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Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS141, KHADDAM, UNIIIC, AND A POSSIBLE CABINET RESHUFFLE
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0141/01 0091342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091342Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6542
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0572
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: KHADDAM, UNIIIC, AND A POSSIBLE CABINET RESHUFFLE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (C) Summary: Polchief met January 8 with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a long-standing Embassy contact, who described
possible motives for the interviews being given by former
Syrian VP Khaddam, as well as increased Alawite
dissatisfaction with President Asad. XXXXXXXXXXXX also described
a threatening outburst by Syria's former Military
Intelligence Chief in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, possibly
under stress from being informed that UNIIIC wants to
re-interview him in Vienna in the coming days. XXXXXXXXXXXX
suggested that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad will agree to
be interviewed in some form by UNIIIC, noting that Syria has
no choice but to cooperate. Despite the crisis related to
Khaddam and UNIIIC developments, or partially even in
reaction to them, the regime is still considering a Cabinet
reshuffle in the month after the impending Eid holidays, said
XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.
¶2. (C) KHADDAM STRATEGY: XXXXXXXXXXXX described the Khaddam
interviews as "a card being played now" largely because of
developments in Lebanon. In his view, Sa'ad Hariri and the
Saudis calculated that "the March 14 forces" in Lebanon were
demoralized after the second Mehlis report. At the same
time, Hizballah looked to be headed into a dangerous alliance
with the Aoun camp. The Khaddam card was played to
strengthen the March 14 forces. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the
SARG is convinced that the Saudis, or some group of the royal
family, are definitely involved with Khaddam and have been
plotting secretly for months to oust the Asad regime. (For
XXXXXXXXXXXX remarks on the Saudis and Asad's January 8 visit to
Jeddah, see septel).
¶3. (C) While playing the Khaddam card now made sense from
the Lebanese angle, it did not mean that Khaddam had
calculated his own interests accurately, assessed XXXXXXXXXXXX.
In his view, Khaddam may have moved prematurely and escalated
things too quickly. "What can he possibly say now" to keep
his attacks going, asked XXXXXXXXXXXX. It is understandable,
nonetheless, that Khaddam is moving quickly, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, noting
that for Khaddam to have any influence, he needs things to
develop in Syria while his reputation as a key former regime
(and Sunni) figure is still imposing.
¶4. (C) IS IT WORKING? XXXXXXXXXXXX also questioned whether
Khaddam "is betting on real horses." The Syrian street is
not ready to move at all, and certainly not behind any
Khaddam-led movement. He cannot lead any "Orange Revolution"
here, added XXXXXXXXXXXX. There is "significant flux" in the
Syrian military, however, something that has become tangible
to close observers in the past few weeks, insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted one well-placed, very senior observer (but did not
name him), who said that the situation in the Syrian military
"is not good at all, not like it was, even a month ago" a
statement XXXXXXXXXXXX took to mean that things are not stable and
that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the regime and
its leadership.
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also pointed to significant recent signs of
growing dissatisfaction and unease in the Alawite community
with Bashar al-Asad and the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted a recent
cultural event at which some of the most distinguished
Alawites in Damascus were gathered. A prominent XXXXXXXXXXXX
actor, XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close relative to former senior
officials in the regime, "trashed" Asad in front of a group
of forty people, calling him indecisive and guilty of
catastrophically bad decision-making. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that such
an outburst in public against the president in such a crowd
would have been unheard of, even a few weeks ago.
¶6. (C) UNIIIC INVESTIGATION: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, two of
the five suspects previously interviewed in Vienna, Rustom
Ghazaleh and Colonel Samih Qashami, were scheduled to return
presently to Austria for further questioning. XXXXXXXXXXXX
expected that the two would be arrested there or immediately
upon their return to Damascus. Perhaps sensing that the end
was near, an armed Ghazaleh and several similarly armed
bodyguards charged into a meeting at the MFA in early
January, attended by XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX.
The purpose of the meeting had been for the five suspects to
sign some routine retainer papers for lawyers arranged for
them by the MFA. While Ghazaleh did not pull his weapon, he
shouted in an insulting, threatening manner, calling XXXXXXXXXXXX
and XXXXXXXXXXXX "agents for the Americans" and insisting that only
he was standing up for Syria's interests. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the
tense confrontation lasted for much of an hour, with MFA
guards coming to ask Ghazaleh to remove his weapon. (He
refused.) There was a real sense that Ghazaleh was capable
of shooting himself or others, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, still unnerved
by the incident several days later. Ghazaleh seemed severely
depressed and unbalanced, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. Eventually the
President's office was called and informed of the incident.
XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted Asad as saying that Ghazaleh should be
compelled to apologize. So far no apology has been
forthcoming.
¶7. (C) The other suspects told XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX afterwards
that Ghazalah had been encouraged to act in such a manner by
SMI head Asif Shawkat. XXXXXXXXXXXX surmised that Ghazaleh was
attempting to obtain some assurances from the regime in
advance of any return trip to Vienna. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that
after any arrest of Ghazaleh, the role of Shawkat is likely
to become much more prominent and problematic, with a
possible regime crisis, as Shawkat would sense the noose
tightening. An arrest of Ghazaleh also might spark unrest in
Dara'a, the Sunni population center closest to Ghazaleh's
hometown, thought XXXXXXXXXXXX. There is a persistent feeling in
such Sunni areas "that the Alawites are robbing the country
and the Sunnis are paying for it."
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that the SARG has no choice but to
continue cooperating with UNIIIC. This included allowing
UNIIIC to interview Asad, although the SARG would not admit
it at first. Some type of "face-saving formula" would be
developed, thought XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Comment: Other contacts are
divided about whether Asad would be cooperative on this
point. An Egyptian diplomat repeatedly pointed out to
Polchief that it would be unprecedented for a sitting head of
state to sit down to such an interrogation and expressed
incredulity that the UNSC would insist on this.
XXXXXXXXXXXX, on the other hand,
insisted to Emboffs January 8, based on his conversations
with Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, that Asad
would agree eventually to an interview with UNIIIC.)
¶9. (C) KHADDAM CRISIS AND CABINET RESHUFFLE RUMORS: Despite
the crisis related to Khaddam and UNIIIC developments, or
partially even in reaction to them, the regime is still
considering a Cabinet reshuffle in the month after the
January 10-13 Eid holidays, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He recounted an
extended discussion he had at the MFA, also in early January,
with Ba'ath Party Regional Command National Security Office
head Hisham Ikhtiyar and Party Regional Secretary Mohammed
Said Bukhaytan (on the margins of another meeting) about such
a reshuffle and other actions the SARG would take on the
domestic front to confront the current crisis. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
they described the current government as non-functioning,
frozen to a significant degree over the deadlock between
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari
and the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, led by Finance
Minister (and Dardari rival) Mohammed al-Hussein. Despite
Hussein's significant support, Dardari would not be pushed
out of a new government. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX summary of
the conversation, reform issues aside, Dardari is now viewed
as "representing the Sunnis," and hence had become
indispensable for the regime in the current crisis. Hussein
(also a Sunni) was viewed as more dispensable. (Note: Other
contacts are divided about the prospects for such a reshuffle
in the coming weeks. XXXXXXXXXXXX,
a confident of Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, told
Emboffs he too believed it was imminent, even post-Khaddam
interview, while XXXXXXXXXXXX said
Khaddam had frozen any movement towards the reshuffle.)
¶10. (C) In addition to a possible reshuffle, the two
Regional Command officials indicated that the government was
discussing (again) granting nationality to stateless Kurds, a
new political parties law, a freer media policy, and
concessions on reform (and appointments) that would please
the Damascene business class, and greater participation by
Sunnis in a new government. While XXXXXXXXXXXX thought a cabinet
reshuffle likely, he discounted much action on these other
issues.
¶11. (C) COMMENT: The Khaddam media campaign in Paris
continues to provoke tremendous interest and speculation
here. With every new theory emerging about his motives,
sense of timing, plans and partners, it becomes more clear
that observers do not have a very clear sense about what
Khaddam is up to. The impact he seems to be having on the
UNIIIC investigation is probably the pressure point that most
concerns the regime right now. Already Khaddam seems to have
put a smug, confident Bashar al-Asad on the defensive, as he
faces an unexpected summons to be questioned by UNIIIC
investigators. Even if the more grandiose ambitions that
seem to be lurking behind Khaddam's action prove to be
unrealistic, given the weak opposition here and Khaddam's
lack of political support, the UNIIIC angle he is relying on
seems to be an effective instrument for getting back at Asad
and his regime.
SECHE