For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33886 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ¢ ¡ ¢ ¢ ¢ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ¡ ¢ ¢ In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs concluded that the agency's leader had "lacked the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position." In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394) stipulated that the FEMA Administrator, among other top agency leaders, must meet certain qualifications. President George W. Bush's signing statement for this act seemingly challenged the constitutionality of these requirements, and it stated that the "executive branch shall construe [the applicable provision] in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." Three Members of Congress then urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out nation's safety and security." These events reflect broader interbranch differences over congressional authority to establish statutory qualifications. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications. The boundaries of this authority have not been conclusively drawn, however, and the executive branch, in recent years, has asserted that congressional authority in this area is more limited than congressional practice would suggest. Statutory qualification requirements might continue to be an area of conflict between Congress and the President. Inasmuch as these provisions are not self-enforcing, their success as a means of assuring competent leadership of the federal government will depend upon the two branches' adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes. In practice, it has not been unusual for Congress to mandate that appointees to certain positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has used such statutory provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have them. This report provides background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and provides related analysis and options. The report includes two tables with examples of existing positions with qualification requirements. This report will be updated in response to policy developments related to statutory qualifications. ¡ ¢ Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 The Constitutional Appointments Framework ................................................................................ 2 Congressional Authority to Establish Qualifications for Leadership Positions............................... 3 Executive Branch Views ........................................................................................................... 4 Signing Statements.............................................................................................................. 4 Department of Justice Opinions.......................................................................................... 5 Statutory Qualifications in Practice................................................................................................. 7 Qualification Modifications ...................................................................................................... 9 Qualification Waivers.............................................................................................................. 10 Qualifications for Members of Collegial Bodies .....................................................................11 Statutory Qualifications: Analysis and Options............................................................................. 12 Advantages and Disadvantages of Statutory Qualifications ................................................... 13 Options for Congressional Consideration ............................................................................... 15 Incremental Establishment of Qualifications.................................................................... 15 Agency-wide Qualifications ............................................................................................. 16 Government-wide Standards............................................................................................. 16 Senate Standards ............................................................................................................... 17 Concluding Observations .............................................................................................................. 18 Table A-1. Examples of Department and Agency Leadership Positions with Statutory Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................ 20 Table A-2. Examples of Positions on Independent Collegial Bodies with Statutory Qualification Requirements........................................................................................................ 24 ¡ Appendix. Examples of Statutory Qualification Requirements .................................................... 20 Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 29 ¡ ¢ In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs concluded, among other findings, that the agency's leader had "lacked the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position."1 The committee went on to recommend that future leaders of national emergency management efforts "have significant experience in crisis management, in addition to substantial management and leadership experience, whether in the public, private or nonprofit sector."2 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, appointees to the top FEMA leadership position were not required, in statute, to meet any qualifications.3 This was changed by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,4 under which the FEMA Administrator, among other top agency leaders, is required to meet certain qualifications. The act provides the following: The Administrator shall be appointed from among individuals who have--(A) a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security; and (B) not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the public or private sector.5 The Bush Administration seemingly challenged the legitimacy of this provision in the President's signing statement for the act. It reads, in part, as follows: Section 503(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by section 611 of the Act, provides for the appointment and certain duties of the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Section 503(c)(2) vests in the President authority to appoint the Administrator, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, but purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may select the appointee in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill the office. The executive branch shall construe section 503(c)(2) in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.6 The President appears to take issue with the extent to which the qualifications might limit the pool of potential nominees to the position. The statement does not make clear whether the Administration sees Section 503(c)(2) as being in conflict with the Appointments Clause and, if so, in what way. The final sentence in the excerpt suggests that, to the degree that Section 503(c)(2) is seen to be in conflict with the Administration's reading of the Appointments Clause, the President might elect not to abide by the provision. In response to the signing statement, three 1 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2006), unpaginated chapter, "Conclusions and Findings." 2 Ibid., p. Recommendations - 4. 3 The head of FEMA at that time was the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Appointments to this position were to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (P.L. 107-296, § 103(a)). 4 P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394. 5 Ibid., § 611(10), as it amends § 503(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002; 120 Stat. 1397. 6 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 42, October 4, 2006, pp. 1742-1743. ¡ ¢ Members of Congress urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out nation's safety and security."7 Both Congress and the President have an interest in assuring that the federal government is led by appointees who have the necessary qualifications to successfully and faithfully implement the law. As discussed later in this report, the preponderance of evidence and historical practices suggest that Congress has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications--as long as those qualifications do not amount to a de facto legislative designation. In many instances, Congress has mandated that appointees to leadership positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has, however, used qualification provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have statutory qualifications. This report provides background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and discusses related options for congressional consideration. Examples of positions with statutory requirements or restrictions are provided in two tables in the Appendix. The Constitution charges Congress with the responsibility of determining how most leaders of the federal government will be appointed. The framework for this process is based in Article II: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.8 This clause sets presidential appointment by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (hereafter referred to as PAS positions) as the default process for filling such positions.9 But only certain officers of the United States must be appointed by that method. At the discretion of Congress, "inferior" officers may be appointed either under the default process or by the President alone, the courts, or agency heads. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "Officers of the United States" to mean "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."10 The Supreme Court has provided guidance that could assist 7 U.S. Congress, letter from Senators Mary L. Landrieu, Susan M. Collins, and Joseph I. Lieberman to President George W. Bush, October 12, 2006. (Letter obtained from CQ Top Docs at CQ.com.) 8 Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2. 9 In a 1976 opinion, the Comptroller General reasoned that this provision indicates that all officers of the United States are to be PAS positions unless Congress affirmatively delegates that authority (Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-183012, 56 Comp. Gen. 137). 10 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). ¡ ¢ Congress in identifying which officers may be appointed through one of the non-PAS processes. In Edmond v. United States,11 the court reasoned that [g]enerally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an "inferior officer" depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase "lesser officer." Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.12 This suggests that, aside from officers in positions that the Constitution specifically identifies, such as ambassadors and "Judges of the supreme Court," the Constitution requires only one layer of advice and consent positions in the hierarchy of each agency. It indicates that appointees with PAS-appointed supervisors are inferior officers, and that Congress may, therefore, provide for appointment by one of the other specified authorities.13 In the case of executive branch departments and agencies outside the White House, Congress usually elects either to use the PAS process or to delegate authority to the agency head. This enables the Senate to play a role in appointments to the leadership positions where it is most interested in maintaining influence over programs and policies. In some cases, Senators may influence nominee selection. They also may obtain commitments to carry out implementation of laws in certain ways during confirmation hearings, and they are likely to exact promises to testify before committees for oversight purposes. ¢ The power of Congress to specify qualifications for a particular office is generally understood to be incident to its constitutional authority to establish the office. Historically, it has established qualifications many times; Justice Louis Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States, documented the longstanding nature of this practice. He observed that "a multitude of laws have been enacted which limit the President's power to make nominations," and added that "[s]uch restriction upon the power to nominate has been exercised by Congress continuously since the foundation of the Government."14 Justice Brandeis noted that Congress has, from time to time, restricted the President's selection by the requirement of citizenship. It has limited the power of nomination by providing that the office may be held only by a resident of the United States; of a State; of a particular State; of a particular district; of a particular territory; of the District of Columbia; of a particular foreign country. 