For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL34203 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ¢ ¢ ¢ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ¢ ¢ ¢ The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. The CSE program serves both welfare and non-welfare families. All 50 states and the four jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands operate CSE programs. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child support payments and served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.6 billion. The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals. P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a revised system that provides incentive payments based on a percentage of the state's CSE collections and incorporates five performance measures related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support payments, and cost-effectiveness. P.L. 105-200 set specific annual caps on total federal incentive payments and required states to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The exact amount of a state's incentive payment depends on its level of performance (or the rate of improvement over the previous year) when compared with other states. In addition, states are required to meet data quality standards. If states do not meet specified performance measures and data quality standards, they face federal financial penalties. P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibited federal matching (effective October 1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states can no longer be used to draw down federal funds. The repeal of federal reimbursement for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the incentive payment system per se. This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, explains how state incentive payments are derived, presents some of the state trends, and discusses the following list of issues: (1) does the CSE incentive payment system reward good performance? (2) should incentive payments be based on additional performance indicators? (3) should TANF funds be reduced because of poor CSE performance? (4) why aren't the incentives and penalties consistent for the paternity establishment performance measure? (5) should incentive payments be based on individual state performance rather than aggregate state performance? and (6) will the elimination of the federal match of incentive payments adversely affect CSE programs? The data analysis in this report covers the five-year period FY2002-FY2006. This report will not be updated. ¢ ¢ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Financing Elements of the CSE Program.................................................................................. 3 Purpose of the Current CSE Incentive Payment System........................................................... 5 Calculation of State CSE Incentive Payments................................................................................. 5 Data Reliability ......................................................................................................................... 8 Federal Financial Penalties.............................................................................................................. 9 State Trends ................................................................................................................................... 10 Performance Incentive Scores..................................................................................................11 Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) ....................................................................... 12 Child Support Order Establishment Percentage................................................................ 13 Current Child Support Collections Scores ........................................................................ 14 Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores ............................................................................. 15 Cost-Effectiveness Scores................................................................................................. 16 Incentive Payments for All Performance Measures ................................................................ 17 Relationship Between Incentive Payments and Performance Measures................................. 18 Policy Issues .................................................................................................................................. 19 Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good Performance? ................................ 20 CSE Collections................................................................................................................ 20 Artificial Thresholds Related to Performance Levels....................................................... 21 Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance Indicators? ...................... 22 Medical Child Support...................................................................................................... 23 Interstate Collections ........................................................................................................ 23 Welfare Cost Avoidance.................................................................................................... 24 Payment Processing Performance..................................................................................... 24 Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE Performance?................................. 24 Why Aren't the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity Establishment Performance Measure?......................................................................................................... 26 Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance?............................................................................................. 27 Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect CSE Programs? .................................................................................................................... 28 Figure 1. Paternity Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum ................................... 13 Figure 2. Child Support Order Establishment Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum................. 14 Figure 3. Child Support Current Collections Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum .................. 15 Figure 4. Child Support Arrearage Cases Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum........................ 16 Figure 5. Cost-Effectiveness Scores: Maximum, Median, Minimum ........................................... 17 ¢ ¢ Table B-1. Actual Incentive Payments, by State, FY2002-FY2005 .............................................. 36 Table B-2. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2002..................................................................................................... 38 Table B-3. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2003..................................................................................................... 41 Table B-4. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2004..................................................................................................... 44 Table B-5. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments and Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2005..................................................................................................... 47 Table B-6. Child Support Enforcement Unaudited Incentive Performance Scores, FY2006........ 51 ¡ Appendix A. Legislative History of CSE Incentive Payments ...................................................... 31 Appendix B. Tables ....................................................................................................................... 35 Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 54 ¢ ¢ Since the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program's enactment in 1975, the federal government has paid incentives (monetary payments) to states to encourage them to operate efficient and effective CSE programs.1 The incentive payment system is part of the CSE program's strategic plan that rewards states for working to achieve the goals and objectives of the program. Incentive payments, although small when compared to federal reimbursement payments for state and local CSE activities, are a very important component of the CSE financing structure. Together with the incentive payment system is a penalty system that imposes financial penalties on states that fail to meet certain performance levels. The purpose of the two complementary systems is to reward states for results while holding them accountable for poor performance, thereby motivating states to focus their efforts on providing vital CSE services. P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 (enacted July 16, 1998), replaced the old incentive payment system to states2 with a revised revenue-neutral (with respect to the federal government) incentive payment system that (1) provided incentive payments based on a percentage of the state's CSE collections; (2) incorporated five performance measures related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due child support payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phased in the incentive system, with it being fully effective beginning in FY2002; (4) required reinvestment of incentive payments into the CSE program; and (5) used an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and former TANF families. P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the revised incentive payment system had to be revenue-neutral (with respect to the federal government), which resulted in an annual cap on incentive payments. Congress capped incentive payments by legislating the total amount of incentive payments that states (in aggregate) could earn in each fiscal year. Federal law stipulates that the aggregate incentive payment to the states can not exceed the following amounts: $422 million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454 million for FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and $483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for inflation. Congress based the capped aggregate incentive 1 The 1975 enacting legislation (P.L. 93-647) based incentive payments solely on child support collections made on behalf of welfare (i.e., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)) families. In 1984, pursuant to P.L. 98-378, the law expanded the incentive payments formula to include child support collections made on behalf of nonwelfare families. For a legislative history of CSE incentive payments, see Appendix A. Also note that the AFDC entitlement program was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant pursuant to P.L. 104-193 (the 1996 welfare reform law). 2 Under the old incentive payment system, each state received a minimum incentive payment equal to at least 6% of the state's total amount of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC/TANF families for the year, plus at least 6% of the state's total amount of child support collections made on behalf of non-AFDC/TANF families for the year. The amount of a state's incentive payment could reach a maximum of 10% of the AFDC/TANF collections plus 10% of the non-AFDC/TANF collections, depending on the state's ratio of CSE collections to CSE expenditures. There was an additional limit (i.e., cap), however, on the incentive payment for non-AFDC/TANF collections. The incentive payment for such collections could not exceed 115% of incentive payments for AFDC/TANF collections. In addition, the old incentive payment system incorporated only one performance measure (i.e., cost-effectiveness) in determining incentive payments to states. One of the main criticisms of the old incentive payment system was that it did not provide an incentive for states to improve their programs because every state regardless of performance received the minimum incentive payment. There was general agreement by Congress that states whose CSE programs performed poorly should not be rewarded with federal funds. ¢ ¢ payment amount on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections of incentive payments at the time that the Child Support Performance and Incentive bill was passed.3 P.L. 105-200 also revised the financial penalty system for the CSE program to reflect that improved performance is especially critical in three areas: paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and current child support collections. If specified performance standards are not met in these three areas, financial penalties against the state's TANF program are imposed. Before the beginning of FY2008, the federal government was required to match incentive funds that states reinvested in the CSE program. P.L. 109-171 (the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) prohibits federal matching (effective October 1, 2007) of state expenditure of federal CSE incentive payments. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. So, instead of receiving 66% federal matching funds for incentive payments that are reinvested in the CSE program, the states receive no federal matching funds for such incentive payments. The repeal of federal matching funds for incentive payments reinvested in the CSE program has garnered much concern over its fiscal impact on the states and has renewed interest in the incentive payment system per se. This report describes the current CSE incentive payment system, provides information on financial penalties that are imposed on states if incentive payment data are unreliable or if performance standards are not met, explains how state incentive payments are derived, discusses some of the state trends, and presents some policy issues concerning incentive payments. In addition, the report includes two appendices. Appendix A presents a legislative history of CSE incentive payments. Appendix B includes several detailed state tables that display unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures.4 Table B-1 shows incentive payments by state for each of the following years--FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005--and the amount that each state received.5 Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2003 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2004 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006. 3 In FY1998, the incentive payment, which at that time came out of the gross federal share of child support collected on behalf of TANF families, was $395 million. Beginning in FY2002, child support incentive payments were no longer paid out of the federal share of child support collections made on behalf of TANF families. Instead, federal funds have been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury for CSE incentive payments. 4 The unaudited incentive performance scores are readily available each year when the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) publishes its preliminary data report. In this report the unaudited scores serve as a proxy for the actual (audited) performance indicator scores upon which actual incentive payments are based. (OCSE does not consistently publish actual (audited) performance indicator scores.) 5 OCSE has not yet published data on CSE incentive payments by state for FY2006. ¢ ¢ The CSE program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state-local partnership to help strengthen families by securing financial support from noncustodial parents. The CSE program serves both welfare and non-welfare families. In FY2006, the CSE program collected $23.9 billion in child support payments and served 15.8 million child support cases. In FY2006, total CSE program expenditures amounted to $5.6 billion, of which $458 million were incentive payments (i.e., 8% of total program expenditures). In FY2006, the CSE program collected $4.58 in child support (from noncustodial parents) for every dollar spent on the program. The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals. There are five funding streams for the CSE program. (For more details, see CRS Report RL33422, Analysis of Federal-State Financing of the Child Support Enforcement Program, by Carmen Solomon-Fears.) First, states spend their own money to operate a CSE program; the level of funding allocated by the state and localities determines the amount of resources available to CSE agencies.6 Second, the federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activities. The federal government's funding is "open-ended" in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amounts spent by state and local governments with no upper limit or ceiling. The federal government's financial participation in the CSE program is the program's largest revenue source. Third, the federal government provides states with an incentive payment to encourage them to operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments back into the CSE program or related activities. Effective October 1, 2007, P.L. 109-171 (enacted February 8, 2006) prohibits federal matching of state expenditures of federal CSE incentive payments. This means that beginning October 1, 2007, CSE incentive payments that are received by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. Fourth, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of 6 As indicated earlier, the federal share of total CSE expenditures is 66%. This means that the state's share of total CSE expenditures is 34%. The following report found that in aggregate 25% of the state's share of CSE expenditures is financed with incentive payments (i.e., dollars received from the federal government). According to a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-commissioned report, "While the mix of funding sources for each state is different, financing for the state and local share of CSE expenditures for the nation as a whole comes from state general fund appropriations (42%), federal incentive payments (25%), the state share of retained TANF collections (15%), and county general fund appropriations (9%). Overall, fees and other cost recoveries finance a negligible proportion (2%) of state and local shares of CSE expenditures." Source: State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services, prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc. and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest, September 3, 2003, p. iii. ¢ ¢ TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive TANF cash assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive TANF. In addition, such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child support. CSE collections on behalf of families receiving TANF cash benefits are used to reimburse state and federal governments for TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child support payments go to the state instead of the family, except