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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09QUITO15, WHITHER CORREA: A SHIFT FURTHER LEFT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO15 | 2009-01-14 00:18 | 2011-04-13 17:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/12/1/1355/cable-186986.html |
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0015/01 0140018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH(CCY AD1B8B49 MSI7873-695)
O 140018Z JAN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9851
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7912
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4066
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3335
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 2976
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0155
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4021
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0041
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0025
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171
id: 186986
date: 1/14/2009 0:18
refid: 09QUITO15
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 08QUITO1047|08QUITO1115|08QUITO1128|08QUITO1145|08QUITO1146|08QUITO1162|08QUITO327|08QUITO442|08QUITO723|08QUITO963|09QUITO1|09QUITO10
header:
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0015/01 0140018
ZNY SSSSS ZZH(CCY AD1B8B49 MSI7873-695)
O 140018Z JAN 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9851
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7912
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4066
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3335
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN LIMA 2976
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0155
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4021
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0041
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0025
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T QUITO 000015
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGE IN CLASSIFICATION)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2034
TAGS: PREL EFIN PGOV SNAR MARR EAID EC VE CU IR
RS, CO
SUBJECT: WHITHER CORREA: A SHIFT FURTHER LEFT
REF: A. QUITO 10
¶B. 08 QUITO 963
¶C. 08 QUITO 1115
¶D. 08 QUITO 1145
¶E. 08 QUITO 1146
¶F. 08 QUITO 1162
¶G. 08 QUITO 1128
¶H. QUITO 01
¶I. 08 QUITO 327
¶J. 08 QUITO 442
¶K. 08 QUITO 723
¶L. 08 QUITO 1047
Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1.4 (D)
¶1. (C) Summary: President Correa's rhetoric and actions in
the last two months have veered off the pattern we witnessed
during much of his earlier presidency. A harder left
orientation is evidenced by his trips to Iran and Cuba, debt
default, and sharp attacks on the U.S. In the past, while
conceding enough to keep his far-left political bases happy,
he acted pragmatically more often than not, and aside from
the aftermath of the March 1 Colombian incursion only
occasionally criticized the U.S. The reasons behind this
shift remain murky. We are advising the GOE of the
consequences of its actions (Ref A). End Summary.
LURCH TO THE LEFT
¶2. (C) Over the past two months, Correa has taken an
increasingly leftist, anti-American posture, apparently
unconcerned that his actions would result in frayed ties with
the United States:
-- Last week in Havana, Correa demanded that the "Empire" end
its blockade (sic) of Cuba, calling U.S. policy absurd. He
accused the "Empire" of ethnocide (apparently meaning
destruction of a people's culture) and criticized the
"perverse injustice" inflicted upon the five Cuban spies
imprisoned in the U.S. Correa declared himself an
unconditional ally of Cuba. He commended the Cuban
revolution's achievements, claiming it had succeeded in
ensuring human rights for all Cubans. He called for an
Organization of Latin American States that would include Cuba
and exclude the U.S. Ecuador and Cuba signed nine
cooperation agreements in the areas of science and
technology, health, education, and culture, among others.
-- Correa closed out 2008 by inviting the ambassadors of
Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Iran, China and Russia for a
December 30 New Year's luncheon, a slap in the face for the
rest of the diplomatic corps.
-- The President's office continued to defer the Ambassador's
request for a meeting, which Correa had agreed to when she
presented credentials on October 2 (Ref B). Two close
presidential advisors promised to arrange such a meeting for
December (Ref C), but it has still not transpired.
-- Changes at the Foreign Ministry are expected to make it
more ideological. Correa appointed Proud and Sovereign
Fatherland (PAIS) movement co-founder Fander Falconi as
Foreign Minister December 15 (Ref D), saying the Government
had been naive to focus on commercial and not geopolitical
matters. The Legislative Commission is likely to approve an
Executive-proposed bill that would allow political appointees
below the ministerial level in the MFA, including as Vice
Minister, Under Secretaries, and Directors General. Correa
defended this move, "We want to politicize the foreign
service in the positive sense, meaning that it reflect the
foreign policy of a democratically-elected government."
-- Correa decided to default on part of the country's
commercial debt on December 13 (Ref E).
-- During his December 5-9 trip to Iran, Correa railed
against U.S. imperialism and condemned IAEA and UN Security
Council policies and resolutions related to Iran (Ref F). He
has approved Iran establishing a fully accredited Iranian
embassy in Quito.
-- The GOE welcomed Russian FM Lavrov on November 27,
discussing trade and military cooperation.
-- Correa aligned Ecuador more closely with the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) by attending its meeting
in Venezuela on November 26, although still without becoming
a full member. He sought and obtained the group's support
for Ecuador's position on foreign debt. (In parallel, he
also sought support from more moderate governments in the
region.)
¶3. (C) We see only a few items on the positive side of the
ledger in the past two months. The most notable was that
Ecuador hosted a cordial and constructive first Bilateral
Dialogue meeting on November 24 (Ref G). In addition, the
MFA responded positively on December 30 to our diplomatic
note on Military Group activities during 2009. In regard to
U.S. investment, the GOE paid an arbitral award to Duke
Energy on December 16 (Ref H) and is close to making payment
to Machala Power, in which case Machala Power would lift its
arbitration case (septel). Although not a new development,
it is also worth noting that USAID, DEA and most other USG
programs continue unimpeded.
