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Patrolling, Intelligence, and Information Operations

Vol. III

**Company-Level
Stability Operations
and
Support Operations**

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
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FOREWORD

This newsletter is the third in a series of products focused on company operations in stability operations and support operations. This volume's focus is on company-level patrolling, INT, and information operations (IO). Historical perspective and recent British allied experience in their approach to counterinsurgency operations is also examined in this volume.

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Company-Level Stability Operations and Support Operations Patrolling, Intelligence, and Information Operations (IO)

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED	
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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Thomas P. Odom, JRTC CALL Cell

This introduces the third volume of the company operations in stability operations and support operations newsletter series. Our focus in Volume III is company-level patrolling, INT, and information operations (IO). All three are so intertwined in stability operations and support operations as to be inseparable. The primary source for INT at the company level in stability operations and support operations is patrolling. The primary delivery means for IO at the company level is the patrol.

Situational awareness at the company level begins with INT preparation of the battlefield (IPB). That is to say, company operations should begin with IPB by the company leadership. We also offer extracts from CALL Handbook 03-20, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, on developing situational understanding through collection and analysis of information. I am especially pleased to highlight in this volume a contribution from our British allies on their approach to counterinsurgency operations; this article concentrates on patrolling, INT, and IO.

Other areas of particular note in this volume are training materials on patrolling, the situational training exercise (STX) lane concept for combat patrols at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the highlights from those lanes in recent rotations, and an article on how best to tackle the challenges of patrolling. We finish with considerations on IO at the company level.

Before proceeding with Chapter 1, let me again emphasize that this newsletter is one of a multi-volume series on company operations in stability operations and support operations. Although this volume can be read and used in stand alone, it is best used in the context of the other volumes. For example, a patrol mission requires planning, briefing, executing, and debriefing followed by analysis. Volume I in this series concerns company command and control, specifically tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) on setting up company command posts to handle patrolling and other related stability operations and support operations missions. So as you read this volume, understand that there are related threads in the remainder of the series. Stability operations and support operations are complex subjects with many overlapping and intertwined themes.

CHAPTER 1: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) AND THE INFANTRY COMPANY IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

MAJ Brian Williams, JRTC CALL Cell Chief

D+3 The company has been conducting operations in their company sector for three days. Earlier in the day, the company had been in direct-fire contact with anti-coalition forces. The company missions for today are escorting a water trailer to the villagers in Jabr Nahr (Hufton) and also escorting Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) personnel from the village of Wadi al Tarif (Jetertown) to the tier-two sites within the company sector.

Headquarters section and elements from 2nd platoon are delivering the water trailer to the villagers as part of a company SWEAT-MS (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, and security) initiative program to the village. The platoon is traveling north along Maddox road at approximately 1110 hours. As the platoon turns north onto Fullerton, an explosion erupts, destroying the company's 5-ton truck and water trailer and killing the two Soldiers in the vehicle.

At the same time, 1st platoon is traveling along the trail network south of Wadi al Tarif. The platoon turns northeast onto the trail leading into the southwestern sector of Wadi al Tarif. At approximately 1124, as the platoon crosses a low-water crossing, an explosion erupts, killing three Soldiers and destroying their high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV).

As a company senior observer/controller the past year, I have had the opportunity to see a variety of units not typically seen at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). I have covered down on mechanized infantry, light infantry, and armor companies, all tasked with stability operations and support operations missions to facilitate the transfer of power to the Iraqi people. Each company, with varying degrees of success, accomplished their assigned tasks. By the time they departed JRTC, they were ready to take the fight to the enemy. Nonetheless, the training deficiency common to all the companies observed was mission analysis, specifically the estimate of the situation and the INT preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to identify the most likely enemy course of action (COA).

According to **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***, the four steps of IPB are the following:

1. Define the battlefield environment.
2. Describe the battlefield effects.
3. Evaluate the threat.
4. Determine threat COA.

FM 34-130 further states the following:

“The IPB process is continuous. You conduct IPB prior to and during the command’s initial planning for an operation, *but you also continue to perform IPB during the conduct of the operation.*” (emphasis added)

FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion* states the following:

“Though the information flows from the S2, who also prepares the various overlays and templates, the IPB is the commander’s decision-making tool.”

Finally, **FM 7-10, *The Infantry Company***, paragraph 2-14 states the following:

“Once the company commander has a full appreciation of the situation (from the IPB process), he then develops several COA that will accomplish his mission.”

IPB is an important tool that company commanders must understand and use. It is even more important in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Company commanders today are given tasks and responsibilities previously outside the scope of company-level leadership. Today, companies execute combat-oriented tasks, such as cordon and search, even as they perform stability operations, support operations, and information operations (IO) within their company sector.

How then can commanders accomplish their assigned tasks? The short answer is IPB.

To illustrate the four steps of the IPB, consider the above scenario. Unfortunately, this was not the first time that the unit had experienced an improvised explosive device (IED) attack. The day prior, the unit struck an IED, wounding two Soldiers and damaging a vehicle. That same day the unit was also held up at a low-water crossing due to the discovery of an IED that explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel later destroyed. Within the battalion as a whole, IED attacks were not new. In the previous two days, the battalion had suffered two IED attacks within the battalion area of operations (AO).

Step one of the IPB is to define the battlefield environment. Characteristics or categories the commander needs to consider include the following: the terrain and weather of the area; the population demographics, including ethnic groups, religious groups, age, and income; the political and/or social economics; and the infrastructure, transportation, and telecommunications.

For simplicity, the two primary religious groups within the company sector are Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Within the village of Jabr Nahr, the population ratio is generally 90% Sunni and 6% Shia. The remaining 4% is mainly Kurdish, the majority of whom are Sunni. Outside the company AO, but within the area of influence, the town of Wadi al Tarif is 96% Sunni and 4% Shia. Political and tribal elements in the company and battalion sector are as follows: the Asim tribe throughout the battalion sector; the Wahabbis, a fundamentalist Sunni anti-coalition sect in Wadi al Tarif; and foreign fighters in the vicinity of Jabr Nahr.

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There are three primary roads within the company sector: Jetertown Road, Jetertown Cutoff, and Fullerton Road; together they form a triangle. Numerous trails, generally running east-west, bisect these primary roads. Jarbr Nahr and Wadi al Tarif each have propane pumping facilities, and there is a bank and medical clinic in the village of Wadi al Tarif.

The terrain in the area is generally flat with gentle slopes. The foliage, consisting of white pines, is generally sparse with wide-open areas. In the low ground and along the streams the underbrush becomes denser. Big Brushy Creek, running primarily north to south, bisects the company sector. Smaller intermittent streams running northeast to southwest are in the eastern half of the company sector.

Step two of the IPB is to describe how the terrain affects threat and friendly forces. Step two always considers terrain and weather factors. The acronym OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) is used to describe the effects of the terrain. Accordingly, observation and fields of fire within and around the village of Jabr Nahr are limited to 75 to 100 meters, which allows virtually 360 degree unobserved access to the village. Cover and concealment around the village of Jabr Nahr is excellent, with dense trees surrounding the area. The intermittent stream beds, foliage, and wood terrain benefit friendly and threat forces, allowing unobserved movement into and out of the two villages.

Existing obstacles in the area are Big Brushy Creek and the intermittent streams, reinforced by the dense foliage along their banks. Key terrain includes the primary road intersections, low-water crossing points, the propane facilities, and the bank. The low-water crossing points and road intersections allow both the threat and friendly forces to restrict movement, either by friendly traffic control posts (TCPs) or opposition use of IEDs or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The limited number of primary gravel roads in the company's area allows friendly forces to quickly consolidate and control the primary road network. The limited number of roads also restricts the avenues of approach into the villages by the threat forces. Low ground on the west side of both Jabr Nahr and Wadi al Tarif allows unobserved movement between the two villages.

Additionally, the water purification facility is within the company's area of influence. Protecting this facility and other utility stations allows the population to receive purified water, a strong psychological benefit to the coalition forces. Alternatively, opposition forces see that damaging such facilities and limiting the population's water, propane, or electricity supplies undermines the coalition and benefits the insurgency.

Step three of IPB is to evaluate the threat. This step involves examining the threat's disposition, composition, and capabilities. Within the company's area of responsibility (AOR), there are small numbers of former regime elements (FRE) and foreign fighters (FF) who are extremely dedicated to an anti-U.S./coalition forces ideology. The FRE and FF personnel operating in the company's AOR are organized into a cell structure. Operating in a cell structure makes it difficult to dismantle the entire organization at one time and allows individuals in the cells the greatest opportunity to blend into the surrounding areas of Jabr Nahr and Wadi al Tarif. These anti-coalition cells were capable of employing small arms, mortar fire, and IEDs to interdict and

harass coalition forces and to intimidate the local population. The Asim tribe can also influence the population within the area. Anti-coalition forces could also use or threaten the use of violence toward the local population to ensure its cooperation.

The fourth step of IPB is to determine threat COAs. This is the step that company commanders fail to appreciate or fully understand. They fail to give their subordinates a viable task and purpose for their plan based on the intentions of the enemy. To have platoon leaders execute combat or reconnaissance patrols for the sake of “clearing” routes or “gathering INT” is unacceptable. It is imperative that company commanders base their missions on the possible COAs that the threat is capable of executing.

To arrive at that level of situational understanding, commanders must grasp the conditions of the environment in which they are operating. In addition, commanders must understand that the COE or any operational environment is not top driven. That is to say, INT data and analysis is not a one-way flow from the brigade S2 to the battalion S2 to the company. Company commanders must allocate resources within the company to collect and analyze as best as possible. In the example given in the introduction, the company suffered an IED attack that destroyed a HMMWV and killed two Soldiers. As stated later, this was not the first IED attack. Unfortunately, between the first and second attacks, the commander failed to try and analyze the threat’s capability and the enemy’s most likely COA. By examining the information in the above three steps, one can deduce the threat’s more probable COA and then plan on how to best counter the opposition’s actions. This examination would have forced the company commander toward understanding that a second IED attack, after an initial successful attack under similar circumstances, was likely.

Focusing on the threat’s capability to use IEDs against coalition forces, situational understanding can be realized using the IPB. Reviewing step one shows that the Asim tribe is a potentially important political force in the village. The infrastructure in the company’s AO is very limited; there are three gravel roads, a propane filling station in the village of Jabr Nahr, and the water purification facility just outside the company’s AOR to the north. (See figure 1-1.)




Figure 1-1

At first glance, the company sector is relatively large, roughly 20 square kilometers. But further study under step 2—the limited roads and intersection—shows the likely areas for IED placement are limited. Along the primary roads there are only six likely areas where IEDs could be placed. The first is the intersection of Maddox and Fullerton Road. The second area is the intersection of Fullerton and Carnis Road. The third is the intersection of Fullerton and Jetertown Road. The fourth is the intersection of Jetertown Cutoff and Jetertown Road. At all three of these intersections, vehicles must slow to a near stop when turning. The fifth area for the possible placement of an IED is just north of Jabr Nahr. The road leading into the town from the north makes an S curve uphill approximately two-hundred meters outside of the village. The sixth location for a possible IED is the low-water crossing point indicated on the grid. (See figure 1-2.)




Figure 1-2

To place these IEDs at any of these locations, the opposition must first reach the location. More importantly they need to be able to return to their safe havens of Jabr Nahr or Wadi al Tarif, again outside of the company's AOR but within its area of influence. Reviewing the key terrain information gathered in step 2 suggests that the opposition would most likely use the wooded low ground areas to the east and north east of Jabr Nahr. As illustrated in the diagram, these are the shortest covered and concealed routes from Jabr Nahr; they are the likely areas for the placement of an IED and for travel between the villages of Jabr Nahr and Wadi al Tarif. (See figure 1-3.)




Figure 1-3

Highlighted information from step three shows that the opposition forces in Jabr Nahr consist of a cell with three to five men, possibly a squad. The cell is capable of employing IEDs and RPGs as well as mortar fire. To maintain the cell's low signature, the cell's weapons cache is most likely located outside of the village, but close enough to support a hasty attack or opportunities. The cell is either covertly or forcibly sustained by the local population. (See figure 1-4.)




Figure 1-4

Compiling the above illustrations gives the commander a “doctrinal template” on how the opposition forces in Jabr Nahr may possibly operate. Based on this template, one can arrive at a most likely COA that the threat will use to place IEDs to disrupt coalition efforts.

To avoid detection, threat elements will most likely operate during a limited period of visibility or they will take several days to place a planned IED. During this time, threat elements would either manufacture the IED inside or outside the village. If the material to manufacture the IED is located outside of the village, the anti-coalition forces will have to move to the location and either assemble the material there or at another location. There are two likely areas for the threat to hide their material outside the village of Jabr Nahr and still keep it readily at hand. The first is the cemetery that is located 150 meters to the northwest of the village and the other is the intermediate stream bed 100 meters to the west. (See figure 1-5.)




Figure 1-5

Both locations are in areas that allow covered and concealed movement in and out of the village, but also along routes identified in step two. After placing the IEDs, the insurgent will have to be in a position to overwatch the target area. Likely areas for the threat to overwatch the identified IED are as follows:

- For area number 1: the wooded area to the west and northeast of the intersection.
- For areas 2 and 3: the wooded area to the south of Fullerton run, which allows an individual to overwatch both intersections.
- For the fourth, fifth, and sixth areas: the route is wooded on both sides. The woods limit the distance (approximately 200 meter) an individual can be from the intersection to effectively overwatch the IED.

Having identified the enemy's most likely COA, the commander can now more effectively assign the assets that are available to him. From the above, the assigned mission could be tasked to the platoons in the company.

Route clearance:

_____ platoon will clear routes Maddox, Fullerton, and Jetertown by clearing named areas of interest (NAI) 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; the purpose is to allow freedom of movement along routes by reducing threat personnel, detention devices, and IED material.

Search and attack/area reconnaissance:

_____ platoon will perform search and attack operations in NAI 6 and 7; the purpose is to capture weapons/ IED material caches to reduce the threat's offensive capability.

Ambushes:

_____ platoon will establish ambush (nonlethal or lethal) positions in the vicinity of grid _____ between 2100 hrs and 0730 to detain suspected individuals.

The company commander does not have to assign only combat-oriented missions. As identified in step one, the Asim tribe was depicted as a potentially influential element. The commander, nested with the battalion's IO plan, can assign platoons specific individuals and then tailor the operation's priority INT requirements (PIR). Beyond specific individuals being targeted, the company commander can also assign specific PIR to the platoon to gather as they patrol through the village.

The above does not necessarily reflect threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) or actions, but what it does is illustrated in that the IPB process is a powerful tool that will allow company commanders to better utilize their limited assets in a time-constrained environment. To borrow a phrase, commanders should analyze the mission versus conduct mission analysis. By continually applying the four steps of the IPB process (define the battlefield environment, describe the battlefield effects, evaluate the threat, and determine threat COA), commanders will better "analyze" the threat in their AO.

CHAPTER 2: TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

DEVELOPING SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING: COLLECTING AND PROCESSING TACTICAL INFORMATION

Extract, CALL Handbook 03-20, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*

A. Introduction. Stability operations and support operations are a common entry point for conventional forces into the new world of asymmetric warfare. In the contemporary operating environment (COE), America's adversaries are attempting to take our overwhelming conventional strengths and turn them into crippling weaknesses. Superior technology, firepower, and mobility—those things that on the conventional battlefield give us amazing strength—become the targets of our enemies. Additionally, our foes attempt to seize upon the presence of the media and the natural American concern for troop welfare by conducting attacks that impact domestic support. Actions to preserve our conventional strength, protect our forces, and facilitate the rapid transition from the defense to the offense must be taken.

In stability operations and support operations, our units suffer from a disadvantage in situational understanding. The enemy has an immediate tactical understanding of the battlespace. It is his home, and he has spent years studying it. The high signature (i.e., obvious presence) of our forces facilitates the enemy's targeting effort. In contrast, his low signature enables him to conceal his location and movement and to gather INT from sympathetic or unwitting members of his own culture. So long as our units lack situational understanding, mission accomplishment in stability operations and support operations will be difficult. Such ignorance may lead to mission failure.

Situational understanding is gained through a constant, relentless, and thorough process of educating every member of the unit about the battlespace in which he operates. This education is gained through a combination of tactical actions that spans the spectrum of operations—from civil affairs to security patrols to open combat. The experiences and information gained through the execution of all these operations increases understanding of the battlespace. The actions suggested in this section are intended to enable small unit leaders to better understand their battlespace.

B. Collecting Tactical Information. Tactical information facilitates tactical operations. The battlespace is full of information. Much of it is useful and helps the unit to develop situational understanding, but much of it is also useless noise and can overwhelm the unit leader. To successfully develop situational understanding, the unit leader must use methods that systematically screen out useless information and enable him to focus on pertinent data.

C. Vigilance. In stability operations and support operations, the Soldier's primary tool is not his weapon, but his mind and the ability to remain alert on and off duty. The unit leader must take actions to increase his unit's vigilance. Suggested actions are the following:

- Make frequent visits to all static posts to observe Soldiers' actions and make on-site corrections to deficiencies in security procedures and alertness levels.

- Quiz the Soldiers about their assigned sectors. Ask them questions about houses, vehicles, and individuals within their sector. Soldiers who demonstrate a familiarity with the routine of life within their sector are demonstrating vigilance. Ask the Soldier about recent changes to the routine. If different squads, patrols, or platoons are rotated through the sector, ask the Soldier what he was briefed about during the relief-in-place.
- Task patrols and observation posts (OPs) with specific questions to answer during their patrols or watch shifts. During debriefing, the patrol or watch standers should provide answers to these questions. Care should be taken not to levy questions that are too general such as, “How were things in town today?” Nor should a single OP or patrol be given too many questions to answer. The following example is a suggested collection task: “Today you will be patrolling through the Shaheed Masoud neighborhood along Mansour Street. Note the buildings on all four corners of the intersection of Mansour Street and Jalal Street, and provide details on their height and the number of street front windows and entrances.” Over time, as more of these questions are asked and answered, the unit leader will be able to develop a very detailed picture of the assigned sector in his headquarters or patrol base. This information will aid in the planning and execution of operations within his sector.

D. Engaging the Locals. Situational understanding is not developed by passively observing the activities within the sector. An important part of the education is getting to know the local populace in detail. Professional interaction with the populace not only helps to communicate the purpose for being there and to gain support, but also to provide information to achieve mission objectives. Significant efforts should be made by leaders at all levels to make contact with the local populace. Regular meetings between company commanders and local neighborhood or village leaders should be held. Keep in mind that even a less than supportive local can provide useful information.

A variety of sources can confirm the veracity of information collected. The use of linguists and/or trained interrogators (based on availability of resources and coordination of Army/joint assets) is highly encouraged, but the use of phrase cards or electronic language translation devices is also beneficial for interaction on patrols or at OPs and checkpoints. Care must be taken to ensure that the interaction is culturally appropriate. For example, it is unacceptable in some cultures for males to address females who are not related to them. In any event, the local populace can be a significant asset if a relationship can be established.

E. Tactical Interrogation. Civilians and captured enemy combatants hold a wealth of information that is useful to the small unit leader. Due to the rapid tempo of operations, however, the usefulness of this information is highly perishable and fleeting. Tactical interrogation of these individuals allows the unit leader to glean those pieces of information that can be critical to success. Trained interrogators are a low-density asset that may not be available for support to the tactical commander. The small unit leader should review the records of his personnel to identify individuals who have proficiency in foreign languages and have them tested to determine their true capability. Larger commands may offer survival-level language training. Leaders should take advantage of these opportunities and request mission-oriented language training that will enable his unit to collect basic facts related to his mission.

F. Recording Information. No Soldier can remember everything that happens on a daily basis, much less weekly or monthly. To capture important information, the unit must have a record of what has occurred in the area of responsibility (AOR).

- **Patrol Logs:** Each patrol leader should maintain a written record of events during his patrol. This record should include any noticed changes to the environment in the sector patrolled, when this information was reported to higher headquarters (the tactical operations center [TOC] or the patrol base), and any information gathered from locals during the patrol. If a patrol log is too difficult to write during a patrol, then the patrol leader can use a voice recorder. The use of small video devices may also be helpful in recording information, depending on the situation. Many current video cameras come with a built-in screen that is sufficient for reviewing the video clips. Many also have a still photograph mode. The video and still photography are useful tools during a relief-in-place for bringing the relieving unit up to date on activities in the assigned sector.
- **Company, Platoon, or Patrol Base Logs:** The maintenance of journals is a standard procedure in battalion TOCs. Smaller units, such as squads or platoons, should also keep logs of all events that occur in their sectors. If a company or platoon has OPs or patrols running from a central headquarters, then both the OPs and patrols should have logs, as well as the headquarters. These headquarters' logs should contain a record of all transmissions from OPs or patrols in the sector, as well as information regarding the situation passed down from higher headquarters or from adjacent units. When the headquarters' logs and patrol/OP logs are set side by side, they should provide a clear picture of significant events that take place in a certain sector over a period of time.

G. Analyzing Information. Recording events is not sufficient to give the unit leader a solid understanding of what is occurring around him. The information must be analyzed to identify any trends that stand out. By doing this analysis, the leader will accomplish two important tasks: 1) He will educate himself and his Soldiers over time on the characteristics of his sector, learning the rhythm of the community, if any, and get to know the locals who live in that area and 2) due to this increased understanding, he will then be able to notice unusual patterns that may be indicators of activity, such as surveillance, smuggling, or guerrilla attack.

- **Operational Debriefing:** The unit leader must see to it that a thorough debriefing of all patrols, OPs, and tactical actions is conducted. This debriefing is more than an after-action review (AAR). Good debriefs include not only a review of friendly actions and recommendations for improved tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), but also a review of the information collected on the sector itself. Debriefings are thought to be difficult and time-intensive. This assessment may be true in the early stages of operations in the assigned sector. As the Soldiers become familiar with the area, however, much of the information on the terrain and people will be briefed only by exception. The unit leader conducts the debriefing for the benefit of his unit, but he may find it helpful to request or invite a representative from the battalion S2 to attend or perhaps even assist. Higher headquarters may bring with them information that gives better context to events occurring with the company or platoon's sector. Debriefs should occur immediately after the patrol is completed or the watch is rotated.

- **Identifying Patterns:** Once the information is recorded by the leaders and debriefed regularly, the next task is to identify patterns in the sector. The pattern of events in all societies is generally cyclical. Days, weeks, months, and years bring with them specific events that take place at regular intervals. Leader and Soldier alike must learn these patterns. Knowing these patterns will be key to both operational planning (When is the best time to conduct a cordon and search operation in my sector?) and surveillance detection (Why is this new car parked across from our compound everyday at 0800 all of the sudden?). The following are two suggested tools to track patterns:
 - **Calendars:** An excellent way to track these patterns is to use a blank daily and weekly calendar. In the beginning of operations in an assigned sector, each platoon commander, patrol leader, and OP should keep a calendar with the events of the local area that are observed. After the first couple of weeks, these can be consolidated into a single unit calendar to be kept in the company/platoon headquarters or patrol base. Higher headquarters can provide information on exceptional events, such as holidays and important anniversaries, when demonstrations or riots are likely to occur. Leaders can consult this calendar when planning patrols or other operations.
 - **Radial Daily Activity Chart:** This chart consists of a radial graph divided into 24 sections—one for each hour of the day. This tool is used to track the daily events in the sector, such as rush hour, daily religious observances, and dry goods delivery. The following figure shows an example of a simple radial graph for plotting and tracking hourly activities over the course of a week.




Figure 2-1

H. Using Information. Building situational understanding is not an end in itself. The purpose of collecting and analyzing tactical information is to enable the small unit leader to act decisively and effectively. There are two classes of information: actionable information and background information. Actionable information requires some action on the unit leader's part. This action can range from dispatching a patrol to gather more information, to conducting a raid on a suspected weapons cache, to merely passing news on an event in the sector to higher headquarters. Background information does not require any action but is useful for understanding the surroundings in depth. An example of background information is a sketch of a neighborhood layout with the name of each family written on each house or a list of vehicles commonly seen in the sector. This information may be important in the future but requires no specific action by the unit leader.

I. Indicators of Surveillance Activity. Reconnaissance is a part of any sophisticated military activity. This generalization applies to terrorists and guerrillas as well. The enemy conducts surveillance and reconnaissance to select the target he will attack and to gather detailed information on the selected target to increase the likelihood of success. Thankfully, the enemy is vulnerable to observation by friendly units when he does this. In fact, these instances of enemy surveillance will likely be the only opportunities during stability operations and support operations to go on the offensive against the enemy. When a terrorist or guerrilla strikes, friendly units are required to react to the attack. Reaction is an inherently defensive activity. It is normally said that defeat can be prevented by the defense, and the offense is the only way to victory. In asymmetric warfare, even a successful defense cannot stave off defeat. The enemy, by the sheer audacity and violence of his attempt, may impact political and popular support for the mission. Therefore, the small unit leader has a strategic responsibility in the asymmetric fight to

attempt to identify surveillance activity. All indicators of surveillance activity represent actionable information. It must be passed along to higher headquarters and may even require counter-surveillance measures in order to spoil or disrupt the enemy's ability to collect target information. It can be difficult to spot surveillance activity in the urban environment. This is why detailed situational understanding is so critical. The better educated all members of the unit are in the characteristics of the sector, the better able they will be to notice activity that is out of the ordinary and perhaps an indicator of surveillance. Surveillance is often detected only after collecting the information from multiple observers in the unit and comparing reports in thorough debriefing sessions.

Some common indicators of surveillance activity are the following:

- The repeated presence of new persons or vehicles in the sector, particularly around times of regularly scheduled friendly activities, such as supply deliveries.
- Reports from the locals of persons from outside the sector/neighborhood asking questions regarding friendly units.
- Spontaneous confrontations with patrols or at checkpoints—guerrillas/terrorists often conduct “dry-runs” on friendly units to determine reaction times and procedures.
- The “accidental” presence of host nation workers in restricted areas of a friendly compound—personnel may use excuses such as, “I got lost while going to the bathroom.”

CHAPTER 3: THE BRITISH APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

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THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) OPERATIONS AT BRIGADE, BATTALION, AND COMPANY LEVEL

Ground

1. The operational environment is characterized by a number of factors, such as:
 - a. The ground (e.g., urban, rural, urban/rural interface).
 - b. The threat (e.g., enemy aims, capabilities, support of population).
 - c. The political situation (e.g., stable, fluid, transitional; democracy?).
 - d. The economic and social situation (e.g., full employment, good wages, decent standard of living or poor conditions that provide fertile ground for recruitment of activists). Particularly important in this is meeting the expectations of the Iraqi; any disappointment or broken promise will be seen as a failure of the coalition and promote discontent.
 - e. The security environment. What about criminal investigations (e.g., active, effective, and respected civilian police force, functioning basic law, judiciary, and penal system)?

All these factors contribute to the operational environment in which troops operate and influence operations.

S2/INT

2. A thorough cultural understanding of the environment is a major combat multiplier that makes Soldiers all the more lethal on the front lines in the war on terrorism. Every encounter with an Iraqi civilian is an opportunity to develop respect and trust in coalition forces as professional, educated Soldiers who are committed to finishing the job they set out to accomplish. Ignorance and intolerance deepens the divide between the coalition forces and the free Iraqi people. The war on terrorism will be won by the squad leader on the ground. It is the foot patrols interacting with the Iraqi people who will provide the raw information and will be the public face of the coalition. Information must be processed into INT at the lowest level. Ideally, this means the company (CO) level, but at the very least it should be processed at the battalion (BN) level. A thorough knowledge of all activity in the area of responsibility (AOR) is essential and the latest INT picture should be briefed to the lowest level possible. If the most junior private patrolling the streets does not understand the local INT picture, then he will not know what to look out for, which is a waste of a valuable asset.

The Threat

3. The military are given missions. Plans are made and executed to fulfill those missions. On completion, there will be a post-operation review. The terrorist is no different in this regard. After deciding what it is he wants to achieve, the terrorist will set about his task in the same manner. INT gathering will begin, which will allow the terrorist to decide which type of attack best suits his needs. There are a host of options available to him. On completion of each of his attacks, he will conduct his after-action review (AAR). He will look at your reaction and procedures, as well as his own. He is looking for areas he can exploit. The easiest thing for the terrorist to exploit is routine and set patterns. If you do the same thing at the same time everyday or even every week, then you are vulnerable to some form of attack.

4. *What options of attack are open to the terrorist?* (These are the categories as specified from United States Army S2). There are a huge number of weapons and munitions stock piles in Iraq. Therefore, everything the terrorist needs is readily available in abundance.

a. **Grenades:** Military or improvised. Used conventionally or in the form of a booby trap.

b. **Mortars:** Predominantly military munitions. Not always military tubes. They are normally used to attack static locations. Mortars can be fired remotely by either command or on a long-delay timer.

c. **Rocket propelled grenade (RPG):** RPGs are used in the direct fire role. They are very effective against soft-skinned vehicles. They have been used as protection by bombing teams with the likely use of firing into the remains of a convoy that had just been attacked.

d. **Rockets:** 122-mm rockets are easily obtained. They have been used to attack buildings, again being fired remotely. They could also be used in a direct fire role.

e. **Small arms attacks:** These comprise snipes, drive-by shootings, close-quarters assassination (CQA), and group attacks following improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

f. **Improvised explosive devices:** The IED allows the enemy to use limited resources to maximum effect. He can use conventional munitions to construct some sophisticated devices. It should be pointed out that Iraq had a very sophisticated state-sponsored IED manufacturing program—a bomb-making school, in effect. As the supply of conventional weapons dwindles, the enemy will increasingly look toward adopting commercially-available products as bomb-making components. The IED can be tailor-made specific to the type of attack, target, and location. The categories that IEDs fall into are the following:

- Time
- Command

- Victim-operated

An IED can be hand held or can fill a cement mixer. IEDs can vary in complexity from a stick of dynamite with a burning fuse to a device that incorporates anti-handling measures, such as a collapsing circuit that is initiated by an encoded firing signal. They can be used singly or in larger numbers. A single IED can be used to draw forces into an area making them vulnerable to a further attack. It has proven to be the weapon of choice for terrorists, insurgents, and enemies of the peace, worldwide. All Soldiers expecting to work in an environment where the IED is a threat must be aware of what they are, what components the enemy uses, where they are likely to be found, and how the devices are employed in an attack. Deploying conventional battlefield clearance personnel (such as scouts or assault engineers) should be avoided. The terrorist will monitor the actions of those who render a device safe. He will amend his modus operandi (MO) to target that render safe procedure. Indeed, this has already happened on numerous occasions. If unit commanders insist on using under-qualified personnel, they must acknowledge the risks. By the same token, Soldiers should not take it upon themselves to “have a go.”

Preservation of Evidence

5. The ground forces will evolve and adapt their procedures to counter the terrorist. Similarly, the terrorist will be doing the same thing to ensure continued success. A key part of the battle to defeat the terrorist is the exploitation of forensic evidence left at the scene of an incident. This analysis will enable the relevantly qualified personnel to determine the level of technology and sophistication of the terrorist. This determination will, in turn, provide guidance as to how to counter that particular threat. Thus it is imperative that incident scenes are attended only by the minimum of qualified personnel.

INT

6. The key to successful operations at brigade (BDE) level is in gaining and exploiting quality INT. While BDEs will often be the recipients of INT from other sources, there is a great deal that can be done to generate INT at BDE level. The principal ways of achieving this are the following:

- a. Construction and implementation of a BDE INT collection plan (ICP).** This plan includes the command's priority INT requirements (PIR). This plan is issued to all units, who use it as their collection tool. Reports are sent back daily or weekly for analysis at BDE level and an INT picture is built up that can ideally result in well-targeted, INT-led operations.
- b. Use of BN- and CO-level INT cells.** The use of INT cells creates a focus for the ICP at these two levels and also permits some additional capability for the unit to conduct its own information collection on local patterns of life, key individuals, mapping, etc. At the very least, each CO should have a noncommissioned officer (NCO) who is the INT focus.

c. **Patrol briefing and debriefing.** All framework patrols must have a task and a purpose and be formally briefed by the CO INT cell before deployment and debriefed on their return in order to gain the maximum amount of information. Each individual on the patrol has an information-gathering function in addition to his role as a rifleman. In counterinsurgency operations, the main INT-gathering tools are the eyes and ears of troops on the ground conducting foot patrols.

d. **Sector observation teams (SOT).** SOTs are Iraqi nationals who work for the coalition forces and are used to get a feel for the mood of a local community. They are deployed into an area to sound out local views and concerns. SOTs are very useful, but always treat their information with a degree of skepticism.

e. **Human INT (HUMINT).** HUMINT teams are working in most areas and are normally controlled at BDE level. Sometimes money is paid for information but always after that information has been confirmed. Again, treat information sourced in this way with caution.

BDEs and higher formations have a responsibility to disseminate information downwards in a fashion that allows the private Soldier to act as an information gatherer; for example, if the threat is from radio controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), then the Soldier needs to know what the component parts look like by using posters with photographs. This information should be well circulated. It will help allow Soldiers to identify suspicious objects during house, car, or personnel searches. A system called "Erica the Eye" involves publishing such information on posters in well-used locations—on the back of latrine doors and in our equivalent of the "chow-queue." It works. Over-classification of such material can be counter-productive.

Responsibility for an AOR

7. Units should be made responsible for all INT-gathering in an AOR, and every unit operating within that area should always coordinate with AOR tactical operations center (TOC). This method is the only way to coordinate effort for both gathering INT and coordination of operations. Outside units working in the AOR must be briefed and debriefed on INT, as well as the posture being adopted and the commander's intent in the area. If the unit in the AOR is trying to win the hearts and minds of a village by a soft approach, a lot of hard work can be ruined very quickly by an outside unit adopting a hard, aggressive approach in the same area. Number 8, Covert Forces, is of particular note.

8. **Covert Forces.** If covert forces are working in the AOR, then an out of bounds (OOB) box should be imposed, and no other units should go into this area. This is the only way to avoid blue-on-blue incidents or disruption of covert activity. The activity within the OOB area will be on a strict need-to-know basis. The temptation to have too many OOB areas should be avoided.

Culture

9. **Hearts and Minds.** Understanding the Iraqi frame of mind:

a. **Atomism.** Arabs tend to see the world and events as isolated incidents, snapshots, and particular moments in time. It also means the Western concept of cause and effect is rarely accepted by Arabs who may not necessarily see a unifying link between events. What they perceive to be the situation is most important, not the reality, which they may not accept.

b. **Deep belief in God.** Arabs usually believe that many, if not all, things in life are controlled by the will of God (fate) rather than by human beings. What might appear as fatalism at first is more deeply a belief in God's power, sovereignty, active participation in the life of the believer, and authority over all things (business transactions, relationships, world events, etc.). True Muslims will respect Christians as fellow believers, as many parts of the Old Testament are common with the Koran.

c. **Wish versus reality.** Arabs, much more so than Westerners, express emotion in a forceful, animated, and exaggerated fashion. Their desire for modernity is contradicted by a desire for tradition (especially Islamic tradition, since Islam is the one area free of Western identification and influence).

d. **Importance of justice and equality.** Arabs value justice and equality more than anything else. It is imperative that coalition forces act within the rule of law. Those who transgress must be dealt with, and the population must know that they have been punished.

e. **Paranoia.** Arabs may seem to be paranoid by Western standards. They are suspicious of U.S. intent in their land and have a cautious approach to American forces. Some Arabs view all Westerners as agents of the government who may be "spies." Especially in the ethnically diverse areas, mistrust runs deep among these various groups.

f. **Family versus self.** Arabic communities are tight-knit groups made up of even tighter family groups and, most often, they belong to tribes. Honor of self and family is paramount. If honor is lost, they may have to kill to regain it. Similarly, if the trust of one member of a family is won, it is likely that the whole family will be on their side.

g. **Hospitality.** The Arabs are a very hospitable race and will share the last of what they have with guests. Care should be taken not to offend them. The Arabs will always greet people by shaking their hands; Soldiers should follow this example and take time to talk to local people who will be the major source of INT. They love to talk and exchange pleasantries; do not expect instant answers and take time to converse with them.

h. **Women.** Male Soldiers should not talk to women except through an Iraqi male. Searching of Arab women **must** only be carried out by female Soldiers. Holding a conversation with an Arab woman could place her in danger; it could well be seen by her family that she has brought dishonor onto them.

i. **Civil affairs (CA) activities.** CA is a core function in COIN operations and must be considered in the planning of all operations. Conducting some routine tasks severely affects the Iraqi in his way of life; house searches are a prime example. Consider ways to negate any negative impact. Have some sweets or a gift for the children when you go into the house. If damage has been caused, have it repaired. Have a CA officer call on the

occupants a day or two later to make sure everything is in order. Use CA to explain your actions if operationally possible; if you have to clear an area to conduct an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) clearance operation, explain that you are moving people out of their homes for their safety. It is courteous and can only improve your standing in the community. A little consideration will go a long way to win these generous and hospitable people over.

FRIENDLY FORCES

10. CJTF-7 Mission, "Conduct offensive operations to DEFEAT remaining non-compliant forces and NEUTRALIZE destabilizing influences . . ." ¹The killing of a terrorist is something to celebrate, but you must consider what is lost by killing and not capturing the individual. It will not always be possible to capture, but by doing so you have a chance to conduct interrogation and produce INT which may close down a terrorist cell. In most circumstances, capture will lead to overall defeat of the enemy quicker than killing the shooter—something for further thought!

11. When working with friendly forces, consider how operations impact the coalition mission. The role you play in supporting the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and generating the confidence of the people in their own security services, again from CJTF-7 Mission, is ". . . to set the conditions for a transfer of operations to designated follow on military or civilian authorities."

12. **Coordination of all activity in an AOR.** As has been mentioned in paragraph 7, the coordination of all military activity in an area is vital in order for a clear intent to be implemented by every unit on the ground. Units working in an area for a short time should be briefed in detail on INT aspects of the AOR and the ongoing operations in the area. Units must be debriefed regularly so that they can all contribute to the INT picture.

13. **Coordination of Overt/Covert Ops.** The aim of such coordination is not to reveal the activities, locations, or MO of the covert forces to a wider audience, but to ensure that there is synergy of effort between the two. For example, covert operations may rely on working unmolested within a particular area. In order to achieve this, an OOB box may be placed over the area of their operation, restricting access by normal, overt, "green" troops; for their part, these "green" troops can contribute to the operation by either conducting normal patrolling in the surrounding area to give the impression of normality or provide quick reaction forces (QRFs) for the covert forces. The role of BDE in this is one of coordination and tasking, working on the strict "need to know" principle to avoid compromise.

1 Defeat—To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that the is unable to participate further.

EXECUTION

Operations at BDE/combat team (BCT) level

14. Operations at BDE/BCT level will tend to revolve around:

- a. Development of the INT picture, through the use of an ICP and analysis of incidents. That includes liaison with Special Forces and other INT agencies to ensure unity of effort. INT then provides the main driver for future operations.
- b. Coordination of all operations in the AO, including coordination of overt and covert operations to ensure synergy of effort where both appropriate and possible. BN-level operations are directed in line with the BDE commander's intent; this includes the allocation of assets (aviation, INT, troops) as appropriate.
- c. Planning and conduct of BDE-level ops in response to INT, threat, or events on the ground are called surge operations and various types are listed later. Division/BDE tactical operation centers (TOCs) must guard against over-tasking BNs, which will negate them running their own surge operations.

15. **Reserves.** In line with all conventional operations, a commander should maintain a reserve. The UK experience in Northern Ireland (NI) and elsewhere confirms that effect can best be achieved through the use of uncommitted reserves on unpredictable and often short-notice operations. The size of reserve will depend on the size of the BCT and the AO, typically one to three companies.

