

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08KABUL2782, QAYUM KARZAI AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS SAUDI
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KABUL2782.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08KABUL2782 | 2008-10-18 10:10 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO8778
OO RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2782/01 2921006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181006Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5863
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002782
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS PTER, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: QAYUM KARZAI AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS SAUDI
RECONCILIATION TALKS
REF: A. KABUL 2746 B. RIYADH 1510
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 13, Abdul Qayum Karzai described to the Ambassador the potential Saudi reconciliation process. He and Abdullah Anas developed the current initiative a year ago and secured Taliban engagement through Anas’ connection to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif (former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan). He led a recent Afghan delegation of 17, including former Taliban officials, to Saudi Arabia for an informal meeting of mullahs and an iftar dinner with the King. Qayum expressed concern about the fragility of the process and its vulnerability to being “usurped” by the government. Saudi Arabia agreed to continue facilitating talks, but was firm it would not serve as an intermediary for the Taliban - they must work directly with Afghanistan. Qayum said the King is concerned about being too closely linked to the Taliban and that media speculation regarding the recent Saudi-hosted event made some officials there nervous. Qayum assured the Ambassador the U.S. would be consulted at every step and asked that the U.S. urge the Saudis to remain engaged. (Qayum is President Karzai’s brother and an American citizen.)
¶2. (C) For the past two and a half years, Qayum said he had been seeking a “bottom-up” process for engagement with reconciliable Taliban outside a governmental framework. Although many senior Taliban were interested in ending hostilities, individual reconciliation was not an option for them politically. In October 2007, Qayum met with Abdullah Anas (former Algerian mujahideen commander now living in London) to discuss Anas’ proposal of engaging Muslim clerics and scholars to create a framework for talks with the Taliban. Qayum suggested Saudi Arabia or Dubai. Anas agreed and began to consul prominent Muslim scholars, rallying them around their shared concern that Taliban violence gave Islam “a bad name” throughout the world.
SEEKING SAUDI INVOLVEMENT
¶3. (C) Anas and Qayum met with Dr. Mansour, advisor to King Abdullah, to ask Saudi Arabia to host the first engagement in this process: gathering a “group of mullahs.” Mansour reacted positively to Saudi Arabia serving this role, in part because as it would dilute Saudi Arabia’s identification with Pakistan - and extremism. According to Qayum, Mansour stated “the international community sees us as a front.” Qayum noted that the Saudis see a directly link between Afghanistan’s security and their own stability concerns.
TALIBAN MULLAH ZAIF AGREES TO PARTICIPATE
¶4. (C) In April 2008, Qayum hosted Dr. Mansour, Anas and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and informal line to Mullah Omar, at his home in Kandahar. Qayum said that when his guests arrived the television was showing footage of a Taliban bombing attack on a mosque earlier that day. The men were visibly upset by the carnage, including Zaif. The shared reaction to the bombing set the tone for constructive talks and Zaif agreed to participate. Qayum shared his view that Zaif is trying to carve a political space within the Taliban for reconciliation.
QAYUM PREPARES THE GROUND AND THE SAUDIS ENGAGE - CAUTIOUSLY
¶5. (C) As a result of Qayum’s, and then President Karzai’s, meetings with Dr. Mansour, King Abdullah called Karzai directly to discuss the proposed process. (The King’s role energized Karzai’s interest in the process for the first time.) Over the next few months Qayum hosted a number of Taliban representatives in Kandahar to continue preparations.
¶6. (C) Through the spring and summer representatives from both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan shuttled back and forth. Qayum and former Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid worked
KABUL 00002782 002 OF 003
closely together, traveling to Saudi to meet with Mansour and Prince Miqrin, head of Saudi intelligence. Mansour made more visits to Kabul and Anas continued to serve as go-between with Zaif and Taliban. In August, Saudi Arabia agreed to host an initial contact meeting during Ramadan -- stressing the importance of maintaining a low profile. While indicating the King Abdullah’s desire to assist, Miqrin made it clear the King was approaching the process cautiously and did not want to be linked too closely to the Taliban. Miqrin said Saudi Arabia didn’t want “to be alone in this,” highlighting the importance of keeping the U.S. and U.K. informed. Miqrin also stressed the Taliban leadership should not see Saudi Arabia’s willingness to support the talks as an indication the country would serve as an intermediary; the Taliban must pursue the reconciliation process directly with Afghanistan.
