

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI9245, INDIA FACES GROWING NAXALITE MENACE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NEWDELHI9245.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05NEWDELHI9245 | 2005-12-08 08:36 | 2011-03-24 01:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1565519.ece |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 009245
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PHUM PTER KCRM ASEC SCUL IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIA FACES GROWING NAXALITE MENACE
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1274 B. CHENNAI 2761
Classified By: Political Counselor Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: Despite India's rapidly expanding economy, Naxalite groups in poor rural areas and their educated urban sympathizers continue to spread and have extended their areas of influence into 12 states, proving they can launch spectacular attacks on government facilities. The GOI has responded with the formation of an ""interstate joint task force,"" to enable state governments to devise a coordinated response. New Delhi has also committed 24 battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to counterinsurgency operations. Embassy contacts and many commentators are skeptical that the new initiatives will accomplish very much, as they do little to address the persistent economic and social problems underlying Naxalism. Indian economic development has missed large portions of the countryside. India's scheduled tribes (STs), and scheduled castes (SCs) who live in these remote areas, often face lives of desperation and view Naxalites as the only groups willing to defend them. There is no chance Naxalites could threaten the Indian state, and the GOI is unlikely to eradicate Naxalism through police action. The most likely prospect is a continuing and bloody stalemate. To end the conflict, the GOI would have to convince Naxalites to renounce violence and embrace parliamentary politics. This would entail ending violent attacks on those Naxalites who have already entered politics and enacting comprehensive land reform and other measures aimed at dismantling the rural feudal power structure than oppresses India's poorest citizens. There is little sign that the GOI is willing to take such steps. India's Maoists are closely eyeing events in Nepal, and if their Nepali comrades eventually give up armed struggle, it could encourage the Naxalites to do the same. Meanwhile in parts of the countryside the bloodletting continues. End Summary.
Naxal Activity Spreading
------------------------
¶2. (U) The Indian Home Ministry in its 2004-2005 Annual Report documented the spread and continued success of the Naxalite insurgency. According to the report, there are currently 9,300 full-time Naxalite fighters active in 118 districts and spread across 12 Indian states (Chattisgarh, Karnataka, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh). The insurgents are armed with 6,300 factory-made weapons (mostly WWII era bolt action rifles, supplemented by a few automatic weapons). The remainder are armed with ""country-made"" weapons, produced in rural gunshops of dubious reliability. Counter-insurgency experts estimate that every one Naxalite fighter is supported by four ""active sympathizers,"" who provide housing, food, money, weapons and other infrastructural support. Just two years ago, Naxalites were active in only 9 states and 76 districts. To date in 2005 some 510 persons have been killed in Naxalite violence, including over 90 security force personnel. The goal of the Naxalites is to create a ""revolutionary corridor"" from AP to Nepal, that will form the basis of a ""liberated zone"" governed by the Maoists (reftel). They currently administer areas in Jharkhand and AP where there is no GOI control and which provide safe-haven for Naxalite combat units.
¶3. (U) Experts concur with the GOI assessment that while Naxalite activity has spread over a wider geographic area, the number of violent attacks has remained constant. Increased tactical sophistication and the use of more lethal improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has pushed up the security force death toll, however. There have been a steady stream of Naxalite attacks throughout 2005. Some of the most notable include:
--November 2004 - 15 policemen killed in an Andhra Pradesh landmine attack.
--February 2005 - 38 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) killed in AP
--June 2005 - approximately 500 Naxalites attack the UP village of Madhuban destroying buildings, capturing weapons and killing several local policemen
--August 2005 - Naxalite murder of a member of the AP legislative assembly, his son and six others.
--August 2005 - 22 CRPF members killed in a Chattisgarh explosives attack.
--September 2005 - 15 police killed in Jharkhand
--November 2005 - Naxalites attack a Jharkhand police Training Center killing policemen and capturing 185 weapons
--November 2005 - an estimated 300 to 400 Naxalites attack the Jehanabad Prison in Bihar - killing several constables - freeing 341 inmates, including 20 members of the anti-Naxalite Ranvir Sena, whom they subsequently murdered.