BN and CO Conduct of Operations

16. At BN and CO level, COIN operations can be broken down into two types:

a. **Framework Operations.** These provide the basic structure for operations in a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), whether it is BN or CO, and usually consist of the following tasks:

- (1) Patrols
- (2) QRF
- (3) Guard
- (4) Rest (often combined with guard or QRF duties)

b. **Surge Operations.** Surge operations are superimposed on framework operations, with the aim of concentrating force in certain areas for certain times to achieve a particular effect. They form the "2nd Echelon" of operations. Surge operations are normally conducted at CO level, by troops uncommitted to ground-holding tasks and who have greater flexibility of movement and employment. Thus, in a four-CO BN, three companies might have a ground-holding role and be responsible for a particular area of operation (AO), while the fourth CO is the CO's maneuver asset. Such assets should be used in addition to, but linked in with, framework operations. Examples of such operations might be:

- (1) Achieve tactical surprise and concentration of force.
- (2) Put the enemy off balance.
- (3) Reduce his freedom of maneuver and action.
- (4) Reassure the local population.
- (5) Have the potential to achieve attrition if well-targeted in terms of time and space.
- (6) Theater AOR-wide traffic control point (TCP) operations, either by aviation (Eagle patrols) or vehicle.
- (7) Planned search operations.
- (8) Area "flooding" to dominate ground and freeze movement if desirable.
- (9) Arrest operations against multiple targets.
- (10) Route check operations, to look for command wires, IEDs, and other potential route/convoy attack options open to the enemy.
- (11) Public order/crowd control/riot control operations.
- (12) Any operation that requires concentration of force while also maintaining "routine" framework operations.

These operations should be mounted using good INT and under conditions of excellent security. They are designed to maximize effect in as short a time as possible. They must be coordinated with neighboring units to ensure de-confliction.

Reaction to Incidents

17. It is important to have standing operating procedures (SOPs) for reacting to incidents. In this way, all personnel will know their part in the process, and time (and possibly lives) will be saved. These SOPs do not and must not hinder mission command or initiative; indeed, they should complement it.

18. There are 3 phases involved in reacting to an incident:

- a. **Contact Phase.** Aim is to kill or capture the terrorist during this phase, which lasts until the immediate contact is over; in our experience this is up to three minutes, but can be longer.
- b. **Immediate Follow-Up.** Aim is to capture the terrorist during this phase which lasts, typically, from 3 – 30 minutes.
- c. **Considered Follow-Up.** Aim is to preserve evidence during this phase, which lasts 30+ minutes.

19. The TOC must support the platoon on the ground. The following should be considered:

- a. The platoon commander sends an initial contact report during the contact phase. The TOC acknowledges contact and deploys QRF to a suitable location close to the contact point but not too close to interfere with the contact platoon; the BN commander (CDR)/executive officer (XO) is informed.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

b. The QRF should move in once the contact platoon commander has passed a rendezvous (RV). This may happen during either the immediate or considered follow-up phases depending on the situation. The platoon leader is still in command of the overall situation at this point.

c. Contact platoon commander or the nominated individual (possibly the QRF commander) seizes control of incident and becomes the incident commander. At this point he is planning the considered follow-up to the incident. We use the following drill:

Pause—Plot—Plan—Issue

d. Incident commander issues a detailed contact report and commences the 4 Cs (confirm, clear, cordon, and control).

e. Agencies deploy to deal with incident (medics, police, bomb disposal, etc.).

20. Many of the above can be happening concurrently, and it is the speed of thought and action in the TOC that will determine how smoothly an operation is mounted. It is recommended that the duty battle captain has a tactical aide memoir with recommended follow-up actions for different incidents. These are not doctrinal documents; they are check lists and for best effect should be produced at unit level.

21. Speed is not, however, always your friend, and you might be being lured into a secondary attack. Take time to study maps that chart recent incidents, incident control points, routes to and from them etc., and do not always rush things. The priority MUST be to save life.

22. It is important to evaluate exactly how an incident occurred, where it occurred, and whom the likely perpetrators were in order to take any action to prevent it from happening again. Unless correctly qualified specialists such as EOD, forensics, and INT agencies are given the opportunity to investigate incidents, post-incident analysis will not be adequately conducted. The enemy will set patterns: bomb-makers have favorite devices; snipers have preferred targets. With a little low-level analysis and the use of specialist agencies you can identify these patterns and take measures to combat them.

Communications

23. The success of operations in the urban environment against a well-equipped and unpredictable enemy relies on many factors. None is more important than communication and in two ways:

a. **Technical Communications.** To enable patrols to deploy themselves to permit depth, mutual support, all-round defense, and unpredictability, they must be able to speak to each other within the patrol. Only in this way will you achieve parallel patrolling, crossing of the primary route, and the ability to move ahead and fall back. Equally, communications must exist between patrols, static bases where the TOC is located, urban operations (UO) where they exist, and helicopters. These are all valuable assets, but they can only be fully utilized on an all-informed net. One radio per patrol is not enough.

b. Information Communication. Information gained on patrol or from analysis of incidents has to be shared. In this way, others—even in a different BN or BCT—can learn from the experiences of others. Photographs say more than words ever can, and so pictorial examples of IEDs, component parts of devices, firing positions, etc. are invaluable. This information is best disseminated in a freely available format, such as posters, leaflets, and briefing packs. Probably the most important people to receive this information will be the Soldiers who are patrolling and guarding on a daily basis and who need to know the up-to-date threat and enemy capabilities in order to counter them. Again the establishment of a company-level INT focus is highly recommended. The ethos of passing on as much INT as possible is to be encouraged. General Metz during Exercise Freedom Resolve said “the rule is to decide if you need to hold anything back rather than to decide what you are going to give out.”

Deception Measures

24. Using deception can unsettle the enemy and heighten coalition troops' security. Most terrorists, less suicidal ones, will only engage if they know they can survive and escape; deception produces doubt in his mind and will act as a significant deterrent. There are many examples possible, but just some include:

- a. "No Move" days, when there is no road/air movement thus depriving the enemy of targets. These periods can, of course, be varied within certain days, e.g., no flying between 0900-1200 and 1500-1800.
- b. Discreetly leaving stay-behind parties on the ground to observe activity once troops have seemingly left the area. The trick here is to conceal the exact number of troops who deploy, as the enemy will count you out and count you back.
- c. Use dogs (even if they are not specially trained) on patrol in the ammunition explosive search role. Take other unusual-looking pieces of equipment that might otherwise do nothing, as this will plant a seed of doubt in the enemy mind.
- d. Deploy several patrols for very short periods into the area around the base in a short time frame. This tactic might put off planned attacks.
- e. Vary routes to and from routine tasks. When en route, double-back, stop for short periods, return to base unexpectedly, etc.
- f. Deploy both foot and vehicle patrols at the same time, and then recover the vehicle patrol immediately—they provide cover and fire-power for the foot patrol deploying.
- g. Deploy teams from different exits in the camp and have a pre-arranged RV for them to link up and continue the patrol – gives the impression of more troops on the ground at any time.
- h. Vary the speed with which the patrol carries out its task. The odd sprint forward, doubling back, or lying up for a period will confuse the opposition. We call it varying profile from hard to soft.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The variation in deception is as endless as your imagination. The golden rule in deception is twofold – firstly, plan it carefully and explain it to your own men, and secondly ensure that it is credible. It is the enemy you are trying to deceive, not yourselves.

Consideration of Low Level Drills and Skills

25. Points to Consider.

- a. Cycle of duties (patrols, guard, QRF, rest) should permit variety, to keep Soldiers alert, interested, and allow time for rest. The British Army might adopt a nine-day cycle at CO level, with each platoon performing each task for three days at a stretch.
- b. Each task should include a roster between duties, to allow Soldiers rest/variety within tasks. For example, guard duties can be split between lookout, main gate guard, perimeter patrols, rest, etc., usually spending no more than two hours on each.

26. **Why Patrol?** It is important to consider the reason for each activity. Patrols might be conducted for one, or a combination, of the following purposes:

- a. To dominate ground
- b. To gain information INT
- c. To speak to the locals and gain their trust
- d. To deter the enemy from mounting attacks
- e. To interdict and attrit the enemy
- f. To reassure the civilian population of their security
- g. To support other operations, e.g., mobile support to static guard points (banks etc.) or larger pre-planned operations such as large-scale searches or arrest operations

This list is not exhaustive.

As already mentioned, all patrols must have a task purpose. If not, question why they are being sent out – the patrol may be unnecessary. Assigning patrols a **purpose** gives Soldiers the feeling that they are being put in harm's way for a legitimate reason. If patrols have a **task**, then Soldiers will feel that they have contributed in some small way towards improving the security situation. This contribution may only be something minor, like accumulating data on car registration plates or speaking to some locals, but it is as important for morale as well as the tactical effect. Tasking patrols will greatly help you in maintaining the morale component of fighting power over your long deployment and is a factor which should not be underestimated. A focused Soldier is a better one and a key factor in your success will be leadership and requiring commanders at all levels to be inspirational in preventing staleness and lax drills.

27. **Planning.** Patrols must be thoroughly planned, taking into account:

- a. Threat.
- b. Duration of patrol.

- c. Time of day (Will patrol interface with dusk, making it a day/night patrol, and necessitate the use of night vision devices? Will it be very hot, with a debilitating effect on troops?).
- d. Tasks (INT gathering, TCPs, route domination, static protection, etc.).
- e. Type (foot/mobile/mix).
- f. Route.
- g. Composition and numbers. Are interpreters available?
- h. Accompanied by civilian police or not.
- i. Other military activity in the AOR at the time, to avoid clashes and potential for fratricide.
- j. Location and state of readiness of QRF.
- k. Communications.

If they plan to work close or up to any boundaries with neighboring units, then coordination must take place between those units/sub-units. Remember, boundaries are just that—lines on the map. They must not be turned into psychological barriers, otherwise patrols will never cover the ground close to them, and a de facto demilitarized zone (DMZ) will be created; the enemy will use this to his advantage.

28. **Phases.** All patrols normally include three phases:

- a. Patrol brief
- b. Patrol action
- c. Patrol de-briefs

29. **Patrol Brief.** When planning a patrol, account must be taken of all recent events in the area. These might include:

- a. **Recent military or civilian police patrols.** Traces of previous patrol routes must be retained for examination. Choke points and commonly-used streets/junctions that might be vulnerable points (VPs) must be identified in addition to recent incidents.
- b. **Recent incidents.** Do they show signs of "clustering"?
- c. **Predictability.** Do patrols generally leave and return at the same time daily? Are they using the same routes? Are they the same size? **Think variety and unpredictability. Sow the seed of doubt in the enemy's mind.**

The patrol brief will cover the essentials of the patrol, such as route (which should also be displayed on the TOC map), composition, timings, tasks, deployment/recovery, "actions on," etc. This briefing will ensure that all those on patrol are well-informed on what they are to do and what they might expect. This is where the CO INT NCO plays a critical role.

30. **Patrol Action.**

- a. **Principles.** These principles are largely at the discretion of the commander, but in pure military terms, the principles to ensure are:

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- (1) Depth
- (2) All-round defense
- (3) Mutual support
- (4) Unpredictability/deception
- (5) Communications, both within the patrol, to any supporting troops (e.g., rooftop operations, aviation assets) and to the base TOC.

b. Patrolling. The lynchpins of coalition forces countermeasures are good INT and domination of the ground, primarily by the Soldier patrolling on foot. In rural areas there is also a need to keep rural routes free for operational and administrative traffic. Vehicle and foot patrols have been subjected to increasingly more sophisticated forms of ambush, including extensive use of the lure or “come-on” technique. We have countered these tactics by constant vigilance, a suspicion of even the most apparently innocent objects, and the avoidance of a predictable pattern of activity. In order to maintain the correct balance of weaponry, specialist equipment, flexibility, and command and control, the concept of multiple team patrolling has been developed. Patrolling should be based on two or more squads working together. This method remains the most efficient way of maintaining a presence on the ground without tying ourselves to static, defensive positions (“fortress mentality”) while allowing movement, initiative and determination (and ability) to succeed to flourish (“maneuver approach”). The patrol with supporting squads can be self-sufficient in terms of security, adhere to all the principles, and retain the ability to conduct a variety of task types.

Ideally patrols should consist of two or more squads/teams working together in synchronization. Squad composition depends of the task purpose and can vary from four to nine depending on this task. One squad is the primary patrol with a given task purpose and the other squad(s) satellite around it thereby creating greater depth, all-round defense, and unpredictability than the standard patrol deploying in linear fashion.

c. It would be impossible to cover all the possible actions on patrol in this short document, but a few might be useful. They are:

- (1) The primary squad follows the route as briefed with the other squads supporting it. All squads can conduct tasks such as TCPs and chat-ups with the public as long as they maintain their situational awareness, continue to provide mutual support to each other, and carry out the primary task purpose. They can cross the primary route to create deception and unpredictability. This requires a thorough knowledge of the AOR, including short-cuts and good communications both between squads and individuals within the squads.
- (2) Use a mix of mobile and foot patrols, to both increase unpredictability and the speed of response to incidents. This mixture requires very thorough briefing and good communications. Vehicles can be used to drop teams/squads off, and these then return to base on foot.
- (3) Establish the occasional rooftop observation post (OP) that dominates the ground you are covering both with view and fire. Good communications between the OP and the ground troops are essential.

(4) Allow the IPS and ICDC to interact with the public, as it is their credibility, as well as ours, that is important if they are ever to be established as a credible police force. Push them to the forefront.

(5) All Soldiers must be aware of their own fire positions; there is no time for the platoon leader to move around advising every man all the time. "Tail-end Charlie's" should be in the habit of looking backwards, as well as forwards and sideways. Look upwards too in urban areas and scan the rooftops.

(6) Dismount from vehicles at vulnerable points, choke points, when the vehicle is likely to be static for some time (traffic lights, traffic jam, etc.). Walk vehicles through such locations when used frequently.

(7) Five and 20-meter (m) checks. Any patrol halting for more than 15 minutes must consider itself vulnerable to snap attack. It will have lost the security provided by the "fire and maneuver" system of pepper-potting or of satellite teams moving along a patrol route from task to task. All halts must involve individual Soldiers conducting 5-m checks and teams conducting 20-m checks. Indeed, individuals halted for more than a couple of minutes should extend the checked area out to 20m. These are potentially life-saving and should be conducted in both urban and rural environments.

(8) Minor aggravation. Patrols should aim to defuse any situation to prevent it building into a riot situation. Minor aggravation can often be used to lure troops into an area of the enemy's choosing for an attack. Troops should aim to defuse the situation either by negotiation or by backing off and returning to the area later. If the patrol has no option but to stand its ground, then the QRF should be deployed to a position close by but unseen. The patrol commander must be aware that the deployment of the QRF to his location could further escalate the situation.

31. **Patrol De-brief.** At the conclusion of the patrol, all members should attend a central debrief, when they can contribute to a short report written by the commander. Each Soldier should be asked for any information gathered during the patrol, and this should be included in a standard patrol report form. These should be kept as reference material for future patrol planning and must include an acetate sheet indicating the route taken by the patrol, known as an honesty trace.

32. **Base Security.** The guard platoon or other nominated force will be responsible for base security during its scheduled guard period. A few tips for base security might be:

a. The guard should consist of a guard commander, second in charge (2IC), and an adequate amount of Soldiers to fulfill a 24 hour duty. The guard should be accommodated together for the duration of their duty.

b. The guard should have their orders read out to them by the commander and also be rehearsed on their reaction to incidents which may occur during their duty.

c. Rotate Soldiers between front gate, lookouts, prowler duty, and standby regularly. Keep their time on duty to a practical minimum; keep them fresh and alert. Ensure each Soldier is posted on duty by the guard 2IC and is briefed of his duty accordingly.

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- d. Ensure that there is sufficient stand-off at the front gate to deter or minimize the threat from car bombs or suicide bomb attack. The gate should be strong, and ideally the base perimeter will have cover from view so that activity within is not observed from outside.
- e. Lookout towers should allow a sentry visibility of the perimeter. The use of sentries in towers can be supplemented by the use of mast-mounted video cameras. Sentries must have communication with the base TOC and should be afforded protection from small arms fire where possible. Watch towers should be equipped with weapons, vision aids (day and night), and panorama photos of the camp surrounds for ease of reference (these photos should also be displayed in the TOC and QRF room). They must have communications with the TOC.
- f. The guard platoon can carry out what we term "ground defensive area patrols" on a frequent yet irregular basis; this ensures that the area immediately surrounding the camp is covered on foot and suspicious activity checked. Potential attack sites, such as mortar base plate positions in dead ground, can be checked too.
- g. A dead ground study for each base will assist in planning the general disturbance area (GDA) patrols.

The CO commander must take personal interest in the security of the base; this is his forward mounting base, and in common with other principles of war, it must be secure.

33. **QRF.** The concept of QRF in response to incidents is very simple and needs no further explanation, except to highlight that there are areas where the best form of transport for the QRF is in a helicopter rather than in vehicles. A few points that might help:

- a. QRF is usually on immediate standby. This is a tiring job, in full kit for hours on end. Break up the monotony by allowing them to conduct GDA patrols while still able to react to incidents, and rotate them every day.
- b. Vehicles should be fully loaded and ready to go. QRF commander should be in the TOC where he is able to be briefed the moment something happens and then deploy quickly with a good idea of the plan to be followed. By being in the TOC, the commander will have good situational awareness for what else is happening in the AO.
- c. A switched-on, well-briefed QRF commander may be able to anticipate the enemy escape route and, rather than make his way to the scene of the incident, make for the getaway car and interdict the enemy.
- d. QRF deployment will be monitored, and they themselves may become a target. Vary routes where possible, as the most direct may be the most obvious and thus more dangerous.
- e. Deconflict deployment of QRFs with neighboring call signs. There is nothing worse than everyone arriving at the same incident needlessly.
- f. Good communications, both with the TOC and the troops on the ground, are essential.

Search

34. **Aim.** The aim of search is to gain INT, deny terrorist resources, protect potential targets and gain evidence for prosecution. Search can be defined as the application of systematic procedures and appropriate detection equipment to locate specified targets.

35. **Levels of Search.** There is a pyramid of search capability; the higher up the pyramid the more specialized the troops and the higher the capability and assurance of search.




Figure 3-1

The diagram illustrates Basic Search Aware Soldiers have been responsible for the majority of finds in the British Army’s experience in COIN. The eyes and ears of the Soldier on the ground are a key asset to foiling terrorist activity and locating the terrorist arsenal.

36. **UK Search Assets in Iraq.** In Baghdad there is a Royal Engineer Search Advisor (RESA) and RESSET under the direct command of a U.S. General. Their main aim is to assist with the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the RESA is able to task a REST, which is located in Basrah along with the infantry AAST.

37. **Types of Search.** Only quick and detailed searches are carried out by Soldiers on patrol. Female Soldiers must be available to search females.

a. Person—There are four types of person search:

- (1) Quick—In the public eye

- (2) Detailed—Out of the public eye, when suspicion aroused
- (3) Strip—Place of confinement
- (4) Intimate—By a doctor

b. Vehicle—There are three types of vehicle search:

- (1) Initial—Primary purpose is to select vehicles for a more detailed examination
- (2) Primary—Carried out on all vehicles that have been selected for a further search after the initial check
- (3) Secondary—Taken away to a workshop for a more detailed search

c. Rummage. Rummage is a form of area search which is generally a planned operation. It is conducted by two or three teams. One team conducts a rummage search while the remaining teams provide an overwatch. It is used to locate terrorist hides and deny the terrorist his resources.

d. Route Check (Urban and Rural). A route check is conducted when a detailed check of a route is required, using metal and cable detectors. It is a slow and labor-intensive process, but it is one of the only ways of giving a high level of assurance in the safety of a route. It is also one of the most dangerous search operations. A route check is carried out by three teams. Two teams move along the flank removing any command wire threat; this is carried out by the use of wire detectors. The remaining team moves behind the flank team (approx 100 m) checking the main route, which is now free of any command wires.

e. House Check/Search. This search forms the basis for all forms of building search. It must be borne in mind that an Iraqi has the right to defend his house with force. A house check that is poorly conducted, causing a lot of damage can cause the owner, his family, and the wider community to turn against the coalition. However, a house check carried out professionally and leaving no damage can help to portray the coalition in a favorable light. Consideration should be given to sending a CA team to the house after it has been checked. The Patrol Search Record is a key part of the house check.

38. Patrol Search Record. A patrol search record is used when any type of search is carried out. It gives the owner a written record of the search, who conducted it, and what damage may have been caused. This report is signed by the owner and is also a receipt for any documentation that has been removed. Two copies of the document are produced; one copy is handed in to the TOC, and the other copy is given to the person who has been searched. This gives the proud Iraqi a feeling of worth and responsibility; it will also prevent him making false claims against the coalition for damage. The Patrol Search Record is a useful document which gives a degree of legality to your actions.

39. Equipment. Metal detectors and wire detectors are required to carry out most forms of the above mentioned search techniques. These pieces of equipment can be either locally purchased or possibly obtained through the Construction Engineer Battalion.