for amounts that states choose to "pass through" to the family as additional income that does not affect TANF eligibility or benefit amounts). The formula for distributing the child support payments collected by the states on behalf of TANF families between the state and the federal government is still based on the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) federal-state reimbursement rates,7 even though the AFDC entitlement program was replaced by the TANF block grant program.8 Under existing law, states have the option of giving some, all, or none of their share of child support payments collected on behalf of TANF families to the family. Pursuant to P.L. 109-171 (effective October 1, 2008), states that choose to pass through some of the collected child support to the TANF family do not have to pay the federal government their shares of such collections if the amount passed through to the family and disregarded by the state does not exceed $100 per month ($200 per month for a family with two or more children) in child support collected on behalf of a TANF (or foster care) family. (For additional information, see CRS Report RL34105, The Financial Impact of Child Support on TANF Families: Simulation for Selected States, by Carmen Solomon-Fears and Gene Falk.) Fifth, application fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare families may help finance the CSE program. In the case of nonwelfare families, the custodial parent can hire a private attorney or apply for CSE services on their own. The CSE agency must charge an application fee, not to exceed $25, for families not on welfare who apply for CSE services. The CSE agency may charge this fee to the applicant or the noncustodial parent, or pay the fee out of state funds. In addition, a state may at its option recover costs in excess of the application fee. Such recovery may be either from the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent. Fees and costs recovered from nonwelfare cases must be subtracted from the state's total administrative costs before calculating the federal reimbursement amount (i.e., the 66% matching rate). Moreover, effective October 1, 2006, P.L. 109-171 requires families that have never been on TANF to pay a $25 annual user fee when child support enforcement efforts on their behalf are successful (i.e., at least $500 annually is collected on their behalf). The state can collect the user 7 Under old AFDC law, the rate at which states were reimbursed by the federal government for the costs of cash welfare was the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), which varies inversely with state per capita income (i.e., poor states have a higher federal matching rate, wealthy states have a lower federal matching rate). The FMAP ranges from a minimum of 50% to a statutory maximum of 83%. Like the old AFDC program, current law requires that child support collections made on behalf of welfare (i.e., TANF) families be split between the federal and state governments according the FMAP. If a state has a 50% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed $50 for each $100 in child support collections for TANF families; if a state has a 70% FMAP, the federal government is reimbursed $70 for each $100 in child support collections for TANF families. In the first example, the state keeps $50 and in the second example, the state keeps $30. Thus, states with a larger FMAP keep a smaller portion of the child support collections. 8 The TANF block grant replaced the AFDC entitlement program pursuant to P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law. Because the CSE incentive payments have changed significantly since 1975 (when the CSE program was enacted), this report refers to both AFDC families/cases and TANF families/cases, depending on the time frame. ¢ ¢ fee from the custodial parent, the noncustodial parent, or the state can pay the fee out of state funds. This annual user fee is separate from the application fee. ¢ ¢ From the outset, incentive payments were provided by the federal government to the states to encourage them to operate effective CSE programs. P.L. 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, was designed to further improve the CSE program by linking incentive payments to states' performance in five major areas. Instead of rewarding states only for their program's cost-effectiveness, the revised incentive payment system was designed to reward states for good performance in five different areas that were closely related to children obtaining child support payments (from their noncustodial parent). The new system was touted as one that would provide real incentives for the states to improve the CSE program, help families attain self- sufficiency, and support important societal goals like paternity identification and parental responsibility.9 The current CSE incentive payment system also adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be a somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, the total amount available is fixed, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds. Under the revised incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive payment for good performance and the total amount of its incentive payment depends on several factors: the total amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive payments, the state's success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload,10 the state's performance in five areas (see text box below), the reliability of a state's data, and the relative success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting the performance criteria. Moreover, unlike the old incentive system which allowed states and counties to spend incentive payments on whatever they chose, the current incentive system requires that the incentive payment be reinvested by the state into either the CSE program or some other activity which might lead to improving the efficiency or effectiveness of the CSE program (e.g., mediation/conflict-resolution services to parents, parenting classes, efforts to improve the earning capacity of noncustodial parents, etc.). Further, beginning October 1, 2007, federal matching funds are not available to increase the value of incentive payments. ¢ The CSE incentive payment structure is very complex. For a fuller explanation of how state incentive payments are calculated, see the example given in the CSE FY2006 data report.11 9 Department of Health and Human Services. News Release. HHS Submits Plan to Congress on New Rewards for States to Improve Child Support Collections. March 13, 1997. 10 The CSE program serves both welfare and nonwelfare families in its caseload. OCSE defines a CSE "case" as a noncustodial parent (mother, father, or putative/alleged father) who is now or eventually may be obligated under law for the support of a child or children receiving services under the CSE program. If the noncustodial parent owes support for two children by different women, that would be considered two cases; if both children have the same mother, that would be considered one case. 11 Go to the following website and scroll nearly to the end of the document to the section entitled How an Incentive (continued...) Payment is determined: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report/. (...continued) performance. not receive an incentive, unless the state makes significant improvement over its previous year's measure. Simultaneously, there is also a minimum level of performance below which states do above this upper threshold are entitled to the maximum possible incentive for that performance performance standard, there is an upper threshold. All states that achieve performance levels at or particular performance measure is based on a standard that is specified in law. For each into a mathematical formula (see text box that follows). The amount of incentive payments for a Under the CSE incentive payment system, each of the five performance measures is translated .snoitcelloc eseht ekam ot margorp eht yb tneps tnuoma latot eht yb margorp troppus dlihc eht hguorht detcelloc tnuoma latot eht gnidivid yb denimreted si ssenevitceffe-tsoc no ecnamrofrep etatS .ssenevitceffE-tsoC ).ylimaf eht htiw noitcelloc eht serahs etats eht sselnu esac tnemyap egaraerra na sa tnuoc ton od ,tpecretni xat emocni laredef yb detcelloc era segaraerra hcihw ni dna ,eraflew no ylremrof saw ylimaf eht hcihw ni sesaC( .dewo si troppus eud-tsap hcihw ni sesac fo rebmun latot eht yb raey lacsif eht gnirud segaraerra no tnemyap emos saw ereht hcihw ni sesac fo rebmun eht gnidivid yb deniatbo si )stnemyap eud-tsap ,.e.i( sraerra no ecnamrofrep etatS .stnemyaP egaraerrA .eud -tsap ton si hcihw sesac eseht ni troppus no dewo tnuoma latot eht yb daolesac ESC eht ni sesac ni troppus tnerruc rof detcelloc srallod latot eht gnidivid yb deniatbo si stnemyap tnerruc no ecnamrofrep etatS .stnemyaP tnerruC .margorp eht ni sesac fo rebmun latot eht yb redro troppus a si ereht hcihw rof daolesac ESC eht ni sesac fo rebmun eht gnidivid yb detaluclac si sredro troppus no ecnamrofrep etatS .sredrO troppuS dlihC fo tnemhsilbatsE .raey lacsif gnidecerp eht gnirud egairram fo edistuo nrob nerdlihc fo rebmun latot eht yb raey lacsif eht gnirud dehsilbatse neeb sah ytinretap mohw rof dna egairram fo edistuo nrob erew ohw nerdlihc ronim fo rebmun latot eht gnidivid yb detaluclac si tnemhsilbatse ytinretap no ecnamrofrep etatS .)PEP( egatnecreP tnemhsilbatsE ytinretaP ediwetatS )2( ;egairram fo edistuo nrob erew ohw raey lacsif gnidecerp eht fo dne eht fo sa daolesac ESC s'etats eht ni nerdlihc fo rebmun latot eht yb dehsilbatse neeb sah ytinretap mohw rof dna egairram fo edistuo nrob erew ohw )raey lacsif eht fo dne eht ta noitpo etats ta ro( raey lacsif eht gnirud daolesac ESC s'etats eht ni nerdlihc fo rebmun latot eht gnidivid yb detaluclac si tnemhsilbatse ytinretap no ecnamrofrep etatS .)PEP( egatnecreP tnemhsilbatsE ytinretaP ESC )1( :snoitpo owt evah setatS .tnemhsilbatsE ytinretaP serusaeM ecnamrofreP ESC support), and (5) cost-effectiveness of the CSE program. collection of current child support, (4) collection of child support arrearages (i.e., past-due child are related to (1) establishment of paternity, (2) establishment of child support orders, (3) support payments and the performance of the states in five areas. The five performance measures CSE incentive payments to states are based on several factors including state collections of child ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ To determine a state's incentive payment, the following computations must be made. First, each state's performance percentage for each performance measure is separately determined and translated into the applicable percentage for that particular performance measure. If the performance percentage is at or above the upper threshold, the applicable percentage for that performance measure would be 100%. If the performance percentage is below the lower threshold, the applicable percentage for that performance measure would be 0%.12 If the performance percentage is in between these two points (the upper and lower thresholds), the applicable percentage is obtained by referring to )egatnecrep elbacilppa dna( sdlohserhT ecnamrofreP the tables specified in PEP fI %001 neht ,%08 %0 neht ,%05 < fi federal law (Section 458(b)(6) of the Social tnemhsilbatse redro fI %001 neht ,%08 %0 neht ,%05 < fi Security Act) for each of troppus tnerruc fI %001 neht ,%08 %0 neht ,%04 < fi the performance segaraerra fI %001 neht ,%08 %0 neht ,%04 < fi measures. For example, with regard to the ssenevitceffe-tsoc fI %001 neht ,00.5 %0 neht ,00.2 < fi establishment of child support orders, if the state's performance percentage for this measure is 70%, meaning that 70% of CSE cases in the state have a child support order, the applicable percentage is 80% (The tables showing all of the applicable percentages for each performance measure are in Section 458(b)(6)(B) of the Social Security Act). Second, after the applicable percentage for each performance measure is determined, that percentage is multiplied by the "collections" base for an individual state. The collections base is calculated by multiplying child support collections made on behalf of TANF families, Title IV-E foster care families and Medicaid families in the state by a factor of 2 and then adding that amount to the amount of collections made on behalf of families that were never on welfare [2 x (TANF collections + formerly on TANF collections)+ never on TANF collections].13 Third, if the performance measure is paternity establishment, child support order establishment, or current collections, then the resulting amount (i.e., the applicable percentage multiplied by the collections base) is multiplied by 100%. If the performance measure is past-due collections (i.e., arrearages) or cost-effectiveness, then the resulting amount is multiplied by 75%. These calculations result in maximum incentives for each performance measure. 12 At the low end of the performance scale, there is a minimum level below which a state is not rewarded with an incentive payment unless the state demonstrates a substantial improvement over the prior year's performance. Even though substantial improvement is recognized, the law stipulates that the incentive payment in such cases cannot exceed 50% of the maximum incentive possible for that performance measure. The substantial improvement provisions do not apply with respect to the cost-effectiveness performance measure. 13 It was decided during the negotiations on revising the incentive payment system that, because collecting child support on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families is generally more difficult than collecting child support on behalf of families who had never been on TANF, the incentive formula should provide a greater emphasis on collection in TANF and former TANF cases. Moreover, it was mentioned that collections in TANF cases provide direct savings to the state and federal governments. The incentive payment formula thus doubles the collections made on behalf of TANF and former-TANF cases to give them extra emphasis. (See Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. February 1997. p. 8.) ¢ ¢ Fourth, the maximum incentives are added together. The dollar amount that is obtained by adding together the five maximum incentives for each performance measure is called the maximum incentive base amount. Fifth, all of the states' (includes the four jurisdictions: the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) maximum incentive base amounts are then added together for a total maximum incentive base amount. Sixth, each state's individual maximum base amount is compared to the total maximum incentive base amount. The mathematical formula would be--maximum state incentive base/sum of all state incentive bases. An individual state's share of the total is the percentage that is used to determine the state's actual incentive payment. For example, if a state's share of the total is 17%, then the state will receive 17% of the capped incentive payment for the fiscal year in question. In FY2007 for example, the state's incentive payment would be $80,070,000 (.17* $471 million). The federal government makes incentive payments to states on an on-going quarterly prospective basis using state estimates of what their incentive payments will total. After the audited performance data (discussed below) are available, OCSE reconciles the incentive payment actually earned with the amount previously estimated, and received, by the state.14 ¢ Before enactment of P.L. 105-200, incentive payments (under the old system) were not dependent on data reliability. Although audits were performed at least once every three years to ensure compliance with federal CSE program requirements, the audits were focused on administrative procedures and processes rather than performance outcomes and results. Under current federal law, states are accountable for providing reliable data on a timely basis or they receive no incentive payments. The data reliability provisions were enacted as part of P.L. 105-200, which established the current incentive payment system. They are in the law to ensure the integrity of the incentive payment system. The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) Office of Audit performs data reliability audits to evaluate the completeness, accuracy, security, and reliability of data reported and produced by state reporting systems. The audits help ensure that incentives under the Child Support Performance and Incentives Act of 1998 (P.L. 105- 200) are earned and paid only on the basis of verifiable data and that the incentive payments system is fair and equitable. If an audit determines that a state's data are not complete and reliable for a given performance measure, the state receives zero payments for that measure.15 If states do not meet the data quality standards, they do not receive incentive payments and are subject to federal financial penalties. Although estimated incentive payments are sent to states on a prospective quarterly basis, those estimated incentive payments are reconciled to the actual 14 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System--Interim Report, by the Lewin Group (Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 19. 15 FY2004 was the fifth year that OCSE calculated and paid incentives to states for meeting performance standards in five performance measure areas. According to OCSE, 50 states and jurisdictions passed the audits for FY2004. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support Enforcement. Office of Child Support Enforcement FY 2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007. http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/reports/annual_report/#26 ¢ ¢ incentive payment earned after the auditing process. Thus, if a state fails the audit on a particular performance measure, the state would not receive an incentive payment for that measure (i.e., the state's funding would be reduced to reflect the audit's findings).16 The audit for the fiscal year generally begins at the beginning of a calendar year (after the fiscal year has ended) and is completed by early summer.17 States provide the assigned regional OCSE office with a universe of cases and audit trails. From this universe, a sample is selected. The auditor selects at least 150 cases from the state's universe. State are required to provide auditors with documentation, through access to state computerized/automated systems and hard copies of documents for each of the sample cases. The auditor reviews the sample cases to determine if the items he or she is trying to verify are correct. For example, if the documentation indicates that $450 in current support was paid during the fiscal year, the auditor looks up the collection history for that particular case on the state's automated system to determine if the $450 figure is correct. Federal regulations (Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i)) require data to meet a 95% standard of reliability.18 Once the audit is completed, the general practice is for an auditor from a different field office to review the findings. Moreover, the OCSE headquarters staff that work on audits also review audit findings. Informational sessions and opportunities to contest the findings are available during the audit process.19 The CSE performance-based penalty system provides that a financial penalty be assessed when data submitted for calculating state performance is found to be incomplete or unreliable. Penalties may also be assessed when the calculated level of performance for any of three performance measures--paternity establishment, support order establishment, or current collections--fails to achieve a specified level or when states are not in compliance with certain child support requirements. There is an automatic corrective action year if performance measures and data reliability are not achieved. The corrective action year is the immediately succeeding fiscal year following the year of the deficiency. If the state's data are determined complete and reliable and the related performance is adequate for the corrective action year, the penalty is not imposed. 