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Viewing cable 09MEXICO3573, MEXICAN NAVY OPERATION NETS DRUG KINGPIN ARTURO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MEXICO3573 | 2009-12-17 20:08 | 2010-12-02 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Mexico |
VZCZCXRO9531
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3573/01 3512042
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 172042Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9478
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003573
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICAN NAVY OPERATION NETS DRUG KINGPIN ARTURO
BELTRAN LEYVA
REF: MONTERREY 000453
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d).
¶1. (S) Summary. Mexican Navy forces acting on U.S.
information killed Arturo Beltran Leyva in an operation on
December 16, the highest-level takedown of a cartel figure
under the Calderon administration. The operation is a clear
victory for the Mexican Government and an example of
excellent USG-GOM cooperation. The unit that conducted the
operation had recieved extensive U.S. training. Arturo
Beltran Leyva's death will not solve Mexico's drug problem,
but it will hopefully generate the momentum necessary to make
sustained progress against other drug trafficking
organizations. End Summary.
The Operation
-------------
¶2. (S) Mexican Navy (SEMAR) sources revealed on the night of
December 17 that SEMAR forces killed Arturo Beltran Leyva
(ABL), head of the Beltran Leyva Organization, during a
shoot-out in Cuernavaca (approximately 50 miles south of
Mexico City) that afternoon. At least three other cartel
operatives were killed during the raid, with a fourth
committing suicide. While it still has not been confirmed,
Embassy officials believe the latter to be ABL's brother,
Hector, which would mean that all Beltran Leyva brothers are
either dead or in prison. Arturo Beltran Leyva has a long
history of involvement in the Mexican drug trade, and worked
with Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman and his Sinaloa Cartel before
splitting in 2008. The rivalry between the Sinaloa and
Beltran Leyva organizations has been a key factor driving the
escalating levels of narcotics-related violence in recent
years. Born in Sinaloa, ABL has been key to the importation
and distribution of cocaine and heroin in the United States,
and also has extensive money laundering capabilities,
corruption networks, and international contacts in Colombia
and the U.S.
¶3. (C) Embassy law enforcement officials say that the arrest
operation targeting ABL began about a week prior to his death
when the Embassy relayed detailed information on his location
to SEMAR. The SEMAR unit has been trained extensively by
NORTHCOM over the past several years. SEMAR raided an
identified location, where they killed several ABL bodyguards
and arrested over 23 associates, while ABL and Hector
escaped. On Monday, the Embassy interagency linked ABL to an
apartment building located in Cuernavaca (about an hour south
of Mexico City), where ABL was in hiding. SEMAR initiated an
arrest operation on Wednesday afternoon, surrounding the
identified apartment complex, and establishing a security
perimeter. ABL's forces fired on the SEMAR operatives and
engaged in a sustained firefight that wounded three SEMAR
marines and possibly killed one. SEMAR forces evacuated
residents of the apartment complex to the gym, according to
press accounts, and no civilian casualties have so far been
reported.
The Mexican Interagency
-----------------------
¶4. (S) The successful operation against ABL comes on the
heels of an aggressive SEMAR effort in Monterrey against Zeta
forces (ref a) and highlights its emerging role as a key
player in the counternarcotics fight. SEMAR is well-trained,
well-equipped, and has shown itself capable of responding
quickly to actionable intelligence. Its success puts the
Army (SEDENA) in the difficult position of explaining why it
has been reluctant to act on good intelligence and conduct
operations against high-level targets. The U.S. interagency
originally provided the information to SEDENA, whose refusal
to move quickly reflected a risk aversion that cost the
institution a major counternarcotics victory. SEDENA did
provide backup to SEMAR during the firefight with ABL forces,
but can take little credit for the operation. Public
Security Secretary (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna can also be
counted as a net loser in the Mexican interagency following
the ABL operation. SSP considers high-level Beltran Leyva
targets to be its responsibility, and Garcia Luna has already
MEXICO 00003573 002 OF 003
said privately that the operation should have been his.
The Impact on Violence
----------------------
¶5. (S) It is early to say with a great degree of confidence
what kind of effect ABL's death will have on levels of
narco-related violence in Mexico. A spike is probably likely
in the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles are
intensified by the sudden leadership gap in one of the
country's most important cartels. With all the Beltran Leyva
brothers likely dead or in prison, there are a number of
other cartel functionaries likely to vie for the leadership
slot. Moreover, rival organizations may intensify efforts to
expand their influence in the disarray likely to follow ABL's
death. At the very least, efforts to clean the Beltran Leyva
house and rout out suspected informers will be bloody, and
retaliation by the organization against Mexican law
enforcement or military officials is not out of the cards.
¶6. (C) In the medium to longer term, ABL's death could have
the potential to lower the level of narco-violence rates.
ABL himself was a particularly violent leader with numerous
effective assassin teams. Moreover, the Sinaloa-Beltran
Leyva rivalry has been responsible for a large number of
narcotics-related homicides in Mexico, and also largely
personally driven by the Beltran Leyva brothers themselves.
Emboffs speculate that Beltran Leyva associates, under
pressure and perhaps more vulnerable due to leadership
deficiencies, could move to align more closely again with
Sinaloa, which they might think offers a more natural
protection than the Zetas.
The Boost for Calderon
----------------------
¶7. (C) SEMAR's successful operation against ABL is a major
victory for President Calderon and his war against organized
crime. ABL is the highest ranking target taken down by the
Calderon government, and his status as one of the most
important and long-standing of Mexican drug traffickers makes
his takedown even more symbolically important. President
Calderon has openly admitted to having a tough year -- his
party lost big in the midterm elections, he is confronting an
economic crisis, and nationwide homicide rates continue to
climb -- and contacts have told Poloff that he has seemed
"down" in meetings. The SEMAR operation is undoubtedly a
huge boost for him, both in terms of bolstering public
support for his security efforts and in reassuring himself
that important security accomplishments in this area are
possible. Calderon's political opponents will also find it
far less useful to accuse the President of hanging on to an
ineffective anti-crime strategy that nets numerous mid- to
low-level cartel figures but fails to rein in the major
kingpins. The major Mexico City dailies have run front page
Beltran Leyva stories, and President Calderon's remarks in a
press conference from Copenhagen highlighting that the
operation represents an "important achievement for the
Mexican people and government" were widely covered.
Comment
-------
¶8. (S) The operation against Arturo Beltran Leyva is a clear
victory for the Mexican Government and an example of
excellent USG-GOM cooperation. Seamless Embassy interagency
collaboration combined with a willing, capable, and ready
SEMAR produced one of the greatest successes to date in the
counternarcotics fight. ABL's death will provide an
important boost to Calderon and hopefully will cultivate a
greater sense of confidence within Mexican security agencies
that will encourage them to take greater advantage of similar
opportunities. SEMAR's win in particular may encourage
SEDENA to be more proactive and less risk averse in future
operations. ABL's death will certainly not resolve Mexico's
drug problem, but it will likely generate the momentum
necessary within the GOM security apparatus to make sustained
and real progress against the country's drug trafficking
organizations.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
MEXICO 00003573 003 OF 003
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL