

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AE
AF
AM
AR
AJ
AU
AORC
AG
AEMR
AMGT
APER
AGMT
AL
AFIN
AO
AMED
ADCO
AS
ABUD
ABLD
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
APECO
AID
AND
AMBASSADOR
AN
ARM
AY
AODE
AMG
ASCH
AMCHAMS
ARF
APCS
APEC
ASEAN
AGAO
ANET
ADPM
ACOA
ACABQ
AORL
AFFAIRS
ATRN
ACS
AFSI
AFSN
ADANA
ASIG
AA
AX
AUC
AC
AECL
AADP
AGRICULTURE
AMEX
ACAO
ACBAQ
AQ
AORG
ADM
AINF
AIT
ASEX
AGR
AROC
ATFN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AZ
AVERY
BA
BY
BU
BR
BE
BL
BO
BK
BM
BILAT
BH
BEXP
BF
BTIO
BC
BBSR
BMGT
BTIU
BG
BWC
BB
BD
BX
BP
BRUSSELS
BN
BIDEN
BT
CW
CH
CF
CD
CV
CVIS
CM
CE
CA
CJAN
CLINTON
CIA
CU
CASC
CI
CO
CACM
CDB
CN
CMGT
CS
CG
CBW
CIS
CR
CONDOLEEZZA
CPAS
CAN
CWC
CY
COUNTER
CDG
CL
CT
CIC
CIDA
CSW
CHR
CB
CODEL
COUNTERTERRORISM
CTR
COM
CICTE
CFED
CJUS
CKGR
CBSA
CEUDA
CARSON
CONS
CITEL
CLMT
CROS
CITT
CAC
CVR
CDC
CAPC
COPUOS
CBC
CBE
CARICOM
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CTM
CNARC
ECON
EFIN
ETRD
EUN
EFIS
EG
ETTC
EZ
EPET
EAID
EAGR
ENRG
ECUN
EU
ELAB
ECPS
EAIR
EINV
ELTN
EWWT
EIND
EMIN
EI
ECIN
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EN
ES
ER
EC
EUC
EINT
EINVETC
ENGR
ET
EK
ENIV
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ECONOMY
EAP
EFTA
EUR
EUMEM
EXIM
ERD
ENERG
EUREM
ESA
ERNG
EXTERNAL
EPA
EINVECONSENVCSJA
ECONOMICS
ELN
EINN
EFINECONCS
ENNP
EEPET
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ETRO
ESENV
ECINECONCS
ECONOMIC
EAIDS
EDU
ETRA
ETRN
EFIM
EIAR
ETRC
EAIG
EXBS
EURN
ECIP
EREL
ECA
ENGY
ECONCS
ECONEFIN
ETC
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
EINDETRD
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
INRB
IRAJ
IQ
IN
IT
IMO
INTERPOL
ICAO
IO
IC
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
ICTY
ID
IPR
IWC
ILC
INTELSAT
IL
IBRD
IMF
IA
IRC
ICRC
ILO
ITU
ITRA
IV
IDA
IAHRC
ICJ
ISRAELI
IRS
INMARSAT
ISRAEL
ISLAMISTS
INDO
IZPREL
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITF
IBET
IEFIN
INR
IACI
INTERNAL
IDP
IGAD
IEA
ICTR
IIP
INRA
INRO
IF
KJUS
KSCA
KNNP
KU
KCOR
KCRM
KDEM
KTFN
KHLS
KPAL
KWBG
KACT
KGHG
KPAO
KTIA
KIRF
KWMN
KS
KG
KZ
KN
KMDR
KISL
KSPR
KHIV
KPRP
KAWK
KR
KUNR
KDRG
KCIP
KGCC
KTIP
KSUM
KPKO
KVIR
KAWC
KPIN
KGIC
KRAD
KIPR
KOLY
KCFE
KMCA
KE
KV
KICC
KNPP
KBCT
KSEP
KFRD
KFLU
KVPR
KOCI
KBIO
KSTH
KMPI
KCRS
KOMC
KTBT
KPLS
KIRC
KREL
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLO
KBTS
KSTC
KTDB
KFSC
KX
KFTFN
KNEI
KIDE
KREC
KMRS
KICA
KPAONZ
KCGC
KSAF
KRGY
KCMR
KRVC
KVRP
KSEO
KCOM
KAID
KTEX
KNUC
KNAR
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KLIG
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KHDP
KGIT
KNSD
KOMS
KWMM
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KO
KMFO
KRCM
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KPWR
KID
KWNM
KRIM
KPOA
KCHG
KOM
KSCI
KFIN
KMOC
KESS
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KPRV
KBTR
KERG
KTER
KDDG
KPAK
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KCFC
KWWMN
KWMNCS
KJUST
MARR
MOPS
MU
MTCRE
MNUC
MY
MASS
MCAP
MOPPS
MAR
MPOS
MO
ML
MR
MASC
MX
MD
MP
MA
MTRE
MIL
MCC
MZ
MK
MDC
MRCRE
MAPS
MV
MI
MEPN
MAPP
MEETINGS
MAS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MTCR
MG
MC
MARAD
MIK
MILITARY
MEDIA
MEPI
MUCN
MEPP
MT
MERCOSUR
MW
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
NZ
NATO
NG
NI
NO
NATIONAL
NU
NPT
NIPP
NL
NPG
NS
NA
NGO
NP
NSG
NDP
NAFTA
NR
NC
NH
NE
NSF
NPA
NK
NSSP
NRR
NATOPREL
NSC
NT
NW