16 According to the federal regulations (45 CFR Part 304.12): Each state calculates the federal government's share of child support payments collected on behalf of TANF families. Then the state retains one-fourth of its annual estimate of incentive payments from the federal government's share of child support collected on behalf of TANF families each quarter. Following the end of a fiscal year, the OCSE will calculate the actual incentive payment the state should have received based on the reports submitted for that fiscal year. If adjustments to the estimate are necessary, the state's quarterly TANF grant award will be reduced or increased because of over- or under-estimates for prior quarters and for other adjustments. 17 Thereby, the audit of FY2007 (October 1, 2006-September 30, 2007) incentive payment data would usually begin in January 2008 and generally would be completed by July 2008. Once the audit is completed, estimated incentive payments would be reconciled with actual incentive payments. 18 Title 45 CFR Section 305.1(i) states that " ... data may contain errors as long as they are not of a magnitude that would cause a reasonable person, aware of the errors, to doubt a finding or conclusion based on the data." 19 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System--Interim Report, by the Lewin Group (Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 14. ¢ ¢ If the corrective action was unsuccessful, the financial penalty is a reduction in the state's TANF block grant. Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC) program. Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with TANF (and used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the governor of a state must certify that it will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block grant funding. Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a provision in federal law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the CSE program with a reduction in Title IV-A funding. Under the performance-based audit procedures (Section 409(a)(8) of the Social Security Act), a graduated penalty equal to 1%-5% of the federal TANF block grant is assessed against a state if (1) on the basis of the data submitted by the state for a review, the state CSE program fails to achieve the paternity establishment or other performance standards set by the HHS Secretary;20 (2) an audit finds that the state data are incomplete or unreliable; or (3) the state failed to substantially comply with one or more CSE state plan requirements, and the state fails to correct the deficiencies in the fiscal year following the performance year (i.e., the corrective action plan year). The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 1% nor more than 2% of the TANF block grant program for the first year of the deficiency. The penalty amount increases each year, up to 5%,21 for each consecutive year the state's data are found to be incomplete, unreliable, or the state's performance on a penalty measure fails to attain the specified level of performance. According to the CSE annual data report for FY2004: "In 2004, nine States received a penalty after the FY2003 corrective action year for the FY2002 performance period. Six States filed appeals to the Department Appeals Board."22 A state's share of incentive payments depends on many factors that are distinct to its population and CSE caseload. CSE collection can be straightforward. In most CSE cases paternity has already been established and in a majority of cases the child support order was established at the time of the divorce or separation. Further, many noncustodial parents are up-to-date in their child support payments and do not owe any past-due (arrearage) payments. However, in other cases meeting CSE performance measures can be more difficult. Although not exactly sequential, the CSE performance measures are very interdependent. A child support order cannot be established if paternity has not been legally determined. Child support payments cannot be collected or enforced unless a child support order has been established. Arrearage payments cannot be 20 There are three performance measures for which states have to achieve certain levels of performance in order to avoid being penalized for poor performance. These measures are (1) paternity establishment [specifically mentioned in the federal law--Section 409(a)(8)(A) of the Social Security Act], (2) child support order establishment, and (3) current child support collections [these last two performance measures were designated by the HHS Secretary--45 CFR Section 305.40]. 21 The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 2% nor more than 3% of the TANF block grant program for the second year of the deficiency. The penalty amount is calculated as not less than 3% nor more than 5% of the TANF block grant program for the third or subsequent year of the deficiency. 22 Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Child Support Enforcement FY2004 Annual Report to Congress. April 2007. ¢ ¢ collected if current child support is not paid. States that have more cases that require services such as paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and payment of arrearages generally have a tougher time collecting child support than states that do not face such challenges. In FY2005, the aggregate incentive payment amount was $446 million. Among the 50 states and the 4 jurisdictions of the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, CSE incentive payments in FY2005 ranged from a high of $41.7 million in California to a low of $108,972 in the Virgin Islands.23 As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state's collections base, which is largely dependent on population size. Thus, the aggregate amount of incentive dollars received by individual states are a poor indicator of a state's performance with respect to individual performance measures. As discussed in more detail later, incentive payments are not directly correlated with performance. In other words, even though a state may receive a high incentive payment, the state's performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very poor. This results because child support collections are the critical determinant of incentive payments to states. In fact, the top ten states with regard to collecting child support (in FY2002- FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments.24 The data presented in this report are based on the unaudited incentive payment performance scores. These data are readily available each year when OCSE publishes its preliminary data report. Over the years, states have made significant improvement in the area of data reliability. According to the final report on FY2004 data, only four jurisdictions failed data reliability audits. A comparison of FY2002 performance score data to FY2006 performance score data25 shows that CSE program performance has improved with respect to all five performance measures. The following scores represent the total score for all 54 jurisdictions for each of the performance measures (referred to in this analysis as national averages). The national average for the paternity establishment score went from 73% (CSE program measure rather than statewide measure) in FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from 70% to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score for child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score increased from 4.13 to 4.58. If state trends are examined in terms of the median score of the five performance measures rather than the average score, the time-trend is similar to the trend in the national averages, but the performance of the median state, over the five-year period, tends to be slightly higher than that of the average state with respect to paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and cost-effectiveness. With regard to the other two performance measures (i.e., current collections 23 The OCSE has not yet published actual incentive payment data by state for FY2006. 24 During the four-year period FY2002-FY2005, the states with the highest incentive payments were California, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. These states also are the most populous states. 25 The table for the FY2002 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/ prelim_datareport/. The table for the FY2006 data can be found at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/ preliminary_report/. ¢ ¢ and arrearages), the median score is the same or almost the same as the average score.26 The median score for paternity establishment went from 87% in FY2002 to 94% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from 71% to 79%; the score for current child support collections increased from 57% to 59%; the score for child support arrearage cases did not change from 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score increased from 4.49 to 4.70. The following analysis examines the individual CSE performance measures for the five-year period FY2002-FY2006. It focuses on the median,27 maximum, and minimum scores for all five performance measures. ¢ One of the goals of the CSE program has always been to establish paternity for those needing that service. In fact the official title of the program when it was enacted in 1975 and to this day is Child Support and Establishment of Paternity. The CSE program's strategic plan for FY2005- FY2009 reiterates this by indicating that goal #1 of the program is that all children have an established parentage and the program tries to achieve this goal by increasing the percentage of children with a legal relationship with their parents. As mentioned earlier in the CSE performance measures text box, states have two options for determining the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP). They can use a PEP that is based on data that pertains solely to the CSE program or they can use a PEP that is based on data that pertains to the state population as a whole. In effect, the PEP compares paternities established during the fiscal year with the number of nonmarital births during the preceding fiscal year. During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median PEP score among the 54 jurisdictions28 with CSE programs ranged from 86.64 in FY2002 to 94.11 in FY2006 (with a slight dip in FY2004). The maximum PEP score was 130.75 in FY2002, it rose to 190.70 in FY2003 and dropped to 122.12 in FY2006. A PEP of 100% or more generally means that the state has established paternity for more than just the newborns who were born outside of marriage in the specified year (i.e., the state has established paternity for many older children as well).29 The minimum PEP score fluctuated during the period FY2002 through FY2006. It started at 50.83 and ended at 59.44. 26 The median reflects the performance of the middle-ranked state, with all states weighted equally. 27 The median score sometimes better illustrates trends because unlike the mean (i.e., average) it is not affected by very high or very low scores. 28 According to preliminary FY2002 data, Guam had the maximum PEP score of 452.87, but that score for Guam was excluded because of conflicting data. 29 As mentioned earlier in the text box, a state may use as its PEP either the CSE PEP or the statewide PEP. The state CSE PEP is based on the entire number of children in the CSE caseload who had been born outside of marriage, regardless of year of birth, and whether paternity had been established for them. If the CSE PEP is more than 100%, then the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage but had paternity established on their behalf exceeded the number of children on the CSE rolls who were born outside of marriage in any previous year. Whereas, if the statewide PEP is more than 100%, then the number of paternities established in the current fiscal year exceeded the number of babies born outside of marriage in the preceding fiscal year. ¢ ¢ muminiM ,naideM ,mumixaM :serocS tnemhsilbatsE ytinretaP .1 erugiF 2002YF 3002YF 4002YF 5002YF 6002YF naideM 46.68 51.09 58.98 74.19 11.49 mumixaM 57.031 07.091 67.711 24.211 21.221 muminiM 38.05 09.36 12.36 50.45 44.95 troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp trahC :ecruoS .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE mauG ,atad yranimilerp fo sisab eht no ,2002YF nI .erocs naidem eht sthgilhgih shparg enil eht no x ehT :etoN rof PEP reiltuo taht ,mauG rof atad gnitcilfnoc rehto fo esuaceb ,revewoH .)78.254( erocs mumixam eht dah .)ohadI( 57.031 saw 2002YF ni erocs PEP tsehgih txen ehT .sisylana siht morf dedulcxe saw mauG Goal #2 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for all children in the CSE caseload to have child support orders. The second performance measure focuses on the percentage of CSE cases that have a child support order (i.e., a legally-binding document that requires the noncustodial parent to pay child support). During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support order establishment score among the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs rose each year, starting at 71.28 in FY2002 and ending at 78.96 in FY2006. The maximum score for this performance measure fluctuated; it started at 92.03, reached a high of 96.00 in FY2005 and declined back to 92.98 in FY2006. The minimum score for child support order establishment rose significantly during the five-year period, starting at 29.66 in FY2002 and ending at 45.43 in FY2006. ¢ ¢ 2 erugiF muminiM ,naideM ,mumixaM :serocS tnemhsilbatsE redrO troppuS dlihC . 2002YF 3002YF 4002YF 5002YF 6002YF naideM 82.17 05.47 14.57 80.67 69.87 mumixaM 30.29 01.49 37.39 00.69 89.29 muminiM 66.92 09.13 29.43 06.93 34.54 troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp trahC :ecruoS .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE .erocs naidem eht sthgilhgih shparg enil eht no x ehT :etoN Goal #430 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program is for all children in the CSE caseload to receive the financial support owed by their noncustodial parents. This goal encompasses both current child support payments and past-due child support payments (i.e., arrearages). The third performance indicator measures the proportion of current child support owed that is collected on behalf of children in the CSE caseload. During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support current collections score among the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs was 57.10 in FY2002, dropped to 56.65 in FY2003, remained relatively unchanged in FY2004, and increased for the next two years to a score of 59.16 in FY2006. The maximum score was relatively stable, ranging from 74.37 to 74.80. The minimum score increased every year over the five-year period, from 39.11 in FY2002 to 45.92 in FY2006. 30 Goal #3 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the CSE Program is for all children in the CSE program to have medical coverage. ¢ ¢ 3 erugiF muminiM ,naideM ,mumixaM :serocS snoitcelloC tnerruC troppuS dlihC . 2002YF 3002YF 4002YF 5002YF 6002YF naideM 01.75 56.65 66.65 98.85 61.95 mumixaM 07.47 08.47 73.47 27.47 56.47 muminiM 11.93 09.04 86.24 63.44 29.54 troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp trahC :ecruoS .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE .erocs naidem eht sthgilhgih shparg enil eht no x ehT :etoN The fourth performance indicator measures state efforts to collect money from CSE cases with an arrearage (i.e., past-due child support payments are owed). This performance measure specifically counts paying cases--and not total arrearage dollars collected--because states have different methods of handling certain aspects of arrearage cases. For example, the ability to write off debt that is deemed uncollectible varies by state. Moreover, some states charge interest on arrearages (which is considered additional arrearages) while other states do not.31 As mentioned above, this performance measure is incorporated in goal #4 as listed in the FY2005-FY2009 CSE Strategic Plan. During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median child support arrearage cases score among the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs fluctuated slightly during the period. It was 60.71 in FY2002 and was 61.34 in FY2006. The maximum score increased from 71.58 in FY2002 to 75.21 in FY2006 (with a drop between FY2003 and FY2004). The minimum score rose from 30.21 in FY2002 to 42.33 in FY2004 and then declined to 41.01 in FY2006. 31 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System--Interim Report, by the Lewin Group (Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 7. ¢ ¢ 4 erugiF muminiM ,naideM ,mumixaM :serocS sesaC egaraerrA troppuS dlihC . 2002YF 3002YF 4002YF 5002YF 6002YF naideM 17.06 08.95 51.95 95.06 43.16 mumixaM 85.17 02.27 38.17 05.37 12.57 muminiM 12.03 00.73 33.24 63.14 10.14 troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp trahC :ecruoS .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE .erocs naidem eht sthgilhgih shparg enil eht no x ehT :etoN Goal #5 in the FY2005-FY2009 Strategic Plan of the Child Support Enforcement Program says that the CSE program will be efficient and responsive in its operations. The fifth performance measure assesses the total dollars collected by the CSE program for each dollar spent During the period FY2002-FY2006, the median cost-effectiveness score among the 54 jurisdictions with CSE programs was 4.49 in FY2002, it rose and fell throughout the period, and ended at 4.70 in FY2006. The maximum score went from 7.80 to 9.45 over the five-year period (with a drop between FY2004 and FY2005). The minimum score was 1.46 in FY2002 reached 2.10 in FY2005 and dropped to 1.84 in FY2006. ¢ ¢ -tsoC .5 erugiF muminiM ,naideM ,mumixaM :serocS ssenevitceffE 2002YF 3002YF 4002YF 5002YF 6002YF naideM 94.4 86.4 26.4 77.4 07.4 mumixaM 08.7 19.7 07.8 35.8 54.9 muminiM 64.1 75.1 38.1 01.2 48.1 troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp trahC :ecruoS .