

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07LIMA3429, MOD BRIEFS SECRETARY GATES ON PLANS TO ENHANCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07LIMA3429.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07LIMA3429 | 2007-10-17 17:05 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #3429/01 2901704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171704Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7146
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5167
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7627
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0843
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ OCT QUITO 1513
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1536
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003429
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV MARR KICC PREL PE
SUBJECT: MOD BRIEFS SECRETARY GATES ON PLANS TO ENHANCE
INTERNAL SECURITY
Classified By: Charge James Nealon, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Senior MOD officials, including Minister of
Defense Alan Wagner, briefed Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates on operational plans to expand the government's control
over four isolated areas of Peru: the Apurimac and Ene river
valleys (the VRAE); the upper Huallaga valley; the border
with Columbia; and the northern coast of Peru. All four
operational plans combine targeted security operations with
increased investment in health, transportation, and education
to re-establish the presence of the state and win the support
of local populations. The briefing emphasized the importance
of Plan VRAE, which is fully funded and in the process of
being implemented; the other three programs remain in the
planning stage. End Summary.
-------------------------------------
A Multi-Faceted Approach -- Plan VRAE
-------------------------------------
¶2. (C) On October 5, Minister of Defense Wagner and senior
defense officials briefed Secretary of Defense Gates on the
GOP's plans to enhance security and state authority within
Peru's borders. The GOP has given top priority to Plan VRAE,
which seeks to re-establish order and combat the presence of
narcotraffickers and Shining Path terrorists in the four
departments comprising the Apurimac and Ene river valleys,
Junin, Cuzco, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho. The VRAE produces
50 percent of Peru's cocaine and is currently under a state
of emergency. More than 200,000 persons live in the area: 30
percent are illiterate, 50 percent malnourished, and 80
percent live in homes lacking both water and electricity. In
response, the government of Peru has secured funding to build
electrical plants, roads, water pipelines, and telephone
connections in 2007 and 2008. An interagency committee,
representing 11 ministries and the office of the vice
president, supervises social development and cooperates with
the military to increase the presence of security forces in
the region and to control the lawlessness that has allowed
the cocaine economy to predominate.
-----------------------------------
Putumayo, Huallaga, and Costa Norte
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) A low level of economic development also afflicts
the 10,000 persons living along the 1300 kilometer border
with Colombia that follows the Putumayo River. Approximately
80 percent of the population lives in poverty, 70 percent in
extreme poverty. More than 80 percent of villagers are
illiterate, and more than 95 percent of homes lack
electricity and water. The goal of Plan Putumayo is to
integrate the region within the larger Peruvian economy by
constructing roads and airports, by building primary schools,
and by ending smuggling across the border. At the same time,
the plan recognizes the need to send additional troops to the
area, possibly an additional army battalion in 2008, to aid
the 2500 soldiers already posted. The long border and dense
vegetation pose challenges for troops patrolling the region,
particularly since the isolated bases in the area lack the
logistical support necessary to sustain operations.
¶4. (C) From 70 to 80 percent of Peru's cocaine transits
through the northern coast, where small fishing villages
supply vessels to transport drugs to larger ships. Plan
Costa Norte seeks to enhance the navy's ability to survey and
patrol waters along Peru's north coast by coordinating
surface and air operations and by pooling intelligence
sources from the military, national police, and Ministry of
Fishing. The GOP expects that increased cooperation will not
only reduce drug smuggling but also have an impact on
curtailing piracy, illegal fishing, and human trafficking.
The MOD noted, however, that at present, the military lacks
the resources necessary to monitor the illegal activity
taking place.
¶5. (C) Like the VRAE, the Huallaga valley contains a
Sendero Luminoso column -- estimated at 60 persons -- who
have increased their involvement in drug trafficking and have
launched attacks against security personnel. Plan VRAE aims
to eliminate the threat posed by Sendero Luminoso by
bolstering the presence of the police and by increasing
investment in basic infrastructure in order to create a
vibrant local economy that will undercut the appeal of drug
trafficking.
-------------
GOP Wish List
-------------
¶6. (C) Minister Wagner concluded the presentation by noting
eight areas where the United States could provide aid to the
GOP. Three involved military assistance: increased training
in the US for Peruvian military officers; access to US
satellite imagery; and funding to allow the Peruvian navy to
participate in multi-national operations. Five requests
involved bilateral assistance: the donation of a field
hospital to assist earthquake victims; additional funding to
assist Peruvian participation in international peacekeeping;
support for demining efforts along the Ecuadorian border;
re-establishment of the bilateral riverine program; and
funding to help improve naval interdictions along the
northern coast.
¶7. (C) In response to questions raised about Plan Putumayo,
Wagner said that cooperation with Columbia is excellent --
the two sides have a treaty allowing "hot pursuit" across the
border -- and the FARC has not yet established a permanent
presence on Peruvian soil, although efforts to recruit local
youths continue. Wagner noted that there are simply not
enough police along the Putumayo river, where thick jungle
makes any kind of travel difficult. Wagner also said that a
lack of air mobility, particularly in the mountainous VRAE,
hampers military operations. In the VRAE, for example, only
one military helicopter is operational. The situation is
different in the Upper Huallaga, where NAS air assets fully
support police patrols.
-------
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) The MOD deserves credit for identifying
transnational threats of terrorism and drug smuggling within
Peru's borders as the key security challenge facing the
government. Wagner recognizes as well that a purely military
approach to re-establishing state control is likely to fail,
and he has pursued a multi-faceted approach that responds to
the underlying social and economic causes of unrest. Still,
the greatest challenge for the GOP is to translate
well-meaning and crucial strategic plans into concrete
action. Plan VRAE, for example, was launched in December
2006 and has yet to get off the ground. The three other
plans are still on the drawing boards, with the laborious
process of obligating funds still pending. President Alan
Garcia's first year in office has shown that while securing
funding is a necessary first step in creating change, much
will depend on implementation.
NEALON