11 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 12 Ibid., pp. 662-663. 13 Although the Senate plays an important advice and consent role for many presidential appointments, it is noteworthy that officers of the United States may not be appointed by Members of Congress. 14 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265 (1926) (dissenting opinion). ¡ ¢ It has limited the power of nomination further by prescribing specific professional attainments, of occupational experience. It has, in other cases, prescribed the test of examinations. It has imposed the requirement of age; of sex; of race; of property; and of habitual temperance in the use of intoxicating liquors. Congress has imposed like restrictions on the power of nomination by requiring political representation; or that the selection be made on a nonpartisan basis. It has required in some cases, that the representation be industrial; in others, that it be geographic. It has at times required that the President's nominees be taken from, or include representatives from, particular branches or departments of the Government. By still other statutes, Congress has confined the President's selection to a small number of persons to be named by others.15 When specifying qualifications, Congress has, at times, come close to specifying the individual who must be appointed. In 1916, for example, Congress enacted a law providing that of the vacancies created in the Judge Advocate's Department by this act, one such vacancy, not below the rank of Major, shall be filled by the appointment of a person from civil life, not less than forty-five nor more than fifty years of age, who shall have been for ten years a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, shall have served for two years as a Captain in the regular or volunteer army, and shall be proficient in the Spanish language and laws.16 These requirements would likely have limited the President's potential choices to one or two people, a limitation on the President's appointment power that might not withstand judicial scrutiny. Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in establishing qualifications, its constitutional power is probably not without limits. In its majority opinion in Myers, the Court noted that "the legislative power" comprehends the authority "to prescribe qualifications for office, or reasonable classification for promotion, ... provided of course that these qualifications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation."17 ¡ Although the preponderance of evidence and historical practice supports the understanding that Congress has broad authority in this area, this view is not universally held. Executive branch views, as articulated through presidential signing statements and opinions of the Department of Justice, have ranged from the assertion that Congress has no such authority to an acknowledgment of some such authority that lacks clear boundaries. The view that Congress may have authority to establish only limited qualifications was evident in President George W. Bush's signing statement for the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, discussed in the introduction to this report, as well as other presidential signing statements. President Bush's 2006 signing statement for the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, for example, raised similar issues. 15 Myers v. United States, 265-274. Footnotes omitted. 16 39 Stat. 169. 17 Myers v. United States, 128 (Opinion of the Court). ¢ ¡ The executive branch shall construe subsections 202(a) and 502(a) of title 39, as enacted by subsections 501(a) and 601(a) of the Act, which purport to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons from whom the President may select appointees in a manner that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill the positions, in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.18 Previous Presidents, in other signing statements, also raised constitutional objections to qualification provisions. In a 1992 signing statement for legislation establishing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy Foundation, for example, President George H.W. Bush stated that the bill he was signing into law "purport[ed] to set qualifications, including requirements as to political party affiliation, for the trustees who will administer the foundation created by the bill." In his estimation, under the appointments clause of the Constitution, "congressional participation in such appointments may be exercised only through the Senate's advice and consent with respect to Presidential nominees." He stated that he would, therefore, "treat these provisions as precatory."19 A signing statement by President William J. Clinton raised specific, rather than blanket, objections to a qualifications provision, while agreeing to abide by its requirements: [S]ection 21(b) of the Act would forbid the appointment as United States Trade Representative or Deputy United States Trade Representative, of anyone who had ever ``directly represented, aided, or advised a foreign [government or political party] ... in any trade negotiation, or trade dispute with the United States.'' The Congress may not, of course, impose broad restrictions on the President's constitutional prerogative to nominate persons of his choosing to the highest executive branch positions, and this is especially so in the area of foreign relations. However, because as a policy matter I agree with the goal of ensuring the undivided loyalty of our representatives in trade negotiations, I intend, as a matter of practice, to act in accordance with this provision.20 Historically, opinions of Attorneys General recognized a constitutional authority for Congress to set qualifications. In 1871, for example, Attorney General Amos T. Akerman offered the following opinion: The argument has been made that the unquestioned right of Congress to create offices implies a right to prescribe qualifications for them. This is admitted. But this right to prescribe qualifications is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment. The parts of the Constitution which confer this power are as valid as those parts from which Congress derives the power to create offices, and one part should not be sacrificed to the other. An 18 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 42, December 20, 2006, p. 2196. 19 U.S. President (G.H.W. Bush), "Statement on Signing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 28, March 19, 1992, p. 507. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell later rebutted, on the Senate floor, the signing statement's reasoning (Sen. George J. Mitchell, "The Udall Foundation Act," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 138, April 9, 1992, pp. 8689-8691). 20 U.S. President (Clinton), "Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 31, December 19, 1995, pp. 2205-2206. As noted later in this report, Congress waived the requirement in question for Clinton's appointment of Charlene Barshevsky to the position. ¢ ¡ office cannot be created except under the condition that it shall be filled according to the constitutional rule.... Though the appointing power alone can designate an individual for an office, either Congress, by direct legislation, or the President, by authority derived from Congress, can prescribe qualifications, and require that the designation shall be made out of a class of persons ascertained by proper tests to have those qualifications; ... It has been argued that a right in Congress to limit in the least the field of selection, implies a right to carry on the contracting process to the designation of a particular individual. But I do not think this a fair conclusion. Congress could require that officers shall be of American citizenship or of a certain age, that judges should be of the legal profession and of a certain standing in the profession, and still leave room to the appointing power for the exercise of its own judgment and will; and I am not prepared to affirm that to go further, and require that the selection shall be made from persons found by an examining board to be qualified in such particulars as diligence, scholarship, integrity, good manners, and attachment to the Government, would impose an unconstitutional limitation on the appointing power. It would still have a reasonable scope for its own judgment and will. But it may be asked, at what point must the contracting process stop? I confess my inability to answer. But the difficulty of drawing a line between such limitations as are, and such as are not, allowed by the Constitution, is no proof that both classes do not exist.21 A 1979 opinion of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) was seemingly consistent with the earlier view, stating that Congress has power to prescribe qualifications for office; but the power of appointment belongs to the President, and it cannot be usurped or abridged by Congress.... There is no settled constitutional rule that determines how these two powers--the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to appoint--are to be reconciled, but it seems clear that there must be some constitutionally prescribed balance. The balance may shift depending on the nature of the office in question. For example, Congress has required that the President appoint members of both parties to certain kinds of boards and commissions; there is serious question whether Congress could constitutionally require the President to follow the same practice with respect to his Cabinet.22 In 1989, however, the Department of Justice articulated a different point of view. The Office of Legal Counsel issued a memorandum entitled "Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Constitutional Authority," which stated, in part, the following: Congress ... imposes impermissible qualifications requirements on principal officers. For instance, Congress will require that a fixed number of members of certain commissions be from a particular political party. These requirements ... violate the Appointments Clause. The only congressional check that the Constitution places on the President's power to appoint "principal officers" is the advice and consent of the Senate.23 In 1996, the Department of Justice, citing Myers v. United States, the 1871 opinion of the Attorney General, and the 1979 OLC opinion, acknowledged that Congress has the constitutional authority to set certain qualifications. Nonetheless, it asserted that the requirements for the U.S. Trade Representative overstepped this authority because of the foreign policy responsibilities of the position and the position's close proximity to the President: 21 13 Op. A.G. 516, 520-521, 524-525 (1871). 22 3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 389 (1979). 23 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 250 (1989). (This memorandum was superceded by a 1996 OLC memorandum, which did not address the issue of qualifications (20 Op. O.L.C. 120).) ¢ ¡ Whatever the possible role of Congress in setting reasonable qualifications for office, ... a restriction ruling out a large portion of those persons best qualified by experience and knowledge to fill a particular office invades the constitutional power of the President and Senate to install the principal officers of the United States. Any power in the Congress to set qualifications "is limited by the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the person or body in whom the Constitution vests the power of appointment." [Akerman] Congress may not dictate qualifications "unattainable by a sufficient number to afford ample room for choice." [Akerman] Even if "there is no settled constitutional rule that determines how ... the power of the Congress to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to appoint ... are to be reconciled," we have opined that "there must be some constitutionally prescribed balance" and that this "balance may shift depending on the nature of the office in question." [1979 OLC opinion] Here, the restriction is particularly egregious because the office in question involves representation of the United States to foreign governments--an area constitutionally committed to the President.... Furthermore, the position in question is especially close to the President. The Office of United States Trade Representative is "established within the Executive Office of the President." ... Congress has also expressed [in statute] its sense that the United States Trade Representative "be the senior representative on any body that the President may establish for the purpose of providing to the President advice on overall economic policies in which international trade matters predominate." ... We believe that, where an office thus entails broad responsibility for advising the President and for making policy, the President must have expansive authority to choose his aides.24 Although executive branch views, as expressed in these signing statements and opinions from the Department of Justice, are seemingly inconclusive about the precise range of Congress's constitutional authority in this area, they clearly do not endorse the view that this authority is broad. ¢ Congress has established hundreds of executive branch positions in statute, but only a relatively small portion of the provisions creating these positions specify minimum qualifications that must be met by appointees. Table A-1, in the Appendix to this report, provides examples of department and agency leadership positions with statutory qualification requirements. For each example, the table identifies the position, its compensation level, the text of the qualification provision, the location of the provision in the U.S. Code, and the type of provision. Table A-2, also located in the Appendix, provides similar examples for independent collegial bodies, such as regulatory boards and commissions. As suggested by Justice Brandeis's previously mentioned dissenting opinion in the Myers case, Congress has developed a number of different kinds of qualifications for executive branch leadership positions. These include the following: · requirements of political party balance on collegial bodies; · restrictions on the basis of active duty or retired military status; · restrictions on the basis of concurrent federal government employment; · restrictions on the basis of criminal record; 24 20 Op. O.L.C. 279, 280-281 (1996). ¡ ¢ · restrictions on the basis of prior employment; · requirements of specified expertise, knowledge, or education; · requirements that the individual be an authority in a specified field related to the position; · requirements of demonstrated ability, or experience related to the position; · requirements of fitness between the individual and the office; · requirements of specified character trait (e.g., integrity); · requirements of U.S. citizenship; · requirements that the individual be selected without regard to political affiliation; and · requirement of specified affiliations (e.g., membership in the Public Health Service for the Surgeon General). For some positions, the qualifications are specific. The director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, for example, is to be appointed "from among individuals who are citizens of the United States, have a demonstrated understanding of financial management or oversight, and have a demonstrated understanding of mortgage security markets and housing finance." The law further provides a very specific disqualifying provision: "An individual may not be appointed as Director if the individual has served as an executive officer or director of an enterprise at any time during the 3-year period ending upon the nomination of such individual for appointment as Director."25 Similarly, the position of controller at the Office of Federal Financial Management in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) must be filled "from among individuals who possess--(1) demonstrated ability and practical experience in accounting, financial management, and financial systems; and (2) extensive practical experience in financial management in large governmental or business entities."26 These provisions seemingly provide objective criteria, such as demonstrated understanding of specific topics and ability and experience in certain fields, that must be used in the selection, by the President, and consideration, by the Senate, of nominees to these two positions. For other positions, qualification requirements are more general. The position of director of operational test and evaluation at the Department of Defense, for example, is to be filled "without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the office of Director."27 Similarly, appointments to the position of archivist of the United States are to be made "without regard to political affiliations and solely on the basis of the professional qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the office of Archivist."28 These provisions supply guidance to the President, in his selection, and to the Senate, in its consideration of a nominee. Compared with the language of more specific requirements, the phrases used in these provisions--regard for political affiliation, fitness to perform the duties, and professional qualifications required to perform the duties and responsibilities--would arguably be subject to a greater variety of subjective interpretations. 25 12 U.S.C. § 4512(a). 26 31 U.S.C. § 504(b). 27 10 U.S.C. § 139(a)(1). 28 44 U.S.C. § 2103(a). ¡ ¢ In some cases, Congress has established requirements that appointees be drawn from particular parts of the population. For example, at least seven of the 25 members of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board must be individuals with disabilities.29 In other cases, Congress has specified that special experience or sensitivity to a population is required. In selecting appointees for the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, the President is to select several non-governmental appointees, one of whom is "conversant with the problems incident to the employment of the blind," another of whom is "conversant with the problems incident to the employment of other severely handicapped individuals," a third of whom "represent[s] blind individuals employed in qualified nonprofit agencies for the blind," and a fourth of whom "represent[s] severely handicapped individuals (other than blind individuals) employed in qualified nonprofit agencies for other severely handicapped individuals."30 Although many individuals would meet these qualifications, the requirements significantly reduce the size of the pool of individuals from which the President can select. In some cases, Congress has applied a qualification to a broad category of positions for specific policy reasons. For example, many defense-related leadership positions are required to be filled by civilians, which reinforces the tradition of civilian supremacy in the United States government.31 Only a civilian may be appointed as Secretary of Defense. In addition, an individual "may not be appointed [to the position] within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force."32 Military service restrictions of one kind or another apply to many other leaders of the Department of Defense, as well, including the Deputy Secretary,33 Under Secretaries,34 and Assistant Secretaries.35 Other executive branch leadership positions with military service restrictions include the Director and Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,36 the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),37 and the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).38 Congress has sometimes modified qualifications it had established earlier. For example, an appointee to the position of Under Secretary for Health at the Department of Veterans Affairs was formerly required to be a doctor of medicine ... appointed without regard to political affiliation or activity and solely--(A) on the basis of demonstrated ability in the medical profession, in health-care 29 29 U.S.C. § 792(a)(1)(A). 30 41 U.S.C. § 46(a)(2). 31 For more on the history of this development, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1957). 32 10 U.S.C. § 113(a). 33 10 U.S.C. § 132(a). 34 10 U.S.C. §§ 133, 134, 135, 136, and 137. 35 10 U.S.C. § 138. 36 50 U.S.C. § 403-3a. 37 49 U.S.C. § 106. 38 42 U.S.C. § 2472. ¡ ¢ administration and policy formulation, and in health-care fiscal management; and (B) on the basis of substantial experience in connection with the programs of the Veterans Health Administration or programs of similar content and scope. This provision was amended by the Veterans Health Programs Improvement Act of 2004.39 Under the qualifications specified in the revised section, the appointee is no longer required to be a doctor of medicine, and must have "demonstrated ability in the medical profession, in health-care administration and policy formulation, or in health-care fiscal management," rather than all three areas.40 This amendment emerged from the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs with the following explanation: Current law requires the Under Secretary for Health to be a "doctor of medicine," restricting the pool of candidates that may be considered by the President for nomination to the position. Senior executives in the health care industry who may have exceptional credentials and experience, but who are not doctors of medicine, are excluded from consideration. The Committee bill would repeal the requirement for VA's Under Secretary for Health to be a medical doctor and allow the Secretary flexibility to nominate candidates with demonstrated abilities to fill this key position from the widest spectrum of talents.41 Qualification provisions are created by law; they may also be waived by law, and Congress has occasionally done so on a case-by-case basis. Congress passed legislation waiving civilian status requirements for the appointments of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense (1950),42 retired Admiral James B. Busey and retired General Thomas C. Richards to FAA Administrator (1989 and 1992),43 and Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly as NASA Administrator (1989).44 In 2002, the civilian status limitation on the NASA Deputy Administrator was waived for the candidate of the President's choosing for the duration of that fiscal year, rather than for a particular individual.45 The President nominated an active duty Marine Corps officer to the position, then withdrew the nomination in the face of opposition, among key Senators, to setting such a precedent.46 He subsequently nominated a civilian, who was confirmed. In addition to these cases involving military officers, Congress has waived qualifications in other instances. In 1997, for example, Congress waived a conflict of interest restriction for the U.S. trade representative. The section provides that 39 P.L. 108-422; 118 Stat. 2379. 40 38 U.S.C. § 305(a). Emphasis added. 41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Nurse Recruitment and Retention Act of 2004, report to accompany H.R. 4231, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 108-538 (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 10. 42 P.L. 81-788, 64 Stat. 853. 43 P.L. 101-47, 103 Stat. 134; and P.L. 102-308, 106 Stat. 273. 44 P.L. 101-48, 103 Stat. 136. 45 P.L. 107-117, § 307, 115 Stat. 2301. 46 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, March 22, 2002, p. 9. ¡ ¢ [a] person who has directly represented, aided, or advised a foreign entity ... in any trade negotiation, or trade dispute, with the United States may not be appointed as United States Trade Representative or as a Deputy United States Trade Representative.47 This provision was waived to allow Charlene Barshefsky to be appointed as U.S. Trade Representative. As an attorney for a Washington law firm, she had "advised the Canadian government on trade matters and also represented the government of Quebec in a case involving lumber imports."48 Among the arguments presented in favor of the waiver was the fact that Barshefsky was already serving as deputy U.S. trade representative in 1995 when the restriction was enacted.49 Statutory qualification requirements are more common for members of collegial boards and commissions than they are for other executive branch leadership positions. (For examples of requirements for collegial bodies, see Table A-2 in the Appendix of this report.) Arguably, such provisions serve to enhance both the independence and neutral competence of these entities. Collegial boards and commissions are generally structured so that they have more independence from the President than do other executive branch agencies. As one congressional study stated with regard to regulatory bodies, [h]istorically, Congressional interest in the regulatory agencies is rooted in the notion that these commissions were created by Congress, vested with Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce and, therefore, had a special relationship to the legislative branch. The commission form, as it has been created and developed by Congress over the past ninety years, is a determined attempt to isolate the agencies both from precipitous change and from control by the Executive Branch. It was for those reasons that Congress established bipartisan commissions composed of multi-members, serving set terms expiring at staggered intervals, who could be removed by the President only upon a showing of sufficient cause.50 Qualification requirements for members of a collegial body can also serve to enhance the agency's independence by emphasizing the importance of neutral competence, relative to political considerations, during the selection and confirmation processes. In the post-World War II era, the quality of the membership and functioning of regulatory bodies was a matter of concern for government scholars and observers. In 1949, the first Hoover Commission observed that "[a]ppointments to membership on [independent regulatory] commissions are sometimes below desirable standards because of the inadequate salaries offered, or the failure of the Executive to appreciate the importance of the positions."51 A 1960 report to President-elect John F. Kennedy was also critical of the quality of regulatory agency leaders: 47 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(3). 48 Paul Blustein, "Clinton Seeks Waiver for Barshefsky," Washington Post, January 9, 1997, p. E3. 49 Rep. Billy Tauzin, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.143, March 11, 1997, p. H822. 50 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Study on Federal Regulations: Vol. 1, The Regulatory Appointments Process, S. Doc. 95-25, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1977), p. 16. 51 U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The Independent Regulatory (continued...) ¡ ¢ It is generally admitted by most observers that since World War II a deterioration in the quality of our administrative personnel has taken place, both at the top level and throughout the staff.... Careful scrutiny of agency members from the standpoint of their qualifications as well as their prejudices in behalf of administering the legislative goals to which they were to be committed, was during these years too often replaced by a consideration of what political obligations could be repaid through appointments.... These attitudes have had a serious impact upon the regulatory agencies. At the top level initial expertise would be lacking and the want of devotion to the public service militated against its acquisition through continuing tenure. Top administrative positions appear to have been sought frequently as stepping stones to further political preference or to positions of importance within the industries subject to regulation. A too common complaint at the bar is that the staffs have captured the commissions and that independent and bold thinking on the part of the members of these agencies is absent.52 In the late 1970s, a Senate committee investigation found that the "pre-eminent problem with the regulatory appointments process, as it has operated in the past, is that it has not consistently resulted in the selection of people best equipped to handle regulatory responsibilities."53 The committee recommended that the organic acts for each collegial regulatory board and commission include the following language: The President shall nominate persons for the Commission/Board to insure commission membership shall be balanced, with broad representation of various talents, backgrounds, occupations, and experience appropriate to the functions and responsibilities of the Commission/Board. . . . The Commission/Board shall be composed of members who by reason of training, education or experience are qualified to carry out the functions of the Commission/Board under this chapter.54 Although this specific language has not been included in the organic acts of all boards and commissions, many collegial bodies now have statutory provisions imposing similar requirements. (See Table A-2.) ¢ ¢ Should issues concerning the competence of executive branch officials become a high priority for Congress, it might consider adding qualification requirements to existing or new statutory executive branch positions. The use of statutory qualifications entails certain potential benefits and costs for Congress, the President, and the federal bureaucracy. These advantages and disadvantages are discussed in the next section. This section is followed by a discussion of several options. (...continued) Commissions: A Report to the Congress by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Washington: GPO, 1949), p. 3. 52 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect, committee print prepared by James M. Landis, 86th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 11-12. 53 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Principal Recommendations and Findings of the Study on Federal Regulation, Volumes I-VI, committee print, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979), p. 13. 54 Ibid., p. 4. ¡ ¢ ¢ Although some statutory qualification requirements address characteristics that are not explicitly related to competence (notably those setting civilian and citizenship status requirements), most appear intended to ensure that competent and qualified individuals are appointed to leadership positions. One student of the administrative process observed, "[t]he prime key to the improvement of the administrative process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good men can make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good laws."55 Both Congress and the President have an interest in ensuring that the federal government is led by competent leaders who have the ability to implement the law successfully and faithfully. At the same time, inasmuch as the President is seen to be responsible for coordinating the management of the executive branch, it could be argued that he must be given the freedom to appoint leaders who will be accountable and, to some degree, politically loyal to him. These interests--competence, accountability, and loyalty--are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, they can be in tension. For example, recent research suggests that executive branch programs headed by mid-level managers, who are appointed at the agency level, may be better managed than those run by top executive branch leaders in presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions.56 It could be argued that establishing minimum qualifications for a program's or agency's leadership position is likely to lead to improved performance by that program or agency. This argument assumes that the President would select, and the Senate would consider, a nominee on the basis of these qualifications. It also assumes that the Senate would more easily reject, on this basis, poorly suited candidates. Finally, it assumes that an appointee with these qualifications would do a better job of leading the program or agency than would an appointee without these qualifications. Although these assumptions might hold true in many cases where qualifications are stipulated, they are not guaranteed to hold in all situations. The difficulties that may arise during the implementation of qualification provisions are illustrated by the nomination and appointment of Julie Myers to be Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This position, originally established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Border Security, is to be filled by an individual who has "a minimum of 5 years professional experience in law enforcement, and a minimum of 5 years of management experience."57 The President nominated Myers to the position on June 29, 2005. Questions about whether or not Myers met the specified qualifications were raised and addressed during her confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.58 In the months 55 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-elect, p. 66. 56 John B. Gilmour and David E. Lewis, "Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management," American Politics Research, vol. 34, January 2006, p. 22. The researchers conclude that they "have shown that programs administered by political appointees get systematically lower management grades than programs administered by senior executives" (p. 42). Their sample of senior executives includes both career employees and political appointees, however. 57 6 U.S.C. § 252(a)(2)(B). This position has a unique statutory context. Originally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the position of Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Border Security without specifying the means of appointment (P.L. 107-296 § 442(a)(2)). As part of a modification of a presidential reorganization plan that rearranged border security functions, the position was renamed the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and identified as a presidentially appointed Senate-confirmed position. (See "Border Reorganization Fact Sheet," at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0073.shtm, visited January 15, 2008.) 