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE .erocs naidem eht sthgilhgih shparg enil eht no x ehT :etoN ¢ Although CSE incentive payments were awarded to all 54 jurisdictions (including the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) during the FY2002-FY2006 period, some jurisdictions performed poorly on certain performance measures and thereby did not receive an incentive for that measure. (See the earlier text box on performance thresholds for the percentage scores on each performance measure that do not warrant an incentive payment.) Even so, the 54 jurisdictions (in aggregate) improved their performance over the five-year period. In FY2002, 46 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures compared to 53 jurisdictions in FY2005 and 52 jurisdictions in FY2006. On the basis of the unaudited FY2002 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 46 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 3 jurisdictions received an incentive for four performance measures (California, Hawaii, and Mississippi), and 5 jurisdictions (Illinois, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) received an incentive for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-2.) On the basis of the unaudited FY2003 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 48 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, 5 jurisdictions received an incentive for four performance measures (Illinois, Mississippi, New Mexico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), and the remaining jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive for three performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-3.) ¢ ¢ On the basis of the unaudited FY2004 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 51 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures, and 3 jurisdictions received an incentive for four performance measures (New Mexico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands). (See Appendix, Table B-4.) On the basis of the unaudited FY2005 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 53 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and the remaining jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) received an incentive for four performance measures. (See Appendix, Table B-5.) Table B-6 indicates that on the basis of the unaudited FY2006 performance incentive scores of the 54 jurisdictions, 52 jurisdictions received an incentive for all five performance measures and the remaining 2 jurisdictions (the District of Columbia and Guam) received an incentive for four performance measures. ¢ Given that the incentive payment is based on five performance measures, it is likely that all jurisdictions would continue to receive some amount of incentive payments. However, if individual performance measures are examined, a different picture develops; some states may not perform well enough to receive an incentive payment with respect to one of the five performance measures. Table B-2, Table B-3, Table B-4, and Table B-5 show actual incentive payments by state (includes jurisdictions) for each of the four years FY2002-FY2005, respectively, along with the five performance measures.32 The states in each of the tables are ranked from highest performing state (relative to each indicator) to lowest performing state. These tables illustrate that the relationship between actual performance and CSE incentive payments is not always transparent. That is, even though a state may receive a high incentive payment, the state's performance on one or several individual performance measures may be very poor. Child support collections are a very important component in determining the amount of a state's incentive payment. As mentioned earlier, incentive payments are a function of a state's collections base, which is composed of child support collected on behalf of current and former TANF families multiplied by two plus the collection amount made on behalf of families who have never been on TANF.33 The main reason that there is not a more direct relationship between incentive payments and performance levels is that the incentive payment calculation is so heavily dependent on child support collections. Thus, a high collections base can mean that a state receives a high incentive payment despite low performance measures. For example, although California received the highest incentive payment in each of the years FY2002-FY2005, it ranked very low with regard to cost-effectiveness (51st in FY2002, 50th in FY2003, 52nd in FY2004, and 51st in FY2005); current collections (53rd in FY2002, 51st in FY2003, 52nd in FY2004, and 50th in FY2005); and arrearage cases (40th in FY2002, 41st in FY2003, 43rd in FY2004, and 37th in FY2005). However, because California collected at least 31% more child support payments than the next ranking state (and at least 64% 32 OCSE has not yet published data showing the incentive payments received by states in FY2006. 33 State's Collections Base = 2 x (TANF collections + Formerly on TANF collections) + Never on TANF collections. ¢ ¢ of those collections were on behalf of TANF or former-TANF families), it is not surprising that California received the highest amount of incentive payments in each of the years FY2002- FY2005.34 According to OCSE annual data reports, the top ten states with regard to collecting child support (in FY2002-FY2005) were the top ten states with regard to high incentive payments (although not in the same rank order). ¢ The current performance-based incentive payments system is part of the CSE program's strategic plan to set goals and measure results. Despite a general consensus that the CSE program is doing well, questions still arise about whether the program is effectively meeting its mission and concerns exist over whether the program will be able to meet future expectations in light of recent reductions in federal funding that were made pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171). Some in the CSE "community" (e.g., states, CSE workers, analysts, state policymakers, and advocates) contend that several factors may cause a state not to receive an incentive payment that is commensurate with its relative performance on individual measures. These factors include static or declining CSE collections; sliding scale performance scores that financially benefit states at the upper end (but not the top) of the artificial threshold and financially disadvantage states at the lower end of the artificial threshold; a limited number of performance indicators that do not encompass all of the components critical to a successful CSE program; and a statutory maximum on the aggregate amount of incentive payments that can be paid to states--which causes states to have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds. Others point out that the current CSE incentive payment system was developed with much thought and input from the CSE community. They maintain that the incentive payment formula rewards states for their performance in five critical areas, consistent with the legislated mission of the CSE program as well as the program's strategic plan and related outcome measures. They say that the performance thresholds were designed to provide tough but reachable targets for performance by rewarding states with higher incentives as they improve. In addition, it is argued that the annual cap on incentive payments (imposed by P.L. 105-200) has encouraged competition among the states and that there is no evidence that the cap has stifled the motivation of states to improve performance. Many in the CSE community argue that any reduction in the federal government's financial commitment to the CSE system could negatively affect states' ability to serve families. They contend that a cost shift to the states (during this time when many interests are competing for limited state dollars) could jeopardize the effectiveness of the CSE program and thereby could 34 California collected 31% more in child support payments than Texas in FY2002. In FY2003, California collected 41% more in child support payments than Texas. In FY2004, California collected 45% more in child support payments than Texas and in FY2005, California collected 25% more in child support payments than Texas. California was the highest ranked state with respect to CSE incentive payments in FY2002-FY2005, Texas was the next ranked state. Given that the incentive formula gives more weight to child support collections made on behalf of TANF and former- TANF families than on families that have never been on TANF, it is important to note that the majority of the child support collected in California for the four years illustrated was on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families. Specifically, in FY2002-FY2005, 75%, 64%, 71%, and 65% (respectively) of CSE collections in California were made on behalf of TANF and former-TANF families. ¢ ¢ have a negative impact on the children and families the CSE program is designed to serve. Although most analysts agree that a reduction in CSE funding could result in a less effective CSE program, several CSE directors who were surveyed in the Lewin Group study said that they expected their states to replace all or most of federal funding shortfalls in the CSE program. However, some of the directors moderated their statements by saying that the prospect of the state replacing eliminated federal dollars with state dollars in years beyond FY2008 is uncertain.35 This section discusses the following list of issues: (1) "Does the CSE Incentive Payment System Reward Good Performance?" (2)"Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Additional Performance Indicators?" (3) "Should TANF Funds Be Reduced Because of Poor CSE Performance?" (4) "Why Aren't the Incentives and Penalties Consistent for the Paternity Establishment Performance Measure?" (5) "Should Incentive Payments Be Based on Individual State Performance Rather Than Aggregate State Performance?" and (6) "Will the Elimination of the Federal Match of Incentive Payments Adversely Affect CSE Programs?" ¢ ¢ According to OCSE, all states received a CSE incentive payment in FY2006. This means that all states attained a certain level of program performance. According to OCSE, for all five performance measures, all states36 achieved applicable percentage scores that earned them incentives. Moreover, a comparison of FY2002 data to FY2006 data shows that CSE program performance has improved for all five performance measures. The national average for the paternity establishment score increased from 73% (CSE measure rather than statewide measure) in FY2002 to 90% in FY2006; the score for child support order establishment increased from 70% to 77%; the score for current child support collections increased from 58% to 60%; the score for child support arrearage cases increased from 60% to 61%; and the cost-effectiveness score increased from 4.13 to 4.58. Nonetheless, many contend that the CSE incentive payment systems is too heavily based on child support collections and that artificial thresholds adversely affect performance levels in that they unfairly allow states that are performing at significantly higher levels than other states to be given the same score (at the high end of the performance scale and at the low end of the performance scale). Ultimately the amount of a state's incentive payment depends on how much the state collects in child support payments. If a state has a small amount of child CSE collections, then even if it has high performance percentages for all five measures, its CSE incentive payment would be small. 35 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child Support Directors by the Legin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/ nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf. 36 Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Guam, received incentive payments in four rather than five performance areas. The District of Columbia failed to meet the performance threshold for child support order establishment and Guam failed to meet the cost-effectiveness threshold. ¢ ¢ Total child support collections for a state may vary for a number of reasons. Some factors that may influence the amount of child support a state collects include the population of the state, the number of single parents in the state, the number of children in the state, the number of unmarried parents in the state, the number of successful paternity determinations, the number of successful child support order establishments, the size of the TANF caseload, the size of the former-TANF caseload, the number of interstate cases, the effectiveness of the state's CSE program, state per capita income, state child poverty rate, and unemployment rate. All of the performance measures have a sliding scale so that increased performance earns a higher level of the incentive payment. However, they also all have upper and lower thresholds.37 This means that above a certain percentage, all percentages are translated into the maximum applicable percentage. By the same policy, all performance percentages that are below a certain threshold percentage are translated into zero (i.e., the state would not be eligible for an incentive payment), unless the program improves sufficiently and quickly. For performance measures pertaining to the establishment of paternity or the establishment of child support orders, if a state establishes paternity for at least 80% of its caseload or establishes a child support order for at least 80% of its caseload, the state receives a percentage score of 100%. In FY2006, this meant that Louisiana, a state that established paternity for 81.07% of the children in the state without legally identified fathers, and Oklahoma, a state that established paternity for 122.12%38 of the children in the state without legally identified fathers, both received a paternity establishment percentage score of 100%. Thus, states separated by more than 40 percentage points received the same performance ranking--thereby not fully rewarding the performance of the more successful state. With regard to the establishment of child support orders, in FY2006, South Dakota, a state with an order establishment percentage of 92.98%, received the maximum possible percentage score of 100% as did California, a state with a child support order establishment percentage of 80.57%. By the same reasoning, the lower threshold of 50% treats states establishing zero paternities and zero child support orders the same as states establishing paternities or child support orders for 49% of their caseload. (In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (the District of Columbia--order establishment [45.43%]) had an applicable percentage score below 50% for either paternity establishment or child support order establishment.) (See Appendix, Table B-6.) The upper threshold for the current collections performance measure also is 80% but the lower threshold is 40%. The performance measure for current child support collections is based on the 37 P.L. 104-193 (enacted August 22, 1996), the 1996 welfare reform law directed the HHS Secretary to develop a new revenue-neutral performance-based incentive payment system in consultation with state CSE directors. The federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) convened an Incentive Funding Work Group in late 1996 to develop a new incentive payment system. The work group consisted of 26 persons representing state and local CSE programs, HHS regional offices, and the OCSE central office. The work group determined the minimum and maximum standards (i.e., thresholds) for each performance measure based on historic performance by the states and state trends. In general, the upper threshold was based on the view that most states could realistically achieve that level of performance. 38 States are able to establish paternities for more than 100% of children needing paternity established because the paternity establishment performance measure compares current year data to previous year's data and includes paternity established on behalf of newborns born outside of marriage as well as older children who were born outside of marriage. ¢ ¢ amount of collections (i.e., a dollar measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue because the highest percentage attained on the current collections performance measure was 74.65% (Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 45.92% (Nevada). (See Appendix, Table B-6.) Likewise, the upper threshold for the arrearage (i.e., past-due) collections performance measure is 80% and the lower threshold is 40%.39 The performance measure for arrearage child support collections assesses the state's efforts to collect money from noncustodial parents for past-due support (i.e., a case ["person"] measure). In FY2006, the thresholds were not an issue because the highest percentage attained on the arrearage collections performance measure was 75.21% (Pennsylvania) and the lowest percentage attained was 41.01% (Hawaii). (See Appendix, Table B-6.) The upper threshold for the cost-effectiveness performance measure is 5.0 and the lower threshold is 2.0. In FY2006, Mississippi had a cost-effectiveness score of 9.45 and West Virginia had a score of 5.00. Even though there was a 4.45 percentage point difference between the two states, the applicable incentive percentage for those two states and the other 22 states with scores of at least 5.0 was 100%. In FY2006, only one jurisdiction (Guam--1.84) was below the lower threshold of 2.0. (See Appendix, Table B-6.) ¢ The establishment and implementation of the current CSE incentive payment system was in part a recognition that a single indicator (i.e., cost-effectiveness) could not effectively evaluate the performance of the CSE program. The current CSE incentive payment system bases incentives on the state's success in achieving a number of goals, in addition to its ability to provide services in a cost-effective manner. Incentive payments are tied to the rates of paternity establishment, child support order establishment, collection of current child support payments, and collection of arrearages (past-due child support payments), as well as the amount of child support collected for each dollar spent (i.e., cost-effectiveness). Some in the CSE community contend that several other indicators of performance have just as much legitimacy as the five measures that were enacted. They include medical child support, interstate collections, welfare cost avoidance, payment processing performance, and customer service. In contrast, according to a report on the implementation of the CSE incentive payment system, many states indicated that the five measures were adequate and that adding new ones would be premature.40 39 States that fail to attain an applicable percentage score of 40% with respect to arrearage collections can still earn an incentive payment if the state improves its performance by at least 5 percentage points over its previous year's score. A financial penalty is not imposed on states that fail to meet specified performance levels with respect to the arrearage collections performance measure. 