NORAD
NEW
NV
NSFO
NAR
NASA
NZUS
OTRA
OVIP
OPRC
OPDC
OSCE
OAS
ODIP
OIIP
OFDP
OVP
OREP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OEXC
OPCW
OIE
OIC
OFDA
OSCI
OPIC
OBSP
OECD
ON
OCII
OHUM
OES
OCS
OMIG
OPAD
OTR
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PSOE
PINS
PARM
PK
PBTS
PEPR
PM
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PREF
PBIO
PROP
PA
PSI
PINT
PO
PKFK
PL
PAK
PE
POLITICS
PINL
POL
PHSA
PU
PF
POV
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PARMS
PRGOV
PNAT
POLINT
PRAM
PMAR
PG
PAO
PROG
PRELP
PPA
PCUL
PSEPC
PSA
PREO
PAHO
PGIV
PREFA
PALESTINIAN
PAIGH
POSTS
PTBS
PGOVLO
PORG
PGOVE
PLN
PINF
PAS
PUNE
POLICY
PDEM
PDOV
PCI
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PHUMPGOV
PMIL
PNG
PP
PS
PHUH
PECON
POGOV
PY
PHUMPREL
PHUS
PRL
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
PEL
RS
RU
RW
REGION
RP
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RUPREL
RM
RO
RCMP
RSO
RELATIONS
REACTION
REPORT
RIGHTS
ROOD
RF
RFE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP
SA
SY
SF
SYR
SENV
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SO
SU
SG
STEINBERG
SHUM
SW
SMIG
SR
SZ
SIPRS
SI
SAARC
SPCE
SARS
SN
SYRIA
SANC
SL
SCRS
SC
SENVKGHG
SAN
SNARCS
SHI
SWE
SNARIZ
SIPDIS
SEN
SNARN
SPCVIS
SEVN
SSA
SH
SOFA
SK
ST
TPHY
TU
TRGY
TI
TX
TS
TW
TC
TFIN
TD
TSPA
TH
TT
TIP
TBIO
TSPL
TZ
TERRORISM
TRSY
TN
THPY
TINT
TF
TL
TV
TK
TO
TP
TURKEY
TNGD
TBID
TAGS
TR
UP
US
UNSC
UK
UZ
UE
UNESCO
UV
UNGA
UN
UNMIK
UNO
UY
UAE
UNEP
UG
UNHCR
UNHRC
USUN
UNAUS
USTR
USNC
USOAS
UNCHR
UNCSD
UNDP
USEU
USPS
UNDC
UNDESCO
UNCHC
UNFICYP
UNC
UNODC
UNPUOS
UNCND
UNICEF
UNCHS
UNVIE
USAID
UNIDROIT
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE361, COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE361.
VZCZCXYZ0053
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0361/01 0541928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231928Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7320
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3931
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000361
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV ELAB ASEC PINR CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB
REF: A. 06 SAN JOSE 2431
¶B. SAN JOSE 175
Classified By: CDA Russell Frisbie per reasons 1.4 (b & d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) 1. (C) The next anti-CAFTA protest is scheduled for
Monday, February 26, with the locus of action likely to be
San Jose. Organizers promise a larger event than last
October's protest, but predicting turnout is impossible in
advance. The GOCR has vowed to prevent disruption of
essential services (not anticipated) and roadblocks
(probable) while respecting the right of citizens to protest.
Costa Rican security officials are confident they can
prevent major disturbances. With assistance from Post
(rented busses) as well as Colombia (Post-funded training)
and Taiwan (vehicles and equipment), the police have improved
their ability to respond to the protests. On the other side,
labor union leaders privately acknowledge that the event
probably will not be a decisive blow against CAFTA
ratification. A less antagonistic but equally determined new
leadership - the National Front - has become the public face
of the CAFTA opposition, seeking a "time out" to develop a
national consensus on the GOCR,s entire development agenda.
