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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE328, NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09THEHAGUE328 | 2009-06-02 16:18 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy The Hague |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0328/01 1531618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021618Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 1201
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2807
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6735
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0404
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1845
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 5251
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0179
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2226
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0674
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000328
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF PAK NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH
BILATERAL WITH DEFENSE MINISTER VAN MIDDELKOOP
Classified By: Char...
209768,6/2/2009 16:18,09THEHAGUE328,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0328/01 1531618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021618Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 1201
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2807
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6735
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0404
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1845
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 5251
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0179
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 2226
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2887
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0674
","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000328
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR AF PAK NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SCENESETTER; SECRETARY,S JUNE 1OTH
BILATERAL WITH DEFENSE MINISTER VAN MIDDELKOOP
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).
Mr. Secretary:
--------
Overview:
--------
¶1. (S) Your participation in the Regional Command-South
RC-South) meeting and the bilateral with Dutch Minister of
Defense Emert van Middelkoop comes at a critical time for the
advancement of key U.S. priorities. Van Middelkoop and the
Dutch government as a whole remain among our strongest
allies, but Dutch domestic politics threaten to limit
progress on our common agenda. On Afghanistan, the
government faces an uphill battle to convince Parliament and
the Dutch people to continue combat missions after 2010.
¶2. (C) Van Middelkoop -- one of only two ministers from the
smallest member of the coalition government, the Christian
Union (CU) -- has a decidedly mixed record. He has vast
foreign and security policy experience as a member of
Parliament. He is also widely recognized as the author of
the Dutch policy requiring parliamentary approval of military
deployments overseas -- a result of the Dutch failure to
prevent the massacre at the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in
¶1995. At the same time, this is the first time the CU and
van Middelkoop have served in the government, and their lack
of experience has been evident in several instances. In
January, for example, Van Middelkoop first denied and then
was forced to apologize for his remarks about the Dutch
mission in Afghanistan. He now almost exclusively reads
aloud from written notes to avoid additional missteps. More
influential voices on Afghanistan policy are Foreign Minister
Verhagen of the Christian Democrat party and Development
Minister Koenders of the Labor Party (reflecting the Dutch 3D
Approach (Development, Diplomacy and Defense).
¶3. (C) During his June 10 bilateral meeting with you, Van
Middelkoop will be interested in hearing more about new U.S.
command structures in Afghanistan; the influx of U.S. troops
into RC-S, including strategic objectives; and initiatives on
civil-military cooperation. Van Middelkoop will anticipate
questions regarding the future of the Dutch mission beyond
August 2010, although his comments will likely be guarded
ahead of a late autumn cabinet decision on the issue. Among
his public statements and misstatements, however, Van
Middelkoop has suggested he believes the Dutch will scale
down their presence.
¶4. (C) For the June 11 RC-S Ministerial, the Dutch foresee an
""intimate"" atmosphere in a 1 3 format with delegates from the
eight countries with troops in RC-S. Besides Van Middelkoop
and yourself, the principals will be Mr. John Hutton (United
Kingdom), Mr. Joel Fitzgibbon (Australia), Mr. Peter Kordon
MacKay (Canada), Mr. Soren Gade (Denmark), Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo
(Estonia), and Mr. Mihai Stanisoara (Romania). The Dutch
envision an informal round-table discussion centered around
three main agenda items: the evolution of RC-S, training and
Qthree main agenda items: the evolution of RC-S, training and
handover of responsibilities, and RC-S engagement with
Pakistan. Prior to the round-table discussion, the Dutch
request that you begin the meeting with an overview of
political developments to include the U.S. review, the influx
of U.S. troops, and new leadership in the mission.
-----------
Afghanistan
-----------
¶5. (C) The Dutch cabinet is presently considering the
Netherlands, role in Afghanistan after 2010, including our
""Afghanistan Asks"" request (Ref A). Senior officials have
specifically requested that we give them the room to
deliberate and come to their own decision, rather than
applying any sort of public pressure. The Embassy strongly
supports that approach, particularly because we are on the
right track for a good decision from the Dutch if we move
carefully.
¶6. (S/NF) On receipt of the ""Afghanistan Asks"" demarche, the
Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Robert de
Groot, told us that most of the requests were very real
possibilities (Ref B). However, we omitted from the formal
request the proposed Provisional Reconstruction Team in the
province of Dai Kundi because De Groot had earlier advised us
that such a request would hurt our cause as negotiations in
the Dutch cabinet proceed. Since that time, there have been
two or three cabinet meetings on the issue. Subsequent
staff-level comments have not been as optimistic as De
Groot,s original remarks, so we are using every high-level
meeting as opportunity to press the U.S. request discreetly.
