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Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE1876, NETHERLANDS: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05THEHAGUE1876 | 2005-07-01 12:38 | 2011-01-27 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001876
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ IR AF NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
BOT
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1853
¶B. THE HAGUE 1852 ...
35731
2005-07-01
05THEHAGUE1876
Embassy The Hague
SECRET
05CARACAS1865|05THEHAGUE1852|05THEHAGUE1853
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001876
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ IR AF NL EUN
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
BOT
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1853
¶B. THE HAGUE 1852
¶C. CARACAS 1865
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Sobel, DCM, and POLCOUNS met
with Dutch FM Bot on June 30 for a tour d'horizon discussion
of outstanding issues. Bot praised the excellent (and
improving) state of U.S.-Dutch relations, but identified four
irritants to be addressed through ongoing consultations:
Dutch dissatisfaction with the U.S. handling of the
Trafficking in Persons issue; the lack of opportunities for
Dutch businesses in Iraq; perceived U.S. indifference to
Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations; and the treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo and other U.S. facilities. Bot
confirmed that the Dutch are moving forward with plans to
send 1,000 to 1.2000 troops to Southern Afghanistan in
conjunction with British and Canadian forces under ISAF
auspices. With regard to Venezuela, Bot confirmed that the
Dutch have invited Chavez to the Hague (no date set) but
intends to deliver a tough message to discourage Venezuelan
meddling in the Antilles. Bot also indicated a willingness
to push for a tougher line on Venezuela within the EU. The
Dutch have formally renewed their commitment to the NATO
Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) and can do more provided
other allies make comparable contributions. Bot would be
interested in doing more in the Middle East in a national
capacity, possibly including contributions to the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) if asked and also
intends to work through the EU to support projects in Gaza.
The current crisis in the EU will could end the political
career of Luxembourg PM Juncker, according to Bot. Bot
expects Solana to remain in place in the hope of one day
becoming EU Foreign Minister (Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on the
other hand, told the Ambassador he thinks Fischer may be a
stronger candidate for this position.) Bot found his recent
meetings with FM Lavrov more productive than those held
during the Dutch EU presidency. On Iran, Bot believes the
new government will take a harder line domestically while
trying to maintain good foreign relations; at the same time,
Bot remains concerned that Dutch parliamentary pressures to
fund an exile-run satellite TV station would have damaging
repercussions for Dutch and EU efforts to moderate Iranian
behaviour. END SUMMARY.
DUTCH CONCERNS:
---------------
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Bot noted that Dutch-U.S. relations
remained excellent and, if anything, had become stronger over
the last four years. This relationship had proven its worth
during the Dutch EU presidency, when both sides had grown
even closer while pursuing shared objectives. The steady
stream of high-level U.S. visitors to the Netherlands
(including President Bush) and vice versa had clearly made a
positive impact. The Dutch considered themselves valued
partners of the U.S., and this partnership had produced
tangible results in many spheres. Bot stressed that he was
personally committed to ensuring the continuation of a strong
transatlantic relationship. In this context, the U.S. and
the Netherlands should work to remove irritations in the
relationship, including:
- Trafficking in Persons: The Dutch feel they are
contributing significantly to the international fight against
Trafficking in Persons and object to being subjected every
year to U.S. criticism in this area. Bot said the annual
fight to remain in Tier One is a source of a lot of
irritation in the Netherlands. The current U.S. system, he
continued, appears to punish the Netherlands for being
transparent and open and does not sufficiently take into
account Dutch efforts to address transit issues.
- Iraq Reconstruction: Bot said he is repeatedly asked,
including in parliament that morning, why Dutch companies
have not received more contracts in Iraq. There is a
perception that countries like France and Germany are
receiving more contracts than the Netherlands, even though
the Dutch have made significantly greater contributions to
Iraqi stability and reconstruction. This is a sore point in
the Dutch business community, as major companies (such as
Phillips) feel that they are not receiving a fair share of
opportunities in Iraq.
