

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05QUITO289, ECUADOR'S ECONOMY: DOING WELL FOR THE WRONG REASONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05QUITO289.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05QUITO289 | 2005-02-04 15:03 | 2011-05-02 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Quito |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 QUITO 000289
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/AND
DEPT FOR WHA/PD LEBENS
DEPT PASS USTR FOR BENNETT HARMAN
DEPT PASS USAID LAC
E.O. 12985: N/A
TAGS: ECON ETRD ENRG EAID PGOV EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR'S ECONOMY: DOING WELL FOR THE WRONG REASONS
¶1. Summary: Despite chronic political instability,
Ecuador's economy continues to hum along to the tune of high
oil prices, increased oil exports, dollarization (and the
resultant stability and low inflation), and responsible
fiscal policies. In 2004 the GOE paid down its
international debt and all economic indicators are looking
good. Prognostications for 2005 are also positive. The IMF
has issued a positive "assessment" letter on the GOE's
management of the economy and established an enhanced
surveillance program with the government, opening the door
to increased lending by international financial institutions
(from a low point in 2004). The GOE is planning further
attempts to enter financial markets and manage their
international debt. The cherry on top is the FTA. However,
much depends on the GOE's success keeping political poison
from infecting the economic sphere. And the cloud adorned
by all these silver linings is Ecuador's continuing
inability to carry out the crucial reforms needed for long-
term economic stability and growth. See paragraphs 14-22
for our plans to push forward U.S. economic and commercial
interests in the short, medium and long term. End Summary.
2004: The Year of Opportunity
-----------------------------
¶2. A banking contact of ours recently concluded that, as a
result of dollarization and responsible economic management,
"Ecuador has seen the last of street mobs calling for the
overthrow of the President." We're not ready to go that
far, but our friend makes an important and oft-overlooked
point about the current situation here: despite all the
sound and fury of the repeated political crises, the
Gutierrez government has been one of the most economically
responsible governments of recent Ecuadorian history, and
the 2004 results, a combination of dumb luck and smart
policy, have been nothing short of spectacular. Economic
growth was about 6.5%, inflation dropped below 2%, and the
government paid back a net $400 million in international
debt, bringing its debt to GDP ratio to under 40% (down from
about 90% in 1999).
Dumb, and Not So Dumb, Luck
--------------------------
¶3. The price of oil is certainly the most obvious piece of
good luck Ecuador benefited from in 2004. Although
Ecuadorians have been disappointed to see the price for
Ecuador's heavy crude fall further behind that of lighter
crude with every price peak they reached, Ecuador has
benefited from a substantial windfall 1 from the increase of
prices over their 2003 level. The effect of the windfall
was particularly great as it coincided with an expansion of
over 50% in oil exports by private companies in the
aftermath of completion of the heavy crude pipeline (OCP for
its Spanish acronym) in late 2003. However, state-owned
Petroecuador struggled just to maintain oil production in
the short term, after a decade of decline.
¶4. With oil money sloshing into the country, the question
on many people's minds became how to use it. Public sector
workers went on strike; pensioners went on strike; teachers
went on strike; each seeking to share in the wealth.
Shielding themselves behind the fiscal responsibility law,
which limits increases in budgets and segregates oil
revenues from other revenues, dedicating them mostly to
payment of public debt, two responsible Ministers of Finance
held the line (mostly). The pressure eventually became too
intense for Mauricio Pozo, who resigned at mid-year to be
replaced by Mauricio Yepez, the former President of the
Central Bank. Both Mauricios applied a policy of under
executing the budget, and thus keeping it within the limits
set by the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The GOE ended 2004
with a very respectable primary fiscal surplus of 5.3% of
GDP.
¶5. The GOE's gamble on an FTA with the U.S. seemed to be
building upside and losing downside throughout the year. In
Fall 2003 it looked like Ecuador would be hard pressed to
enter the negotiations together with Peru and Colombia by
mid-year 2004. However, the GOE pulled out all the stops,
managed to resolve several commercial disputes, and not only
entered the negotiations together with the others, but
acquitted itself reasonably well in the negotiations
themselves.