THE SEPTEMBER MEETING
¶7. (C) In organizing the trip, Qayum, Mansour and Zaif agreed the focus would be on religious activities and peaceful exchanges, in keeping with the Ramadan season. Both sides agreed a large group would not be advisable so there were 17 in the Afghan delegation, and only a subset would attend all meetings. In addition to Zaif, Maulavi Ahmad Mutawakkil (Taliban ex-Foreign Minister), Maulvi Abdul Hadi Shinwari (former chief justice) and current Afghan senator Arsala Rahmani agreed to attend. Qayum denied reports that Hekmatyar sent a representative; he said Hekmatyar’s nephew was in Saudi Arabia at the same time, but did not participate in the talks.
¶8. (C) Qayum said the Saudis orchestrated the encounter carefully. When the Taliban group arrived, Qayum went to his room while Mansour remained with the group to welcome them. Mansour, like Miqrin, made opening points to the Taliban: Saudi Arabia condemned the killing of innocents in Afghanistan and viewed the Afghan constitution with the same respect as its own; both share a common basis in the Koran. The Saudis further clarified they would not support any Taliban proposals that infringed on the authority of the central Afghan government - such as the establishment of autonomous regions.
¶9. (C) Qayum said Prince Miqrin called him just before dawn to brief him on the dinner and meeting. Miqrin said a large group had come from Medina to meet the Afghan delegation and there had been an enthusiastic response from the Quetta participants. Qayum said everyone reacted nervously when details of the process first leaked to the media - especially the Taliban participants and the Saudis. Miqrin suggested an alternative location might be needed for talks - perhaps Dubai.
QAYUM DETERMINED TO KEEP PROCESS DISCIPLINED AND OUT OF GOVT HANDS
¶10. (C) The Ambassador praised Qayum’s leadership on this important issue. He stressed that such talks require discipline and patience. Afghanistan must deal from a position of strength. Qayum agreed, saying that if the military pressure on the Taliban eased the process would fail. He confided what he had told Dr. Mansour - that the engagement must be kept simple and focused at the beginning - with the same facilitators guiding it until it matured. It would collapse if too many people - or governments - became involved. Qayum repeatedly expressed concern that the government might “usurp” the process: “An Afghan government-based negotiation would lead to everyone at the table demanding a slice (of the government), but the government would be unable to satisfy all of these competing demands and would take the blame for the negotiations’ failure.”
¶11. (C) The Ambassador asked that the U.S. be advised if Afghanistan engaged any Taliban with ties to Al Qaeda and/or global terrorism in the reconciliation process - figures like Mullah Omar and Mullah Barader. The U.S. did not oppose this
KABUL 00002782 003 OF 003
process, stressed the Ambassador, but would not be a participant either. Qayum accepted this and commented that he saw no way for Mullah Omar to survive the process - he didn’t have the intelligence or popular support to emerge on top. He and Barader were hated by too many elements within the Pashtun spectrum. Perhaps exile was an option for them. In closing, Qayum assured the Ambassador that the U.S. would be kept informed of all developments.
COMMENT
¶12. (C) Qayum has President Karzai’s confidence, but is a neophyte in such a process. The encounter in Saudi Arabia was with Afghan and Taliban proxies, rather than decision-makers. It is especially unclear what connection Zaif and the other so-called Taliban representatives have with the Taliban leadership, although there are reports that Zaif met with two representatives from the Quetta Shura who had shadowed the delegation to follow developments and report back. President Karzai is interested in this process at least as much because it represents a step forward in support from King Abdullah as because it holds some prospect for neutralizing some or all of the Taliban. That said, this encounter could bring Saudi Arabia closer to Afghanistan and could have some benefits with the Taliban, especially if other pressures on the Taliban continue to grow. We intend to be supportive, but without unrealistic expectations, and certainly with no direct U.S. involvement.
WOOD