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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09SANJOSE624, COSTA RICA'S FIRST FEMALE PRESIDENT? SCENESETTER
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0624/01 2081948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271948Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1065
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000624
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN; WHA/PPC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PREL CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA'S FIRST FEMALE PRESIDENT? SCENESETTER
FOR THE 2010 ELECTIONS
Classified By: CDA Peter M. Brennan for reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: With Costa Rica's presidential primary season
now over, the stakes are set for the February 2010 national
election. For the first time in Costa Rican history, a
female candidate, Laura Chinchilla from the Partido
Liberacion Nacional (PLN), has a strong chance to become
President. Chinchilla, who was President Oscar Arias's
vice-president before declaring her candidacy, handily won
her party's hotly-contested June 7 primary election. The
other two major-party candidates, Otton Solis from the
Partido Accion Ciudadana (PAC) and former-President Rafael
Angel Calderon from the Partido Union Social Cristiana
(PUSC), are both political retreads who starkly contrast with
Chinchilla's "fresher" public persona. In addition, Calderon
has an ongoing legal case stemming from 2004 corruption
charges. END SUMMARY
----------------------------------------
THE REAL GENERAL ELECTION? PLN'S PRIMARY
----------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) In some ways, PLN's June 7 primary had all the
appearances of a general election, from the large turnout of
over half-a-million voters, to the fact that whomever emerged
as the winner would be the favorite to win the 2010
presidential elections. Additionally, it was the only
presidential primary that had an open, country-wide election
in which all Costa Ricans could vote. While San Jose Mayor
Johnny Araya, Chinchilla's chief adversary in the PLN
primary, had led in the polls through March, Chinchilla had
overtaken Araya by May 2009. Most of those polls gave a
small advantage to Chinchilla going into the primary, though
many experts still believed that Araya's well organized
campaign might actually surge ahead for an election day
victory.
¶3. (C) Araya's popularity sprang from his accomplishments as
mayor of San Jose, not the least of which was his general
managerial efficiency in Costa Rica's hectic capital (despite
consistent rumors of corruption, which haunted him throughout
the campaign). He also brought a subtle form of
traditionalist populism to the race, running on a slogan of
"the power of the people" and targeting those that have felt
left behind in Costa Rica's trend toward modernization and
economic development over the last decade. Araya also
appealed to those who, at some level, weren't ready to vote
for a woman for president. Araya's biggest appeal, however,
might have been that of an alternative to the PLN's "Arias
faction", of which Chinchilla was considered a member.
¶4. (C) Despite high approval ratings, there is a small core
of voters who strongly dislike President Arias and his
brother Rodrigo Arias, considering them oligarchs who
"rigged" the 2003 constitutional amendment process which
permitted Arias to run again; the 2006 national elections;
and even the 2007 CAFTA referendum, to pursue their own
agenda. Araya presented himself as an alternative to Arias's
hand picked successor, Chinchilla, who had publicly stated
that she would continue the policies of the Arias
administration if elected. Some experts we spoke with
immediately before the June 7 primary, including pollsters
from CID-Gallup, believed that these factors, along with a
well organized voter-mobilization push, might spur Araya to
victory.
¶5. (C) However, Chinchilla pushed through to a surprisingly
comfortable victory, winning the popular vote by thirteen
percent (55 percent to Araya's 42 percent, with former
Minister of Public Security Fernando Berrocal winning the
remaining 3 percent). We believe that her victory came about
due to two major wells of support--women voters and those
seeking continuity of the Arias period--as well as a bit of
old-fashioned mud-slinging. As the country's first female
Vice-President, and the first female with a legitimate chance
of becoming president, Chinchilla used a backbone of female
supporters to power her campaign and present herself as a
"new" political player--despite years on the political scene.
¶6. (C) Additionally, by tying herself closely to the Arias
government, Chinchilla was able to take a share of credit for
the successes of the administration, and benefited from the
Arias political machine's ability to mobilize supporters and
resources. Chinchilla also was very successful through
surrogates, at hitting at Araya for alleged corruption
(including linking him to disgraced former-president and
current PUSC candidate Calderon) without it being linked
directly to her campaign. The end result was a smashing
victory that confounded doubters and firmly positioned her as
the front-runner in the general election.
