

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MADRID449, SPANISH INTERIOR MINISTER RUBALCABA ON DE JUANA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MADRID449.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MADRID449 | 2007-03-08 19:07 | 2010-12-09 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
VZCZCXRO0119
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0449/01 0671933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081933Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2048
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 6004
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 2516
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000449
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/WE CLEMENTS AND CERVETTI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: PREL SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH INTERIOR MINISTER RUBALCABA ON DE JUANA
CHAOS DECISION; ETA TERRORISM; KEY BILATERAL ISSUES
REF: MADRID 432
MADRID 00000449 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: During a March 7 lunch with Spanish Minister
of Interior Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Ambassador Aguirre heard
the Spanish government's defense of its recent controversial
decision to allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos
to serve out the rest of his sentence under house arrest (see
REFTEL for Embassy analysis on this issue). De Juana was
close to death due to a 4-month hunger strike, and Minister
Rubalcaba said that the decision was the correct one because
it allowed the GOS to prevent De Juana from becoming a
"decades-long martyr for radical ETA youth." He said the GOS
was solely responsible for the decision, without any
discussion with or pressure from ETA. Rubalcaba also said
that ETA had the power to put the opposition Partido Popular
(PP) "in the driver's seat" by assassinating one or more
individuals of consequential PP rank or position, but was
unsure if ETA leaders would want to do this. The Interior
Minister said, responding to our request, he was closely
following developments on the Couso case and the CIA flights
issue, and was eager to see a cooling of Spanish emotions in
both cases. Finally, Rubalcaba asked the Ambassador for
further reasons behind the postponement of the proposed March
visit to Madrid by Secretary Rice. The Minister expressed
appreciation for his meetings with the Ambassador, as
opportunities to exchange ideas and gain perspective. End
Summary.
//GOS Decision Saved Lives//
¶2. (C) Rubalcaba told the Ambassador that the decision to
allow convicted ETA assassin Inaki De Juana Chaos to serve
the remaining 18 months of his sentence at home under house
arrest was the correct one. (Embassy Note: On March 1,
incarcerated ETA member Inaki De Juana Chaos was released
from the Madrid hospital where he was being treated for a
hunger strike and was transferred to a hospital in San
Sebastian. When he has recovered from the affects of the
4-month hunger strike, he will be allowed to complete his
sentence at home under police surveillance. De Juana had
almost completed 17 years of a 30-year sentence for the
murder of 18 individuals when he became eligible for early
release in 2005. A National Court magistrate blocked De
Juana's release in 2005 by charging him with writing letters
threatening prison officials, and De Juana was later
sentenced to an additional 12 years behind bars. The Supreme
Court in February 2007 reduced that sentence to 3 years,
leaving only 18 months remaining due to time already served,
and setting the stage for the government's decision to
release him). Minister Rubalcaba said that his government
knew the decision would be controversial, but that government
officials had not done a good job explaining to the Spanish
people that De Juana had already served his time for the
murders, and remained in prison only on the lesser charge of
making threatening statements. Rubalcaba confided to the
Ambassador that as the end of De Juana's murder sentence drew
near in 2005, the Minister of Justice at that time did not
want to see the convicted assassin go free. He thus sought
to slap on an additional charge--albeit an obscure one with
flimsy merits--that would continue the ETA member's
incarceration. Rubalcaba said that in hindsight, it would
have been better to allow De Juana to go free in 2005 and
that now the Zapatero Government was "paying the price" for
that decision.
¶3. (C) Rubalcaba said that at the time of De Juana's release,
the ETA member was just hours away from suffering medically
irreversible damage due to his hunger strike, and would have
died in a short time if the GOS had not acted. Rubalcaba's
view is that the decision to release De Juana saved Spanish
lives by avoiding his transformation into a "decades-long
martyr for radical ETA youth." Rubalcaba said the GOS was
solely responsible for the decision, without any discussion
with or pressure from ETA. The Minister told the Ambassador
that despite the De Juana case becoming a rallying cry for
ETA members in recent weeks, current ETA leaders have no use
for him in the organization and will not want anything to do
with him once he is freed. Rubalcaba posited that De Juana
will likely retire to Morocco upon his release.
