For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL34340 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ¡ ¢ ¢ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ¢ ¡ ¢ This report describes the history of temporary federal extensions to unemployment benefits from 1980 to the present. Among these extensions is the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program created by P.L. 110-252 and amended by P.L. 110-449. Additionally, information is included on economic recessions, changes in unemployment levels compared to the same month in the previous year, and the legislative timing of those additional federal unemployment benefits during this period. This report contains four sections. The first section provides background information on unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. It also provides a brief summary of UC benefit exhaustion and how exhaustion rates are related to the business cycle. The second section provides the definition of a recession as well as the determination process for declaring a recession. It also provides information on the timing of all recessions since 1980. The third section summarizes the legislative history of federal extensions of unemployment benefits. It includes information on the permanently authorized extended benefit (EB) program as well as information on temporary unemployment benefit extensions. It also includes a brief discussion on the role of extended unemployment benefits as part of an economic stimulus package. The fourth section provides a summary of the timing of recessions, the changes in unemployment levels compared to the same month in the previous year, the unemployment rate, changes in long- term unemployment, changes in the exhaustion of regular UC benefits, and temporary federal extended unemployment benefit programs. The Appendix contains tables summarizing the legislative history of federal extensions of unemployment benefits. ¢ ¡ Unemployment Compensation and Exhaustion of Benefits........................................................... 1 UC Benefits and Duration......................................................................................................... 1 Generosity of Unemployment Benefits and Disincentives to Find Work ........................... 2 UC Benefit Exhaustion ............................................................................................................. 2 Recessions ....................................................................................................................................... 4 Determination of a Recession ................................................................................................... 4 Current Recession Began December 2007.......................................................................... 5 Recessions from 1980 to Present .............................................................................................. 5 Federal Programs of Extended Unemployment Compensation....................................................... 5 Extended Benefit (EB) Program (Determined at the State Level) ............................................ 5 Methods for Determining 20 Weeks of Full-Time Insured Employment ........................... 6 Temporary Federal Extensions of Unemployment Benefits: Congressional Intervention in Recessions ..................................................................................................... 7 Temporary Extended UC Benefits as Economic Stimulus........................................................ 8 Assessing the Labor Market: Determining When to Intervene ...................................................... 9 Using the Insured Unemployment Rate vs. Total Unemployment Rate................................... 9 National, State, and Sub-State Triggers................................................................................... 10 Increases in Unemployment of at Least One Million Unemployed as Compared to the Same Month in the Previous Year .........................................................................................11 Other Measures: Changes in Long-Term Unemployment and Changes in UC Benefits Exhaustions............................................................................................................ 13 Figure 1. Economic Recessions, Percent of Regular UC Beneficiaries to All Unemployed, and UC Benefit Exhaustees, January 1979- October 2008 .......................................................... 4 Figure 2. Recessions, Changes in Unemployment Compared to Same Month in Previous Year, Unemployment Rates, and Temporary Federal Benefit Availability, January 1979- October 2008.............................................................................................................................. 12 Figure 3. Recessions, Changes in Regular UC Benefit Exhaustions as Compared to the Same Month in Previous Year, and Unemployment Rates, January 1979- October 2008 ......... 14 Figure 4. Recessions, Changes in Long-Term Unemployment Compared to the same Month in Previous Year, and Unemployment Rates, January 1979-October 2008 .................... 15 Table A-1. Summary of Extended Unemployment Compensation Programs ............................... 16 Table A-2. Details: Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) Benefits.................................... 18 Table A-3. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Benefits of 1991............. 19 Table A-4. Details: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) Benefits of 2008......... 20 ¢ ¡ Table A-5. Timing of Recessions, Changes in Unemployment of at Least One Million Unemployed Compared to Same Month in Previous Year, and Extended Unemployment Benefits, 1990-2008 ......................................................................................... 21 ¡ Appendix. Related Tables.............................................................................................................. 