-------------------------------------
PAC'S "CLOSED PRIMARY" DELIVERS SOLIS
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Despite challenges by two younger, fresher faces in
the party (politician/economist Epsy Campbell and businessman
Roman Macaya), quasi-populist PAC founder Otton Solis easily
won PAC's "closed" primary on May 31. Solis, who is running
for president for the third time in a row, will be
Chinchilla's major competition in the general election.
While Chinchilla presents voters with an option for a
continuation of the moderate, pro-trade policies of the Arias
administration, Solis promotes a left-of-center,
protectionist agenda which was highlighted by his vocal
opposition to the CAFTA-DR agreement. Solis still maintains
that he would attempt to renegotiate the trade agreement if
he were elected president.
¶8. (C) In contrast to the PLN's open primary, PAC required
that all would-be voters register with the party to be
eligible to vote in the primary. Perhaps showing the waning
popularity of the party, just over twenty-two thousand voters
participated in the primary, despite sixty-seven thousand
actually registering to vote. PAC's turnout came in stark
contrast to the more than five-hundred thousand Costa Ricans
who took part in the PLN primary and meant that the PLN's
third place finisher, Berrocal with, three percent of the
vote, won almost as many votes as Solis.
9 (C) If Solis hopes to have a chance at victory in 2010, he
now needs to unite not just his own party, but also put
together a wider "opposition coalition" to support him.
While there have been signs that he might be able to bring
together other leftist parties, he still faces a challenge in
creating excitement for his (third) presidential campaign and
finding a way to appeal to voters at a time when PAC appears
to be losing steam. Additionally, Solis is sometimes his
campaign's own worst enemy, with frugal/austere political
spending policies, a traditional skepticism of modern
campaign styles (he eschews public opinion polls and new
media) and a dislike for fundraising, which he views as
damaging to the clean and ethical image he seeks to project.
-----------------------------------------
THE ONCE AND FUTURE PRESIDENT? NOT LIKELY
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) The conservative Partido Union Social Cristiana
(PUSC), the final major piece in the Costa Rican political
scene, is a party in disarray. While the party was in power
only four short years ago, today some Embassy contacts
question whether it will survive past the next elections.
Deepening its crisis, PUSC party leaders (now down to mostly
calderonistas) selected former-President Rafael Angel
Calderon to be its presidential candidate at its June 26th
national convention. Calderon is currently on trial for
corruption (charges widely believed to be true), and faces
possible imprisonment if convicted. According to polls, over
70 percent of Costa Ricans hold an unfavorable view of him,
though most analysts concede that he could possibly win up to
15 percent of the popular vote in 2010--if he's not a
convicted felon before then.
------------------------
MUCH STILL UP IN THE AIR
------------------------
¶11. (C) While Chinchilla is widely considered to be the
front-runner, the actual elections are nearly seven months
away--plenty of time for mistakes to be made. Chinchilla will
have to work to unite her own party behind her, and has
already gone a long way in reconciling with Araya and his
supporters. Under an agreement the two former adversaries
have reached, a number of Araya supporters will be included
among PLN's National Assembly candidate list. However, Araya
recently put speculation that himself would run for a seat to
rest, stating that his possibly candidacy stood in the way of
any reconciliation agreement with Chinchilla. Chinchilla and
Araya have both publicly hinted at a possible ministerial
post for Araya in a Chinchilla administration.
¶12. (C) Solis will probably try and unite a number of small
leftist parties behind his candidacy and work to develop a
focus and effective message for his campaign. Calderon,
though unlikely to prevail, will probably focus on trying to
win his court battle and then reviving his moribund party.
