

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09LONDON2346, BROWN'S PROMISE TO SEND AN ADDITIONAL 500 TROOPS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09LONDON2346.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09LONDON2346 | 2009-10-15 16:40 | 2011-02-04 21:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London |
VZCZCXRO1072
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHLO #2346/01 2881640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151640Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3738
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002346
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2019
TAGS: AF PK UK PGOV PREL MARR MOPS MCAP PTER
SUBJECT: BROWN'S PROMISE TO SEND AN ADDITIONAL 500 TROOPS
TO AFGHANISTAN -- IF KEY CONDITIONS ARE MET
REF: A. 10/14/2009 LONDON DAILY REPORT (NOTAL) B. 10/15/209 LONDON DAILY REPORT (NOTAL) C. LONDON 2311
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville, for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (C//NF) Summary. Prime Minister Brown announced October 14 that he is prepared to deploy an additional 500 troops to Afghanistan provided three key conditions are met: the Afghan security forces must do a better job, and be willing to fight alongside and be trained by British forces; British troops must have adequate equipment; and, other allies must bear a greater burden in Afghanistan. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) officials confirmed to Poloff that the 500 troops would not deploy to Afghanistan until the PM is satisfied that all three conditions have been met. They said these conditions should be met within a few months. The UK currently has about 9,000 troops in Afghanistan; the addition of 500 troops would bring British force levels in Afghanistan to approximately 9,500. In addition to the 500 new troops, the 700 British troops deployed to Afghanistan for the electoral period would remain there. Brown also announced that the regional battle group for southern Afghanistan will be redeployed to Helmand "with immediate effect."
¶2. (C//NF) Summary Continued. Brown's statement followed weeks of intense debate within HMG about the way forward in Afghanistan, including pressure from senior military officers to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan. Recent polling indicates that public support for Britain's combat mission in Afghanistan remains tepid. Although PM Brown's personal commitment to the Afghanistan mission is firm, he and other UK leaders continue to look to the United States for strategic leadership of the alliance in Afghanistan. (Ref C) Brown also discussed Pakistan in his statement, asserting that "while the sustained pressure on al Qaeda in Pakistan combined with military action in Afghanistan is having a suppressive effect on al Qaeda, the main element of the threat to Britain still emanates from al Qaeda and Pakistan." British officials are "cautiously encouraged" by the government of Pakistan's recent steps to combat extremism. End Summary.
500 More Troops; "In Principle," with Conditions --------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (C//NF) Prime Minister Brown launched the October 14 Prime Minister's Questions in the House of Commons with a somber tribute to British forces, reading out the names of the 37 servicemen who have died in Afghanistan since the last PM's Questions in July. The PM then read into the record a detailed statement describing HMG policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Note: The full text of PM Brown's statement to the House of Commons is available at www.number10.gov.uk; it is a "check against delivery" version that is very close to Brown's actual remarks. End Note.) Although the statement covered a broad range of topics, media and analysts have focused on Brown's announcement that he has decided to deploy 500 additional British troops to Afghanistan, supplementing the 9,000 UK troops presently there.
¶4. (U) PM Brown declared that: "I have agreed in principle a new force level subject to the following conditions. First, that a new Afghan government demonstrates its commitment to bring forward the Afghan troops to be trained and to fight alongside our forces - and I talked yesterday to President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah and received assurances that it is their determination that this will happen. Second, that as before every soldier and unit deployed to Afghanistan is fully equipped for the operations they are asked to undertake. Third, that our commitment is part of an agreed approach across the international coalition, with all countries bearing their fair share. The combination of force levels, equipment levels and tasks I am setting out today follows the clear military advice from the Chiefs of Staff and our commanders on the ground: on implementing our strategy; and on reducing the risk to our forces. And it is on this basis that I have agreed in principle to a new British force level of 9,500, which will be put into effect once these conditions are met." Brown stated to the Commons that he had consulted with President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and U.S. military commanders about the way forward in Afghanistan. He expressed support for "General McChrystal's ambition to accelerate the growth of the Afghan security forces."
¶5. (C//NF) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) officials confirmed October 14 to Poloff and representatives from other Embassies whose nations LONDON 00002346 002 OF 003 have troops in Regional Command South that the deployment of 500 more British troops to Afghanistan is indeed contingent upon the three conditions outlined by PM Brown. In regard to the first condition, they stressed that it requires that the Afghan National Security Forces deploy more forces to the south to fight alongside, and be trained by, British forces. Jeff Garrett (Protect), Head of Afghanistan Policy at the Ministry of Defence's Operations Directorate, confirmed that the additional 500 troops would be "largely focused on partnering" with Afghan soldiers "to reflect General McChrystal's concept of embedded partnering." Garrett characterized the second condition as "an internal concern," for HMG. Matthew Lodge (Protect), head of the Afghanistan Group at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated to Poloff, that HMG does not want the mission in Afghanistan to become "an operation with only a small handful of ISAF partners." PM Brown's third condition requires "an agreed approach across the international coalition, with all countries bearing their fair share," Garrett stated. He also noted that the third condition is "not just about military contributions" by other allies, but could include other forms of support.
¶6. (C//NF) Both Garrett and Lodge confirmed that the PM would authorize the deployment of the 500 troops only when he is convinced that all three conditions have been met. They predicted this should occur "within the next few months ...(but there will be) no deployment until the Prime Minister is satisfied these conditions are met," Lodge stated. Lodge and Garrett pointed to Brown's statement that he had agreed "in principle" to a new British force level of 9,500 as confirmation that the 700 British troops sent to Afghanistan for the electoral period would remain there.
Why An Announcement Now? ------------------------
¶7. (C//NF) Ed Hadley (Protect), a Cabinet Office official who covers Afghanistan and Pakistan, told Poloff shortly before Brown's announcement that the decision followed a "long and tortuous" discussion among senior UK policy makers about the way forward in Afghanistan. Echoing Lodge's and Garrett's observations, he stressed that sending more troops is contingent upon "a high level of certainty" that the troops will be "adequately equipped" and "assuring adequate Afghan National Security Forces' support...something we have not always had in the past." Lodge offered several reasons for the timing of Brown's announcement. The return of Parliament after the summer recess provided an apt moment to explain HMG's Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy, Lodge stated. Heavy British "casualties over the summer, media interest in Afghanistan, and growing public skepticism" about Britain's mission are factors that help explain the timing of Brown's announcement, Lodge continued. The primary reason for the PM's announcement, however, was because the Prime Minister wanted to offer a clear picture of HMG's policy, "provide additional resources, and reassure allies." Garrett added that with the "presidential electoral cycle coming to an end soon, now is a natural point to announce a new decision." Lodge expressed hope that the USG would decide soon on the future course of allied strategy in Afghanistan. He stressed that "now is a potentially decisive period" for allies to articulate and implement a winning Afghanistan strategy.
Military Reaction -----------------
¶8. (SBU) Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, and General Sir David Richards, head of the army, publicly endorsed Brown's promise of more troops. Stirrup stated October 14 that "this is what we've asked for, this is what we've been given." Richards stated that "I'm confident that the Prime Minister's conditions can be met." Some, however, criticized Brown for waiting too long to announce the plus up. Ex-Defence Secretary John Hutton, a longtime Labour Party MP, observed that "it would have been more helpful had we had the troops six months ago." MOD sources disputed Hutton's view, insisting that there were insufficient trained troops ready to deploy six months ago.
Redeploying -----------
¶9. (C//NF) Brown affirmed in his statement to the Commons that "to meet the changing demands of the campaign, which require greater concentration of our forces in Central Helmand, we have confirmed the decision we made as a national security counsel in the summer: that one of the British units, the regional battle group for Southern Afghanistan, will be redeployed to Helmand with immediate effect." Garrett asserted that this redeployment was necessary to provide adequate numbers of British troops "for the holding task in Central Helmand." LONDON 00002346 003 OF 003
What About Pakistan? --------------------
¶10. (C//NF) Although the media has focused on Brown's promise of more troops, subject to conditions, the PM also discussed Britain's overall Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, including efforts to stabilize Pakistan and fight extremism there. He asserted that "while the sustained pressure on al Qaeda in Pakistan combined with military action in Afghanistan is having a suppressive effect on al Qaeda, the main element of the threat to Britain still emanates from al Qaeda and Pakistan." Lodge told Poloff that "notwithstanding the problems of the last ten days, the government of Pakistan seems increasingly determined to take the fight to the insurgency in Waziristan" and to combat extremism generally. HMG is "cautiously encouraged" by Pakistan's recent efforts, he said.
Tepid Support for Combat Mission --------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) Brown's statement to the House of Commons coincided with the October 14 publication of the results of a Populus poll in The Times. According to the poll, 36 percent of British voters believe that British troops should be withdrawn immediately from Afghanistan, up from 29 percent in mid-September. The poll finds that four out of ten want British forces to quit Afghanistan, up from three out of ten over the past month. More than twice as many men as women (40 to 17 percent) believe that British troops should remain in Afghanistan until the "Taliban is defeated and the situation is stable, even it that takes many years." Sixty-four percent believe that HMG should send more troops to Afghanistan if the Army requests. Further details about the poll are available at www.timesonline.co.uk.
Comment -------
¶12. (C//NF) The three conditions laid out by PM Brown are not new. The PM, Defence Secretary Ainsworth and other HMG officials have consistently asserted that more British troops should not deploy to Afghanistan unless the Afghan security forces do a better job, unless British troops have adequate kit, and unless other allies bear a greater burden in Afghanistan. Brown's October 14 announcement followed weeks of intense debate within HMG about the way forward in Afghanistan. In the past several months, Brown has come under pressure from senior military officers to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan. PM Brown's personal commitment to the Afghanistan mission remains firm, but he, and other UK leaders, continue to look to the United States for strategic leadership of the alliance in Afghanistan. (Ref C) End Comment.) Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX
SUSMAN