Tactical Considerations

40. There are a few tactical issues that require consideration at BN level:

a. **Nonlethal Force.** The ability to deal with situations, particularly those involving crowds, in a nonlethal way is essential. Having no step between verbal and lethal gives no room for escalation and/or maneuver. Urgent consideration should be given to procuring a non-lethal projectile, such as the Federal Riot gun (plastic baton rounds for the M203 or riot control gas). Equally, for employment in TCPs, some method must be found to stop vehicles that seem to be running the checkpoint—any such vehicle may not be driven by the enemy at all, but by a drunk, an illiterate who cannot read the road signs, or merely be a car that has faulty brakes. Using lethal force to stop it may be highly counter-productive.

b. **Cross Boundary Cooperation and Operations.** As stated earlier, boundaries provide useful control between AORs but can also create no-go zones that the enemy can exploit. Neighboring units should develop SOPs for cross-boundary operations where such exploitation might occur. The use of "ops boxes" that straddle these boundaries, and in which patrols from both units can operate with prior agreement, should be considered.

c. **Movement of Military Vehicles.** Military vehicles are an obvious target, and their movement into, within and out of AORs must be controlled. Consideration might be given to establishing restricted movements times during the day, even to the extent of having complete "no move by road" days. Planned in advance, there should be no effect on operations or on logistic support. The use of civilian vehicles should also be given thought, especially for logistic runs to collect rations, etc. Consider establishing a BDE movement control (MOVCON) cell.

d. **Convoy Movement.** Convoys of vehicles should be treated as a separate operation; they present tempting and high-profile targets, especially if they are routine (e.g., to/from logistic bases for re-supply) and are obliged to follow the same route regularly. Steps can be taken to reduce their frequency (see above), but when they do become necessary, they should be preceded by route checks to look for roadside IEDs, provided with mobile escorts and helicopter top cover that is in communication with the ground troops. Physical picketing of the route—especially at vulnerable points (VPs) where vehicles commonly either slow down or bunch together (junctions, sharp bends, bridges)—may be necessary.

e. **Aviation.** The use of aviation assets adds a 3rd dimension to the COIN battlespace. Helicopters providing aerial surveillance are an excellent force multiplier keeping the terrorist guessing and making him unsure when he can and cannot be seen. Aviation assets providing real-time commentary or live ground linked video is a very good way of keeping track of a riot situation. The ring leaders in a riot can be spotted and photographed more easily from the air, and coalition forces can be guided to the right place accordingly. Aviation can also be used for deploying patrols and for mid-patrol moves. In high-threat areas, helicopters can be deployed in pairs or in threes, one to conduct the task and another one or two to provide overwatch for the first; the overwatch helicopters are able to react quickly to any potential attack on the primary helicopter. Like any other asset entering an AO, pilots must receive a full brief by the TOC in order

to complement—not counter— current operations and circumstances. Aviation direct action must only be taken with the approval of the AO commander due to their significant impact potential.

f. **Patrol Search.** Search is one of the ways in which the ordinary infantry Soldier (or any Soldier operating in the infantry role) can make a difference. He can find weapons and other munitions in vehicles, on people, and in buildings. The act of searching people and vehicles in public is itself a deterrent. In addition to using search as a fundamental part of normal patrols, consideration might be given to BN-level search operations as part of a surge op. Once a search has been conducted a patrol search report should be completed.

g. **Secondary Weapons.** Many Soldiers carry two weapons when on patrol. This redundancy creates a problem when encountering a crowd disturbance, as usually only one weapon can be secured by an individual. This gives scope for the unsecured weapon, normally the pistol, to be stolen and used against the security forces. One weapon only should be carried. All those on patrol should carry a rifle as this prevents individuals being singled out as "special" by carrying only a sidearm—be anonymous.

Top Tips

41. To finish off with, a few "top tips" in no particular order:

a. **Names on windshields.** All HMMWVs have the names and rank of the driver and passenger on the windshield. Is this necessary? Already suspects have been detained in Baghdad in possession of a list of names from one unit, taken from observing vehicles with names on them. This is presenting an unnecessary risk and providing the enemy with valuable target information. At least ranks should be removed.

b. **Weapons.** Do they need to be loaded with "one up the spout" at all times? This may seem sound military practice, but the act of cocking the weapon is in itself an escalatory act and can be used either to defuse potentially difficult crowd problems or persuade a potential assailant to put down his weapon. It also reduces the chances of negligent discharges.

c. **Top Cover Sentries.** They could be equipped with SA so that they can cover 360-degree arcs from their position on top of the vehicle. This is not always possible with a large-caliber crew-served weapon.

d. **"Cheesecutters."** Top cover sentries are very vulnerable to wires stretched across roads at head height – these are potentially fatal traps. Welding a 6-foot engineer picket onto the side of the vehicle **in line with the windshield** that extends above head height will hugely decrease the risk.

e. **"Come-on."** Be aware of the threat from the terrorist "come-on," i.e., a ruse designed to draw coalition forces into a killing area of their choosing. This ruse may take the form of civilians asking for medical help from a Soldier to draw him away from the patrol, isolate, and then execute him. Or the "come-on" may take the form of an attack on a patrol to draw them towards the firing point, and then a secondary IED/booby trap device

is left on the firing point. Always treat the firing point with caution and cordon it off to a distance of 200 m.

f. **Vehicles.** Patrols and vehicles should maintain tactical spacing between them to decrease the risk of more than one man/vehicle being involved in an incident and allow greater freedom of action should an incident occur. Vehicles should always leave distance between them (not bumper-to-bumper) and the vehicles in front if static, for example at a busy road junction. This allows room for maneuver should someone approach the vehicle to attempt a CQA or to dispatch a grenade through the window. Always have windows up and doors closed when in busy urban areas.

g. **Depth/Mutual Support.** Foot and vehicle patrols should always generate integral mutual support and depth, by varying the route of at least one of the three teams/squads/vehicles, satelliting, moving ahead, and holding back. This all confuses the enemy and helps deter attacks. Remember, in general terms, the enemy wants to attack and then escape and he will not put himself in harm's way if he is not sure of his escape.

h. **Relating to the Locals.** Do not forget that not all Iraqis are the enemy – in fact, if only 2% out of a population of 25 million were, that would still be a gross over-estimation. Treat them with respect, interact with them, remove your sunglasses, shake their hand, and make contact to prove that you are human like them. When you search them, do not humiliate them. There is a time to be hard and a time to be softer, as we learned the hard way in Northern Ireland. If you build up a relationship with them, then they are more likely to respect you, and help you defeat the enemy. Consider the profile you are presenting; by removing sunglasses, balaclavas, and not pointing weapons at ordinary individuals, you are presenting a less-aggressive image which might be more appropriate in most circumstances.

i. **"Absence of the Normal" and the "Presence of the Abnormal."** Is that normally busy market strangely quiet today? Why is there a large white panel up against the wall at that point in the road where you always slow down? Are there fewer children on the street than usual? All these potential 'combat indicators' should arouse your suspicion and heighten your awareness.

j. **Think of Operations from the Enemy's Point of View.** Are you becoming too predictable, both in patrolling and in your reaction to incidents? Are you too static, with too many fixed points and not enough mobility? Is the base an easy target? The enemy knows you are always there, after all. Are you alienating the population, thus encouraging them to either sympathize with, or worse, actively support or join the ranks of the enemy?

k. **Evaluation of Information.** Each incident, however minor, teaches a lesson. Learn from these, and share the experience with the others in your BN and elsewhere in the BCT; they all face the same problems to a greater or lesser degree. Conduct evaluation of serious incidents, describing enemy MO, and supplement this with maps and photos that others can easily assimilate. Regular study periods for all ranks will allow lessons learned from incident analysis to be passed on.

l. **TCPs.** Once deployed, TCPs quickly become compromised as the enemy has a fix on your position and could either take you on or merely avoid your TCP. Employ hasty TCPs for short periods, and then continue the patrol and set-up another hasty TCP in a different street. Multiple, short-duration TCPs are more effective; more likely to yield results than long-term, static TCPs; and do not upset the routine of life for the neighborhood as much.

m. **The Corporals'/E6 War.** Counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations are won at the tactical level by the alertness, professionalism, and low-level skills of team and squad leaders. Drill it into your Soldiers that they must respect the local population while also being inquisitive and taking time to speak to the locals. This is the best way of gathering low-level INT and a feel for the daily routine and main players in your AO—your “patch.” You will quickly build-up a good picture of who is who in the area, and who is conducting attacks against security forces or supporting the terrorists. It is imperative, however, that all information is shared. The most innocuous piece of information picked up by a Soldier on patrol may hold the key to foiling a terrorist attack and therefore save lives. Be aware that the actions of even the most junior Soldier can have strategic consequences. The shooting of a child or unarmed civilian will cause great damage to the coalition efforts. Everyone on patrol is the “strategic Soldier” and is very much the public face of the coalition as they are seen every day by the common Iraqi and the global media.

Conclusion

41. I hope that this short list is of some use to you in the planning and conduct of operations in the urban environment. It is not exhaustive, but it may provoke some thought, discussion, and assist in the prosecution of an effective internal security campaign. Greater detail is contained in the Northern Ireland Blue Book (copy included on the CD). The key task must be to wrest the initiative from the enemy and maintain it. He is clever, resourceful, and enjoys a degree of support from the population, either through ideology or intimidation. Deprive him of his support, his resources, and his secure mounting bases, and his will to fight will ebb away.

RESPECT THE IRAQI AND HIS CULTURE AND HE WILL BE YOUR FRIEND AND ALLY.

CHAPTER 4: URBAN PATROLLING

Extract, CALL Handbook 03-20, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*

A. Typical Patrol Deficiencies

- Carelessness in movement, resulting in compromise by the enemy
- Failure to conduct rehearsals
- Land navigation errors
- Poor planning of direct fires and insufficient control measures (e.g., routes, building numbers, boundaries)
- Complacency
- Individual actions—failure to think 3-D, 360-degree/spherical security at all times

B. Execution of Patrols in an Urban Environment

1. Prior coordination:

- Recon town or urban area to establish layout.
- Draw out diagram and label each building for Soldiers to study with checkpoints. Use higher headquarters' building numbering system and routes if available.
- Brief Soldiers on routes, alternate routes, and rally points along route.
- Identify possible threats in town (e.g., sniper, mines, vehicles).
- Brief Soldiers on ethnic makeup of the area.
- Scan area with thermal sites if available.
- Ensure mounted and dismounted elements understand target reference points.

2. Movement through urban areas (dismounted):

- Leaders designate sectors for Soldiers to scan.
- Patrols split up on left and right sides of road. Leaders and their radio telephone operators (RTOs) and machine-gun teams stay on the same side of the road. Depending on threat, sub-elements may advance by bounds with squads or fire teams setting, then bounding through each other, setting again.
- Dismounts scan opposite side of road in urban areas (i.e., Soldiers on the left side of the road scan the right side). This must be rehearsed. Soldiers must pay attention to windows, doorways, and roofs as potential threats.
- Pause at intersections to allow Soldiers across the road to check for threats prior to crossing.
- Do not allow children to distract the patrol; do not give them trinkets or candy.
- Always look for something out of the ordinary (i.e., a civilian overdressed for conditions or unattended bags and packages in roadways).

3. Movement through urban areas (mounted):

- In general, lead with the heaviest vehicle forward.

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- Ensure loaders, tank commanders, and Bradley commanders scan upper story windows and assign sectors prior to movement.
- Use dismounts to protect mounted forces when terrain/threat dictates.
- Recon bridges for weight classifications prior to execution of patrol.

4. Other tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs):

- Smaller patrols are easier to control in an urban environment.
- A warm, lighted dugout in each battalion should be reserved for exclusive use of patrols. Assemble the patrol there about an hour and a half before starting on a mission so that they can be warmed and given hot coffee. This procedure allows time, too, for such chores as field stripping, cleaning, and drying each weapon. During this time the mission should be thoroughly explained and each man's duties carefully reviewed. Maps and aerial photographs should be studied in detail. All these things help to form the men into a team. They are the incidentals that pay off later in more effective performance of the patrol's duties.
- Two small patrols are better than one large one if they are in constant communication and terrain permits them to be mutually supporting.
- Walking in the footsteps of the man ahead helps conceal the number of men in the patrol and reduces the chances of setting off booby traps.
- Simply warning the men on the outpost line that friendly patrols are operating to their front is not enough. They should be told where and during what time the patrols will be operating.
- Prior to departure, work out with the artillery three or four easily recognizable target reference points (TRPs). Arrange to communicate directly with the artillery to get rapid action on requests for smoke (for orientation) and supporting fire.

5. One mission per patrol: A patrol should have a single task and purpose. There can be a tendency by staff officers and commanders to add a second mission just because a patrol is going to be in the vicinity of some point in which they are interested.

World War II Vignette

Patrol experts from the United States Army's 99th Infantry Division, France, report effective use of a magic wand when it was necessary for small units to cross known minefields not covered with snow: "We had considerable success in detecting boobies by having one man precede us through the minefield holding a small stick lightly in his hand at an angle of 45 degrees with the end about two inches off the ground. Pressure of the trip wires against the stick warned him of eight booby traps in one day. Some trip wires are neck high, others only six inches or less from the ground. Remember that if you find one booby trap, there probably are more around." (Taken from Center for Military History website, WWII Collection)

6. Night patrols:

- When the mission is reconnaissance, night patrols should consist of a small number of men. Higher headquarters should not prescribe the composition of a patrol. They should order that certain information be obtained, allowing the unit furnishing the patrol to decide on its composition.
- At night, send one squad-sized ambush and at least one fire-team-sized listening post. The squad that pulls the night ambush conducts a squad patrol in the morning, a second squad pulls an afternoon patrol, and a third squad secures the patrol base.
- The purpose of a day patrol is to select a site for a night ambush. A squad will rarely conduct an ambush at a site it has not seen in daylight.

7. Include an engineer: Whenever possible, an engineer sapper should be sent with each patrol. It is reassuring for any patrol to have with it someone who is experienced in handling mines, booby traps, and explosives.

8. Assumptions: When on patrol, always assume that you are being watched and that if being watched, you are probably being followed.

9. Patrol security:

- “Drop-back ambush.” The “drop-back” ambush is a technique used when the patrol suspects it is being followed. On a signal, two or more men, previously designated and scattered throughout the patrol, drop to the ground and cover the rear. The patrol continues to move a few hundred meters and set up security. The “drop-back” team remains in place 10-15 minutes and then rejoins the remainder of the squad. This tactic is repeated two or three times on a normal patrol and is very effective.
- “Cloverleaf.” This technique is very difficult in an urban environment and should only be used when building layout permits.

10. Presence patrols: Presence patrols provide a “cop on the beat” approach. Presence patrols use both mounted and dismounted patrol techniques to accomplish their tasks. Presence patrols are visible, show strength and discipline, and are combat ready. Stealth is not normally required or desired. Presence patrols also:

- Establish habitual relationships within sectors and communities.
- Provide information, news, and upcoming events to the community.
- Assist communities in requesting and receiving civil military operations projects.
- Encourage community projects and assist when appropriate.
- Provide quick fixes with medical or engineer assets.
- Are honest and fair and do not take sides (they arbitrate if necessary).
- Provide a living example of “professionalism” to the local police and military.

CHAPTER 5: PATROLLING: CONDUCT A ZONE RECONNAISSANCE BY A PLATOON

Student Text (ST) 071-720-0012

Conditions

As the platoon sergeant or acting platoon leader of a rifle platoon, given a 1:50,000 map, a lensatic compass, and a mission to conduct a zone reconnaissance of an area specified on the map.

Standards

Satisfactorily perform the following within the time specified by the commander:

1. Organize the platoon into the command, reconnaissance, and security elements necessary to accomplish the mission.
2. Employ one of the three basic methods of zone reconnaissance (fan, converging routes, or successive sectors).
3. Obtain and report information about the terrain and enemy within the specified area.
4. Enter and leave the target area without being detected by the enemy.

Training and Evaluation

Training Information Outline

1. Estimate of the situation. Upon receipt of the reconnaissance mission, the platoon leader develops an estimate of the situation. That estimate is based on all current INT available about the enemy in the vicinity of the target area and on the capabilities of the unit. While planning for the mission, the unit engages in normal preparation for the mission. The organization is tailored to best support the mission. The reconnaissance element of a platoon will normally be no larger than a squad.
2. Planning details. The overall plan is developed based on the following considerations:
 - a. INT. All reconnaissance operations must be based on the best information available about conditions in the objective area.
 - b. Deceptive measures. The success of reconnaissance operations depends to a large extent on deception measures and on undetected infiltration and exfiltration.
 - c. Use of the smallest possible unit to accomplish the mission. Keeping the unit size to a minimum decreases the possibility of detection by the enemy. While only a small element may do the actual reconnoitering, the parent unit must be large enough to provide

security or support if the reconnaissance element is detected or engaged by an enemy force.

d. The importance of remaining undetected. The unit uses stealth, camouflage, concealment, and sound and light discipline while taking advantage of limited visibility to avoid contact and to get near or on the objective.

e. Use of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) devices. The unit uses STANO devices to help it to move and to gain information about the enemy. Based on INT reports, however, consideration must be given to the enemy's detection devices. When detection devices are available to the enemy, passive devices should be used by reconnoitering forces to decrease the probability of enemy detection.

f. Rehearsals. After all INT has been analyzed, the plan developed, special items of equipment procured and issued, and the troops briefed, the unit then rehearses the plan. The rehearsal increases the probability of the operation's success. Rehearsals are as detailed as time will allow and include dry runs and briefings, with appropriate repetition and questioning to ensure understanding of the plan. Contingency plans are also rehearsed where applicable; as a minimum, those plans must be repeated by the reconnaissance members to ensure they are understood.

g. The need for minimizing audio and electronic communications. Constraints on communication depend upon enemy detection capabilities and upon how quickly the information obtained about the enemy must be acted on. There may be instances where the importance of the information may require an immediate report that could threaten the unit's existence. Often, a one-time radio contact during the mission is necessary.

h. Inspections. The planning phase of the operation will include at least one inspection of all members of the reconnaissance force with equipment included. Only equipment identified by the platoon leader as essential for mission accomplishment will be carried. Special equipment must be closely inspected and safeguarded to ensure its functioning during the mission. Personnel and equipment assigned to augment the unit must also be carefully inspected and monitored before and during the operation. Every shortcoming found in personnel or equipment is corrected before the operation begins. Thorough inspections and supervision of personnel and equipment before the operation make compromise or failure less likely.

3. Organization of the unit for a zone reconnaissance patrol. Regardless of the type of reconnaissance, the unit normally is organized into three elements: command and control element, reconnaissance element, and security element.

a. Command and control. The commander of the unit conducting a reconnaissance normally will require a small command group. The command group helps communicate with higher headquarters, subordinate elements, and supporting forces; helps coordinate and control supporting elements, fire support, and air or water transport; and helps provide logistical support for the operation. For small operations, this group may consist of only the commander and a radio operator. For larger operations, the commander may require INT, logistics, and fire support elements, with communication personnel adequate for sustained 24-hour operations. The command group is always kept as small as possible.

b. Reconnaissance of the objective. The reconnaissance element approaches the target using stealth and concealment. The element must acquire the needed information while remaining undetected. It must skillfully avoid all known and discovered enemy sensing devices; therefore, patience is important. Passive STANO devices will be used to observe

activities at the objective. Reconnaissance personnel may electronically transmit information about the target to the appropriate headquarters as it is observed, or they may withdraw from the target and disseminate the information by other means. The reconnaissance site should be sterilized before the reconnaissance elements withdraw from it. Withdrawal from the area must be as skillful, patient, and precise as was the movement into it.

c. Security of the force. The element(s) responsible for security must give the commander sufficient warning of the location and movement of enemy forces to permit the friendly force to take evasive action. When it is not possible to give warning, covering fires must be provided to permit withdrawal of the reconnaissance element. Only timely warning and accurate information can give the commander the time and space to react. If the reconnaissance element is detected by the enemy, the commander must have correct information quickly in order to support the element with suppressive fires or to give it time to evade and withdraw.

4. Zone reconnaissance. In a zone reconnaissance, the platoon is tasked to obtain information about the terrain and enemy within a clearly defined boundary (Figure 5-1). The techniques presented below can be used regardless of the nature of the INT objective. The major differences would result from the movement technique involved.