In doing so, his goal will likely be to make a decent showing
in the presidential elections, but more importantly pick up
some National Assembly seats for his key supporters (his
wife, Gloria Bejarano heads the list of PUSC National
Assembly candidates). Finally, all the candidates will
choose their first and second vice-presidential running
mates, and work on formalizing their party's candidate lists
for Congressional seats. In short, though Chinchilla begins
the general campaign with an advantage, much could change
over the next seven months.
----------------------------------------
COMMENT: BETWEEN THE FUTURE AND THE PAST
----------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Barring some unforeseen occurrence, the election
should come down to a basic choice between Chinchilla and
Solis, with the former looking ahead to "the future" and the
latter gazing back towards "the past". In the race itself,
Chinchilla has a distinct organizational and financial
advantage. Her team has already been through a serious
primary challenge, which forced her to hone her message and
her tactics. Her campaign relies on a host of modern polling
and tracking data, makes use of robo-calls, hosts
sophisticated real-time on-line chats with supporters and has
a solid fundraising machine. If Chinchilla does go on to the
win, she would not only be the first female to hold the
office, but also a welcome continuation of the Arias
administration's U.S.-compatible policies. Her election
would provide needed continuity on a number of important
policy fronts, from international trade and infrastructure
development to public security and environmental protection.
This would provide the USG it's best opportunity to continue
pursuing our foreign policy goals in relation to Costa Rica,
and see Costa Rica continue its role as a close U.S. ally in
Central America.
¶14. (C) Solis's path to the presidency relies in part on
external factors. His best chance of victory entails a
criminal conviction for Calderon, which would leave Solis as
the only viable alternative to the PLN and Chinchilla
(describing the situation, one analyst we spoke with said a
free Calderon is "the best friend the PLN has"). In this
scenario, Solis might be able to siphon off votes from the
hard-core PUSC loyalists, who would never vote for a PLN
candidate. Solis is also counting on appealing to the "anti"
vote--made up of traditionalist Ticos resistant to change and
skeptical about the transformations the country has gone
through over the last 8-10 years. Support from these sectors
combined with support from PAC and other smaller parties
might possibly be enough to push Solis over the top in
February--or it might not. While Solis came close to winning
the last election in 2006 (losing by only one percent to
Arias), he and his message have become a bit stale,
especially in comparison to the "fresh" and "new" Chinchilla.
Solis' campaign, in comparison, is also fairly
rudimentary--his campaign manager recently told us that he
"thought he had convinced Solis to do some polling before the
election this time", providing a stark contrast to the
Chinchilla campaigns mountains of data.
¶15. (C) If Solis were to somehow win, large question marks
exist over how he would actually govern. Taken at his word,
Solis would attempt to renegotiate or even repeal CAFTA-DR,
which might scuttle the agreement in its entirety. But
questions also abound as to what he would do in other
sectors, including his stated distrust of international
investment and what focus, if any, he would put on addressing
Costa Rica's deteriorating security situation. Regardless, a
Solis-led government would be less predictable and less
reliable in support of U.S. interests, and might again detour
Costa Rica from its path towards socio-economic development.
END COMMENT.
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ELECTIONS TIME-TABLE
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¶16. (SBU) The following are the next key milestones for the
2010 elections:
8/7/2009 - Deadline for public officials to resign their
posts to run for a seat in the National Assembly
(Embassy sources report that Minister of Finance
Guillermo Zuniga and Minister of Justice Viviana
Martin are among those government officials
planning to resign and run for National Assembly
seats)
10/1/2009 - General election campaigns legally begin
10/23/2009 - Deadline for registration of presidential
candidates
12/16/2009 - Start of two-week "Christmas Truce" in
campaigning
1/7/2010 - Civil Registry finalizes the voter rolls
2/4/2010 - Final day of official political campaigning
2/6/2010 - Start of three-day prohibition on alcohol sales
2/7/2010 - Election Day
4/4/2010 - Second round of Presidential voting (only
necessary if no candidate wins more than
40 percent of the vote)
5/1/2010 - First session of new Legislative Assembly begins
5/8/2010 - Inauguration of new President
BRENNAN