PAC leader Otton Solis has urged CAFTA opponents to take to
the streets in a celebration of Costa Rican democracy.
Assuming no violence, both sides will likely declare victory,
but momentum seems to favor the GOCR. Anti-CAFTA forces may
try to mount further (and perhaps more violent) protests
later, especially around the ratification vote. END SUMMARY.
------------------------
ANOTHER ANTI-CAFTA MARCH
------------------------
¶2. (U) Both sides are squaring off for the next anti-CAFTA
protest, scheduled for February 26. Led by the "National
Front of Support for the Fight Against CAFTA," an umbrella
group drawn from university students and faculty, labor
unions, and members of various social organizations, the
protesters plan to focus most of their action in San Jose.
They plan to assemble at the old national soccer stadium and
march through downtown to rally at the Legislative Assembly.
The organizers hope to far exceed the 6-9,000 person crowd
assembled for the last protest, October 23-24 (Ref A). As in
the October protests, a few additional marches and attempted
road blockages may take place around the country. The GOCR
has made it clear, including in stern television
advertisements featuring Minister of Presidency Rodrigo
Arias, that the public's right to protest peacefully will be
honored fully, but no disruption to essential services or
roadblocks will be allowed.
----------------------------
UNIONS: SIZE DOES NOT MATTER
----------------------------
¶3. (SBU) PolCouns and Poloff met with public employees,
labor union leader and outspoken CAFTA critic Albino Vargas
and two associates on February 7. Vargas, as feisty as ever,
repeated his familiar mantra: Since the GOCR has refused a
true national dialogue, CAFTA must be "decided in the
streets." The Agreement is illegitimate, anyway, because it
was negotiated "in secret" by the former administration.
And, the Arias Administration has no right to "impose" CAFTA
on Costa Rica because a) Arias "stole" the 2006 election and
b) Arias should not have been allowed to run again in the
first place. When asked why he continued to boycott meetings
with Arias and other union leaders, Vargas insisted the
President never listens to their concerns. When asked about
the impact if the protest turnout is lower than expected
(based on just-published CID-Gallup data showing that only
six percent of those polled supported the protests), Vargas
insisted "numbers don't matter". Although he dismissed the
CID-Gallup figures as biased, Vargas acknowledge that the
February 26 events probably will not b decisive. He expects
the GOCR will claim victoy no matter the tunout.
-------------------------------------------
NATIONAL FRONT: NEW FACE FO THE OPPOSITION?
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (U) The National Front, led byEugenio Trejos, Dean of
the Technology Instituteof Costa Rica at Cartago, has
increasingly become the public face of the opposition, part
of a clear effort to play down the role of the more
antagonistic unions. In a long meeting with PolCouns and
Poloff on February 21, Trejos said he and other Front leaders
had met with a wide range of protest organizers and GOCR
officials, including Public Security Minister Fernando
Berrocal, to urge that the events be peaceful. Trejos was
optimistic that ex-presidents Luis Alberto Monje (PLN) and
Rodrigo Carazo (PUSC) would join the protests to lend them
more gravitas. Trejos was fairly confident that the San Jose
events would remain peaceful, but he warned that the Front
could not "guarantee" calm everywhere, especially in the
hinterlands, and particularly if the police "provoked"
violence.
¶5. (U) Trejos echoed the legitimacy concerns about the Arias
Administration raised by Vargas. Insisting that the GOCR,s
38-seat working coalition in the Assembly was weak, he said
the best case scenario for CAFTA opponents would be to peel
away one or two of those legislators, so the GOCR would have
to halt CAFTA, "listen to the people," and seek a new
national "consensus," not only on CAFTA, but on the GOCR,s
entire development agenda. Trejos said a national referendum
would be the ideal vehicle to help build the consensus, but
admitted that it wasn't clear a referendum related to CAFTA
was constitutionally feasible. A team of opposition legal
experts are studying the issue, he said. For CAFTA
opponents, the GOCR,s pushing ahead to ratification would be
the worst case scenario, according to Trejos. A ratification
vote in April might provoke real violence, he warned. The
contest at hand, he maintained, is about the "60% of the
population that has not really made up their minds" about
CAFTA. Like Vargas, Trejos also dismissed the recent
CID-Gallup results (that 62% of those who are familiar with
CAFTA support it.)
