

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06HALIFAX70, ENERGY: MOVING LABRADOR'S LOWER CHURCHILL PROJECT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06HALIFAX70.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06HALIFAX70 | 2006-04-07 15:03 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Consulate Halifax |
VZCZCXRO6201
RR RUEHGA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHHA #0070/01 0971503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071503Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL HALIFAX
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0976
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0353
INFO RUEHHA/AMCONSUL HALIFAX 1039
RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0010
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HALIFAX 000070
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG PGOV CA
SUBJECT: ENERGY: MOVING LABRADOR'S LOWER CHURCHILL PROJECT TO
REALITY
HALIFAX 00000070 001.2 OF 003
¶1. SUMMARY: Suitors have lined up for a chance to be part of
the long-anticipated project to develop the hydroelectric
resource of the Lower Churchill River in Newfoundland-Labrador.
A tough but calculated business plan by Premier Danny Williams,
coupled with new market dynamics, has economists and even the
Premier's staunchest political foes predicting that it looks
good for the multi-billion dollar project to proceed. Estimated
output from the facility could be enough to supply 1.4 million
households in eastern North America. However, until the
provincial government decides on a specific marketing and
transmission plan, just what portion of the output will be
available for export to the United States will remain unknown.
END SUMMARY
¶2. Danny Williams, the high profile premier of
Newfoundland-Labrador, is once again at the forefront of another
mega energy project: this time the decades-old dream of
harnessing the hydroelectric potential of Labrador's Lower
Churchill River (LCR). Since his election as Premier in 2003
Williams has developed a reputation as a bare-knuckled fighter
for his province's economic well-being. His zealous policy of
controlling development of his province's resources while
maximizing economic returns has seen him take on Ottawa and win
big on oil and gas royalties. However, his strong-arm tactics
frustrated major oil companies in their negotiations with the
Premier on a development deal for the province's fourth offshore
project, Hebron, with the result that they walked away. Whether
the Premier went too far in pushing the industry in the Hebron
case remains to be seen. However, when it comes to the LCR
project, the Premier's hard-nosed business tactics are not
dissuading some high level contenders from wanting to want to
work with him in moving the LCR project from a dream to a
reality.
Project Specifics
-----------------
¶3. To quote the Newfoundland-Labrador government's promotional
literature, the Lower Churchill River is a significant untapped
long-term source of clean, renewable energy available for the
North American electricity market. Located 140 miles from the
existing 5,428-megawatt generating facility at Churchill Falls,
Labrador, the proposed project includes two potential sites. A
2,000 megawatt project at Gull Island has the potential to
produce an average 11.9 terawatt-hours of energy annually. An
824-megawatt project at Muskrat Falls has the potential to
produce an average 4.8 terawatt-hours per year. Combined, the
projects have the potential to produce sufficient energy to
supply up to 1.4 million households annually.
¶4. The cost of the project will depend on whether the Gull
Island and Muskrat Falls sites are developed at the same time
(the province's preference) and how each site is configured.
Because of the varying development options, analysts are looking
at a broad range of total costs, falling anywhere from $6 to $9
billion. Assuming the project goes ahead, the estimated
start-up date would be 2015.
Routing And Marketing Options: US Market Only One Option
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. The provincial government is looking at two very different
options for getting Lower Churchill's combined 2,800 megawatts
of power to market. Option number one is the so-called
traditional route that would see LCR power wheeled through
Quebec and then to energy markets in that province, Ontario and
the United States. Option number two is the Maritime route
which would see the electricity moved across Labrador and then
by underwater cable to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and from
there to the United States. Until those marketing options are
settled, it is unclear just how much LCR power will be available
for export to the United States.
Getting the Project Moving: Past and Current Attempts
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶6. The dream to see a second hydro project in Labrador has been
around for over 30 years and the province's history books show
several failed attempts to get the project off the ground.
Recent attempts include those proposed by Premier Williams'
immediate predecessors, Liberal Premiers Roger Grimes (2002) and
Brian Tobin (1998). As analysts have concluded, these previous
deals were doomed to fail, principally, because they were too
wrapped up in politics. The general perception in the minds of
the Newfoundland-Labrador electorate was that the premiers were
too quick to sell off a valuable energy resource to the only
suitor, Hydro-Quebec (HQ). Also, HQ was portrayed as a bully,
holding Newfoundland-Labrador ransom because it controlled the
transmission lines that the LCR project would need. To add to
HALIFAX 00000070 002.2 OF 003
the contentious atmosphere, the ghost of the existing Churchill
Falls contract haunted any negotiations on the LCR project.
Signed in the 1960s the Churchill Falls contract allows HQ to
purchase the output from the 5,428-megawatt facility at cheap
rates with no escalator clauses. Several Newfoundland-Labrador
premiers have tried to reopen the contract to no avail, which
led them to insist on onerous conditions in a future LCR
contract as a means of compensation for Churchill Falls.
