

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07STATE60919, OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07STATE60919.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07STATE60919 | 2007-05-04 17:05 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #0919 1250019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041756Z MAY 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
UNCLAS STATE 060919
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY
DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY
DOD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID
BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN
REF: A. BERLIN 000845
¶1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political
Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal
(coordinated by the NSC with strong interagency
support) to expand and extend the G8 Global
Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction (GP) for another 10 years
(2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other
GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging
global WMD threats. This proposal was also raised
at the April 26-27 Sherpas meeting and more
extensively in the April 23 Global Partnership
Working Group meeting (GPWG) (reftel). All GP
members recognize the evolving global WMD threat,
but most have been resistant to our proposal )
largely due to worries about cost and potential
for dilution of ongoing efforts in Russia and
the former Soviet Union (FSU). Canada and the
UK are the most supportive. Russia poses the
strongest opposition and has expressed that
the original Kananaskis priorities must be
completed before moving forward. Germany has
expressed similar concerns. Therefore the U.S.
is increasing senior diplomatic outreach to G8
partners on this proposal, emphasizing that this
commitment will help address critical global
proliferation challenges, including the requirements
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,
and other G8 priorities. END SUMMARY.
----------------
BACKGROUND
----------------
¶3. (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8
initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002
to address the spread of WMD, and now includes the
G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the EU.
2007 marks the halfway point for the Global
Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion
commitment. GP donor pledges to date come
in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion
from the U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion
from Russia. The current GP scope addresses WMD
threats only within Russia and other former Soviet
states (the U.S. recognizes all former Soviet nations
as GP recipients, but so far only Russia and Ukraine
are officially recognized as recipient states by the
entire Partnership). The Kananaskis document
anticipated an expansion by mandating that GP
programs begin &initially in Russia8 but not be
limited to Russia. In the context of the G8, the
GP is handled by the Global Partnership Working
Group (GPWG), which reports to the Nonproliferation
Directors Group (NPDG). The GP is a unique model
of multilateral cooperation to combat WMD and missile
threats and has made great progress in its first five
years to reduce the proliferation threat, including
chemical weapons destruction; redirection of former
WMD scientists, technicians and engineers; improving
security for fissile nuclear materials, chemical
weapons stocks and biological agents; and dismantlement
of decommissioned nuclear submarines.
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend the
GP to combat new and emerging global WMD threats
includes four components: 1) Immediate expansion
of geographic scope outside of Russia and the former
Soviet Union (to include the broadest possible
participation of new recipient states worldwide);
2) Immediate inclusion of broadest possible
functional scope to include all chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile
threats; 3) Extension of time commitment for an
additional 10 years (2012-2022); and 4) Increased
financial commitment of an additional $20 billion
for 2012-2022 with the same parameters as original
commitment (U.S. $10 billion; $10 billion from other
donors). The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement
at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8
committed to coordinate activities to reduce the
global WMD threat through the GP. Note that the
U.S. and other G8 donors (notably Canada and the
UK) believe that the Kananaskis Guidelines and
Principles, on which the GP was formed, already
include a broad interpretation of threats (chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and missile);
however Russia has strongly argued to limit scope
to Russia,s most important priorities of chemical
weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement.
¶5. (SBU) After working this proposal at the level
of the GPWG and Political Directors, the U.S. has
gained some support from most G8 members for the
first two objectives (geographic and programmatic
expansion), with limited to no support for the
10-year extension and additional financial
commitments at this time. Russia objects to
the entire proposal.
---------------------------------------------
JAPAN POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Japan has participated in the GP, but
has not committed much funding. Japan initially
expressed its concern about justifying an expansion
of the GP when the program is so associated with a
now oil rich Russia. However, we are working to make
it clear to Japan that a geographic expansion of the
GP would include Asia and could help address some of
Japan,s regional security concerns. Japan was
recently supportive of the geographic expansion
at the April 23 GPWG, but did not endorse the
financial commitment or specific time extension.
¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to reach
out, at the highest level, to Japan to garner support
for this proposal. The Draft G8 Leaders' language
proposed by the U.S. for inclusion in the
Nonproliferation statement (as mentioned in
the points below) will follow as an attachment
by email to Post.
Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.
¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND APPROPRIATE:
--In addition to meeting or exceeding our current
Global Partnership commitments laid out at Kananaskis,
the global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving,
and our collective peace and security depends on our
response and leadership. Therefore, we must act
immediately and provide that leadership to address
the threats that all our nations face.
--Expanding the geographic scope of the Global
Partnership to focus on worldwide threats beyond
Russia and the former Soviet Union - with all G8
nations (including Russia) as partners - would
allow for greater attention to combat emerging
terrorist threats in Southeast Asia and other
terrorist hotspot regions.
--In fact, the U.S. is already beginning to address
global WMD threats, including important work to
combat nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological
threats in Southeast Asia.
--Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s
future within the Global Partnership Working Group
and general support for the ideas we are proposing,
our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not
reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s
midpoint 5-year review document or the NPDG,s
broader nonproliferation statement.
--We understand that the financial commitment we
are asking for - another $10 billion from other
GP donors - is substantial. We recognize that
it will not be easy and will take time for many
GP members to develop mechanisms to fund projects
to combat the global threat.
--This is precisely why we must act now to begin
the expansion and extension process.
The global threat we face is too important
to delay, and we have a chance to show
important leadership.
--All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation,
including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on
halting the spread of WMD, related materials and delivery
systems after the Kananaskis documents, terms expire in
¶2012.
--The original Kananaskis document stated a vision
for the future, and we are asking Leaders to reaffirm
a commitment for a vision of the future beyond 2012.
-- Global security demands that we help to eliminate
chemical weapons worldwide, reduce dangerous nuclear,
radiological, chemical, and biological materials, and
secure those which remain. In doing so, we will greatly
reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation and terrorism.
Even as we do so, we will also facilitate access worldwide
to the economic and social benefits of the peaceful use of
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials.
--We have also committed to help the nations of the world
implement United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation
prevention around the world. Expansion and extension
of the GP would provide us with a way to help fill these
gaps.
--The GP has been successful and effective despite
numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which
have been overcome. The Partnership works without
any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and
is a positive model of cooperation for combating
global proliferation threats. This makes the GP
an effective mechanism for providing assistance to
reduce global proliferation threats, including by meeting
our 1540 obligations in addition to other
critical G8 commitments, such as the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
--At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to
coordinate activities to reduce the global
WMD threat through the GP. It is time now
to take the next step to continue and expand
the GP.
--We have drafted Leaders, language for your
consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation
statement and we hope you will support us.
--The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional $10
billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP donors
can also be able to match this.
IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE
CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT
STATES:
--We feel that the current mechanism for admitting
new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not
serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat.
Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only
allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to
formally benefit from the GP.
--When countries ask us for assistance in combating
terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an
important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting
for a formal process before we act.
--Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest
possible participation of states when the geographic
scope of the GP is expanded.
END POINTS
¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this action
request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel), NSC (Mary
Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen Newhouse),
ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff, Elizabeth Cameron,
David Evans), E (John Duncan and Benedict Wolf), P
(Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and Jim Timbie), S/P
(Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt, Lisa Benthien),
DOE (Joyce Connery, Gerald Stacey), and DoD/CTR
(Jim Reid, Monette Melason, Andy Weber).
RICE