--------------------------
GOVERNMENT: READY BUT WARY
--------------------------
¶6. (SBU) The GOCR seems ready for the protests. The
intelligence service is confident it knows who the real
troublemakers will be, but is still wary. In a detailed
pre-protest strategy session convened by Minister Berrocal on
February 3 (the first such planning session in our memory),
police officials were worried that the February 26 events
might be more disruptive than those of last October. Radical
elements outside of the organized anti-CAFTA groups, for
example, might block roads in defiance of the GOCR,s
warnings. Alternatively, a group of students perhaps aided
by opposition legislators - could "peacefully" take over the
Assembly building, forcing the police to remove them, at the
risk of looking "too aggressive." Security and screening has
been tightened at the building to prevent this. NOTE:
Poloff will also attend the final pre-protest strategy
meeting on February 23.
------------------------------
USG (AND COLOMBIAN) ASSISTANCE
------------------------------
¶7. (C) As in the case of the October protests, mobility is
the chief concern of the police. With approximately 450 riot
police available in San Jose, but only 160 of those
fully-equipped (and recently refresher-trained by
Embassy-funded Colombian police instructors), the police may
need to move resources quickly to potential traffic choke
points and protest hot spots throughout the capital. The
Ministry of Public Security thus asked Post to rent buses for
their use, using available INL funds. Post will provide 10
buses, for February 26 only. (The police do not believe they
will need the buses after that.) Berrocal believes that
managing the image of the demonstrations is crucial and that
the government will win this showdown if security officials
are not provoked into violence with protesters. Berrocal is
so determined that he told national police commanders that
"if blood must be shed, let it be our blood first." Berrocal
has announced publicly that police will not be armed during
the protests.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Colombian police instructors, provided
with the very helpful assistance of Embassy Bogota and the
Colombian Embassy here, greatly boosted the confidence of the
police anti-riot personnel. Poloffs observed this firsthand
during a visit to the National Police training facility in
Guanacaste. Adding to the police's confidence was the first
tranche of security assistance provided by Taiwan. An array
of 125 motorcycles, 60 pick-up trucks and other equipment was
received in a public ceremony on February 22, deliberately
timed to be a signal to protesters. END COMMENT.
-----------------------
IMPACT ON THE ASAMBLEA?
-----------------------
¶9. (SBU) CAFTA opponents have maintained pressure on
legislators, even in advance of the big day on February 26.
On January 23 and February 12, union leaders including Vargas
tried to disrupt proceedings in the Assembly by noisily and
personally threatening legislators from the visitors,
gallery. After trying to reason with the protesters,
Assembly President Fernando Pacheco called the police,
leading to a brief, but well-publicized scuffle as the
gallery was cleared. CAFTA opponents, including Trejos,
decried this use of "excessive force." Meeting with the
Ambassador on February 16, PLN faction chief Mayi Antillon
said the noisy union leaders had overplayed their hands by
being "too disrespectful." She acknowledged, however, that
some individual legislators - such as Jose Manuel Echandi of
the PUN -- were concerned for their safety and would be
allowed to be "absent" on February 26. (Echandi also
requested police protection near his residence.) Antillon
acknowledged that the protests, if widespread enough and
violent at all, could make some members of the GOCR,s
working coalition "waiver" a little. She remains confident,
however, that the Asamblea can complete the first
ratification vote by April. Once that is done, she predicts
that the opposition will lose most of its steam.
--------------------------------------------
THE PAC,S OTTON SOLIS: WILL HE OR WON'T HE?
--------------------------------------------
¶10. (U) And what about PAC party leader Otton Solis, who
vowed to join the protests when the CAFTA bill was voted out
of committee last December, and who has taken a higher
anti-CAFTA, pro-CBI profile since his January visit to
Washington? In a lengthy radio interview on February 6,
Solis said his PAC party was not organizing anything, but
would join the protests if they were convoked under "correct
terms," i.e., as "day for Costa Rica." He has since been coy
about his own participation, and whether PAC would take any
responsibility for keeping the protests peaceful. Minister
of Government Arias insisted to the media that if Solis
joined the march, then his participation (as leader of the
main opposition party) should be "a guarantee that the march
will be peaceful." In a TV commercial aired on February 22,
however, Solis urged those concerned about CAFTA to take to
the streets on Monday in a peaceful celebration of Costa
Rican sovereignty.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (SBU) Both sides seem ready and determined for Monday's
events. Assuming no violence, both sides are likely to claim
victory. Momentum seems to favor the GOCR, however, based on
the increased discipline and confidence in the Assembly (Ref
B), the better organization and higher confidence of the
police, and the CID-Gallup polling data (generally in support
of CAFTA, against the protests and unfavorable to the more
notorious union leaders). The opposition cannot keep holding
"rehearsals." But, if the GOCR does not blink in the
Assembly (and we don't think it will), then the anti-CAFTA
forces may try to mount further (and perhaps more violent)
protests later, especially around the ratification vote. The
CID-Gallup data also shows that most Costa Ricans expect more
turbulence before CAFTA is ratified.
FRISBIE