Figure 5-1. Zone reconnaissance

- a. Once given a zone reconnaissance mission, the platoon will move to the designated area in the shortest possible time. This movement normally involves traveling along existing roads and, of course, employing the appropriate movement techniques. During this movement to an area, the platoon should report and bypass enemy opposition unless ordered to take other action.
- b. The choice of the techniques that follow should be based on the distribution of INT objectives within the area and the time allocated for the reconnaissance of said objectives. Objective rally points (ORPs) and rendezvous points are used to facilitate control.

(1) The fan method (Figure 5-2): The element leader first selects a series of ORPs throughout the zone from which to operate. When the unit arrives at the first ORP, it halts and establishes security. The leader confirms the unit's location. He then selects reconnaissance routes to and from the ORP. (These routes form a fan-shaped pattern around the ORP. The routes must overlap to ensure that the entire area has been reconnoitered.) The leader sends out reconnaissance elements along the routes. He does not send out all of his elements at once. He keeps a small reserve in the ORP. (For example, if the unit has three reconnaissance elements, only two are sent out. The other one is kept as a reserve.) Additionally, the patrol leader sends the elements out on adjacent routes. This pattern prevents having the unit make contact in two different directions. After the entire area (fan) has been reconnoitered, all information acquired during the reconnaissance is disseminated. The unit moves to the next ORP. This action is reported at each successive ORP.




Figure 5-2. The fan method

(2) The converging routes method (Figure 5-3). In this method, the unit moves to its zone of operation. Once there, they halt at the designated ORP and establish security. The leader confirms his location, and the unit is broken down into smaller elements. The leader gives each element a reconnaissance route, the location for the rendezvous point, and a linkup time at the rendezvous point. All elements depart for their designated routes. The leader normally travels with the center element. Each element normally reconnoiters its route using the fan method. After the zone has been reconnoitered, the elements link up at the rendezvous point at the designated time. Security is established in the same




Figure 5-3. The converging routes method

manner as it was in the ORP. All of the information gathered will be given to the Soldiers. The unit returns to friendly lines.

(3) The successive sector method (Figure 5-4). The successive sector method of area reconnaissance is a continuation of the converging routes method. The unit moves to its zone of operation and selects an ORP, a series of reconnaissance routes, and a rendezvous point. The action of the unit at each ORP and rendezvous point is the same as is used for the converging routes method. At each rendezvous point, information is disseminated. That point becomes the ORP for the next phase. This action continues until the entire zone has been reconnoitered. Once the reconnaissance is completed, the unit returns to friendly lines.




Figure 5-4. Evaluation preparation

EVALUATION PREPARATION

Setup: Provide a test site that includes the materials and equipment indicated in the task conditions statement.

Brief Soldier: Tell the Soldier that he will be a platoon sergeant or acting platoon leader. Tell the Soldier that he must organize the platoon as described in the standards for the mission.

EVALUATION GUIDE

Performance Measures	Results
1. Organize the platoon in the command, reconnaissance, and security elements necessary to accomplish the mission.	P F
2. Employ one of the three basic methods of zone reconnaissance (fan, converging routes, or successive sectors).	P F

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3. Obtain and report information about the terrain and enemy within the specified area. P F

4. Enter and leave the target area without being detected by the enemy. P F

(P – Pass, F – Fail)

FEEDBACK

Score the Soldier "GO" if all steps are passed. Score the Soldier "NO-GO" if any steps are failed. If the Soldier fails any steps, show what was done wrong and how to do it correctly.

REFERENCES

Required

Related

None

FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad

FM 7-7J, Mechanized infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley)

FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad

CHAPTER 6: COMBAT PATROL PLANNING: FINISH DECISIVELY

CPT Frank Baltazar, TF1 JRTC Operations Group

In the current operational environment, units face a multitude of variables not traditional to company-level leadership. This new complex environment forces leaders to think and act differently. The traditional seven forms of contact have evolved to include the media, civilians on the battlefield, and non-governmental agencies (NGOs) just to name a few. This article focuses on planning considerations using the objective force warfighting concept: see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively.

INT Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Although the environment has changed, there are two important things that have not—the potential for a close fight and combined arms maneuver. Therefore, leaders have to plan for the close fight and maneuver forces to dominate the potential threat to gain the initiative if the threat is realized. As in a movement to contact, leaders must identify potential friction points, such as crowds during an engagement. Leaders also must identify potential points of contact, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at intersections, or built up area with a suspected cell. Prior to those points, the leader must maneuver to either confirm or deny the threat. For example, a company commander conducting a combat patrol identifies potential IED locations at key intersections outside of a built up area. Prior to reaching those intersections, the commander maneuvers a clearing team along the flanks to clear possible enemy observers (defile drill), secures the area around the suspected IED, and waits for a follow on force (explosive ordnance disposal [EOD]) to clear the suspected IED location before committing the main body.

Today's contemporary operational environment involves much more than a direct fire threat. As stated before, this environment involves more variables that require Soldiers to be smarter and much more than just steely-eyed Soldiers. These variables have the potential of influencing unit operations. Therefore, they should be addressed during the planning phase of an operation. Below are just a few of the variables that units will be exposed to:

- Guerrilla/insurgent tactics
- Terrorism
- Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Ambiguous military and political situations
- Non-governmental and private volunteer organizations
- Media
- Criminal organizations
- Civilians on the battlefield
- Urban and complex terrain
- Information operations
- Transition between warfighting and stability operations and support operations

See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively

The objective force warfighting concept—see first, understand first, act first, finish decisively—is one way of assisting leaders in planning for and executing combat patrols.

See First—Traditionally, there are three areas that commanders want to see or visualize: the environment (observation, concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach [OCOKA]), threats (variables), and his unit.

Understand First—Commanders must understand how the terrain; threats (variables); and his unit's strength, composition, and disposition will affect the operation. Additionally, he must understand threat indicators in order to act on them.

Act First—Based on the commander or patrol leader's understanding, he must develop control measures or contingencies. He must always be in a position to "see" and "understand" the situation in order for him to act and finish decisively.

Finish Decisively—Whether the unit makes contact, conducts a civil leader engagement, or encounters the media, the unit's ability to finish each of its encounters depends on the leader's ability to see, understand, and act first.

To help readers identify with each of the topics below, the following situation is provided:

A recent human INT (HUMINT) (single source, credibility unknown) report indicates that since the last time coalition forces patrolled the village approximately one month ago, non-compliant forces (NCF) of three to five men have been operating in the vicinity VQ 884412, within the city of XXX. This source thinks that they are actively recruiting, smuggling weapons and explosives, and conducting anti-coalition activities within the region. The source believes that the cell leader is an Iraqi national, and the members are likely a mix of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Arabs.

The general mission given to a unit is to conduct an area reconnaissance of objective (OBJ) XXX to gather information requirements (IR) and promote information operation (IO) themes to influence attitudes and reduce commitment to a hostile cause. Other tasks include engaging key leaders of the village, confirming or denying the enemy cell or activity, updating a civil assessment, and conducting a consensual search of four buildings.

See First

The Environment

Commanders or leaders analyze the terrain to understand the advantages and disadvantages it holds for the unit and the enemy. Additionally, in this environment, leaders must be able to visualize the three-dimensional terrain of built up areas and the population. Sources of information may be in two forms—target folders and previous patrol debriefings.

Built up areas

- Characteristics of urban areas that the patrol may encounter
- General building construction
- Dominating terrain or buildings along the route
- Possible observation post (OP) locations for both friendly and enemy
- Subterranean locations (if known)
- Restrictive routes
- If the patrol is stopping at a known location for a period of time, for example a key leader engagement, then conduct an urban analysis of the immediate area (aperture analysis, etc.)
- Previous locations of direct fire contacts

Population

- General background information (tribal, religion, ethnicity, population, etc.)
- Allegiance assessments
- Suspected supporters of the enemy
- Key leaders/personnel and locations
- Influential leaders of the population
- Civil, religious, and historical structures and locations
- Police and their availability to support the patrol
- Local media

Threat/Variables

Based on the general situation, the commander or patrol leader identifies potential threats and contemporary operational environment (COE) variables that the unit may come into contact with. Given the situation, one can identify the following possible threats/variables:

- Direct fire contact with insurgents
- IED/rocket propelled grenade (RPG) ambush
- Crowds
- Media

Once the leader or commander identifies the variables, he should also template where they are likely to occur.




Figure 6-1

Friendly Actions/Counteractions

Based on the estimate, the commander/patrol leader develops contingencies or control measures.

<i>Threat/Variable</i>	<i>Counteraction</i>
Direct Fire Contact	Direct Fire Plan/Control Measures
	Detention Team
IED	Defile Drill
Crowds	Crowd Control Standing Operating Procedures/(SOP/Trigger Reserve
	Prepared Scripts
	IO Themes
Media	Designate Sphere of Influence
	IO Themes

Understand First

When planning, leaders must understand current enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in order for his battle drills or planned actions to be effective. In addition to understanding TTP, leaders should receive a briefing from the S2 to understand threat activities that have occurred in the area.

Leaders must understand how each threat or variable will affect his operation. A technique is to use the elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information—to understand the effect (see Table below). For example, a unit that does not understand or anticipate the combat power required to control a crowd loses the initiative by committing a force not prepared or rehearsed. Additionally, he commits unforeseen combat power.

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Variables	Maneuver	Firepower	Protection	Leadership	Information
Direct Fire Contact	Plan multiple overwatch/support by fire (SBF) positions to dominate the contact; move with a small security element forward of the main body	Establish direct fire control measures for SBF & maneuvering elements	Maintain security during engagement and movement through village while dismounted	Position command and control (C2) element to observe decisive actions	Location of suspected caches or insurgents; indicators such as anti-coalition sentiment, graffiti, or propaganda; streets become empty; location of new families/people in the village
IED	Identify security/TCP teams	Establish overwatch	EOD clears prior to committing main body	Position C2 element to observe decisive actions	Establish IR requirements
Crowds	Maneuver designated crowd control team/reserve to prevent security element from getting involved or disrupting the main effort	Security element continues to provide overwatch	Use wire to separate crowd from Soldiers/security; use local leaders/IP to contain/disperse crowd	Position C2 element to observe decisive actions	Group of 10 or more individuals moving towards engagement site; prepare script; Use IO themes
Media			Maintain operations security (OPSEC); secure media to the rear	Establish sphere of influence; (SOI) give media our story; Use IO themes	Use IO themes; show the media our successes: discovery of caches, insurgents, taking care of injured civilians, etc.

Information Dominance

Based on the given situation, the intended outcome of the patrol is to gather information confirming or denying the location of an enemy cell operating in the village. The situation leads the patrol to a general area or location and, based on the size of the village, more information is needed to further focus the patrol's efforts. Primary sources of information include local leaders and the populace. Therefore, the patrol must interact with locals and/or local leaders in order to collect the necessary information.

Informal Engagements

Prior to any operation requiring units to interact with the local population, leaders and Soldiers must review the unit IO campaign plan, understand the messages and themes, and be able to relay the message or theme with and without interpreters. Ultimately, the messages should influence the population's attitudes toward the unit and prevent commitment to the enemy. Not every Soldier has immediate access to an interpreter. However, a TTP is to have Soldiers prepare themselves with a script or fliers with IO messages in the appropriate language.

Formal Engagements

In most cases, a formal engagement between a village leader and the patrol leader becomes the primary effort in gathering information. Leaders must prepare themselves by doing the following:

- Understand background information of the village and leaders.
- Review previous debriefings and civil assessments.
- Identify potential motivational needs.
- Prepare an agenda to address both village needs and leaders' concerns, as well as build a smooth transition into questioning that may provide the unit actionable INT
- Review the unit's IO campaign plan. Focus IO effort to influence attitudes and reduce commitment to the enemy.
- Rehearse using the interpreter.
- During the course of the engagement, if other individuals are present, ensure that the names of the individuals and other information (if available) are recorded.

Debriefings

Not every patrol will produce priority INT requirements (PIR) or actionable INT. However, every patrol collects information based on what the Soldiers see or hear. A friendly interaction with a local vendor may not immediately seem important to a Soldier. However, the local interaction of any Soldier of that patrol may build a picture for a commander or effects cell. Therefore, it is critical that every Soldier is debriefed. Additionally, Soldiers should be debriefed on their actions or IO themes successfully passed or relayed.

The quality of the debriefing may even be degraded by the length of the patrol. Soldiers, over a period of time, may forget certain aspects of the patrol or certain observations. Therefore, a patrol should designate recorders. One TTP is to designate a recorder per fire team or squad. Another technique for capturing information is to use digital cameras. If available to the unit, patrols should maximize the use of the digital cameras and designate a "camera man."

Prior to a patrol, as a secondary task, squads should be given certain information requirements to gather:

1st Squad : Develop a sketch of building 21 and 22. Identify doorways and windows.

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2nd Squad: Identify locations where the populace congregates and note the makeup of the congregation. Attempt to identify certain individuals.

3rd Squad: Identify potential observation platforms. Observe attitudes of the populace.

These information requirements will help focus the patrol's IR effort and build a better understanding of the village for future operations.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Leaders and Soldiers must understand the ROE prior to the patrol. Knowing and understanding are different. If a Soldier does not truly understand, he may hesitate or prolong an action. A technique to ensure Soldiers understand the ROE is to provide vignette training of possible situations he may encounter. This training can be given during rehearsal time or during inspections.

Detainee Operations

Probably the most discouraging event is to watch a captured person get released for improper handling or failing to fill out required documents. Leaders must understand the process if an individual meets the requirements for detention. A technique to facilitate detention operations is to designate a team armed with the appropriate documents, knowledge, and expertise of the process.

The following questions are provided to assist in determining if a person meets the requirements for detention at the initial point of capture. These questions are not inclusive, and the patrolling unit may have additional information requirements that meet detention criteria.

- Has the person committed a crime?
- Did they shoot at the capturing unit?
- Did they drop their weapons and attempt escape?
- Were they engaged in hostile conduct upon capture?
- Do they possess multiple identification documents?
- Are they carrying explosives, large amounts of munitions, or money?

Immediate Actions of Detention

- Treat all detainees with dignity and respect.
- Use only appropriate and necessary force.
- Immediately secure the area and restrain the individual.
- Search/silence the individual and the immediate area around the detainee before moving.
- Tag the detainee and move the individual away from public/media viewing until movement to the rear can be executed.
- Safeguard the detainee from others detained, local populace, family members, and media.

- Record all information: who, what, when, where, and why on a Department of Defense (DD) Form 2745; when possible take pictures of individuals or evidence.
- As soon as possible, move the detainee to the designated detainee collection point.

Required Detention Documents—fill out at the point of detention or detention site prior to evacuating the detainee to the rear:

- DD Form 2745—Enemy prisoners of war capture tag
- Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNCI) apprehension form
- DA Form 4137—Evidence/property custody document
- DA Form 2823—Sworn statement

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and Vehicle Recovery Operations

CASEVAC and vehicle recovery operations are easier said than done. Similarly to direct fire planning discussed in the next section, these operations must be planned and rehearsed. Below are a few considerations when planning a patrol:

- Security
- Location of medical and recovery assets throughout the formation
- Closest facility of medical care
- Pick-up zone (PZ) locations along the route
- Response time for ground and air CASEVAC
- PZ marking team and markings
- Actions on vehicle breakdown (does the patrol recover the vehicle and bring it forward, to the rear, or wait for a recovery team?)
- How many and/or types of casualties can the patrol sustain before it must stop offensive actions and focus on security or defending the terrain it owns until additional forces arrive

Act First

Force Protection

There are two thoughts when conducting a patrol requiring units to interact with locals. Some units will attempt to enter with a small force to conduct the initial engagement while leaving a majority of its combat power out of sight or tactically uncommitted. Another approach is to demonstrate combat power up front by maneuvering units into overwatch while the engagement team approaches the potential site of the engagement. Units must weigh the pros and the cons of both courses of action. However, the latter may deter attacks on the unit, set the stage for the engagement, and posture the unit for success if contact is made. Not every scenario will provide the ability to establish overwatch positions, but it is helpful to employ them whenever possible.

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Development of Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

In today's environment, units must be able to operate effectively throughout the spectrum of conflict. The most difficult transition for any Soldier or leader is the ability to quickly and effectively transition from stability operations and support operations to combat operations. The development of CCIR will help the unit make those transitions, visualize the battlefield, and stay ahead of the enemy's decision-making cycle.

A current trend for commanders is listing numerous IR as CCIR. By definition, CCIR is information required by a commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of tactical operations. Therefore, CCIR are those information requirements that either confirm the commander's vision or cause the commander to deviate from the plan. CCIR do not encompass all IR. Instead, they focus on specific information.

Another trend is commanders failing to plan and disseminate branches or sequels if an IR is answered. When developing IR, focus on IR that would cause the plan to be invalid or cause the commander to make a decision. Decisions can be focused on either an unexpected event or the exploitation of a success.

The "if, and, then" is one method of developing IR and decisions. Some examples might be: "if" a crowd develops during an engagement; "and" local leaders and the Iraqi Police cannot control the crowd; "then" trigger the reserve and "if" a mortar system is found; "and" our unit has not been compromised; "then" establish a hasty ambush.

Command and Control

One of the toughest concerns for company commanders is determining where his location best commands and controls the unit during the patrol or, in terms of the COE, a location where he can see and understand to act first and finish decisively. As previously discussed, the development of CCIR helps the commander visualize the fight and make decisions. The commander should be located where he could best make those decisions. It is highly recommended that the commander be able to observe the situation develop, rather than attempt to build a picture based on reports. In addition to CCIR, company commanders or patrol leaders should consider three things:

1. Decisive actions during the patrol. For example, a patrol may require a company to conduct an engagement with local leaders and then a joint dismounted patrol with the Iraqi Police. The first decisive action is the engagement. The commander or patrol leader, if not decisively engaged with the local leaders, should be positioned to observe the security of that engagement and the situation as it develops. The next decisive action is the joint dismounted patrol. In the same manner, the commander or patrol leader should be positioned where he can observe the patrol and the situation around it. This position allows either the commander or patrol leader to decisively influence actions (positioning forces to isolate one decisive action at a time or influencing the decisive action with additional assets based on what the commander "sees.")
2. Picture based off reporting versus ground truth. Company commanders rely heavily on reports to help paint the picture. Reporting, by all means, is important. However,

commanders must understand that platoons report the actions of the close-in fight. At times it may be difficult for subordinate leaders to observe, hence report, the evolving situation around their units. Therefore, the commander's location serves to provide a "second set of eyes" generally not decisively engaged in the fight.

3. The ability to influence or shape the platoon fights at the decisive point. Based on being able to observe his unit's actions and "understand" the surrounding situation, the commander may anticipate the leverage of additional assets to the fight. If a platoon makes direct fire contact, a commander may employ additional forces to provide supporting fires and secure or isolate key avenues of approach to the contact by employing traffic control points (TCPs). These actions restrict the enemy and force the enemy to fight in two directions until the platoon in contact is able to maneuver on the enemy. This example demonstrates how the commander can shape the platoon's fight with assets readily available to him. In some instances, other assets, if available, can be used—mortars for isolating or attack aviation for route reconnaissance or supporting fires.

Direct Fire Planning/Graphical Control Measures

Unless the patrol is given specific locations of the enemy, the location of direct fire contacts will be impossible to predict. Therefore, the patrol leaders must develop a direct fire plan and graphical control measures for locations of anticipated contact. This plan facilitates controlling and maneuvering units and orienting fires. Consider the following topics when developing control measures:

- Movement—routes, phase lines, building numbers
- Direct Fire—building numbers, support by fire (SBF)/overwatch, potential objectives
- Indirect Fire/Aviation—target reference points, aerial attack by fire positions, minimum safe distances




Figure 6-2

Finish Decisively

The desired outcome for all lethal contacts is obviously to “finish decisively.” Hopefully, the previous topics will help prepare patrol leaders in decisively finishing the enemy. However, the contact may have an effect on our ability to influence the population. Therefore, the focus of “finishing decisively” can be directed to one question: “What message did we leave the population?”

There are various and evolving techniques:

- *Informal engagements with local leaders.* A technique is to keep the individuals informed of what individuals are in lethal contact with friendly forces. If unit leaders are decisively engaged, an informal engagement afterwards would be just as effective. This informal engagement provides the unit the opportunity to pass on pertaining IO messages:
 - Insurgents are indiscriminate with their weapons. They risk the lives of innocent civilians.
 - Friendly forces are capable of defeating insurgents and protecting the population.
- *Using the Media.* Soldiers and leaders shy away from the media. However, this asset can be used to influence the population. One rule of thumb to remember is as follows: “If we don’t provide them our story, they will make their own without our input.”

