

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 00HARARE6677, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #00HARARE6677.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
00HARARE6677 | 2000-11-29 13:59 | 2010-12-08 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Harare |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
291359Z Nov 00
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1859
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z
ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00
CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00
EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00
H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W
------------------A54E38 291401Z /38
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7738
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
Wednesday, 29 November 2000, 13:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/29/10
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ZI, SA
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z OPPOSITION LEADER
REFTEL: HARARE 6584
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE MET MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI ON NOVEMBER 16. TSVANGIRAI OFFERED FOUR
SIPDIS SCENARIOS UNDER WHICH THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS COULD UNFOLD. HE BELIEVES A TRANSITIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS PITTING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR UNPOPULAR LEADER. MASS ACTION WILL BE CONSIDERED INITIALLY AT THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING NOVEMBER 24. MASS ACTION WOULD BE INTENDED TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MUGABE TO RESIGN. THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE SERIOUS RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MASS ACTION, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED, AND RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS IN THE COUNTRY’S BEST INTEREST TO AVOID BLOODSHED. EVERYONE IS FOCUSED ON SEEING MUGABE GO, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE A CONVERGENCE OF OPPOSITION FROM ZANU-PF, THE MILITARY, AND REGIONAL LEADERS TO FORCE HIM OUT. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) ON NOVEMBER 16, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE, HER DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD, DCM, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) HAD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI. TSVANGIRAI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MDC NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ISAAC MATONGO.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z
--------------------------------------
TSVANGIRAI LOOKS INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL
SIPDIS
--------------------------------------
¶3. (C) TSVANGIRAI BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE SEES THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN ZIMBABWE: LAWLESSNESS, THE LAND QUESTION, AND THE ECONOMY, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE ECONOMY IS THE MOST DIRE PROBLEM. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE (GOZ) IS TRYING TO POLARIZE THE POLITICAL PLAYERS IN THE COUNTRY. THE MDC LEADER SEES FOUR POTENTIAL SCENARIOS EMERGING FROM THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS: 1) THE PEOPLE WAIT 18 MONTHS TO VOTE MUGABE OUT--THIS IS THE MOST CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT LEAST LIKELY SCENARIO. 2) THERE IS AN ACCELERATED, BUT STILL CONSTITUTIONAL, PROCESS WHEREBY MUGABE RESIGNS OR IS EASED OUT AT THE DECEMBER ZANU-PF CONGRESS. THIS IS NOT VERY LIKELY EITHER SINCE MUGABE HAS OUSTED THE PROVINCIAL PARTY EXECUTIVES THAT MIGHT CHALLENGE HIS INTENTION TO RUN AGAIN IN 2002. 3) MASS ACTION IS UNDERTAKEN, FORCING MUGABE TO LEAVE THE SCENE EARLY. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT THIS OPTION MUST BE CAREFULLY
SIPDIS CONSIDERED, AND HE ASKED RHETORICALLY: DO WE WANT TO PUSH OUT AN ELECTED PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS TERM IS UP? 4) AN ARMY COUP THAT REMOVES MUGABE, POSSIBLY WITH A GREAT DEAL OF BLOODSHED, FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ZIMBABWE TO RECOVER.
¶4. (C) IDEALLY, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED, THE MDC WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS WHERE ZANU-PF REMAINED IN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT BROUGHT IN MDC MINISTERS--ESSENTIALLY, A CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE GOAL OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TO ARREST THE ECONOMIC DECLINE, RESTORE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN ZIMBABWE, AND ESTABLISH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION FIRST TO MAKE A COALITION GOVERNMENT MORE FEASIBLE, TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS
SIPDIS SHOULD BE BROAD-BASED AND WELL-CONSIDERED. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO GO THROUGH THAT PROCESS NOW. HE SAID THE ECONOMY IS THE PRIORITY ISSUE BECAUSE CONFIDENCE MUST BE RESTORED IN IT BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2002. IT DOESN’T MAKE SENSE TO TALK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION WHILE THE PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING.
