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Viewing cable 09ROME558, G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME558 | 2009-05-20 08:08 | 2011-03-18 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO9669
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #0558/01 1400819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200819Z MAY 09 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2090
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4560
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3631
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0043
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3820
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4822
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000558
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR ENERGY SECRETARY CHU
DOE ALSO FOR A/S DAVID SANDALOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: ENRG EPET OVIP PREL IR RU IT
SUBJECT: G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
Classified By: CHARGE ELIZABETH DIBBLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Your 23-25 May visit to Rome will provide
opportunities to interact with senior Italian officials on
priority USG energy issues. On European energy security,
Italy's very close relationship with Russia often causes it
to resist efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy
sources. We hope you can urge a broader reevaluation of
energy sources and technologies. In particular, Italy's
decision to return to nuclear power will -- if carried out --
reduce this dependence; you should raise worrisome
indications that U.S. firms will be unfairly denied the
opportunity to participate in this multi-billion dollar
project. Italy is a laggard in the EU on the use of
renewable energy, but its market may grow the most in the
near future. You can support the use of U.S. technology in
this area. Italy's parastatal energy company Eni is active
in Iran and wants to expand its operation in that country;
the USG is strongly opposed to this expansion of ""business as
usual"" at a time when Iran is continuing its own nuclear
program in defiance of UN and IAEA requirements that it
sustpend enrichment activities.
¶2. (C/NF) Because of the strong influence of organized
crime, Italian seaports are vulnerable to use for the
shipment of illicit nuclear materials. DOE's Megaports
program could significantly reduce this threat, but at least
two USG efforts to launch Megaports in Italy have faltered
owing to Italian red tape. We would like to make another big
push on this high USG priority, and your intervention could
be critical in getting high-level Italian support for this
effort. End Summary.
INTERACTION WITH ITALIAN POLICY MAKERS
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) During the 23-25 May 2009 G8 Energy Ministerial
in Rome, you will have at least one bilateral meeting with
Claudio Scajola, the Italian cabinet minister with
responsibility for energy affairs. This meeting, and other
potential side meetings with Italian officials during the
Ministerial are key opportunities to press a number of top
USG energy concerns with the Berlusconi government.
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
-----------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's close personal
ties with Vladimir Putin and the very strong corporate ties
between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom
often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce
Europe's dependence on Russian energy. That dependence has
been reflected in Italian policy vis--vis Russia. The
Italian government has been overtly apologetic for Russian
power projection in its so-called Near Abroad - notably
against Georgia last August. Italy opposes further expansion
of NATO, and, finally, Italy's energy policy too often
reflects Russian, rather than European, priorities. For
example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about
the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while ENI is poised to
help GAZPROM construct Black Sea and Baltic Sea pipelines
that will deepen EU's dependence on Russia. ENI, 30 percent
owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy
policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU
energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some
steps in the right direction: the Turkey-Greece-Italy
pipeline project could bring Europe gas from the Caspian, and
Liquid Natural Gas projects promise further diversification.
It would be helpful if you could raise with Italian officials
long-standing USG concerns about European energy security,
emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around
Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity
of energy sources, routes and technologies.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
--------------
¶5. (C) Minister Scajola announced in May 2008 that Italy
would pursue the start of construction of new nuclear power
ROME 00000558 002.4 OF 003
plants by the end of the current legislature (2013). The
uncertain cost of fossil fuels, the need to meet emission
targets, and a desire for greater energy security appear to
be the motives behind this return to nuclear power (Note:
Italy's previous nuclear power plants were decommissioned
after the Chernobyl accident led to a series of three
referenda in 1987 that had the practical effect of banning
nuclear power generation. End Note) Solid government
majorities in both chambers of parliament should facilitate
the passage of legislation to address the issues of nuclear
waste and plant siting. These issues, however, are likely to
remain thorny problems for the GOI. U.S.-based companies
Westinghouse and GE are interested in selling their nuclear
power plant technology to Italy, but they face stiff
competition from foreign rivals whose governments are heavily
lobbying the GOI. For example, intense French pressure,
possibly involving corrupt payments to GOI officials, led the
way for the February agreement by Italian and French
electricity parastatals ENEL and EdF to form a 50-50
consortium to build nuclear power plants in Italy and
elsewhere. The agreement foresees the construction of four
French Areva design nuclear plants in Italy by 2020 and,
more disturbingly for U.S. firms, may establish French
nuclear technology as the standard for Italy's return to
nuclear power. The GOI has assured us that GE and
Westinghouse can still compete for nuclear business, as Italy
intends to build up to 10 plants as part of its energy
security plan. Post continues to work for a level-playing
field for U.S. companies (see ref A). You could usefully
underline to Italian officials that we expect U.S. firms to
be given a fair opportunity to bid for contracts in Italy's
nuclear power program. You might also note that Italian
behavior since February has produced the impression that
other bidders -- including U.S. firms -- ""need not apply.""