16 Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 23 ¢ ¡ ¢ ¡ The cornerstone of an unemployed worker's income support is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC)1 program, which may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. The underlying framework of the UC system is contained in the Social Security Act. Title III of the act authorizes grants to states for the administration of state UC laws, Title IX authorizes the various components of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), and Title XII authorizes advances or loans to insolvent state UC programs. UC is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). The federal government funds federal and state UC program administration, the federal share (50%) of Extended Benefit (EB) payments, and federal loans to insolvent state UC programs. States fund regular state UC benefits and the state share (50%) of EB payments. In FY2008, the states received an estimated $2.73 billion from the federal government for the administration of their regular UC programs and for the administration of the federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. In FY2008, states spent an estimated $38.1 billion on regular UC benefits and $4.1 million on EB payments. Workers who lose their jobs face serious long-term economic implications. In general, they face a substantially reduced probability of full-time employment and an increased probability of part- time employment. Those workers who find new full-time employment on average experience significantly decreased earnings relative to what they earned before they lost employment. The UC program pays benefits to workers in covered employment who become involuntarily unemployed for economic reasons and meet state-established eligibility rules. The UC program generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, to those who are unable to work, or to those who do not have a recent earnings history. States usually disqualify claimants who lost their jobs because of inability to work or unavailability for work, who voluntarily quit without good cause, who were discharged for job-related misconduct, or who refused suitable work without good cause.2 This temporary unemployment insurance benefit is designed to be sufficient to meet an unemployed worker's basic obligations until the worker finds a new position. Generally, benefits are based on wages for covered work over a 12-month period. The entitlement formula varies by state, typically requiring a substantial work history and replacing approximately 50%-80% of 1 For more information on UC, see CRS Report RS22538, Unemployment Compensation: The Cornerstone of Income Support for Unemployed Workers, by Julie M. Whittaker, and CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Available Unemployment Benefits and Legislative Activity, by Julie M. Whittaker. For information on the most recent temporary federal unemployment benefit extension, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment Benefits: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), by Julie M. Whittaker. 2 Workers who have quit or have been fired may qualify for UC benefits after a waiting period in a few states. ¢ ¡ workers' wages. Generally, benefits are capped at a percentage of the average wage for workers in the state, which generally lowers the average replacement rate for all worker to less than 50% (47% in 2007). Weekly maximums in January 2008 ranged from $210 (Mississippi) to $600 (Massachusetts) and, in states that provide dependent's allowances, up to $900 (Massachusetts). In the third quarter of CY2008, the average weekly benefit was $292. Benefits are available for up to 26 weeks (30 weeks in Massachusetts). The average regular UC benefit duration in third quarter of CY2008 was 15.3 weeks. In FY2008, the ratio of unemployed workers who receive benefits to all those who are unemployed ranges from a low of 0.19 (South Dakota) to a high of 0.68 (Idaho). In FY2008, 40% of all U.S. unemployed workers received UC benefits. Generally the recipiency rate of UC benefits rises during economic recessions (as workers with strong labor market experience are laid-off) and falls during economic expansions (as new entrants to the labor market begin to comprise a greater proportion of the unemployed).3 ¢ ¢ The difficulty in monitoring job search intensity creates the risk the unemployed will abuse a system designed to alleviate the worst of job loss. Although there are clear disincentives to quickly find work in the UC system, this disincentive is balanced by a relatively low replacement rate of wages by UC benefits and a recognition that proper allocation of human resources and human capital requires adequate job search time.4 The job-search behavior of the unemployed can be influenced by changing the timing, generosity, and duration of UC benefits. Higher benefit levels and easier program requirements for benefits will cause recipients to be less willing to accept jobs and may alleviate some of the social stigma from being unemployed.5 Thus, the availability of benefits may create a disincentive to search for and accept reemployment, increasing unemployment and unemployment duration.6 ¡ The limited duration of UC benefits (generally 26 weeks) will result in some unemployed individuals exhausting their UC benefits before finding work or voluntarily leaving the labor force for other activities such as retirement, disability, family care, or education. Empirical research suggests that workers who exhaust benefits search at similar or higher levels of intensity as those workers who do find employment before benefit exhaustion.7 Most state UC programs 3 The percent of UC beneficiaries as compared to all unemployed workers is commonly referred to as the "recipiency rate." The exhaustion rate measures the proportion of all UC benefit recipients who exhaust their UC eligibility and do not find a job within that period. 4 For a detailed survey of this disincentive effect, see Burtless, Gary. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Supply: A Survey." In Unemployment Insurance, W. Lee Hansen and James Byers, eds. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 5 Burtless, Gary. "Unemployment Insurance and Labor Supply: A Survey." In Unemployment Insurance, W. Lee Hansen and James Byers, eds. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 6 See CRS Report RL32111, Unemployment Compensation (UC)/ Unemployment Insurance (UI): Trends and Contributing Factors in UC Benefit Exhaustion, by Julie M. Whittaker. 7 Corson, Walter and Mark Dynarski. A Study of Unemployment Insurance Recipients and Exhaustees: Findings from a National Survey. Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper 90-3. U.S. Department of Labor Employment and (continued...) ¢ ¡ attempt to identify potential benefit exhaustees through a profiling system. Workers who are identified as likely to become unemployed long-term are offered intensive employment services.8 Figure 1 displays both the percent of UC beneficiaries as compared to all unemployed workers (the "recipiency rate") and as the number of UC benefit exhaustees since 1979. (Please note that Figure 1 uses different numerical scales for the recipiency rate and for the exhaustion rate. Because the correspondence between the two scales was determined by page size rather than by a particular reason, readers should not place any significance in the two lines crossing each other. The scale for the recipiency rate is located on the left-hand y-axis. The scale for the UC benefit exhaustees is located on the right-hand y-axis.) The proportion of UC recipients who exhaust their benefits varies according to economic conditions, state benefit duration formulas, and the composition of the labor force. Some evidence suggests that an aging workforce may have increased the proportion of unemployed workers who were long-term unemployed; at the same time, this aging workforce may also have contributed to the decrease in the overall unemployment rate.9 (...continued) Training Administration, 1990. 8 These services may include training on job search, job counseling, and funding for educational and skill-enhancing courses. 9 For details on these trends, see CRS Report RL32757, Unemployment and Older Workers, by Julie M. Whittaker. ¢ ¡ llA ot seiraicifeneB CU ralugeR fo tnecreP ,snoisseceR cimonocE .1 erugiF 8002 rebotcO -9791 yraunaJ ,seetsuahxE tifeneB CU dna ,deyolpmenU 50 500 Percent of UC Beneficiaries as Compared to All 45 450 Number of UC Exhaustees (thousands) 40 400 35 350 Unemployed 30 300 25 250 20 200 15 150 10 100 Recession 5 Percent of UC Beneficiaries to Total Unemployed 50 Regular UC Exhaustees 0 0 Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- Jan- 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 gniniarT dna tnemyolpmE ,robaL fo tnemtrapeD morf era ataD .ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC :ecruoS mfc.koobtrahc/yolpmenu/vog.atelod.www//:ptth .noitartsinimdA The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)--not the federal government--declares when a recession began.10 A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in measures of real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.11 A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between a trough and a peak, the economy is in an expansion. 10 For a detailed explanation on the determination of recessions, see CRS Report RS22793, What is a Recession, Who Decides When It Starts, and When Do They Decide?, by Brian W. Cashell. 11 The NBER explicitly states that it considers real GDP to be the single measure that comes closest to capturing what it means by "aggregate economic activity." Therefore, it places considerable weight on real GDP and other output measures. Thus, the NBER takes into account employment but not unemployment or unemployment rates when determining recessionary periods. The NBER's approach is summarized at http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html. ¢ ¡ The NBER maintains a time line of the U.S. business cycle. This chronology identifies the dates of peaks and troughs that frame economic recessions or expansions. According to NBER, a peak was reached in December 2007, marking the end of the expansion that began in November 2001 and thus marking the beginning of the current recession. The most recent expansion lasted 73 months; the previous expansion of the 1990s lasted 120 months. Since 1980 there have been five separate periods that the NBER has identified as recessions: January 1980-July 1980; July 1981-November 1982; July 1990-March 1991; March 2001- November 2001; and the ongoing December 2007 recession. ¡ ¢ The Unemployment Compensation program's two main objectives are to provide temporary and partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and to stabilize the economy during recessions.12 These objectives are reflected in the current UC program's funding and benefit structure. When the economy grows, UC program revenue rises through increased tax revenues while UC program spending falls as fewer workers are unemployed and receive benefits. The effect of collecting more taxes while decreasing spending on benefits dampens demand in the economy. This also creates a surplus of funds or a "cushion" of available funds for the UC program to draw upon during a recession. In a recession, UC tax revenue falls and UC program spending rises as more workers lose their jobs and receive UC benefits. The increased amount of UC payments to unemployed workers dampens the economic effect of lost earnings by injecting additional funds into the economy. In response to economic recessions, the federal government sometimes has augmented the regular UC benefit with both permanent (the EB program) and temporary extensions (including the EUC08 program) of the duration of unemployment benefits. ¡ The Extended Benefit program was established by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA), P.L. 91-373 (26 U.S.C. 3304, note). EUCA may extend receipt of unemployment benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic 12 See, for example, President Franklin Roosevelt's remarks at the signing of the Social Security Act; http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#signing. ¢ ¡ situations exist within the state. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, P.L. 97-35, among other items, amended the EUCA to require that claimants work at least 20 weeks of full- time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages. The EB program is active in North Carolina and Rhode Island. On December 7, 2008 the program will become active in Oregon. The EB program is triggered when a state's insured unemployment rate (IUR)13 or total unemployment rate (TUR)14 reaches certain levels. All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the 2 previous years. There are two other optional thresholds that states may choose. (States may chose one, two, or none.) If the state has chosen the option, they would provide the following: · Option 1: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, regardless of previous years' averages. · Option 2: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's TUR is at least 6.5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13-weeks in either of the previous two years; an additional 20 weeks of benefits if the TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for the same 13-weeks in either of the previous two years. The EB program imposes additional restrictions on individual eligibility for benefits. It requires that a worker be actively searching and available for work. Furthermore, the worker may not receive benefits if the worker refused an offer of suitable work. Finally, claimants must have recorded least 20 weeks of full-time insured employment or the equivalent in insured wages during their base period. ¢ States use one, two, or three different methods for determining an "equivalent" to 20 weeks of full-time insured employment. These methods are described in both law (Section 202(a)(5) of the EUCA) and regulation (20 CFR 615.4(b)). In practice, states that require any of these three requirements for receipt of regular UC benefits and do not allow for exceptions to those requirements do not need to establish that the worker met the 20 weeks full-time insured employment.15 The three methods are listed below. 13 The IUR is substantially different than the TUR because it excludes several important groups: self-employed workers, unpaid family workers, workers in certain not-for-profit organizations, and several other, primarily seasonal, categories of workers. In addition to those unemployed workers whose last jobs were in the excluded employment, the insured unemployed rate excludes the following: those who have exhausted their UC benefits; new entrants or reentrants to the labor force; disqualified workers whose unemployment is considered to have resulted from their own actions rather than from economic conditions; and, eligible unemployed persons who do not file for benefits. 14 The TUR is essentially a weekly version of the unemployment rate published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics: that is, the ratio of the total number of unemployed persons divided by the total number of employed and unemployed persons. 15 According to the 2008 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws the following states require at least one of the "20 weeks" requirements for regular UC benefits: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah. ¢ ¡ · earnings in the base period equal to at least 1.5 times the high-quarter wages; or · earnings in the base period of at least 40 times the most recent weekly benefit amount, and if this alternative is adopted, it shall use the weekly benefit amount (including dependents' allowances) payable for a week of total unemployment (before any reduction because of earnings, pensions or other requirements) that applied to the most recent week of regular benefits; or · earnings in the base period equal to at least 20 weeks of full-time insured employment, and if this alternative is adopted, the term "full-time" shall have the meaning provided by the state law. The base period may be the regular base period or, if applicable in the state, the period may be the alternative base period or the extended base period if that determined the regular UC benefit. ¢ ¡ ¢ During some economic recessions, Congress has created federal temporary programs of extended unemployment compensation. Congress acted eight times--in 1958, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008--to establish these temporary programs of extended UC benefits. These programs extended the time an individual might claim UC benefits (ranging from an additional 6 to 33 weeks) and had expiration dates. Some extensions took into account state economic conditions; many temporary programs considered the state's total TUR or the state's IUR or both. Historically, these programs started operation after the trough of a recession had passed. This is due to several reasons. One cause is that NBER often announces that a recession has begun three or more months after what is later determined to be the official start. Another cause to this lag in response time is that often the severity of the recession and its impact on unemployment levels does not become apparent for several quarters after the recession begins. The 1958 and the 1961 programs were proposed and enacted after the trough of those recessions but before the unemployment rate had peaked. The 1971 program was enacted after the end of the recession in November 1970. Both the 1974 and 1982 programs also became effective toward the end of those recessions. The 1991 program was enacted eight months after the 1990-1991 recession trough but eight months before the unemployment rate peaked. Likewise, the 2002 program was enacted after the recession had ended but before the unemployment rate peaked. The current Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program of 2008 was enacted seven months after the most recent recession began.16 16 For a detailed description of the EUC08 program, see CRS Report RS22915, Temporary Extension of Unemployment Benefits: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), by Julie M. Whittaker. ¢ ¡ Table A-1 located in the Appendix briefly summarizes these temporary programs17 as well as the permanently authorized Extended Benefit (EB) program. The 1982 Federal Supplemental Compensation Benefit (FSB) and 1991 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) had extremely complicated--and changing--extended benefit triggers. Table A-2 and Table A-3 (also located in the AppendixError! Reference source not found.) provide detailed information on those benefit triggers for those two temporary programs. Table A-4 provides information on the current Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program benefits and triggers. ¢ ¡ Recently, congressional and popular debate has examined the relative efficacy of expansion of UC benefits and duration compared to other potential economic stimuli. In his January 22, 2008, congressional testimony, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated that increasing the value or duration of UC benefits may be one of the more effective economic stimulus plans.18 This is because many of the unemployed are severely cash constrained and would be expected to