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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1296, UHURU KENYATTA - PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI1296 | 2009-06-26 12:12 | 2011-02-27 23:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.the-star.co.ke/ |
VZCZCXRO9757
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1296/01 1771213
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261213Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0005
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6607
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3251
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3123
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001296
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KE
SUBJECT: UHURU KENYATTA - PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE
REFORM PROCESS
REF: NAIROBI 767
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 b,d
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Uhuru Kenyatta appears to be working towards a
presidential run in 2012. While many have pointed out that
replacing President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, by another Kikuyu,
would be unlikely due to anti-Kikuyu sentiments prevalent
across much of Kenyan society, Kenyatta may be encouraged to
attempt a presidential run due to shifting political dynamics
that make potential challengers seem weak. Interestingly,
Kenyatta seems to appreciate the need to be seen as
pro-reform, and we should encourage him to push for action on
key reform issues. Alternatively, the potential for Kenyatta
to foment violence to achieve political ends cannot be ruled
out (he is reportedly a key figure on the list of suspected
perpetrators of post-election violence). End summary.
--------------------------------------------
Kenyetta Preparing For 2012 Presidential Bid
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Although in public and private Uhuru Kenyatta has
avoided openly declaring presidential ambitions for 2012, he
appears to be moving to pave the way for a presidential run.
While conventional wisdom says that another person from the
Kikuyu ethnic group cannot succeed President Kibaki, a
Kikuyu, political dynamics that make potential challengers
seem weak may be encouraging Uhuru and his potential
supporters to rethink this.
¶3. (C) Kenyatta is taking steps that are clearly intended to
bolster his political standing and mobilize support. His
appointment as Finance Minister was seen by many as an
implicit endorsement by Kibaki; it provides a powerful
platform for Kenyatta to pursue presidential ambitions. The
budget which he recently submitted to Parliament (septel) has
virtually bought many parliamentarians as a result of vast
expansion of the funds designated for the Constituency
Development Fund (CDF). The CDF is used to fund projects in
parliamentary constituencies. While use of CDF funds has
become more transparent and accountable over the past couple
of years, parliamentarians still wield enormous influence
over use of the funds, and employ them to enhance their
political standing and support. No budget presentation has
ever been greeted with such enthusiasm by
parliamentarians.(It is important to note that expansion of
the CDF, if used transparently ) and therein lies the rub )
can serve a legitimate purpose of helping stimulate the
economy through infrastructure projects; the economy is
suffering greatly due to the aftermath of the post-election
violence and the world financial crisis. Through this tactic,
Kenyatta also increases the support he is likely to receive
in working behind the scenes to ensure that parliamentarians
never approve an independent special tribunal to hold
accountable those involved in post-election violence. It is
generally assumed that Kenyatta,s name (and that of his
prospective ally William Ruto) are on the list of suspects
the Waki Commission gave to Kofi Annan. (The danger of being
identified for investigation and possible prosecution is one
of Kenyatta,s principal vulnerabilities.)
------------------------------
Kikuyu Politics Favor Kenyetta
------------------------------
¶4. (C) Kenyatta must move to ensure solid control of his KANU
party as a potential presidential vehicle. KANU is currently
the second biggest partner to Kibaki,s Party of National
Unity (PNU), holding 14 seats in Parliament, mostly
representing non-Kikuyu regions. Ex-President Moi,s son
Gideon could compete for control, but at the end of the day
an accommodation could be worked out.(Kenyatta was Moi,s
designated successor and ran in 2002 on the KANU ticket.)
Gideon Moi and other KANU stalwarts have been pressing
Kenyatta to focus his energies on rebuilding KANU.