LIMITED BUT GROWING USE OF RENEWABLES
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Although Italy has some of the most generous
subsidies for renewable energy in Europe, more solar energy
is produced in gloomy Germany than in sunny Italy. Experts
attribute this to NIMBYism and difficulties in dealing with
Italian bureaucracy, noting that the premium that Italians
pay for renewable energy subsidies compared to Germans can
even be considered a quantitative measure of the cost of
Italian red tape. That said, Italy is now attracting
attention as a growing renewables market, as Germany and
Spain rein in their subsidies, and Italy's remain in place$wQz!4k2Q)CQgIQj'Qthe Laboratory to the Market.""
TRYING AGAIN ON DOE's MEGAPORTS
----------------------------
¶7. (C) With seaports, particularly those in southern Italy
under the influence of organized crime, it is especially
important that Italy be included in DOE's Megaports project.
Italian ports send large numbers of containers to the United
States, and some Italian ports are major transhipment
centers. In 2007 about 3 million containers were shipped
from or through Gioia Tauro, probably the port of most
concern owing to organized crime influence. Among these were
40,000 shipments to the U.S. (See Reftels C and D.)
Megaports would provide a critically important safeguard that
might prevent the shipment to the United States of nuclear
materials by terrorists. The USG has tried twice before to
launch Megaports in Italy -- on both occasions our efforts
were thwarted by the Italian bureaucracy. The GOI showed
little enthusiasm for the project, and consistently failed to
name a senior ""point person"" for implementation. As a
result, Megaports-Italy was crushed by Italian interagency
squabbling and red tape. We
are set to make another major push on this critical USG
priority. In order to avoid the pitfalls that killed our
ROME 00000558 003.10 OF 003
earlier efforts, we are seeking early, high-level GOI buy-in.
We want the GOI, at very senior level, to commit to
Megaports implementation, and to formally designate an
Italian cabinet minister who will be responsible for
implementation.
¶8. (C) Your meeting with Minister Scajola represents an
important opportunity to move Megaports forward in Italy.
Scajola is one of the GOI's most powerful Ministers, and is
considered personally close to Prime Minister Berlusconi. We
recommend that you tell Minister Scajola that nuclear
materials security is a top priority of the Obama
administration, and that Megaports represents an important
opportunity for Italy to do something tangible in support of
President Obama's efforts to protect the world from nuclear
terrorism. You may also wish to point out that Megaports
will help Italian ports meet the requirement for 100 percent
radiation screening (by 2012) of all U.S.-bound containers;
without Megaports, Italian ports could lose business to
competing European ports that are currently implementing
Megaports. For the Berlusconi government to take this issue
seriously, key Italian officials must hear this directly from
Washington, particularly from yourself.
IRAN
----
¶9. (C) You should be aware that Italian parastatal energy
company Eni is active in Iran, and is currently considering
an expansion of its operations in that country. On May 18,
Eni officials broached the possibility of this expansion with
USG officials in Washington and were told that the USG
strongly opposes any such expansion.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKDROP
----------------------------
¶10. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi continues to enjoy
record popularity numbers; he possesses a commanding
parliamentary majority that gives him a degree of political
security unprecedented in post-war Italy. Berlusconi's
standing has been bolstered by positive public perceptions of
his response to the devastating April 2009 earthquake in the
Abruzzo region. We expect him to stay in power at least
until the next scheduled national election in 2013.
¶11. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices
allowed Italy's banks to avoid the global financial sector
melt down. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime
lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so
much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not
been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that
has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth
rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis --
has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its
export markets and falling domestic demand. Unemployment is
expected to exceed 8 percent this year and to rise further in
¶2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off
sharply. Moreover, according to the IMF, an already large
government debt is expected to hit 121 percent of GDP this
year. Both factors reduce the government's ability to
provide for stimulus measures.
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) On a variety of important issues, your interactions
with Italian officials provide an opportunity to advance
important U.S. interests. Because Megaports is a DOE
project, it is especially important for you to ask Minister
Scajola for GOI support. Absent such a request it will be
very difficult for Embassy Rome to push Megaports forward in
Italy. It is also very important for you to remind the GOI
that we expect U.S. firms to be given a fair opportunity to
bid on nuclear power projects in Italy, given what we have
seen to date on the selection process.
DIBBLE