The Weak Underbelly
-------------------
¶6. Unfortunately, short-term high quality economic
management is not all Ecuador needs. The GOE fell off its
IMF program in February 2004, despite good fiscal policy, as
its political weakness had allowed it to show almost no
progress on structural reform during the previous year. No
real progress was made in 2004, either. An attempt to turn
over Petroecuador's "crown jewel" oil fields to private
management early in the year failed when the Attorney
General (reversing himself for the second time on the issue)
determined that the bidding round was illegal under current
Ecuadorian law. The GOE submitted legislation to Congress
twice to overcome this problem, and twice was forced to
withdraw it in the face of almost certain defeat. The GOE
also submitted legislation to carry out modest reforms in
the electric sector, but that legislation also went nowhere,
as did proposals to turn over management of state-owned
telecommunications companies to international management and
to carry out an external audit of Petroecuador.
¶7. In the fall, Yepez took another stab at convincing the
President to increase the price of (heavily subsidized)
cooking gas. (Pozo had tried the same in 2003, with the same
unsuccessful result.) Although the early response was
positive, the end of year political situation made this a
non-starter, again.
¶8. Despite an oft-repeated message from the U.S. on the
issue, Ecuador has made only limited progress on labor
reforms. The GOE did hire one child labor inspector for
each province, as required under its own law. It also
issued a watered-down decree regulating subcontracting.
However, real protection of the rights of workers in Ecuador
remains to be implemented.
2005: Another Year of Opportunity
---------------------------------
¶9. The good news for 2005 is that all or most of the
opportunities Ecuador failed to take advantage of in 2004
are still available. There may even be a few new ones.
¶10. Two years of responsible fiscal policy, plus continued
high oil prices, may pay off this year. International
analysts suggest that the GOE may be over financed in 2005,
possibly by as much as $1 billion. This is the result of
expected increased disbursements by the international banks,
oil revenues, and likely new placements of international
debt. This would take pressure off the local market for GOE
debt, which was looking rather saturated in 2004. Yepez is
also planning $275 million in private debt placements, a
swap of the Global 12 bonds and a $400 million bond issuance
later in the year.
¶11. The IMF has grudgingly accepted the fact that GOE
fiscal policy remains responsible and that the country, for
the moment, has little need for the IMF's money. It agreed
in December to issue an assessment letter allowing funds
from other international financial institutions to flow. It
also established an enhanced surveillance mechanism with the
GOE, which amounts to quarterly reviews of GOE performance.
The Fund, like us, remains very concerned about the long
term given the lack of structural reform.
¶12. We expect the free trade agreement to be a major
political and economic issue in 2005. The conclusion of the
negotiations will lead to an intensification of the national
debate over the value of the agreement, and likely an
increased effort in the drive to collect signatures and
force a non-binding referendum on the agreement. The
general population seems uninspired by the FTA, but resigned
to its inevitability given Colombia's and Peru's likely
entry.
¶13. Yepez and his small band of reformers are making noise
about resurrecting the hydrocarbon law and the electric
sector reform, and have added to them a proposal for limited
social security reform. They suggest that the new
congressional majority the government wields may allow
passage. We are not optimistic. The new majority depends
on support from the MPD and the Socialists, neither of which
are likely to vote for any kind of economic reform, and the
bitterness between the government and the Social Christians
means that that party, which might be expected to support
some economic reforms, is not likely to vote for any GOE
proposal.
Our Plan
--------
¶14. We are focusing our efforts on the short, middle, and
long range as follows:
¶15. Short Range: Crisis prevention and response. This
includes a focus on resolving the commercial disputes
involving U.S. companies and combating the extremely bad
policy initiatives which crop up on a regular basis (recent
examples include regulations which would have destroyed the
nascent credit bureau industry and legislation proposed by
the powerful Social Christian Party to fix interest rates
and otherwise hamstring the banking sector, which is still
recovering from the 1999-2000 banking crisis). We will also
focus GOE attention on the need to comply with international
labor standards to prevent Ecuador's exclusion from an
Andean-U.S. FTA. Our public affairs section, including its
Information Resource Center, is also involved in
congressional outreach, helping those interested in finding
sensible alternatives to bad proposals.
