

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI590, THE CAST OF THE JAMAHIRIYA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 960; B) O8 TRIPOLI 993 TRIPOLI 00000590 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI590.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI590 | 2009-07-21 17:05 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO2715
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0590/01 2021726
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 211726Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5062
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1090
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0766
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0535
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0081
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0211
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5601
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000590
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG; DRL/NESCA; AND PM/RSAT (MIKE MILLER)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR UNGA MARR LY ABLD
SUBJECT: THE CAST OF THE JAMAHIRIYA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 960; B) O8 TRIPOLI 993 TRIPOLI 00000590 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(S/NF) Summary. Personalities and relationships play an extremely important role in Libya's opaque system of government. Your visit will bring you face-to-face with the ambiguity of the Libyan bureaucracy and will enable you to initiate relationships with the GOL's key decision-makers: Muammar al-Qadhafi, FM Musa Kusa, PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and the sons who are rivaling to carry their father's mantle -- Muatassim and Saif al-Islam. While Musa has taken a larger foreign policy role, he still appears to hold sway on certain intelligence and security issues. Whereas Musa has served as a proponent of an expanding US-Libya relationship, the PM has been more reluctant and has reportedly slow-rolled fulfillment of GOL WMD commitments. As National Security Advisor, Muatassim's role has been to herald the call for security assurances as Libya's compensation for giving up its WMD program. While Saif has ostensibly retreated to the shadows, his influence seems to be continually present in business and social realms. In spite of the different personalities vying for influence in Libya, pleasing the Leader is still the end goal. End summary.
MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI: SELF-STYLED LEADER OF AFRICA
2.(S/NF) Qadhafi is a famously mercurial interlocutor: his comportment ranges from quiet and difficult to engage (sometimes avoiding eye contact) to holding forth in rambling, non-linear fashion. His latest interactions with the West, including during his most recent visit to Rome, reflect his desire to have his ego fed. He has capitalized on his AU chairmanship by participating in nearly every international meeting to which he has been invited over the last six months, including the Arab League Summit and the G8 Summit in L'Aquila. Local press reports indicate that Qadhafi was honored by his handshake with POTUS at L'Aquila and his subsequent meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown. Nevertheless, he has reflected his insecurity about national security by seeking military, security and procurement agreements with the likes of Russia, France, and Italy. He will want to hear from you the new administration's views on the bilateral relationship, particularly assurances on peaceful USG motives in Libya.
3.(S/NF) Qadhafi views himself as a man of particular historical importance and has long sought to leverage leadership of Libya into a more prominent international role. His role as African Union Chair has provided both a convenient forum to raise his international profile and to promote his long-standing policy goals for the continent. Qadhafi's interest in Africa dates to the late-1980's, when it became clear that efforts to position Libya as a leading Arab state were unlikely to succeed. Libya has significant commercial investments and development projects in sub-Saharan Africa, and has leveraged them as part of its "dinar diplomacy" approach to managing relations on the continent. Qadhafi is keenly focused on African issues and seems to genuinely aspire to be the founding father of a United States of Africa. He has expressed willingness to assist U.S. efforts in Darfur, Somalia, and in ending the Chad-Sudan conflict.
4.(S/NF) Qadhafi's increased international profile as AU Chair coincides with the 40th anniversary of the Fatah Revolution (September 1) and the tenth anniversary of the Sirte Declaration that created the AU (September 9). Libya's current roles on the UNSC and as UNGA President add to the importance of this year for Qadhafi. Libyan officials will be looking toward Qadhafi's appearance at UNGA as the capstone of an extraordinary year; any potential interaction with POTUS will have long-lasting implications for our bilateral relationship.
MUSA KUSA'S EXPANDING PORTFOLIO
5.(S/NF) Musa Kusa was named Foreign Minister in March, and was dual-hatted as External Security Organization (ESO) chief for several weeks before a new External Security Organization Director was named. (Note: The extent to which Kusa has relinquished control of day-to-day intelligence operations remains unclear. The current ESO Director, Abuzeid Dorda, is a former Prime Minister and most recently served as the Chairman of the high-profile Housing and Infrastructure Board; however, he does not have experience in intelligence and security issues. End note.) Kusa frequently travels with the Leader and is a TRIPOLI 00000590 002.2 OF 003 principal advisor on security matters. He is Western-educated, holding an M.A. from Michigan State, and is seen as a strong supporter of reengagement with the West. The Ambassador and GRPO have met him frequently. He has played a prominent role in U.S.-Libya relations and, more broadly, in Libya's foreign affairs. Since becoming Foreign Minister, he has assumed several portfolios previously held by other prominent regime figures.
