



**Office of Internal Oversight Services  
Internal Audit Division II**

AUD: UNON (053/2005)

24 October 2005

TO: Mr. Klaus Toepfer, Director-General  
United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON)

FROM: Egbert C. Kaltenbach, Director  
Internal Audit Division  
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)

SUBJECT: **Audit of UNON's Security and Safety Management (AA2004/211/03)**

1. I am pleased to submit the final report on the audit of UNON's Security and Safety Management, which was conducted between September 2004 and July 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya by Mr. Obin Silungwe, Mr. Tetsuya Hirano, Ms. Jaydene Kana and Mr. Humphrey Kagunda. A draft of the report was shared with Mr. Peter Marshall, Chief of Security and Safety Service on 16 August 2005, whose comments, which were discussed at a meetings held on 21 and 28 September 2005, are reflected in the attached final report, in italics.

2. I am pleased to note that the audit recommendations contained in this final report have been accepted and that Security and Safety Service has initiated their implementation. The table in paragraph 59 of the report identifies those recommendations, which require further action to be closed. I wish to draw your attention to recommendations 01, 02, 03, 04, 05, 10, 11 and 16, which OIOS considers to be of critical importance.

3. I would appreciate if you could provide Mr. C. F. Bagot with an update on the status of implementation of the audit recommendations not later than 31 May 2006. This will facilitate the preparation of the twice-yearly report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of recommendations, required by General Assembly resolution 48/218B.

4. Please note that OIOS is assessing the overall quality of its audit process. I therefore kindly request that you consult with your managers who dealt directly with the auditors, complete the attached client satisfaction survey form and return it to me.

5. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the assistance and cooperation extended to the audit team.

**Attachment:** final report and client satisfaction survey form

cc: Mr. C. Burnham, Under-Secretary-General for Management (by e-mail)  
Mr. S. Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, United Nations Board of Auditors (by e-mail)  
Mr. P. Marshall, Chief, Security and Safety Service (by e-mail)  
Mr. A. Barabanov, Director, Division of Administrative Services, United Nations of Nairobi  
Mr. M. Tapio, Programme Officer, OUSG, OIOS (by e-mail)  
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Office of Internal Oversight Services  
Internal Audit Division II

# **Audit Report**

**Audit of UNON's Security and Safety Management  
(AA2004/211/03)**

**Report date: 24 October 2005**

**Auditors: Obin Silungwe  
Tetsuya Hirano  
Jaydene Kana  
Humphrey Kagunda**



**Office of Internal Oversight Services  
Internal Audit Division II**

**Audit of UNON's Security and Safety Management (AA2004/211/03)**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Between September 2004 and July 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNON's Security and Safety Management. The audit covered activities with an expenditure of approximately US\$4 million in the 2002-2003 biennium and US\$6 million in the 2004-2005 biennium. The overall conclusion is that there were adequate arrangements in place to ensure that security related services were being provided in compliance with United Nations Regulations and Rules. However there are a number of areas where there is scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of current arrangements.

OIOS thanks UNON for the positive response to its report and prompt action taken to address the issues discussed below.

**Planning, monitoring and reporting**

Security and Safety Service (S&SS) did not have adequate controls and mechanisms in place for planning, monitoring and reporting of S&SS activities. OIOS recommended improvement of the draft country security plan, update of the United Nations Gigiri complex evacuation plan and the S&SS Standard Operating Procedures, and systematic monitoring and compilation of security related information and reports

**Human resources management**

The credibility and efficiency of S&SS human resource management could be enhanced by:

- Undertaking a comprehensive review of the current shift system to identify where there is scope to reduce overtime expenditure;
- Determining a mechanism for carrying out background checks on candidates selected for S&SS employment;
- Developing a mechanism for maintaining a central register to identify all training required and undertaken by each S&SS staff member; and
- Identifying which training should be provided to each United Nations staff member based in Kenya and developing a mechanism to ensure each United Nations staff member receives that training.

**Operations/Provision of service**

The effectiveness of S&SS operations could be improved by:

- Establishing guidelines to govern the protective escort service provide by the S&SS Close Protection Unit (CPU);
- Clearly defining the role of the host country security officers assistance provided to UNON, including the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, especially when the use of weapons may be required; and
- Clearly defining the role of S&SS assistance provided to United Nations staff members and their dependants, how this will be incorporated into the S&SS duties and what funding is available to support the assistance provided.

### **Fire and Safety Team (FST)**

The effectiveness of the FST could be improved by:

- Reviewing the adequacy of the Fire and Safety Team and the external contractor providing fire and ambulance services capacity and fire fighting equipment to safeguard United Nations property and staff members;
- Ensuring all FST members, S&SS security officers and key UNON staff members receive adequate training in fire fighting and fire prevention techniques; and
- Developing a mechanism for maintaining a central register to identify all building marshals and floor wardens to ensure these staff members receive adequate training and disseminate this knowledge to all United Nations staff members.