rapidly spend any increase in benefits that they may receive.19 Mark Zandi of Moody's Economy.com has estimated multiplier effects for several different policy options, including extending unemployment benefits (with multiplier effect of 1.64).20 The multiplier estimates the increase in total spending in the economy that would result from a dollar spent on a given policy option. Zandi does not explain how these multipliers were estimated, other than to say that they were calculated using his firm's macroeconomic model. Therefore, it is difficult to offer a thorough analysis of the estimates. Others point out that increasing either the value or length of UC benefits may, however, discourage recipients from searching for work and from accepting less desirable jobs.21 A 17 The summary does not include P.L. 108-11, which created the special "TEUC-A" program. That temporary program was in response to the unemployment of airline workers resulting from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, subsequent security measures, and the Iraq war. Signed into law on April 16, 2003, the program provided up to 39 weeks of extended benefits to individuals whose regular UC was based on qualifying employment with a certified air carrier, at a facility in an airport, or with a producer or supplier of products or services for an air carrier. The program had two tiers of benefits, known as TEUC-A and TEUC-AX and were authorized through the week ending before December 29, 2003. 18 See CBO Testimony of Peter Orszag on Options for Responding to Short-Term Economic Weakness before the Committee on Finance United States Senate on January 22, 2008; http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8932/01-22- TestimonyEconStimulus.pdf. 19 For another paper that takes this position, see the following: Elmendorf, Douglas W. and Jason Furman, If, When, How: A Primer on Fiscal Stimulus, January 2008; available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/ 0110_fiscal_stimulus_elmendorf_furman.aspx. 20 Mark Zandi, "Washington Throws the Economy a Rope," Dismal Scientist, Moody's Economy.com, January 22, 2008. 21 For example, Shrek, James and Patrick Tyrell, Unemployment Insurance Does Not Stimulate the Economy, Webmemo #1777, January 2008; http://www.heritage.org/Research/Economy/wm1777.cfm#_ftn1. See also Martin Feldstein's testimony before the Committee on Finance United States on January 24, 2008, in which he stated that "[w]hile raising unemployment benefits or extending the duration of benefits beyond 26 weeks would help some individuals ... it would also create undesirable incentives for individuals to delay returning to work. That would lower earnings and total spending." Available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2008test/ 012408mftest.pdf. ¢ ¡ rationale for making any extension in unemployment benefits temporary would be to mitigate disincentives to work, as the extension would expire once the economy improves and cyclical unemployment declines. A variety of measures are typically used to assess the state of the labor market.22 These measures may include statistics that are absolute measures, such as employment and unemployment levels, as well as relative measures, such as the insured unemployment rate and the total unemployment rate. A vigorous debate on how to determine when the federal government should intervene by extending unemployment benefits has been active for decades. Generally, this debate has examined the efficacy of using the IUR or TUR as triggers for extending unemployment benefits. The debate also has examined whether the intervention should be at a national or state level. Recently, serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year has emerged in several proposals as a new trigger for a nationwide extension in unemployment benefits. ¢ ¢ The Federal-State Extended Benefit Program, created by P.L. 91-373, originally assessed the labor market through both insured and "total" unemployment rates and included both federal and state level triggers for extended UC benefits. The EB's federal trigger23 was eliminated by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-499). That act also required that the IUR measure not include those who had exhausted benefits or who were receiving EB. This effectively made the IUR statistic a less generous measure of unemployment. Since the adoption of the permanent EB program in 1970, there has been considerable debate concerning the relative merits of the IUR versus the TUR as an EB trigger. The IUR is defined as the 13-week moving average of continuing regular UC claims divided by the average number of individuals in UC-covered employment. This means that the IUR itself is an output of the UC program. Because the calculation of the IUR is based upon the number of individuals currently receiving UC benefits, each state's IUR depends on various noneconomic factors, including state eligibility 22 For a detailed explanation of the more common employment measures, see CRS Report RL32642, Employment Statistics: Differences and Similarities in Job-based and Person-based Employment and Unemployment Estimates, by Julie M. Whittaker. 23 The federal trigger was an IUR of at least 4.5% for 3 consecutive months. ¢ ¡ rules and administrative practices. Thus, the IUR is not a precise reflection of the health of a state's economy. In comparison, the TUR is defined as the number of all unemployed individuals actively seeking work divided by the size of the civilian labor force. The TUR represents a larger population than the IUR, because it counts as unemployed all those who are out of work and actively looking for work, on layoff, or waiting to start a new job within 30 days. A perennial question concerns the appropriate level at which to measure changes in unemployment. Generally this debate has centered on the EB program and whether the EB trigger should be based on national, regional, state or sub-state data. Recently, the debate on the EB trigger has been expanded to ask what measure should be used if a new temporary extension of UC benefits were to be enacted. In particular, should Congress act as it has in the most recent recessions and create a nationwide extension of UC benefits with a nod to higher unemployment states through an additional "high-unemployment" trigger? Or would it be more appropriate and a better