//ETA Could Put PP in Driver Seat//
¶4. (C) Turning to broader ETA issues, the Minister discussed
the virulent reaction to the De Juana decision by the main
opposition Partido Popular (PP). Rubalcaba told the
MADRID 00000449 002.2 OF 003
Ambassador that the GOS knows ETA could "put the PP in the
driver's seat" in advance of regional elections in May and
national elections in early 2008 by assassinating one or more
individuals of important PP rank or position. Rubalcaba
quickly said his government is unsure whether current ETA
leaders would risk taking this step, but the fear is that any
ETA sympathizer would have the power to change the political
calculus in Spain with one rash act. In discussing the
December 30 ETA bombing at Madrid's Barajas airport that
killed two individuals, Rubalcaba said that act proved the
ETA hard-liners had won out over those favoring moderation,
and derailed the peace process. Rubalcaba said that ETA's
political front group Batasuna is still working every angle
to try and gain permission to run in Basque municipal
elections in May, but the Barajas bombing has made that
scenario even more problematic.
//Bilateral Issues//
¶5. (C) The Ambassador expressed his appreciation to Minister
Rubalcaba for the strong level of counterterrorism
cooperation, specifically the development of the Bilateral
Counterterrorism Working Group. He said the working group is
an effective vehicle to improve judicial efforts against
terrorism in both countries. The Ambassador also reiterated
USG support for Spain's efforts in fighting terrorism and
said that the ongoing trial of individuals allegedly involved
in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings highlights the
continued threat facing both of our countries. When the
Ambassador conveyed continued Department and National
Security Council interest in the possible terrorist
designation of Barakat Yarkas, Rubalcaba replied that he was
aware that this was still a pending issue between our
governments and knows that it needs to be addressed. The
Minister told the Ambassador that responding to our request,
he was also following developments on the Jose Couso case
(the Spanish TV cameraman killed in the Palestine Hotel
incident in Iraq) and the CIA flights issue that have been
the subject of much sensational press coverage in Spain in
recent weeks. Rubalcaba said that although the Spanish
judiciary was fiercely independent and would do what it
thought was right, Rubalcaba had instructed his staff to
avoid any inflammatory rhetorical comments in an attempt to
lower the temperature on these issues.
//S Visit to Madrid//
¶6. (C) Minister Rubalcaba pressed the Ambassador for the
"real reason" why the Secretary postponed her proposed March
visit to Spain. The Ambassador replied that the postponement
was purely for scheduling reasons due to the Secretary's
planned travel and had nothing to do with any problems in the
bilateral relationship. Ambassador Aguirre noted that the
Secretary's recent phone call with Foreign Minister
SIPDIS
Moratinos, informing him that she needed to testify in
Congress on March 28, confirmed what the Ambassador had said.
Rubalcaba seemed satisfied with the answer. The Ambassador
reminded Rubalcaba that if sectors of the Spanish Government
continue to insist that there are signs of a deteriorating
bilateral relationship when no signs exist, they run the risk
of reversing some of the improvements made in the
relationship over the past two years. Although the GOS has
not confirmed the Secretary's new proposed visit date of June
1, Rubalcaba raised the possibility of the GOS eventually
making some kind of statement confirming the visit. The
Ambassador suggested to Rubalcaba that for security and
logistical reasons, it was probably not wise to confirm the
exact date of such a visit three months out, and the Minister
agreed with the reasoning. (Note: Embassy is working with
Washington, at the request of the Spanish MFA, to develop
some kind of public statement indicating that S had planned
to visit in March, is committed to coming to Spain, and that
dates are being worked out. MFA would like to publicize a
precise date for a rescheduled visit, but this issue is under
discussion between the Embassy and Washington.)
¶7. (C) Comment. Rubalcaba said he was weighed down with the
issues currently facing him and remarked that he "felt the
weight of Spain on his shoulders." He is currently living
above the Ministry due to repairs and refurbishment occurring
at his house and said that living so close to the office made
it hard to "disconnect": that he is having trouble sleeping
at night. Although he shows no outward signs of stress, the
events since the December 30 ETA bombing have clearly taken a
toll. The Minister said that he appreciated opportunities
such as these to exchange ideas and gain perspective and
hopes they will continue.
MADRID 00000449 003.2 OF 003
AGUIRRE