40 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System--Final Report. Prepared for the Office of Child Support Enforcement by the Legin Group (Karen N. Gardiner, Michael E. Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna), 2004. ¢ ¢ P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary in consultation with state CSE directors and custodial parents to develop a performance indicator that would measure the effectiveness of states in establishing and enforcing medical child support obligations. Supporters maintained that a medical child support measure would encourage states to strengthen their efforts to ensure that every child who is eligible for CSE services has comprehensive health care coverage. But even supporters of the proposal agree that not enough reliable data exist upon which to calculate a medical child support measure. Some supporters have also expressed concern about the benefits of implementing a performance measure before states have adequate tools to improve their performance in this area.41 According to the CSE Justifications of Appropriations document for FY2008, OCSE is developing two new indicators to measure the extent to which medical child support is ordered and provided in child support cases. According to the Justifications, states have submitted medical support performance measure data for FY2006 and during calendar year 2007 data reliability audits will be conducted on the medical child support data.42 Many CSE workers contend that the most difficult child support orders to establish and enforce are interstate cases. Although states are required to cooperate in interstate child support enforcement, problems arise due to the autonomy of local courts. Family law has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of state and local governments, and citizens fall under the jurisdiction of the courts where they live. Many child support advocates argue that a child should not be seriously disadvantaged in obtaining child support just because his or her parents do not live in the same state. Despite several federal enforcement tools intended to facilitate the establishment and enforcement of interstate collections, problems still exist. Given that about 33% of all CSE cases involve more than one state, some analysts maintain that a performance indicator that would measure whether states were successfully establishing and enforcing interstate child support cases would significantly improve the overall effectiveness of the CSE program.43 Others acknowledge the importance of interstate collections but argue that states are not yet in a position to perform satisfactorily on an interstate performance measure. They acknowledge that although interstate collections increased by 39% over the eight-year period FY1998-FY2006, from $1.032 billion in FY1998 to $1.438 billion in FY2006, interstate collections (i.e., child support collections forwarded to other states) comprised between 6% and 7% of total CSE collections over the period FY1998-FY2006. 41 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support Enforcement. 21 Million Children's Health: Our Shared Responsibility - The Medical Child Support Working Group's Report. June 2000. See Chapter 7. 42 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families FY2008 Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committee. February 2007. p. 259. 43 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. 2004 Green Book: Background Material and Data on the Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. March 2004. WMCP:108-6, p. 8-43-- 8-49. ¢ ¢ Unlike other social services programs, the CSE program is intended to transfer private--not public--funds to nonwelfare families enrolled in the program. Thus, the CSE program imposes personal responsibility on noncustodial parents by requiring them to meet their financial obligations to their children, thereby alleviating taxpayers of this responsibility. These child support payments reduce government spending by providing families with incomes sufficient to make them ineligible for programs such as TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid. In FY2004, child support payments enabled 331,000 CSE families to end their TANF eligibility. Research has indicated that families go on welfare less often and leave sooner when they receive reliable child support payments. In addition, federal costs for Medicaid, food stamps, and other means-tested programs decrease when both parents support their children.44 Although it is difficult to determine how much money might have been spent on various public assistance programs without the collection of child support payments, some analysts contend that it would be good public policy to add a performance indicator that attempts to measure--or at least estimate--the impact of CSE collections in reducing or eliminating costs in other public benefit/welfare programs.45 Other analysts argue that adding a performance indicator to measure welfare cost avoidance would only add more complexity to an already complicated incentive payment system. ¢ Some state policymakers and advocates want to look at an even broader set of factors when evaluating their state CSE program. They maintain that a legitimate purpose of performance standards in some instances is to set expectations. They contend that, because the CSE program has expanded its mission from welfare cost recovery to include promotion of self-sufficiency and personal responsibility and service delivery, it should account for payment processing performance. Such a measure would try to capture whether or not child support payments were accurately accounted, whether families were paid in a timely manner, and whether both custodial and noncustodial parents were satisfied with the state's CSE dispute resolution system.46 Several persons who commented on the federal regulations for implementation of the CSE incentive payment and audit penalty provisions said that incentive payments and financial 44 The Effects of Child Support on Welfare Exits and Re-entries, by Chien-Chung Huang, James Kunz, and Irwin Garfinkel. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 557-576 (2002); http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/Courses/PA882/Huangm%20et%20al_JPAM.pdf. 45 Urban Institute, prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Child Support Cost Avoidance in 1999, Final Report, by Laura Wheaton, June 6, 2003, Contract No. 105-00-8303; http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/ cost_avoidance/#N10026. 46 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm. ¢ ¢ penalties are at odds with each other because they affect different programs (i.e., CSE and TANF).47 Incentive payments are given to states from federal CSE funding and penalties are taken from a state's TANF funding.48 Historically, Congress has linked the CSE program and the TANF (and old AFDC) program. Currently Section 402(a)(2) of the Social Security Act (Title IV-A which deals with TANF (and used to pertain to the AFDC program)) stipulates that the Governor of a state must certify that it will operate an approved CSE program as a condition of receiving TANF block grant funding. Since the enactment of the CSE program in 1975, there has always been a provision in federal law that linked poor performance (and penalties) or noncompliance in the CSE program with a reduction in Title IV-A funding. The principle that there are levels of state performance that would merit an incentive payment and there are levels that would warrant a penalty was incorporated into the current CSE incentive payment system. But, the law also provides that, before a penalty is imposed, states with lower performance levels may be able to receive some incentive, provided their program improves sufficiently and quickly.49 States with poor performance are able to still qualify for an incentive payment if a significant increase over the previous year's performance is achieved in those measures (i.e., 10 percentage points on the paternity establishment performance level, 5 percentage points on the child support order establishment performance level, 5 percentage points on the current support collections performance level, and 5 percentage points on the arrearage collections performance level). Federal law stipulates that with regard to the three "more important" performance measures, states must achieve certain levels of performance in order to avoid being penalized for poor performance. The three performance measures are: paternity establishment, child support order establishment, and collection of current child support payments. A graduated penalty equal to a 1% to 5% reduction in federal TANF block grant funds is assessed against states that fail to meet the CSE performance requirements.50 Although there is an interaction between the incentive payment and financial penalty systems, they affect different programs. Thus, even if a state's incentive payment is larger than any penalty assessed against the state, the state cannot easily reconcile the difference because the state is required to reinvest incentive payments back into the CSE program. The state would have to expend other state funds (that are not earmarked for the CSE program) to replace the loss in TANF funding. 47 Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 249. Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services. Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit Penalties. Final Rule. December 27, 2000 (p. 50 of 71). 48 Even in cases in which the amount of the child support payment incentive is larger than the amount of the TANF penalty imposed, a state is required to reinvest its incentive payment in its CSE program, while penalties are assessed from the TANF funding stream. States that acquire a penalty would find that each quarterly TANF payment for the upcoming year would be reduced for a total of the TANF penalty amount. These states would then additionally have to expend an equivalent amount of state funds if they wanted to replace the reduction of federal funds. 49 Under this alternative improvement formula, the CSE incentive payment can never be more than half (50%) of the maximum incentive possible. The cost-effectiveness performance indicator is the only measure whereby improved performance does not translate into an incentive payment. 50 The percentage reduction depends on number of times a state fails to comply with CSE state plan requirements (i.e., at least 1% but not more than 2% for the 1st failure to comply, at least 2% but not more than 3% for the 2nd failure, and at least 3% but not more than 5% for the 3rd and subsequent failures). ¢ ¢ An alternative to imposing penalties in the form of reducing TANF funding to a state for the inadequacies of its CSE program would be to reduce funding for the CSE program instead. This could be done by taking the financial penalty out of the state's incentive payment and/or subtracting the penalty from the federal government's 66% matching funds to the state. ¢ ¢ Unlike the other performance measures, the paternity establishment indicator has two separate standards to which it must adhere. First, the Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP), must meet a 90% standard (Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). This means that federal law currently requires that states must establish paternity for at least 90% of the children who need to have their father legally identified in order to substantially comply with the requirements of the CSE program.51 If a state does not meet the PEP, it must raise its performance by a specified level of improvement in order to avoid having a financial penalty imposed. The percentage of improvement required varies with a state's performance level. The increase needed to avoid a penalty decreases with higher PEP scores until a state reaches a 90% or higher PEP, at which point the penalty is avoided without an increase in performance.52 For example, a state with a PEP of less than 40% needs a 6 percentage point increase over the prior year to avoid the penalty. Whereas, a state with a PEP between 75% and 90% needs a 2 percentage point increase over the previous year to avoid the penalty.53 If the state fails to increase the PEP by the necessary percentage points after a corrective action period, the state is penalized by a 1%-5% reduction in its state's TANF funding. Second, in a separate provision (Section 458 of the Social Security Act) the PEP is included as one of the five CSE performance measures. Thus, states can receive incentive payments if their PEP meets certain requirements. The incentive payment provision with respect to the PEP is consistent with the view of the CSE community that only poor performance should be penalized. Thus, under the incentive formula, an incentive is awarded to a state with a PEP of 50% or more. The incentive formula provides that a state that achieves a PEP of 80% or more will receive 100% of the applicable state collection's base for that measure. If a state has a PEP of less than 50%, the 51 The original Paternity Establishment Percentage (PEP) was enacted into law as part of the Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485, Section 452(g) of the Social Security Act). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66) increased the percentage of children for whom a state must establish paternity (PEP) from 50% to 75%. P.L. 103-66 also imposed financial penalties against states that failed to comply with the mandatory paternity standards. The financial penalty translated into a reduction in federal matching funds for the state's AFDC program. P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law, raised the PEP from 75% to 90%. 52 Report on State Child Support Enforcement Performance Penalties. Recommendations of the State/Federal Penalties Work Group. July 27, 1998; http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/DCL/1998/dcl9893a.htm. 53 A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 75% and 90% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by two percentage points over the previous year's percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 50% and 75% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by three percentage points over the previous year's percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 45% and 50% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by four percentage points over the previous year's percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level between 40% and 45% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by five percentage points over the previous year's percentage. A state with a paternity establishment percentage at a level less than 40% is required to increase its paternity establishment percentage by six percentage points over the previous year's percentage. ¢ ¢ state must increase its PEP score by at least 10 percentage points over the previous year's score in order to receive an incentive payment. From the outset of the performance measure debate (1996-1998), there was a concern about whether states should be subject to penalties and be eligible for incentives at the same time. Some argued that the lack of an incentive payment would make some states doubly penalized by not improving performance. It was decided that states should be eligible for incentive payments based on performance even if they were subject to penalties because their performance had not improved to the extent required to avoid the penalty.54 The work group that developed the current incentive payment system maintained that the existing statutory PEP standard of 90% was too high and that it conflicted with their premise that only very poor performance should be penalized. Thus, the work group overlaid another provision on top of existing law which provided that a state that had a PEP of 80% or higher would receive 100% of the applicable state collection's base for the paternity establishment performance measure. This new PEP for incentive payment purposes created what many maintain is an inconsistency in CSE law. According to the National Council of Child Support Directors: It is inconsistent to reward a state that achieves a paternity establishment percentage of 80% with maximum child support incentive funding, but impose a penalty against the State's TANF funding if a 2 percentage point increase is not achieved between 80% and 90% performance.55 The National Council of Child Support Directors recommended that "the paternity establishment penalty provisions set the upper threshold at 80%, which will then make it consistent and uniform with the existing incentive formula under which a state that has a paternity establishment percentage of 80% or more receives 100% of the weight allowable for that measure."56 If this recommendation was enacted into law, states would be required to establish paternity for at least 80% of the children who need to have their father legally identified rather than 90% (as required by current law). ¢ The CSE incentive payment system adds an element of uncertainty to what used to be a somewhat predictable source of income for states. Although in the aggregate, states receive higher incentive payments than under the earlier incentive payment system, these totals are a fixed amount, and individual states have to compete with each other for their share of the capped funds. The revenue-neutral capped incentive payment system creates an interactive effect--an increase in incentive payments to one state must be matched by a decrease in payments to other states. Similarly, if one state's performance weakens or the state fails an audit, every other state obtains an increase in incentive payments.57 54 Incentive Funding Work Group: Report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. January 31, 1997. p. 9. 55 National Council of Child Support Directors. Position Paper on Paternity Performance Penalty Revisions, February 24, 2005. 