### **Special Investigations Unit (SIU)**

The role of the special investigations unit could be enhanced by S&SS working with OIOS Investigations Division to develop guidelines dictating the protocol for receiving complaints, conducting investigations, issuing reports and following up on reported complaints as well as recruitment and training of investigators and tracking and maintaining an accurate record of reported complaints.

### **Security strengthening projects**

Building and Grounds Management Unit (BGMU), UNON did not have an adequate project management system in place to effectively manage the security strengthening projects proposed by the Secretary-General report A/56/848 of 28 February 2002. OIOS recommended the designation of a project manager to manage ongoing and future security-related projects.

### **Asset management**

Procurement, Travel and Shipping Section (PTSS), UNON did not have adequate controls and mechanism in place for maintaining an accurate and complete record of S&SS assets. OIOS recommended steps to ensure accurate and regular monitoring of assets.

### **Information and communications technology (ICT)**

The efficiency and effectiveness of S&SS could be enhanced by obtaining the services of an ICT consultant, specializing in security-related services, to assist in preparing an ICT strategy identifying and costing the ICT equipment and service needs of S&SS.

**October 2005**

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. This report discusses the results of an OIOS audit of United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) Security and Safety management, which was carried out between September 2004 and July 2005 in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. Security and Safety Services (S&SS) provided security and safety services to the United Nations Gigiri compound and were responsible for:
  - a) Planning, coordination and implementation of security plan for the United Nations in Kenya;
  - b) Planning, coordination and implementation of security, fire protection and safety programmes that provide protection for United Nations delegates, staff, visitors, buildings and grounds; and
  - c) Investigation of losses, thefts, accidents, property damage claims and provision of traffic control within and outside the Gigiri complex.
3. At the time of the audit, the approved staffing table for S&SS was a P-5 supported by two Professional (P) staff and 127 General Service (GS) staff.
4. The allotment received by S&SS for the 2002-2003 biennium included approximately US\$3 million from the Regular Budget and US\$600,000 from extra-budgetary funding. In the 2004-05 biennium the allotment received by S&SS included approximately US\$5.5 million from the Regular Budget and US\$400,000 from extra-budgetary funding.
5. This was the first audit by OIOS of security and safety services.
6. A draft of this report was shared with Mr. Peter Marshall, Chief of Security and Safety Service on 16 August 2005, whose comments, which were discussed with him and the Director, Division of Administrative Services in September 2005, are reflected in the attached final report, in italics.
7. The Security and Safety Service has accepted most of the recommendations made and is in the process of implementing them.

## **II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES**

8. The overall objective of the audit was to provide the Director-General, UNON with an assessment of the adequacy of UNON's arrangements for Security and Safety management of its staff, assets and premises. This included assessing:
  - a) The efficiency and effectiveness of UNON's arrangements for security and safety of its staff, assets and premises; and
  - b) Whether the security and safety services were being carried out in compliance with United Nations Regulations and Rules and relevant standards.

## **III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY**

9. The audit embraced activities for the period from 1 January 2002 to December 2004 (and early 2005 where necessary).

10. In view of A/59/365 dated 11 October 2004 (Strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations), the current audit did not include a detailed review of: country security arrangements; mandate and mission of UNON's security and safety services; the relationship with the UNSECOORD; and the reporting line of S&SS within UNON and with the Department of Safety and Security (DSS).

11. Security for UNEP, UN-Habitat and UNON Offices away from Nairobi Headquarters (OANH) are not included in scope, beyond confirming what steps had been taken to ensure that they were part of the local security plan arrangements where they are located.

12. The audit activities involved interviewing staff and management as well as reviewing available documentation and other relevant records.

#### **IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

##### **A. Planning, monitoring and reporting**

###### **(a) Country security plan (CSP)**

13. OIOS reviewed the 2004 draft country security plan (CSP) and was satisfied that the overall approach and assumptions taken by S&SS in preparing the CSP were in accordance with the field security handbook (FSH). However, the CSP could be further improved by taking account of the following FSH requirements:

- a) Including locally recruited General Service (GS) staff in the country security plan cover and evacuation entitlements; and
- b) Establishing a clearer distinction between 'essential' and 'non-essential' staff.

14. OIOS is pleased to note that these factors have been taken into account in the preparation of the 2005 draft CSP and as a result, no recommendation is raised.

###### **(b) Evacuation plan**

15. OIOS reviewed the Gigiri complex evacuation plan and was satisfied with the majority of the information contained in the plan. However, the evacuation plan could be further improved by taking account of the following:

- a) A full rehearsal to test it's effectiveness;
- b) A list of key personnel;
- c) Details of specific evacuation procedures from the Gigiri complex to the designated transit safe haven; and
- d) Details of assistance to physically challenged staff members, including the use of volunteer colleagues as defined in ST/SGB/2002/8 – Evacuation Procedures for the United Nations Headquarters Complex that states: "In case of an emergency, trained volunteers will assist in evacuation staff with special needs."