Reasons for the Spread
----------------------
¶4. (U) Aggressive counterinsurgency operations by State police forces, supplemented by 24 battalions of the CRPF deployed by New Delhi, have failed to halt the spread of Naxalite activity. Experts agree that the Maoists are ahead of the game, adapting quickly to changed circumstances and growing in sophistication and capability since the September 2004 formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The formation of the banned CPI(Maoist), with the merger of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), has increased Naxalite capabilities, enabled intelligence sharing between formerly disparate Naxalite groups, increased the Naxalite support network, and allowed formerly localized groups to operate across state boundaries. The new party has implemented an extensive training program that has produced professional military-type cadres with improved tactics, better coordination, more sophisticated communication networks and better IEDs.
¶5. (C) Although Naxalites claim to represent the interests of India's oppressed Scheduled Castes (STs) and Schedule Tribes (STs), the leadership is almost entirely from the upper castes, including some highly educated individuals. The same applies to the extensive Naxalite support network, including above-ground organizations of educated middle class persons from academia, the media and the legal profession. As globalization and economic liberalization (neo-liberalism) expand in India, some within the largely middle-class anti-globalization forces disparage the Left Front (LF), a group of Communist and Socialist Parties who espouse parliamentary democracy and support the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from outside. They feel that the Naxalites are the only ""true"" leftists, who stand up for the oppressed SCs and STs. The Naxalite movement would not have been able to expand without this middle-class, above-ground support.
New Delhi's Response
--------------------
¶6. (U) The Home Ministry, frustrated by the inability of Naxalite effected states to mount a coordinated response, on September 19 called the administrative heads, senior officials and Chief Ministers of the 12 states together in New Delhi. The participants established an ""interstate joint task force"" to ""facilitate coordinated and synergized anti-naxalite operations across state boundaries,"" and ""strengthen intelligence networks."" Home Minister Shivraj Patil hailed the meeting, claiming that it would foster a ""multi-track approach,"" rather than merely treating Naxalism as a law-enforcement problem. Patil emphasized that the new approach would work to develop the local economies in the effected areas, ensure political and social justice for the SCs and STs, and ""as a last resort"" act against those Naxalites who continue to insist on committing acts of violence.
An Opposition Viewpoint
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Telegu Desam MP M. Jagannath represents an AP constituency with a large ST population in which Naxalites are quite active. Although he is in the opposition, he supported many of the views expounded by Home Minister Patil, but urged the Indian state to go much further. In a December 2 conversation with Poloff, Jagannath emphasized that the Naxalite problem is inherently political, and cannot be solved with a purely law and order approach. He pointed out that India's STs and SCs often live in the grip of feudalism, that in India's more backward areas the ""feudals"" are usually supported by the high castes, and local police do the bidding of the feudal/high caste nexus, leaving STs and SCs helpless. India's rural underclass, he noted, face an unrelenting cycle of poverty, unemployment and atrocities, including the rape of wives and daughters. Seeing no other option, the STs and SCs often turn to the Naxalites, who provide them the means to exact revenge and reverse their economic status.
¶8. (C) Jagannath urged the GOI to tackle the Naxalite problem by providing employment and subsidized loans to poor SCs and STs and investing in genuine rural development programs, including extensive land reforms aimed at breaking the back of the feudals. Jagannath blamed the AP government for the breakdown of negotiations with the Naxalites there, pointing out that to show ""progress"" in the anti-Naxalite campaign, state police forces have picked up innocent tribals, murdered them and claimed they were Naxalites killed in ""encounters.""