¶5. (C) Kikuyu political dynamics seem to be favoring
Kenyatta. There has been an emerging realization among Kikuyu
professionals, progressive politicians, and others that it
would not be healthy for the nation or wise politically to
NAIROBI 00001296 002 OF 004
seek to have another Kikuyu replace Kibaki. That said,
however, many Kikuyus, including the still dominant political
class, fear the potential consequences of electing a
non-Kikuyu (the concerns include worries about their economic
and political interests, including the potential for another
ethnic group to exploit anti-corruption efforts against
them). Kenyatta is slowly but steadily emerging as the most
likely potential presidential designee of the Kikuyus --
should they decide to back a candidate for president. Other
contenders are not gaining traction. Minister of Security
Saitoti is considered too old, not charismatic, and he is
tainted by the Goldenberg corruption scandal. Kikuyu
dissident Martha Karua, the former Minister of Justice and
head of the NARC-K party within the PNU, has not gained wide
support in the Kikuyu Central Province. (Vice President
Musyoka, the nominal head of the Kamba community, which is
closely related to the Kikuyu community, remains a potential
standard-bearer if at the end of the day the Kikuyus decide
that they should not field their own candidate. However, that
would be seen as a Kikuyu-Kamba condominium, which might well
be worse than a straight-out bid by Kenyatta if he can get
crucial support from the Kalenjin community.)
¶6. (C) While Kibaki will not play a decisive role in
designating his preferred successor, his standing as the
principal Kikuyu elder and the power that State House wields,
mean that obtaining his support is important. A number of
sources report close contacts between Kibaki and Kenyatta,
and between those two and William Ruto, a potential ally.
Kibaki,s naming of Kenyatta as Finance Minister was seen as
at least giving Kenyatta the platform to make a play for
leadership.
--------------------------------
Potential Kenyetta-Ruto Alliance
--------------------------------
¶7. (C) Ruto has made a number of private visits to State
House in recent months, and he and Kenyatta are in close
contact. They worked together behind the scenes to ensure
defeat of the special tribunal bill. One rationale for
cooperation is the importance they attach to promoting the
welfare of their respective ethnic communities (Kenyatta,s
Kikuyu community in Central Province and Ruto,s Kalenjin
community in Rift Valley) in order to avoid a repeat of what
happened last year during the post-election violence.
Although tensions between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities
remain high and make an alliance problematic, the political
imperatives driving potential cooperation between Kenyatta
and Ruto cannot be dismissed.(Some of the thinking runs along
these lines: an alliance among the Kalenjins, Kikuyus, and
the Kambas assures a winning majority. In the event of
violence in response to such a victory, such violence could
be contained to PM Odinga,s Luo ethnic community in Nyanza
Province and to his supporters in Nairobi,s Kibera slum.)
¶8. (C) Tentative, behind the scenes cooperation between
Kenyatta and Ruto is focused on a deal whereby Ruto uses his
influence among Kalenjins to facilitate the reintegration of
the Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Rift Valley; in
return, Ruto would get a significant share of important
economic positions for his Kalenjin political allies. What is
particularly problematic in a potential Kenyatta-Ruto
alliance is who would get top billing on the presidential
ticket, but there is some sense that Ruto might accept the
position of vice president or prime minister, and thus
prepare the ground for a presidential run in 2017.(Ruto is in
his 40s.)
¶9. (C) Most observers, rightly in our view, believe that
attempting to have another Kikuyu succeed Kibaki is a recipe
for serious instability ) perhaps for a meltdown much more
severe than that experienced last year. While some sort of
arrangement could emerge between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin
communities, this seems a distant prospect given what
happened last year. (Importantly Moi, rather than Ruto, is
still seen as the head of the Kalenjin community and there is
bad blood between those two. If Moi supports Kenyatta, Ruto
could decide to stay with Odinga, which would mean a split of
the Kalenjin vote.)
