

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05PARIS4659, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S JULY 5 VISIT TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05PARIS4659.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05PARIS4659 | 2005-07-01 16:04 | 2011-02-10 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
Appears in these articles: http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/documents-wikileaks/article/2011/02/09/wikileaks-les-visiteurs-de-l-ambassade_1477418_1446239.htm |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004659
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PINR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S JULY 5 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON: THE EDUCATION OF PHILIPPE DOUSTE-BLAZY
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex Wolff for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------------------
No Honeymoon Period
-------------------
¶1. (C) Upon his appointment as foreign minister June
2, much of the French press and many political pundits
(fed by, among others, disdainful career diplomats at
the MFA) wrote off Philippe Douste-Blazy as a
dilettante. His lack of foreign policy experience, it
was said, and penchant for currying favor with his
superiors would mean his tenure at the Quai d'Orsay
would be spent taking orders from President Chirac,
Prime Minister de Villepin, and even his junior
Minister for European Affairs (and Chirac protge)
Catherine Colonna. As word has filtered down that
Douste-Blazy is a "quick study" and is working hard at
mastering the issues, his press has improved somewhat.
But for most of the French political class, he remains
untested in this job and hampered by the image as an
ambitious politician chosen for his loyalty to Chirac
to replace a capable and appreciated predecessor.
Against this backdrop, his meeting with the Secretary
July 5 is extremely important to Douste-Blazy since it
allows him to portray himself as a serious player on
French foreign policy in the eyes of others. He
knows that a successful visit to Washington can do much
to improve his treasured public image, and thus will be
torn between conveying effectively prepared points on a
range of subjects and pleasing us in order to
demonstrate he can work well with Washington.
¶2. (C) Douste-Blazy has already had some successful
performances in his new job. He certainly counts among
these his brief conversation with the Secretary June 23
on the margins of the G-8 foreign ministers meeting in
London, where the joint press statement calling for
Syrian compliance with UNSCR 1559 was judged "worthy of
a seasoned veteran of the Quai" by one of the Parisian
dailies. Within the last week, he participated in a
trilateral meeting with his German and Polish
counterparts in an effort to establish rapport with the
much more experienced Joshka Fischer, and enlist the
support of Adam Rotfeld for France's defense of the
Common Agricultural Policy. In this context,
Washington is only the second bilateral visit
following a mandatory first-bow to Berlin.
----------------
Too Soon to Tell
----------------
¶3. (C) Despite his strict loyalty to Chirac, Douste-
Blazy's course in his political career -- from Mayor of
Lourdes in a centrist, pro-Europe party, to supporter
of failed center-right presidential candidate Edouard
Balladur (against Chirac), to today's Chirac-boosting,
anti-Sarkozy Gaullist -- suggests that he shifts
loyalties to reap the maximum political benefit for
himself. He is universally described as ambitious,
with sights set on a future prime ministership. The
foreign affairs ministry, many believe, is a way
station in Douste-Blazy's quest for higher office. He
certainly does not come to the office as the
proponent of a particular approach, or with a special
focus, such as Barnier's on Europe.
----------------------------
Our Opportunity to Influence
----------------------------
¶4. (C) His visit to Washington provides an important
opportunity to hear directly from us about our goals
for U.S.-Europe and U.S.-France cooperation. Douste-
Blazy does not necessarily bring to the job the
conventional view among some of France's foreign policy
elite that France and Europe need to define themselves
in distinction from the U.S. Many will want to
inculcate him quickly to this view and portray U.S.
policies in simplistic caricatures. By inviting him to
Washington early in his tenure, we have the opportunity
to educate him about our views and the reasons for
them. In this regard, it is important that he hear the
importance we attach to NATO, not because we are wary
of the EU, but because it is the only institution that
is truly transatlantic where Europe and North America
sit together around the same table to discuss, debate,
and formulate common approaches. Douste-Blazy has
already bought into the French mantra that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is the root of all problems and
that the U.S. is prepared to give PM Sharon a free hand
to everyone's detriment. The more he understands about
our approach, the less likely he'll be to parrot
established talking points on general Middle East
matters. Coming directly from us, these messages will
carry the weight of conviction that they would lack if
filtered through some of the career diplomats at the
MFA.