¶7. Enter Danny Williams in 2003 who with his successful
business background was quick to take a fresh look at the LCF
project. The result was a whole new strategy featuring a
pragmatic, business approach, not politics or emotions. The
first notable change with the Williams' game plan was that the
ghost of Churchill Falls would no longer have any influence. As
Williams told Newfoundlanders and Labradoreans, "just get it
over it." Also different this time is the premier's decision to
have the provincially-owned utility, Newfoundland-Labrador
Hydro, not politicians, on the frontlines of the process.
Furthermore, the premier made another business decision by
calling in some high-priced help, hiring independent industry
consultants to advise the new LCR team.
¶8. By far the most radical difference from previous attempts to
get the project kick-started was the Premier's move to dispel
the notion that LCR could only be developed by the direct
participation of HQ. Instead, the Premier embarked on an
ambitious plan to see just who else might be interested in
getting the project moving. What followed was his release of a
competitive, five-phase strategy aimed at finding the best
entity to develop the project, with no preference to any one
group that might have had a past interest in the project, i.e.,
HQ. Phase one of the strategy was letting the world know about
LCR and inviting expressions of interest. Phase two is the
assessment of the different proposals. Phase three, the
negotiation of commercial principles with the selected entity;
and phase four, detailed commercial negotiations.
Where we are now - Assessing the Proposals
------------------------------------------
¶9. In January 2005 the government launched Phase one by sending
out individual invitations to private companies and government
jurisdictions and by running ads in global business newspapers
and magazines. By March 31, 2005, 25 interested parties
responded. From that list, the LCR team found three development
proposals to their liking and three financing options. The
review team is currently crunching the numbers and finishing the
risk analysis for each. Speculation is there will be a final
cut by the last half of 2006.
Who Made the Cut?
----------------
¶10. The three development proponents under consideration are:
a) Hydro Quebec/Ontario Energy Financing Company/SNC-Lavalin.
Hydro Quebec is owned by the government of Quebec; Ontario
Energy Financing Company is one of the five components
established by the restructuring of the former Ontario Hydro;
and SNC-Lavalin is a privately owned engineering and
construction company.
b) TransCanada Corporation, a publicly traded North American
energy company, headquartered in Calgary.
c) The Tshiaskueshish Group, a consortium comprised of
Australian, Canadian and First Nation business interests in
Labrador.
The three financial proponents are:
a) Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited, a Hong Kong
diversified infrastructure company.
b) Borealis Infrastructure Management Inc. a subsidiary of the
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, one of Canada's
largest pension plans.
c) Altius, a Newfoundland and Labrador based royalty and mineral
exploration investment company focused on resource development
in Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Other Contender - The Newfoundland-Labrador Government
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶11. Consistent with his government's policy of maintaining
control over the province's resources and maximizing economic
returns, the Premier also has another option, going it alone.
HALIFAX 00000070 003.2 OF 003
The Premier's thinking is if the 25 interested parties who bid
on the project believe they can develop it, there is no reason
why the Newfoundland-Labrador government cannot do the same.
With the money from the new offshore royalty agreement, the
Premier believes this cash provides the province with the
required leverage in dealing with any potential developers or
financial partners in a Newfoundland-Labrador led project. To
let all the parties know that the Williams government is serious
in its intent to be an equal contender, it formally applied to
Hydro Quebec's transmission division for approval to wheel the
LCR power through its transmission system. The province has
already made a refundable deposit of $17 million, which presents
an estimate of one-month tariff for using HQ infrastructure
through its Open Access Transmission Tariff. At present, HQ is
studying the application, but will have to come up with a
response at some point.
Comment: Is It Really LCR's Day In The Sun?
--------------------------------------------
¶12. With a number of serious propositions on the table and a
changed energy market which now favors new, clean power sources
like the LCR, many economists, joined surprisingly enough by the
Premier's political foes, believe it is time for LCR's day in
the sun. Moreover, the Premier's steadfast business approach
should mean that the province can get the most realistic and
cost-effective development plan possible. While finding an
interested party now appears likely, there are still several
hurdles to overcome before the project can move ahead. The
premier has been very forthright in discussing what these are:
environmental and aboriginal issues and equally important,
national political considerations. A specific issue will be to
determine just what role the new Harper government may play in
the project.
¶13. Considering the Premier's record of never shying away from
a battle, he will be looking to Ottawa for such things as loan
guarantees or other forms of financial involvement. However,
just how interested the Conservative government in Ottawa will
be in helping to finance a project where the bulk of the power
might leave the country, remains to be seen. While these
considerations will be complicating factors further down the
road, for now the Premier and his LCR team are focused on the
immediate task of reviewing the different proposals. Once that
is completed, then the next battle starts: Premier Williams
going head to head with a would-be developer in the commercial
negotiations of Phase three. Given his tenaciousness as a
negotiator, our money is on Williams to take every possible
nickel off the table. END COMMENT
HILL