56 Ibid. 57 Study of the Implementation of the Performance-Based Incentive System--Interim Report, by the Lewin Group (continued...) ¢ ¢ Although CSE incentive payments were constructed to compare a state's program performance to itself rather than a "national average," the fixed amount of aggregate incentive payments forces a state to compete with the other states for its share of the aggregate amount.58 Under the current incentive system, whether or not a state receives an incentive payment for good performance and the total amount of the incentive payment depend on four factors: the total amount of money available in a given fiscal year from which to make incentive payments, the state's success in obtaining collections on behalf of its caseload, the state's performance in five areas, and the relative success or failure of other states in making collections and meeting these performance criteria. Because the incentive payments are now capped, some states face a loss of incentive payments even if they improve their performance. Some analysts argue that each state is unique in terms of its CSE caseload and thereby should only have to make improvements over its performance in previous years with regard to rewarding of incentive payments. Nevertheless, CSE programs are compared to one another in that there is a capped funding source and it must be shared by all. So even though Texas has a large CSE caseload, shares an international border, and has vast cultural and socioeconomic diversity among its residents, its program is in essence compared to that of a small mid-western state or a wealthy northeastern state in determining its share of CSE incentive dollars.59 Others contend that if a state deems that it has not received a sufficient amount of incentive payments and that more CSE funding is necessary, it is the state's prerogative to augment federal funding. They maintain that the federal government is carrying too much of the financial burden of CSE program. They point out that the federal government matches state funds at a 66% rate and additionally provides states with incentive payments. ¢ ¢ As mentioned earlier, the CSE funding structure requires states to spend state dollars on the program in order to receive federal matching funds. An important source of those states' dollars has been CSE incentive payments. CSE incentive payments represent a significant percentage of CSE financing for the states. A 2003 report commissioned by HHS indicated that for the nation as a whole, federal CSE incentive payments represented 25% of CSE financing for the states.60 (...continued) (Karen Gardiner, Michael Fishman, and Asaph Glosser) and ECONorthwest (John Tapogna). Prepared for the Office of Child Support Enforcement. October 2003. p. 9 and p. 20. 58 P.L. 105-200 stipulated that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts, i.e., $422 million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001; $450 million for FY2002; $461 million for FY2003, $454 million for FY2004; $446 million for FY2005; $458 million for FY2006; $471 million for FY2007; and $483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for inflation. 59 National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program Performance, by Teresa A. Myers; http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm. 60 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. State Financing of Child Support Enforcement Programs: Final Report, prepared for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Child Support Enforcement, prepared by Michael E. Fishman, Kristin Dybdal of the Legin Group, Inc. and John Tapogna of ECONorthwest, September 3, 2003, p. iii. ¢ ¢ Until now, states have received a 66% federal match for every dollar invested in the CSE program, including incentive payments (which came from the federal government). Although incentive payments per se are not affected, P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated (effective October 1, 2007) the federal match on CSE incentive payments that states, in compliance with federal law, reinvest back into the CSE program. This provision was passed as part of the Deficit Reduction Act because many argued that "reinvesting" incentive payments back into the CSE program was really supplanting state funding. States are no longer entitled to receive federal matching funds for CSE incentive payments that the state reinvests in the CSE program. The elimination of federal reimbursement of CSE incentive payments is likely to result in a significant reduction in CSE financing. Two bills (H.R. 1386/S. 803) have been introduced in the 110th Congress to repeal the provision that eliminates the federal match on incentive payments. In other words, both bills would restore the federal match on incentive payments. Under previous law, the 66% federal matching rate on incentive payments resulted in a near tripling of state CSE funding--in that for every dollar the state reinvested in the CSE program, the federal government matched that investment with about $2.61 Thereby, states were able to significantly leverage their investment through the federal financial structure. Both a 2003 study by the Lewin Group (mentioned earlier) and a recent 2007 study by the Lewin Group indicate that CSE incentive payments represent 25% of all funds used to draw down the federal match for the CSE program. According to the Lewin study: ... there is substantial variation across states in the proportion of the state share financed by incentives (from 7 percent to 54 percent). This variation may be due to a number of factors, such as poor state performance on incentive measures (thus low incentive payments) or higher appropriations from state legislatures. Similarly, the decrease in expenditures assuming no new state outlays ranges from 5 percent to 36 percent.62 The 2007 Lewin study also indicates that because about a third of the CSE caseload is composed of interstate cases, CSE directors expect that the elimination of the federal match on incentive payments will probably result in negative interstate ramifications. The study uses the following illustration. For example, consider two states. State A replaces funding and maintains strong performance, but State B cuts back services due to funding shortfalls and performance declines. State A needs assistance from State B on interstate cases, but State B cuts back staff on this labor-intensive unit. State A's performance is affected negatively as a result.63 61 The general CSE federal matching rate is 66%. This means that for every dollar that a state spends on its CSE program, the federal government will reimburse the state 66 cents. So if the state spends $1 on its program, the federal share of that expenditure is 66 cents and the state share of that expenditure is 34 cents. The algebraic formula for this relationship is represented by .66/.34=x/1. Thereby, if the state share of the expenditure is $1, the federal share is $1.94 (i.e., the federal share is 1.94 times the state share), and the total expenditure by the state is $2.94 ($1+$1.94). Similarly, if the state share of expenditures amounted solely to the incentive payment of $471 million (i.e., the statutory cap on the aggregate CSE incentive payment for FY2007), the federal share would amount to 1.94 times that amount, or $914 million, translating into $1.385 billion in total CSE expenditures/funding. 62 The Lewin Group. Anticipated Effects of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions on Child Support Program Financing and Performance Summary of Data Analysis and IV-D Director Calls. Prepared for the National Council of Child Support Directors by the Lewin Group and ECONorthwest. July 20, 2007. p. 4; http://www.nccsd.net/documents/ nccsd_final_report_revised_2_437782.pdf. 63 Ibid., p. iv. ¢ ¢ It is generally agreed that state spending/investment in the CSE program significantly impacts program performance. Several studies have indicated that most of the best-performing state CSE programs also have the most generous funding levels.64 The elimination of the federal match of incentive payments is expected to reduce overall CSE program expenditures and correspondingly reduce the rate of growth of child support collections. The OCSE expects that while states will increase their state contributions to cover some of the lost federal funds, they will not completely make up the shortfall and overall CSE expenditures will be reduced.65 64 Center for Law and Social Policy. You Get What You Pay For: How Federal and State Investment Decisions Affect Child Support Performance, by Vicki Turetsky. December 1998. See also National Conference of State Legislatures. Issue Brief: Accurately Evaluating State Child Support Program Performance, by Teresa A. Myers. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/PerformIB.htm 65 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Fiscal Year 2008-- Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees. Child Support Enforcement. p. 443-445. ¢ ¢ ¡ ¢ ¢ Before enactment of the CSE program in 1975, when a state or locality collected child support payments from a noncustodial parent on behalf of a family receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the federal government was reimbursed for its share of the cost of AFDC payments to the family.66 Although local units of government (e.g., counties) often enforced child support obligations, in most states they did not make any financial contributions toward funding AFDC benefit payments. Therefore the localities were not eligible for any share of the "savings" that occurred when child support was collected from a noncustodial parent on behalf of an AFDC family. From the debate on the establishment of a CSE program, Congress concluded that a fiscal sharing in the results of child support collections could be a strong incentive for encouraging the local units of government to improve their CSE activities.67 ¢ ¢ Although the formal CSE program was not in existence, P.L. 90-248 provided for the development and implementation of a program under which a state agency would undertake the responsibility for (1) determining the paternity of children receiving AFDC and who were born outside of marriage, and (2) securing financial support from the noncustodial parent for these and other children receiving AFDC, using reciprocal arrangements with other states to obtain and enforce court orders for support. (P.L. 89-97, the Social Security Amendments of 1965 (enacted July 30, 1965), allowed states to use the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) to determine federal-state cost sharing for Title IV-A (i.e., AFDC expenditures), which ranged from a minimum of 50% to a maximum of 83%.) Title IV-A included the child support enforcement provisions indicated above. This meant that if a state collected child support payments on behalf of an AFDC family, the federal government would be reimbursed at the state's FMAP. If the state had an FMAP of 60%, the federal government was reimbursed $60 for every $100 the state collected (from the noncustodial parent) in child support payments for AFDC families. ¢ P.L. 93-647 required that if a child support collection were made by any locality in the state or by the state for another state, that locality or state was to receive a special bonus--incentive payment--based on the amount of any child support collected from a noncustodial parent to reimburse amounts paid out as AFDC. The incentive payment was equal to 25% of the amount of child support collected on behalf of AFDC families for the first 12 months and 10% thereafter. The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families.69 66 The federal share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income. 67 U.S. Senate. Committee on Finance. Social Services Amendments of 1974; a report to accompany H.R. 17045. December 14, 1974. S.Rept. 93-1356. p. 50-51. 68 The CSE program was enacted as Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 69 P.L. 93-647 stipulated that child support payments on behalf of AFDC families were to be paid to the states following an assignment of child support rights by the AFDC client to the state. Because federal dollars were used to (continued...) ¢ ¢ ¡ ¢ P.L. 95-30 changed the rate at which incentives were paid to states and localities for child support collections used to reimburse AFDC payments. This amendment to Section 458 of the Social Security Act simplified the complex process of computing incentive payments at two different rates by adopting a flat 15% incentive payment rate. The incentive payment was now equal to 15% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families. The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families. ¡ ¢ ¢ P.L. 97-248 reduced the incentive payment rate from 15% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families to 12% of child support collections made on behalf of AFDC families. The incentive payment came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families. P.L. 98-378 significantly revised incentive payments. Instead of making incentive payments to localities and states that collected child support payments on another state's behalf, the federal government made the incentive payments directly to the states70 and each state was required to pass incentive payments through to local CSE agencies if those agencies shared in funding the state CSE program. In order to improve cost-effectiveness and encourage states to emphasize child support collections on behalf of both AFDC and non-AFDC families, the incentive payment formula was changed so that states were paid a minimum of 6% of their child support collections in AFDC cases and 6% of their child support collections in non-AFDC cases. Under this approach, there was the potential to earn up to 10% of both AFDC and non-AFDC child support collections depending on the state's cost-effectiveness in running a child support program (i.e., ratio of state collections to the state's cost of operating the CSE program). The federal government paid the incentive payments from its share of retained collections for AFDC families and capped the amount of incentive payments any state could earn on the non-AFDC cases at (...continued) finance a portion of the state AFDC benefit payment, states were required to split child support payments collected on behalf of AFDC families with the federal government. The child support collections obtained on behalf of AFDC families are divided between the state and the federal government according to their respective share of total AFDC benefit payments (a small percentage of AFDC collections is paid directly to families). As noted above, the federal share of AFDC benefit expenditures ranged from 50% to 83%, depending on state per capita income. The federal share is also called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage or FMAP. 70 Before 1984, a state that initiated a successful action to collect child support from another state did not receive an incentive payment. Rather, the state that made the collection received the incentive payment. P.L. 98-378 stipulated that each state involved in an interstate child support collection be credited with the collection for purposes of computing the incentive payment. This "double-counting" was intended to encourage states to pursue interstate child support cases as energetically as they pursued intrastate child support cases. ¢ ¢ 115%71 of the AFDC incentive payment earned. The incentive payments came out of the federal share of the child support recovered (i.e., collected) on behalf AFDC families. ¢ P.L. 100-485 included a provision that authorized Congress to create a U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support to make recommendations to Congress on improving the child support program. That Commission's report called for a study of the federal funding formula and changes to an incentive structure that is based on performance. In addition, other national organizations, including the National Conference of State Legislatures, the American Public Welfare Association (now the American Public Human Services Association, APHSA), the National Governors Association, and several national advocacy organizations recommended the adoption of a new performance-based incentive system.72 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) required the HHS Secretary, in consultation with state CSE program directors, to recommend to Congress a new incentive funding system for state CSE programs based on program performance. P.L. 104-193 required that (1) the new incentive funding system be developed in a revenue- neutral manner; (2) the new system provide additional payments to any state based on that state's performance; and (3) the Secretary report to Congress on the proposed new system by March 1, 1997. The Incentive Funding Workgroup was formed in October 1996. This group consisted of 15 state and local CSE directors or their representatives and 11 federal staff representatives from HHS. Earlier efforts of this state-federal partnership produced the National Strategic Plan for the CSE program and a set of outcome measures to indicate the program's success in achieving the goals and objectives of the plan. Using the same collaboration and consensus-building approach, state and federal partners recommended a new incentive funding system based on the foundation of the CSE National Strategic Plan. Over a period of three months, recommendations for the new incentive funding system emerged. State partners consulted with state CSE programs not represented directly on the Workgroup. The final recommendations represented a consensus among state and federal partners on the new incentive funding system. The Secretary fully endorsed the incentive formula recommendations. The Secretary's report made recommendations for a new CSE incentive payment system to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance.73 71 The total amount of incentives awarded for non-AFDC collections could not exceed the amount of the state's incentive payments for AFDC collections for FY1986 and FY1987. The incentive paid for non-AFDC collections was capped at 105% of the incentive for AFDC collections for FY1988, 110% for FY1989, and 115% for FY1990 and years thereafter. 72 The incentive payment system had been criticized for focusing on only one aspect of the CSE program: cost- effectiveness. It was faulted for not rewarding states for other important aspects of child support enforcement, such as paternity and support order establishment. In addition, because all states received the minimum incentive payment amount of 6% of both AFDC and non-AFDC collections regardless of the state's performance, many analysts claimed that the CSE incentive payment system did not have a real incentive effect. 