- If caches are found, showing the media the captured equipment could demonstrate how friendly forces are protecting the population.
- Other events to exploit could be enemy destruction of infrastructure and friendly forces assisting civilian casualties or assisting the general population in general.
- *Finishing Force/Exploitation Force.* One of the most important things about captured individuals or equipment is preserving the evidence. A technique is to identify a team of individuals (for example, the detainee team) to preserve the evidence. This team must be able to photograph the evidence (possibly with the individual), inventory, tag the evidence with the appropriate paperwork, and evacuate/secure the evidence.
- *Assessment of Collateral Damage.* Assessing the damage and working with civil leaders enhances the relationship with both the leaders and the population. Additionally, it identifies potential commander's emergency response program- (CERP) funded projects for general infrastructure to be repaired by the local government.

CHAPTER 7: BETTER PATROLLING

MAJ Jon K Sowards and SSG Paul Weaver, Fire Support JRTC Operations Group

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3rd Platoon, X-ray Company receives a warning order to conduct a combat security patrol in approximately four hours. The verbal fragmentary order (FRAGO) came an hour later confirming the mission. The platoon conducted pre-combat checks (PCC) and pre-combat inspections (PCI) in accordance with their standing operating procedures (SOPs). The company commander briefed the route to follow and assigned an interpreter for the mission. The squad's mission is to conduct a four-hour foot patrol of a nearby neighborhood (vehicles are used for transportation and mobile security). While executing this mission, the squad maintained an aggressive security posture in order to deter any aggressors. The patrol moved along its assigned route and made minimal contact with locals. At the conclusion of the security patrol mission, the platoon leader (PL) completed a patrol debrief form that stated the patrol was successfully executed and that there were no injuries, accidents, or incidents to either U.S. forces or the local populace.

Given the above scenario, one might quickly assume the patrol was successful. The patrol leader followed troop leading procedures (TLPs) and ensured thorough PCC and PCI were completed. The patrol returned from its four-hour mission intact and unharmed. Unfortunately, many leaders would consider this patrol a success and in doing so, shortchange themselves.

What did the patrol see? Did they understand the commander's priority information requirements (PIR)? Did the S2 give them specific information requirements (IR) to look for such as infrastructure, graffiti, or trash? Did they engage any local leaders? If so, what was discussed? Were any promises made that the company or battalion commanders need to know about? Are there differences in pedestrian patterns or rhythms? Were anti-coalition posters or handbills present? Has there been a change to electrical output?

Introduction and Article Framework

In today's operational environment (OE), leaders are asked to accomplish complex tasks in dynamic and uncertain environments. Whether engaged in stability operations and support operations or counterinsurgency operations (COIN), our leaders must have the skills to successfully execute assigned missions. In addition to traditional mission essential task list (METL) and battle drills, units are expected to execute non-lethal missions such as information operations (IO) and civil affairs tasks, gather INT, establish and follow spheres of influence (SOI), and apply the rules of engagement (ROE) with precision.

One of the most common platoon missions is that of the combat security patrol, often called "presence patrols." In stability operations and support operations, the combat security patrol has to accomplish many of the missions and tasks outlined above. It is therefore imperative that our

leaders are trained in non-traditional missions and tasks. Multiple Iraqi-based mission readiness exercises (MREs) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) have revealed a glaring deficiency in combat security patrols, especially a lack of detail and understanding by junior officers and non-commissioned officers executing non-lethal tasks. This article will attempt to outline common non-lethal mistakes made by our junior leaders and provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to improve patrolling. The patrolling TTP outlined complement and assist decide, detect, deliver-assess (D3A) targeting process and effects-based operations (EBO) because they focus on information gathering.

While we have tried to keep the focus of this article on the executors of patrols, we do occasionally raise TTP for companies and battalions as well. For the sake of clarity, we will use the term "commander" to denote battalion or company commanders directing a combat security patrol. The term "leader" will denote the platoon or squad leader in charge of a combat security patrol. The term "local" will denote an area leader or person of influence in the operational environment (OE). Finally, the term "engagement" will denote a two-party (bilateral) negotiation between a leader and a local in the OE.

“Patrolling is the basis of operations in a hostile area”

FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations states, *“Patrolling is the basis of operations in a hostile area; it is aimed at acquiring information, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile group”* (pg. IV-1). A common mistake made by leaders is to assume that the sheer number of patrols conducted is a positive indicator or measure of effectiveness. If patrols are not prepared to answer specific questions, then they have not succeeded in accomplishing anything of value. If the patrols do not engage the local populace, especially locals and persons of influence in the area, then the Soldiers' ability to understand local challenges and gauge local sentiment is challenged.

A successful patrol requires a focused patrol brief. While there are many details that need to be briefed and rehearsed, patrol leaders routinely fail to cover the commander's priority INT requirements (PIR). *FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*, defines PIR as “those INT requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.” The battalion S2 establishes specific information requirements (SIR) and special orders and requests (SOR) for each patrol. The S2's SIR and SOR should be put in the form of questions to be answered or tasks to be accomplished for each patrol.

An all too common mistake at the JRTC is for companies and battalions to send out patrols with no focused INT requirements. Because the patrol is not provided PIR, SOR, and SIR, it does not provide the detailed information the battalion, and ultimately the brigade, requires for making decisions. Like the example above, the patrol is debriefed upon return, but no actionable INT is gleaned from the patrol.

On the other hand, if a patrol is directed to survey citizens on power outages and determines one section of the town has a consistent problem with power, the battalion can coordinate with the brigade to send a team to assess and repair the problem. The unit can also use this information and the follow-on action as a bargaining chip in future engagements. Patrols are often directed to

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engage the locals and deliver focused messages. While this sounds simple enough, most junior leaders are ill-prepared to engage locals and effectively deliver focused messages. A little knowledge in engagement techniques, interpreter skills, and rehearsals can greatly assist leaders in patrol execution.

Prior Trained Tasks vs. Pre-Mission Tasks

Units always have a number of tasks to accomplish. These tasks may be divided into prior-trained tasks and pre-mission tasks. Prior-trained tasks involve all general tasks trained before knowledge of the warning order (WARNO) and are usually found in a unit's battle drills and standing operating procedure (SOP). Pre-mission tasks are those that are specific to the mission at hand.

Prior-trained tasks set up the leader for success and allow his unit to start preparation with only a WARNO. Prior-trained tasks consist of battle drills and SOPs (for example, react to contact, react to sniper, CASEVAC, etc.). Companies and platoons should include non-lethal tasks, such as a rules of engagement (ROE) rehearsal and interpreter rehearsal.

Soldiers must be proficient at the use of an interpreter, they must know and understand IO themes and talking points, and they must understand how to apply the ROE. Of these, use of an interpreter will take the most training time, as it is a very unfamiliar task for most Soldiers. Interpreters should be viewed as part of the unit and included in training and rehearsals as much as possible. They must be made to feel safe during the mission, and the leader must understand their capabilities and limitations. Above all, during actual translation they must act as translation machines, accurately interpreting the conversation without injecting their own analysis, opinion, or personal agenda.

Tips for Using an Interpreter:

- Speak in the first person, and tell your interpreter to do the same.
- Instruct your interpreter to translate accurately and to avoid paraphrasing.
- Keep eye contact and orientation with the local person to whom you are speaking, not your interpreter.
- Speak in short phrases with simple vocabulary.
- Avoid military jargon and acronyms.
- If a misunderstanding occurs, the leader and local person should rephrase their statements; do not ask the interpreter what the local person means.
- Prepare simple hand and arm signals to signal interpreter or leader to stop talking when needed.
- Rehearse with your interpreter any specific terminology likely to arise.
- Ensure your interpreter knows the proper roles and actions during battle drills.
- As much as possible, include the interpreter in the mission preparation to make him part of the team.

Once the leader has received the WARNO, he can start his troop-leading procedures and determine the necessary pre-mission tasks. All patrol members should attend the commander's patrol briefing and should be encouraged to ask questions to fully understand the mission. The

leader should ensure everyone in the patrol knows and understands the commander's intent, the PIR, the SOR/SIR, and relevant I/O themes and talking points. Standard pre-mission tasks include route planning, requesting and receiving mission-specific equipment or supplies, ROE, key tasks, and making coordination with other units or agencies.

Reviewing the ROE by providing examples to patrol members and soliciting a response is much more effective than simply reading acronyms such as Random Antiterrorism Measures Program (RAMP). In other words, it is better to ask questions that force Soldiers to apply the ROE. For example: "You are on a patrol when you see two men down an alley in a fist fight. One man pulls a knife on the other. Is use of deadly force authorized?" This question requires the Soldier to apply the ROE that states that U.S. Soldiers must do everything in their power to prevent bodily harm to a civilian.

Actions during Patrols

In addition to leading his patrol, the patrol leader will often be the "man-on-point" when talking to locals. His demeanor, as well as that of the rest of the unit, can greatly influence the outcome of the mission. A friendly smile and respectful greeting to important figures will go a long way toward fostering a cooperative relationship. While demonstrating a good, alert security posture to deter attacks, make an effort to engage the locals in friendly conversation.

The leader must integrate IO themes and messages, including his commander's guidance, in his conversations. Getting information out is a vital portion of the mission, not a public relations (PR) drill. The leader should focus a large percentage of his conversation toward his commander's SIR, but he should also remember to try to set up the town to ensure success in following missions. The British Army calls this "leaving a trace," noting that every contact between Soldiers and locals leaves some sort of trace, whether physical remnants of the patrol (battle damage, improved school, etc.) or a memory in the mind of a local. The leader should try to ensure the trace he leaves is in accordance with his commander's guidance.

Spheres of Influence

In his article, "Preparing Leaders for Nation Building," Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Donahoe writes, "In Iraq and elsewhere, the Army asks battalion and company combat commanders to conduct nation building and act as civil affairs officers. Soldiers must master war-fighting skills to seize and secure terrain and towns while working peacefully with the local populace and, hopefully, persuading them that nonviolence is the best path to stability. Failing to win the hearts and minds of local people might not sound a mission's death knell, but it makes success in suppressing insurgencies and terrorism more difficult" (pg. 24, Military Review, May 2004).

Why Establish Spheres of Influence:

- Allow the task force (TF) to speak with one voice to specific government officials, international government organizations, (IGO) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- Establish sound relationships with local officials.

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- Enable understanding among locals of their primary and alternate points of contact (POC).
- Prevent IO fratricide: i.e., multiple engagements on one official, obtaining different outcomes not in the interest of the maneuver commander.
- Prevent locals from manipulating multiple engagements to their benefit.

It is vitally important that SOI are developed within each unit’s area of operations and are understood throughout the brigade. The term “spheres of influence” is a non-doctrinal IO term that refers to the establishment of a fixed transmitter/receiver relationship between a leader and a target audience key communicator. In simpler terms, a key communicator (for example, a town sheik) has one, and only one, primary point of contact. Barring exceptional circumstances, all interaction with that sheik is conducted by the designated task force (TF) leader. The example in Figure 7-1 identifies the A/5-89IN company commander as the primary point of contact with J-town’s Sheik Mohammed Ali. Anyone seeking to communicate with Sheik Mohammed Ali should coordinate with the company commander in order to prevent IO fratricide.

1BCT SPHERES OF INFLUENCE (Example Only)							
ORGANIZATION	NAME	POSITION	ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA				
			Primary	Role	Secondary	Role	Type Eng
TOWN LEADERS							
A Company / 5-89th IN							
KEY LEADERS IN J-Town	MOHAMMED ALI	SHEIK (SUNNI)	Co Cdr	DIRECT	CO FSO	OVERSIGHT	W
	KAREEM ABDUL	IMAM	Co Cdr	DIRECT	CO FSO	OVERSIGHT	AN
	AHMAN HAMAD	MAYOR	Co Cdr	DIRECT	CO FSO	OVERSIGHT	AN
	AMIR AL FADL	SCHOOL PRINCIPAL	PL	DIRECT	CO Cdr	OVERSIGHT	W
	HAMDAN AHMET	TOWN COUNCIL MEMBER	PL	DIRECT	CO Cdr	OVERSIGHT	D
	MUDIR SAHIB	POLICE CHIEF	PL	DIRECT	CO Cdr	OVERSIGHT	D
		BUSINESS OWNERS	SQD LDRS	DIRECT	PL	OVERSIGHT	
		POPULACE	SQD LDRS	DIRECT	PL	OVERSIGHT	

Figure 7-1

FM 3-14, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis defines “information operation fratricide” as “the result of employing information operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.” A common mistake we see at the JRTC involves civil affairs (CA) teams. The CA teams will approve projects or pass out money to local leaders and, without knowing it, strip the company commander of power and influence in the town. An established and enforced SOI prevents confusion and allows the unit to maintain a consistent message.

Actions Following Patrols

As soon as possible after returning from the patrol, usually 45 minutes to 1 hour later, the leader should ensure all personnel are present for the debrief. The final stage of the patrol involves the actions on return to the forward operating base (FOB). Too many leaders focus on preparation for follow-on missions and do not give enough attention to the patrol just completed. While it is vital for patrol members to refuel and rearm, the leader should focus his attention on the commander’s debrief. Following an after-action review (AAR) format, where everyone is interested in improving future operations rather than assigning blame for past mistakes, is a valuable method to conduct the debrief.

The commander and leader should verbally walk through the patrol from receipt of mission through debrief time, focusing on lessons learned and information gathered. Effective leaders foster an attitude that everyone, from the leader to the lowest Soldier, can and should gather valuable information. Remind your Soldiers that there are no stupid questions, and all information has potential INT value. As much as possible, refrain from pointing fingers for poorly-performed actions—the time for corrective training is later. The commander must also ensure that he receives the actual route taken by the patrol and any reasons the patrol may have for deviating from pre-planned routes.

Using your Fire Supporters

The company commander can effectively utilize the fire support officer (FSO) to assist with preparation, execution, and follow-up of non-lethal and IO tasks. The FSO can work with an effects-based mindset to prepare the patrol in lethal fires and non-lethal tasks and should be on call to assist the leader during the patrol. He can also serve as an assistant to the commander during patrol debriefs and in collecting information for analysis. Because most battalion S2 sections are undermanned, a good technique is for the company FSO to prepare the patrol debriefs that go to the battalion S2. He can send the battalion the raw data from the patrol debriefs with a summary analysis attached, thereby reducing the information overload.

Forward observers (FOs) can also serve a valuable role to patrol leaders. As trained observers, they understand the elements of lethal and non-lethal effects-based planning and can effectively integrate IO. Patrol leaders can rely on their FOs to assist in ensuring that IO themes and messages are distributed, and SIR/SOR elements are observed and accurately captured. They should also assist in leader preparation for engagements and, of course, execute their traditional fire planning responsibilities.

Tying it all together

Given the TTP offered in this article, let us revisit the patrol example:

FOB Granite, Baghdad, Iraq:

3rd Platoon, X-ray Company receives a WARNO to conduct a dismounted combat security patrol in the town of Tamirah. The platoon leader notifies the Soldiers conducting the patrol and directs specific battle drills to be rehearsed. The verbal FRAGO arrives an hour later, confirming the mission and directing the patrol to gather SIR of the availability of clean drinking water and how the police chief is viewed by townspeople. During the patrol briefing, the S2 provides a list of specific questions for the patrol to ask in order to answer the SIR and asks the Leader to survey at least fifteen townspeople. The S2 also wants the Soldiers to ask the townspeople if they know about any insurgent activity in the area.

The FSO confirms the specific IO themes and messages to be disseminated during the patrol, reviews the police chief's contact folder, and prepares the patrol leader with facts about the police chief. The company commander assigns the interpreter for the mission and ensures he is linked up with the platoon leader. The platoon conducts PCC and PCI in accordance with their SOP, and the company commander ensures adherence by selecting three random items to inspect.

During the patrol, the squad maintained an alert security posture in order to deter aggressors and gave lollipops to twenty-three local children while walking through the town. The patrol moved along its assigned route for the most part, but made a detour down one alley to take digital photos of a vandalized building with anti-coalition graffiti. The surveys were completed, and two individuals (one from the survey and one child's uncle) report knowledge of an IED workshop on the outskirts of town.

At the conclusion of the combat security patrol, the FSO debriefed the entire patrol, asking specific questions to find out the general attitude of locals who were encountered during the patrol. He confirmed the route taken and recorded the location of the vandalized building. Two Soldiers in the patrol reported that they observed the town banker handing large amounts of cash to three people behind the bank. The FSO compiled the information and forwarded it to the S2. The squad leaders led a post-mission AAR and identified a need to better train Soldiers in common Arabic phrases. The platoon leader arranged for the interpreter to teach a class to the Soldiers, thanked him for his assistance during the patrol, and ensured he was getting enough rest between missions. The squad leaders finished supervising after-operations preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on weapons and equipment, re-supply of Class I (subsistence) and III (fuel and lubricants) expended during the patrol, and released their Soldiers from the patrol.

By all measures, this was an effective patrol. Prior to the mission, the battalion S2 developed SIR for the patrol. The company commander assigned an interpreter and did leader checks on the platoon's mission preparation. The platoon conducted battle drill rehearsals, to include vehicle rollover drills, mounted and dismounted react to contact, CASEVAC, react to IED, and ROE rehearsal. The company FSO armed the platoon leader with talking points and information about the police chief.

During the mission, the patrol engaged the local population, completed the questionnaires, gathered actionable INT on a possible IED workshop, left a positive trace, and maintained a good security posture throughout. The company headquarters maintained situational awareness of the patrol's status and conducted TLPs. The battalion's current operations cell battle-tracked the patrol and maintained troop-to-task situational awareness.

Post-mission actions included a patrol debrief by the company FSO and company commander. Pertinent information (summary of questionnaires, photo and analysis of vandalized building and location of a possible IED workshop) was forwarded to the battalion S2. The squads conducted an AAR of their actions and began to refit and prepare for the next day's mission. The battalion S2 received the patrol debrief, analyzed it, and made recommendations to S3 and commander for a cordon and search of the suspected IED warehouse. Additionally, the S2 developed a new questionnaire for follow-on patrols that will seek information about the vandalized building and about the distribution of money by the bank officer.

By following the patrol cycle in Figure 7-2, the right information gets collected by patrols and fed to higher-ranking officers for analysis and decision making. The common mistake made at the JRTC is brigade and battalion staffs fail to tell patrols what information needs to be collected. Often, patrols are sent out with no guidance other than to provide a security presence in town. After several days of not getting information, brigade assets, like the PSYOPS and CA teams, get frustrated. In an effort to "be proactive" these teams will go out and commit information fratricide. The result is an unsynchronized effort across the brigade's battlespace.

Another way of looking at this problem is that information collection is critical to success in the COE (more so than in traditional, linear combat). Winning the support of the population cannot be accomplished unless patrol leaders engage the local population and get a sense for what local needs are. Brigades and the new modular BCTs are empowered with tremendous assets to shape the fight in their battlespace but need bottom-up information to plan the use of those assets. The patrol cycle attempts to show how information requirements from a higher headquarters are tasked to a patrol for collection and ultimately fed back to that higher headquarters.




Figure 7-2

CHAPTER 8: TASK FORCE (TF) 1, SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE (STX) 2 (COMBAT PATROL), STX LANE OBSERVATIONS

TF 1, JRTC Operations Group

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

1. Conduct Patrol Operations:
 - Prepare for combat.
 - Mounted/dismounted movement.
 - Conduct INT, security, reconnaissance.
 - Protect the force/secure objective (dominate battlespace).
 - Collect information requirements (complete civil assessment).
 - Engage leaders/promote information operation themes.
 - Command and control.
2. Take action on contact (company [CO] task)/react to contact (platoon (PLT)/squad (SQD) battle drill)
3. Enter a building/clear a room (PLT/SQD) ARTEP 7-8 mission training plan (MTP) drill
4. Conduct bilingual leader engagement (JRTC feedback form)
5. Process a prisoner of war (PW)/detainee (PLT) (FM 3-19.40, Chapter 2, Joint Detainee Manual)
6. Employ close air attack with preplanned army attack aviation
7. React to civil disturbance (CALL Handbook 03-34)
8. React to improvised explosive device (IED)/ambush (CALL Handbook 03-34)

AREAS OF FOCUS:

- Operating within an operational environment replicating Iraq—cultural awareness (Iraqi police, mosques, imams, interpreters, Arabic language, crowds, trash, battlefield clutter—cars and junk).
- Reacting to contact in an urban area with civilians on the battlefield (COBs) while minimizing collateral damage.
- Operating under ROE.
- Operating under specified constraints for mosque entry, handling abandoned munitions, and medical treatment of wounded civilians.
- Operating under specific criteria and approval authority for conducting a cordon and search, a cordon and knock, and a consensual search of a dwelling or facility (not in contact).
- Handling PWs during surrender, wounded PWs, and detainees.
- Developing flexible and adaptive leadership capable of working within an ambiguous environment and acting decisively on actionable INT.