58 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Nominations of Stewart A. (continued...) ¢ ¡ after the hearing, some Senators were satisfied that Myers was qualified for the position, while others stated that her experience was insufficient and opposed the nomination on that basis.59 The nomination was reported out of the committee and placed on the Senate Executive Calendar, but it was not considered by the full Senate during the 109th Congress.60 Although reservations about Myers's qualifications may have prevented the nomination from coming to the floor at that time, the nomination may also have been held up because of other concerns.61 On January 4, 2006, the President gave Myers a recess appointment to the position.62 He again nominated her to the position on January 9, 2007, at the beginning of the 110th Congress. On December 19, 2007, after Myers had served in the position for nearly two years, and less than a month before her recess appointment would have expired, the Senate confirmed her nomination. Although many qualified individuals are nominated to, and confirmed for, positions with statutory qualifications, appointments to such positions can sometimes lead to a tug of war between the President and Congress. In such a case, (1) Congress establishes minimum experience requirements; (2) the President nominates the individual of his choice, who some argue has insufficient experience to meet these requirements; (3) the Senate does not confirm the nomination after some Senators oppose it because of this perceived shortcoming; (4) the President gives the nominee a recess appointment that lasts up to two years; and (5) the Senate confirms the individual, despite concerns about his or her qualifications, or, if the appointee is not confirmed, he or she must leave office when the recess appointment expires. It could be argued that this interbranch conflict is a healthy exercise of constitutional checks and balances. But this dynamic seemingly imposes a potentially heavy cost on the federal bureaucracy. An individual whose leadership and management qualifications are publicly cast into doubt in the Senate can still serve in a major federal government leadership position if the President elects to circumvent the confirmation process through a recess appointment. Although the President can install his chosen nominee in this way, the process might diminish the appointee's stature and, potentially, his or her effectiveness. The prospect of an interbranch tug of war over qualifications might raise concerns, from an institutional perspective and on a practical level, about the worth of establishing such qualifications in the first place. Institutionally, this tug of war might sometimes damage Congress, particularly the Senate. To the extent that the President circumvents the Senate when a nominee's qualifications are in question, congressional prerogatives--the authority of Congress to specify the characteristics of an office and the role of the Senate in the appointment process--are undercut and, seemingly, these institutions are injured. As a practical matter, it could be argued that a qualification requirement is of little use if it is not sufficient to prevent an individual whose satisfaction of that requirement is in doubt in the Senate from holding the office. (...continued) Baker and Julie L. Myers, hearing, 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 15, 2005, pp. 16-21. 59 Chris Strohm, "New Immigration Enforcement Chief Gets Mixed Reception," GovExec.com Daily Briefing, January 5, 2006, at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0106/010506c1.htm, visited January 15, 2008. 60 Information obtained from the nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS), available to Congress at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, visited January 15, 2008. 61 Eileen Sullivan, "Recess DHS Appointments May Backfire, Expert Says," CQ Homeland Security, January 6, 2006, at http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/109/hsnews109- 000002026893.html@allnews&metapub=HSNEWS&seqNum=8&searchIndex=0, visited January 15, 2008. 62 U.S. President (G.W. Bush), "Personnel Announcement," January 4, 2006, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2006/01/20060104-3.html, visited January 15, 2008. ¢ ¡ It is worth noting, however, that statutory qualifications do not typically lead to such open conflicts between Congress and the President. Because these conflicts can impose political and institutional costs on the President as well, he has an incentive, in general, to abide by the requirements established by Congress. When Congress contemplates establishing qualifications, the possibility of such a conflict--a disadvantage--might be weighed against the potential benefits of the proposed requirements. Conflicts concerning statutory qualifications have typically been resolved through the political process. Whether statutory qualifications legally bind the appointment process actions of the President or the Senate remains an open question. It is not clear what, if any, legal consequences might follow if either actor were to ignore such provisions. Establishing specific qualifications for an advice and consent position entails other potential disadvantages. First, it narrows the field of individuals from whom the President may select, and otherwise worthy candidates might be eliminated prematurely from consideration. Second, the inclusion of certain qualifications in law could lead the President and the Senate to overlook or undervalue other potentially important qualities when evaluating candidates. Third, the qualifications that are necessary, or most important, for carrying out the responsibilities of a position might change over time. Finally, should the President and the Senate determine that it would be preferable, in a given situation, to appoint, to a given position, an individual who does not technically meet its qualifications, legislation might be necessary to waive the statutory requirements. With regard to statutory qualifications, several approaches are available to Congress. Most existing statutory qualifications will remain in force absent congressional action. Congress could reduce the number of positions with these kinds of requirements, either through a comprehensive review of such provisions or through incremental legislative changes, during a reauthorization process, for example. Congress could increase the use of statutory qualifications. Options include the continued incremental adoption of qualification provisions, the development of agency-wide minimum qualification thresholds, and the enactment of a government-wide standard for all government leadership positions. The Senate could also elect to establish threshold standards for confirmation of all or some presidential nominees. Congress could continue recent legislative practices and establish statutory qualifications on a case-by-case basis. Under this option, the number of positions with these requirements would slowly increase. These provisions could be added where neutral competence is perceived to be of particular importance, or where other attributes, such as U.S. citizenship or civilian status, are deemed necessary. This approach would be consistent with the view that the need for program or agency leaders with particular characteristics should be weighed, on a case-by-case basis, against the President's need for flexibility in selecting his preferred leadership team. It assumes that the balance between these two interests will vary according to the responsibilities of the position and its proximity to the President. Whereas Congress might require members of an independent regulatory entity that deals with complex technical questions to have a certain educational background, for example, it might not stipulate any requirements for an assistant secretary whose responsibilities are assigned by the secretary. ¡ ¢ ¢ Congress could establish, for one or more agencies, organization-wide threshold requirements. In effect, Congress has instituted such a threshold requirement--civilian status--for most top leadership positions at the Department of Defense. Such thresholds have also been established for the membership of many collegial bodies, especially regulatory boards and commissions, as discussed above. These entities differ from departments and other executive branch entities, however, because they each have only a few uniform leadership positions. In a variation of this approach, Congress could establish agency-wide requirements that vary according to each leadership position's level in an agency's hierarchy. During the 109th Congress, Senator Daniel K. Akaka introduced legislation that used this model. The bill would have established minimum leadership, management, and subject matter experience requirements for most top leaders at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It would also have required that appointees to top leadership positions in the department possess "a demonstrated ability to manage a substantial staff and budget."63 Appointees to positions compensated at Levels II and III of the Executive Schedule, such as the Administrator of FEMA and DHS Under Secretaries, would have been required to meet the most rigorous standards proposed by the bill. Appointees to Level IV positions, such as most Assistant Secretaries, would have been subject to similar, but slightly less stringent, standards. The bill would have excepted the DHS Secretary and Deputy Secretary, as well as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, from these requirements. The agency-wide qualifications approach might be particularly useful to Congress where broad agreement exists, particularly on the congressional committees of jurisdiction, regarding threshold standards for a particular agency. Agency-wide qualifications might be more difficult to establish where broad agreement on minimum standards does not exist or where the leadership positions for a given agency require a broad range of talents or experience. Another approach that Congress could consider would be to establish government-wide requirements that would be applied to all or most top leadership positions. Congress has established government-wide requirements regarding citizenship through a recurring provision of the funding bill for the Department of the Treasury and other agencies. The provision's requirements are quite specific: Unless otherwise specified during the current fiscal year, no part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used to pay the compensation of any officer or employee of the Government of the United States (including any agency the majority of the stock of which is owned by the Government of the United States) whose post of duty is in the continental United States unless such person: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is a person in the service of the United States on the date of the enactment of this Act who, being eligible for citizenship, has filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States prior to such date and is actually residing in the United States; (3) is a person who owes allegiance to the United States; (4) is an alien from Cuba, Poland, South Vietnam, the countries of the former Soviet Union, or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; (5) is a South Vietnamese, Cambodian, or Laotian refugee paroled in the United States after January 1, 1975; or (6) is a national of the People's 63 109th Cong., S. 2040, § 3. ¡ ¢ Republic of China who qualifies for adjustment of status pursuant to the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-404): Provided, That for the purpose of this section, an affidavit signed by any such person shall be considered prima facie evidence that the requirements of this section with respect to his or her status have been complied with: Provided further, That any person making a false affidavit shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined no more than $4,000 or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both: Provided further, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other provisions of existing law: Provided further, That any payment made to any officer or employee contrary to the provisions of this section shall be recoverable in action by the Federal Government. This section shall not apply to citizens of Ireland, Israel, or the Republic of the Philippines, or to nationals of those countries allied with the United States in a current defense effort, or to international broadcasters employed by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or to temporary employment of translators, or to temporary employment in the field service (not to exceed 60 days) as a result of emergencies.64 Most full-time leaders are paid from appropriated funds. In effect, therefore, the provision restricts appointments, government-wide, to many top leadership positions. If Congress found it necessary, such an approach could be used to put in place qualifications such as minimum experience or demonstrated ability. Qualifications that set discrete, objective standards might be more easily enforced than those that set more subjective requirements. Arguably, it is easier to measure whether or not a nominee has specific educational credentials than whether he or she meets the threshold of "related educational background." Notably, the appropriations provision above includes a number of exceptions. If Congress were to determine that no non-U.S. citizen should be appointed to a particular position, it would need to enact a separate, more restrictive, provision for that post. This example demonstrates the difficulty of establishing a government-wide standard that could cover all situations. Consequently, if Congress were to establish government-wide minimum standards, it might be necessary to create individual exceptions for certain positions. Several of the options discussed above would set qualifications in statute. The Senate, of course, could establish confirmation standards that would, in effect, set qualifications for some or all nominations. This approach was recommended, for regulatory agency appointees, by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as a result of its previously discussed late-1970s study. The committee recommended that [t]he Senate should establish the following general standards to be applied in confirmation of regulatory agency appointees: (a) That by reason of background, training or experience, the nominee is affirmatively qualified for the office to which he or she is nominated. (b) That, in considering a regulatory appointment, the Senate shall consider the character and nature of the office, and the needs of the agency to which the nominee has been named. (c) That, in considering a regulatory appointment to a collegial body, the Senate shall consider the existing composition of that body and whether or not members of a single sector or group in society are too heavily represented. (d) That the nominee is committed to enforcement of the 64 P.L. 110-161, Division D, § 705. ¡ ¢ regulatory framework as established by Congress in the statutes. (e) That the nominee meet the statutory qualifications to hold the office to which he or she was nominated.65 Such confirmation standards might be established in the Standing Rules of the Senate, or by standing order, either of which would be accomplished by Senate resolution. Alternatively, such standards could be adopted by individual committees for nominations within their jurisdictions. These rules, at either the committee or full Senate level, could establish either mandatory or optional consideration of standards during the confirmation process, and they could require either that the standards be considered or that they be followed, and/or include waiver and enforcement provisions. A constitutional objection might be raised with regard to the establishment of Senate confirmation standards. Unlike statutory qualifications, which, as discussed above, can be seen to be an exercise of Congress's constitutional authority to create offices, Senate confirmation standards would be established by the Senate alone, rather than the full Congress. On the other hand, it could be argued that such standards would be a legitimate exercise of the Senate's constitutional authority to set its own rules. The rules would not directly limit the President's authority to select a nominee, they would merely guide the Senate's advice and consent process. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the constitutional authority to establish statutory qualifications for federal government positions. Although Congress enjoys broad discretion in this area, there appears to be consensus that it may not set qualifications that limit the President's selection to the extent that the appointment is a de facto legislative designation. Neither case law nor statute has established a bright line that clearly defines the boundaries of this authority. Within this somewhat ambiguous environment, Congress, at times, has enacted standards that limit the President's selection pool to a greater extent than the executive branch sees as legitimate. In response, the President has issued signing statements, and the Justice Department has issued opinions, that challenge the constitutionality of such provisions. In practice, this difference of opinion has occasionally led to conflict between the two branches in the appointment process arena. Whereas Senators may sometimes block confirmation of a nominee who is perceived to lack sufficient qualifications, the President may use his recess appointment power to sidestep the Senate and install his preferred nominee. Although this dynamic might be suboptimal for the smooth functioning of the federal bureaucracy, for Congress, and for the President, it is part of a larger pattern of give and take between the President and Congress in areas of shared constitutional power. For the moment, interbranch conflicts concerning statutory qualifications are likely to be resolved in the political realm. If establishing such standards became a legislative priority, Congress would have a number of options for asserting its prerogatives in this area. These options include a continuation of present ad hoc practices, establishment of agency-wide or government-wide standards, and the establishment, in the Senate, of confirmation standards. The success of statutory qualifications and confirmation standards as a means of ensuring competent leadership of the federal 65 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Principal Recommendations and Findings of the Study on Federal Regulation, Volumes I-VI, p. 10. ¡ ¢ bureaucracy would depend on adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes, and successful political resolution of interbranch conflicts as they arise. ])a(2154 § .C.S.U 21[ .rotceriD sa tnemtnioppa rof laudividni hcus fo noitanimon eht nopu gnidne doirep raey-3 eht gnirud noitcirtser emit yna ta esirpretne na fo rotcerid ro reciffo evitucexe na sa devres sah laudividni eht fi rotceriD tnemyolpme roirP · sa detnioppa eb ton yam laudividni nA .ecnanif gnisuoh dna stekram ytiruces egagtrom fo gnidnatsrednu )II( tnempoleveD nabrU dna gnisuoH egdelwonk detaleR · detartsnomed a evah dna ,thgisrevo ro tnemeganam laicnanif fo gnidnatsrednu detartsnomed fo tnemtrapeD ,thgisrevO esirpretnE 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noitisoP stnemeriuqeR noitacifilauQ yrotutatS htiw snoitisoP pihsredaeL ycnegA dna tnemtrapeD fo selpmaxE .1-A elbaT ¡ ¢ ¡ snoitacifilauq detaleR · ])3()b(2317 § .C.S.U 24[ .tnemtrapeD eht fo dnuorgkcab smargorp tnempoleved dna hcraeser nailivic eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era )B( dna ;sdleif gnireenigne )III( ygrenE detaleR · ro cifitneics ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah )A(--ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,ecneicS rof yraterceS rednU ytiliba detartsnomed detaleR · ])a(603 § .C.S.U 83[ .epocs dna tnetnoc ralimis fo smargorp ro noitartsinimdA stifeneB snareteV tnemtnioppa eht nihtiw smargorp fo noitartsinimda eht )2( dna ;tnemeganam lacsif )1(--ni ytiliba detartsnomed )III( sriaffA snareteV lacitilopA · fo sisab eht no ylelos dna ytivitca ro noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,stifeneB rof yraterceS rednU ecneirepxe detaleR · ])2()a(503 ytiliba detartsnomed § .C.S.U 83[ .epocs dna tnetnoc ralimis fo smargorp ro noitartsinimdA htlaeH snareteV eht fo smargorp detaleR · eht htiw noitcennoc ni ecneirepxe laitnatsbus fo sisab eht no )B( dna ;tnemeganam lacsif erac-htlaeh tnemtnioppa ni ro ,noitalumrof ycilop dna noitartsinimda erac-htlaeh ni ,noisseforp lacidem eht ni ytiliba detartsnomed )III( sriaffA snareteV lacitilopA · fo sisab eht no )A(--ylelos dna ytivitca ro noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,htlaeH rof yraterceS rednU ecneirepxe detaleR · ])1()a(3071 § .C.S.U 12[ .tnemtaert ro ,noitacude )III( tnediserP eht fo eciffO evitucexE dnuorgkcab ,noitneverp esuba ecnatsbus fo sdleif eht ni ecneirepxe sah laudividni eht rehtehw dna ,laudividni ,yciloP lortnoC gurD lanoitaN fo eciffO detaleR · eht fo dnuorgkcab lanoisseforp ro lanoitacude ,cifitneics eht noitaredisnoc otni ekat llahs tnediserP eht ... ,noitcudeR dnameD rof rotceriD ytupeD snoitacifilauq detaleR · ])a(3012 tnemtnioppa § .C.S.U 44[ .tsivihcrA fo eciffo eht fo seitilibisnopser dna seitud eht mrofrep ot deriuqer snoitacifilauq )III( noitartsinimdA sdroceR dna sevihcrA lacitilopA · lanoisseforp eht fo sisab eht no ylelos dna snoitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ... lanoitaN ,setatS detinU eht fo tsivihcrA )III( ecneirepxe detaleR · ])b(405 § .C.S.U 13[ .seititne ssenisub ro latnemnrevog egral ni tnemeganam laicnanif ni ecneirepxe tnediserP eht fo eciffO evitucexE ,tegduB ytiliba detartsnomed lacitcarp evisnetxe )2( dna ;smetsys laicnanif dna ,tnemeganam laicnanif ,gnitnuocca ni ecneirepxe dna tnemeganaM fo eciffO ,tnemeganaM detaleR · lacitcarp dna ytiliba detartsnomed )1(--ssessop ohw slaudividni gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... laicnaniF laredeF fo eciffO ,rellortnoC ecneirepxe detaleR · egdelwonk detaleR · ])2()c(313 § .C.S.U 6[ .rotces etavirp ro cilbup eht ni ecneirepxe tnemeganam )II( ytiruceS dnalemoH ytiliba detartsnomed dna pihsredael evitucexe fo sraey 5 naht ssel ton ... dna ;ytiruces dnalemoh dna tnemeganam ycnegreme fo tnemtrapeD ,ycnegA tnemeganaM detaleR · fo egdelwonk dna ni ytiliba detartsnomed a ... evah ohw slaudividni gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... ycnegremE laredeF ,rotartsinimdA ytiliba detartsnomed detaleR · ])d(4159 § .C.S.U 02[ .saera eseht ni pihsredael dna ytivitcudorp deniatsus rof yticapac detartsnomed sdleif deificeps a evah dna ,saera hcus nihtiw tnemeganam sa llew sa ,noitacude ni noitaulave ro ,scitsitats ,hcraeser )II( noitacudE fo tnemtrapeD ni ytirohtuA · dilav yllacifitneics fo sdleif eht ni seitirohtua deifilauq ylhgih era ohw slaudividni morf detceles eb llahs ... ,secneicS noitacudE fo etutitsnI ,rotceriD noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE( ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP a lareneG noitisoP egdelwonk detaleR · ytiliba detartsnomed )b(e123 )VI( ytiruceS dnalemoH detaleR · § .C.S.U 6[ .htlaeh cilbup dna enicidem fo egdelwonk dna ni ytiliba detartsnomed a ssessop llahs ... fo tnemtrapeD ,reciffO lacideM feihC snoitacifilauq ])2()a(3042 § .C.S.U 05[ .setatS detinU detaleR · eht fo ytiruces lanoitan eht stcetorp dna secnavda taht rennam a ni noitartsinimdA eht fo smargorp )VI( ygrenE fo tnemtrapeD dnuorgkcab noitisopsid slairetam dna ,noitarefilorpnon ,snopaew raelcun eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era dna ,noitartsinimdA ytiruceS raelcuN detaleR · tnemeganam lanoitazinagro ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... lanoitaN ,rotartsinimdA ytupeD lapicnirP dnuorgkcab detaleR · ])a(6317 § .C.S.U ytiliba detartsnomed 24[ .ycilop ygrene laredeF yb detceffa stseretni lla fo snrecnoc dna sdeen eht ylriaf ssessa ot deifilauq )VI( ygrenE fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA detaleR · yllaiceps si ohw laudividni na ,ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomed yb ,eb llahs ... yrotalugeR cimonocE ,rotartsinimdA ssentiF · tnemtnioppa ])1()a(931 § .C.S.U 01[ .rotceriD fo eciffo eht fo seitud eht mrofrep ot ssentif )VI( esnefeD fo tnemtrapeD lacitilopA · fo sisab eht no ylelos dna noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw ... ],[efil nailivic morf detnioppa ]eb llahs[ ... ,noitaulavE dna tseT lanoitarepO fo rotceriD )VI( ytiruceS dnalemoH ])B()2()a(252 § .C.S.U 6[ .ecneirepxe tnemeganam fo fo tnemtrapeD tnemecrofnE smotsuC ecneirepxe detaleR · sraey 5 fo muminim a dna ,tnemecrofne wal ni ecneirepxe lanoisseforp sraey 5 fo muminim a evah llahs ... dna noitargimmI rof yraterceS tnatsissA )VI( noitacudE fo tnemtrapeD ])b(7159 § .C.S.U 02[ .scitsitatS ,scitsitatS noitacudE rof retneC lanoitaN egdelwonk detaleR · noitacudE rof retneC lanoitaN eht yb detsissa smargorp fo egdelwonk laitnatsbus evah ... llahs ... ,scitsitatS noitacudE rof renoissimmoC ])1()d(601 § .C.S.U 94[ .ecrof demra na fo reciffo raluger remrof a ro ,ecrof demra na fo reciffo raluger deriter a ,ecrof demra na ni ytud evitca no reciffo noitcirtser yratiliM · na eb ton yam rotartsinimdA ytupeD eht ,ecrof demra na fo reciffo raluger remrof a si rotartsinimdA )VI( noitatropsnarT ecneirepxe detaleR · eht fi ,revewoH .rotartsinimdA ytupeD sa detnioppa eb yam ecrof demra na ni ytud evitca no reciffo fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA pihsnezitic .S.U · nA .noitaiva ot detaler yltcerid dleif a ni ecneirepxe evah dna setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb tsum ... noitaivA laredeF ,rotartsinimdA ytupeD ytiliba detartsnomed ])A()1()a(3087 § .C.S.U 62[ .tnemeganam ni ytiliba )III( yrusaerT eht fo tnemtrapeD detaleR · detartsnomed a evah ,snoitacifilauq rehto gnoma ,ohw slaudividni morf edam eb llahs tnemtnioppa ... ,euneveR lanretnI fo renoissimmoC ])1()c(a2641 )III( yrusaerT eht fo tnemtrapeD pihsnezitic .S.U · .C.S.U 21[ .setatS detinU eht fo snezitic era ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs ... ,noisivrepuS tfirhT fo eciffO ,rotceriD ])2()c(2317 § .C.S.U snoitacifilauq 24[ .setatS detinU eht fo ytiruces lanoitan eht stcetorp dna secnavda taht rennam a ni noitartsinimdA )III( ygrenE detaleR · ytiruceS raelcuN lanoitaN eht fo smargorp noitisopsid slairetam dna ,noitarefilorpnon ,snopaew raelcun fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA ytiruceS dnuorgkcab eht eganam ot deifilauq llew era )B( dna ;sdleif lacinhcet etairporppa dna ,tnemeganam lanoitazinagro raelcuN lanoitaN ,rotartsinimdA/ytiruceS detaleR · ,ytiruces lanoitan ni dnuorgkcab evisnetxe evah )A(--ohw snosrep gnoma morf detnioppa eb llahs ... raelcuN rof yraterceS rednU noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE( ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP a lareneG noitisoP ])i(165 § .C.S.U 82[ .sessentiw dna ,sroruj ,lennosrep truoc fo noitcetorp htiw ecneirepxe ro smetsys truoc laredeF dna ,etatS ,ytnuoc htiw ro ni ecneirepxe )4( dna ;ecneirepxe cimedaca level-egelloc )3( ;level lacol dna etatS eht ta ylralucitrap ,seicnega tnemecrofne wal rehto htiw gnitanidrooc ni ecneirepxe )2( ;ycnega tnemecrofne wal laredeF ro eciffo s'ffirehs ,tnemtraped ecilop a ni ,seussi ytreporp elbatnuocca dna ,tegdub ,lennosrep gnidulcni ,seitud tnemeganam tnemecrofne wal level-dnammoc fo sraey 4 fo muminim a )1(--evah dluohs ... lahsram hcaE ])e(165 § .C.S.U 82[ .tcirtsid rehto hcus ni ediser yam tcirtsid rehtona ni lahsram sa gnivres noitacude detaleR · si emit emas eht ta ohw sdnalsI anairaM nrehtroN eht rof detnioppa lahsram yna )2( dna ;detnioppa ecneirepxe detaleR · si lahsram eht hcihw rof tcirtsid eht fo selim 02 nihtiw ediser yam kroY weN fo tcirtsiD nrehtuoS tnemeriuqer eht rof dna ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht fo truoC roirepuS eht rof ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht rof lahsram ycnediseR · eht )1(--taht tpecxe ,detnioppa si lahsram hcus hcihw rof tcirtsid eht nihtiw ediser llahs lahsram hcaE c slahsraM setatS detinU ecneirepxe detaleR · gniniart detaleR · ]502 § .C.S.U 24[ .smargorp htlaeh cilbup ni ecneirepxe tnacifingis ro gniniart dezilaiceps bsecivreS namuH dna htlaeH fo tnemtrapeD pihsrebmem sproC · evah )2( dna ,sproC ralugeR eht fo srebmem era )1( ohw slaudividni morf detnioppa eb llahs ... ,ecivreS htlaeH cilbuP ,lareneG noegruS egdelwonk detaleR · ]eton 1151 § .C.S.U 51 ;)d(2 § ,0791 fo 4 .oN nalP noitazinagroeR[ .noitartsinimdA )V( ecremmoC ecneirepxe detaleR · eht fo krow eht ot tnatropmi senilpicsid cifitneics rehto ro ,cirehpsomta ,cinaeco fo selpicnirp fo tnemtrapeD ,noitartsinimdA cirehpsomtA noitacude detaleR · eht ni elbaegdelwonk ,ecneirepxe dna noitacude cifitneics fo nosaer yb ,si ohw laudividni na eb llahs ... dna cinaecO lanoitaN ,tsitneicS feihC egdelwonk detaleR · ecneirepxe detaleR · ])b(b247 § .C.S.U 61[ .tnemeganam efildliw dna seirehsif fo selpicnirp eht ni elbaegdelwonk ,ecneirepxe )V( roiretnI eht fo tnemtrapeD ,ecivreS noitacude detaleR · dna noitacude cifitneics fo nosaer yb ,si eh sselnu rotceriD eht sa detnioppa eb yam laudividni oN efildliW dna hsiF setatS detinU ,rotceriD )VI ot lauqe etar si riahC - V ot lauqe etaR( noitcirtser ])5()b(4072§ .C.S.U 52[ ....esneffo gnimag ro ynolef a fo detcivnoc neeb sah roiretnI eht fo tnemtrapeD ,noissimmoC noitcivnoc ynoleF · ... ohw ,noissimmoC eht ,no ecivres eunitnoc ot ro ,ot tnemtnioppa yna rof elbigile eb llahs laudividni oN gnimaG naidnI lanoitaN ,srebmeM ytiliba detartsnomed detaleR · tiart retcarahc deificepS · ])a(3 § .ppA .C.S.U 5[ .snoitagitsevni ro ,noitartsinimda tnemtnioppa cilbup ,sisylana tnemeganam ,wal ,sisylana laicnanif ,gnitidua ,gnitnuocca ni ytiliba detartsnomed lacitilopA · dna ytirgetni fo sisab eht no ylelos dna noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw ... detnioppa eb llahs ... )VI( lareneG srotcepsnI ecneirepxe detaleR · egdelwonk detaleR · ])3()a(109 § .C.S.U 13[ .seititne ssenisub ro latnemnrevog egral ni secitcarp tnemeganam ytiliba detartsnomed laicnanif ni ecneirepxe lacitcarp evisnetxe dna fo egdelwonk dna ,fo tnemeganam lareneg ni ytiliba detaleR · detartsnomed ssessop ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ,elbacilppa sa ,detangised ro detnioppa eb ... llahs ... )VI( sreciffO laicnaniF feihC noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE( ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP a lareneG noitisoP ])A()2()a(2 § .C.S.U 7[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem eht fo eerht naht erom toN .saera hcus lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · ot tcepser htiw decnalab si srenoissimmoC eht fo egdelwonk detartsnomed eht taht erusne ot kees srebmem )ii( dna ;tcA siht yb derevoc stseretni dna ,sthgir ,secivres ,selcitra dna sdoog rehto ro seitidommoc eht gnoma decnalab ,saera detaler fo erom ro eno fo noitubirtsid ro gnissecorp ,gnisidnahcrem ,noitcudorp eht ro ,noitaluger sti ro gnidart )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC ni egdelwonk detartsnomeD · serutuf ni egdelwonk detartsnomed evah hcae llahs ohw snosrep tceles )i( llahs tnediserP eh]T[ ... gnidarT serutuF ytidommoC noitcirtseR )srebmeM ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS evitucexE( aycnegA stnemeriuqeR noitacifilauQ yrotutatS htiw seidoB laigelloC tnednepednI no snoitisoP fo selpmaxE .2-A elbaT .)845 § .C.S.U 82( "edoC setatS detinU ,5 eltit fo 5135 noitces ni htrof tes eludehcS evitucexE eht fo VI leveL evitucexE rof dedivorp noitasnepmoc cisab fo etar eht fo ssecxe ni ton noitasnepmoc fo setar ta eltit siht fo 345 noitces rednu detnioppa syenrotta dna ,syenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa ,syenrotta setatS detinU fo seiralas launna eht xif llahs lareneG yenrottA eht ,5 eltit fo 7135 hguorht 5135 snoitces ot tcejbuS" .d ).6002 ,82 rebmeceD deniatbo ,noitamrofni noitpircsed boj dna ,noitacifilauq ,ssecorp noitanimon gnidivorp tnemucod ,sriaffA lanoissergnoC fo eciffO ,ecivreS slahsraM .S.U( ".esaercni yap siht evorppa ot dezirohtua si lareneG yenrottA ytupeD ehT .raey eno rof MSU sa ecnamrofrep lufsseccus no desab si ,yap ytilacol gnidulcni ,000,341$ mumixam a ot egnar yap leveL roineS eht hguorht tnemecnavdA .yap ytilacol rieht dedda si hcihw ot ,)6002 ni( 808,901$ ta snigeb sMSU 72 eseht fo yralas ehT .noitan eht dnuora seciffO tcirtsiD SMSU xelpmoc erom ,regral eht fo emos ta snoitisop lahsraM leveL roineS 72 yltnerruc era erehT .%86.82 ot %25.21 morf seiralas tsujda taht ediwnoitan saera yap ytilacol 23 era erehT .yap ytilacol dedda osla si hcihw ot ,)6002 ni( 759,811$ si etar 01 petS 51-SG ehT .noitisop eht ni shtnom xis retfa 01 petS eht ot og yam sMSU .yap ytilacol fo tnuoma etairporppa eht dedda yllacitamotua si hcihw ot ,705,19$ fo )6002 ni( etar esab a htiw trats )51 edarG( eludehcS lareneG eht ni sMSU .level 51-SG eht ta retne ]slahsraM .S.U[ sMSU fo ytirojam ehT" .c ).102 .C.S.U 73 eeS( .9-O leveL ta reciffo denoissimmoc a sa detasnepmoc si lareneG noegruS ehT .b .leveL eludehcS evitucexE yb degnarra era snoitisoP .a .edoC setatS detinU eht morf deniatbo noitamrofni morf ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC yb depoleveD :ecruoS ])a(545 .C.S.U 82[ .lawener ot tcejbus dna redro eht yb dehsilbatse sa doirep cificeps a rof noitcesbus siht ni tnemeriuqer ycnediser eht morf reciffo hcus tpmexe taht seitilibisnopser lanoitidda ro laud dengissa eb yam yenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa na ro yenrotta setatS detinU a ,eengised sih ro lareneG yenrottA eht morf redro na ot tnausruP .tcirtsid rehtona ni yticapac emas eht ni gnivres si emit emas eht ta ohw sdnalsI anairaM nrehtroN eht rof detnioppa yenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa ro yenrotta setatS detinU yna ot ylppa ton llahs noitcesbus siht fo snoisivorp ehT .foereht selim 52 nihtiw ro detnioppa si ehs ro eh hcihw rof tcirtsid eht ni ediser llahs yenrotta setatS detinU tnatsissa hcaE .foereht selim 02 nihtiw ediser yam kroY tnemeriuqer weN fo tcirtsiD nretsaE eht dna ,kroY weN fo tcirtsiD nrehtuoS eht ,aibmuloC fo tcirtsiD eht fo sreciffo dsyenrottA ycnediseR · eseht taht tpecxe ,detnioppa si eh hcihw rof tcirtsid eht ni ediser llahs yenrotta setatS detinU hcaE tnatsissA dna syenrottA setatS detinU noitcirtseR )leveL eludehcS evitucexE( ro tnemeriuqeR )s(noisivorP a lareneG noitisoP ])b(451 § .C.S.U 74[ .noissimmoC eht fo pihsrebmem lluf eht fo ytirojam a etutitsnoc hcihw srenoissimmoc fo rebmun lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · tsael eht ot lauqe rebmun a eb llahs ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb yam ohw srenoissimmoc )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC pihsnezitic .S.U · fo rebmun mumixam ehT ....setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo rebmem hcaE snoitacinummoC laredeF ])e(2422 § .C.S.U 21[ .dnuorgkcab yrotaluger ro ,lagel ,laicnanif gnorts a evah )3( ro ;seititne laicnanif fo noitaluger eht dnuorgkcab ni elbaegdelwonk ro decneirepxe era )2( ;erusolcsid dna gnitroper laicnanif dna scimonoce larutlucirga ro ,ecneirepxe ,egdelwonk detaleR · ni elbaegdelwonk ro decneirepxe era )1(--ohw draoB eht fo srebmem tnioppa llahs tnediserP ehT ])a(2422 § .C.S.U 21[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · fo srebmem eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem owt naht erom toN ....tseretni cilbup eht fo evitatneserper )III si riahC -VI( pihsnezitic .S.U · yldaorb dna setatS detinU eht fo snezitic eb llahs ohw ,srebmem eerht fo tsisnoc llahs draoB ehT noitartsinimdA tiderC mraF ])2()c(a536 § .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI( srotceriD fo lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · 21[ .ytrap lacitilop eno yna fo srebmem eb llahs eerht naht erom ton ,draoB eht fo srebmem evif eht fO draoB knaB tropmI-tropxE )III si riahC - ])a(4-e0002 § .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs mohw fo eerht naht VI( noissimmoC ytinutroppO lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · erom ton ,srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs ... noissimmoC ytinutroppO tnemyolpmE lauqE eh]T[ ... tnemyolpmE lauqE ])b(32351 § .C.S.U 24[ .tnemtnioppa lanigiro eht ot tcepser htiw deilppa hcihw snoitidnoc yna ot tcejbus eb llahs dna edam saw tnemtnioppa lanigiro eht hcihw ni rennam eht ni dellif eb llahs noissimmoC eht no ycnacav A ....sraey 4 fo mret a rof detnioppa eb llahs )ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa eb yam mohw fo eno naht erom ton( srebmem eht fo owt )B( dna ;sraey 2 fo mret a rof detnioppa eb llahs )ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa eb yam mohw fo eno naht erom ton( srebmem eht lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · fo owt )A(--detnioppa tsrif srebmem eht fo ,noitanimon fo emit eht ta tnediserP eht yb detangised sA ])3()a(32351 § .C.S.U 24[ .snoitcele fo yduts eht )VI( noissimmoC esitrepxe ro ecneirepxe detaleR · ro noitartsinimda noitcele ni esitrepxe ro htiw ecneirepxe evah llahs noissimmoC eht fo rebmem hcaE ecnatsissA noitcelE lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · egdelwonk dna ])1()b(6822 § .