----------
The Issues
----------
¶5. (C) Iran: The French don't know yet what to make
of the Iranian presidential elections and their effect
on Tehran's policies. Political Director Stanislas de
Laboulaye, who is the lead French negotiator within the
EU-3 framework and who will accompany Douste-Blazy to
Washington, told the DCM that the EU-3 is in a
difficult discussion about how to handle the Iran
dossier at this time. The French believe it possible,
if not likely, that there may be a crisis with Iran
looming soon. Laboulaye said he personally saw merit
in proposing a generous package to the Iranians before
the new government takes office in order to ensure that
all responsibility for a breakdown in negotiations over
Tehran's nuclear program falls squarely on the Iranians
in the eyes of the international community. He
acknowledge an equally valid argument (presumably being
advocated by the UK) that now was not the time to show
any flexibility or generosity since no one knew what
the new government's intentions are. (We reinforced
the latter argument, adding that anything less would be
irresponsible at this point.) Laboulaye said the EU-3
focused in its meeting with Iranian lead negotiator
Moussavian this week on the need to avoid a breakdown
in the negotiations and on the costs for Iran of
any resumption of nuclear enrichment-related
activities. Laboulaye is likely to take the lead on
this topic, but it will be useful nonetheless for
Douste-Blazy to hear authoritatively our position.
(C) Syria/Lebanon: The Elysee retains the lead on this
issue, and our cooperation continues to be excellent
despite a different analysis of Syrian political
dynamics that lead the French to a less forceful policy
toward the Bashar al-Asad regime. We should continue
the discussion that begain with him on the margins of
the London G-8 meeting and provide him our assessment
of the implications of the June 29 attack across the
Blue Line by Hizballah forces. We should continue to
keep France committed to early implementation of UNSCR
1559's mandate for disarming Hizballah by underscoring
that neither Hizballah, its sponsors, nor the U.S. see
this issue as divorced somehow from wider concerns in
the region.
(C) Iraq: The MFA spokesman's reaction June 29 to
President Bush's speech on Iraq unhelpfully reprised
some of the more contentious arguments the French
leadership were in the habit of using before the visits
to Europe this winter and spring of the Secretary and
the President. In telling the press that Iraqis should
have "a perspective, a clear horizon of full
sovereignty, including in the military and security
realm," the MFA spokesman appeared to be reverting
to French language on Iraq's imperfect sovereignty that
pre-dated the January 30 elections. Douste-Blazy
should be reminded of the mutually agreed commitment of
our governments to put our differences over Iraq behind
us, and be encouraged to carry through with French
promises for gendarmes training and material assistance
to Iraq.
(C) Bilateral Relations: It might be useful to end the
meeting with a brief tutorial (perhaps in a one-on-one)
for Douste-Blazy of how to best manage our bilateral
relationship. As former Foreign Minister Barnier
understood, we have to manage our differences in a
spirit of candor and cooperation, not competition or
search for advantage. Displaying our differences in
the press or resorting to surprise can only aggravate
matters. If we get Douste-Blazy's buy-in on this
point, he'll have a personal stake in serving as a
constructive force in our relationship and tempering
the temptations of his masters to score public points.
Early tests of this would include urging Douste-Blazy
to look carefully at our climate change initiatives in
connection with the G-8 Summit. We continue to receive
considerable bad press in Europe, and particularly in
France, that disregards what we are saying and doing.
Douste-Blazy could help modulate France's official
public line on U.S. climate policy. More directly, we
should lay down a marker on Iraq. The French have told
us our differences were in the past and that they
share the desire for a stable and viable Iraqi state.
The MFA's official reaction to the President's speech
is a step backward that we did not appreciate. We
would expect a more positive approach in keeping with
the recently improved tone in the relationship. We
will look to Douste-Blazy to assert himself on this.
STAPLETON