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Viewing cable 93LIMA56, THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
93LIMA56 | 1993-01-04 22:51 | 2011-05-13 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: elcomercio.pe |
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF DEPA...
id: 594
date: 1/4/1993 22:51
refid: 93LIMA56
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL VOTING PATTERNS,
POVERTY LEVELS PROVED A MUCH BETTER PREDICTOR OF
VOTING TURNOUT IN THE NOVEMBER 22 CCD ELECTIONS
THAN DID THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO
TERRORIST GROUP. THE IMPACT ON ABSTENTIONISM OF
RELATIVE POVERTY WAS ALSO MUCH GREATER THAN ITS
IMPACT ON SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE
OAS RENDERED ITS VERDICT AND EIGHTEEN DAYS LATER
THAN PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD PROMISED,
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22
CONSTITUENT CONGRESS ELECTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED.
FOLLOWING IS A FIRST ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
POVERTY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO
ON VOTING TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
IN THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS (CCD) ELECTIONS.
POVERTY AND THE VOTE
--------------------
¶3. (C) BASED UPON DEPARTMENTAL VOTING FIGURES,
THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, ABSENTEEISM AND SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANALYZED USING
SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TECHNIQUES FOR
BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTIONS.
¶4. (C) IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT POVERTY AND
POLITICAL VIEWS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED IN THE
CASE OF PERU, POVERTY APPEARS TO HAVE A MUCH
GREATER IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO VOTE THAN IT
DOES ON WHICH CANDIDATE OR PARTY A VOTER CHOSES.
¶5. (C) TO LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, THE
VOTE IN DEPARTMENTS WITHIN WHICH 48 OF PERU'S 50
MOST IMPOVERISHED PROVINCES (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT
TO COUNTIES IN THE UNITED STATES) WAS COMPARED
TO THE REST OF PERU. WHEN ABSENTEEISM AND
SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S "NEW
MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" PARTY WERE COMPARED IN THE
MOST POOR AND LEAST POOR DEPARTMENTS, THE IMPACT
ON ABSTENTEEISM WAS MARKED. APPROXIMATELY 29.4
PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN NON-VOTING RATES
CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY THE
POVERTY FACTOR. IN CONTRAST, ONLY 10.8 PERCENT
OF THE DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR THE
GOVERNMENT'S "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE
CAN BE EXPLAINED BY ECONOMIC IMPROVERISHMENT.
¶6. (C) WHY DID RELATIVE POVERTY APPEAR TO HAVE
SUCH AN IMPACT ON THE VOTE? ALTHOUGH VOTING IS
COMPULSORY IN PERU, CHANGING ONE'S VOTING
LOCATION IS A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING
PROCESS. THE OPTION OPEN TO PERUVIANS IS TO NOT
VOTE AND EITHER PAY, OR HOPE TO EVADE THE 12
DOLLAR FINE FOR NON-VOTING. FOR THE POOR, WHO
HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY
EVENT, THE RISK OF THE FINE EVER BEING COLLECTED
IS MINIMAL. CONSTITUTIONS ARE SEE AS ABSTRACT
DOCUMENTS WITH LITTLE IMPACT ON DAILY LIFE.
THUS, IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION, IT APPEARS
THAT IRRELEVANCE COMBINED WITH ECONOMIC
NECESSITY COMBINED TO REDUCE VOTER TURNOUT IN
PERU'S POOREST AREAS.
THE SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE VOTE
---------------------------------
¶7. (C) MANY COMMENTATORS IN THE WAKE OF THE
NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION CONGRATULATED PERUVIANS FOR
DEFYING SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) THREATS AND
CASTING THEIR BALLOTS. IN 1992, APPROXIMATELY
25 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY WAS DECLARED TO BE IN
A STATE EMERGENCY. JUST UNDER HALF OF PERU'S
POPULATION (47.45 PERCENT) LIVED IN THESE
EMERGENCY ZONES. TWO WAYS TO MEASURE THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM ON THE VOTE WOULD BE TO LOOK AT
PERCENTAGES OF NON-VOTERS (THE FEAR FACTOR), OR
LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT (REJECTION
OF GUERRILLAS FACTOR) IN EMERGENCY ZONES VERSUS
AREAS DECLARED FREE OF SUBSTANTIAL GUERRILLA
INFLUENCE.
¶8. (C) WHEN NON-VOTING RATES IN DEPARTMENTS ALL
OR PART OF WHICH WERE DECLARED "EMERGENCY ZONES"
AS OF NOVEMBER 3 WERE COMPARED WITH DEPARTMENTS
WITHOUT EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 9.1 PERCENT OF THE
DIFFERENCE COULD BE STATISTICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR.