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem eerht naht ecnetepmoc detartsnomed detaleR · erom toN .draoB eht fo snoitcnuf thgisrevo dna evitagitsevni tnednepedni eht ot tnaveler egdelwonk pihsnezitic .S.U · dna ecnetepmoc detartsnomed a htiw ytefas raelcun fo dleif eht ni strepxe detcepser era ohw snezitic )III( draoB ytefaS noitcirtser yratiliM · setatS detinU gnoma morf ... efil nailivic morf detnioppa srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs draoB ehT seitilicaF raelcuN esnefeD ])c(3502 lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · § .C.S.U 51[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht htiw detailiffa eb llahs srenoissimmoC eht fo eerht naht erom toN ])a(3502 § .C.S.U 51[ .noissimmoC eht fo srebmem sa evres ot deifilauq era ,ytefas ot sksir morf cilbup eht fo noitcetorp dna stcudorp remusnoc ot detaler saera ni esitrepxe dna dnuorgkcab )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC esitrepxe dna dnuorgkcab detaleR · rieht fo nosaer yb ,ohw slaudividni redisnoc llahs tnediserP eht ,stnemtnioppa hcus gnikam nI ytefaS tcudorP remusnoC noitcirtseR )srebmeM ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS evitucexE( aycnegA ]142 stseretni § .C.S.U 21[ .yrtnuoc eht fo snoisivid lacihpargoeg dna ,stseretni laicremmoc dna ,lairtsudni ,larutlucirga )II si riahC deificeps fo noitatneserpeR · ,laicnanif eht fo noitatneserper riaf a ot drager eud evah llahs tnediserP eht ,tcirtsid evreseR laredeF - III( sronrevoG fo draoB noitcirtser cihpargoeG · eno yna morf detceles eb llahs mohw fo eno naht erom ton ,draoB eht fo srebmem eht gnitceles nI metsyS evreseR laredeF ])a(328 § .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI( ecneirepxe 03[ ....noissimmoC eht fo snoitcnuf eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq era ecneirepxe ro ,noitacude ,gniniart noissimmoC weiveR htlaeH ro ,noitacude ,gniniart detaleR · fo nosaer yb ohw snosrep gnoma morf ... detnioppa ,srebmem evif fo tsisnoc llahs noissimmoC ehT dna ytefaS eniM laredeF )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · ])b(103 § .C.S.U 64[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srenoissimmoC 3 naht erom toN emitiraM laredeF ])a(4017 § .C.S.U 5[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda eb )VI si riahC - V( ytirohtuA lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · yam mohw fo 2 naht erom ton ,srebmem eerht fo desopmoc si ytirohtuA snoitaleR robaL laredeF ehT snoitaleR robaL laredeF rotcerid ])b(a2241 § .C.S.U 21[ .snoitcetorp remusnoc laicnanif ro ,gnisuoh ,sdeen tiderc ,secivres gniknab no 1 tsael ta rof noitailiffa deificepS · stseretni ytinummoc ro remusnoc gnitneserper fo yrotsih raey-2 a naht erom htiw noitazinagro na morf noitcirtser cihpargoeG · nesohc eb llahs rotcerid 1 tsael tA ....metsyS knaB naoL emoH laredeF eht fo tcirtsid elgnis yna morf lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · eb llahs rotcerid detnioppa 1 naht erom toN .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srotcerid tnemtimmoc ro ,gniniart 3 naht erom toN ....tiderc gnisuoh dezilaiceps gnidivorp ot tnemtimmoc a htiw ro ecnanif gnisuoh )III si riahC - VI( draoB ,ecneirepxe evisnetxe detaleR · ni gniniart ro ecneirepxe evisnetxe htiw snosrep gnoma morf eb llahs ... detnioppa srotcerid ehT ecnaniF gnisuoH laredeF ]4317 § .C.S.U 24[ .ycilop ygrene laredeF yb detceffa stseretni lla fo snrecnoc dna sdeen eht ylriaf ssessa ot deifilauq yllaiceps era ,ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomed yb ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem dna namriahC ehT ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomeD · ])1()b(1717 § .C.S.U )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC eht fo srebmem eerht naht erom toN yrotalugeR ygrenE laredeF tnemnrevog ])3()a(c734 § .C.S.U laredef eht fo trap toN · 2[ .tnemnrevoG laredeF eht fo hcnarb laiciduj ro ,evitalsigel ,evitucexe eht ni seeyolpme ro sreciffo stiart retcarahc deificepS · detnioppa ro detcele ton era ,noissimmoC eht ot detnioppa emit eht ta ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs ... ecneirepxE · dna tnemgduj doog dna ,ytilaitrapmi ,ytirgetni ,ecneirepxe rieht fo sisab eht no nesohc eb llahs srebmeM ])1()a(c734 § .C.S.U 2[ .ytrap lacitilop emas )VI( lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · eht htiw detailiffa eb yam hpargarap siht rednu detnioppa noissimmoC eht fo srebmem 3 naht erom oN noissimmoC noitcelE laredeF ])a(2181 § .C.S.U lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · 21[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb yam srotceriD fo draoB eht fo srebmem eht fo 3 naht erom to]N[ ....ecneirepxe yrosivrepus knab etatS evah llahs mohw fo 1 ,setatS detinU eht fo snezitic rotcerid era ohw slaudividni gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs mohw fo 3 )C( dna ;noisivrepuS tfirhT fo eciffO )III si riahC - VI( srotceriD eno tsael ta rof ecneirepxe detaleR · eht fo rotceriD eht eb llahs mohw fo 1 )B( ;ycnerruC eht fo rellortpmoC eht eb llahs mohw fo 1 )A( fo draoB noitaroproC pihsnezitic .S.U · --srebmem 5 fo gnitsisnoc srotceriD fo draoB a ni detsev eb llahs noitaroproC eht fo tnemeganam ehT ecnarusnI tisopeD laredeF noitcirtseR )srebmeM ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS evitucexE( aycnegA ])a(166 § .C.S.U 92[ .tcA siht rednu noissimmoC )III si riahC - VI( ecneirepxe eht fo snoitcnuf eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq era ecneirepxe ro ,noitacude ,gniniart fo nosaer yb ohw noissimmoC weiveR htlaeH ro ,noitacude ,gniniart detaleR · snosrep gnoma morf ... detnioppa eb llahs ohw srebmem eerht fo desopmoc eb llahs noissimmoC ehT dna ytefaS lanoitapuccO ])2()b(1485 § .C.S.U 24[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs noissimmoC lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · eht fo srebmem eerht naht erom ton taht rennam a hcus ni edam eb llahs ... srebmem fo stnemtnioppA ])1()a(1485 § .C.S.U 24[ .setatS detinU eht fo nezitic a eb llahs mohw fo hcae )II si riahC - III( noissimmoC pihsnezitic .S.U · ,srebmem evif fo desopmoc eb llahs hcihw noissimmoC yrotalugeR raelcuN eht ... dehsilbatse si erehT yrotalugeR raelcuN srebmem 3 ])b(1111 § .C.S.U 94[ tsael ta rof egdelwonk detartsnomed .noitaluger dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp noitatropsnart ro ,ytefas noitatropsnart ,srotcaf namuh ,gnireenigne ytefas ,noitcurtsnocer tnedicca ,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet detaleR · ni egdelwonk detartsnomed dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ,noitacifilauq lacinhcet fo sisab eht no detnioppa )III si riahC - VI( draoB ytefaS lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · eb llahs srebmem 3 tsael tA .ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srebmem 3 naht erom toN noitatropsnarT lanoitaN ]451 § .C.S.U 54[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo eb llahs mohw fo owt naht erom ton )III si riahC - lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · ... srebmem eerht fo desopmoc eb ot ,"draoB noitaideM lanoitaN" eht ... dehsilbatse ybereh si erehT VI( draoB noitaideM lanoitaN ])b(a2571 § .C.S.U 21[ .ytrap detailiffa -noitutitsni rehto ro ,eeyolpme ,reciffo ,rotcerid ,rebmem eettimmoc a sa noinu tiderc derusni yna htiw rebmem 1 tub devlovni ,neeb yltnecer evah ro ,era ,tnemtnioppa eht fo emit eht ta ,ohw slaudividni gnoma morf draoB lla rof noitcirtser noitailiffa roirP · eht ot detnioppa eb yam draoB eht fo rebmem eno naht erom toN ....draoB eht no evres ot deifilauq ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,noitacude yllaicepse era ,ycilop laicnanif ro ,noitaluger secivres laicnanif ,secivres laicnanif fo egnar daorb a ot detaler fo noitaredisnoC · gnitaler ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,noitacude rieht fo eutriv yb ,ohw slaudividni ot noitaredisnoc evig llahs )III lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · tnediserP eh]T[ ....ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem owt naht erom si riahC - VI( noitartsinimdA tseretni cilbup fo evitatneserpeR · toN ....tseretni cilbup eht fo evitatneserper yldaorb era ohw ,srebmem eerht fo tsisnoc llahs draoB ehT noinU tiderC lanoitaN ]1021 § .C.S.U 5[ .tnediserP tnemnrevog eht fo noitcerid eht ta ro wal yb dedivorp esiwrehto sa tpecxe ,setatS detinU eht fo tnemnrevoG laredef eht fo trap toN · eht ni noitisop ro eciffo rehtona dloh yam draoB eht fo rebmem oN .draoB eht fo snoitcnuf ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab eht tuo yrrac ot deifilauq yllaicepse era ecneirepxe ro ,gniniart ,dnuorgkcab ,ytiliba detartsnomed ,ytiliba detartsnomed detaleR · yb ,ohw slaudividni eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem ehT .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda )III si riahC - VI( draoB lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · eb yam mohw fo 2 naht erom ton ,... srebmem 3 fo desopmoc si draoB noitcetorP smetsyS tireM ehT noitcetorP metsyS tireM ]14 )III si riahC - VI( lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · § .C.S.U 51[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srenoissimmoc eht fo eerht naht erom toN noissimmoC edarT laredeF noitcirtseR )srebmeM ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS evitucexE( aycnegA .yllacitebahpla degnarra era seicnegA .a .edoC setatS detinU eht morf deniatbo noitamrofni morf ecivreS hcraeseR lanoissergnoC yb depoleveD :ecruoS rebmem eno tsael ta rof ecneirepxe rotces etavirP · ])b(107 srebmem draob owt § .C.S.U 94[ .rotces etavirp eht ni )erutlucirga gnidulcni( ecneirepxe ssenisub ro lanoisseforp htiw tsael ta rof egdelwonk detartsnomed laudividni na eb llahs rebmem eno tsael ta dna ,noitaluger noitatropsnart ro noitatropsnart fo sdleif eht dna gnidnats lanoisseforp detaleR · ni egdelwonk detartsnomed dna gnidnats lanoisseforp htiw slaudividni eb llahs draoB eht fo srebmem 2 )III si riahC - VI( draoB lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · tsael ta ,emit nevig yna tA ....ytrap lacitilop emas eht morf detnioppa eb yam srebmem 2 naht erom toN noitatropsnarT ecafruS ])a(d87 § .C.S.U 51[ .elbacitcarp stnemtnioppa gnitanretla eb yam sa ylraen sa yletanretla detnioppa eb llahs seitrap lacitilop tnereffid fo srebmem stnemtnioppa )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC hguorht lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · gnikam ni dna ,ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb llahs srenoissimmoc ... eerht naht erom toN egnahcxE dna seitiruceS ])a(f132 § .C.S.U 54[ .seeyolpme fo noitazinagro ro reyolpme yna ni detseretni esiwrehto ro ylirainucep eb ro fo tnemyolpme eht ni eb ton llahs dna spuorg tneutitsnoc deificeps seeyolpme ro sreyolpme rehtie yb noitadnemmocer tuohtiw detnioppa eb llahs ,draoB eht fo namriahc morf eb tonnac rebmem drihT · eb llahs ohw ,rebmem enO .denrecnoc sreyolpme dna seeyolpme fo ,ylevitcepser ,rebmun tsegral spuorg tneutitsnoc eht ot yrotcafsitas draoB eht no noitatneserper edivorp ot sa os ,tcerid llahs tnediserP eht sa sesac htob deificeps fo snoitadnemmocer ni ,... sreyolpme fo sevitatneserper yb edam snoitadnemmocer morf detnioppa eb llahs rebmem eno )III si riahC - VI( morf srebmem owT · dna seeyolpme eht fo sevitatneserper yb edam snoitadnemmocer morf detnioppa eb llahs rebmem enO draoB tnemeriteR daorliaR lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · tnemtnioppa lacitilopA · egdelwonk detaleR · ]553 .tatS 121 ;)a(108 § ,35-011 tnemeveihca .L.P[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo srebmem eb draoB eht fo srebmem 3 naht erom llahs tneve on ni tub )III si riahC - tnelaviuqe dna ecneirepxe detaleR · ,noitailiffa lacitilop ot drager tuohtiw dna ,ecneirepxe tnaveler dna ,ycavirp dna seitrebil livic ni esitrepxe yliad :VI( draoB thgisrevO snoitacifilauq detaleR · ,erutats cilbup ,stnemeveihca ,snoitacifilauq lanoisseforp rieht fo sisab eht no ylelos detceles eb llahs ... seitrebiL liviC dna ycavirP ])a(205 .C.S.U 93[ .ytrap lacitilop emas eht fo stnerehda eb yam srenoissimmoC eht fo 3 naht erom toN .tcA tnemecnahnE dna ytilibatnuoccA latsoP eht rednu srenoissimmoC lenap no ecnalab lacitiloP · dedrocca seitilibisnopser decnahne eht tuo yrrac ot yrassecen esitrepxe dna snoitacifilauq eht evah llahs esitrepxe detartsnomed noissimmoC eht ot detnioppa laudividni hcaE ....noitartsinimda cilbup ro ,wal ,gnitnuocca ,scimonoce dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ni esitrepxe detartsnomed dna ,gnidnats lanoisseforp ,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet rieht fo sisab eht )III si riahC - VI( noissimmoC ,snoitacifilauq lacinhcet detaleR · no ylelos nesohc eb llahs ]yehT[ ....srenoissimmoC 5 fo desopmoc si noissimmoC yrotalugeR latsoP ehT yrotalugeR latsoP noitcirtseR )srebmeM ro tnemeriuqeR lareneG )s(noisivorP fo leveL eludehcS evitucexE( aycnegA ¡ ¢ Henry B. Hogue Analyst in American National Government hhogue@crs.loc.gov, 7-0642 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RL33886