use of scarce resources to target only those states with current economic difficulties? The argument in favor of a national trigger is that the definition of a recession is national in scope, and the federal government's interest in reversing an economic decline is national as well. However, recessions have often been primarily regional in impact. Thus, a national trigger can result in the payment of extended benefits to individuals in states that do not face unusually weak labor markets. There have also been proposals to create triggers on either a regional or a sub-state level. The logic behind the sub-state or regional triggers is that they might improve the targeting of benefits because state boundaries are often of little relevance to the workings of labor markets. There can be considerable labor market differences between urban and rural areas within a state or among urban areas within a state. Furthermore, some labor markets are located in more than one state. A statewide trigger can deny benefits to areas facing severe labor market problems because other regions of the state are not facing the same conditions. There are a variety of arguments against regional and sub-state triggers. It would be difficult to define appropriate regional or sub-state boundaries, and it is unclear whether these newly defined regions would be any less arbitrary than current state boundaries. In addition, there are significant obstacles to be overcome in the financing and administration of an EB program on the basis of regional or sub-state areas, because the state has always been the operational unit for UC. There is also concern regarding the accuracy and availability of regional or sub-state data and the costs of data improvements that would be needed.24 24 The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation advised against the use of substate or regional data in determining the availability of extended benefits. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, Collected Findings and Recommendations: 1994-1996, 1996. p. 5. ¢ ¡ ¢ ¢ Most recently, congressional debate has moved away from using the IUR or TUR as a trigger for a national program. Serious consideration of other measures of the labor market has become increasingly common. In particular, the increase in the number of unemployed from the previous year has emerged in several proposals for new triggers in a nationwide extension in unemployment benefits. H.R. 4934, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008, was introduced on January 15, 2008. This bill would have extended UC benefits for up to 26 weeks whenever the number of unemployed persons 16 years of age or older as compared to the same month of the previous year exceeded one million individuals. Table A-5, located in the Appendix, provides information on the timing of the recessions, changes in unemployment of at least 1 million compared to same month in the previous year, and federal enactment of the temporary extensions of benefits. During this period, the temporary extensions of unemployment benefits take effect between 4 and 14 months after the onset of the recession. The first changes in unemployment compared to the same month in the previous year of at least 1 million occur between 3 and 5 months after the onset of the recession. Therefore, if the use of the 1 million trigger had been applied in the past, the extension of UC benefits would have been triggered between 8 to 12 months earlier than actually occurred. Figure 2 provides a graphical presentation of the information that was summarized in Table A-4. Figure 2 also includes data on the unemployment rate. Please note that Figure 2 uses different numerical scales for changes in unemployment levels and for the unemployment rate. Because the correspondence between the two scales was determined by page size rather than by a particular reason, readers should not place any significance in the two lines crossing each other. The scale for the changes in unemployment levels compared to same month in the previous year is located on the left-hand y-axis. The scale for the unemployment rate is located on the right-hand y-axis. .scitsitatS robaL fo uaeruB ,atad yevruS noitalupoP tnerruC eht morf raey suoiverp eht ni htnom emas ot derapmoc tnemyolpmenu ni segnahc detamitsE .hcraeseR fo uaeruB cimonocE lanoitaN morf snoissecer fo gnimiT .erugif SRC :ecruoS 8002 rebotcO-9791 yraunaJ ,ytilibaliavA tifeneB laredeF yraropmeT dna ,setaR tnemyolpmenU ,raeY suoiverP ni htnoM emaS ot derapmoC tnemyolpmenU ni segnahC ,snoisseceR . 2 erugiF ¢ ¡ ¢ ¡ Beyond the IUR, TUR, and changes in the total number of unemployed, several other measures of unemployment are often used in assessing the severity of employment conditions. These measures include the number of unemployed workers who exhaust UC benefits and the number of workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks (the number of long-term unemployed). Figure 3 shows the change in the number of exhaustion of UC benefits. Figure 4 shows the change in the number of workers who have been unemployed for more than 26 weeks. Generally, both the changes in the numbers of exhaustees and the changes in the number of long-term unemployed peak after the end of a recession. .robaL fo tnemtrapeD ,scitsitatS robaL fo uaeruB ,atad yevruS noitalupoP tnerruC eht morf etar tnemyolpmenU .robaL fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA gniniarT dna tnemyolpmE eht morf raey suoiverp ni htnom emas ot derapmoc noitsuahxe tifeneb CU ni segnahc detamitsE .hcraeseR fo uaeruB cimonocE lanoitaN morf snoissecer fo gnimiT .erugif SRC :ecruoS 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1 9 7 5 3 1 9 08 n- 7 n- 6 n- 2 n- 0 n- 8 n- 6 n- 4 n- 2 n- 0 Ja 0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-0 Jan-9 Jan-9 Jan-9 Jan-9 Jan-9 Jan-9 Ja 9 Jan-9 Ja 9 Jan-9 Ja 8 Jan-8 Ja 8 Jan-8 Ja 8 Jan-8 Ja 8 Jan-8 Ja 8 Jan-8 Jan-7 Ja -15 -300 Unemployment Rate Change in Regular UC Exhaustions Recession -10 -200 -5 -100 0 0 5 100 Unemployment Rate 10 200 Same Month Previous Year (thousands) Change in Regular UC Exhaustions Compared to 15 300 8002 rebotcO -9791 yraunaJ ,setaR tnemyolpmenU dna ,raeY suoiverP ni htnoM emaS eht ot derapmoC sa snoitsuahxE tifeneB CU ralugeR ni segnahC ,snoisseceR . 3 erugiF .scitsitatS robaL fo uaeruB ,atad yevruS noitalupoP tnerruC eht morf etar tnemyolpmenu dna raey suoiverp ni htnom emas ot derapmoc tnemyolpmenu mret-gnol ni segnahc detamitsE .hcraeseR fo uaeruB cimonocE lanoitaN morf snoissecer fo gnimiT .erugif SRC :ecruoS 4 1 6 1 7 6 1 08 n- 7 n- 5 n- 2 n- 7 n- 2 n- 8 n- 2 Jan-06 Ja 0 Jan-0 Jan-03 Ja 0 Jan-0 Jan-00 Jan-09 Jan-98 Ja 9 Jan-9 Jan-95 Jan-94 Jan-93 Ja 9 Jan-9 Jan-90 Jan-99 Ja 8 Jan-8 Jan-8 Jan-85 Jan-84 Jan-83 Ja 8 Jan-8 Jan-80 Jan-89 Jan-7 Ja -15 Unemployment Rate -2000 Long-term (27+ w eeeks) Unemployment Change Recession -1500 -10 -1000 -5 -500 0 0 500 5 Unemployment Rate 1000 Same Month Previous Year 10 1500 Change in Long-Term Unemployment Compared to 15 2000 8002 rebotcO-9791 yraunaJ ,setaR tnemyolpmenU dna ,raeY suoiverP ni htnoM emas eht ot derapmoC tnemyolpmenU mreT-gnoL ni segnahC ,snoisseceR .4 erugiF ,ro ;%0.6 ro ;sraey 2 roirp .7791/1/4 retfa ro no %021 dna %5 tsael ta :RUI diap stifeneb rof eunever :etatS 91-59 .L.P dna ,54-49 .L.P lareneg laredef ;7791/4 %5.4 tsael ta fo etar erofeb diap stifeneb detsujda yllanosaes :RUI .stifeneb fo skeew 62 ,21-49 .L.P )BSF( stifeneB rof sdnuf ATUF laredeF :lanoitaN ot pu dedivorP ).deiraV( 8791/1 ot 5791/1 , 275-39 .L.P latnemelppuS laredeF sraey 2 roirp fo %021 dna %4 tsael ta fo snoitsuahxe rof detsujda :RUI :etatS %5.4 tsael ta fo etar .skeew 31 ro tnemeltitne )tcA .eunever lareneg detsujda yllanosaes :RUI tifeneb CU raluger 923-29 .L.P nosungaM( noitasnepmoC dna sdnuf ATUF laredeF :lanoitaN eht fo %05 fo resseL 3791/3 ot 2791/1 dna 422-29 .L.P tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE .sraey roirp 2 fo rehtie fo %011 dna %5.6 :RUT ro ;%0.6 ro ;sraey 2 roirp ni doirep gnidnopserroc fo %021 dna %5 tsael ta :RUI :etatS shtnom evitucesnoc ).woleb 53-79 .L.P 3 rof %5.4 tsael ta fo etar .skeew 31 ro tnemeltitne dna 994-69 .L.P osla eeS .sdnuf ATUF laredef %05 detsujda yllanosaes :RUI tifeneb CU raluger .semit lareves dednemA( )BE( 0791 fo tcA stifeneB .sdnuf ATUS etats %05 :lanoitaN eht fo %05 fo resseL dezirohtuA yltnenamreP 373-19 .L.P dednetxE etatS-laredeF .skeew 31 ro tnemeltitne )CUET( noitasnepmoC tifeneb CU raluger 2691/30 ot 1691/40 tnemyolpmenU .sdnuf ATUF .enoN eht fo %05 fo resseL 0691/60 ot kcab hcaeR 6-78 .L.P dednetxE yraropmeT .naol eht yaper ot desiar saw etats eht ni xat ATUF eht 36/1/1 yb naol yaper ot .skeew 31 ro tnemeltitne )CUT( noitasnepmoC deliaf etats a fi ;stnuocca tifeneb CU raluger 9591/6 ot 8591/6 tnemyolpmenU etats ot snaol eerf tseretnI .enoN eht fo %05 fo resseL 7591/6 ot kcab hcaeR 144-58 .L.P yraropmeT ytirohtuA gnicnaniF msinahceM reggirT stifeneB fo noitaruD setaD waL cilbuP margorP smargorP noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU dednetxE fo yrammuS .1-A elbaT ¡ dereggirt neeb evah dluow margorp BE eht fi ro ;no dereggirt saw margorp )X-CUET ,CUET( BE eht fi :level etats yb .skeew 31 lanoitidda denimreted saw X-CUET na ot pu ;)X-CUET( 62-801 .L.P noitasnepmoC .yllanoitan setats tnemyolpmenu hgiH 4002/3-2002/3 dna , 1-801 .L.P tnemyolpmenU .sdnuf ATUF laredeF elbaliava saw CUET .skeew 31 ot pU :CUET 1002/3 ot kcab hcaeR , 741-701 .L.P dednetxE yraropmeT .3991/3/01 erofeb tub 2991/5/7 retfa ro no ].stifeneb BE "ffo" 251-301 .L.P diap stifeneb rof eunever gnireggirt fo noitpo eht dna ,6-301 .L.P lareneg laredef ,snoitpecxe .3-A elbaT eeS .deiraV dah sronrevoG .margorp ,813-201 .L.P niatrec htiw ;3991/2/01 BE eht stnemelppus naht ,442-201 .L.P retfa dna 2991/5/7 .erusaem rehtar sedesrepuS :etoN[ erofeb diap stifeneb nosirapmoc keew-31 a 4991/4-1991/11 ,281-201 .L.P )CUE( noitasnepmoC rof sdnuf ATUF laredeF ,RUI "egareva" decudortnI .3-A elbaT eeS .deiraV 1991/2 ot kcab hcaeR , 461-201 .L.P tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE ).aina vlysnneP ni stneipicer emos ,272-99 .L.P( .51-99 .L.P dna ,531-89 .L.P ,811-89 .L.P ,12-89 .L.P .eunever lareneg 5891/6-2891/9 ,424-79 .L.P )CSF( noitasnepmoC dna sdnuf ATUF laredeF .2-A elbaT eeS .deiraV .2-A elbaT eeS .deiraV 2891/6 ot kcab hcaeR ,842-79 .L.P latnemelppuS laredeF .yltnecer skeew 02 tsael t a d e k r o w t n a mi a l c .sraey roirp 2 fo rehtie taht deriuqer dna fo %011 dna %5.6 :RUT ,snoita lucla c RUI morf ,ro ;%0.6 s t n e i pi c e r B E d e v o m e r ro ;sraey 2 suoiverp eht ,reg girt lanoitan ni doirep keew-31 roirp %021 dna %5 tsael ta :RUI eht detanimile 53-79 .L.P .sdnuf ATUF laredef %05 :etatS .stnemeriuqer krow )BE( tcA .detanimile fo lasufer d na hcraes stifeneB dednetxE etatS dna sdnuf ATUS etats %05 reggirt BE lanoitaN denethgit 994-69 .L.P dezirohtuA yltnenamreP 53-79 .L.P dna 994-69 .L.P -laredeF ot stnemdnemA .sraey roirp 2 fo rehtie fo %011 dna %5.6 :RUT ytirohtuA gnicnaniF msinahceM reggirT stifeneB fo noitaruD setaD waL cilbuP margorP %6 tsael ta RUI :skeew 01 3891/1/4 erofeb stneipicer CSF rof stnemeltitne lanoitiddA setats rehto llA :skeew 8 %5 naht ssel tub %4 tsael ta fo RUI :skeew 01 %6 naht ssel tub %5 tsael ta fo RUI :skeew 21 rehgih ro %6 fo RUI :skeew 41 .3891/02/4 .3891/81/01-3891/1/4 :retal ro 3891/1/4 no stnemyap CSF tsriF dengis ,)12-89 .L.P( 3891 fo stnemdnemA ytiruceS laicoS setats rehto lla :skeew 8 %5.4 naht ssel tub %5.3 tsael ta RUI :skeew 01 %5.4 tsael ta RUI :skeew 21 %6 woleb RUI tub 3891/1/6 retfa ro no detavitca BE :skeew 41 .3891/6/1 .3891/13/3-3891/9/1 rehgih ro %6 fo RUI :skeew 61 dengis ,)424-79 .L.P( 2891 fo tcA noitatropsnarT ecafruS .setats rehto lla :skeew 6 %5.3 tsael ta RUI ;etats ni evitcani BE :skeew 8 .2891/2/9 dengis .3891/8/1-2891/21/9 2891/1/6 retfa etats ni detavitca BE :skeew 01 ,)842-79 .L.P( tcA ytilibisnopseR lacsiF dna ytiuqE xaT )etad mialc tsrif( tceffE ni setaD sreiT tifeneB waL cilbuP stifeneB )CSF( noitasnepmoC latnemelppuS laredeF :sliateD .2-A elbaT .SRC :ecruoS .