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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD759, SALAH AD DIN: YUNIS BA'ATH FACTION SEEKS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BAGHDAD759 | 2009-03-19 13:01 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO3887
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0759/01 0781338
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191338Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2293
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000759
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SALAH AD DIN: YUNIS BA'ATH FACTION SEEKS
RECONCILIATION; SAYS IT CAN SPLIT AL DURI'S FACTION
REF: BAGHDAD 598
Classified By: PRT Salah Ad Din Leader Rick Bell for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).
(U) This is a PRT Salah Ad Din (SAD) reporting cable. See
action request for Department and Embassy Baghdad, para 11.
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Men purporting to represent the Muhammad
Yunis Ahmed (MYA) faction of the Ba'ath Party (BP) told
Coalition Forces (CF) and the PRT on March 14 that the
faction wants to reconcile now, and can bring some of Izzat
Ibrahim al-Duri's IAD faction along. MYA is ready to meet
with a senior USG official, they said. They stressed that
they were speaking in confidence: fearing for their own
safety, they have not yet contacted the Government of Iraq
(GOI). PRT requests Department and Embassy assistance in
determining their bona fides. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) On March 14, the PRT and CF met with four men who
identified themselves as senior Ba'ath Party officials. They
provided the following unconfirmed information about
themselves:
- XXXXXXXXXXXX Was three-star general and
division commander under Saddam; XXXXXXXXXXXX
- XXXXXXXXXXXX Member of SaD Sheikhs' Council,
chairman of the Ad-Dawr Sheikhs' Council. Brigadier
general in former regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX
- XXXXXXXXXXXX. Senior official in the former
Iraqi Intelligence Services (commander of the five southern
provinces). XXXXXXXXXXXX
- XXXXXXXXXXXX. Former brigadier general in
the air force XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶3. (S) The men said they intended this meeting as a formal
first step, personally authorized by Mohammed Yunis Ahmed
(MYA), in seeking USG intervention to help reconcile the
Ba'ath Party (BP) to the GOI. As MYA's putative spokesman,
XXXXXXXXXXXXdid most of the speaking. This cable relays
considerable detail in order to convey the level of
discourse. XXXXXXXXXXXX passed a message that MYA is willing to
meet personally with a high-level USG official to discuss
reconciliation.
¶4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the BP is organized and planning for the
future. He explained that it has split into two groups, one
following IAD and the other MYA. IAD is not willing to
negotiate or admit that the BP ever made mistakes. MYA has
been looking back and believes that Saddam's regime made many
mistakes. His faction would like to find a peaceful way to
participate in the democratic process. They have not yet been
in touch with the GOI because they fear the GOI is under
Iranian influence and will seek revenge against any BP
members. MYA's group wants USG assistance to reconcile
because it believes that after the U.S. leaves Iraq, it will
be much harder to negotiate and if reconciliation is not
already well underway by then, there will likely be
bloodshed. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that there are about four million BP
members who will need to protect themselves because Iranians
and Shi'a will persecute them and their families. Some of
IAD's supporters have told MYA's group that they also want to
reconcile, even without IAD
¶5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed BP dissatisfaction
with the way Iraq has been run since the 2003 invasion.
The BP was in existence for 62 years and in power for 35 years. It was
very influential in building Iraqi society. All educated
people today were educated under the old regime, which was
built by the BP. Although there were problems during its
Qbuilt by the BP. Although there were problems during its
rule, the last six years have been "ten times worse." Two
million Iraqis have been killed, two million displaced
outside the country, and four million displaced internally.
The U.S. bears a share of moral and legal responsibility for
this. President Bush admitted that the invasion was based on
false intelligence regarding WMD. Now the US has allowed
Iran to develop nuclear capabilities, making that country a
greater threat than it already was. The GOI is divided and
corrupt, built on sectarianism. Under the BP all ethnic
groups were included. What have the Iraqis gained for paying
such a price? No infrastructure and poor basic services.
