For other versions of this document, see http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-98-495 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 98-495 F CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Intelligence Collection Platforms: Satellites, Manned Aircraft, and UAVs May 21, 1998 Michael F. Miller and Richard A. Best, Jr. Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress ABSTRACT Imagery--images derived from photography, radar, and electro-optical devices similar to television--is a vital tool to policymakers and military commanders. It is the basis for the precise attacks on enemy forces and infrastructure that are expected to be at the center of future military operations. The principal imagery collection platforms--satellites, manned reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)--have all been controversial due to cost factors and operational limitations. Often based on cutting-edge technology, they are acquired and maintained in different government organizations, complicating efforts to achieve a balanced mix and hold costs down. Congress has taken a number of initiatives to strengthen the acquisition process, but challenges remain. This report provides a basic overview of the role of imagery in policymaking and military planning, the capabilities and limitations of different imagery collection platforms, and the evolving organizational relationships that govern the acquisition and use of imagery. Special attention is given to past congressional concerns and legislative provisions that have had a major influence on imagery collection efforts. This report will be updated as events warrant. Intelligence Collection Platforms: Satellites, Manned Aircraft, and UAVs Summary Imagery--photographs or electro-optical transmissions similar to television--is a key component of contemporary military planning and operations as well as civilian decisionmaking. This report provides an overview of the various imagery collection platforms, their strengths and limitations, the evolving organizational relationships that govern their use, as well as the steps Congress has taken to strengthen imagery capabilities. Imagery allows military commanders to undertake operations using precision- guided munitions with minimal civilian and friendly casualties; it also has a wide variety of civilian uses, providing overhead perspectives of environmental changes, natural disasters, or activities, such as mass burials, that foreign entities wish to hide. Imagery is collected by satellites, manned reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Satellite programs, initiated by the Intelligence Community in the midst of the Cold War; continue to be uniquely valuable but remain costly and commercial satellite imagery, now becoming available, may render some Government programs redundant. Manned reconnaissance aircraft continue to be widely used (as U-2s fly over Iraq), but the Defense Department and the services have often been reluctant to acquire replacement planes, preferring to invest scarce funds in bombers and fighters. UAVs are promising and potentially cost effective, but acquisition programs have been frustratingly slow and few operational systems are currently available despite a decade of efforts. Often critical of the executive branch's management of imagery, Congress has shaped the acquisition of collection platforms through a number of initiatives. It has encouraged the procurement of larger numbers of smaller satellites that can be used more flexibly than the Cold War systems. It has urged the services to retain or acquire manned reconnaissance aircraft, a message that the Defense Department appears to have received. The potential of UAVs has been appreciated for some time, but the slow pace of acquisition programs led Congress to mandate the establishment of a centralized effort in 1993. When, however, difficulties persisted, many Members called for the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office to be abolished, a step that the Pentagon intends to take by October 1998. Efforts to acquire and utilize imagery are complicated by two major factors in additional to inevitable budgetary considerations. The first is technological; imagery acquisition systems, especially UAVs, are not mature systems. They are subject to trial-and-error experimentation, cancellations, delays, and cost overruns. The second is organizational; imagery collection and analysis involves a number of agencies, inside and outside the Department of Defense, and coordination is complex and difficult. Furthermore, imagery is produced in response to the disparate and not inevitably compatible requirements of Washington decisionmakers and military commanders. Congressional oversight is undertaken by a number of different committees. Taken together these factors make imagery an especially important and difficult issue for policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch. Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Role of Overhead Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Platforms for Imagery Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Manned Reconnaissance Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Organizational Complexities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Imagery for the Future: Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Intelligence Collection Platforms: Satellites, Manned Aircraft, and UAVs Introduction Imagery--images derived from photography, radar, and electro-optical devices similar to television--has become a vital tool for U.S. policymakers and military commanders even those at tactical levels. The ability to see reliable images of buildings, roads, bridges, fortifications, and troop concentrations generally enhances decisionmaking and, in a combat situation, allows action against enemy targets that could reduce significantly the danger to friendly troops and civilians. Imagery is the basis for the precise attacks on enemy forces and infrastructure that are expected to be at the center of military operations in the next century. New capabilities include devices to detect predetermined types of equipment, such as a tank, even when camouflaged, as well as moving targets. Imagery collection has undeniably become a crucial element of force planning in the post-Cold War world. Imagery is obtained from satellites in space, from manned aircraft with cameras configured for specific missions, and, more recently, from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)--pilotless drones some little bigger than model airplanes--that can take pictures without putting a pilot at risk of shootdown or capture. Each type of platform has strengths and limitations in collecting imagery, and each requires significant investment in an era of lower defense spending. The platforms are equipped with cameras, electro-optical devices, and synthetic aperture radars which produce radar-derived images that resemble photographs. Congress has been greatly concerned with imagery and has taken a number of initiatives in an effort to improve the effectiveness of all three types of programs. There remain, however, a number of major challenges that are likely to persist: · The increasing complexity of designing a balanced force of satellites, manned reconnaissance aircraft, and UAVs for uncertain post-Cold War missions. In addition to encouraging UAV acquisition, Congress has expressed its support for manned reconnaissance aircraft programs despite apparent reluctance among some in the Department of Defense (DOD). · The diffusion of decision-making authority for imagery collection platforms within the executive branch and Congress. Congress mandated the establishment of a centralized office in DOD for airborne reconnaissance in 1993; the House voted to dis-establish it in 1997. DOD announced in March 1998 that it is to be dissolved and its responsibilities transferred to the services and other Defense agencies by the end of FY1998. CRS-2 · Significant cost concerns affect the multi-billion dollar satellite effort and the services' ability to support manned reconnaissance aircraft. Congress strongly supported the development of smaller and less costly but also somewhat less capable satellites. · Delivery of an adequate number of operational UAVs has been difficult to achieve. Congress has specifically addressed UAV procurement expressing strong complaints about perceived deficiencies in some DOD efforts. · The increasing availability of commercial imagery and the questions regarding its ability to meet current and future Government requirements. Although Congress has supported sales of high-quality commercial satellites imagery and its purchase by DOD, there is no consensus that Government satellites programs can be significantly scaled back across the board. · Technical and organization challenges involved in making imagery available in useable formats and in real-time to appropriate decisionmakers. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War experience, Congress funded a number of initiatives to improve imagery dissemination, but it is widely recognized that this must be an ongoing effort. Manned reconnaissance aircraft face an even more uncertain future. Although the U-2, developed during the Eisenhower Administration, continues to be employed in a wide variety of reconnaissance missions, the Clinton Administration vetoed funding for continued operation of its more sophisticated, but costly, successor, the SR-71 Blackbird. The services have deactivated tactical reconnaissance aircraft, in large measure for budgetary reasons, and many observers believe that they have not energetically pursued planning for successor versions. Based on experience in the Persian Gulf War and in Bosnia, UAVs show great promise for collecting imagery that is otherwise unavailable. The acquisition process, however, has been marked by several false starts, delays, and, for a number or reasons, an inability to produce operating systems in adequate numbers that some observers have blamed on the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO)--the much-criticized Defense Department office that has overseen UAV programs. Several programs have been canceled despite major investments of time and money. Others have yet to achieve expected capabilities. In 1997 the House of Representatives passed legislation mandating the dissolution of DARO. Even though subsequently enacted legislation was less sweeping, in March 1998 DOD announced its own plan to restructure airborne reconnaissance programs including the abolition of DARO by the following October. The executive branch has made what some observers view as uneven progress in the past few years in regard to imagery collection efforts, even as Congress has taken a number of initiatives on its own. A major concern is organizational. The responsibility for acquiring and operating collection platforms is diffuse and not widely understood. A fundamental distinction exists between "national" and "tactical" systems, i.e. those that support the nation's senior policymakers and those that CRS-3 provide intelligence to military commanders at increasingly lower echelons of command. Some observers suggest that the national/tactical distinctions that are reflected in the separate organizations have produced an unnecessarily expensive and not wholly coordinated effort. Others maintain that congressional budgetary categories and overlapping committee jurisdictions have also contributed to this alleged problem. Public discussion of imagery collection systems has been limited by the complexity of the issues as well as by classification of essential data, especially in regard to satellite programs, whose existence was not even acknowledged until very recent years. It is the purpose of this report to describe the role of imagery to policymaking and military planning; to examine the capabilities and limitations of the three primary types of imagery collection platforms; to review the evolving organizational relationships that govern the acquisition and use of imagery; and to describe recent congressional actions regarding imagery platforms. Although a comprehensive assessment of imagery programs would have to be classified, it is possible to describe the parameters of the issue in general terms, as a basis for more detailed consideration. The Role of Overhead Reconnaissance Overhead reconnaissance has long been important to military operations, and it will be essential to post-Cold War planning and operations, since it is closely tied to the use of precision-guided munitions and information warfare strategies expected to characterize post-Cold War combat. Designing an effective approach (or "architecture") to imagery collection is, however, complicated by the different types of collection platforms, by the significant problems in adapting them to different types of military environments, and by administrative and oversight mechanisms that have developed both in the executive branch and Congress. Imagery collection platforms have evolved over the course of many decades and have been integrated in military and civilian decisionmaking processes in different ways. Overhead imagery was first used by Union forces in the Civil War with photographers working from balloons. In World War I, aircraft undertook overhead reconnaissance of enemy forces along the trenches of northern France. In the interwar years, photographic equipment was installed on specially configured aircraft and airborne reconnaissance was eventually recognized as a separate military discipline. During World War II aerial photography was employed for targeting bomber attacks on Germany and Japan and for making battle damage assessments.1 In the Cold War era, fear of a surprise conventional or nuclear attack by the Soviet Union drove the development of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft such as the U-2 and satellites dedicated to monitoring military activities in the vast expanses 1 See George W. Goddard with DeWitt S. Copp, Overview: A Life-Long Adventure in Aerial Photography (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969); George A. Larson and William O'Dwyer, "Photo-Reconnaissance: The Early Years," Air Power History, Spring 1998. CRS-4 of Soviet territories.2 Overhead reconnaissance proved indispensable in determining the size, strength, and disposition of a massive Soviet military machine that many feared could launch a devastating attack on the United States or Western Europe. This effort, probably the most important achievement of the U.S. Intelligence Community, provided the basis for shaping U.S. strategic forces and for negotiating a series of major arms control agreements with Moscow.3 As demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, innovative reconnaissance capabilities have emerged as an integral component of a military technical revolution that is shaping warfighting in the post-Cold War world. The widely publicized use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in Desert Storm depended upon the availability of precise imagery intelligence. Subsequent defense planning aims to make such intelligence available in real-time at virtually all levels of military operations as part of an effort to achieve dominant battlefield awareness. Problems identified in Desert Storm relating to inadequate and incompatible communications and insufficient wide- area imagery are still being addressed. The need for real-time imagery has led to an emphasis on electro-optical systems that can be transmitted digitally, although it is recognized that photography, which usually requires longer processing times, can provide uniquely valuable details and better wide-area coverage.4 Imagery technologies continue to be refined, as means are sought to acquire images at night, through clouds and smoke, and to isolate objects of particular interest. Military operations in Bosnia have provided a laboratory for innovative uses of imagery. U.S. satellite imagery has assisted in the location of opposing military forces (as well as of hidden mass burial sites). Manned aircraft are regularly used for reconnaissance missions. UAVs are launched from ground stations first in Albania and more recently in Hungary. Different platforms with different collection capabilities can be used "synergistically" to acquire more complete evidence than would be possible from single collectors; evidence acquired by one system can also be used to alert (or "cross-cue") another platform that is more suitable for obtaining the needed information. Some observers report that the utilization of intelligence information by tactical commanders is uneven at best. A Defense Science Board Task Force has noted that there is little capability to catalogue and retrieve video imagery. 5 Some commands 2 Prior to the availability of the U-2 there were a handful of highly dangerous overflights of Soviet territory by specially configured bombers in a combined U.S.-British effort. See R. Cargill Hall, "The Truth About Overflights," MHQ: the Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 1997. 3 See Dino A. Brugioni, "The Art and Science of Photoreconnaissance," Scientific American, March 1996; Richard M. Bissell, Jr. with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). 4 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Future of Space Reconnaissance," Scientific American, January 1991, pp. 38-39. 5 Defense Science Board, Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield, May-July, (continued...) CRS-5 are inundated with large quantities of unusable imagery. The flow of information down to tactical levels can be too slow for operational use. Most lower-level tactical commanders do not have their own reconnaissance assets. Some commanders and even intelligence officers are not adequately trained to take advantage of imagery that is available. The presence of outdated communications equipment designed for Cold War missions has led to widespread reliance on "workarounds," adjustments to systems that allow their use in ways for which they were not designed.6 With the end of the Cold War, the Defense Department and Congress have undertaken a number of studies and reassessments to change the focus of U.S. military forces from the threat of strategic warfare with the Soviet Union to an array of missions ranging from peacekeeping to major theater wars. A distinct feature of virtually all such studies is the importance of PGMs and requirements for increasing amounts of precise, real-time intelligence or information. · The May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) describes information superiority as the "backbone of military innovation" built upon "a robust multi-sensor information grid providing dominant awareness of the battlespace to our commanders and forces."7 · The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Vision 2010 foresees a military environment where, "[w]ith precision targeting and longer range systems, commanders can achieve the necessary destruction or suppression of enemy forces with fewer systems, thereby reducing the need for time - consuming and risky massing of people and equipment. Improved command and control, based on fused, all-source, real-time intelligence will reduce the need to assemble maneuver formations days and hours in advance of attacks."8 · The December 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel suggests that the U.S. may be on the cusp of a military revolution "characterized, in part, by a rapidly growing potential to detect, identify, and track far greater numbers of targets, over a larger area, for a longer time than ever before, and to order and move this information much more quickly and effectively than ever before."9 5 (...continued) 1996, p. 47. The Task Force advocated making available "video archives which allow a user to