---------------------------
MASS ACTION IS ON THE TABLE
---------------------------
¶5. (C) THE OPPOSITION LEADER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE COUNTRY CANNOT CONTINUE AS IT HAS FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS. WE KNOW THAT ZIMBABWE IS NOT LIKE YUGOSLAVIA, BUT THE PEOPLE ARE DEMANDING CHANGE BEFORE THE SITUATION GETS WORSE, HE PROFESSED. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MDC WOULD WAIT UNTIL 2002 FOR CHANGE, BUT THE ECONOMIC DECLINE IS SO STEEP THAT IF IT WAITS THAT LONG,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1865
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W ------------------A54E56 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7739 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR ZI SA
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
THERE WILL BE “NOTHING TO VOTE FOR” BY THE TIME THE ELECTION ARRIVES. THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL , AT LEAST INITIALLY, WILL MEET NOVEMBER 24 TO CONSIDER MASS ACTION. IF THE EXECUTIVE DECIDES TO CONDUCT A MASS ACTION, IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE IN THE FORM OF GENERAL STRIKE TO BEGIN IN MID-DECEMBER WHEN CHILDREN ARE HOME FROM SCHOOL AND BUSINESSES BEGIN TO CLOSE ANYWAY FOR THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY. THIS WOULD MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE POPULATION, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVES. (NOTE: THE MDC’S NATIONAL COUNCIL CANCELLED PLANS FOR MASS ACTION AT ITS NOVEMBER 24 MEETING. SEE REFTEL. END NOTE.) HE SAID THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE MAGNITUDE AND SERIOUSNESS OF MASS ACTION, AND IT HAS TRIED TO POSTPONE IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE POPULAR SENTIMENT IS TO DO IT. A GENERAL STAY-AWAY IS PREFERABLE TO CONFRONTATION SINCE IT IS NOT IN THE COUNTRY’S BEST INTEREST TO HAVE VIOLENCE OR BLOODSHED.
¶6. (C) ON THE GOZ’S REACTION TO A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN HARARE, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVED THE ARMY WOULDN’T HESITATE TO SHOOT A LOT OF PEOPLE. HE THOUGHT ITS REACTION WOULD BE LESS SEVERE IN OTHER CITIES LIKE BULAWAYO AND MUTARE, WHERE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IS MUCH FEWER AND THEIR LOYALTY TO MUGABE MORE QUESTIONABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SEES THE MILITARY AS DIVIDED. MUGABE HAS APPROPRIATED THE TOP BRASS FOR HIS OWN ENDS, AND THEY ARE LOYAL TO HIM. HOWEVER, THE BULK OF THE MILITARY’S LOWER RANKS DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT, TSVANGIRAI CLAIMED. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z
---------------------
HOW TO GET MUGABE OUT
---------------------
¶7. (C) THE MILITARY IS ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR INFLUENCES ON MUGABE, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED. THE OTHER TWO ARE ZANU-PF AND REGIONAL LEADERS. IF MUGABE IS TO BE PRESSURED TO LEAVE THE SCENE, ALL THREE MUST TURN AGAINST HIM, THE OPPOSITION LEADER DECLARED. WHEN ASKED WHAT ELSE MIGHT INDUCE MUGABE TO STEP DOWN, TSVANGIRAI SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL DO SO ONLY AFTER HE HAS HAD HIS REVENGE AGAINST THE WHITES AND ONLY AFTER HE HAS REIGNED IN ZANU-PF DISSIDENTS AND UNIFIED HIS PARTY. MUGABE IS A VINDICTIVE PERSON, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED. FOR ITS PART, THE MDC RECOGNIZES MUGABE AS THE NATION’S FIRST LEADER AND A VERY IMPORTANT ONE IN ITS HISTORY. THE MDC WON’T ENGAGE IN RETRIBUTION AGAINST MUGABE AND HIS SUPPORTERS, TSVANGIRAI HINTED, BECAUSE “WE CAN’T FOCUS ON THE PAST IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD.” WHILE MUGABE IS PRESIDENT, THE MDC LEADERSHIP WON’T MAKE PERSONAL COMMENTS ABOUT HIM, AS THAT WOULD JUST INFLAME THE SITUATION.
