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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS517, THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA; PART I: COULD THEY
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VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0517/01 0391547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081547Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7004
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0624
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000517
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL KDEM SY
SUBJECT: THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA; PART I: COULD THEY
WIN AN ELECTION HERE?
REF: 05 DAMASCUS 1377
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (U) This is the first of two cables that assess the
potential political influence of the Muslim Brothers in
Syria.
¶2. (U) PART I. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
POWER; CONSTRAINTS ON MB INFLUENCE
¶3. (C) Summary: In the wake of former VP Khaddam's
flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood's exiled leadership in
January, and Hamas's recent electoral victory in the
Palestinian territories, many observers of the Syrian
political scene are asking themselves what kind of political
power (or potential) the Muslim Brotherhood and other
Islamist elements have here in Syria. While there has been a
rise in Islamism (with some fundamentalism) in Syria in the
past 20 years, we assess that the potential political
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been
exaggerated. Putting aside likely continued SARG opposition,
the most striking constraint on the potential appeal of any
repackaged Muslim Brotherhood grouping is the heavy minority
make-up (35 percent) of the Syrian population that is
generally opposed to any Islamist domination. End Summary.
¶4. (C) TALKING ONLY THEORETICALLY: It is difficult to
assess clearly the potential power of the Muslim Brothers at
a time when the Asad regime has destroyed the movement and
engages in ongoing repression (and reinforcement of the
exiled status of the MB's leadership) to ensure they are not
able to rebuild. It is also difficult to assess their
potential support relative to other political currents in
Syria, such as pan-Arabism, Syrian nationalism, and
Ba'athism, given the current lack of free and fair elections.
When asked about the power of the Muslim Brothers,
interlocutors often inquire whether one is considering a
situation "of full democracy" or one in which the regime
still controls elections and the political environment. In
free and fair elections, some type of Islamist political
current would almost certainly play a major role in Syria,
although it is doubtful that the Muslim Brothers could
reconstitute themselves to assume that role, given present
conditions.
¶5. (C) VARIOUS SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER: Observers assert that
if the regime were still in control of the electoral process
but wanted to make a show of free elections, it would
manipulate the situation, as in Egypt, to win and to show
that their chief rivals were extremist MB-type Islamists.
Some note, in addition, that a sudden collapse of the Asad
regime, possibly caused by outside intervention, might
remove some of the natural restraints on an MB resurgence.
The result could be a sudden spike in MB/radical Islamist
power, which would likely be nourished by the group's
takeover -- from discredited collaborationist Islamic clerics
-- of the extensive network of mosques and other Islamic
institutions present in Syria. The more likely scenario for
the 2007 elections is that the regime allows new political
parties but prohibits any based on religion (or ethnic
factors), preventing an Islamist bloc from forming, whether a
conservative, MB-dominated one or a more moderate Islamic
bloc exluding the MB (and possibly allied with some Sunni
businessmen).
¶6. (C) MB PARTY ORGANIZATION COMPLETELY DESTROYED: The
influence of the Muslim Brothers is limited nowadays because
they are weak on the ground in Syria. The SARG destroyed
their political organization in the early 1980's and they
have not recovered because of ongoing SARG repression. An
entire network of competing Islamic institutions and
personalities now exists in Syria, which would oppose any
reasserting of Muslim Brother influence, noted moderate
Islamist and MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (although many in this
network, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, support allowing the MB to return
to Syria). In addition, the efforts of Muslim Brother
leaders in exile to moderate their positions to make them
more politically attractive in Syria (and less threatening to
minorities and to the regime) has reinforced a perception
that they are opportunistic, cannot be trusted, and will say
anything to augment their influence. Their recent flirtation
with former Syrian VP Khaddam has reinforced this widely
shared perception of their opportunism.
¶7. (C) OTHER CONSTRAINING FACTORS: In addition to SARG
repression, there are some natural constraints on the ability
of Islamist groups like the MB to dominate Syrian politics.