¶7. (C) The international media has lauded the accomplishments
of the ""Dutch Model"" for Development, Diplomacy, and Defense
(3D) integrated efforts. This praise has been better
received internationally than domestically where the public,
although very supportive of the soldiers, does not strongly
support their deployment. The Dutch have lost 19 soldiers to
date, and Dutch public believes they have done more than
their fair share. Moreover, many Dutch legislators are
concerned about the effect of the deployment on military
readiness and recruitment. The Dutch still have a shortfall
of approximately 7,000 personnel. The Dutch media report
that the ISAF mission is not successful in bringing security
to the region and many development programs are ineffective.
The cabinet and the Parliament will have to make very strong
and convincing arguments to continue a strong commitment
beyond 2010.
¶8. (C) A majority of the cabinet (the Christian Democrats and
the Christian Union) is committed to the NATO/ISAF mission
and the Afghan people. Throughout the cabinet's decision
process, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and van
Middelkoop will be strong and effective allies in winning
support from the Parliament. The political challenge lies
with the Labor Party, where Development Cooperation Minister
Koenders will be the key player. Although part of the
coalition, Labor is the most skeptical of continuing ground
engagement in Afghanistan after 2010. For Labor,s rank and
file, the most compelling arguments are those that
demonstrate how Dutch efforts benefit the Afghan people,
rather than how essential the Dutch military is for ISAF
success. The March 31 Afghanistan Conference in The Hague
provided the cabinet a platform to portray its eventual
decision as one that was consultative in nature, ""one among
equals"", and not one of ""request"" from the U.S. or NATO.
This small point is very crucial in dealing with the Dutch
psyche and understanding their decision process. The cabinet
Qpsyche and understanding their decision process. The cabinet
will be very deft in announcing their decision which is
expected in the fall. Cabinet approval for some sort of
follow-on mission is only the first step. That plan then
goes to Parliament for approval. Although the coalition has
sufficient votes to pass a plan, Dutch consensus will require
support from parties other than just those in the coalition.
The Embassy believes the cabinet and Parliament will
eventually agree to some follow-on mission in Uruzgan, along
the lines of our ""asks"" items, but the number of Dutch
military troops committed to a battle group will be reduced
significantly and it will step down as lead nation for Task
Force Uruzgan. There is little information being provided by
the decision makers but what is received indicates that the
Dutch will commit to all of the ""asks"" with the exception
that the funding levels may be lower.
¶9. (C) From ref A, the specific ""asks"" delivered to the
Netherlands were:
- Contribute to fulfillment of Election Support Force
requirements for Regional Command-South
- Retain PRT, OMLTs, Special Operations Forces, and critical
enablers in Uruzgan Province beyond 2010
- Special Operations Task Group with Rotary Wing Lift to
conduct military training and mentoring
- Contribute $20 million per year for five years to the
Afghan National Army Trust Fund
- Support counter-narcotics initiatives including the GPI,
training the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and
funding Counter-Narcotics Advisory Teams
- Deploy gendarmerie for training and mentoring Afghan police
- Contribute $10 million/year for the ARTF and work with RC-S
partners to contribute resources to promote regional
agriculture and power development
- Continued training and contribution of fully-formed police
mentor teams for districts in Uruzgan Province to all future
cycles of Focused District Development
- Increased support for governance and development programs
at PRTs, including additional civilian experts with access to
programming resources
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JSF
----
¶10. (C) The Dutch have gone to the brink as JSF partners. In
a bitter late-April political debate, the Labor Party forced
a compromise to purchase only one of the planned two OT&E
aircraft, and delay the decision on the purchase of the
second test aircraft until 2010, and delayed the decision to
buy 85 JSF aircraft from 2010 to 2012. Although strongly
supported by State Secretary of Defense DeVries, JSF will
likely continue to face headwinds in the Parliament for some
time to come.
¶11. (C) More broadly, the JSF compromise could indirectly
threaten the Dutch decision to stay in Afghanistan after
¶2010. The Labor Party, already skeptical on Afghanistan, is
viewed as having lost the JSF debate and several other policy
issues. Looking for a victory, the Labor Party may thus make
negotiations over Afghanistan more difficult.
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LAIRCM
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¶12. (C) The recent approval by OSD to grant an exception to
LAIRCM release policy for Dutch KDC-10 aircraft presents an
opportunity to reiterate appreciation for Dutch efforts and
shared risks in Afghanistan, along with the hope that a
significant contribution of Dutch military capabilities will
continue beyond 2010.
-------------------------------
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
-------------------------------
¶13. (C) SAF/IA recently approved exchange of two Dutch Air
Force operators into an operational UAV squadron at Nellis
AFB, if the Netherlands agree to purchase MQ-1 or MQ-9 UAVs
within the next twelve to eighteen months. The Netherlands
move towards this type of system is borne out of their
experience in Afghanistan. Should this offer be accepted by
the Netherlands, it will the first of its kind for UAVs.
GALLAGHER