##### **Recommendation:**

To improve the completeness and effectiveness of the Gigiri complex evacuation plan, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) in

consultation with United Nations Department of Safety and Security, should review and update the evacuation plan to include a list of key personnel, details of specific evacuation procedures from the Gigiri complex to the designated transit safe haven, details of assistance to physically challenged staff members and consider the use of volunteer colleagues as defined in ST/SGB/2002/8 – Evacuation Procedures for United Nations Headquarters Complex and determine a mechanism to carry out rehearsals of the evacuation plan, to ensure staff are aware of what should happen in case of an actual evacuation (Rec. 01).

16. *UNON commented that the recommendation was accepted and action would taken by end of 2006.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the revised Gigiri evacuation plan.

#### (c) Standard operating procedures (SOP)

17. OIOS noted that the current standard operating procedures (SOP) had last been updated in 2001. OIOS is aware that the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is currently developing standard operating procedures, which will be disseminated to S&SS, then tailored to local conditions. Although these compensating arrangements are due to take place, OIOS are concerned that S&SS currently has neither a mechanism for updating and disseminating changes to the existing SOP nor a mechanism to cope with the tailoring of the DSS SOP to local conditions.

#### **Recommendation:**

To improve the effectiveness of standard operating procedures of Security and Safety Service (S&SS), S&SS should develop a mechanism to tailor the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) standard operating procedures (SOP) to local conditions and update the SOP as changes in those conditions occur (Rec. 02).

18. *UNON commented that upon receipt of the generic SOP from DSS, UNON would tailor them to local conditions, as required.* OIOS thanks UNON for the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the S&SS SOP.

#### (d) Monitoring and reporting

19. OIOS noted the initiatives taken by S&SS in respect of monitoring and reporting activities, including the 2003 year book and the weekly incident reports disseminated to United Nations staff members. Efficiency of monitoring and reporting may be better served if these initiatives formed part of a central register of S&SS reporting requirements, supported by mechanisms to collate and monitor the information to generate these reports.

#### **Recommendation:**

To improve the effectiveness of monitoring and reporting arrangements of Security and Safety Service (S&SS), S&SS should compile a central register of reports required of S&SS, by whom and by when, then develop a monitoring mechanism to identify, collate and monitor the information required to generate these reports (Rec. 03).

20. *UNON commented that a central registry would be compiled by the end of 2006.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of register and details of the mechanism to identify, collate and monitor the information required to generate these reports.

## **B. Human resources management**

### (a) Overtime - General

21. OIOS noted that the S&SS allotment for overtime in the 2002-2003 biennium was \$19,400 and the expenditure against that allotment was \$437,000. S&SS explained that the majority of the over expenditure resulted from staffing shortages to:

- a) Cover unscheduled leave due to personal staff emergencies; and
- b) Staff the Close Protection Unit, which provided a protective escort service to the Director-General, UNON and the Executive Director, UN-Habitat.

### (b) Overtime - Shift system

22. S&SS changed the security officer shift system from an eight hour to a 12-hour working day to ensure security officers' safety was not jeopardised by travelling home in the hours of darkness and also to reduce S&SS overtime expenditure. S&SS can demonstrate that the shift system has benefited the security officers in terms of their personal safety, but no information has been collected to demonstrate whether there has been any reduction in overtime. In addition, the current system is unable to absorb unscheduled events such as sick leave without overtime being incurred. Whilst S&SS believes that the problem is shortage of staff, OIOS is of the view that this can only be established by analysis of management information.

### **Recommendation:**

To assist in ensuring that the Nairobi Security and Safety Service (S&SS) shift system minimises overtime to the extent possible, S&SS should analyse the information available on overtime to determine whether overtime could be reduced by making changes to the system, or whether, and to what extent, additional resources are required (Rec. 04).

23. *UNON commented that it would undertake the analysis suggested, and intends to complete the work by end of 2005.* OIOS thanks S&SS for the prompt action taken and will close the recommendation upon notification of the results of the review.

### (c) Overtime - Staffing of the Close Protection Unit (CPU)

24. In the 2002-2003 biennium, the two security officers assigned to the heads of UNON/ UNEP and UN-Habitat contributed approximately US\$30,000 to the overtime expenditure of S&SS. OIOS noted that adequate procedures were in place to ensure the CPU overtime was approved in accordance with the United Nations Regulations and Rules, but are concerned about the lack of clear guidelines governing length of working hours for protective escort service duties. OIOS noted that there were no approved guidelines covering any aspect of the duties offered by the CPU to the Director-General, UNON and Executive Director, UN-Habitat, which may have contributed to the excessive hours worked. S&SS have taken steps to address the situation by establishing a roster, but this

roster has not been discussed and agreed and does not form part of operating procedures for the close protection duty.

**Recommendation:**

To improve the protective escort service afforded to the Director-General, UNON/ Executive Director, UNEP and to the Executive Director, UN-Habitat the Security and Safety Service (S&SS) in conjunction with the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) should establish guidelines to govern the protective escort service provided by S&SS which should be discussed and agreed with all parties involved (Rec. 05).

25. *UNON commented that DSS is undertaking a threat assessment of risks to United Nations senior personnel and, based on this work, will develop an SOP for protection of United Nations senior personnel, which S&SS would tailor for local conditions.* OIOS thanks UNON for the additional information and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the SOP.

**(d) Background checks**

26. At the time of the audit, there was no requirement for S&SS to carry out checks into the background of a candidate selected for recruitment, to confirm that there is nothing that would make them unsuitable for a S&SS position. OIOS is of the view that such checks should be introduced because security staff have access to knowledge about the security of UNON buildings and United Nations staff member's dwellings that could be of value to any third party planning an act against the buildings or dwellings.

**Recommendation:**

To safeguard the credibility and reliability of UNON Security Officers, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) and the Human Resources Management Service should work together to determine a mechanism for carrying out background checks on candidates selected for S&SS employment (Rec. 06).

27. *UNON accepted the recommendation.* OIOS will close the recommendation upon receipt and review of the mechanism for carrying out background checks on candidates selected for security positions.

**(e) Training of S&SS staff**

28. The S&SS training and development team (TDT) consists of three GS staff members who are assigned the responsibility for planning and organising the training of S&SS staff. At the time of the audit, the TDT did not maintain a central register of training required nor training undertaken by each S&SS staff member. OIOS is aware that DSS is planning to develop a centralised training programme, which will be disseminated to S&SS, then tailored to local conditions. Although these compensating arrangements are due to take place, OIOS is concerned that S&SS currently has neither a mechanism for maintaining a central register nor a mechanism to cope with tailoring of the DSS centralised training programme to local conditions.

### **Recommendation:**

To improve the effectiveness of training of Kenya-based Security and Safety Service (S&SS) staff, S&SS should develop a mechanism to tailor the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) centralised training programme to local conditions and maintain a central register to identify training required and undertaken by each S&SS staff member (Rec. 07).

29. *UNON accepted the recommendation, which would be implemented by the end of 2005.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the training programme and the register.

#### **(f) Training of United Nations staff**

30. S&SS have made considerable effort in providing security induction briefings for new staff members and weekly incident reports to keep all United Nations staff members informed of events relating to security and safety. These measures are not currently linked to any policy on what general and geographic specific training should be provided United Nations staff members working in Kenya and there is no central register of security training undertaken.

### **Recommendation:**

To ensure that Kenya based United Nations staff receive the appropriate level and quantity of security training, and there are mechanisms in place to ensure that this training is kept up to date, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) should seek advice from Department of Safety and Security (DSS) on what training should be provided to Kenya based United Nations staff member, how this will be kept up to date. In addition, S&SS should develop and maintain a central register of training undertaken (Rec. 08).

31. *UNON commented that they would refer the matter to DSS.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the proposed training for United Nations staff based in Kenya.

## **C. Operations/Provision of services**

#### **(a) Surveillance**

32. S&SS undertook a security surveillance rationalisation exercise in 2004, which highlighted the areas within the Gigiri complex with inadequate surveillance coverage. OIOS is of the opinion that whilst the security exercise addressed the adequacy of external coverage it did not adequately address internal surveillance, for example:

- a) There is no electronic surveillance in any of the conference rooms;
- b) There is poor security surveillance around the Office of the Executive Directors, and the Office of the Deputy Executive Directors; and
- c) There are an inadequate number of cameras with insufficient scope to monitor the complex's perimeter areas and portals.

33. An inspection of the Control Room Unit revealed that the majority of surveillance cameras used outdated technology, were faulty or not functioning properly and the

maintenance contract for these cameras did not allow for immediate repair. In the opinion of OIOS, this exposes the Gigiri complex to illegal entry and could reduce the effectiveness of investigations of incidents, which may not be captured by the current surveillance equipment.

34. OIOS is pleased to note that DAS has taken steps to procure the surveillance equipment identified as lacking and as such, no recommendation is raised.

(b) Identification Unit

35. OIOS noted that the controls over the work conducted by the Identification Unit appeared adequate with the following exception, which reduces the effectiveness of unit. At the time of the audit there was no record of lost and stolen identification (ID) cards, which is important:

- a) To provide security officers with details of recently stolen passes, which they should be vigilant for when checking passes;
- b) For detecting and analysing trends and;
- c) Considering action required against staff members who continually lose their passes.

