

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10MOSCOW392, IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW392.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10MOSCOW392 | 2010-02-22 11:32 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO9554
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0392/01 0531132
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221132Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2246
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0342
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000392
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Eric Green for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a two-day visit to Moscow, PM Netanyahu
pressed his case on Iran while the GOR was more focused on
trade than the MEPP. The Israeli PM downplayed disagreements
over Hamas and welcomed government initiatives to help
crisis-depleted economic relations. Netanyahu came away
pleasantly surprised with Moscow's tougher attitude towards
Tehran and the GOR's willingness to countenance sanctions,
even though disagreement remains on their content. Israeli
contacts are confident Russia will not deliver the S-300s to
Iran anytime soon. End Summary.
----------------------
A Special Relationship
----------------------
¶2. (C) In his first official visit to Russia, PM Netanyahu
met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin as well
as leaders from Russia's Jewish community. Both sides
described this as a productive visit with "frank but positive
discussions."
¶3. (C) Israeli DCM Roi Rosenblit said Netanyahu's visit
emphasized the "special relationship" between Israel and
Russia. He indicated that this the connection between the
two countries has flourished in the past year. Thanks to
visa free travel, 400,000 Russian tourists travelled to
Israel in 2009.
--------------------------------------------- --
Bilateral Economic and Cultural Ties Increasing
--------------------------------------------- --
¶4. (C) According to Dmitri Lebedov, Second Secretary in the
MFA's Israel and Palestine Department, there was some
discussion of economic issues, including cooperation in
nanotechnology, agriculture, tourism and banking. The
Russian-Israeli Bilateral Economic and Trade Commission last
met in November 2009. The commission is planning another
meeting in 2010 in Jersusalem although a date has not yet
been selected. Lebedev noted that Putin has agreed to visit
Israel in 2010.
¶5. (C) Rosenblit said both sides blamed the economic crisis
for the decrease in bilateral trade in 2009 which affected
Israeli imports of both raw diamonds and petrochemicals.
Both sides are looking for ways to diversify trade to include
more agricultural products. Rosenblit noted that Russia was
very interested in attracting Israeli investment, citing a
bilateral agreement on industrial research and development
which gives both governments the ability to finance joint
start-ups.
¶6. (C) Elaborating on economics issues, Rosenblit said that
Netanyahu and Putin discussed energy issues. Rosenblit said
that Israel had discussed with Russia and Turkey the
possibility of extending to Israel a gas pipeline but this
proposal became unnecessary after Israel found offshore gas
reserves in Haifa. Although Gazprom is still interested in
building facilities in Haifa and aiding in distribution,
Rosenblit said this was now a question for the private
sector. Rosenblit also claimed that an agreement was
reached to launch a bilateral agricultural business forum in
Moscow, possibly in March 2010. This would also be a private
effort, but under governmental auspices. He also said that
there was some discussion about future outer space
cooperation for peaceful purposes.
¶7. (C) Rosenblit claimed that the 65th anniversary of World
War II and Holocaust remembrance were high on the agenda. He
said that both the GOI and the GOR are unhappy with recent
attempts to revise the history of these events. He noted
that a Holocaust Museum will be built in Russia and a
commemorative site recognizing the Red Army's role in WWII
will be constructed in Israel. Rosenblit also said that PM
Putin invited President Peres to the May 9 Victory Day
ceremonies in Moscow later this year. Medevedev also
reportedly green lighted the idea of a cultural program
including a "Year of Russia in Israel" and "Year of Israel in
Russia" exchange.
-------------------------------------------
Middle East Peace Not High on Either Agenda
-------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) According to Rosenblit, MEPP was not thoroughly
discussed and he "doubted that the Moscow Conference
specifically was mentioned." Rosenblit also downplayed the
MOSCOW 00000392 002 OF 003
recent visits of Abbas and Meshaal and the importance
attached to them by the Russians. He said that he believed
Georgia was of greater importance to Russia than Syria,
Lebanon or Palestine.
¶9. (C) Rosenblit said that Netanyahu emphasized his openness
to talks between the GOR and the Palestinians because he
welcomed any way to bring them back to negotiations. "We
wanted everyone to tell Abbas to return to negotiations
because we can't give him a deal until he sits down." He
noted that Israel prefers direct contacts but supports any
kind of negotiations. Rosenblit said that Israel still
insists on talks without preconditions and no interim
agreements: "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
Rosenblit said that Israel supported Russia's efforts to
achieve comprehensive negotiations including Syria and
Lebanon.
¶10. (C) Referring to the recent visit to Moscow of Khaled
Meshaal, Netanyahu told his interlocutors that Hamas should
not be legitimized by other countries. Although Meshaal had
only a 15 minute meeting with Lavrov, it received significant
coverage in the media. Rosenblit said Medvedev asked what
Russia could do to help with Hamas. Netanyahu repeated that
Israel does not see Hamas as a legitimate partner but would
use the Russia-Hamas channel to discuss humanitarian issues
such as the proposed prisoner swap for IDF soldier Gilad
Shalit.
