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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING560, PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING560 | 2009-03-04 12:55 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
VZCZCXRO9112
OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0560/01 0631255
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041255Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2655
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000560
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
OFFERS HELP IN TALKING TO IRAN
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China is keen to understand the direction of
U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
according to an MFA official. China remains committed to the
P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with
Iran. Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
economic relations with the PRC. Despite PRC urging that
Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
be difficult, the official suggested. The official said that
it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
should Iran develop a nuclear weapon. An academic contact
suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
form of new diplomatic engagement emerge. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the
international community's efforts to deal with the Iran
nuclear issue with Deputy Director Xu Wei of MFA's West Asian
Affairs Department Iran Division March 3. PolOff also met
with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International
Studies (CIIS) February 27.
China Seeks Clarity on Policy Review
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) MFA's Xu Wei told PolOff that China was closely
following the ongoing review of our Iran policy. He said
that China believed that the United States maintains a
leadership role in the Middle East and that the results of
the review will have an impact on Chinese engagement with the
region. He said that Beijing hoped for more clarity from the
United States on policy adjustments resulting from this
review, adding that China had been left to guess at how U.S.
policy might change on a very important set of shared
concerns. In the meantime, Xu stressed, China's overall
policy toward Iran had not changed, and China would continue
to emphasize the importance of stability in the Middle East
and its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in
the region. Xu noted that additional clarity was especially
important because China perceives several voices in the USG
with different viewpoints on Iran speaking publicly on the
issue.
PRC Committed to P5-plus-1, Willing to Facilitate Talks
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶4. (C) Xu stressed the need to resolve the nuclear impasse
through dialogue, and added that China remained committed to
the P5-plus-1 process, as indicated in its support for the
recent P5-plus-1 joint statement on Iran. He said that China
sincerely hoped that the outcome of our Iran policy review
would be direct U.S.-Iran talks, and offered China's
assistance in creating a channel for communication with the
Iranians.
Official: PRC Effective at Communicating with Tehran
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶5. (C) China and Iran continued to enjoy "good" relations in
both the political and economic realms, Xu said, but this did
not indicate that China supports all of Tehran's policies.
He said that China had developed strong communication with
the Iranian regime and used these channels to express to the
Iranian leadership the concerns of the P5-plus-1 and the Gulf
Cooperation Council over nuclear proliferation. Beijing
sought to persuade Iran to play a positive role in the
region, and Chinese communication with Tehran to that end was
effective, Xu said, adding that Iran's cooperation with the
IAEA and the P5-plus-1, though limited, was due in part to
Chinese intervention. China had made clear to Iran that
PRC-Iran economic cooperation should not be interpreted as an
indication that China is not serious about concerns over
nuclear proliferation or about working with the international
community to deal with the nuclear issue.
Talking to Iran Would Require Patience
--------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Xu said that the U.S. policy review had generated
debate within Iran over how to respond, especially over the
possibility of direct dialogue. China was urging the Iranian
regime to respond positively to American overtures, but Xu
said that based on his experience working on Iranian issues,
he believed the leadership will find it difficult to show a
BEIJING 00000560 002 OF 003
positive attitude in public. Xu counseled patience, saying
that he was concerned that expectations in the United States
on how Iran would respond may be too high. Still, he said
that the issues involved were too important for the United
States to fail to press forward with dialogue even if any
such discussions are difficult.
"Too Soon" to Contemplate Weaponization Concerns
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶7. (C) Pressed on how China would respond if Iran developed
nuclear weapons, Xu said that China took proliferation
concerns seriously and opposed such a development. However,
he indicated that China did not yet see Iranian development
of nuclear weapons as an immediate concern, noting that China
was willing to "wait and see how far Iran can go" in
developing nuclear technology before it would change its
position. He added that it was still too soon to contemplate
what actions should be taken should the Iranians develop a
nuclear weapon.
¶8. (C) CIIS's Li Guofu echoed this approach, saying that
while China followed the Iranian nuclear program closely,
China was not 100-percent convinced that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons. He indicated that observers who believe
there is a "point of no return" in Iran's technical
development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the
problem was fundamentally a political one and not technical.
He said that Iran was moving ahead with its nuclear program
without a clear internal position on whether it would want to
weaponize the technology, but added that Iran hoped to bring
the technology to the point where it could produce a nuclear
weapon in a short period of time. He stressed, however, that
in his view, a complicated series of steps remained between
the current level of technology and the point of
weaponization, including the necessity for a nuclear test.
Such a test, he indicated, would have a profound effect on
the political questions facing the international community.
U.S. Needs to Offer "Something Real"
------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Li said that direct U.S. engagement with Iran would be
complicated by the reality that there is little the United
States can offer at present that would persuade Tehran to
change its behavior. As the regime's confidence in its own
domestic legitimacy has grown, the value to the regime of
normalized relations with the United States has decreased.
Similarly, security guarantees would mean little to an
Iranian Government convinced that it can already ensure its
own security. Li stressed that the U.S. side would need to
be prepared to make concessions in any engagement, and would
need to offer "something real." Li sugested starting with
demonstrating a position of "mutual respect."
Iran Remains Suspicious of U.S. Intentions
------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Based on his conversations with Iranian
policy-makers, Li said, Iran remained suspicious of U.S.
intentions. He suggested that dialogue with Iran should have
a "symbolic" beginning to avoid a false start. He said that
the two sides should first agree on principles not directly
related to the nuclear issue. He suggested that if the
Iranians show a willingness to suspend uranium enrichment,
the United States should be prepared to follow up immediately
with new cooperation. He stressed that the Iranian
leadership regarded itself an important player on the
regional issues that concern the United States, especially
efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
IRI Official: Nuclear Weapon Would Be "Disastrous"
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¶11. (C) Li reported that he was told by a Deputy Foreign
Minister in Tehran that Iran considers itself a regional
power, but understands that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, the United States would likely deploy nuclear weapons
to the Persian Gulf region, which would be "strategically
disastrous" for Iran. He said that the official had told him
Iran wants to develop "nuclear capability" as a symbol of its
status as a regional power. The official told Li that Iran
was nevertheless willing to open a dialogue with the United
States.
Other Challenges to Opening a Dialogue
--------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Li said that the atmosphere had improved for
developing new engagement with Iran, but obstacles remained.
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The regime in Tehran continued to see opportunities for
changing Iran's engagement with the world under the new U.S.
administration, and there was debate in Iran on how best to
respond. Serious debate among the Iranian people on the need
for a nuclear program had yet to take place, Li stressed,
although the notion of weaponizing the results of the nuclear
program continued to generate debate among the Iranian
leadership. Li stressed that the Iranian leadership
continued to dismiss the notion of U.S. military action in
response to its ongoing nuclear development and was convinced
that suspension of uranium enrichment is not necessary for
starting a "new process" with the United States.
Election Politics also a Factor
-------------------------------
¶13. (C) Li said that this year's presidential election in
Iran would be an important factor in the chances for
meaningful talks with the United States. Noting that the
candidacy of former President Khatami posed the first real
challenge of the campaign to incumbent President Ahmadinejad,
Li stressed that Khatami would not have been able to announce
his candidacy without explicit approval from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Unlike previous elections, other
reformist candidates had since dropped out of the campaign,
Li said, improving Khatami's chances. Still, the hard-liners
had acted to overcome their internal divisions in light of
the Khatami candidacy, and Ahmadinejad remained "likely" to
be re-elected. Li argued that the top-level blessing of the
Khatami candidacy indicated that the Supreme Leader deems
Khatami reliable enough and would not expect bold reforms
even if Khatami were elected. In the meantime, Li suggested,
Ahmadinejad might feel the need to demonstrate his hard-line
credentials in the run-up to the June election.
PRC to Iran: Don't Take Economic Cooperation for Granted
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¶14. (C) Li said that China continued to value development of
its economic ties with Iran in order to maintain economic
growth. He noted that Chinese officials told their Iranian
counterparts that they are frustrated with the lack of
progress on the nuclear issue, progress which would create a
foundation for new investment in the energy sector.
According to Li, to prod the Iranians to show progress on the
nuclear issue, the Chinese had warned them not to take
China's economic interests in Iran for granted. Furthermore,
China's dependence on Iranian energy is decreasing given
recent improvements in Sino-Saudi relations (as evidenced by
President Hu's recent travel there) and their potential to
bring about increased Chinese access to Saudi energy
supplies.
PICCUTA