AN EARLIER ROUND OF ANTI-AMERICANISM
¶4. (C) The U.S. first moved into Correa's crosshairs after
Washington defended Colombia's March 1, 2008 incursion into
Ecuador, which prompted Correa to allege participation by the
United States and make his first call for an Organization of
Latin American States. The low point of the period was in
early April 2008 when Correa charged that the CIA had taken
over Ecuadorian intelligence services and suggested the CIA
might be out to kill him (Ref I).
¶5. (S/NF) During the summer and early fall of 2008, the
GOE's actions were mixed, giving us hope that the fallout
from the Colombian incursion did not signal a permanent shift
further to the left and against the U.S. Among the
encouraging developments was that Correa largely retreated
from harshly criticizing us; his Saturday radio addresses
from June to August 2008 contained more positive or neutral
references to the U.S. than negative ones. He allowed
bilateral cooperation to continue in all areas except
intelligence. Correa accepted USAID's recommendation on ten
economic sectors to target for investment (Ref J). He
instructed FM Salvador to sign the Letter of Agreement with
the U.S. on Narcotics Affairs Section programs.
(Unfortunately, the GOE did not notify us of its decision by
September 30, and we are still waiting for the funding to be
reassigned back to us.) In this context, we were willing to
accept that the two-month delay in Correa receiving the
Ambassador's credentials was due to his hectic campaign
schedule; at least she was able to present them to the
President, rather than being asked to present credentials to
the Vice President as many other Ambassadors had.
¶6. (C) There were a couple of worrisome events during the
summer and early fall as well. Although Correa's intent was
clear, we were surprised by the undiplomatic delivery of the
diplomatic note informing us that Ecuador would not renew the
Forward Operating Location agreement when it expired (Ref K),
and FM Salvador's anti-U.S. comments at the Non-Aligned
Movement meeting in Tehran. The GOE's intelligence
commission report, released on October 30, called the March 1
Colombian action a joint operation with the United States and
repeated allegations about involvement by a FOL plane (Ref L).
THE CORREA WE THOUGHT WE KNEW
¶7. (C) What we hoped for during the summer and early fall of
2008 was the return of the pattern we witnessed during
Correa's first year in office. In 2007, Correa's government
had continued ) and even improved ) bilateral cooperation
(asking only for tweaks in the exchange of diplomatic notes
on Military Group activities to show greater respect for
Ecuadorian sovereignty). His actions were generally
pragmatic that year, such as paying the debt. Although he
occasionally took a swipe at us (e.g., when TSA searched him
at Miami Airport), Correa did not use the U.S. as his regular
whipping boy, instead lashing out against the traditional
domestic political parties, bankers and other economic elite,
and the media.
¶8. (C) In the foreign policy arena, while Correa clearly
wished to reduce dependence on the U.S., he appeared during
his first year in office to want to cultivate good relations
with countries across the political spectrum. He accepted
the assistance Venezuela offered, but chose not to join ALBA
at that time. When Iran pressed to open embassies in 2007,
he decided on commercial offices. And he repeatedly put off
trips to Cuba.
DECIPHERING THE UNDECIPHERABLE
¶9. (C) We attribute Correa's more radical shift to a
combination of some or all of the following, although their
relative weight is difficult to gauge:
-- The Iran and Cuba trips and rhetoric, together with the
debt default, may be aimed at countering criticism from far
left elites and undercutting prospects for a more radical
presidential candidate (e.g., former Constituent Assembly
president Alberto Acosta).
-- The debt default decision plays to the electorate since it
strikes a chord still raw from the late 1990s banking crisis.
(In contrast, the Iran and Cuba trips mean little to the
large majority of voters who just want a meal on the table
and a roof over their heads.)
-- Correa may have been emboldened when almost 64% of the
electorate approved the country's new constitution on
September 28, 2008.
-- He remains angry at the Colombian government, which he
sees as a puppet of the U.S.
-- Correa blames the U.S. for its role in the global
financial crisis.
-- He seems to be marginalizing his moderate advisors.
-- Correa may have decided to throw in his lot with Chavez
and other anti-American populists. Former Vice FM Jose
Valencia explained Correa's behavior to us on December 22 as
gravitating toward Chavez's orbit.
WILL THE REAL CORREA PLEASE STAND UP
¶10. (C) COMMENT: Only time will tell whether Correa's
behavior in recent months shows his true colors. Some
analysts suggest we will not know for sure until after the
April 26 election when the composition of the National
Assembly may push him in one direction or another. In the
meantime, we are conveying the message in private that
Correa's actions will have consequences for his relationship
with the new Obama Administration, while avoiding public
comments that would be counterproductive. We do not
recommend terminating any USG programs that serve our
interests since that would only weaken the incentive for
Correa to move back into a more pragmatic mode. However, we
cut off support for a Department of Homeland
Security/Immigration and Customs Enforcement vetted unit when
the Police Commander insisted on a new leader who was not
subject to polygraphing, which is required for all vetted
unit personnel. We will do the same if any of our other
programs lose integrity.
HODGES
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