------------------------
Closer than Ever on Iran
------------------------
¶11. (C) Lebedov sought to downplay discussions of Iran saying
that, while it was discussed, other bilateral issues took up
most of the discussions.
¶12. (C) Rosenblit, however, claimed that Iran was clearly at
the top of Israel's agenda for this visit. He said Netanyahu
was "keen to form a group of like-minded parties" who
recognized the danger of Iran's program and would cooperate
to stop its "militant nuclearlization." Netanyahu emphasized
that Israel believes that once Iran has nuclear capabilities,
other regional powers will immediately seek their own nuclear
weapons. Because of this danger, and the threat from Tehran
itself, Netanyahu urged Russia to cooperate on tougher
sanctions against Iran.
¶13. (C) The Israeli side, according to Rosenblit, was
pleasantly surprised at Russia's harsh tone on Iran which had
changed dramatically even since FM Lieberman's visit in
November. "We heard words from them that we've never heard
before," Rosenblit claimed, "and we aren't hearing the same
old arguments." Rosenblit credited this change to the
Iranians themselves, saying that their rejection of the TRR
proposal and their decision to enrich to 20 percent had
toughened Russia's stance on Iran. He remarked that just a
few months ago, there was concern in Israel that Iran would
divide the international community, but Iran's actions have
only served as a unifying factor. "Russia's understanding of
the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to ours than it was a few
months ago."
--------------------------
Ready to Discuss Sanctions
--------------------------
¶14. (C) On the issue of sanctions, Netanyahu reportedly
handed the GOR a list of areas where Israel felt sanctions
could affect change in Iran's behavior. The list included
restrictions on Iranian exports of energy products; Iranian
imports of refined petroleum products; the financial and
banking sectors; and, shipping and aerospace companies. He
noted that, while Russia was ready to discuss sanctions, the
two did not necessarily see eye to eye on the specifics.
Both sides did agree, however, that the UNSC had to agree on
sanctions. Rosenblit said that Russian officials do not
believe that unilateral sanctions will have the desired
effect. They believe that the international community has to
maintain united and either agree to impose or not impose
sanctions.
¶15. (C) Netanyahu encouraged Russia to be an example for
China regarding sanctions. Rosenblit said both Israel and
Russia had been working bilaterally with China to convince
them that it was time for a serious discussion on sanctions.
--------------------------------------------- --
S-300s: No Quid Pro Quo, but We Trust Medevedev
--------------------------------------------- --
MOSCOW 00000392 003 OF 003
¶16. (C) When asked about media reports citing Netanyahu
himself which suggested that Israel had agreed not to restart
arms deals with Georgia in exchange for Russia's continued
inaction on the S-300s contract with Iran, Lebedov noted
that, in spite of this statement, there had been no change in
the GOR's policy. He claimed that fulfillment of the S-300s
contract remained a political decision. He remarked that the
S-300 system was itself defensive in nature and could not be
used against another party, such as Israel.
¶17. (C) Rosenblit also would not acknowledge that a deal had
been made. Instead, he said that Netanyahu had reiterated
his trust in Medvedev regarding the S-300s. According to
Rosenblit, Netanyahu believes that Russia has taken "all
aspects of regional stability" into account when taking
decisions on the S-300s. Rosenblit did note that the S-300s
issue offered a window onto the different vectors in Russian
foreign policy, with the contradictory statements that their
delivery was imminent, and the delay being caused by
technical and political issues, coming just days before
Netanyahu's visit.
¶18. (C) Rosenblit said that neither Russia nor Israel was
linking the S-300 issue with arms sales to Georgia. Israel,
he claimed, as a Russian partner, was "listening attentively"
to Russia's concerns about weapons supplies to Georgia and
the effects this could have in the region. Israel has
friendly relations with Georgia but the Russian relationship
was also very important, he said. He indicated that both
sides were trying to come to an "understanding."
¶19. (C) Comment: The Russian media built up the Prime
Minster's visit as the final stage of Russia's
Abbas-Meshaal-Netanyahu trifecta of Middle East callers.
While both sides paid lip-service to MEPP issues, Iran was
the main agenda item. This reflects Netanyahu's priorities
and the GOR's belief that it is Washington's job, not
Moscow's, to pressure the Israelis on MEPP issues. Israel
came away pleased with Russia's changed posture on Iran, but
disappointed that its list of sanctions was too ambitious for
the GOR. Separately, the widely reported "quid-pro-quo" on a
mutual freeze of the Russian S-300 delivery for Iran and
Israeli military sales to Georgia could be a convenient
Israeli invention. While Israeli contacts say there is no
formal deal, Netanyahu's statements to the media created
enough speculation to put Russia in a corner. Should Moscow
eventually deliver the system to Iran, Israel has a pretext
to step up arms sales to Georgia.
Beyrle