There is a developed tradition of nationalist politics in
Syria, some of it pan-Syrian, some of it pan-Arab, some of it
practiced by former communists. Much of it has been
dominated in the past by, for example, Christian political
figures and intellectuals. Hence, there is a tradition of
minority politicians attracting Sunni Arab voters, according
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a Christian MP from Damascus who depends on
Sunni Arab voters for some of his mandate. (Note: He
belongs to an offshoot of the secular Syrian Socialist
Nationalist Party.) Political dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX put it
somewhat differently to PolChief, noting that "our society is
predominantly Islamic, but our politics have always been
diverse. I am a Sunni, but a Communist."
¶8. (C) THIRD OF POPULATION ANTI-ISLAMIST MINORITIES: Most
observers assess that the potential power of the Muslim
Brothers (and other similarly inclined Islamist political
groups) in Syria will also be constrained because of Syria's
population mosaic. They note that minorities constitute at
least 35 percent of the Syrian population. Although 75
percent of the population is Sunni, ten percent of that total
is Kurdish, rather than Arab. The Kurdish population, in
general, identifies more with strains of Kurdish nationalism
than with Sunni politics and considers itself part of the
minority population of Syria, along with Christians (ten
percent), Druze (three percent), Alawites (12 percent), and
smaller groups, including Shiites, Ismailis, Yazidis, and
others. In greater Damascus alone there are some one million
Christians, representing 20 percent of that important
population center.
¶9. C) Although some of these minorities are Muslim, all
oppose Sunni Arab domination and would not support any
conservative Islamist political current dominated by a group
like the Muslim Brotherhood. (Note: In the Palestinian
territories, by point of contrast, where Hamas, an offshoot
of the Muslim Brothers, recently won an overwhelming
political victory, Sunni Arabs make up some 97 percent of the
Palestinian population.)
¶10. (C) CLEAVAGES IN ANY ISLAMIST BLOC?: Politicians and
other observers disagree about the potential level of support
for an Islamist bloc. Some, such as MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, posit
relatively high overall potential support for overtly Islamic
political alternatives (up to 50 percent of potential
voters), while others, like former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, provide
lower assessments of the size of any potential Islamic
current. Nonetheless, many point to significant cleavages
within this potential bloc of (largely Sunni Arab) voters.
XXXXXXXXXXXX points to divisions between conservative Muslims,
reform-oriented Muslims, secular Sunnis, and a tiny segment
(one percent or less) of fundamentalists (with only a
minority of them advocating violence). Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX (and former political prisoner) XXXXXXXXXXXX say that fundamentalists probably represent a larger
group, perhaps as much as ten percent of the total, but
concur that significant cleavages exist and that elections
would compel competition among these groups for Muslim
voters.
¶11. (C) MUSLIM-MINORITY COALITIONS CREATING SPLITS?: There
is also a long tradition in Syrian politics of Sunni
politicians straddling cleavages between these different
Muslim tendencies, for individual political gain, and a
related tradition of these politicians building individual
coalitions with non-Muslim voting blocs (who would oppose any
Sunni Islamist domination). These traditions, according to
former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (a Sunni politician well-practiced in both
traditions), could exacerbate existing cleavages in any
potential Islamist bloc.
¶12. (C) SYRIAN POLITICAL TRADITION ALSO A LIMITING FACTOR:
Modern Syrian political history and tradition also point away
from any MB/radical Islamist takeover in future elections.
While the MB or their forerunners have been around in Syria
since the 1920's, they have never been very successful in
Syrian politics, and certainly have never come close to
attaining a majority in any election, note observers such as
historian XXXXXXXXXXXX and dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX. Also,
Sunni political and business elites, who tend to have
community influence through their employment power and
prestige far beyond their actual numbers, have no tradition
of supporting calls for the full implementation of Sharia law
or the formation of an Islamic state. Finally, there is no
history of a decades-long foreign military occupation of the
type endured by Palestinians that would radicalize the Syrian
population, added XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶13. (C) AS IS DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN SYRIA: In addition,
Islam in modern Syria (unlike in neighboring Turkey, with its
decades-long Kemalist tradition in the early 20th century of
official suppression of Islam) has been allowed to flourish
and develop at its own pace, notes xxxxxxxx. This has allowed
moderate, dissident, and skeptical tendencies within the
Islamic community to develop and provide buffers against
radical Islamic doctrine. There have also been no violent
societal upheavals, of the kind that Iraq has recently
witnessed, that would encourage frightened, mass lurches
towards more extreme Islamic tendencies, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
SECHE