6.(S/NF) Kusa is a key mentor for Muatassim al-Qadhafi and served as his "minder" during the latter's first trip to the U.S. in September 2007 to attend the UN General Assembly. Muatassim made his latest trip without Kusa, but the two likely consult extensively on matters of security and intelligence. Kusa previously served (circa 2004-2006) as a mentor to Muatassim's brother and potential succession rival, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, and reportedly remains close to him. Kusa is rare among Libyan officials -- he embodies a combination of intellectual acumen, operational ability, and political weight. When the USG has promoted specific areas of cooperation with Kusa, he has been willing to cast the USG message in terms palatable to Libya's leadership.
AL-BAGHDADI AL-MAHMOUDI: THE SKEPTIC
7.(S/NF) Prime Minister Dr. al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi has been described as having limited influence with Muammar al-Qadhafi, though he is a key decision-maker within the regime. We have had limited contact with al-Mahmoudi. GOL sources have told us that he is seen as an obstacle to deepening bilateral engagement and have hinted that he is personally responsible for holding up the GOL's signing of the HEU-LEU agreement. xxxxxxxxxxxx Al-Mahmoudi also is a key player in resolving the standoff between the Land Registery Office and Ministry of Finance regarding payment for our seven USG properties in Tripoli.
MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI'S ROLE AND INTERESTS
8.(S/NF) Muatassim's visit to Washington was seen here as further evidence that he is being groomed as a potential successor to his father's throne. His meeting in March with AFRICOM Commander Ward reflected skepticism about the role of the Africa Command and a desire for security assurances. The points he raised with Ward are likely to preview the issues he will raise with you: 1) Libya has not been adequately compensated for its decision to give up its WMD programs and abandon terrorism in 2003; 2) Libya wants security assurances in the form of a defensive alliance with the United States; and 3) Libya needs U.S. training and equipment to adequately secure its borders and fight transnational terrorism. Muatassim also stressed to Ward that Libya is eager to procure lethal and non-lethal military equipment and to resolve the case of Libya's eight C-130's in Marietta, Georgia. The GOL recently sent two amendments to the military-to-military MOU, requesting security guarantees and rehabilitation and return of Libya's eight C-130's.
9.(S/NF) When Muatassim raised the issue of Libya's C-130's with the Political-Military (PM) Bureau, PM responded that while the U.S. would look favorably on requests for new aircraft (C-130J's), the USG position remains that there will be no compensation for the old aircraft, and Libya should work directly with Lockheed Martin to resolve the matter. Regarding Libya's requests for lethal and non-lethal equipment, Post has submitted a draft end-use and transfer agreement to the MFA to enable some of the sales, but the Libyans have not responded with an acceptance of the agreement.
10.(S/NF) During his visit to Washington, USG interlocuturs urged Muatassim to initiate a Political-Military Dialogue and marked it as the appropriate venue to develop plans for political-military cooperation. Muatassim will be listening for a reaffirmation of our willingness to move forward on the military component of the bilateral relationship, to include security assistance. Post continues to urge the GOL to discuss outstanding security concerns within the framework of a TRIPOLI 00000590 003.2 OF 003 Political-Military Dialogue.
SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI -- MOVING BEHIND THE SCENES
11.(S/NF) Whereas Saif al-Islam ostensibly retreated from political life nearly one year ago, his influence remains palpable within the country. Saif stands behind the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), which holds one of the most extensive investment portfolios in the country. His oil company NESSO is a member of one of the few successful oil production consortiums in the country, and he is the primary investor in Libya's Coca-Cola operation, among other ventures. Saif also plays a lead role in Libya's quasi-civil society. His Qadhafi Foundation oversees the International Society for Peace and Relief (which focuses on refugee assistance) and a new organization entitled the Arab Alliance for Democracy, Human Rights, and Development (which he launched at in February at the Davos Forum to "name and shame" regional human rights abusers). Our contacts report that Saif continues to play an influential role with his father and within the regime. Some observers view him as retreating strategically from the limelight, after having overstepped boundaries with his expansive reform agenda. Nevertheless, he has played an enduring role behind the political scene by brokering dialogue in late-2008 on the release of former LIFG fighters and facilitating our access to Fathi el-Jahmi in prison (refs a, b). We believe that Saif and the Qadhafi Foundation could be helpful in pushing the Human Rights Dialogue forward and in creating the buy-in necessary for the regime to actively engage in areas that are of priority concern to us, including rule of law; the detention and treatment of minorities and refugees; human trafficking; and religious freedom.
12.(S/NF) Comment: We have requested meetings for you with all of the personalities outlined above. Because the roles that Musa, Muatassim, and Saif play are fluid and influential with Qadhafi in different ways, you will have the opportunity to lay out USG policy priorities as outlined in septel with each of them. A clear, unified message that explicitly links achievement of our goals to engagement on their priorities will speak most effectively to the Qadhafi regime. End comment. POLASCHIK