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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL1377, CODEL LEAHY: CRITICAL TIME IN BILATERAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL1377 | 2009-06-01 08:08 | 2011-01-28 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO7120
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1377/01 1520814
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010814Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9178
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
209437
2009-06-01
09KABUL1377
Embassy Kabul
CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001377
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER USAID
SUBJECT: CODEL LEAHY: CRITICAL TIME IN BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The members of CODEL Leahy told President
Karzai during a 5/26 meeting that this was a critical time
for the Afghan-U.S. relationship. Americans needed
assurances, especially in this economy, that the money they
are spending in Afghanistan is being well spent, and that the
people of Afghanistan are benefiting from it. Karzai replied
that Afghanistan had made much progress in the past seven
years, but needed continued U.S. assistance, particularly in
building capacity in the areas of agriculture and security.
-----------------------------------------
Important Point in Bilateral Relationship
-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) CODEL Leahy (Senators Leahy, Whitehouse and Warner),
accompanied by Ambassador Eikenberry, met for approximately
one hour with President Karzai. Senator Leahy told Karzai
this was a particularly critical time in the Afghan-U.S.
relationship. President Obama was strongly committed to
continuing assistance to Afghanistan, but the American people
needed assurance that such assistance was being used
appropriately, wisely and for the benefit of the Afghan
people, especially in light of the troubled world economy.
Karzai insisted that Afghanistan would do all necessary to
convince Americans their investment in Afghanistan's future
was a sound one. Afghanistan had already made substantial
progress in recent years, but still needed assistance in
building its capacities in areas such as agriculture,
security, finance and other areas.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Must Promote Capacity Building in the Ministries
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C) Senator Whitehouse said that he had been impressed by
the Ministers of Agriculture, Finance and Rural
Rehabilitation and Development at an earlier meeting,
referring to their demonstrated commitment to accountability
and transparency in their ministries. The more progress in
good governance and transparency, he said, the more goodwill
Afghans would see from the American people, and the more
support they would see from the American government. Karzai
replied that he had a very good cabinet of technocrat
ministers and advisors. The problem, he said, lay below the
senior level, and was caused by a lack of capacity in the
ranks. Karzai referred to India's program of training 1,000
young Afghans each year for civil service and suggested he
would like to model an Afghan program along those lines.
------------------------------------------
Need to Promote Development of Rule of Law
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Karzai asserted it would take a long time to restore
the judiciary because it had been so thoroughly destroyed
during the war years. Many Afghans still relied on informal
or community-based systems for swift justice, rather than the
courts. He believed, however, that it was an encouraging
sign that Afghans had a higher expectation of justice than
ever before. The Afghan government was committed to removing
corrupt and incompetent judges. Karzai cited progress in the
anti-corruption and rule of law areas, though he was still
concerned about widespread corruption among officials and
police, and its impact on the average Afghan.
-------------------------
Karzai's Campaign Message
-------------------------
¶6. (U) Karzai said his campaign message would be to stress
Afghanistan's progress during his seven years as president.
Most importantly, Afghanistan had been made into a country
for all Afghans again, and had become a proud member of the
world community, actively participating in multi-lateral
talks with nations such as Iran and Pakistan - something he
could not have imagined six years ago. Average per capita
income had risen from $180 six years ago to more than $500
now. Afghanistan had amassed $3.6 BN in foreign reserves,
and established banking and accounting systems to prevent
theft and misuse of public funds. Karzai had encouraged the
establishment of a strong and independent media to hold the
government accountable. Regarding the narcotics threat,
Karzai acknowledged serious challenges remained, but noted 22
of Afghanistan's provinces were free or mostly free of poppy,
up from just three poppy-free provinces in 2005.
¶7. (C) Karzai said when he assumed the presidency, there
were 4,000 - 5,000 students in Kabul's five universities -
today there are approximately 75,000 in the nation's
universities, 45,000 of whom entered the university this
KABUL 00001377 002 OF 002
year. Of those 75,000 university students, 25 percent were
women. The nation, he said, had seven million students in
its schools, mostly in areas not controlled by the Taliban.
Over the next 10 years, he expected that population to grow
as areas were increasingly wrested from insurgent control,
and new schools opened. He proudly pointed to a program
initiated four years ago in which female students were sent
overseas for advanced education, and were now returning to
Afghanistan with advanced degrees to teach in the schools and
universities.
--------------------------------
Poppy Production Still a Problem
--------------------------------
¶8. (C) Karzai said that Afghanistan had always had poppies,
but forty years ago, poppy was not an important crop in
comparison to apricots, pomegranates, and other agriculture
products. He believed the people could be turned from poppy
production, but feared limited opportunities and poverty
served to increase the temptation of easy money through poppy
cultivation. He also criticized some forms of aid or NGO
gifts. Afghans, he said, needed to take on the work of
repairing Afghanistan for themselves, rather than having the
NGOs do it for them. The NGOs were not helping the Afghans'
work ethic though gifts, but through training.
---------------------------------------
Iranian Attitudes Towards U.S. Changing
---------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Karzai said the purpose of his May 24 trip to Tehran
was to participate in Afghanistan's first tri-partite summit
talks with Iran and Pakistan, on the issue of
counter-terrorism, among other regional issues. Karzai told
Iran's leadership the U.S. was a good country and the
Iranians should seek better relations with the Americans.
President Ahmadinejad indicated he would be willing to
improve relations; Karzai believed Iran's attitude towards
the U.S. was changing.
EIKENBERRY