------------------------
ROLE OF REGIONAL LEADERS
------------------------
¶8. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASKED THE MDC LEADER ABOUT THE ROLE REGIONAL LEADERS COULD PLAY IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT AFTER INITIALLY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z SHOWING AMBIVALENCE TOWARD ZIMBABWE, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT MBEKI HAS RECENTLY STARTED TO TALK MORE FIRMLY AND IS SHOWING SIGNS HE WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE THE SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE. TSVANGIRAI MENTIONED THAT ON HIS LAST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA, HE MET WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MANDELA--WHO STILL EXERTS GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, HE STATED--AND URGED THE LEADER TO INTERVENE IN ZIMBABWE. HE DID NOT RECEIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM MANDELA, HOWEVER, AND DID NOT SEE MBEKI. ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT CHILUBA HAS BEEN DISTANT WITH THE MDC..
------------------------
MDC’S VIEW ON LAND ISSUE
------------------------
¶9. (C) ON THE LAND ISSUE, TSVANGIRAI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LAND REFORM WAS “UNFINISHED” BUSINESS AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY BY ANY GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. HOWEVER, EQUITY, LEGALITY AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY MUST BE KEYSTONES TO ANY SUCCESSFUL LAND REFORM PROGRAM. THE MDC SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAND COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND. THE MDC ALSO SEES THE 1998 DONORS CONFERENCE AS THE STARTING POINT FOR LAND REFORM, AND IT WOULD SUPPORT THE UNDP LAND INITIATIVE, THE OPPOSITION LEADER STATED. TSVANGIRAI SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS IN THE UK RECENTLY, HE TOLD THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1866
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W ------------------A54E5D 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7740 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PINR ZI SA
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
BRITISH TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE AND TO USE ITS INFLUENCE BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.
------------------------------------
ZIMBABWE NEEDS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION TO THE OPPOSITION LEADER. THE USG SEES HUGE RISKS--WITH FEW, IF ANY, UPSIDES--TO MASS ACTION, AND URGED THE MDC TO MANAGE THE POLITICAL TRANSITION CAREFULLY. WE HAVE URGED THE GOZ NOT TO USE LETHAL FORCE ON DEMONSTRATORS, AND WE URGE THE OPPOSITION NOT TO GET IN A SITUATION WHERE LETHAL FORCE MIGHT BE USED, THE SECRETARY SAID. THE USG ALSO WANTS TO ENCOURAGE THE MDC TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH MODERATES IN ZANU-PF, EVEN IF PRIVATELY. A/S RICE AFFIRMED THE USG’S WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE SUCH CONTACTS, IF DESIRED. SHE ALSO PUSHED THE MDC TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH ITS SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE IN PARLIAMENT, AND LAMENTED THE MDC FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET, DESPITE THE FINANCE MINISTER’S SOLICITATION OF MDC INPUT. SUCH ENGAGEMENT, RICE ARGUED, WOULD SHOW THAT THE MDC IS A SERIOUS AND CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO ZANU- PF. TSVANGIRAI, WHEN PRESSED, RELUCTANTLY TOOK THIS POINT ON BOARD.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z 11. (C) COMMENT: TSVANGIRAI WAS FRANK, CONFIDENT AND RELAXED. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CONVINCE US THAT THE MDC HAS A CLEAR OR WELL-THOUGHT-OUT PLAN FOR MASS ACTION OR WHAT IT WOULD ACCOMPLISH. HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THE MDC IS PINNING HOPE ON INTERNAL ZANU-PF MACHINATIONS TO FORCE MUGABE FROM POWER. HIS PUBLIC APPROVAL OF FINANCE MINISTER MAKONI’S BUDGET, AS REPORTED IN THE NOVEMBER 17 “THE DAILY NEWS,” MAY BE AN INDICATION OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE CREDIBLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. TSVANGIRAI IS CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PUBLIC TO LEAD A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. OTHER INTERLOCUTORS HAVE TOLD US THAT IF HE DOES NOT DO SO SOON, HE HIMSELF MAY BE FORCED FROM THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. NOW THAT THE QUESTION OF MASS ACTION IS MOOT FOR THE TIME-BEING, IT WILL BE UP TO TSVANGIRAI TO CHANNEL THE PEOPLE’S, AND HIS OWN PARTY MEMBERS’, FRUSTRATION INTO CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE. IF TSVANGIRAI CAN DO THAT, HIS POSITION WILL BE STRENGTHENED IMMEASURABLY, BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. END COMMENT.
¶12. (U) A/S RICE HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
MCDONALD
CONFIDENTIAL
>