¶9. (C) WHEN THE DIFFERENCE IN VOTING RATES IN
DEPARTMENTS WHERE THERE WERE EMERGENCY ZONES IN
NOVEMBER WERE COMPARED TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN
ON THE LIST IN FEBRUARY, TEN MONTHS EARLIER, BUT
REMOVED IN NOVEMBER, NO STATISTICALLY SIGNFICANT
DIFFERENCES WERE DETECTED.
GUERRILLAS AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) IF THE ACT OF VOTING IS TAKEN AS A
HIGHLY SYMBOLIC STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO
TERRORISM, THIS SHOULD ALSO TRANSLATE INTO SOME
DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT.
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SL FOUNDER AND
LEADER ABIMAEL GUZMAN AND MUCH OF THE SL'S TOP
LEADERSHIP, MANY EXPECTED THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE
RECEIVED A SURGE OF SUPPORT. YET WHEN THE
PERCENTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT VOTE (SUPPORT FOR
THE "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE) IN
DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT ANY EMERGENCY ZONE IS
COMPARED SIMILAR VOTES IN DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT
EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 6.2 PERCENT OF THE
DIFFERENCE CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY
THIS VARIABLE. THE DIFFERENCE ESSENTIALLY
DISAPPEARS WHEN THE DEPARTMENTS WHICH HAD
EMERGENCY ZONES IN FEBRUARY ARE COMPARED TO THE
REST OF PERU. APPARENTLY, WHAT HAROLD WILSON
SAID ABOUT POLITICS ALSO APPLIES TO PERUVIAN
VOTERS' MEMORIES. THIS FINDING TALLIES WITH THE
RESULTS OF FOCUS GROUP ANALYSES WHICH A
GOVERNMENT POLITICAL CONSULTING FIRM PERFORMED.
THIS FIRM FOUND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE
INCREASINGLY THE FOCUS OF VOTER'S ATTENTION WITH
THE PRESUMED RESOLUTION OF THE GUERRILLA PROBLEM
FOLLOWING GUZMAN'S CAPTURE.
THE 1992 CONSTITUENT CONGRESS
-----------------------------
¶11. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL LIST OF
INDIVIDUALS ELECTED TO THE CONSITUTENT CONGRESS
IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTIONS:
PARTY - NAMES OF REPRESENTATIVES
"NUEVA MAYORIA- CAMBIO 90"
JAIME YOSHIYAMA TANAKA
LUZ SALGADO RUBIANES
CARLOS TORRES Y TORRES LARA
VICTOR JOY WAY ROJAS
ANDRES REGGIARDO SAYAN
MIGUEL VELIT NUNEZ
CARLOS BLANCO OROPEZA
JOSE GAMONAL CRUZ
GILBERTO SIURA CESPEDES
JAIME FREUNDT-THURNE
ANASTACIO VEGA ASCENCIO
REYNALDO ROBERTS BILLIG
MANUEL LA TORRE BARDALES
JUAN HERMOZA RIOS
MARTHA CHAVEZ COSSIO
JORGE NAKAMURA HINOSTROZA
DEMETRIO PASTIAS MELLA
CESAR FERNANDEZ ARCE
CARLOS FERRERO COSTA
MARIA LOZADA DE GAMBOA
ROMULO GUERRA AYALA
JORGE VELASQUEZ URETA
DANIEL ZEVALLOS RIOS
MIGUEL PAJARES RUIZ
HUGO ZAMATA AGUIRRE
OSWALDO SANDOVAL AGUIRRE
JUAN HUAMANCHUMO ROMERO
PABLO TELLO TELLO
JUAN CRUZADO MANTILLA
SAMUEL MATSUDA NISHIMURA
PEDRO VILCHEZ MALPICA
TITO CHAVEZ ROMERO
CARLOS LEON TRELLES
MARIA VICTOR ALFARO
JORGE FIGUEROA VIZCARRA
NICOLASA VILLAR MARTINEZ
GENARO COLCHADO ARELLANO
GAMANIEL BARRETO ESTRADO
PEDRO GARCIA SAAVEDRA
VICTOR MELENDEZ CAMPOS
CARLOS REATEGUI TRIGOSO
ROGER AMURUZ GALLEGOS
RICARDO MARCENARO FRERS
GUILLERMO YSISOLA FARFAN
"PARTIDO POPULAR CRISTIANO"
LOURDES FLORES NANO
ANTERO FLORES ARAOZ
ALEXANDER KOURI BUMACHAR
LUIS BEDOYA DE VIVANCO
XAVIER BARRON CEBREROS
CELSO SOTOMARINO CHAVEZ
HECTOR CRUZ ARRUNAATEGUI
MARIO OCHARAN ZEGARRA
"FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE MORALIZADOR"
FERNANDO OLIVERA VEGA
ERNESTO GAMARRA OLIVARES
CARLOS CUARESMA SANCHEZ
CESAR LARRABURE GALVEZ
JULIO CHU MERIZ
HUMBERTO SABUCETTI PEDRAGLIO
WILLY SERRATO PUSE
"RENOVACION"
RAFAEL REY REY
GONZALO ORTIZ DE ZEVALLOS
ENRIQUE CHIRINOS SOTO
JUAN CARPIO MUNOZ
FRANCISCO TUDELA VAN BREUGEL
JUAN CARRION RUIZ
"MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRACTICO DE IZQUIERDA"
GLORIA HELFER PALACIOS
HENRY PEASE GARCIA
JULIO CASTRO GOMEZ
JULIO DIAZ PALACIOS
"COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA"
JOSE BARBA CABALLERO
JORGE DONAIRE LOZANA
LUIS TORD ROMERO
JORGE TORRES VALLEJO
"FRENATRACA"
ROGER CACERES VELASQUEZ
PEDRO CACERES VELASQUEZ
JORGE VELASQUEZ GONZALES
"FREPAP"
MARIO PAREDES CUEVA
EUSEBIO VICUNA VASQUEZ
"SODE"
MANUEL MOREYRA LOREDA
"MOVIMIENTO INDEPIENTE AGRARIO"
GUSTAVO GARCIA MUNDACA
¶12. (C) COMMENT: BASED UPON A DEPARTMENTAL
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS, POVERTY
APPEARS TO HAVE HAD A MUCH STRONGER IMPACT ON
THE VOTING DECISION IN THE CCD ELECTIONS THAN
THE SENDERO. THE TERRORIST GROUP'S RELATIVE
LACK OF IMPACT ON THE VOTING MAY BE DUE IN PART
TO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. IT WAS WIDELY
BELIEVED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS THAT THE
SL CONSIDERED THE CCD ELECTIONS ESSENTIALLY
UNIMPORTANT. WHILE THE SL CONDUCTED A TERROR
BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN LIMA IN THE WEEK BEFORE THE
ELECTION, THE ATTACKS HAD TAPERED OFF SEVERAL
DAYS BEFORE THE VOTING. IF THE SL HAD HOPED TO
HAVE AN IMPACT IN NOVEMBER WITH THIS LAST MINUTE
EFFORT, IT APPARENTLY FAILED. IF THE GOVERNMENT
HAD HOPED TO RECEIVE A "GRATITUDE VOTE" FROM A
GRATEFUL POPULATION, IT TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED.
WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE
CCD, THE RESULTS REFLECT MOSTLY THEIR BETTER
ORGANIZATION AND FULLER COFFERS. CONTRIBUTING
TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY WAS ALSO HIGH
LEVELS OF OPPOSITION DISORGANIZATION AND POOR
TACTICAL DECISIONS BY APRA AND ACCION POPULAR TO
BOYCOTT THE ELECTION.
¶13. (C) THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
IN PERU IS CONSIDERED A SUB-FIELD OF LEGAL
STUDIES AND THIS TRADITIONAL, NON-QUANTATIVE
BENT IS REFLECTED IN THE ANALYSIS OF PERUVIAN
SOCIAL INVESTIGATORS. SINCE EMERGENCY ZONES DO
NOT, IN MOST CASES, CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS
COMPARING PRECINCT TALLIES WITH EMERGENCY ZONES
AND POVERTY WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE
EXACT NATURE AND IMPACT OF THESE VARIABLES.
¶14. (C) SUCH A DETAILED, QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS
MAY BE A LONG-TIME COMING. MOST OF THE
COMMENTARY THUS FAR PRODUCED BY PERUVIAN
POLITICIANS, INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICIANS
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION HAS BEEN
IMPRESSIONISTIC, HISTORICAL AND SUBJECTIVE. ONE
LONG-TIME STUDENT OF THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLAS
AND VOTING INSISTED TO POLOFFS DECEMBER 31 THAT
THE SL OBVIOUSLY HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE
NOVEMBER 22 VOTE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHE HAD NO
DATA OR ANALYSIS TO BACK UP HER GUT FEELING.
BRAYSHAW##
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