The quality of life in Iraq has become worse.
¶6. (S) The BP is not against democracy, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said, but fears sectarianism and Iranian influence. It wants to
BAGHDAD 00000759 002 OF 002
participate in political life and is against violence. The
current democracy is built on sectarianism. This has led to
strife, kidnappings and assassinations. Many now fear that
the U.S. wants to turn Iraq over to Iran; just as Iran is led
by the mullahs, GOI officials now consult Ayatollah Sistani
before making decisions. Shiites show how irrational they
are in the way they flagellate and beat themselves. The
Shi'a are loyal to Iran; Iraq could be returning to medieval
times.
¶7. (S) The current Iraqi Army (IA) is poorly trained, more
like a militia than a professional army, said Khalaf. The
U.S. has signed a contract to turn over weapon systems to the
IA; those weapons should be given to trained professionals.
Many of the weapons will just end up in the hands of Shiite
soldiers who are like militiamen. Not all of the IA are
militias, some are professional, but the top leaders lack
training. The best, most experienced senior officers are
outside Iraq now or are just sitting around at home.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that MYA has issued an
order that BP members are
prohibited from serving in the new ISF.
¶8. (S) The MYA faction now believes multi-party democracy is
an option, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued. IAD does not agree
with MYA, who wants to review BP activities and leadership
from 1968 to the occupation, in order to identify mistakes and put in
place a strategy for a changed party. IAD absolutely refuses
and believes he should lead the BP. Because of this
disagreement the BP had a conference in December 2007 that
elected MYA as commander. The MYA faction believes the way
forward must be peaceful, and refuses to use violence. If
the BP is allowed to compete politically, the will of the
people will decide. The party just wants the same
opportunities as others; it wants to announce that the BP is
back now. Even if it is forbidden to have meetings, the BP
is "in our hearts and minds, it represents our values, so you
cannot just get rid of it with a quick decision." People
believe in the BP more now, and the BP includes all ethnic
groups. The security agencies know that the BP did not
commit crimes, actually it fought against AQI. The BP had
longstanding problems with AQI before 2003, and suffered many
losses.
¶9. (S) So many Iraqis have been murdered by groups like
Badr, Mahdi Army, former Interior Minister Solah, Quds Force,
and others. The BP wants peace. Iran stopped the killing
when CF started paying attention to the connection of
Iranians to the violence, but after the U.S. leaves, it will
start again. PM Maliki's words are empty. Iran is getting
revenge for the Iran-Iraq War. A month ago, the GOI banned
the use of the word "martyr" for soldiers killed during the
war with Iran. Now those dead soldiers are referred to as
"victims of the past regime." This takes away their honor
for serving their country as soldiers during the war. BP is
not so narrow-minded now. It wants to have an army that
represents everybody. The Iraqi Constitution was written too
quickly and is filled with problems. Iraq has the trappings
of democracy such as ballot boxes, but sectarianism corrupts
the result. President Obama said U.S. forces are leaving, so
"we have no more problems with you now" - help us get the ban
on the BP lifted, and pardon the loyal nationalist insurgents.
¶10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX and his colleagues stressed
that they were speaking in confidence to the USG.
They explained that they had not approached the GOI yetbecause
they fear they will be arrested even though the GOI does not
have warrants for them. Qarrested even though the GOI does
not have warrants for them. "Ninety-five percent of us did
nothing wrong. If there are criminals then try them under
the criminal laws, but allow us to bring back the BP."
¶11. (S) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: PRT requests Embassy
and Department assistance in verifying the bona fides of
XXXXXXXXXXXX Nassir, et al. The PRT will work with CF try to
determine whether the delegation truly represents MYA. It is
not clear whether there is any connection between this
meeting and the PRT Tikrit Satellite representative's
discussion of similar issues with Sheikh Hassan Nida of
Saddam's tribe, Albu Nasser (reftel). END COMMENT AND ACTION
REQUEST.
BUTENIS