%4 tsael ta si RUI etats eht fi ro %6 tsael ta si RUT etats eht fi :level etats eht ta denimreted si 80CUE II reiT tnemyolpmenU hgiH )80CUE( elbaliava 9002/82/3-8002/6/7 944-011 .L.P 8002 fo noitasnepmoC .sdnuf ATUF laredeF yllanoitan si 80CUE .4-A elbaT eeS .deiraV 7002/5 ot kcab hcaeR dna 252-011 .L.P tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE .sraey 2 roirp eht fo %021 dna %4 tsael ta :RUI daer ot dednema erew 0791 fo tcA noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU etatS-laredeF eht fo )d(302 noitces fi no ytirohtuA gnicnaniF msinahceM reggirT stifeneB fo noitaruD setaD waL cilbuP margorP ].reit hcae rof skeew 31 lanoitidda na dezirohtua 442-201 .L.P ;skeew 31 dna 02 fo sdoirep tifeneb dezirohtua 281-201 .L.P :etoN[ .setats rehto llA :skeew 31 .rehgih ro %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 02 2991/41/6 retfa ro no delif smialC .setats rehto llA :skeew 62 .2991/7/2 dengis ,)442-201 .L.P( noisnetxE stifeneB .rehgih ro tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE dna ;1991/4/21 dengis %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 33 ,)281-201 .L.P( yragnuH dna aikavolsohcezC ot 4791 fo .2991/3/7-1991/71/11 2991/41/6 erofeb delif smialC tcA edarT eht fo VI eltiT fo noitacilppA fo noitanimreT .setats rehto llA :skeew 6 .rehgih ro %92 fo etar noitsuahxe CU dna rehgih ro %5.2 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %4 fo RUI htiw setatS :skeew 31 .rehgih ro %5 .1991/51/11 dengis ,)461 . 281-201 .L.P yb dedesrepuS fo RUI ro rehgih ro %5.9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 02 -201 .L.P( tcA noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE )etad mialc tsrif( tceffE ni setaD sreiT tifeneB waL cilbuP 1991 fo stifeneB )CUE( noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE :sliateD .3-A elbaT .SRC :ecruoS setats rehto lla :skeew 2 %5 tsael ta fo RUI :skeew 4 3891/91/01 erofeb skeew rof era stifeneb gniniamer lla fi :skeew 5 3891/91/01 erofeb tub 3891/13/3 retfa stneipicer CSF rof stnemeltitne lanoitiddA setats rehto lla :skeew 8 %5 naht ssel tub %4 tsael ta fo RUI :skeew 01 %6 naht ssel tub %5 tsael ta fo RUI :skeew 21 .)5891/6 tsap stifeneb oN( rehgih ro %6 fo RUI :skeew 41 .3891/42/01 dengis ,)531-89 .L.P( 3891 .5891/13/3-3891/91/01 :retal ro 3891/91/01 no stnemyap tsrif CSF fo stnemdnemA noitasnepmoC latnemelppuS laredeF setats rehto lla :skeew 6 %6 naht ssel tub %4 tsael ta RUI :skeew 8 )etad mialc tsrif( tceffE ni setaD sreiT tifeneB waL cilbuP .SRC :ecruoS setats rehto lla :skeew 02 )9002/92/8 tsap stifeneb oN( rehgih ro .8002 ,12 rebmevoN dengis ,)944-011 .L.P( 9002/92/3-8002/32/11 %4 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %6 fo RUT htiw setats :skeew 33 ,8002 fo tcA noisnetxE noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU 8002 ,03 enuJ dengis ,)252 )9002/4/7 tsap stifeneb oN( -011 .L.P( noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE 9002/92/3-8002/6/7 setats lla :skeew 31 VI eltiT ,8002 fo tcA snoitairporppA latnemelppuS )etad mialc tsrif( tceffE ni setaD sreiT tifeneB waL cilbuP 8002 fo stifeneB )80CUE( noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE :sliateD .4-A elbaT .SRC :ecruoS ].CUE fo noitaripxe eht retfa elbaliava ylediw erom stifeneb sti ekam ot margorp BE eht ot segnahc tnenamrep edam osla wal sihT :etoN[ .setats rehto llA :skeew 7 )4991/03/4 tsap stifeneb oN( .rehgih ro 3991/52/11 dengis ,)251-301 .L.P( 4991/5/2-3991/3/01 %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 31 3991 fo stnemdnemA noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU .setats rehto llA :skeew 01 .rehgih ro %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 51 )shtnom evitucesnoc 2 rof %7 woleb gnillaf RUT lanoitan yb dereggirt( 3991/21/9 retfa ro no delif smialC setats rehto lla :skeew 02 rehgih ro %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setats :skeew 62 .3991/4/3 dengis ,)6-301 .L.P( 3991 fo .3991/2/01-3991/7/3 3991/21/9 erofeb delif smialC stnemdnemA noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU ycnegremE ].tem ton saw noitidnoc sihT .nwod desahp eb ot erew stifeneb %0.7 woleb llef RUT lanoitan fI :etoN[ .setats rehto llA :skeew 02 rehgih ro .2991/3/7 dengis ,)813-201 .L.P( .3991/6/3-2991/41/6 %5 fo RUI ro rehgih ro %9 fo RUT htiw setatS :skeew 62 2991 fo stnemdnemA noitasnepmoC tnemyolpmenU .53-79 .L.P yb suoreneg ssel eb ot deretla saw RUI fo noitaluclac eht dna detanimile saw reggirt BE laredef ehT .994-69 .L.P yb denethgit saw margorp BE etats-laredef eht rof ytilibigile laudividni ehT .a .mth.emoh/atad/vog.slb.www//:ptth ;scitsitatS robaL fo uaeruB ,yevruS noitalupoP tnerruC eht morf atad esu deyolpmenu noillim 1 fo sesaercni detamitsE .lmth.selcyc/gro.rebn.www//:ptth hcraeseR fo uaeruB cimonocE lanoitaN morf snoissecer fo gnimiT .SRC :ecruoS shtnom 81 9002 shtnom 73 4002 lirpA shtnom 44 4991 lirpA shtnom 74 5891 enuJ AN AN :deludehcS tsuguA demialc :deludehcS stifeneb tsaL -- DBT shtnom 02 2002 shtnom 71 2991 shtnom 12 3891 lirpA shtnom 41 1891 hcraM deyolpmenu rebmetpeS rebmetpeS noillim 1 tsael ta fo egnahc tsaL -- )DBT( shtnom 8 1002 shtnom 8 1991 shtnom 61 2891 shtnom 6 0891 yluJ denimreted rebmevoN hcraM rebmevoN eb oT noissecer dnE c,b shtnom 7 8002 yluJ shtnom 21 2002 shtnom 61 1991 shtnom 41 2891 AN enoN evitca hcraM rebmevoN rebmetpeS semoceb margorP a shtnom 6 8002 enuJ shtnom 11 2002 shtnom 31 1991 shtnom 31 2891 AN enoN noisnetxe stcane yraurbeF tsuguA tsuguA tsrif ssergnoC shtnom 3 8002 shtnom 5 1002 shtnom 4 0991 shtnom 4 1891 shtnom 3 0891 lirpA raey suoiverp hcraM tsuguA rebmevoN rebmevoN ni htnom emas ot derapmoc noillim 1 tsael ta fo tnemyolpmenu ni egnahc tsriF -- 7002 -- 1002 -- 0991 yluJ -- 1891 yluJ -- 0891 yraunaJ rebmeceD hcraM nageb etaD snigeB stifeneB snigeB stifeneB snigeB stifeneB snigeB stifeneB snigeB noisnetxE noisseceR 80CUE noisseceR CUET noisseceR CUE ,461 noisseceR CSF ,842 noisseceR laredeF retfa ,252 retfa ,741 retfa -201 .L.P retfa -79 .L.P retfa yraropmeT shtnoM -011 .L.P shtnoM -701 .L.P shtnoM shtnoM shtnoM oN noisseceR 7002 noisseceR 1002 noisseceR 1991-0991 noisseceR 2891-1891 noisseceR 0891 8002-0991 ,stifeneB tnemyolpmenU dednetxE dna ,raeY suoiverP ni htnoM emaS ot derapmoC deyolpmenU noilliM enO tsaeL ta fo tnemyolpmenU ni segnahC ,snoisseceR fo gnimiT.5-A elbaT .reit hcae rof skeew 31 lanoitidda na dezirohtua 442-201 .L.P ;snoitidnoc cimonoce etats no gnidneped skeew 31 dna 02 fo sdoirep tifeneb dezirohtua 281-201 .L.P .2991/7/2 dengis ,442-201 .L.P dna ,1991/4/21 dengis ,281-201 .L.P :swal rehto 2 yb dedesrepus yletaidemmi saw ti ,1991 ,51 rebmevoN no wal otni dengis saw 461-201 .L.P hguohtlA .c .79002=dip?php.xedni/sw/ude.bscu.ycnediserp.www//:ptth ees ,otev eht rof snosaer eht no tnemetats a roF .1991/1/01 no ti deotev ohw tnediserP eht ot 2271 .S tnes ssergnoC .elbaliava erew stifeneb on ,suht ;ycnegreme na eralced ton did tub )701-201 .L.P( llib eht dengis tnediserP eht ;1991/2/8 no dessap saw 1023 .R.H .b Julie M. Whittaker Specialist in Income Security jwhittaker@crs.loc.gov, 7-2587 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL34340