¶16. We continue to support Ecuador's participation in FTA
negotiations through key technical assistance, studies and
training. This assistance has been vital to the GOE's
successful participation in the negotiations. Moreover, we
have engaged in a broad ranging public awareness campaign
that seeks to inform the public about the benefits of the
FTA. The goal is not only to gather supporters, but also to
make people aware of the opportunities the agreement will
bring.
¶17. Medium Term: We look for targets of opportunity,
either institutions which can be reformed because committed
reformers are in leadership positions or policy reforms
which seem to have sponsors and support. For several years
now we have supported the Internal Revenue Service (SRI) to
improve tax policy and tax administration. Our support has
resulted in a dramatic increase in tax collection over the
last five years and the establishment of the SRI as one of
the few effective and well-respected institutions of the
GOE. We are currently focusing assistance on building SRI
capacity to collect from the largest taxpayers. USAID has
designed and is supporting a major reform of the Ministry of
Economy. Over 2-3 years the program will restructure the
day-to-day operations, personnel systems, accounting and the
information management system. A similar reform is underway
at the Superintendency of Banks, with USAID's assistance.
In addition we are supporting Yepez effort to develop and
implement a broad reduction in unnecessary personnel across
the public sector, which will help reduce salary
obligations, a huge burden on the budget and streamline
government services. We will do what we can to advise and
support Yepez in the reform projects he is pushing, and have
our own suggestions, as well. Though we are encouraging the
GOE to take steps immediately to better protect worker
rights through administrative means, substantive labor
reform is another goal more likely to be achieved over the
medium term.
¶18. Our public diplomacy strategy targets Ecuadorian
reformers, sending them on International Visitor programs to
expose them to the benefits of responsible policies.
Publications, CD-Roms and other material from our
Information Research Center, as well as the Embassy web
site, provide information opinion leaders need to bolster
their arguments. Speaker programs by US economic experts
and Embassy staff also are spreading the word. We will be
fully engaged in a very public campaign to help Ecuadorians
understand the benefits of the FTA for their country. We
hope to continue the AID-funded FTA public awareness
campaign that has already reached some 10,000 Ecuadorians.
¶19. Long Term: Despite our efforts and those of our allies
on economic reform in the medium term, we believe it likely
that the FTA will be the only significant economic reform of
the final two years of the Gutierrez administration. Our
long-term effort is centered on two key issues, making the
most of the FTA as an opportunity for reform and building
support among the youth for future reforms.
¶20. Ecuador will have to undertake a great deal of
institution building to comply with the terms of the FTA.
Our assistance will be critical to help the GOE adopt
standards, train its people, approve legislation and create
institutions. We can use FTA-mandated reforms in Customs
and intellectual property rights areas as a vehicle to clean
up the former and improve enforcement efforts on the latter.
In areas such as technical barriers to trade, competition
policy, labor regulation and environment control the GOE
will depend to a great extent on our assistance to implement
the agreement. Even where international financial
institutions are present to provide resources to address
some of these issues, USG assistance is essential to provide
tailored support, and to help address specific USG
interests.
¶21. Our public diplomacy efforts focus on increasing the
public's understanding of the real benefits reforms will
provide in accomplishing Ecuador's long term social and
economic development goals, particularly among the young
leaders of today who will shape Ecuador's future. We are
encouraging qualified candidates to apply for Fulbright
scholarships to study in the United States and supporting
the English teaching programs that give them the edge they
need to compete internationally. We are focusing our press
and outreach programming on such issues as transparency in
government, fighting corruption and the need for greater
civic participation in order to encourage the successor
generation to carry on fight for continued reforms.
Resource Constraints
--------------------
¶22. We are concerned that reductions in Economic Support
Funds for Ecuador, as well as Nethercutt amendment and other
sanctions may significantly affect our ability to help our
allies in the GOE move economic reforms forward. It would
be particularly unfortunate if we were unable to help them
take advantage of the FTA to spur reforms along, and would
directly damage both our commercial and our strategic
interests in Ecuador.
KENNEY
_______________________________
1How much