The View from the Left
----------------------
¶9. (C) Journalist and political activist AS Verma, himself a former Naxalite, told Poloff on December 2 that the GOI's September 19 meeting was little more than political theater and would do nothing to stop the spread of Naxalism. He pointed out that LK Advani had pursued a similar policy as Home Minister in the previous NDA government, when Naxal activity was confined to only four states. Verma accused the GOI of inherent hypocrisy, in that it claims that Naxalism is a ""social problem,"" but then relies on a law and order solution. In Verma's estimation, the UPA will rely more on the police than the NDA. This is because the LF, which keeps the UPA in power, is a sworn enemy of the Naxalites, as the CPI(M) used harsh police methods to crush Naxalism in West Bengal.
¶10. (C) Verma urged the GOI to differentiate between revolutionaries and terrorists. Terrorists, he emphasized, have no mass base, while Naxalites have a popular following throughout India. The Naxalites, unlike terrorists, target their violence and do not engage in mass killing of innocents. This was demonstrated in Jehanabad, when they warned civilians to remain indoors and assured them they would not face attack. Verma emphasized that the GOI must stop jailing illegally leftist activists who speak out on behalf of STs/SCs, especially those that are landless laborers and poor peasants, and should release those currently in illegal detention. Arguing that India is basically a ""criminalized state,"" he noted that the left parties and Naxalites are the only parties in India that are not corrupt and entrenched with criminal mafias.
¶11. (C) Verma urged Poloff not to take Naxalite assertions of eternal class war at face value. In his estimation, Naxalite violence is a bargaining tool and a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Saying that ""this is not the 1960's and there is no possibility of a violent overthrow of the Indian state,"" Verma insisted that the Naxalites want to see a negotiated settlement, an end to violence, and their acceptance as above-ground political parties. The GOI should hurry this process along by declaring a cease-fire, and ending violent attacks against the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), the above-ground political party formed by former Naxalites.
Comment - Naxalism as Prelude to Bargaining
-------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Naxalites cannot overthrow the government of India, and are unlikely ever to control more than a few remote areas of the country. Likewise, the GOI is unlikely to eradicate Naxalism, as the crushing poverty, lingering feudalism and inherent discrimination of Indian society has nurtured desperation that finds its only outlet through violence. Without a radical change of tack by both sides, the most likely outcome is an extended stalemate that can only grow bloodier as the Naxalites acquire more sophistication and better weapons. While the security forces can gain the upper hand in some Naxalite areas, they can expect to suffer reverses in others. Three factors hold the key to an eventual solution: events in Nepal, the development of India's left parties, and the nature of Indian economic development.
¶13. (C) India's Naxalites are watching events in Nepal closely. Nepal is a small and largely homogeneous state, with an entrenched feudal class, weak central government, and a desperately poor rural underclass, which provides much better conditions for a Maoist revolution than India. If Nepal's Maoists eventually give up armed struggle and come to a negotiated settlement, it will provide the impetus to India's Maoists to do the same, as the chances for a Maoist victory in India are much less than in Nepal. Some leftists, such as Verma, argue that Indian Maoists are well aware that they cannot win a class war, and intend to negotiate a settlement when conditions are right. A negotiated outcome in Nepal would provide a further impetus.
¶14. (C) The Communist Party of India (Marxist) is India's leftist flagship and remains a committed enemy of the Naxalites. CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat dismisses the Naxalites as ""adventurists"" whose ""politics rely on anarchic violence directed at individuals and ordinary people."" Karat argues that Naxalite violence only invites state repression, hurting the very people it intends to help. He has pledged the CPI(M) to ""counter politically and ideologically the false posturing of such 'revolutionary' activities."" The fledgling CPI(ML) is committed to bringing the Naxalites out of the underground and into parliamentary democracy, but faces opposition from both the LF and the GOI. In order for India's Naxalites to renounce violence, the GOI would have treat the CPI(ML) as a legitimate political party and provide reformed Naxalites an opportunity to join and agitate on behalf of STs and SCs.
¶15. (C) Desperation often drives Naxalism. The onus is on the GOI to demonstrate to India's have-nots that it is crafting an economic development program that is genuinely aimed at alleviating this desperate situation. As long as India's political parties and elites are willing to accept the status quo and not take on feudal interests, the stalemate and the violence will continue.
MULFORD