**Recommendation:**

To ensure the Security and Safety Service (S&SS) has adequate control over lost and stolen identification (ID) cards, S&SS should develop procedures for recording, monitoring and analysing information about lost and stolen ID cards and to take appropriate follow up action where necessary (Rec. 09).

36. *UNON commented that it had begun work on developing the procedures, which should be complete by the end of 2005.* OIOS thanks UNON for the prompt action taken and will close the recommendation upon receipt and review of a copy of the procedures.

(c) Accessing the Gigiri complex

37. As illegal or undesired access to the Gigiri complex puts both United Nations property and staff members at risk, security officers guarding access to the Gigiri complex are tasked with ensuring that each person entering the Gigiri complex has a valid identification pass. OIOS observed an inconsistent treatment by security officers guarding access to the Gigiri complex in checking the validity of identification passes depending on whether a person arrived in vehicles with United Nations number plates or Kenyan number plates. *UNON commented that when funds become available, it is implementing an electronic access system involving personnel and vehicle recognition.* In view of this additional information, OIOS is not raising any recommendation.

(d) Host country support in accessing the Gigiri complex

38. Following a request by UNON in June 2004, the host country (Kenyan Government) provided static armed personnel to assist in controlling and restricting entry to the Gigiri complex. The benefits of this initiative are diminished because at the time of the audit there was only an informal understanding of what this entailed and it was unclear what would happen in the event of an emergency at the front gate, especially with regard to use of weapons.

### **Recommendation:**

To clearly define the role of the host country security officers in controlling access to the Gigiri complex, Security and Safety Service (S&SS), and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), should reach an agreement with the Host Country on the specific roles and responsibilities of these security officers, including the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, especially when the use of weapons may be required (Rec. 10).

39. *UNON accepted the recommendation, which would be implemented by the end of 2006.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon notification of the outcome of discussions with the Host Country on the specific roles and responsibilities of these security officers, including the actions to be taken in the event of an emergency, especially when the use of weapons may be required.

#### **(e) Assistance to United Nations staff**

40. OIOS noted that S&SS provide assistance to United Nations staff members and their dependants in response to a range of distress calls outside the Gigiri complex, including robberies and traffic incidents. In addition, OIOS noted the formation of the Diplomatic Police Unit in 2005 to further assist United Nations staff members. Although OIOS is pleased to note the assistance offered to staff members, where 223 distress calls were reported and followed up by S&SS from January to August 2004, there is a concern that there is no clear policy which governs the use of S&SS staff and funding resources to provide this assistance.

41. As a result, without a clear policy and funding, S&SS staff responding to multiple distress calls outside of the Gigiri complex could lead to both inadequate and untimely responses to these calls as well as depleted S&SS staff remaining to safeguard the security of the Gigiri complex.

### **Recommendation:**

To clearly define the role of Security and Safety Service (S&SS) assistance provided to United Nations staff members and their dependants, S&SS should request the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) to provide guidance on what assistance should be provided to United Nations staff members and their dependants, how this assistance will be incorporated into the S&SS duties and what funding is available to support the assistance provided (Rec. 11).

42. *UNON commented that it would request guidance from DSS on the level of assistance to be provided to Nairobi based staff and their dependants.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon notification of the outcome of the discussion with DSS.

## **D. Fire and Safety Team (FST)**

#### **(a) Fire and safety procedures**

43. FST consists of five GS staff whose duties were not exclusive to the FST, as they were also included in duty roster for all security officers. To compensate for the lack of dedicated FST staff, an external party had been contracted to provide fire protection and

ambulance services to the Gigiri complex. However, neither the contract signed with the external party nor the current capacity of the FST provides for:

- a) Reviewing the adequacy of the dedicated FST staff resources;
- b) Reviewing the adequacy of UNON fire fighting equipment (fire detectors, fire hydrants, fire hoses, hydrogen cylinders, water sprinklers and water pressure);
- c) Inspection and servicing of UNON fire fighting equipment;
- d) Training FST staff members, security officers, building marshals, floor wardens and key building maintenance personnel in fire fighting techniques and fire prevention procedures; and
- e) Resolving the issues raised in the independent fire safety assessment conducted in 2002.

### **Recommendations:**

To improve the fire and safety procedures for the Gigiri complex, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) should review the adequacy of the current resources of staff members and fire fighting equipment and make arrangements for the regular inspection of all fire fighting equipment and carry out servicing of this equipment where necessary (Rec. 12).

To safeguard both property and staff members at the Gigiri complex, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) should make arrangements to train all fire and safety team staff members, S&SS security officers and key UNON staff members on fire fighting techniques and fire prevention and take steps towards addressing and resolving the issues raised in the independent fire safety assessment conducted in 2002 (Rec. 13).

To ensure that the contract awarded to the external party for fire protection and ambulance services covers all critical services required to safeguard property and staff members at the Gigiri complex, Security and Safety Service (S&SS), in conjunction with Procurement, Travel and Shipping Section (PTSS) should ensure a scoping exercise is undertaken prior to the renewal of the contract to procure fire protection and ambulance services to ensure that the contract covers as a minimum, all services identified as critical in that scoping exercise (Rec. 14).

44. *UNON accepted the recommendations.* OIOS notes the response and will close:

- a) Recommendation 12 upon receipt of details of the review of the adequacy of the current resources of staff members and fire fighting equipment and details of the arrangements for the regular inspection of fire fighting equipment.
- b) Recommendation 13 upon notification of the arrangements to train all fire and safety team staff members, S&SS security officers and key UNON staff members on fire fighting techniques and fire prevention, and the steps taken to address and resolve the issues raised in the independent fire safety assessment conducted in 2002.
- c) Recommendation 14 upon receipt of the outcome of the next contract renewal exercise in 2006.

## (b) Building marshals and floor wardens

45. OIOS is of the opinion that the FST should maintain a central register of every building marshal and floor warden within the Gigiri complex, the training they have received to date and the training required to keep their knowledge of fire safety up to date. Furthermore, as the FST are reliant on building marshals and floor wardens to disseminate information to all United Nations staff members, the FST should monitor whether the building marshals and floor wardens are carrying out their duties as detailed in the annual fire service presentation.

### **Recommendation:**

To ensure all building marshals and floor wardens are held accountable in safeguarding United Nations property and staff members, Security and Safety Service (S&SS) should ensure that a central register of every building marshal and floor warden is maintained to determine at any time, which staff members have completed the training provided in the annual fire service presentation. Furthermore, this should also include a mechanism to monitor whether the building marshals and floor wardens are adequately carrying out their duties and a feature to record feedback on the briefings and training required (Rec. 15).

46. *UNON accepted the recommendation which would be implemented by the end of 2005.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the register of training for building marshals and floor wardens.

## **E. Special Investigations Unit (SIU)**

47. GA report A/58/708 (Report of OIOS on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations) stated that the arrangements for the conduct and follow up of investigations needed strengthening. During the course of the audit, OIOS noted:

- a) No formally approved guidelines or procedures dictating the protocol for receiving complaints and/or inquiries, conducting investigations, issuing reports nor following up of reported complaints and/or inquiries;
- b) Investigators were hired as security officers and then reassigned to SIU based on possessing previous experience in investigative work. Whilst appreciating the rationale, OIOS is of the opinion that it would enhance the standing of the SIU if officers assigned to SIU, were either recruited directly against specific criteria or were subject to additional testing and training prior to being assigned to such duties;
- c) SIU had inadequate systems to maintain accurate records of all complaints and/or inquiries, investigations, reports issued and follow up action taken; and
- d) Investigative training by the Investigations Division of OIOS had been provided to selected S&SS staff but the lessons learnt from that training were not adequately disseminated to all S&SS staff.

### **Recommendation:**

To ensure Security and Safety Service (S&SS), UNON has a professional special investigations unit, S&SS should refer to the GA report A/58/708 (Report of OIOS on strengthening the investigation functions in the United Nations) and in consultation with OIOS

Investigations Division, develop guidelines dictating the protocol for receiving complaints, conducting investigations, issuing reports and following up on reported complaints as well as recruitment and training of investigators and tracking and maintaining an accurate record of these complaints (Rec. 16).

48. *UNON commented that it would approach DSS to discuss whether this issue was going to be addressed centrally or whether S&SS should approach OIOS directly.* OIOS thanks UNON for the additional information and will close the recommendation upon notification of the outcome of discussions with DSS.

## **F. Security strengthening projects**

### (a) Project implementation status

49. In his report A/56/848 of 28 February 2002, the Secretary-General presented a set of proposals for strengthening safety and security which included the following projects for UNON:

- a) Installation and improvement of gates and barriers;
- b) Installation of a perimeter alarm system and fence;
- c) Increase in perimeter lighting;
- d) Installation of closed circuit TV and control room equipment;
- e) Installation of public address and fire safety systems;
- f) Installation of a conference pre-registration area at the visitor's pavilion, including the extension of the local area network to reach the site; and
- g) Installation of lamination/glazing material on the glass surfaces of window in the visitors' pavilion and the main gate.

50. GA Resolution (A/RES/58/295) para 6 (b) states "Time frames for the completion of the various projects proposed in the report of the Secretary-General (A/58/756), as well as determinations as to which organizational units are responsible for their completion". Since both Section 27G (originally stated as Section 29G in A/58/756) and Section 33 expenditure was covered in A/58/756, the above mentioned statement is to be applied to any procurement related to the project "Strengthening the security and safety of United Nations operations, staff and premises.

51. UNON expensed/committed US\$726,700 against the initial appropriation of US\$535,000; the difference being met by additional appropriations in 2003 and 2004. These increases arose mainly in respect of project (a) above for a variety of reasons including, achieving compliance with H-MOSS, and changes in specification and design. Furthermore, due to inadequate monitoring and a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all parties involved, only project (g) was fully implemented at the end of 2004.

(b) Management for security strengthening projects

<b>Projects</b>	<b>Planned completion date</b>	<b>Actual completion date</b>	<b>Reasons for delay</b>
Installation and improvement of gates and barriers	The target date was not determined	June 2004 for hardware installation	Material cost escalation caused shortage of funds, for which additional fund of US\$320,400 was approved for completion.
Installation of a perimeter alarm system and fence	The target date was not determined	Phase-One: Nov. 2003 Phase-Two: June 2004	Delay was caused due to substandard delivery by the contractor and inadequate monitoring by UNON. Roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved were not adequately clear for overall co-ordination, which is a central feature of project management, to ensure all inter-linkages are fully understood and optimized. Budgetary control was vested with BFMS together with NYHQ. The S&SS (Security and Safety Service) was ultimate project owner. The actual implementation of the work was to the S&SS (Support Services Service) based on contracts conducted by Procurement Unit with joint monitoring responsibility by BGMU (Building and Ground Management Unit) and S&SS. The lack of adequate coordination arrangement hampered prioritization of various projects and monitoring of the project and financial performance. OIOS also determined that this lack of adequate project management arrangement attributed to the delays in implementing the construction projects.
Installation of closed-circuit TV and control room equipment	The target date was not determined		The original amount of US\$138,900 was allocated for this project in 2002 and subsequently increased by UNON to US\$171,600.00. The delay has been caused by a combination of factors, namely the allocation of insufficient funds; the requirement for a thorough site survey; and revisions to the global assessments. Hence, the project was put on hold and included in A/59/448/Add. 2 – Report of the Fifth Committee for the General Assembly at its 59 <sup>th</sup> session. This submission has been postponed pending a re-evaluation by UNDSS. UNON is currently undergoing procurement action to utilise both these funds and the lighting funds to implement a portion of the access control (lighting/CCTV) proposal.
Increase in perimeter lighting	The target date was not determined		The original amount of US\$84,300.00 was allocated in 2002 for this project. The delay has been caused by a combination of factors, namely the allocation of insufficient funds; the requirement for a thorough site survey; and revisions to the global assessments. Hence, the project was put on hold and included in A/59/448/Add. 2 – Report of the Fifth Committee for the General Assembly at its 59 <sup>th</sup> session. This submission has been postponed pending a re-evaluation by UNDSS. UNON is currently undergoing procurement action to utilise both these funds and the lighting funds to implement a portion of the access control (lighting/CCTV) proposal.
Installation of public address and fire-safety systems	The target date was not determined		The original amount of US\$32,700.00 was allocated in 2002. Its subsequent inclusion under A/59/448/Add. 2 – Report of the Fifth Committee for the General Assembly at its 59 <sup>th</sup> session was subsequently approved in December 2004. A total revised budget including smoke detection, fire fighting equipment (such as hose reels and portable extinguishers of US\$904,800.00 is currently being processed by PTSS.

52. OIOS noted the overall project management arrangements and planning were weak, mainly because the post of Chief, Building and Grounds Management Unit, who usually manage these types of projects, only came on board in late 2003. Consequently, inadequate attention had been paid to the establishment of project deadlines and targets as well as co-ordination and project monitoring, resulting in delays to projects and project budgets being exceeded.

**Recommendation:**

To ensure effective project management arrangements and planning are in place with respect to security strengthening projects, Security and Safety Service in conjunction with Building and Grounds Management Unit (BGMU) should designate a project manager to ensure adequate timely implementation of ongoing and future security-related projects, including monitoring of project budgets (Rec. 17).

53. *UNON accepted the recommendation.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon notification of the designation of a project manager to assist with security works.

**G. Asset management**

54. S&SS expressed dissatisfaction with the service provided by the inventory sub-unit of PTSS, who were responsible for the maintenance of the S&SS assets. As a result, S&SS were considering developing their own system to record and monitor their assets. The audit team reviewed the asset system maintained by PTSS and the following shortcomings were identified:

- a) There was no definition of attractive assets, leading to inconsistencies of recording items with a value of less than \$1,500;
- b) Some assets such as computers, printers and telephones were not included in the asset system maintained by PTSS;
- c) From the asset records provided by PTSS, it was noted that some assets were not recorded in the system such as traffic barriers;
- d) There was duplication of assets in the system, as well as inclusion of non-existent assets;
- e) The locations of some assets such as fire extinguishers were not recorded;
- f) The records in the asset system regarding ownership were not consistent;
- g) Approximately 84 percent of the total assets recorded did not have the acquisition value or the date of purchase; and
- h) The current value of each S&SS asset was not recorded.

**Recommendations:**

To ensure a complete and accurate record is maintained for the assets of Security and Safety Service (S&SS), Division of Administrative Services (DAS) should assign staff from the inventory sub-unit of the Procurement Travel and Shipping Section (PTSS) to work with S&SS to ensure all S&SS assets are recorded and to determine which details pertaining to these assets should be recorded, including acquisition and current value, date of purchase and location (Rec. 18).

Furthermore, to ensure this information is effectively utilised by Security

and Safety Services (S&SS), S&SS should request the inventory sub-unit of the Procurement Travel and Shipping Section (PTSS) to provide a listing of S&SS assets on a quarterly basis, to perform a regular reconciliation of that listing and to identify which assets require maintenance or disposal (Rec. 19).

55. *UNON accepted the recommendations, which would be implemented by the end of 2005.* OIOS notes the response and will close:

- a) Recommendation 18 upon receipt of a copy of the asset register.
- b) Recommendation 19 upon notification that PTSS is providing a listing of S&SS assets on a quarterly basis, and is performing a regular reconciliation of that listing.

#### **H. Information and Communications Technology (ICT)**

56. OIOS noted that S&SS were endeavoring to utilize information and communications technology (ICT) to support their activities, however, the initiatives taken did not form part of a planned approach. As a result, S&SS has procured hardware that is incompatible with the current hardware used and the back-up, maintenance and security support provided by Information Technology Services (ITS), UNON. Consequently, S&SS must now seek back-up, maintenance and security support for the hardware that is not supported by ITS, UNON.

57. Furthermore, S&SS explained that funding was a constraint, but OIOS is of the opinion that an ICT strategy could identify shortcomings and justify more funding being diverted to this area of growing importance.

#### **Recommendation:**

To enhance the effective and efficient utilisation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for Security and Safety Services (S&SS), S&SS should seek advice from Information and Technology Service (ITS) in obtaining the services of a ICT consultant, specializing in security-related services, to assist in preparing an ICT strategy identifying and costing the ICT equipment and service needs of S&SS (Rec. 20).

58. *UNON accepted the recommendation, which would be implemented by the end of 2006.* OIOS notes the response and will close the recommendation upon receipt of a copy of the ICT strategy for S&SS.

#### **V. FURTHER ACTIONS REQUIRED ON RECOMMENDATIONS**

59. OIOS monitors the implementation of its audit recommendations for reporting to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly. The responses received on the audit recommendations contained in the draft report have been recorded in our recommendations database. In order to record full implementation, the actions described in the following table are required:

Recommendation No.	Action Required
Rec. 01	Receipt of a copy of the revised Gigiri evacuation plan.
Rec. 02	Receipt of a copy of the S&SS SOP.

Rec. 03	Receipt of a copy of register and details of the mechanism to identify, collate and monitor the information required to generate the reports in the central register for monitoring and reporting.
Rec. 04	Notification of the results of the review of overtime.
Rec. 05	Receipt of a copy of the S&SS SOP for the protection of United Nations senior personnel.
Rec. 06	Receipt and review of the mechanism for carrying out background checks on candidates selected for security positions.
Rec. 07	Receipt of a copy of the training programme and the central register of training required and undertaken by each S&SS staff member.
Rec. 08	Receipt of a copy of the proposed training for United Nations staff based in Kenya.
Rec. 09	Receipt of a copy of the procedures for recording, monitoring and analysing information about lost and stolen ID cards
Rec. 10	Notification of the outcome of discussions with the Host Country on the specific roles and responsibilities of the host country security officers.
Rec. 11	Notification of the outcome of the discussion with DSS on the level of assistance to be provided to Nairobi based staff and their dependents.
Rec. 12	Receipt of details of the review of the adequacy of current resources of staff members and fire fighting equipment and details of the arrangements for the regular inspection of fire fighting equipment.
Rec. 13	Notification of the arrangements to train all fire and safety team staff members, S&SS security officers and key UNON staff members on fire fighting techniques and fire prevention and receipt of information on the steps taken to address and resolve the issues raised in the independent fire safety assessment conducted in 2002.
Rec. 14	Receipt of the outcome of the next renewal of the contract to procure fire protection and ambulance services in 2006.
Rec. 15	Receipt of a copy of the register of training for building marshals and floor wardens.
Rec. 16	Notification of the outcome of discussions with DSS on whether the guidelines dictating protocol for investigations and complaints as well as recruitment and training of investigators is going to be addressed centrally or whether S&SS should approach OIOS Investigations Division directly for assistance.
Rec. 17	Notification of the designation of a project manager to assist with security works.
Rec. 18	Receipt of a copy of the asset register.
Rec. 19	Notification that PTSS is providing a listing of S&SS assets on a quarterly basis and is performing a regular reconciliation of the listing.
Rec. 20	Receipt of a copy of the ICT strategy for S&SS.

## **VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

60. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the audit team by management and staff of Division of Administrative Services and S&SS.

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