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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LIMA1358, NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA1358 | 2006-04-07 22:10 | 2011-02-22 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: www.elcomercio.pe |
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #1358/01 0972243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072243Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9676
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3231
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9299
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0227
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0401
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6659
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001358
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
HUMALA
Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble. Reason 1.4(b/d).
1...
id: 59852
date: 4/7/2006 22:43
refid: 06LIMA1358
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #1358/01 0972243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072243Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9676
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3231
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9299
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0227
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0401
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6659
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001358
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PE
SUBJECT: NEW VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LOBBIES AMBASSADOR FOR
HUMALA
Classified By: Ambassador Curt Struble. Reason 1.4(b/d).
¶1. (C) The Ambassador invited new Vice Foreign Minister
Harold Forsyth over for a one-on-one breakfast April 7.
Forsyth, who according to rumor has the inside track to
become Foreign Minister if Ollanta Humala is elected
President, quickly steered the subject to Peru,s election.
The Vice Minister wanted to solicit the Ambassador,s views
on USG concerns about Humala and to convey reassurance that
an Humala government would not align Peru with Venezuela,s
Chavez.
¶2. (C) Forsyth began by recalling his unusual experience as
a career diplomat and sometime politician. He was among the
protesting diplomats who were forced out of the service by
Fujimori after the 1992 auto-coup. In 1996, he won a
Congressional seat with Perez de Cuellar,s UPP. The Vice
Minister zeroed in on one element in his biography, his role
in co-founding the pro-democracy NGO Transparencia with
Salomon Lerner Ghitis in 2000. From that association, he
said, he developed a close bond of trust with Lerner and is
convinced that the latter would not help someone who would
lead Peru in a radical direction. (Comment: Lerner is one
of Humala,s principle advisors and a key liaison between the
candidate and the business community. During the
conversation Forsyth never specifically referred to any
conversation he has had with Humala. While offering his own
assessment of the candidate, he validated it at several
points by referring to the views of Salomon Lerner rather
than his own experience.)
¶3. (C) Forsyth noted that Peru is a country with a history
and culture unequaled elsewhere in Spanish-speaking America
except Mexico. That and Peru,s enduring national interests
would, Forsyth argued, prevent it from following Venezuela,s
foreign policy lead. Even during the 1968-74 Velasco
dictatorship, he said, Peru had taken care to prevent a
rupture in its relations with Washington.
¶4. (C) Forsyth observed that the Andean Community (CAN) is
in crisis because of the increasing alignment of Bolivia with
Venezuela. He would be representing Peru on Monday, April
10, at a CAN meeting of Vice Ministers to discuss problems
posed by the fact that three members want Free Trade
Agreements with the United States and two do not. Bolivia
did Venezuela,s bidding by circulating a letter before the
scheduled March CAN-EU summit preparatory conference,
objecting that the right conditions did not exist for such a
meeting because of differences within the CAN on trade
policy. Venezuela responded by canceling the meeting with
the EU though it had no right to do so.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, letting President Toledo,s signature of an FTA
with the U.S. the following day speak for Peru. Warming to
his point, Forsyth said that Peru is not Bolivia; it doesn't
have Venezuela,s oil and neither can nor wants to alienate
the United States.
¶6. (C) Forsyth asked the Ambassador what concerns the
United States might have about an Humala government. The
Ambassador said that four building blocks form the foundation
of U.S.-Peruvian relations, which are the best they have been
since World War II. They are:
--a common interest in strengthening democracy;
--cooperation against terrorism;
--cooperation in fighting narcotics and other transnational
crimes;
--the commercial relationship and its association with U.S.
efforts to reduce poverty in Peru through economic growth.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that Humala has said he will
abide by the democratic rules of the game. If he wins the
election he will be taken at his word unless actions show
otherwise, but his lack of a track record in government
creates uncertainty. Humala,s military background lends
credibility to his pledge that Peruvian terrorists will be
confronted, but he has not addressed the international
dimension of the problem. Toledo,s actions to help Colombia
deal with the FARC have been exemplary and stand in contrast
to the Chavez government's approach. While Colombia is going
to win against the FARC, there is no question that what its
neighbors do can make the process more bloody, lengthy and
costly.
¶8. (C) In the area of narcotics, the Ambassador observed,
Humala,s proposals are unclear and may be non-viable; for
example, the candidate's call to ban all forced eradication.
Colombia is determined to eradicate coca as a means of
severing the FARC's logistical tail. This will progressively
drive up coca leaf prices in Peru and Bolivia. Unless those
governments show resolve, they will quickly see a huge
displacement of cultivation and trafficking to their
territory. Finally, the candidate's proposal to force
renegotiation of contracts will create friction with all
foreign investors, including those from the United States.
¶9. (C) Forsyth expressed gratitude for these observations.
Rather than addressing them directly, he said that he wanted
to share the reasons why he considers Humala the best option
as President of Peru. "Lourdes (Flores) is a friend of
mine," the Vice Minister said, "but she is very ideological
and inflexible." These characteristics, he predicted, will
lead the country to serious social conflict. "Alan Garcia
denounces Humala for being an unknown. My problem with
Garcia," Forsyth added, "is that he is a known quantity who
has presided over the most disastrous administration Peru has
seen."
¶10. (C) Again citing his confidence in Lerner,s appraisal
and judgment, the Vice Minister expressed confidence that
Humala would prove to be a responsible President, but one who
could make the lower classes feel included. In that
connection, Forsyth predicted that an Humala government would
retain the U.S.-Peru FTA. The Ambassador questioned that
statement, noting that Humala had staked out a pretty firm
position against it. Forsyth insisted on his view,
predicting that the Peruvian Congress will have approved the
FTA by the time the next President is inaugurated and that
Humala would be unwilling to rupture an agreement that has
been implemented (sic, since implementation would not occur
under the most optimistic scenario until January 1, 2007.)
¶11. (C) COMMENT: Forsyth sought to walk a delicate line.
He avoided mention of his own meetings with Humala, though
the relationship is an open secret among insiders. All the
same, it is a bit awkward for a sitting Vice Minister and
career diplomat to acknowledge them directly. Still, he was
on a clear mission to reassure the Ambassador that Humala is
no Chavez. Humala has been making the same case in public,
but his credibility is undercut by the remarkable similarity
his plan of government holds to those pioneered by Chavez and
Evo Morales. It was also interesting that, notwithstanding
his efforts to promote a return to institutional democracy
during the Fujimori years, Forsyth expressed doubts to the
Ambassador that Peru is capable of normal democratic
governance. At the beginning of their breakfast, Forsyth
noted that the middle class is the backbone of democracy
where it flourishes and lamented that Peru has too small a
middle class to provide that backbone. While he at no point
expressed sympathy for authoritarianism, Forsyth was
pessimistic about the near term health of democracy in his
country. END COMMENT.
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