

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI65, PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI65.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI65 | 2009-01-28 17:05 | 2011-02-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
Appears in these articles: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/libya-wikileaks/ |
VZCZCXRO7211
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0065/01 0281700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281700Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4377
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0991
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0678
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4901
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000065
NOFORN
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER
EO 12958 DECL: 1/28/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, LY, UK
SUBJECT: PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI
REF: A) LONDON 209, B) 06 TRIPOLI 0055, C) 08 TRIPOLI 994
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C/NF) Summary: While Libya has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate, the case of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi is arguably the regime’s most sensitive political subject, in part because it involves a firm timeline in the form of the ailing el-Megrahi’s approaching death. Through remarks by senior officials suggesting that al-Megrahi is innocent and a steady diet of publicity about his case, the regime has limited its room for political maneuver. U.K. Embassy interlocutors here are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi’s transfer to Libya. The U.K. Embassy expects a sharply negative GOL reaction if al-Megrahi dies in prison or if the Scottish Executive and/or FCO oppose his transfer. The U.K. Embassy has recommended dramatic pre-emptive measures, to include drawing down their mission in Tripoli, if either of those possibilities occurs. If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi’s release - or is perceived to be complicit in a decision that results in al-Megrahi remaining in prison - the U.S. Embassy and private Americans in Libya could face similar consequences. End summary.
AL-MEGRAHI’S CASE IS THE GOL’S MOST SENSITIVE AT PRESENT
¶2. (C/NF) Consistent with information reported reftel, U.K. Emboffs here have interpreted the lengthy and repeated visits to the U.K. by MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa in connection with the matter of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi as reflecting the great political importance the GOL attaches to successfully resolving (from the GOL’s perspective) the case. Contacts here have told us that Ahmed el-Msellati, a senior regime legal adviser/fixer who played a pivotal role in finalizing and implementing the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, has also visited the U.K. to consult with al-Megrahi’s defense team and FCO officials. While the GOL has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate - moving forward with re-established U.S.-Libya ties, reacting to the Gaza crisis, managing its role as the only current Arab member of the UNSC, mediating between Chad and Sudan, resolving its contretemps with the Swiss, and initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa - al-Megrahi’s case is arguably the most critical and sensitive political subject at present. That is so because the regime has widely publicized developments in his case and because, unlike other foreign policy priorities, al-Megrahi’s situation involves an immutable timeline in the form of his approaching death from cancer. In media interviews last August, senior regime figure Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi said al-Megrahi was innocent and that Libya had accepted responsibility for Pan Am 103 and allowed al-Megrahi and co-defendant al-Amin Khalifah Fhima to be tried in order to facilitate Libya’s re-assimilation into the international community after years of isolation under international sanctions. Those comments, together with a steady diet of articles in Libyan state-owned newspapers about al-Megrahi’s case and the travails of his family in Glasgow, have raised expectations among ordinary Libyans that the regime will secure his release, and have limited the GOL’s room for political maneuver.
U.K. EMBASSY FOCUSED ON TRANSFER UNDER PTA AND SECURITY POSTURE
¶3. (C/NF) U.K. Embassy interlocutors here tell us they are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi’s transfer to Libya. They do not anticipate that GOL officials will pursue another application for bail, and said they had no information from the FCO to suggest that al-Megrahi’s application for compassionate release, which was denied in November, would be re-submitted in light of his deteriorating medical condition. U.K. Emboffs began consulting with us in December about deliberations concerning their security posture and tripwires for action should al-Megrahi die in Scottish prison. Consistent with information reported reftel, GOL officials have warned U.K. Emboffs in demarches here that the consequences for the U.K.-Libya bilateral relationship would be “dire” were al-Megrahi to die in Scottish prison. Specific threats have included the immediate cessation of all U.K. commercial activity in Libya, a diminishment or severing of political ties and demonstrations against official U.K. facilities. GOL officials also implied, but did not directly state, that the welfare of U.K. diplomats and citizens in Libya would be at risk.
¶4. (C/NF) Citing demonstrations in Benghazi against the Italian consulate in 2006 that rapidly turned violent (ref B) and the quick curtailment of direct air links in the ongoing Swiss-Libyan dispute (ref C), the U.K. Embassy has reportedly recommended to London that the following pre-emptive measures be taken immediately if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were to be denied: 1) close the British School; 2) close the British Council; 3) issue a travel advisory/warden message-equivalent advising British nationals to exercise extreme caution and/or leave Libya; and 4) draw the U.K. mission down to only essential personnel. The failure of Switzerland and Libya to resolve the dispute prompted by the arrest of Muammar al-Qadhafi’s son, Hannibal, last July has convinced U.K. Emboffs that the consequences if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were denied would be harsh, immediate and not easily remedied.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
¶5. (C/NF) If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi’s release (or is perceived to be complicit in a decision to keep al-Megrahi in prison), Post judges that U.S. interests could face similar consequences, including regime-orchestrated demonstrations against the Embassy, retaliation against U.S. business interests and possible obstruction of the travel of official and private Americans, as occurred in the case of the Swiss. (Note: Unlike recent demonstrations against the Swiss (Swiss-Libyan dispute) and Egyptian embassies (in connection with Gaza), in which the regime mustered crowds that dutifully went through the paces, al-Megrahi’s case is a genuinely emotive one for ordinary Libyans; demonstrations would likely be more energetic and harder for the GOL to control. End note.) Some variation of that scenario is possible, though not as likely, if al-Megrahi were to die in prison without the USG having declared a position. The fact that the GOL did not orchestrate and apparently did not sanction protests against U.S. facilities in connection with events in Gaza gives cause for cautious optimism that the GOL might distinguish between U.S. and U.K. interests in such a case, although the GOL essentially views the Pan Am 103 case as a joint U.S.-U.K. issue.
¶6. (C/NF) Comment: Despite the GOL’s strategic decision in 2003 to take steps to facilitate its acceptance back into the community of nations, the regime remains essentially thuggish in its approach, particularly on issues it perceives to involve domestic political equities. The over-reaction of Muammar al-Qadhafi to what amounted to a matter of pride involving a verbal spat with then-Crown Prince Abdullah at the 2003 Arab League Summit, together with the more recent deterioration of Swiss-Libyan ties, are illustrative of what may happen should al-Megrahi die in prison. The regime understands that we have equities in this case: on the margins of the former Secretary’s visit to Tripoli in September, senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi asked former NEA A/S David Welch to influence Pan Am 103 families not to oppose al-Megrahi’s transfer (Welch demurred). The issue of al-Megrahi is sensitive enough for the regime that there may be repercussions for our interests here even if we remain neutral; there will almost certainly be consequences if we publicly take a position opposing his transfer. By contrast with the Swiss problem, which is seen as an issue over the reprehensible behavior of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, al-Megrahi is effectively viewed as something of a folks hero in the eyes of the regime and many ordinary Libyans. End comment.
CRETZ