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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07BERN258, IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BERN258 | 2007-03-16 07:07 | 2011-03-14 06:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern |
Appears in these articles: http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers |
VZCZCXRO7217
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0258/01 0750749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160749Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
2007-03-16 07:49:00 07BERN258 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO7217\
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0258/01 0750749\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
P 160749Z MAR 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE\
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000258 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM UNSC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \
IS GOING TO TEHRAN \
\
Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
------- \
Summary \
------- \
\
1.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \
Ambuehl told visiting EUR A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway on \
March 9 that he planned to visit Tehran the week of March 12, \
claiming that IAEA DG ElBaradei had encouraged Ambuehl to \
tell Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani that Iran was \
facing its "last chance." A/S Fried and the Ambassador \
cautioned strongly against the visit, noting that a Swiss \
visit could be misinterpreted and used by Iranian officials, \
particularly given Bern's status as U.S. protecting power in \
Tehran. Ambuehl assured the USG that his message would be \
identical to that of the UN Security Council and IAEA, namely \
that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities and accept \
its international obligations. Ambuehl's staff informed \
Embassy on March 12 that he was on his way to Tehran and \
would provide a readout immediately upon return. End \
summary. \
\
------------------------------ \
"Last Chance" Message for Iran \
------------------------------ \
\
2.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met with A/S \
Dan Fried and the Ambassador on March 9 at Zurich Airport, \
joined by Swiss DFA Americas Desk official Urs Hammer and \
Poloff. Ambuehl told A/S Fried that he planned to fly to \
Tehran the week of March 12 to meet with Iranian Nuclear \
Negotiator Ali Larijani. Ambuehl said that he wanted to \
brief A/S Fried and the Ambassador in order to keep the USG \
fully apprised of Swiss activities, per Ambassador Coneway's \
request. His purpose, he said, would be to push Iran to \
accept the three "modalities" demanded by the UN Security \
Council and IAEA, namely: \
\
-- Suspension of all enrichment activities, with "no tricks;" \
-- Transparency with the international community; and \
-- Acceptance of rights and obligations as defined by the \
IAEA and UNSC resolutions. \
\
3.(C/NF) Ambuehl said he had been encouraged to travel to \
Iran by IAEA DG ElBaradei, with whom he had spoken three \
times in recent days. ElBaradei told Ambuehl that he had \
spoken with Secretary Rice and suggested that "we have to use \
the Swiss" to urge the Iranians to abide by UNSC resolutions. \
Notably, ElBaradei had not conveyed what the Secretary's \
response (if any) was. In any event, Ambuehl would tell the \
Iranians that this was their "last chance." He acknowledged \
that a Swiss effort would have only a 30 percent chance of \
success, but described the visit as low-risk, high potential \
gain. \
\
--------------- \
Counterargument \
--------------- \
\
4.(C/NF) Ambassador Coneway challenged Ambuehl to describe \
what if anything new the Swiss could tell the Iranians. It \
was a delicate time in the stand-off between the P5 plus 1 \
and Iran; silence would be the best policy by Switzerland. \
Moreover, Tehran would be unlikely to see this as a "last \
chance." A/S Fried told Ambuehl firmly that the USG had been \
concerned by some Swiss actions. Side initiatives could \
encourage the Iranians to game the unity of the international \
community. Bern's status as U.S. Protecting Power could also \
cause Iran to misconstrue Swiss actions. \
\
5.(C/NF) Ambuehl insisted that his prospective visit would \
not undermine the P5 plus 1. His points would be exactly the \
points agreed to by the UN Security Council and supported by \
the IAEA. Iran's rebuff of the Swiss initiative would be \
recognized as further evidence of Tehran's intransigence. \
\
6.(C/NF) A/S Fried reiterated that the international \
community had finally gained traction against Iran. It was \
important to let the pressure work. A/S Fried urged Ambuehl \
to make no firm plans until we could speak to officials in \
Washington. In any event, Ambuehl should make clear to the \
Iranians, if he does in the end go, that he did not speak for \
the USG. Ambuehl said that this went without saying. \
Ambuehl asked for understanding of the difficult situation he \
was in (we surmise this means the directive from Foreign \
Minister Calmy-Rey to engage with Iran on this issue). \
Options other than a flat "no" would be appreciated. A/S \
Fried and Ambassador Coneway agreed to get back to him as \
soon as possible. \
\
\
BERN 00000258 002 OF 002 \
\
\
--------------------------------------------- - \
Ambassador Coneway's follow up call to Ambuehl \
--------------------------------------------- - \
\
7.(C/NF) Using points provided by P staff, Ambassador Coneway \
called Ambuehl that night with the message that the USG had \
made its opinion clear. There was nothing new in the Swiss \
proposal and the visit presented many opportunities for \
misinterpretation. The decision to go would be a sovereign \
Swiss decision to take. If Ambuehl chose to go, the \
Ambassador stressed, it must be clear that he was not acting \
on the USG's behalf. \
\
8.(C/NF) Ambuehl's initial response was that he would \
consider the USG points. However, his diplomatic advisor \
Stephan Estermann called DCM on March 12 to announce that \
Ambuehl was on his way to Tehran and would provide a briefing \
upon his return. \
\
------- \
Comment \
------- \
\
9.(C/NF) A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway were very clear in \
their expression of concern about Ambuehl's planned travel to \
Tehran. However, it is obvious that the Swiss think there is \
at least the chance that the engagement of a "disinterested" \
non-member of the P5 plus 1 could offer Tehran a face-saving \
way to give into the UN Security Council - a belief \
apparently reinforced by ElBaradei. Ambuehl was noticeably \
uncomfortable not taking the USG's advice. But, there is \
little surprise in his decision to go forward with the visit, \
given the clear mandate he has received from Swiss Foreign \
Minister Calmy-Rey. \
CONEWAY \