

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3370, CRITICISM OVER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06TELAVIV3370.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06TELAVIV3370 | 2006-08-24 12:55 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
null
Leza L Olson 08/25/2006 02:05:09 PM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 03370
SIPDIS
CXTelA:
ACTION: POL
INFO: IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO
CONS
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:RJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MDPEARLSTEIN/RBL
CLEARED: DCM:GCRETZ, POL:NOLSEN, ECON:BMASILKO, DAO:PJDERMER
VZCZCTVI017
PP RUEHC RUEHXK RHEHNSC
DE RUEHTV #3370/01 2361255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241255Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003370
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IPA
NSC FOR WATERS AND LOGERFO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IS
SUBJECT: CRITICISM OVER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF
LEBANON WAR ON THE RISE
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The cease-fire in Lebanon has
rapidly eroded the strong public and political support for
the Government's conduct of the war and has left both Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz open to
an increasingly loud chorus of criticism. Initial GOI
attempts to channel criticism through a friendly commission
of inquiry evoked strong protests and leave Olmert with the
option of ordering a formal government inquiry or risking an
independent investigation. The problems faced by Olmert and
Peretz are exacerbated by coalition infighting on the budget
and by political maneuvering within Kadima and Labor, while
the opposition Likud Party waits for the appropriate moment
to strike in an effort to increase its own support. Israelis
will continue to digest and assess the outcome of the war,
Olmert's first real test as prime minister, over the next
weeks and months. This process will likely determine the
political futures of Olmert and Peretz. End summary and
comment.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Strong Public Support Drops Following Cease-Fire
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶2. (SBU) Following the July 12 attack by Hizballah, Israeli
political leaders and the public rallied around Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and his government as they authorized
extensive air and ground operations in Lebanon. Olmert's
approval ratings soared and even the often-acerbic Bibi
Netanyahu offered support.
¶3. (SBU) As pressure from the international community for a
cease-fire increased and hostilities came to an -- at least
temporary -- end, this situation changed. Embassy contacts
and the media are all skeptical that the war has removed the
threat or resulted in anything but a minor setback for
Hizballah. To many, this result is inadequate compensation
for the approximately 180 Israelis (including 110 soldiers
and more than 70 civilians) killed in the conflict, the
disruption of economic life from rocket attacks and the
call-up of the reserves, the high financial cost of
conducting the war, the destruction of homes and businesses
in parts of northern Israel, and the failure to obtain the
return of kidnapped IDF soldiers.
---------------------------------------------
Olmert Likely to Form a Commission of Inquiry
---------------------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) The emerging criticism is exacerbated by a public
debate over the government's planning and conduct of the war.
A small but vocal group of reserve soldiers have called for
the resignation of Olmert, Peretz, and IDF Chief of Staff LTG
Dan Halutz. They blame the political leadership for what
they say was a grave underestimation of Hizballah's
capabilities and for a failure to provide Israeli troops with
the necessary equipment and, in isolated incidents, even
sufficient food and water.
¶5. (SBU) Such charges played a role in leading Peretz to form
a commission led by his advisor, former IDF Chief of Staff
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, to examine the conduct of the war. This
idea, however, drew fire from both the IDF -- which wants to
guarantee the confidentiality of any military witnesses --
and much of the public -- which objects to an investigation
led by a Peretz supporter -- and the commission has suspended
its activity. As he faces increasing pressure for a more
independent investigation, Olmert has two choices: a
governmental inquiry over which he would have substantial
influence, or an independent commission. While the latter
option would be more acceptable to the public, any potential
findings of mismanagement or lack of planning by the GOI
could potentially bring down senior members of the coalition.
In a conversation with congressional visitors from
Washington on August 20, Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon
Barak said that he believed such a commission would be formed
and hinted that he expects to be chosen to lead it.
-------------------------------
Coalition and Party In-fighting
-------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) In addition to the public criticism, the government
has also suffered from coalition infighting, as well as
internal party disputes in both Kadima and Labor.
Transportation Minister and former Defense Minister Shaul
Mofaz abstained from the Cabinet vote on the cease-fire,
calling UNSCR 1701 "less than satisfactory." More
importantly, FM Tzipi Livni and Olmert disagreed on tactics
during the cease-fire negotiations, resulting in Olmert
calling off at the eleventh hour Livni's planned trip to the
UNSC on September 12. The disagreement was an apparent
first. Livni was widely viewed as a real asset to Kadima's
electoral campaign, and her decision to back Olmert after
Sharon's stroke precluded any leadership challenge at that
time.
¶7. (SBU) Peretz faces similar problems in Labor. His
performance during the Lebanon war has only strengthened
criticism that he is unqualified to manage what most Israelis
feel is the country's most important portfolio. Former naval
chief and Shin Bet Director Ami Ayalon and former IDF Deputy
Chief of Staff Matan Vilnai, both Labor MKs who see
themselves as future prime ministers, have attacked Peretz in
public. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has been more
subtle in his criticism, but is building upon his image as
the leader who extricated Israel from the last Lebanon war.
One or more of them is likely to challenge Peretz for the
Labor leadership in internal party elections scheduled for
May 2007.
¶8. (C) The two main parties in the coalition, Kadima and
Labor, have also publicly disagreed on how to finance the
war. With Treasury experts now leaking war cost estimates
exceeding NIS six billion (approximately 1.3 billion
dollars), the coalition has been unable to reach consensus on
where to find the funding. As a result, Kadima caucus chair
Avigdor Yizhaki publicly threatened to end the coalition,
telling reporters "the Labor Party is not a coalition partner
that can be trusted. Therefore, I am going to propose to the
Prime Minister that he immediately reshuffle (the Cabinet)
and enter into new coalition negotiations." Note: Gabi
Golan, advisor to the Prime Minister for Planning and
Development told EconCouns that while the next few months
will be rocky for the coalition, he does not expect the Labor
members on the Finance Committee to continue to disrupt
budget negotiations because, "they know that if the PM
reshuffles the Cabinet their position will not be any
stronger." End Note.
-----------------------
Likud Waiting to Pounce
-----------------------
¶9. (SBU) To further compound Olmert's difficulties, Likud
Chairman Bibi Netanyahu is waiting for the right opportunity
to pounce. Netanyahu was atypically restrained in his
comments during the fighting, merely referring in a Knesset
speech to "hitches" in the conduct of the war. On August 22,
however, he told the press that "with this many inadequacies,
there is no choice but to form a state commission of
inquiry." Likud is also attempting to lure former IDF Chief
of Staff Moshe "Boogie" Ya'alon into the party to bolster its
claims to the "strong on defense" title.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Comment: Jury Still Out, but GOI Facing Difficult Time
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶10. (C) Comment: The conflict with Hizballah was Olmert's
first real test as Prime Minister. Israelis will continue to
digest and assess the outcome of the war over the next weeks
and months. Their views of the war's achievements -- or lack
thereof -- will have a long-term impact on his government's
political standing. Local perceptions of the deployment
timing, mandate, and composition of the enhanced UNIFIL
force, as well as the effectiveness of the arms interdiction
regime and progress on securing the return of the two
abducted soldiers, will play a large role in shaping their
opinion. These factors will also determine what type of
inquiry on the war's conduct Olmert will feel compelled to
order. In the end, Olmert and Peretz are both likely to face
increasingly vocal opposition within their own parties.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES