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Viewing cable 06SOFIA202, UNDER THE YOKE: BULGARIA'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SOFIA202 | 2006-02-08 11:57 | 2011-04-29 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlbelene.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/04/29/1082317_mrusna_energiia/ http://wlcentral.org/node/1722 |
VZCZCXRO9830
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0202/01 0391157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081157Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1401
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000202
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2016
TAGS: ENRG ECON ETRD TRGY EINV EPET PREL SENV
SUBJECT: UNDER THE YOKE: BULGARIA'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS
REF: A) SOFIA 190 B) 05 SOFIA 2063
Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sixteen years after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria still finds itself under the Russian
energy yoke. Bulgaria receives 88 percent of its natural gas
from Gazprom or one of its sister companies, and 73 percent
of its oil from Russia. As it awaits entry into the EU,
Bulgaria still faces the fact that one country-supplier can
control whether the lights stay on. Minister of Economy and
Energy Rumen Ovcharov went to Moscow January 31 - February 1
to discuss the Belene Nuclear Plant, Burgas-Alexandropolous
(B-A) oil pipeline, and gas prices with Russian Energy
Minister Khristyenko. Upon return, he has publicly spoken
about the prospect of an even larger Russian energy presence
in Bulgaria if Russian firms are selected to build the
proposed Belene Nuclear Power Plant. In a possible quid pro
quo, he has also said Russia and Bulgaria have agreed that
the current subsidized gas delivery contract with Gazprom --
which the Russian side had insisted on revising -- will
continue unchanged for the time being. In addition, Ovcharov
announced that Russia, Bulgaria and Greece will meet in
Athens in March to discuss final details for the
Burgas-Alexandropolous pipeline. The GOB, with its neighbors
and soon-to-be EU partners, must come up with an energy
policy that diversifies its supply of primary fuels, without
burning any bridges to Russia, on which it will be dependent
for years to come. END SUMMARY
GAS: GAZPROM CALLING THE SHOTS
------------------------------
¶2. (C) Gazprom's recent attempt to reopen the contract it
negotiated in 1998 with Bulgaria has again highlighted
Bulgaria's need for strategic energy planning (Ref B).
Although Bulgaria drafted an energy policy in 2004 with the
aim of diversifying its sources, scant attention had been
paid to the issue until Gazprom's, New Years "surprises" here
and in Ukraine.
¶3. (C) In 2005, Bulgaria consumed 3.47 billion cubic
meters, of which 3 billion was imported from Russia. The
remaining amount was produced domestically, from dwindling
reserves. Bulgaria currently pays less than market prices
for the portion -- 40-50 percent -- of the gas it receives
from Gazprom in the form of transit fees for gas flowing to
Turkey, Greece and Macedonia. The transit price was fixed in
1998 at USD 83/1000 cubic meter. Bulgaria claims that for
the first few years of the contract, they lost USD 30 Million
at that price. Once energy prices began to rise, though,
Bulgaria began to enjoy the fruits of a contract that now
seems very shrewd. The agreement is complex; but the current
average price for all gas delivered to Bulgaria is approx.
USD 160-170 vs. a market price of USD 258. In December,
Gazprom began calling for renegotiation of the contract due
to the escalation in natural gas prices. Gazprom said it
would pay the transit fees in cash, and charge Bulgaria
market rates for all gas deliveries.
¶4. (C) GOB officials and private analysts told us the
sanctity of the 1998 contract could and should be respected.
If the EU backed up Bulgaria, it would send a strong message
to Russia not to meddle with previously agreed contracts.
Nevertheless, Bulgarian leaders privately worry that they
could "win the battle, but lose the war," as former Economy
and Energy Minister Milko Kovachev told us. When the current
contract runs out in 2010, Bulgaria will not only have to
contend with a potentially stronger Gazprom, but could be
faced with loss of revenue from its pipeline if Russia makes
good on its threat to build an additional Blue Stream route
in Turkey. GOB officials, including current Minister of
Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov, have told us they take
seriously the threat that Russia will go ahead with another
Blue Stream route, which could leave Bulgaria holding an
empty pipeline come 2010. This, more than any other piece of
Russian gas leverage, has forced the GOB to assess its
long-term strategic goals, rather than just seek short-term
pricing advantages.
¶5. (U) Upon his return from the Moscow meetings, Ovcharov
said Gazprom was pleased with Bulgaria for not slowing the
supply of natural gas to neighboring countries, and that the
current gas contracts will stay in place for the time being
) a victory of sorts for Bulgaria. But he also said that
the two sides discussed increasing the transit of natural
gas, as well as the involvement of Gazprom and other Russian
companies in various energy projects in Bulgaria. In a clear
SOFIA 00000202 002 OF 003
recognition of the unbalanced nature of the Bulgarian-Russian
energy relationship, Ovcharov said that Bulgaria, as a small
country, "cannot stand up to a giant like Gazprom" and
discuss natural gas in isolation from other energy projects.
¶6. (C) Ovcharov told the press that in Russia the two sides
discussed the option of jointly constructing an extension of
the current gas pipeline grid and possible Gazprom
participation in a future privatization of Bulgargaz, but
this would not happen until after EU-mandated changes in the
structure of Bulgargaz in 2007. These changes might help
Bulgaria resolve its current gas and transit fee dilemma, but
would lead to a much deeper reliance on Gazprom.
NABUCCO: BACK ON THE RADAR SCREEN
---------------------------------
¶7. (C) The prospect of continued dependence on Gazprom has
renewed Bulgaria's focus on a long-delayed alternative, the
Nabucco pipeline. In 2005 Austria's OMV, Hungary's MOL,
Romania's Transgas, Turkey's Botas, and Bulgaria's Bulgargaz
signed a joint-venture agreement to establish Nabucco. Each
of the partners would own a 20 percent stake. This pipeline
would bring jobs, transit fees and, most importantly to
Bulgaria, a non-Russian source of gas. However, it is still
in the discussion stage. There are outstanding questions
about where the gas would come from -- Iran, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, or other Caspian sources -- and whether Turkey
would first purchase the gas and re-sell it to the pipeline,
or allow it to transit through and just collect their own
fees. The Bulgarians complain that Turkey wants to play a
controlling role in both gas and oil supply, rather than
remaining "just" a transit country. In fact, Turkey and
Bulgaria can be seen as competitors in the gas/oil hub arena,
although Turkey, closer to the sources and much larger, has
an obvious advantage over Bulgaria.
¶8. (C) Ovcharov told us the earliest Nabucco will be
on-line is 2011-12, and even then the most likely potential
supplier ) Iran ) is not necessarily a more preferable
partner than Russia. Ovcharov said this in the context of
explaining why Bulgaria will need to improve its overall
relationship with Gazprom for both current contracts and for
other energy-sector projects. Nabucco, particularly with EU
support, could help Bulgaria diversify away from Russian
sources -- unless, of course, Gazprom purchases Bulgargaz.
OIL PIPELINES: B-A BACK IN PLAY
-------------------------------
¶9. (U) There are currently two oil pipelines under
consideration to run through Bulgaria: AMBO ) an
American-led consortium to carry oil of unspecified origin
from Burgas, Bulgaria, through Macedonia and on to Vlore,
Albania; and B-A, taking Russian oil from Burgas to
Alexandropolous, Greece. The current Bulgarian government
has not clearly indicated whether it will support one route
over another, or allow the market to take over the process.
Ovcharov, in remarks to Parliament on January 27, stated that
B-A is at a more advanced stage of development than AMBO.
Ovcharov said Russia and Bulgaria agree now is the time to
move B-A into the implementation stage. Specifics will be
discussed in a trilateral meeting in Athens in March.
Interestingly, Gazprom will also take part in the
construction of B-A, Ovcharov reported after his trip to
Moscow.
¶10. (C) However, we learned from Bulgaria's Minister of
Regional Development, Asen Gagauzov, that Russia recently
reneged on last year's three-nation agreement on equal
ownership in a consortium to build B-A, and is now pushing
for a 90 percent share, leaving Bulgaria and Greece with only
5 percent each. Gagauzov claimed Greece has already accepted
the deal, and the GOB is ready to concede as long as it can
be guaranteed ownership and control of the Universal Terminal
Burgas (UTB) ) the entry point for the oil. The GOB says it
does not want to build two terminals, in case both AMBO and
B-A are eventually built.
¶11. (C) American companies involved in B-A have told us
privately that they are strongly opposed to the current
structure of the UTB (the companies want the terminal to be
part of the pipeline, not separate) and route, and would not
participate under the current plan. However, if the GOB
brought in an international investor, that could change the
equation, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us. There are
also questions about the players involved in UTB and their
links to current and former high-ranking government
SOFIA 00000202 003 OF 003
officials. In the end, Amb. Beyrle has told Gagauzov and PM
Stanishev that the GOB needed to work with the private sector
regarding plans for UTB in order to get their buy-in. One
risk here for Bulgaria is that if the government puts too
many conditions on the structure of the project, it could
chase investors to other routes through Romania or Turkey.
¶12. (C) Successful completion of B-A would give Bulgaria a
more reliable supply of oil, and increase the government's
revenues from transit fees. However, with such a large
presence of Russian financing, construction and supply
interests, it would not help Bulgaria diversify its energy
sources.
AMBO MOVING SLOWLY
------------------
¶13. (C) There are conflicting views of whether AMBO is a
viable project. Ovcharov told Parliament that it is possible
if AMBO receives backing from a major power (i.e., the U.S.),
along the lines of Baku-Ceyan. Others feel the length and
cost of the project, not to mention the potential instability
of Macedonia and Albania, make AMBO less attractive as a true
Bosphorous bypass.
¶14. (C) Private sources have told us AMBO has not yet
signed up the international suppliers necessary to finalize
the project's financing. GOB energy officials told us AMBO
has not been active for months ) perhaps waiting to see how
B-A gets moving. Curiously, this is an area where the EU
might be more interested, former Energy Minister Kovachev
told us, due to the potential to bring oil right to Italy's
shores. AMBO, with US and/or EU participation, could
diversify Bulgaria's energy supplies -) particularly if the
oil comes from non-Russian (Kazahk) sources -- but there
needs to be some external interest from the oil suppliers as
well as a major governmental player for this to happen
anytime soon.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Bulgaria's leadership recognizes that their
dependence on one energy supplier ) even a historical friend
like Russia ) threatens its independence and prosperity. It
is likely Gazprom's threat to cut off supplies was a ploy to
get favorable concessions on other projects. Any move by the
GOB to allow Gazprom to reach further into Bulgaria's energy
market could ensure Bulgaria's gas supplies in the short
term, but weaken the country's ability to resist further
pressures from Gazprom and/or Russia. Bulgaria's
geographical position makes it a natural energy hub for
Southeastern Europe, bringing oil and gas from the East to
Europe and beyond, while continuing to export electricity to
the immediate region. The strategic challenge for the
Bulgarians is securing their hub position without mortgaging
too much of their future to Gazprom and Russia.
Beyrle