OBSERVATIONS:

Conduct Patrol Operations

1. Orders: The majority of companies had very strong CO-level troop leading procedures (TLPs). Company time management and operation orders (OPORDs) were generally strong, as were rehearsals and pre-combat inspections (PCIs).

2. Soldier discipline: Very strong for the majority of companies. Weapons posture, weapons on safe when not engaging a threat, etc. There were, however, three cases of negligent discharges and two cases of fratricide. Reflexive fire drills will help enforce weapons being on safe except when engaging targets, and trigger fingers staying outside the trigger well, unless engaging targets as well.

3. Soldier use of Random Antiterrorism Measures Program (RAMP)/Soldier rules of engagement (ROE) knowledge: Most Soldiers were comfortable with ROE. Nevertheless, some Soldiers did not understand the ROE, and the results were catastrophic. Continued use of ROE vignette training is recommended to ensure that Soldiers do not hesitate when it counts, nor violate the laws of war with respect to PWs. ROE vignette training is another area where leaders try to make it too complicated. Training for the simple black and white scenarios is recommended; most commanders are not going to second-guess a judgment of our junior leaders in contact for the grey cases.

4. Integration of tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) teams (TPTs): Several companies were allocated a TPT. In fifty percent of the cases, the TPT was used very effectively. In the cases where it was not use effectively, poor positioning prevented employment or the ability to control the asset. In several cases, the TPT failed to prepare a dismounted rig for a dismounted patrol. Identifying the right messages for different contingencies (unruly crowds, direct fire contact, etc.) and the criteria for employment are keys to success.

5. Security: Another major trend for combat patrol STX training was not adequately securing objective areas prior to conducting specified tasks to engage local leaders, collect INT requirements (IR), and promote information operations (IO). Dominating battlespace and securing the force are prerequisites to conducting civil engagements. Several companies were challenged to coordinate the heavy weapons platforms with dismounted movement. This can be accomplished using the “bounding overwatch movement technique.” A majority of the companies were challenged to effectively position their mounted and heavy weapons, with dispersion and standoff in good positions affording cover and fields of fire. These positioning challenges resulted in difficulty getting these assets into the fight if, or when, contact was made. In many cases, leaders are not thinking of the Bradley as a mobile support by fire capability. Additionally, dismounted formations tended to group and did not maintain tactical dispersion. Maintaining 360-degree security of every independent element was another common shortcoming for both mounted and dismounted elements. Vehicle commanders learned to think in terms of optimizing the use of their critical weapons systems while reducing the vehicle’s vulnerability to rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) shots when selecting positions.

6. Security and weapons posture: During these patrols, force protection is about dominating battlespace. Sometimes this is personal battlespace. Soldiers seem to understand this. Most Soldiers, whether walking or in the turret, looked ready and capable of inflicting lethal force. Leaders must constantly enforce weapons being on safe, muzzle awareness, and fingers remaining out of trigger wells until the Soldiers needs to engage a target. “Quick fire” and “reflexive fire” training will enforce these habits.

7. Mobility requirements: Commanders often have more high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and mobility platforms than they need for the specific mission i.e., 25 HMMWVs for an 89 Soldier company. Once dismounted to conduct the patrol, the need for security of the vehicles impedes the ability to get boots on the ground and does not contribute to the key tasks of the mission beyond force protection (FP). Configuring mobility assets to support the “ground tactical plan” is a new phenomenon for mobile or wheeled company commanders. With 3-Soldier vehicle crews, if a dismounted PLT is the requirement, then sometimes leaving the HMMWVs at the forward operating base (FOB) and using an light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) may be a better option.

8. Battle command: (The most prevalent improve trend) Company commanders were challenged in positioning themselves on the battlefield to maintain situational awareness and “feel” the battlefield. Most were not positioned to “see and understand,” in order to make decisions to "act first, finish decisively." Generally, commanders of heavy companies initially positioned themselves too far from their main effort to really understand what was going on. In several cases, the company commanders tried to command and control the fight using just a map and the radio. Other commanders who positioned themselves forward in the fight quickly begin to fight the SQD or PLT fight, abdicating their roles in shaping the battlefield outside the PLT fight.

9. Commanders were coached into anticipating what decisions they would have to make during the operation or in contact and then determining the best location from which to see and understand in order to make this decision. Urban terrain generally requires leaders to position farther forward in order to “understand first and act first.” This improved throughout STX lane training and with each iteration; commanders better positioned themselves to understand (to make quick but informed decisions). Leaders who moved forward to literally “see” and “feel” the battle were much more successful in quickly developing the situation. This involved maneuvering other available assets to isolate, contain, secure a flank, or follow and support casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and handling PWs. Company commanders reporting/painting the picture for battalion once in contact will facilitate requesting battalion or brigade assets to help shape the company fight (Army aviation, close air support, quick reaction forces, and flash traffic control points). Twenty-five percent did well; seventy-five percent received heavy coaching after the first iteration with some improvements in their second iterations. The urban environment necessitates having dismounted radio configurations so that commanders can shape the fight battalion (BN) and CO and maintain command and control.

10. Language Skills: Generally, companies are attempting to incorporate Soldier remedial language skills. We see language cheat sheets on butt stocks and Soldiers trying out greetings to civilians on the battlefield (COB) while on patrol; both of these are definite steps in the right direction in this area.

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11. Integration of Iraqi police (IP): Across the board, BN-level coaching and resulting CO-level actions to incorporate the IPs and town leadership into the actions on the ground were very strong. In all but a few cases, IP integration was a very positive trend. IP was effectively used to help control crowds as well as investigate information leads for potential actionable INT.

12. CASEVAC/"Buddy" aid: CASEVAC planning and command and control were a noted sustain for multiple elements. Generally they were strengths at SQD and PLT level as well. Combat lifesaver (CLS) bags, first responder actions (first aid), and assistance to civilians on the battlefield COBs (enemy collateral damage).

Take Action on Contact/React to Contact

1. React to Contact: Both battle drills were challenges for several units not comfortable with dismounted operations. However, these units did increasingly well during subsequent iterations. Understanding infantry SQD/PLT battle drills for react to contact/enter a building/clear a room should be a prerequisite for any unit conducting a combat patrol. Returning fire quickly and taking good covered positions was generally performed to standard. "Quick fire" and "reflexive fire" training is imperative for all of our Soldiers who will conduct dismounted patrols in this environment.

Communication between team members, positively identifying the threat, directing team members to move to good positions (with appropriate individual movement techniques [IMT]), and allowing effective suppression of the enemy challenged many non-infantry team leaders. (Again, rehearsals and repetitive training—crawl, walk, run—in urban terrain is imperative.) Some junior leaders were slow to develop the situation at the SQD and PLT level with fire and (particularly) maneuver to close with and destroy/capture the enemy. Non-infantry SQDs and PLTs should rehearse and train the fundamentals of the dismounted SQD/PLT attack battle drill (dismounted) prior to executing this type of mission.

2. Controlling Fires: A few company commanders required coaching to plan appropriate fire control measures because the mission involved "an engagement patrol." Every operation must be treated as if contact is anticipated. Phase lines, check points, numbering buildings or blocks, and designating aerial battle positions allows subordinate leaders to more easily control fires, as well as render contact reports. At the fire team and SQD level, several leaders failed to direct the fires of their formations. In some companies, in-contact Soldiers fired without positively identifying enemy and without good situation awareness of other Soldiers forward of them. Team leaders must "lead the team." Weapons control status (hold, tight, and free) —based on where the element is in the formation—is another technique to control fires and reduce individual Soldiers firing without good situational awareness (SA).

Enter a Building/Clear a Room

Enter a building/clear a room: Units must execute Battle Drill 6 and 6a in a repetitive manner in order for it to become routine. Leaders should not have to discuss who is the number one man or four men in the stack prior to entering a room. Units cannot do this drill enough. They must do it enough so that they can execute it comfortably—"slow is smooth, smooth is fast"

Conduct Bilingual Leader Engagement

Engagements: Seventy five percent of key leader engagements were very strong and balanced (firm but not “the ugly American occupier” syndrome). Generally PLT leaders are using interpreters much more effectively. Obviously they have reviewed some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that JRTC has been pushing, even though they were not involved in the engagement STX lanes.

Process PW/Detainee Operations

PW/Detainee Operations: There was a noted lack of tagging at the point of detention; however, handling and understanding ROE with respect to detainees was strong.

Employ Close Air Attack with preplanned Army Attack Aviation (AVN)

Air-Ground Coordination (AGI): There was great development during this STX. The intent was for contingency planning at the company level. Most companies received an AGI TTP review. Collaborative planning with aircrews was limited based on design for this STX; the AGI was for opportunity air integration. Cordon and search AGI was a more deliberate planning effort. Nevertheless, in seventy-five percent of the formations, company commanders planned AVN support for their operation with contingencies for contact. In contact, half of the commanders were able to successfully conduct close-combat attack (CCA) with lethal effects. In twenty-five percent of the other cases, the opportunity was not there due to proximity/compression/density of the ground forces once air was available. The other twenty-five percent missed the opportunity by lacking SA and situational understanding (SU) at the CO level. A lesson learned by several company commanders was to pass the AVN directly to the PL in contact (who had requisite SA) to effectively employ the AVN—keeping the aircraft (A/C) on the company net, but allowing the PL to talk directly to the A/C. Maneuver companies with fire support officers (FSOs) often used the FSO to control the A/C—a great trend which we have been trying to coach.

React to Civil Disturbance

Responding to civil disturbance and crowds: half of SQDs and PLTs attempt to apply a domestic civil disturbance technique to a tactical civil disturbance problem. For example, Soldiers are not maintaining dispersion when it is clearly possible and would reduce vulnerability of the force to enemy contact (grenade or small arms). However, the majority of Soldiers understand the ROE in dealing with application of lethal force. Controlling COB and media during the military operation continues to be a challenge to fifty percent of our leaders/Soldiers.

TASK FORCE 1 STX 2 (COMBAT PATROL) STX LANE BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Training Resources: Three STX sites were used replicating small Iraqi villages (Suliyah-Arbatash, Suliyah-Sabina, and Sadiq). Each village had a population of approximately 130 personnel, 35 of whom were Arabic-speaking role players. Each town had a small Iraqi Police station with approximately six armed (AK-47) patrolmen and a police chief. Each town

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

had a mayor, a mosque, and an Imam. The combat patrol was executed under daylight conditions with temperatures varying from mid-80's to the mid 60's. Although each village had distinctly different characteristics, each provided a dense and compressed urban environment. CO commanders were required to maintain communications with a replicated battalion headquarters. The battle captain tracked/de-conflicted the lanes, caused the company commanders to render timely situation reports, and pushed Army attack aviation down to the companies. Planned Army aviation support was available and was integrated for nearly all of the lanes, except when weather/resource priority did not permit.

Training Scenario: The scenario involved a town which was assessed as pro-U.S. and which had stable relationships with a previous coalition force. Although (based on recent theater of operations [TOA] observations) the village had not been visited for over a month, the previous company in the area of operations (AO) visited the town weekly. The previous company commander had a sound relationship with the police chief and the mayor, but little if any interaction with the Imam. The previous unit provided a "target folder," including a civil affairs (CA) assessment and aerial imagery of the town and some key facilities (school, police station, gas station, and mosque). The battalion, which just completed TOA, received a single-source (credibility unknown) report that an enemy cell was hiding in or near the town. The battalion gives the company the mission to conduct a combat patrol to collect information requirements (IR) (confirm or deny the report) and promote information operations (IO) themes in order to promote a stable and safe environment. The company is tasked to collect other information requirements supporting updating the CA assessment, as well as to establish positive relationships and partnership with the town leadership. The company is encouraged to involve the IPs into the operation in order to improve their confidence and credibility and demonstrate our commitment to Iraqi sovereignty and support of Iraqi security forces.

Timeline: Companies received a BN operations order with imagery and target folder products for the objective (a town) between 1500 hours and 1800 and moved out of the FOB the next morning between 0600 hours and 0700 hours. Training on the objective completed at approximately 1300 hours and then PLT and company after action reviews (AARs) were conducted. Training on the objective generally included two iterations, the second of which focused on react to contact and subsequent actions on the objective. Between iterations abbreviated AARs were conducted and the unit was usually afforded one hour to conduct internal training (generally at the SQD or PLT level).

Concept of the STX: Company commanders were briefed an operations order (OPORD) by the battalion S3 and given a hard copy of the OPORD as well as a target folder. Company commanders were required to conduct a confirmation brief after the order and a back brief after completing a tentative plan. Companies had several options for routes to the objective, but were required to coordinate these routes with battalion. Companies were encouraged to request other combat multipliers from their battalion (PSYOP teams, CA teams, combat INT (CI) teams, military police [MPs], etc.)

Given the diverse levels of experience with this type of operation, observer/controllers offered the commander the option for a leader review of some fundamental tactical considerations for this type of mission, as well as a review of some TTP emerging from Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF) experiences germane to the training objectives. (About half of the commanders used this review for key leaders in the company.) Companies had about 12 hours to conduct troop leading procedures (TLPs) as well as execute a rest plan prior to execution.

Companies conducted a tactical movement to the objective area and then executed actions on the objective. During the patrol a member of the company is given a tip about a weapons cache in the town. The commander had to develop the information using the local population and town leaders into actionable INT and then act on this. The company is forced to react to contact and develop the situation to close with and destroy or capture a small enemy cell. Every iteration involved casualty treatment and evacuation and handling a PW or detainee.

CHAPTER 9: COMBAT PATROL SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE (STX) LANE CONCEPT

Task Force (TF) 1, JRTC Operations Group

TRAINING OBJECTIVES

Conduct Patrol Operations (Company (CO) task), *Mission Rehearsal Exercise*:

- Preparation for combat
- Mounted/dismounted movement
- Conduct INT, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
- Protect the force/secure objective (dominate battlespace)
- Collect information requirements (IR) (complete civil assessment)
- Establish relationships/promote information operation (IO) themes
- Command and control (C2)

Take Action on Contact (CO task) ARTEP 7-10 MTP

- React to contact (PLT/SQD Task)

Sub Unit Tasks

- Enter building/clear room (platoon [PLT]/squad [SQD]) ARTEP 7-8 MTP drill
- Conduct engagement (JRTC Feedback Form)
- Process prisoner of war (PW)/detainee (PLT), FM 3-19.40, *Joint Detainee Manual*
- React to civil disturbance, **CALL Handbook 03-34, *Mission Rehearsal Exercise***
- React to improvised explosive device (IED)/ambush, **CALL Handbook 03-34, *Mission Rehearsal Exercise***

TRAINING EMPHASIS

Flexible adaptive leadership: acting decisively on actionable INT

React to contact: traditional/non-traditional forms of contact

Detainee operations: process detainee/PWs (5-S+T or STRESS)

Contemporary operational environment (COE)/cultural awareness:

- Local leadership (mayor, imam, sheik)
- Iraqi police (IP)
- Insurgents (Anti-Iraqi Forces [AIF] cell)
- Crowd dynamics (civilians on the battlefield [COB])
- Mosque/prayer hours
- Language barrier/interpreters
- Battlefield clutter (trash, vehicles, compression/density)

BASIC SITUATION

The CO was directed to conduct patrol in a village to collect IR (confirm or deny INT report) and promote IO with local leadership. Coalition forces have not been in village for one month. Previous unit (prior to TOA) established positive relationship with village and visited with some limited civil assistance weekly (water, school supplies).

- The IP station in the village has uniforms and weapons but has limited connection with a regional police organization. Previous unit did conduct all village operations in accordance with IPs.
- Unknown to training unit, an AIF cell has a safe house within the village. Villagers are aware of new families/people in town but have not interfered. A single-source (credibility unknown) report was passed to the battalion (BN) from the brigade (BDE) S2.
- CO must use villagers to develop the situation with information, analyze, and act.

TLP/ FRAGO HIGHLIGHTS

- BN S3 (observer/controller [OC]) briefs CO commander on order (OO) with hard copy, maps, and target folder products (village sketch, imagery, previous unit civil assessments, some key communicator pictures/limited biographies)
- Operations order (OPORD) reviews rules of engagement (ROE), IO talking points, medical ROE (MEDROE), and mosque ROE
- CO receives order at 1700 hrs for 0600 SP (~13 hrs for troop leading procedures [TLP], to include fighter management)

STX 2: CBT Patrol Overview




Figure 9-1




Figure 9-2




Figure 9-3

Required Role-Play Support

STX 2 Dismounted Combat Patrol (Monday-Friday)																																							
Hours	0000	0700	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0000	0100	0200	0300																
Total Civilians by Shift	150																																						
SULIYAH																																							
Total Role-Play	150																																						
Local NON-FLS COBs	110																																						
Arabic-Speaking Iraqi Police	6																																						
Arabic-Speaking Role Players	34																																						
Shift Change Route: Utilize Artillery Road for all East / West Movement of Administrative Civilian Traffic																																							

Figure 9-6

STX Lane 2 Resource Requirements

<u>Resource</u>	<u>Per lane</u>
Urban area to secure	1
Local police officers w/vehicle	2
Interpreter w/uniform	16
Fire marker	1
EOD team	1 per company
OPFOR sniper	2
Suspects w/AK-47s/RPGs	2
Imam	1
Civilians	106
OPFOR	10
OPFOR vehicle	2
Junk cars	7
 <u>Cache</u>	
AP mines	4
AT mines	5
Plastic explosives	20 lbs
Ammo cans w/small arms ammo	8
Hand grenades	20
RPG rounds	5
IED (Visual recognition)	1
Iraqi currency	300K

•100(+) COB to include linguist, lead role-play OICs

Figure 9-7

CHAPTER 10: COMBAT PATROL SMART CARD

Task Force (TF) 1, JRTC Operations Group

For operations in urban complex terrain in non-English speaking environments

Fundamentals	Task Organization	Special Equipment
<p>1. Provide all-around security / dominate battlespace by placement of combat power (CBT PWR)/maintain sound force protection / soldiers look like they mean business.</p> <p>2. Know the purpose of the patrol –</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Collect information (Info) requirements (IR) b. Promote info operations (IO) talking points c. Key leader engagements d. Civil/ population assessment e. Security of area of operations (AO)/identify or disrupt enemy battlespace or freedom of movement / interdict enemy. <p>3. Maintain communications with higher.</p> <p>4. Present enough CBT PWR to overwhelm anticipated threat.</p> <p>5. Maintain flexibility to rapidly develop combat power to destroy unanticipated threat.</p> <p>7. Every soldier knows IR; every soldier a sensor.</p> <p>8. Every IR is assigned to a primary collector.</p>	<p>Security elements-</p> <p>Mounted / dismounted</p> <p>Overwatch elements</p> <p>Traffic control points (TCPs) (optional)</p> <p><i>Observation Posts (OPs) (on objective (OBJ) - urban, on Avenues of Approach)</i></p> <p><i>Engagement Teams (ET) - (mission dependant) can be any of the below, interpreter or foreign language speaker normally required.</i></p> <p>-Designated leader and interpreter</p> <p>-Tactical human INT team (THT) interpreter</p> <p>-Tactical psychological operations team (TPT) interpreter</p> <p>-Civic action team (CAT) interpreter</p> <p>-Other teams or personnel as required</p> <p>Main effort patrolling element</p> <p>Reserve or QRF (mission dependant)</p>	<p>-Sunglasses/eye protection</p> <p>-Squad communications with ear piece</p> <p>-Loud speakers</p> <p>-Handouts</p> <p>-Wire</p> <p>-Gloves</p> <p>-Digital camera</p> <p>-Binoculars</p> <p>-Thermals</p> <p>-Night vision device</p> <p>-Shotguns</p> <p>-Special tools</p> <p>-Explosives</p>
<p>Security – Standard – Provides freedom of movement for engagement team (ET).</p> <p>-Continues to observe sectors and AO.</p> <p>-Looks for any and all indicators threat and friendly.</p> <p>-Remains out of decisive two-way communication.</p> <p>-Portrays the commander’s intent.</p> <p>-Collects information with eyes and ears.</p> <p>-Collects priority INT requirements (PIR).</p> <p>-Upon enemy lethal contact closes with and destroys.</p>	<p>Engagement Team – Element used to do the verbal two-way communication.</p> <p>-You should be free to converse comfortably while security element is in place.</p> <p>-Collects information with eyes, ears; actively listens as well as exchanging desired messages. Collect PIR.</p>	<p>Reserve – Standard –</p> <p>Closes with and destroys enemy or assumes additional role as security. Collect PIR</p>