----------------------------------
Politicians Compete For Youth Vote
----------------------------------
NAIROBI 00001296 003 OF 004
¶10. (C) Yet another indication that Kenyatta may be preparing
the ground for a presidential run is his tacit support for
the creation of a national youth movement. Struck by U.S.
outreach efforts to grassroots youth movements in support of
the reform agenda, parliamentarians and other politicians are
scrambling to try to co-opt the youth. One of the most
important of these efforts is the plan underway by Kibaki,s
son Jimmy and several parliamentarians to launch a national
youth movement on July 4. Although Jimmy has publicly claimed
this is intended to push for change across the political
spectrum, this is a ridiculous assertion given Jimmy,s
position as a charter member of the vested interests.
¶11. (C) There are some indications that this new youth
movement is intended to co-opt and destroy the grassroots
youth movements which have been emerging across ethnic lines
to push peacefully and in a non-partisan manner for change
(see reftel on our efforts to encourage this). Jimmy and
those behind establishment of this new youth movement
attempted to get the Ambassador to attend the launch, which
he declined to do. One of those heavily involved in setting
up this youth movement made clear that it is intended both to
bolster Jimmy,s eventual political prospects (probably to
run for his father,s parliamentary seat in 2012) and
potentially to serve as a source of support for Kenyatta.
------------------------------------------
Kenyetta Election Could Push Reform Agenda
------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Kenyatta,s potential ambitions could be helpful in
pushing the reform process. During a recent conversation
with the Ambassador, Kenyatta claimed that he is privately
pushing Kibaki to carry out key reforms, particularly with
respect to the police and judiciary. It seems possible that
) given the clear public frustration with the slow pace of
reform and our stated concerns -- Kenyatta appreciates the
need for him, KANU, and PNU to be seen as more pro-reform.
He claimed to the Ambassador that he is urging removal of
Police Commissioner Ali and Attorney General Wako.
¶13. (C) If he decides to pursue the presidency, Kenyatta has
several major strengths, but these are balanced and
potentially offset by important weaknesses. Kenyatta is
bright and charming, even charismatic. He is enormously
wealthy, and therefore has not had to engage in corruption.
Although his wealth is the inheritance from his father,s
corruption, the Kenyatta family still holds a special status.
Kenyatta,s liabilities are at least as important as his
strengths. He drinks too much and is not a hard worker
(though he surprised everyone by the acuity of the budget,
which reportedly resulted from some tough work over long
hours). Perhaps most importantly, Kenyatta has been closely
linked to the Mungiki (which emerged in the aftermath of the
Mau Mau and began as a movement in defense of Kikuyu
traditional values, but which has long since morphed into a
well-organized mafia-style criminal organization). The reason
that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of
suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his
fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against
Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports
indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the
Mungiki. (The links between the Mungiki and various Kikuyu
politicians are at best murky.) Ironically, Kenyatta,s links
to the Mungiki make him one of those who feels strongly that
extrajudicial killing must stop (since many of the
extrajudicial killings have been carried out by the police,
under Commissioner Ali,s direction, against the Mungiki).
¶14. (C) Kenyatta may see shifting political dynamics as
opening the way for a presidential run. Odinga is
increasingly perceived as feckless, unable or unwilling to
govern effectively and move forward the reform agenda. There
is growing disillusionment within his camp (as conveyed by
key interlocutors of Odinga,s Orange Democratic Movement,
ODM, party to the Ambassador). Odinga,s being seen as in a
weakened position may be wishful thinking given his political
resilience and the fact that he could yet emerge as a
reformer, but he has clearly lost significant popular
support. The ODM seems both directionless and less united
than before.
¶15. (C) Comment: Although talk of calculations with respect
to the 2012 presidential election seems very premature, the
reality is that politicians are already maneuvering with that
NAIROBI 00001296 004 OF 004
in mind. Those considerations will influence their
calculations with respect to the reform agenda. The popular
dynamic in favor of reform will influence politicians,
behavior in a positive direction to some degree, but this
will be weighed against considerations of ethnic alliances,
fund-raising, and personal politics. Continued intensive U.S.
pressure for implementation of reforms will help drive
considerations in the right direction towards reform steps.
End comment.
RANNEBERGER