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Viewing cable 06BOGOTA10571, COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA: TIES THAT BIND
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA10571 | 2006-11-16 18:06 | 2011-02-23 06:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota |
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #0571/01 3201855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161855Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0829
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7275
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 8435
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 8368
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4491
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 9752
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 5153
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010571
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR PHUM CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA: TIES THAT BIND
REF: BOGOTA 4125
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) President Uribe sees Venezuela's polarizing,
anti-U.S. focus as a serious problem, but prefers to manage
President Chavez rather than confront him. He works to
maintain a positive bilateral atmosphere, using joint energy
projects and trade to create incentives to moderate Chavez'
behavior. National security concerns, a large and porous
border, extensive economic relationships, and significant
people-to-people ties explain Uribe's outwardly conciliatory
approach. He also uses this approach to create the political
space to permit clandestine cross border operations against
terrorists and narcotraffickers when required. End summary.
--------------------
"Perfect Hypocrites"
--------------------
¶2. (C) Uribe is under no illusions about Chavez. Uribe's
close ties with the U.S., as well as his commitment to
regional economic integration and security cooperation, put
him squarely at odds with Chavez' Bolivarian revolution. He
has emphasized to us the anti-democratic nature of the Chavez
regime, and criticized Venezuela's lack of cooperation in
bringing terrorists and narcotraffickers to justice. GOC
officials regularly complain that Venezuela allows the FARC
and ELN to use its territory as a sanctuary, and both groups
obtain arms and other supplies from across the border.
Administrative Department of Security Director Andres Penate
told us Venezuelan anti-terrorism cooperation is low level
and sporadic. The Colombian military is concerned by
Venezuela's recent arms purchases.
¶3. (C) Still, one of Uribe's top bilateral priorities is to
ensure that Venezuela does not disrupt implementation of his
democratic security policy. He wants to minimize Venezuelan
support for Colombia's terrorist groups, and to avoid
diplomatic clashes or polarization that would detract from
his internal security focus. Hence, Uribe tries to manage
Chavez rather than confront him. He regularly meets with
Chavez in bilateral summits, and respective Foreign Ministry
and intelligence officials also communicate often. Uribe
does not challenge Chavez in multilateral fora. Instead, he
seeks to strengthen the economic ties between the two
countries in an effort to diminish Chavez' leverage over
Colombia. Uribe advisor Jose ObdulioGaviria characterized
Colombia's facade of friendship with Chavez by saying, "we
are the perfect hypocrites," emphasizing Uribe's use of
diplomacy to protect national security.
¶4. (C) In part thanks to his emphasis on engagement rather
than confrontation, Uribe remains able to conduct armed
action in Venezuela to protect Colombia from terrorist
attack. He authorizes clandestine cross border operations
against the FARC as appropriate, while trying to avoid a
repeat of the crisis generated by the capture of FARC
official Rodrigo Granda in Caracas in 2003. On that
occasion, Chavez' decision to close the border to trade
caused substantial economic losses in both countries. Since
then, Venezuela has not challenged Colombia on such actions.
-----------------------------------
Structural Factors: Border Security
-----------------------------------
¶5. (C) A number of structural factors help explain Uribe's
public outreach to Venezuela: a large and porous border,
extensive trade links, and long-standing people-to-people
ties. Colombia's border with Venezuela runs more than
2,000km and encompasses 10 Departments or States in both
countries. Crossing without inspection is easy and routine.
FARC and ELN forces regularly operate in Venezuela, as shown
by a mid-October FARC-ELN clash in El Nula, Apure State that
displaced 200. Senior ELN figures spend considerable time in
Venezuela, residing openly in Caracas. A GOC-ELN peace
process guarantor told us ELN military commander Antonio
Garcia has spent most of his adult life in either Europe or
Venezuela. Presidential advisor Jose ObdulioGaviria said
the GOC welcomes Venezuela's "facilitation" of peace talks
with the ELN because it has no choice. It is better to have
Chavez inside the process rather than outside causing
problems.
-------------------------
Structural Factors: Trade
-------------------------
¶6. (C) Venezuela is Colombia's second most important trading
partner. Two way trade amounted to 3.3 billion USD in 2005,
with Colombia enjoying a surplus of some 890 million USD.
Figures in the first 6 months of 2006 show trade up 23
percent over comparable 2005 numbers. Colombian exports to
Venezuela in 2005 amounted to 9 percent of total exports.
2006 figures show Colombian exports to Venezuela up 17
percent over the corresponding 2005 period. Venezuelan
purchases are key in important sectors, such as livestock (97
percent, primarily cattle), meat (93 percent), vehicles (71
percent), cotton (45 percent), and machinery (35 percent).
Trade is especially important in border areas. 40 percent of
Venezuelans registered with their consulate in Bucaramanga
are independent traders, and the figures for Venezuelan
consulates in Riohacha and Cucuta are even higher. Vice
Foreign Minister Camilo Reyes told us the border economies
are so inter-dependent that they have created a separate
border culture.
¶7. (C) Colombia and Venezuela are also cooperating on
various energy projects, including the USD 300 million La
Guajira/Maracaibo pipeline that started construction in July.
Financed entirely by PDVSA, Venezuela hopes to extend the
pipeline to Panama and beyond to export gas to Central
America (reftel). Venezuela has also started discussions
with the GOC on plans to build an oil pipeline to the Pacific
(although few knowledgeable people believe a
Venezuela-Pacific pipeline is economically viable). Vice
Minister Reyes and Colombian National Police Intelligence
Chief Oscar Naranjo told us separately that Chavez' keen
interest in the pipeline projects has led him to be more
accommodating of Colombian security concerns.
-----------------------------------------
Structural Factors: People-to-People Ties
-----------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Official Colombian census numbers show that over
600,000 Colombians, or 1 in 5 of all Colombians residing
overseas, live in Venezuela. The IOM's Fernando Calado put
the real number at almost 1.1 million. The IOM told us that,
historically, 70 percent of the Colombians in Venezuela were
economic migrants, pushed by poor Colombian prospects and
pulled by Venezuela's oil boom. In recent years, the numbers
have been reversed, with most Colombians fleeing for security
reasons. This migration has also led to many members of
Colombia's business and political elites having extensive
Venezuelan ties. DAS Director Penate worked in Caracas for
several years; former Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Luis
Alberto Moreno is married to a Venezuelan. These extensive
people-to-people ties are reflected in the combined 25
consulates in each other's country to serve their respective
citizens. Colombia's 15 consulates in Venezuela dwarf its
representation in any other country; In comparison, Colombia
maintains 10 consulates in the U.S., 6 in Ecuador, and 2 in
Panama.
WOOD