Planning Considerations	Control Measures
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -What do I know about the enemy? Size, capabilities, methods of operating (think seven forms of contact). -What do I know about the AO? Terrain, size and disposition of local population, key figures in area. -What has happened in the AO recently? INT dump from S2, earlier patrol debriefings, PIR we are trying to answer. -Fire support plan (lethal and non-lethal effects). -Location and actions of other units- adjacent patrols, special operating forces (SOF), other government agencies (OGA). -Iraqi police (IPs), Iraqi National Guard (ING), fixed site security. -Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC); air and ground, plan along the entire route. -Quick reaction force (QRF) location, commitment criteria, command and control (C2). -Communications plan. -Spheres of Influence or points of contact (POCs) for key leaders or communicators in AO? -Interview area (fixed site away from observation for personnel who do not want to be exposed). -Generally no smaller than a squad per ET. -Integration of indigenous forces (local police, national guard; limits interpreter requirements). -Multiple ET can be utilized at once each with the same or different intermediate goals and/or objectives. -Interpreters can be used and helpful for all elements in the theater of operations (TOA). As long as roles are clear. -Placement of combat lifesavers (CLS) and medics within formation. -Placement of interpreters within formation. -Integrating Army aviation (AVN)/air-ground integration (AGI -control measures, communications/frequencies/call signs), task and purpose for air assets. -These help determine what contingencies the unit needs to plan for. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Phase lines -Checkpoints -Contact points -Target reference points (TRPs) / building numbering system -Limit of advance (LOA) -Objectives for orientation -Interview fixed sight <p align="center">Generic Rehearsals</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Battle drills -React to contact (RTC)—HMMWV (mounted) -Dismount drills / machine guns - Take personal weapon (every fire team) - Treat casualties (every tm/crew)/MEDEVAC -AGI -Commo/reports/OPSKID -Dismounted CO/PLT command post (CP) -(Radiotelephone operators (RTOs), fire support officer (FSO), security)

CHAPTER 11: CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS

Extract FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, Chapter 14

The company team may face a number of situations in which leaders will need to conduct negotiations. The two general types of negotiations are situational and preplanned. Situational negotiations are conducted in response to a requirement for on-the-spot discussion and resolution of a specific issue or problem. An example would be members of an advance guard negotiating the passage of a convoy through a checkpoint. Preplanned negotiations are conducted in such situations as a company team commander conducting a work coordination meeting between commanders of former warring factions (FWFs) to determine mine clearance responsibilities.

a. **Situational Negotiations.** At the company team level, situational negotiations are far more common than the preplanned type. In fact, employment in stability operations will require the commander, his subordinate leaders, and other Soldiers to conduct some form of negotiations almost daily. This, in turn, requires them to have a thorough understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE) and rules of interaction (ROI).

(1) Members of the company team apply this working knowledge to the process of discussing and, whenever possible, resolving issues and problems that arise between opposing parties, which may include the team itself. A critical aspect of this knowledge is the negotiator's ability to recognize that he has exhausted his options under the ROE/ROI and must turn the discussion over to a higher authority. Negotiations continue at progressive levels of authority until the issue is resolved.

(2) In preparing themselves and their Soldiers for the negotiation process, the commander and subordinate leaders must conduct rehearsals covering the ROE and ROI. One effective technique is to war-game application of ROE/ROI in a given stability situation such as manning a checkpoint. These simulations force leaders and subordinates alike to analyze the ROE/ROI and apply them in an operational environment.

b. **Preplanned Negotiations.** Preplanned negotiations require negotiators to thoroughly understand both the dispute or issue at hand and the factors influencing it, such as the ROE and ROI, before talks begin. The negotiator's ultimate goal is to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides and that reduces antagonism (and or the chance of renewed hostilities) between the parties involved. The following paragraphs discuss guidelines and procedures for each phase of the negotiation process.

(1) **Identify the purpose of negotiations.** Before contacting leaders of the belligerent parties to initiate the negotiation process, the commander must familiarize himself with both the situation and the area in which his unit will be operating. This includes identifying and evaluating avenues of approach that connect the opposing forces. Results of the negotiation process, which may be

lengthy and complicated, must be based on national or international agreements or accords. Negotiation topics include the following:

- When the sides will withdraw.
- Positions to which they will withdraw (these should be located to preclude observation and direct fire by the opposing parties).
- Which forces or elements will move during each phase of the operation?
- Pre-positioning of peace forces that can intervene in case of renewed hostilities.
- Control of heavy weapons.
- Mine clearance.
- Formal protest procedures for the belligerent parties.

(2) ***Establish the proper context.*** The next step in the process is to earn the trust and confidence of each opposing party. This includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting) that participants will judge to be both fair and safe. These considerations apply:

- Always conduct joint negotiations on matters that affect both parties.
- When serving as a mediator, remain neutral at all times.
- Learn as much as possible about the belligerents, the details of the dispute or issue being negotiated, and other factors such as the geography of the area and specific limitations or restrictions (for example, the ROE and ROI).
- Gain and keep the trust of the opposing parties by being firm, fair, and polite.
- Use tact, remain patient, and be objective.
- Never deviate from applicable local and national laws and international agreements.

(3) ***Prepare for the negotiations.*** Thorough, exacting preparation is another important factor in ensuring the success of the negotiation process. Company team personnel should use the following guidelines:

- Negotiate sequentially, from subordinate level to senior level.
- Select and prepare a meeting place that is acceptable to all parties.
- Arrange for interpreters and adequate communications facilities as necessary.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

- Ensure that all opposing parties, as well as the negotiating team, use a common map (edition and scale).
- Coordinate all necessary movement.
- Establish local security.
- Keep higher headquarters informed throughout preparation and during the negotiations.
- Make arrangements to record the negotiations (use audio or video recording equipment, if available).

(4) ***Conduct the negotiations.*** Negotiators must always strive to maintain control of the session. They must be firm, yet evenhanded, in leading the discussion. At the same time, they must be flexible, with a willingness to accept recommendations from the opposing parties and from their own assistants and advisors. The following procedures and guidelines apply:

- Exchange greetings.
- Introduce all participants by name, including negotiators and any advisors.
- Consider the use of small talk at the beginning of the session to put the participants at ease.
- Allow each side to state its case without interruption and without making premature judgments.
- Make a record of issues presented by both sides.
- If one side makes a statement that is incorrect, be prepared to produce evidence or proof to establish the facts.
- If the negotiating team or peacekeeping force has a preferred solution, present it and encourage both sides to accept it.
- Close the meeting by explaining to both sides what has been agreed upon and what actions they are expected to take. If necessary, be prepared to present this information in writing for their signatures.
- Do not negotiate or make deals in the presence of the media.
- Maintain the highest standards of conduct at all times.

CHAPTER 12: COMPANY ENGAGEMENT TRAINING

CPT (P) Roy Walker, JRTC Operations Group

Engagement Definition

Bilateral is defined as affecting *reciprocally two nations or parties; to arrange or bring about an agreement through conference, discussion, and compromise.*

Engagement is defined as (1) a promise or commitment to appear at a certain time; appointment; (2) a battle or encounter; (3) a hostile encounter between military forces; (4) to interlock.

Why Engagement Training?

“Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is an information operation (IO) campaign with integrated combat missions”—quote from an OIF battalion (BN) S3.

Engagements will enhance the unit’s ability to achieve its campaign plan goals.

Successful engagements will save lives (yours and theirs) and facilitate transition to a safe and secure environment.

Leader Prep Sheet Example		
CONTACT:	DTG:	COPY OF
DESIRED ENDSTATE:	OPENING COMMENTS: 1) THANKS/REGRETS 2) CMD MSG: 3) PURPOSE OF MTG:	
IO THEMES AND MSGS:	TALKING POINTS:	
INTENDED OUTCOMES:	BOTTOM LINE:	
PARTNER’S INTENDED OUTCOMES:	HIS BOTTOM LINE:	
POSSIBLE IMPASSES:	IMPASS STRATEGY:	
POSSIBLE OTHER PARTNER ISSUES:	PARTNER ISSUE STRATEGY:	
ORDER OF EVENTS:	RELATIONSHIP BUILDING TOPICS:	EXIT STRATEGY:

Figure 12-1

DETAILED TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES (TLP) METHODOLOGY

Receive the Mission:

- Conduct confirmation brief to higher headquarters commander (HQ CDR).
- Receive additional guidance from higher HQ CDR.
- Assemble your staff: executive officer (XO), fire support officer (FSO), first sergeant (1SG), and translator.
- Conduct INT preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

Issue a Warning Order:

- Use IPB to develop engagement milestones/timeline
- Publish timeline
- Assign tasks and roles to your staff
- Apply “W.A.T.E.R.S.” methodology; it is a tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for engagements:

W— Who am I conducting the engagement with? What are his issues?

A— Action leader. Who is conducting the engagement?

T— Time and place? Are there any conflicts?

E— Effects to achieve and the intended outcome?

R— Response to Impasses? What are we willing to do if we don't get what we want?

S— Specific command messages to be delivered during the engagement?

Note: This methodology is also a good tool to use by the higher HQ when receiving the back brief or conducting an abbreviated rehearsal of the engagement.

Make a Tentative Plan:

- Identify desired outcome
- Ask yourself: "What do I want?" "What do they want?" "What is preventing this outcome?"
- Develop course of action (COA) to achieve desired outcome
- Identify impasses (road blocks)
- Utilize leaders preparation sheet
- Develop company operations order (OPORD)

Initiate Movement:

- Gather information about the operation from higher and lower HQ
- Identify pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections (PCI)
- Clarify tasks and roles
- Inform security detachment

Conduct Reconnaissance:

- Review target folders
- Review photographs (location and people)
- Walk the ground
- Predict the environment

Complete the Plan:

- War game the COA
- Conduct back brief to higher HQ CDR
- Ask for more guidance, especially with regards to impasses (road blocks)
- Complete W.A.T.E.R.S. methodology and leader's preparation sheet

Issue Operation Order:

- Issue a company order for entire operation, include leader's preparation sheet and W.A.T.E.R.S. methodology
- Confirm/update timeline

Supervise, Inspect, Rehearse:

- Supervise movement
- Conduct PCI
- Conduct full-force rehearsal, if time permits

—At a minimum, actions on the objective should be rehearsed, which is the actual engagement operation

Example Timeline:

H- Hour receive mission

H+0:30 Issue the warning order

H+1:00 Make tentative plan

H+1:30 Initiate movement

H+2:00 Conduct reconnaissance

H+2:30 Complete the plan

H+3:00 Issue operations order

H+3:30 Supervise and inspect

H+4:00 Rehearsals (security detachment, engagement)

H+5:00 Travel to engagement

H+6:00 Execute

Note: 6-hour timeline is an assumption for planning, mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil (METT-TC) considerations still apply.




Figure 12-2

ACTIONS DURING AN ENGAGEMENT

Recorder TTP

The recorder must be aware of all aspects of the meeting, to include:

- Time management
- Changes in tone
- Discussion leading to an impasse
- Translator disposition

Take notes, capture issues

Proven techniques for formal engagement:

- Sit to watch the leader more than the coalition partner and, where you can, provide signals to the leader outside of the partner's field of view.
- Use a template of notes to fill in the blanks.
- Help keep the leader on the pathway to the intended outcomes through use of signals.
- Schedule adequate breaks to keep the translator fresh as interpretation is a difficult task.
- Alternate translators as the engagement transitions from one phase to the next.
- If the partner is a smoker, provide him a break once an hour.
- Ensure appropriate refreshments are on-hand.

Leader Do's and Don'ts:

- Don't agree to any first offer at the table.
- Don't ever lie, bluff, or make threats.
- Avoid discussion of politics, religion, or "policy."
- Don't have side-bar conversations—very rude.
- Don't tell jokes—they do not translate well.
- Don't look at your translator—look at your counterpart when you speak to them.
- Maintain eye-to-eye contact.
- Don't rush off to the next meeting. Make them feel “this” meeting is the most important event in your day.
- Don't promise anything beyond your ability to control.
- Do know if the partner is a decision-maker.
- Do finish on-time.
- Do stay in your lane.
- Finish with review of agreements made.




Figure 12-3

POST-ENGAGEMENT ACTIONS

Post-engagement Hot Wash:

- A leader's credibility is directly linked to the follow-through on agreements made.
- Engagement staff work is a continuous process.
- Leader and staff/recorder must conduct a post-engagement hot wash—the sooner the better.
- The project officer briefs:
 - Review of agreements made
 - Outstanding issues captured
 - Recommended next steps
- The leader listens, provides clarity and guidance for follow-up.
- Leader and staff officer discuss linkage to other persons of influence, current events, IO themes and campaign plan.
- Identify and announce taskings that result from hot wash.
- At conclusion of hot wash:
 - Results and recommendations staffed with IO cell
 - Update target folder

Engagement TTP:

- Stay in your lane.
- Put your game face on and be ready. Watch your facial expressions.
- Appearance—perceptions are everything—this applies to all those with you.
- Time management plan:
 - 25% casual, develop "professional relationships"

- 50% business
- 25% closure and "relationship" time
- Avoid slang/off-color humor/avoid jokes/avoid acronyms.
- Avoid "quid pro quo" solutions (this for that).
- Emphasize win-win solutions.
- Only shift to "win-lose" if all else fails.
- 90% of all progress occurs away from the table.
- Never make threats—unless you are prepared to follow-through.
- Treat translators as pacing items!
- Rehearse repeatedly—you can not over-prepare.
- Every aspect of the meeting is deliberate—even small talk.
- Stick to your agenda—do not let a confrontational person drag you all over the map.
- Watch your body language.
- Always separate the person from the problem—attack the problem.
- Be a good listener.
- If you can't say "I don't know," you are in trouble.
- "Schmooze" sessions help fill in the blanks on the biographies.

What to Expect of an Interpreter:

- Provides an accurate translation of your message
- Uses same tone and inflection you use
- Speaks in first person
- Presents a professional appearance (well groomed)
- Speaks for approximately the same length of time as you
- Understands military jargon and can translate
- Is prepared, knows the general subjects / topics
- Will be on time, at the right place

Interpreter TTP:

- Rehearse them—make them part of your team—invest your time in them—know his religion, background, history of hostilities.
- Think before you speak and group your words in short bursts.
- Speak succinctly and simply.
- It takes extra time to get your message across—make sure you plan for it.
- Interpreters get tired—plan periodic breaks.
- Look at your counter-part, not at the interpreter or off in space.
- Maintain eye-to-eye contact.
- Act normal—speak as if the interpreter is not there.
- Always try to take a second interpreter (your note-taker can use this one).
- Plan the placement of your interpreter (beside, behind, or between).

Conclusions:

- Consider the engagement a combat operation with three phases—preparation, execution, follow-up.
- Conduct thorough preparation (rehearse).
- Rehearse your interpreter.

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- Arrive early with recorder and interpreter to conduct last-minute prep.
- Emphasize a win-win solution.
- Show respect to culture, religion, and the counterpart.
- Your actions after the engagement are just as important as your actions during the engagement.

CHAPTER 13: CIVIL AFFAIRS—RESPECT AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT—OEF

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While assigned as an infantry section leader in Afghanistan from April through September 2002, my unit conducted numerous patrols focusing on reconnaissance and route clearance, as well as verifying the status of various water wells and the attitude of the civilian populace. We normally operated with at least two up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), one with a .50 caliber and the other with an MK19. For some patrols we added an additional two cargo M966 HMMWVs. A medic, an interpreter, and an Afghanistan soldier always accompanied the six to twelve U.S. Infantrymen. At times we would have “add-ons” including counterintelligence (CI) agents, leaders and staff previewing routes, or members from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). I was selected to lead many additional patrols because of the rapport established between the local elders and my team.

We met our interpreters several days before we started the patrols. We spent many hours together and were taught some of the basic language and local customs. I asked the correct way to show proper respect to the different age groups of people with special focus on the elders. The elder of the village is a well-respected and usually educated man but is not necessarily the oldest male in the village. It is his responsibility to ensure the needs of the village are met. He is expected to greet strangers (accepting the risk himself) and decide if they bode good or evil for his people. The younger village members show him sincere respect and respond to his requests immediately. I wanted to be sure the villagers were not offended as we conducted our patrols through their villages and farms.

Usually we would stop about 200-300 meters from the village and set up security. Then the interpreter and I would walk up to the village and seek out the elder. The first visit was usually tense, but with a friendly smile and a handshake we began the slow process of building trust. I had the assurance that my patrol was watching my back and the interpreter would tell the elder that we meant no harm to his village or his people. We also asked a few questions to ensure that we had a good understanding of the best way to travel through the area. Some example questions are:

1. Would you mind if we drove through town or is there a safe by-pass around the village? Usually the response would be that we were welcome to drive through town.
2. Where do the children play so we can watch for them and make sure they are a safe distance from the trucks? In every case we were shown the play area and thanked for our concern.
3. Do you mind if we come back through again? We were invited back and thanked for helping them.

We would then usually be invited for tea. I asked the interpreter if they would be offended if I declined. He explained that if I did not accept the offer then the elders would not believe we

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were friendly and meant them no harm. So after sharing tea for about twenty minutes, we were safely on our way through town. The extra time for public relations was critical to the success of our mission.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

As we became better acquainted in each of the villages, we expanded our questions to gather more intelligence (INT) about the areas. Some example questions are:

1. Are there any strangers moving into your village that did not live here before the war? On some occasions there were, and the information was passed to the S2.
2. Have your people found any new mines while they were farming/working? The people started to warn us about the mines and helped us mark some safe routes through existing minefields.
3. Have you seen any of the Taliban Soldiers in this area?

When some of the towns became hostile or closed their gates due to some careless patrols conducted by other nations' forces, I was tasked with taking my team on patrol and attempting to re-establish rapport so the route would open again. Fortunately, because of the earlier visits when we took the time to show some respect and share in their customs, the doors were reopened and patrolling resumed. I would then take their complaint to the S2 to be worked through proper channels.

The reputation for having good rapport with the locals led to my selection to conduct several CI and HA (humanitarian aid) missions. On these missions there were usually a lot of children in the towns. I would assist the patrol by keeping the children out of the way. Getting the kids interested in me worked well. I would take out a pen and some paper and ask one of their names in their own language. Then I would write it in English as best I could and ask them to write the name in Pashtu. When we had both written the name, the paper was given to the child. The activity allowed the gunners to pull security without having children in the kill zone. The leaders were also able to accomplish the CI or HA intent. The INT staff and the local elder commended the effectiveness of this technique.

Another simple technique was to wave a lot. This caused the locals to wave and allowed us to locate the people with weapons more readily. In addition, we seemed friendly and that resulted in friendlier responses whenever we stopped for information or for a security halt.

On several occasions we heard of people who were harassed by previous patrols. After some sincere questioning of the locals, we learned that the previous patrol had in some way been viewed as disrespectful. Usually, the disrespectful perspective was based on a simple activity that we take for granted, such as passing out candy or ink pens to the children. Even though the children loved it, the adults looked on the practice as not respecting their ability to provide for their own. We would go to the elder and explain our custom of sharing and apologize for the offense. Then we would ask the proper way to give these items to the kids. The answer was

simple: give the items to the elder and he would pass the candy or ink pens to the villagers. At this point, the villagers became comfortable with this tradition because respect was then focused on the village elder.

Because of the success of our earlier patrols, my team was selected to escort Akmed Karzi, the king's brother. This assignment was a great honor and I was thrilled to lead the escort. I was informed that my team was selected by the S5 specifically because of the earlier reports about the success of the CI, HA, and patrol missions. The task was to lead him through a village with a known minefield and to mark the route for safe passage.

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