

Currently released so far... 1446 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/13
2010/12/12
2010/12/11
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CU
CH
CO
CI
COUNTERTERRORISM
CA
CY
CASC
CIA
CIS
CD
CV
CVIS
CF
CM
CE
CJAN
CLINTON
CMGT
CS
CACM
CDB
COUNTER
CG
CN
CDG
CBW
ECUN
EU
ETRD
EFIN
EAID
ES
ECON
EWWT
EINVEFIN
ELAB
ETTC
ENRG
EUN
EC
EG
EINV
EXTERNAL
EPET
EAGR
ENVR
EIND
EI
ECPS
EINT
ELTN
EFIS
EZ
EMIN
EAIR
EREL
ECIP
EINDETRD
ET
EN
ER
EUC
ELECTIONS
KDEM
KIRF
KISL
KJUS
KTFN
KNNP
KWBG
KPAL
KPKO
KSCA
KCRM
KR
KWMN
KN
KU
KV
KE
KPAO
KDRG
KCOR
KGCC
KDEMAF
KG
KZ
KTIP
KICC
KTIA
KIPR
KMDR
KSPR
KHIV
KHLS
KACT
KGHG
KS
KUNR
KAWK
KCIP
KBIO
KFRD
KSUM
KOLY
KSEC
KAWC
KPIN
KPRP
KGIC
KRAD
KPWR
KIFR
KNUC
KFIN
KCOM
KCFE
KMCA
KWAC
KDEV
KIRC
KNPP
MTCRE
MOPS
MARR
MO
MASS
MNUC
MY
MX
MCAP
MZ
MIL
MPOS
MU
ML
MR
MOPPS
MG
MASC
MAR
MP
MD
MA
MTCR
MEPP
MAPP
MCC
MK
PREL
PGOV
PTER
PHUM
PINR
PARM
PBTS
PHSA
PK
PINS
PSI
PA
PE
PINT
PL
PSOE
PU
POL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PROP
PO
PBIO
PECON
PREF
PM
PGOF
PAK
PINL
POGOV
POLITICS
PEPR
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10PARIS183, CLIMATE CHANGE - BORLOO SAYS DROP "LEGALLY BINDING"
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10PARIS183.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10PARIS183 | 2010-02-17 11:11 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO5558
RR RUEHAG RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHPB RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0183 0481130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171130Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8324
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000183
SIPDIS
E.O. 19528: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: SENV KGHG ENRG FR
SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE - BORLOO SAYS DROP "LEGALLY BINDING"
REF:09 Paris 1635
Classified by Amb. Charles H. Rivkin for Reasons 1.5 (b)(d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo told the
Ambassador that the key to advancing climate negotiations is to drop
the notion of a legally binding treaty in favor of a system of
national commitments. He also argued that it would be up to a small
group of eight or ten heads of state, and their sherpas, to negotiate
implementation of the Copenhagen Accord. Borloo attributed the
European obsession with legally binding treaties to its post-war
history and experience in creating the EU by progressively ceding
sovereignty via treaty. The key to reaching this kind of deal would
be credible action on tradable quotas, forests, and finance including
innovative financing mechanisms. The Copenhagen Accord was not a
failure, but allowing the means to become the ends was a trap. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador Rivkin called on Minister of State for Sustainable
Development Jean-Louis Borloo on February 11 to review the Copenhagen
Conference and next steps on the Accord. They had last met on the
eve of the conference (reftel.) Borloo expressed in several
different ways the idea that Copenhagen had gone off track because
its approach had been too Western and too European. Major emerging
countries were not prepared to cede sovereignty to a treaty, while EU
members saw this as both normal and essential. Borloo observed that
Copenhagen had, in fact, established a possible global deal on
emissions reductions by the United States, China, and Europe. We
will not get beyond this balance at the next Conference of the
Parties (COP) in Cancun, he said.
¶3. (C) Borloo insisted that UNFCCC COP negotiators did not have the
ability to close a deal after years of ongoing negotiations. It was
now up to the major heads of state. He suggested a group of eight or
ten: Germany and France for Europe, the United States, China, India,
Brazil, Algeria and Ethiopia (and possibly South Africa). Once these
leaders, working through their sherpas or personal representatives
agree on an implementation plan for Copenhagen, it will be largely
acceptable to, and accepted by, the rest of the world, and can then
be returned to a UN forum to be finalized. (Borloo dismissed the
role of Spain as the current EU Presidency country, saying that Spain
has exceeded its Kyoto Protocol targets by 50 percent and is mired by
its internal economic situation. The United Nations also did not
have any leadership capacity to advance the negotiations, he said.)
¶4. (C) Borloo argued that the key to implementing the "equilibrium"
revealed at Copenhagen was an arrangement that would be voluntary but
also automatic in implementation and would include tradable emissions
quotas (with linked carbon markets), a forestry mechanism (REDD
Plus), and financing, including innovative financing and a fast start
mechanism. He commented that China would agree to such a system as
far preferable to a U.S. and EU carbon border tax or tariff
arrangement.
¶5. (C) Borloo thought that adhesion to the Copenhagen Accord would be
more than adequate to establish its acceptance, and he expected most
of Africa and three quarters of the island states to sign on. He
relayed that France continues to advocate adhesion and said that he
personally was travelling and meeting with key country counterparts,
including China and India.
¶6. (C) COMMENT: Borloo conveyed a strategic view of these
negotiations that has changed significantly. We note especially his
assessment that a legally binding instrument is not only unnecessary
but also impossible. He stressed that unlike some Europeans, the
French understood the USG position and had not been critical of the
United States at Copenhagen. In fact, he said, the success of the
Copenhagen Accord for the USG had been the direct engagement of
President Obama. END COMMENT.
¶7. (U) Borloo also passed a letter from himself, on behalf of the
French people, to Secretary of Energy Chu expressing condolences for
the loss of life at the Kleen Energy Power plant in Middletown,
Connecticut, and expressing his wish that those injured in the
explosion recover quickly. The Embassy has faxed the letter to the
Department of Energy.
RIVKIN