73 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families. Office of Child Support (continued...) ¢ ¢ ¢ Most of the HHS Secretary's recommendations for a new incentive payment system were included in P.L. 105-200. This law replaced the old incentive payment system to states with a revised revenue-neutral incentive payment system that provides (1) incentive payments based on a percentage of the state's collections; (2) incorporation of five performance measures related to establishment of paternity and child support orders, collections of current and past-due support payments, and cost-effectiveness; (3) phase-in of the incentive system, with it being fully effective beginning in FY2002; (4) mandatory reinvestment of incentive payments into the CSE program (or an activity that contributes to improving the effectiveness or efficiency of the CSE program); and (5) an incentive payment formula weighted in favor of TANF and former TANF families. P.L. 105-200 required the HHS Secretary to make incentive payments to the states and stipulated that the aggregate incentive payment to the states could not exceed the following amounts: $422 million for FY2000, $429 million for FY2001, $450 million for FY2002,74 $461 million for FY2003, $454 million for FY2004, $446 million for FY2005, $458 million for FY2006, $471 million for FY2007, and $483 million for FY2008. For years after FY2008, the aggregate incentive payment to the states is to be increased to account for inflation. ¢ P.L. 109-171 included a provision that eliminated (effective October 1, 2007) the 66% federal match on CSE incentive payments that states, in compliance with federal law, reinvest back into the CSE program. This means that CSE incentive payments that are received by states and reinvested in the CSE program are no longer eligible for federal reimbursement. (...continued) Enforcement. Child Support Enforcement Incentive Funding. Report to the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. February 1997. 74 Before FY2002, CSE incentive payments were paid out of the federal share of child support collected on behalf of TANF families. Since October 1, 2001 (when the revised incentive payment system was fully phased-in), CSE incentive payments have been paid with federal funds that have been specifically appropriated out of the U.S. Treasury. ¢ ¢ ¡ Appendix B includes several detailed state tables. Table B-1 shows that all states received incentive payments in FY2002, FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005 and the amounts they received. Table B-2 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2002 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2002. Table B-3 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2003 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2003. Table B-4 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2004 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2004. Table B-5 presents CSE incentive payments for FY2005 together with unaudited incentive performance scores for each of the five performance measures for FY2005. Table B-6 shows only the unaudited incentive performance scores for FY2006.75 75 OCSE has not yet published CSE incentive payment data by state for FY2006. 211,324,5 anozirA 42 548,874,5 dnalyraM 42 225,255,5 anaidnI 42 305,194,5 tucitcennoC 42 727,006,5 nogerO 32 049,878,5 anaisiuoL 32 293,031,6 anaisiuoL 32 185,465,5 anaidnI 32 773,312,6 anaisiuoL 22 430,659,5 nogerO 22 371,633,6 nogerO 22 963,381,6 sionillI 22 472,719,6 awoI 12 909,080,7 anaidnI 12 567,735,6 dnalyraM 12 263,145,6 nogerO 12 984,303,7 dnalyraM 02 934,742,7 awoI 02 971,661,7 sionillI 02 857,118,6 eessenneT 02 597,738,7 eessenneT 91 819,726,7 ykcutneK 91 507,022,7 awoI 91 825,621,7 awoI 91 594,583,8 anaidnI 81 137,667,7 eessenneT 81 500,617,7 eessenneT 81 515,880,8 ykcutneK 81 336,056,8 sionillI 71 442,044,8 sionillI 71 036,459,7 ykcutneK 71 038,694,8 iruossiM 71 830,898,8 sttesuhcassaM 61 511,861,9 sttesuhcassaM 61 671,356,8 iruossiM 61 694,947,8 dnalyraM 61 934,402,01 iruossiM 51 688,525,01 iruossiM 51 458,859,9 sttesuhcassaM 51 069,717,9 sttesuhcassaM 51 432,732,01 ainigriV 41 493,475,01 aigroeG 41 521,354,01 aigroeG 41 685,212,11 ainigriV 41 881,808,01 aigroeG 31 373,376,01 ainigriV 31 857,134,11 ainigriV 31 778,147,11 aniloraC htroN 31 132,531,21 atosenniM 21 290,708,21 aniloraC htroN 21 570,902,21 aniloraC htroN 21 346,999,11 aigroeG 21 773,917,21 notgnihsaW 11 434,840,31 atosenniM 11 031,294,31 atosenniM 11 670,555,31 atosenniM 11 726,164,31 aniloraC htroN 01 158,544,31 notgnihsaW 01 631,576,41 notgnihsaW 01 330,402,51 notgnihsaW 01 574,847,31 nisnocsiW 9 242,925,41 nisnocsiW 9 278,236,51 nisnocsiW 9 580,429,51 nisnocsiW 9 289,479,51 yesreJ weN 8 167,533,61 yesreJ weN 8 131,598,71 yesreJ weN 8 823,763,71 yesreJ weN 8 037,362,52 adirolF 7 823,680,52 adirolF 7 094,545,22 adirolF 7 888,162,12 adirolF 7 850,224,52 ainavlysnneP 6 458,892,62 kroY weN 6 675,173,72 nagihciM 6 651,821,03 nagihciM 6 751,530,62 nagihciM 5 163,235,62 ainavlysnneP 5 541,335,92 ainavlysnneP 5 937,671,03 kroY weN 5 919,242,62 kroY weN 4 339,270,92 nagihciM 4 514,153,03 oihO 4 428,482,03 ainavlysnneP 4 806,589,82 oihO 3 638,048,03 oihO 3 720,928,03 kroY weN 3 888,402,23 oihO 3 328,495,73 saxeT 2 030,810,53 saxeT 2 402,528,63 saxeT 2 453,518,33 saxeT 2 655,347,14 ainrofilaC 1 041,719,34 ainrofilaC 1 203,852,54 ainrofilaC 1 823,418,63 ainrofilaC 1 5002YF etatS 4002YF etatS 3002YF etatS 2002YF etatS )tnemyap evitnecni tsewol eht htiw etats ot tnemy ap evitnecni tsehgih eht htiw eta ts yb d egnarra( 5002YF-2002YF ,etatS yb ,stnemyaP evitnecnI lautcA . 1-B elbaT 503,009 erawaleD 15 507,079 ocixeM weN 15 128,276 ocixeM weN 15 406,455 ocixeM weN 15 762,779 tnomreV 05 021,160,1 anatnoM 05 891,269 dnalsI edohR 05 000,758 adaveN 05 964,820,1 anatnoM 94 905,081,1 gnimoyW 94 742,079 erawaleD 94 102,379 iiawaH 94 983,550,1 ocixeM weN 84 433,791,1 tnomreV 84 433,680,1 tnomreV 84 128,610,1 dnalsI edohR 84 207,361,1 gnimoyW 74 902,562,1 erawaleD 74 400,551,1 anatnoM 74 581,430,1 erawaleD 74 052,112,1 dnalsI edohR 64 228,072,1 dnalsI edohR 64 577,361,1 gnimoyW 64 161,721,1 tnomreV 64 379,134,1 iiawaH 54 344,553,1 adaveN 54 902,462,1 atokaD htroN 54 619,291,1 atokaD htroN 54 315,664,1 atokaD htuoS 44 087,715,1 atokaD htuoS 44 345,392,1 adaveN 44 759,102,1 gnimoyW 44 458,065,1 atokaD htroN 34 814,245,1 atokaD htroN 34 213,885,1 iiawaH 34 506,202,1 anatnoM 34 821,056,1 erihspmaH weN 24 887,665,1 iiawaH 24 625,066,1 atokaD htuoS 24 353,834,1 erihspmaH weN 24 923,908,1 aksalA 14 199,308,1 erihspmaH weN 14 800,289,1 erihspmaH weN 14 232,056,1 ohadI 14 447,628,1 adaveN 04 767,439,1 aksalA 04 288,041,2 aksalA 04 394,656,1 atokaD htuoS 04 591,761,2 eniaM 93 745,533,2 ohadI 93 774,612,2 ohadI 93 701,976,1 aksalA 93 758,983,2 ohadI 83 922,933,2 eniaM 83 509,284,2 ippississiM 83 116,625,2 ippississiM 83 016,094,2 sasnakrA 73 120,642,3 ippississiM 73 667,655,2 eniaM 73 791,695,2 eniaM 73 078,222,3 ippississiM 63 654,372,3 ociR otreuP 63 220,650,3 amohalkO 63 656,378,2 sasnaK 63 276,862,3 ociR otreuP 53 903,603,3 sasnaK 53 968,980,3 aksarbeN 53 906,998,2 amohalkO 53 826,882,3 hatU 43 781,163,3 sasnakrA 43 108,501,3 sasnaK 43 577,009,2 amabalA 43 079,982,3 sasnaK 33 972,734,3 amohalkO 33 484,641,3 sasnakrA 33 299,650,3 aksarbeN 33 388,123,3 aniloraC htuoS 23 952,554,3 tucitcennoC 23 984,364,3 ociR otreuP 23 238,101,3 hatU 23 303,574,3 aksarbeN 13 693,506,3 aniloraC htuoS 13 110,394,3 hatU 13 676,102,3 ociR otreuP 13 878,346,3 amohalkO 03 763,536,3 aksarbeN 03 906,829,3 aniloraC htuoS 03 734,712,3 sasnakrA 03 346,978,3 ainigriV tseW 92 929,776,3 hatU 92 147,249,3 tucitcennoC 92 517,998,3 aniloraC htuoS 92 646,020,4 amabalA 82 114,577,3 ainigriV tseW 82 595,100,4 amabalA 82 983,850,4 ainigriV tseW 82 152,057,4 odaroloC 72 749,329,3 amabalA 72 510,902,4 ainigriV tseW 72 780,983,4 anaisiuoL 72 419,568,4 tucitcennoC 62 832,338,4 odaroloC 62 429,029,4 odaroloC 62 741,602,5 anozirA 62 111,802,5 ykcutneK 52 630,299,4 anozirA 52 564,560,5 anozirA 52 569,653,5 odaroloC 52 5002YF etatS 4002YF etatS 3002YF etatS 2002YF etatS 77.5 sttesuhcassaM 40.66 hatU 00.56 yesreJ weN 09.28 aksalA 88.001 notgnihsaW 670,555,31 atosenniM 58.5 nogerO 01.66 odaroloC 21.56 kroY weN 79.28 ainavlysnneP 58.201 odaroloC 330,402,51 notgnihsaW aniloraC atokaD erihspmaH 78.5 htuoS 21.66 htroN 15.56 weN 01.38 anatnoM 83.301 oihO 580,429,51 nisnocsiW 11.6 nisnocsiW 93.76 aksalA 43.66 tnomreV 64.38 odaroloC 10.601 ainavlysnneP 823,763,71 yesreJ weN atokaD 72.6 ociR otreuP 64.76 oihO 94.66 aksarbeN 67.48 htroN 64.601 atokaD htuoS 888,162,12 adirolF erihspmaH 43.6 ainigriV 38.76 erawaleD 77.66 oihO 11.58 hatU 47.601 weN 651,821,03 nagihciM 35.6 iiawaH 33.86 notgnihsaW 07.76 atokaD htuoS 08.58 tnomreV 49.701 ainrofilaC 937,671,03 kroY weN atokaD 58.6 ainavlysnneP 95.86 atokaD htuoS 55.17 htroN 71.78 eniaM 34.801 saxeT 428,482,03 ainavlysnneP 21.7 ippississiM 46.07 tnomreV 86.27 nisnocsiW 97.78 awoI 70.311 anatnoM 888,402,23 oihO 95.7 atokaD htuoS 86.07 ainavlysnneP 69.27 atosenniM 00.19 notgnihsaW 57.031 ohadI 453,518,33 saxeT erihspmaH 08.7 anaidnI 85.17 weN 07.47 ainavlysnneP 30.29 atokaD htuoS a 78.254 mauG 823,418,63 ainrofilaC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP )etats gnimrofrep tsewol ot etats gnimrofrep tsehg ih yb d egnarra( 2002YF ,serocS ecnamrofreP evitnecnI detiduanU dna stnemyaP evitnecnI tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC .2-B elbaT .slatot etats eht ni dedulcni era sdnalsI nigriV eht dna ,ociR otreuP ,mauG ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht fo snoitcidsiruj ruof ehT .)45 deknar( tnemyap evitnecni tsewol eht ehtiw etats eht ot )1 deknar( tnemyap evitnecni tsehgih eht htiw etats morf etats hcae fo redro knar eht swohs saera dedahs ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS 000,000,644 latoT 000,000,454 latoT 000,000,164 latoT 000,000,054 latoT 279,801 sdnalsI nigriV 45 881,08 mauG 45 933,06 mauG 45 869,36 sdnalsI nigriV 45 328,911 mauG 35 817,501 sdnalsI nigriV 35 884,99 sdnalsI nigriV 35 902,101 mauG 35 705,895 aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD 25 709,795 aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD 25 453,194 aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD 25 393,205 aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD 25 5002YF etatS 4002YF etatS 3002YF etatS 2002YF etatS aniloraC 82.4 eniaM 23.06 htroN 60.55 sasnaK 40.07 ykcutneK 52.38 aigroeG 676,102,3 ociR otreuP erihspmaH aniloraC 73.4 weN 33.06 ocixeM weN 34.55 ohadI 43.07 erawaleD 14.48 htroN 734,712,3 sasnakrA aniloraC aniloraC 34.4 htroN 34.06 kroY weN 04.65 adirolF 95.07 anaidnI 60.58 tucitcennoC 517,998,3 htuoS 94.4 kroY weN 36.06 anaisiuoL 44.65 anaisiuoL 71.17 sttesuhcassaM 88.58 sasnakrA 983,850,4 ainigriV tseW atokaD 94.4 aksalA 87.06 nagihciM 67.75 eniaM 83.17 oihO 04.78 htroN 780,983,4 anaisiuoL 05.4 eessenneT 87.06 aigroeG 05.85 anatnoM 50.37 kroY weN 75.78 awoI 741,602,5 anozirA aniloraC 25.4 dnalsI edohR 30.16 sasnaK 06.85 hatU 51.37 htroN 77.78 kroY weN 569,653,5 odaroloC 95.4 nagihciM 40.16 nogerO 79.85 ainigriV 09.47 ainigriV tseW 71.88 ociR otreuP 305,194,5 tucitcennoC 36.4 iruossiM 70.16 nisnocsiW 01.95 awoI 23.57 ainrofilaC 46.98 aksalA 185,465,5 anaidnI atokaD 17.4 htroN 81.16 yesreJ weN 63.95 nagihciM 40.67 aksarbeN 41.09 ainigriV 963,381,6 sionillI 17.4 ykcutneK 52.16 eniaM 86.95 sttesuhcassaM 22.67 nagihciM 72.09 hatU 263,145,6 nogerO 18.4 oihO 75.16 gnimoyW 39.95 saxeT 40.87 atosenniM 94.09 ainigriV tseW 857,118,6 eessenneT 38.4 yesreJ weN 66.16 aksarbeN 50.06 gnimoyW 35.87 sasnakrA 40.29 nagihciM 825,621,7 awoI 78.4 ainigriV tseW 30.26 adaveN 14.06 nogerO 46.87 ohadI 65.39 eniaM 515,880,8 ykcutneK 78.4 anaisiuoL 38.26 adirolF 47.06 erawaleD 09.87 yesreJ weN 80.49 tnomreV 038,694,8 iruossiM 59.4 notgnihsaW 43.36 awoI 11.16 dnalsI edohR 39.87 iruossiM 04.49 nogerO 694,947,8 dnalyraM aniloraC 00.5 gnimoyW 27.36 anatnoM 62.16 htroN 99.87 nisnocsiW 05.49 nisnocsiW 069,717,9 sttesuhcassaM 92.5 ohadI 92.46 dnalyraM 20.26 dnalyraM 02.08 ainigriV 76.69 dnalyraM 685,212,11 ainigriV erihspmaH aniloraC 14.5 saxeT 54.46 saxeT 33.26 ainigriV tseW 20.28 weN 60.79 sionillI 778,147,11 htroN 36.5 awoI 70.56 atosenniM 89.36 notgnihsaW 57.28 gnimoyW 87.79 gnimoyW 346,999,11 aigroeG erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP aibmuloC 46.1 mauG 80.73 mauG 61.34 mauG 28.04 sionillI 49.25 sdnalsI nigriV 393,205 fo tcirtsiD 19.1 ainrofilaC 59.74 amabalA 84.44 anozirA 15.74 ocixeM weN 16.75 ocixeM weN 406,455 ocixeM weN 16.2 sasnaK 96.84 sdnalsI nigriV 64.64 amohalkO 48.94 ippississiM 93.56 amabalA 000,758 adaveN 66.2 sasnakrA 79.94 ykcutneK 57.64 ocixeM weN 71.05 mauG 98.76 adaveN 102,379 iiawaH aibmuloC 96.2 fo tcirtsiD 00.05 iruossiM 99.64 adaveN 42.15 dnalsI edohR 58.86 dnalsI edohR 128,610,1 dnalsI edohR 08.2 amohalkO 36.05 anozirA 20.74 sdnalsI nigriV 55.65 eessenneT 28.96 ippississiM 581,430,1 erawaleD 08.2 sionillI 48.05 ociR otreuP 77.74 amabalA 22.95 iiawaH 57.47 sasnaK 161,721,1 tnomreV aniloraC aibmuloC aibmuloC atokaD 78.2 adaveN 48.15 htuoS 69.74 fo tcirtsiD 53.06 adaveN 32.57 fo tcirtsiD 619,291,1 htroN 78.2 aksarbeN 03.25 sionillI 25.84 anaidnI 67.36 ociR otreuP 38.67 anaisiuoL 759,102,1 gnimoyW 46.3 amabalA 85.25 anaidnI 76.84 ociR otreuP 19.36 sasnaK 49.67 eessenneT 506,202,1 anatnoM aniloraC erihspmaH 66.3 erawaleD 31.35 tucitcennoC 15.94 htuoS 43.46 tucitcennoC 12.77 erawaleD 353,834,1 weN 66.3 odaroloC 45.45 eessenneT 55.94 ippississiM 32.56 adirolF 47.97 iruossiM 232,056,1 ohadI 67.3 tucitcennoC 29.45 ainrofilaC 37.94 aigroeG 22.66 amabalA 01.08 adirolF 394,656,1 atokaD htuoS aniloraC 98.3 hatU 35.55 sasnakrA 23.05 sasnakrA 17.66 htuoS 96.08 amohalkO 701,976,1 aksalA 39.3 tnomreV 73.65 ainigriV 44.05 eessenneT 19.66 nogerO 30.18 aksarbeN 116,625,2 ippississiM 30.4 adirolF 87.65 amohalkO 47.05 iruossiM 99.66 anozirA 73.18 yesreJ weN 791,695,2 eniaM 50.4 atosenniM 35.75 ainigriV tseW 31.15 iiawaH 63.76 anaisiuoL 14.18 iiawaH 656,378,2 sasnaK aniloraC 01.4 anatnoM 91.85 dnalsI edohR 08.25 ykcutneK 61.86 aigroeG 44.18 htuoS 906,998,2 amohalkO 91.4 dnalyraM 23.85 sttesuhcassaM 48.35 aksalA 56.86 dnalyraM 60.28 atosenniM 577,009,2 amabalA 42.4 aigroeG 48.95 ippississiM 79.45 odaroloC 00.96 saxeT 54.28 sttesuhcassaM 299,650,3 aksarbeN 52.4 anozirA 11.06 ohadI 40.55 tucitcennoC 96.96 amohalkO 45.28 ykcutneK 238,101,3 hatU erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP erihspmaH 07.5 ohadI 03.66 oihO 00.56 yesreJ weN 01.48 anatnoM 03.99 weN 278,236,51 nisnocsiW 39.5 nogerO 06.76 aksalA 08.56 tnomreV 09.48 hatU 07.99 ainavlysnneP 131,598,71 yesreJ weN atokaD 59.5 nisnocsiW 00.86 atosenniM 03.66 aksarbeN 07.58 htroN 06.001 iiawaH 094,545,22 adirolF aniloraC atokaD 23.6 htuoS 08.86 htroN 01.76 atokaD htuoS 05.68 gnimoyW 08.001 ohadI 675,173,72 nagihciM 25.6 ainigriV 09.86 notgnihsaW 03.76 oihO 06.78 tnomreV 02.101 odaroloC 541,335,92 ainavlysnneP 08.6 ainavlysnneP 02.96 atokaD htuoS 07.76 nisnocsiW 06.88 awoI 03.301 anatnoM 514,153,03 oihO 05.7 ippississiM 08.96 tnomreV 09.96 atosenniM 00.09 eniaM 01.701 ainrofilaC 720,928,03 kroY weN atokaD 08.7 atokaD htuoS 05.17 ainavlysnneP 03.17 htroN 00.19 notgnihsaW 01.211 saxeT 402,528,63 saxeT erihspmaH 19.7 anaidnI 02.27 weN 08.47 ainavlysnneP 01.49 atokaD htuoS 07.091 ykcutneK 203,852,54 ainrofilaC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP )etats gnimrofrep tsewol ot etats gnimrofrep tsehg ih yb d egnarra( 3002YF ,serocS ecnamrofreP evitnecnI detiduanU dna stnemyaP evitnecnI tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC . 3-B elbaT .sisylana s'troper siht morf dedulcxe saw 78.254 fo erocs PEP s'mauG stroper rehto ni atad dna noitamrofni gnitcilfnoc fo esuaceB .a .raey elgnis a rof egairram fo edistuo shtrib fo rebmun eht ot dehsilbatse rebmun taht erapmoc dna ega yna fo nerdlihc rof dehsilbatse seitinretap rof tiderc ekat nac setats esuaceb %001 naht retaerg eb nac egatnecrep tnemhsilbatse ytinretap ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD ,tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS aibmuloC aibmuloC 64.1 ocixeM weN 12.03 fo tcirtsiD 11.93 sionillI 66.92 fo tcirtsiD 38.05 anaidnI 869,36 sdnalsI nigriV 85.1 sdnalsI nigriV 78.63 iiawaH 04.24 ainrofilaC 70.83 sdnalsI nigriV 20.15 anozirA 902,101 mauG erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 36.4 dnalsI edohR 08.95 kroY weN 04.65 adirolF 09.37 sttesuhcassaM 00.09 kroY weN 595,100,4 amabalA erihspmaH 27.4 weN 08.95 anaisiuoL 09.65 anaisiuoL 01.57 anaidnI 03.09 hatU 510,902,4 ainigriV tseW 97.4 nagihciM 04.06 sttesuhcassaM 07.75 saxeT 07.57 saxeT 03.09 ociR otreuP 429,029,4 odaroloC aniloraC 88.4 ykcutneK 05.06 odaroloC 03.85 sasnakrA 08.57 kroY weN 00.19 htroN 564,560,5 anozirA aniloraC 19.4 oihO 02.16 adaveN 06.85 hatU 04.67 htroN 02.29 dnalyraM 225,255,5 anaidnI 59.4 iruossiM 06.16 nogerO 01.95 anatnoM 04.67 ainrofilaC 06.29 amohalkO 293,031,6 anaisiuoL aniloraC 99.4 htroN 00.26 nisnocsiW 07.95 ainigriV 09.77 aksarbeN 06.39 nogerO 371,633,6 nogerO 99.4 eniaM 00.26 sasnaK 09.95 nogerO 09.77 ohadI 06.49 aksalA 567,735,6 dnalyraM 00.5 kroY weN 03.26 saxeT 00.06 awoI 00.97 sasnakrA 00.59 awoI 971,661,7 sionillI 60.5 yesreJ weN 04.26 dnalyraM 07.06 erawaleD 05.97 yesreJ weN 00.59 aigroeG 507,022,7 awoI 80.5 iiawaH 02.36 gnimoyW 09.06 gnimoyW 05.97 iruossiM 01.59 oihO 500,617,7 eessenneT atokaD atokaD 01.5 htroN 02.36 ocixeM weN 09.06 sttesuhcassaM 06.97 atosenniM 01.59 htroN 036,459,7 ykcutneK 11.5 anaisiuoL 04.36 awoI 08.16 dnalsI edohR 03.08 nisnocsiW 03.59 sionillI 671,356,8 iruossiM aniloraC 64.5 sttesuhcassaM 06.36 aigroeG 08.16 htroN 01.18 ainigriV tseW 01.69 tnomreV 458,859,9 sttesuhcassaM erihspmaH 74.5 eessenneT 03.46 anatnoM 08.26 ainigriV tseW 02.18 weN 09.79 nisnocsiW 521,354,01 aigroeG 25.5 awoI 06.46 adirolF 02.36 dnalyraM 05.18 ainavlysnneP 01.89 yesreJ weN 857,134,11 ainigriV aniloraC 75.5 gnimoyW 08.46 erawaleD 03.46 notgnihsaW 08.28 aksalA 05.89 notgnihsaW 570,902,21 htroN erihspmaH 36.5 saxeT 06.56 yesreJ weN 03.46 weN 09.28 ainigriV 02.99 atokaD htuoS 031,294,31 atosenniM 76.5 ociR otreuP 08.56 hatU 07.46 kroY weN 07.38 odaroloC 02.99 eniaM 631,576,41 notgnihsaW erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 30.3 erawaleD 08.05 iruossiM 00.94 ocixeM weN 05.35 adaveN 03.27 anaidnI 433,680,1 tnomreV aniloraC 21.3 amohalkO 08.05 anozirA 02.94 htuoS 09.45 sdnalsI nigriV 07.37 erawaleD 400,551,1 anatnoM aniloraC aibmuloC 21.3 adaveN 03.15 htuoS 07.94 fo tcirtsiD 08.95 iiawaH 06.87 sdnalsI nigriV 577,361,1 gnimoyW aniloraC atokaD 21.3 sasnaK 04.15 sionillI 09.94 amabalA 03.06 eessenneT 08.87 htuoS 902,462,1 htroN 21.3 sasnakrA 04.25 ociR otreuP 05.05 anaidnI 02.36 anozirA 08.87 anaisiuoL 345,392,1 adaveN 22.3 aksarbeN 05.45 tucitcennoC 00.15 aigroeG 07.46 ociR otreuP 00.97 eessenneT 213,885,1 iiawaH 22.3 odaroloC 08.45 anaidnI 03.15 iiawaH 03.56 tucitcennoC 07.18 mauG 625,066,1 atokaD htuoS erihspmaH 36.3 anatnoM 04.55 ainrofilaC 00.25 ippississiM 03.86 sasnaK 02.38 tucitcennoC 800,289,1 weN 87.3 tnomreV 01.65 sasnakrA 06.25 ociR otreuP 05.86 anaisiuoL 05.38 nagihciM 288,041,2 aksalA 87.3 amabalA 02.75 dnalsI edohR 07.25 iruossiM 06.86 nogerO 09.48 atosenniM 774,612,2 ohadI 40.4 tucitcennoC 03.75 eessenneT 01.35 sdnalsI nigriV 08.86 dnalyraM 01.58 ainigriV 509,284,2 ippississiM 50.4 atosenniM 04.75 amohalkO 06.35 ykcutneK 08.86 adirolF 03.58 sasnaK 667,655,2 eniaM 31.4 hatU 05.75 ainigriV 07.35 eessenneT 07.96 amabalA 05.58 iruossiM 220,650,3 amohalkO aniloraC 42.4 aksalA 04.85 htroN 09.35 ohadI 01.07 aigroeG 05.58 ippississiM 968,980,3 aksarbeN 93.4 adirolF 09.85 ippississiM 08.45 tucitcennoC 05.07 erawaleD 00.68 sasnakrA 108,501,3 sasnaK aniloraC 74.4 aigroeG 00.95 nagihciM 02.55 odaroloC 07.07 htuoS 05.68 sttesuhcassaM 484,641,3 sasnakrA 74.4 anozirA 02.95 aksarbeN 03.55 sasnaK 08.07 amohalkO 01.88 aksarbeN 984,364,3 ociR otreuP 35.4 dnalyraM 02.95 ohadI 07.55 nagihciM 04.17 oihO 02.88 ainigriV tseW 110,394,3 hatU aniloraC 45.4 ainigriV tseW 04.95 ainigriV tseW 07.55 eniaM 04.27 ykcutneK 01.98 gnimoyW 906,829,3 htuoS 45.4 notgnihsaW 06.95 eniaM 07.55 aksalA 09.27 nagihciM 04.98 adirolF 147,249,3 tucitcennoC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 00.7 htuoS 36.66 aksalA 73.76 aksarbeN 28.68 aksalA 74.301 saxeT 823,680,52 adirolF 10.7 ainavlysnneP 71.76 notgnihsaW 46.76 nisnocsiW 69.68 awoI 26.401 amohalkO 458,892,62 kroY weN atokaD 40.7 anaidnI 53.76 htroN 88.76 oihO 80.88 tnomreV 89.401 anatnoM 163,235,62 ainavlysnneP 94.7 atokaD htuoS 67.86 atokaD htuoS 92.86 atokaD htuoS 33.88 gnimoyW 72.601 yesreJ weN 339,270,92 nagihciM 88.7 ociR otreuP 93.07 tnomreV 35.96 atosenniM 96.98 notgnihsaW 75.601 sionillI 638,048,03 oihO atokaD 69.7 ippississiM 79.07 ainavlysnneP 20.27 htroN 13.09 eniaM 27.801 odaroloC 030,810,53 saxeT erihspmaH 07.8 iiawaH 38.17 weN 73.47 ainavlysnneP 37.39 atokaD htuoS 67.711 ainrofilaC 041,719,34 ainrofilaC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP )etats gnimrofrep tsewol ot etats gnimrofrep tsehg ih yb d egnarra( 4002YF ,serocS ecnamrofreP evitnecnI detiduanU dna stnemyaP evitnecnI tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC . 4-B elbaT .raey elgnis a rof egairram fo edistuo shtrib fo rebmun eht ot dehsilbatse rebmun taht erapmoc dna ega yna fo nerdlihc rof dehsilbatse seitinretap rof tiderc ekat nac setats esuaceb %001 naht retaerg eb nac egatnecrep tnemhsilbatse ytinretap ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD .tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS aibmuloC aibmuloC aibmuloC 75.1 ocixeM weN 00.73 fo tcirtsiD 09.04 adaveN 09.13 fo tcirtsiD 09.36 fo tcirtsiD 933,06 mauG 48.1 sdnalsI nigriV 03.04 iiawaH 02.34 anozirA 07.64 sionillI 09.46 dnalsI edohR 884,99 sdnalsI nigriV aibmuloC aibmuloC 90.2 fo tcirtsiD 08.54 mauG 06.44 mauG 06.94 ippississiM 02.66 adaveN 453,194 fo tcirtsiD 01.2 mauG 02.64 sdnalsI nigriV 02.54 ainrofilaC 09.94 mauG 03.76 ocixeM weN 128,276 ocixeM weN 13.2 ainrofilaC 07.84 amabalA 00.74 sionillI 00.25 ocixeM weN 00.07 amabalA 891,269 dnalsI edohR 46.2 sionillI 07.05 ykcutneK 04.84 amohalkO 03.25 dnalsI edohR 06.17 anozirA 742,079 erawaleD erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 98.4 yesreJ weN 20.16 htroN 45.85 saxeT 55.87 ohadI 65.09 aksarbeN 630,299,4 anozirA aniloraC 10.5 dnalsI edohR 91.16 nogerO 92.95 nogerO 58.87 htroN 28.19 aksalA 548,874,5 dnalyraM aniloraC 10.5 htroN 22.16 ocixeM weN 28.95 hatU 29.87 aksarbeN 64.29 adirolF 049,878,5 anaisiuoL aniloraC 40.5 anaisiuoL 01.26 dnalyraM 40.06 ainigriV 36.97 yesreJ weN 23.39 htroN 430,659,5 nogerO 61.5 gnimoyW 03.26 sasnaK 12.06 nagihciM 38.97 saxeT 78.49 ohadI 909,080,7 anaidnI 61.5 eessenneT 43.36 yesreJ weN 92.06 erawaleD 78.97 sasnakrA 09.59 ociR otreuP 934,742,7 awoI erihspmaH 72.5 weN 35.36 anatnoM 97.06 gnimoyW 51.08 kroY weN 01.69 awoI 819,726,7 ykcutneK atokaD 73.5 htroN 45.36 saxeT 97.16 dnalyraM 07.08 iruossiM 57.69 dnalyraM 137,667,7 eessenneT erihspmaH 04.5 iruossiM 11.46 gnimoyW 29.16 dnalsI edohR 89.08 weN 28.69 notgnihsaW 442,044,8 sionillI 24.5 nagihciM 62.46 nisnocsiW 81.26 awoI 00.18 atosenniM 35.79 tnomreV 511,861,9 sttesuhcassaM 64.5 oihO 03.46 erawaleD 46.26 sttesuhcassaM 29.18 nisnocsiW 87.89 atosenniM 688,525,01 iruossiM aniloraC erihspmaH 95.5 awoI 26.46 aksarbeN 27.26 htroN 28.28 ainigriV tseW 40.001 weN 493,475,01 aigroeG 19.5 nisnocsiW 39.46 odaroloC 58.26 ainigriV tseW 45.38 ainigriV 51.001 nisnocsiW 373,376,01 ainigriV atokaD aniloraC 49.5 ohadI 02.56 hatU 78.26 notgnihsaW 50.48 ainavlysnneP 58.001 htroN 290,708,21 htroN erihspmaH 59.5 saxeT 57.56 adirolF 45.46 weN 37.48 odaroloC 50.101 eniaM 434,840,31 atosenniM 59.5 ykcutneK 00.66 atosenniM 57.46 kroY weN 52.58 hatU 83.101 ainavlysnneP 158,544,31 notgnihsaW 71.6 nogerO 21.66 awoI 29.46 yesreJ weN 52.58 anatnoM 95.201 oihO 242,925,41 nisnocsiW atokaD 33.6 ainigriV 43.66 oihO 21.66 tnomreV 95.68 htroN 13.301 atokaD htuoS 167,533,61 yesreJ weN aniloraC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP aibmuloC 13.3 adaveN 95.15 iruossiM 22.15 fo tcirtsiD 29.36 eessenneT 18.87 anaisiuoL 344,553,1 adaveN 55.3 odaroloC 65.35 ociR otreuP 62.15 amabalA 74.56 ociR otreuP 25.97 anaidnI 087,715,1 atokaD htuoS atokaD 36.3 aksarbeN 49.45 ainrofilaC 88.15 aigroeG 84.76 nogerO 46.18 aigroeG 814,245,1 htroN aniloraC 46.3 amohalkO 20.55 tucitcennoC 97.25 ippississiM 36.76 tucitcennoC 82.28 htuoS 887,665,1 iiawaH erihspmaH 88.3 sasnakrA 06.55 nagihciM 90.35 iiawaH 08.86 anozirA 19.38 sdnalsI nigriV 199,308,1 weN 49.3 anatnoM 91.65 anaidnI 42.35 sdnalsI nigriV 45.96 amohalkO 83.48 nogerO 767,439,1 aksalA 59.3 amabalA 64.65 ohadI 33.35 iruossiM 30.07 adirolF 14.48 hatU 745,533,2 ohadI 80.4 hatU 04.75 sasnakrA 48.35 ociR otreuP 45.07 anaidnI 68.58 sttesuhcassaM 922,933,2 eniaM 01.4 atosenniM 24.75 ainigriV 83.45 sasnaK 31.17 aigroeG 11.68 nagihciM 120,642,3 ippississiM aniloraC 22.4 tnomreV 15.75 amohalkO 45.45 tucitcennoC 71.17 htuoS 04.68 tucitcennoC 654,372,3 ociR otreuP 13.4 kroY weN 22.85 ippississiM 07.45 ykcutneK 92.17 anaisiuoL 16.68 sasnaK 903,603,3 sasnaK 53.4 eniaM 22.85 sionillI 17.45 eessenneT 85.17 oihO 98.68 gnimoyW 781,163,3 sasnakrA 24.4 ainigriV tseW 35.85 anaisiuoL 43.55 sasnakrA 50.27 erawaleD 89.68 ainigriV 972,734,3 amohalkO 24.4 anozirA 18.85 sttesuhcassaM 94.55 aksalA 00.37 sasnaK 25.78 ainigriV tseW 952,554,3 tucitcennoC aniloraC 05.4 adirolF 68.85 ainigriV tseW 15.55 odaroloC 50.37 amabalA 09.78 iiawaH 693,506,3 htuoS 05.4 aksalA 49.85 dnalsI edohR 86.55 ohadI 77.37 dnalyraM 12.88 sasnakrA 763,536,3 aksarbeN 25.4 notgnihsaW 80.95 kroY weN 39.55 anaisiuoL 24.47 sttesuhcassaM 98.88 iruossiM 929,776,3 hatU 75.4 dnalyraM 21.95 aigroeG 75.65 eniaM 69.47 nagihciM 54.98 ykcutneK 114,577,3 ainigriV tseW 76.4 aigroeG 71.95 eessenneT 57.65 adirolF 58.57 ykcutneK 52.09 kroY weN 749,329,3 amabalA 88.4 sttesuhcassaM 57.95 eniaM 04.85 anatnoM 31.87 ainrofilaC 52.09 ocixeM weN 832,338,4 odaroloC aniloraC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 67.7 atokaD htuoS 10.17 tnomreV 13.96 atosenniM 75.98 notgnihsaW 59.701 saxeT 806,589,82 oihO erihspmaH atokaD 35.8 ippississiM 79.17 weN 07.27 htroN 14.29 aksalA 20.111 eniaM 328,495,73 saxeT 35.8 anaidnI 05.37 ainavlysnneP 27.47 ainavlysnneP 00.69 atokaD htuoS 24.211 amohalkO 655,347,14 ainrofilaC erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP )etats gnimrofrep tsewol ot etats gnimrofrep tsehg ih yb d egnarra( 5002YF ,serocS ecnamrofreP evitnecnI detiduanU dna stnemyaP evitnecnI tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC . 5-B elbaT .raey elgnis a rof egairram fo edistuo shtrib fo rebmun eht ot dehsilbatse rebmun taht erapmoc dna ega yna fo nerdlihc rof dehsilbatse seitinretap rof tiderc ekat nac setats esuaceb %001 naht retaerg eb nac egatnecrep tnemhsilbatse ytinretap ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD .tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS aibmuloC aibmuloC 38.1 sdnalsI nigriV 33.24 fo tcirtsiD 86.24 anozirA 29.43 fo tcirtsiD 12.36 adaveN 881,08 mauG aibmuloC 78.1 ocixeM weN 48.24 iiawaH 66.64 mauG 11.05 mauG 43.46 fo tcirtsiD 817,501 sdnalsI nigriV aibmuloC 21.2 ainrofilaC 25.74 mauG 69.74 ainrofilaC 05.15 sionillI 21.17 mauG 709,795 fo tcirtsiD aniloraC 62.2 mauG 39.74 sdnalsI nigriV 93.84 htuoS 31.25 ippississiM 27.37 amabalA 507,079 ocixeM weN aniloraC 10.3 erawaleD 12.94 htuoS 06.84 amohalkO 35.25 dnalsI edohR 31.47 erawaleD 021,160,1 anatnoM aibmuloC 41.3 fo tcirtsiD 00.05 amabalA 52.94 sionillI 29.35 ocixeM weN 74.47 ippississiM 905,081,1 gnimoyW 51.3 sasnaK 05.05 anozirA 24.94 ocixeM weN 58.45 sdnalsI nigriV 57.47 dnalsI edohR 433,791,1 tnomreV 02.3 tucitcennoC 43.15 ykcutneK 40.15 anaidnI 66.85 iiawaH 57.47 anozirA 902,562,1 erawaleD 22.3 sionillI 44.15 adaveN 11.15 adaveN 87.95 adaveN 17.77 eessenneT 228,072,1 dnalsI edohR erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 02.5 aigroeG 88.26 ainigriV tseW 36.06 dnalsI edohR 27.08 yesreJ weN 79.39 ohadI 773,312,6 anaisiuoL aniloraC 14.5 nisnocsiW 02.36 yesreJ weN 86.06 anatnoM 88.08 htroN 67.49 awoI 472,719,6 awoI erihspmaH 14.5 iruossiM 17.36 erawaleD 19.06 ainigriV 51.18 weN 61.59 notgnihsaW 984,303,7 dnalyraM 44.5 eessenneT 29.36 dnalyraM 93.16 hatU 36.18 iruossiM 90.69 atosenniM 597,738,7 eessenneT aniloraC 85.5 ohadI 41.46 anatnoM 80.36 dnalyraM 21.28 atosenniM 73.69 htroN 594,583,8 anaidnI 66.5 oihO 91.46 nisnocsiW 13.36 notgnihsaW 32.28 saxeT 90.89 iiawaH 336,056,8 sionillI 08.5 awoI 69.46 aksarbeN 76.36 gnimoyW 14.28 sasnakrA 37.89 ainavlysnneP 830,898,8 sttesuhcassaM 39.5 nogerO 32.56 saxeT 96.36 ainigriV tseW 45.38 ainigriV tseW 28.89 tnomreV 934,402,01 iruossiM 39.5 sttesuhcassaM 56.56 odaroloC 97.36 sttesuhcassaM 55.38 nisnocsiW 09.99 adirolF 432,732,01 ainigriV aniloraC 59.5 ykcutneK 07.56 awoI 25.46 htroN 86.48 ainigriV 32.001 nisnocsiW 881,808,01 aigroeG erihspmaH 10.6 ociR otreuP 80.66 atosenniM 36.46 weN 17.48 ainavlysnneP 54.001 yesreJ weN 132,531,21 atosenniM atokaD erihspmaH 30.6 htroN 11.66 notgnihsaW 47.46 awoI 52.58 hatU 35.201 weN 773,917,21 notgnihsaW atokaD aniloraC 52.6 gnimoyW 45.66 oihO 31.56 kroY weN 53.58 awoI 88.201 htroN 726,164,31 htroN 93.6 ainavlysnneP 17.66 adirolF 72.56 yesreJ weN 83.58 odaroloC 65.301 atokaD htuoS 574,847,31 nisnocsiW atokaD 54.6 dnalsI edohR 64.76 aksalA 89.66 tnomreV 57.68 htroN 31.401 oihO 289,479,51 yesreJ weN 25.6 ainigriV 75.76 hatU 48.76 aksarbeN 20.88 tnomreV 04.401 ociR otreuP 037,362,52 adirolF 07.6 nagihciM 67.76 gnimoyW 89.86 oihO 21.88 anatnoM 97.401 aksalA 850,224,52 ainavlysnneP 18.6 saxeT 25.96 atokaD htuoS 10.96 nisnocsiW 01.98 eniaM 34.501 anatnoM 751,530,62 nagihciM aniloraC atokaD 70.7 htuoS 96.96 htroN 40.96 atokaD htuoS 83.98 gnimoyW 45.601 ainrofilaC 919,242,62 kroY weN erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP erihspmaH 86.3 sasnakrA 44.35 ykcutneK 74.35 ippississiM 90.96 amohalkO 82.28 anaidnI 821,056,1 weN aniloraC 97.3 amohalkO 08.35 htuoS 25.45 sasnaK 93.96 anaidnI 94.28 aksarbeN 923,908,1 aksalA 19.3 tnomreV 66.45 ohadI 96.45 iruossiM 25.96 tucitcennoC 09.28 gnimoyW 447,628,1 adaveN aniloraC 20.4 anatnoM 81.55 amohalkO 69.45 aksalA 32.17 htuoS 74.38 hatU 591,761,2 eniaM 30.4 hatU 15.55 tucitcennoC 82.55 ociR otreuP 99.17 anaisiuoL 96.38 aigroeG 758,983,2 ohadI aniloraC 22.4 atosenniM 30.65 ainrofilaC 03.55 iiawaH 81.27 adirolF 76.48 htuoS 016,094,2 sasnakrA 62.4 amabalA 46.75 anaisiuoL 13.55 ykcutneK 96.27 oihO 64.68 nagihciM 078,222,3 ippississiM 72.4 eniaM 67.75 ainigriV 83.55 tucitcennoC 06.37 sttesuhcassaM 56.78 ainigriV tseW 276,862,3 ociR otreuP 93.4 iiawaH 68.75 sttesuhcassaM 34.55 eessenneT 38.37 erawaleD 78.78 tucitcennoC 826,882,3 hatU 45.4 aksalA 10.85 anaidnI 54.55 anaisiuoL 19.37 anozirA 43.98 ainigriV 079,982,3 sasnaK aniloraC 17.4 anaisiuoL 30.85 dnalsI edohR 66.55 sdnalsI nigriV 39.37 amabalA 33.09 kroY weN 388,123,3 htuoS 37.4 anozirA 20.95 kroY weN 18.55 ohadI 14.47 sasnaK 75.09 dnalyraM 303,574,3 aksarbeN 47.4 notgnihsaW 61.95 aigroeG 27.65 adirolF 74.47 aigroeG 75.09 sasnakrA 878,346,3 amohalkO 47.4 yesreJ weN 50.06 eessenneT 90.75 sasnakrA 05.47 nagihciM 91.19 sasnaK 346,978,3 ainigriV tseW erihspmaH 57.4 weN 64.06 ippississiM 96.75 odaroloC 56.47 dnalyraM 22.19 sttesuhcassaM 646,020,4 amabalA 97.4 kroY weN 27.06 nogerO 90.06 nogerO 15.77 ykcutneK 17.19 nogerO 152,057,4 odaroloC 08.4 adirolF 78.06 sasnakrA 03.06 eniaM 27.77 aksarbeN 91.29 sionillI 419,568,4 tucitcennoC 88.4 dnalyraM 23.16 ocixeM weN 14.06 erawaleD 85.87 ohadI 63.29 odaroloC 111,802,5 ykcutneK aniloraC 09.4 ainigriV tseW 61.26 htroN 15.06 saxeT 30.08 kroY weN 25.29 iruossiM 211,324,5 anozirA aniloraC 01.5 htroN 95.26 sasnaK 25.06 nagihciM 82.08 ainrofilaC 35.29 ykcutneK 727,006,5 nogerO erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP .raey elgnis a rof egairram fo edistuo shtrib fo rebmun eht ot dehsilbatse rebmun taht erapmoc dna ega yna fo nerdlihc rof dehsilbatse seitinretap rof tiderc ekat nac setats esuaceb %001 naht retaerg eb nac egatnecrep tnemhsilbatse ytinretap ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD .tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS aibmuloC 01.2 ocixeM weN 63.14 iiawaH 63.44 anozirA 06.93 fo tcirtsiD 50.45 ocixeM weN 279,801 sdnalsI nigriV aibmuloC 11.2 sdnalsI nigriV 86.34 fo tcirtsiD 86.54 adaveN 36.35 ippississiM 03.66 adaveN 328,911 mauG aibmuloC aibmuloC 11.2 mauG 19.54 sionillI 33.74 mauG 14.55 sdnalsI nigriV 18.47 fo tcirtsiD 705,895 fo tcirtsiD aniloraC 51.2 ainrofilaC 87.74 sdnalsI nigriV 14.74 htuoS 81.75 dnalsI edohR 20.77 dnalsI edohR 503,009 erawaleD aibmuloC 54.2 fo tcirtsiD 06.94 adaveN 72.94 ainrofilaC 03.85 iiawaH 08.77 ippississiM 762,779 tnomreV 89.2 adaveN 69.94 amabalA 00.05 ocixeM weN 53.95 sionillI 41.97 erawaleD 964,820,1 anatnoM 01.3 erawaleD 33.05 mauG 11.05 amohalkO 38.95 ocixeM weN 72.97 mauG 983,550,1 ocixeM weN 93.3 sasnaK 73.15 anozirA 47.15 amabalA 81.06 mauG 65.97 sdnalsI nigriV 207,361,1 gnimoyW 75.3 aksarbeN 01.25 iruossiM 65.25 aigroeG 14.26 adaveN 84.08 eessenneT 052,112,1 dnalsI edohR 86.3 sionillI 55.25 ociR otreuP 28.25 anaidnI 48.46 eessenneT 11.18 anozirA 379,134,1 iiawaH aibmuloC 86.3 tucitcennoC 69.25 eniaM 98.25 fo tcirtsiD 73.66 ociR otreuP 98.18 amabalA 315,664,1 atokaD htuoS atokaD 86.3 odaroloC 81.35 nagihciM 92.35 sionillI 14.76 nogerO 39.18 anaisiuoL 458,065,1 htroN erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP )srallod( ssen etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS stnemyaP etatS -evitceffE egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE evitnecnI -tsoC ytinretaP 53.5 ohadI 26.36 ocixeM weN 33.26 saxeT 45.28 weN 59.79 aksalA 34.5 ociR otreuP 17.36 adirolF 75.36 hatU 45.28 atosenniM 00.89 notgnihsaW 85.5 iruossiM 27.36 dnalyraM 91.46 dnalyraM 47.28 saxeT 23.89 sionillI 95.5 sttesuhcassaM 77.36 yesreJ weN 33.46 notgnihsaW 18.28 iruossiM 22.99 adirolF erihspmaH 97.5 nisnocsiW 12.56 aksarbeN 83.46 weN 16.38 sasnakrA 92.99 ociR otreuP 97.5 awoI 14.56 anatnoM 84.46 ainigriV tseW 18.38 nisnocsiW 11.001 ainavlysnneP 68.5 nogerO 22.66 atosenniM 19.46 kroY weN 05.48 ainavlysnneP 31.001 sasnakrA 68.5 atokaD htroN 15.66 aksalA 44.56 sttesuhcassaM 91.58 ainigriV 32.001 nisnocsiW 80.6 eessenneT 81.76 awoI 75.56 yesreJ weN 24.58 ainigriV tseW 10.101 tnomreV aniloraC 61.6 ykcutneK 03.76 oihO 46.56 htroN 78.58 tnomreV 75.201 ainigriV tseW 81.6 aigroeG 03.76 odaroloC 66.56 awoI 78.58 awoI 13.301 iiawaH 92.6 gnimoyW 43.76 notgnihsaW 58.56 gnimoyW 92.68 odaroloC 48.401 ohadI 92.6 oihO 53.76 saxeT 44.76 aksarbeN 05.78 atokaD htroN 86.801 atokaD htuoS 54.6 ainavlysnneP 64.86 hatU 64.76 tnomreV 76.78 eniaM 86.801 anatnoM 85.6 ainigriV 35.86 atokaD htuoS 38.86 atosenniM 38.78 hatU 88.901 ainrofilaC aniloraC 04.7 htuoS 83.96 gnimoyW 41.96 oihO 69.78 anatnoM 81.211 hatU 25.7 saxeT 51.07 atokaD htroN 74.96 atokaD htuoS 90.98 gnimoyW 02.311 yesreJ weN erihspmaH 32.8 atokaD htuoS 86.07 tnomreV 46.07 nisnocsiW 68.98 notgnihsaW 02.311 weN erihspmaH 29.8 anaidnI 81.27 weN 24.37 atokaD htroN 42.29 aksalA 04.411 atokaD htroN 54.9 ippississiM 12.57 ainavlysnneP 56.47 ainavlysnneP 89.29 atokaD htuoS 21.221 amohalkO erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP ssenevitceffE etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS -tsoC egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE ytinretaP )etats gnimrofrep tsewol ot etats gnimrofrep tsehg ih yb d egnarra( 6002YF ,serocS ecnamrofreP evitnecnI detiduanU tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC . 6-B elbaT 99.3 amohalkO 94.55 anozirA 23.45 ippississiM 44.86 anaidnI 91.68 anaidnI 50.4 atosenniM 39.55 anaisiuoL 83.45 adirolF 36.96 amohalkO 03.78 aigroeG 80.4 sasnakrA 64.65 ainrofilaC 09.45 aksalA 99.07 tucitcennoC 84.98 eessenneT 61.4 eniaM 29.65 ykcutneK 99.45 tucitcennoC 01.37 anaisiuoL 17.09 nagihciM 91.4 anatnoM 37.75 tucitcennoC 70.55 ociR otreuP 33.37 oihO 57.09 dnalyraM 72.4 aksalA 90.85 ainigriV 92.55 sasnaK 97.37 adirolF 93.19 ykcutneK 82.4 hatU 44.85 dnalsI edohR 86.55 eessenneT 27.47 sasnaK 84.19 sasnaK 53.4 anozirA 45.85 sttesuhcassaM 86.55 iruossiM 58.47 sttesuhcassaM 96.19 ainigriV 83.4 amabalA 18.85 kroY weN 68.55 ohadI 11.57 erawaleD 57.19 kroY weN aniloraC 14.4 notgnihsaW 28.85 anaidnI 46.65 ykcutneK 56.57 htuoS 99.19 tucitcennoC 65.4 yesreJ weN 30.95 nisnocsiW 39.65 iiawaH 76.57 aigroeG 50.29 nogerO 85.4 anaisiuoL 29.95 amohalkO 71.75 sdnalsI nigriV 84.67 anozirA 19.29 iruossiM 06.4 adirolF 42.06 aigroeG 20.95 sasnakrA 66.77 dnalyraM 69.29 saxeT 07.4 dnalsI edohR 65.06 eessenneT 90.95 odaroloC 24.87 aksarbeN 99.29 odaroloC erihspmaH 07.4 weN 43.16 ainigriV tseW 32.95 dnalsI edohR 94.97 ohadI 32.59 aksarbeN 57.4 kroY weN 53.16 ippississiM 24.06 nogerO 37.97 ykcutneK 52.59 oihO aniloraC 79.4 htroN 23.26 erawaleD 84.06 erawaleD 97.97 nagihciM 35.59 awoI 00.5 ainigriV tseW 15.26 nogerO 50.16 eniaM 75.08 ainrofilaC 43.69 eniaM aniloraC 00.5 iiawaH 15.26 sasnakrA 83.16 nagihciM 50.18 htroN 64.69 sttesuhcassaM 02.5 dnalyraM 82.36 sasnaK 94.16 anatnoM 06.18 kroY weN 84.69 atosenniM aniloraC aniloraC 92.5 nagihciM 04.36 htroN 16.16 ainigriV 30.28 yesreJ weN 17.79 htroN erihspmaH erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP ssenevitceffE etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS -tsoC egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE ytinretaP .raey elgnis a rof egairram fo edistuo shtrib fo rebmun eht ot dehsilbatse rebmun taht erapmoc dna ega yna fo nerdlihc rof dehsilbatse seitinretap rof tiderc ekat nac setats esuaceb %001 naht retaerg eb nac egatnecrep tnemhsilbatse ytinretap ehT :etoN .secivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD .tnemecrofnE troppuS dlihC fo eciffO eht morf atad no desab ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC eht yb deraperp elbaT :ecruoS aibmuloC 48.1 mauG .A.N amabalA 29.54 adaveN 34.54 fo tcirtsiD 44.95 ocixeM weN 30.2 ainrofilaC 10.14 iiawaH 93.64 mauG 19.05 amabalA 53.96 adaveN aibmuloC 31.2 sdnalsI nigriV 66.14 fo tcirtsiD 55.64 anozirA 31.45 ippississiM 92.77 mauG aniloraC aibmuloC 63.2 ocixeM weN 16.74 sdnalsI nigriV 13.94 htuoS 64.55 sdnalsI nigriV 90.87 fo tcirtsiD aibmuloC 55.2 fo tcirtsiD 64.94 mauG 93.05 ainrofilaC 35.85 iiawaH 89.97 ippississiM 07.2 erawaleD 92.15 sionillI 67.15 sionillI 75.85 dnalsI edohR 70.18 anaisiuoL 43.3 adaveN 35.15 adaveN 39.15 aigroeG 08.85 mauG 16.18 erawaleD aibmuloC 83.3 sasnaK 73.25 ociR otreuP 35.25 fo tcirtsiD 42.36 ocixeM weN 96.18 amabalA aniloraC 47.3 tucitcennoC 89.25 htuoS 86.25 amohalkO 78.36 eessenneT 35.38 sdnalsI nigriV aniloraC 87.3 aksarbeN 63.35 iruossiM 78.25 amabalA 63.66 nogerO 42.48 htuoS 08.3 tnomreV 50.45 ohadI 79.25 ocixeM weN 08.66 adaveN 72.48 anozirA 48.3 sionillI 03.45 nagihciM 28.35 anaidnI 68.66 sionillI 70.68 gnimoyW 49.3 odaroloC 20.55 eniaM 50.45 anaisiuoL 44.76 ociR otreuP 51.68 dnalsI edohR erocS egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP egatnecreP ssenevitceffE etatS sesaC etatS snoitcelloC etatS sredrO etatS tnem etatS -tsoC egaraerrA tnerruC htiw sesaC -hsilbatsE ytinretaP csolomonfears@crs.loc.gov, 7-7306 Specialist in Social Policy Carmen Solomon-Fears ¢ ¢ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL34203