social problems increase at a
time when social conflict goes to zero. He argued that the
lack of social conflict was due to the weakness of civil
society and the political system's successful co-optation of
the unions. Economic consultant Esteban Fernandez described
President Kirchner as a ""neo-populist economic conservative,""
who takes a populist approach to politics while maintaining
conservative fiscal and monetary policies. Senator Dodd
responded that despite the problems, the overall lunch
conversation had been much more positive than the
conversations that he had had a year ago.
¶17. (C) Comment: All of the CODEL,s interlocutors, up to
and including the President, spoke highly of the GOA,s
cooperative relationship with the U.S. and President Bush's
strong support for Argentina. At the conclusion of the
luncheon, Senator Dodd acknowledged that he had come to
Argentina believing that the Administration had not been
helpful but recognized that the Bush Administration had been
engaged in suppporting Argentina. End Comment.
¶18. (U) CODEL Dodd did not review/clear on this cable.
¶19. To see more Embassy Buenos Aires reporting, visit our
classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/buenosaires
GUTIERREZ
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