- Non-Proliferation: The failure of the NPT Review
Conference, Bot said, was viewed by many as a sign that the
U.S. is not serious about multilateral non-proliferation
efforts. If the U.S. wants support in combating nuclear
proliferation, it should also be prepared to assist those
countries seeking a peaceful nuclear power capacity as
provided for in the treaty.
- Guantanamo: Bot recalled that at the UNHRC meeting in
Geneva, the Dutch voted in favor of the U.S.-supported Cuba
resolution and the U.S. promised to consider allowing UN
Human Rights Rapporteurs to visit Guantanamo. The fact that
no such visits have occurred is a source of embarrassment to
the Dutch government. The Dutch parliament is also pressing
the government hard to explain its arrangements for handling
prisoners taken by Dutch forces in Afghanistan to ensure they
covered by the Geneva protocols -- i.e., that they are not
turned over to American forces. These charges are becoming
increasingly difficult to counter, he said. Recalling his
discussion with Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick, Bot
reiterated that resolving these concerns would make it easier
for the Netherlands to respond positively to anticipated
future requests. The Ambassador noted that in responding to
parliamentary concerns, the Foreign Minister should be aware
that there had been no referrals to Guantanamo in the past
year.
¶3. (C) Bot reiterated that he was very satisfied with the
tremendous successes of the Dutch-U.S. relationship over
the past several years. He felt it was important, however,
to restate officially Dutch concerns in the above areas.
In response, Ambassador Sobel seconded Bot's overall positive
assessment of U.S.-Dutch relations. The key to overcoming
the various irritations cited by Bot was to continue
communication and consultations at all levels. Ambassador
Sobel noted that the TIP, Iraq Reconstruction, and Guantanamo
issues were already the subject of intense, high-level
dialogue in the Hague and in Washington, which should
continue.
AFGHANISTAN:
-----------
¶4. (S) Picking up on Bot's Guantanamo comments, Ambassador
Sobel asked Bot whether these concerns would interfere with
the Dutch government's plans to staff a second Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan during phase III.
Bot said that, on the contrary, the government was moving
ahead with plans to send 1,000 - 1,200 troops to Southern
Afghanistan in 2006 for an 18-month deployment in conjunction
with British and Canadian deployments in the same region.
Bot said the Dutch contingent would expect to lead the
overall deployment in the region, which could include other
forces (from the Baltics, for example) and would staff a
headquarters for the middle six months of the deployment. In
response to a question from POLCOUNS, Bot confirmed that
these plans had been briefed to key parliamentary leaders
(including the opposition PvdA) who concurred with the
government's plans, with two conditions: 1) the troops
should be deployed in an ISAF, vice OEF, capacity; and 2)
Dutch Special Forces should be withdrawn from the region
prior to the PRT's deployment for purposes of deconfliction.
(Note: The current Dutch SOF deployment to OEF was already
expected to conclude in April 2006.)
VENEZUELA:
---------
¶5. (S) Bot confirmed (ref b) that he planned to visit Caracas
in the Fall, and that Chavez had been invited to visit The
Hague this summer if he is in Europe. He stressed,
however, that he intended to use these opportunities to
deliver a strong message to Chavez that Venezuelan meddling
in the Antilles would not be tolerated. Although he had not
yet seen the specific recommendations sent back by the Dutch
Ambassador to Caracas (ref c), Bot said that he would support
steps -- including U.S. Military Ship visits and high-level
U.S.- Antillean exchanges -- intended to send a clear signal
to Chavez. With regard to the internal EU debate on
Venezuela, Bot made clear that he did not accept that Spain
would have the natural lead on the issue as the Dutch, as a
Caribbean power, have national interests at stake. (Later,
in a private one-on-one with Ambassador Sobel, Bot indicated
that he was not averse to playing a leading role within the
EU on this issue, and that would be interested in discussing
Venezuela issues with senior U.S. officials to coordinate our
approaches.)
IRAQ:
----
¶6. (C) Noting that the Dutch parliament had just supported
extending the Dutch contribution to the NATO Training Mission
in Iraq (NTM-I), Ambassador Sobel asked whether the Dutch
were still considering expanding their contribution to 100 or
more. Bot responded that the Dutch offer to do more remained
on the table, but only if other allies made comparable
contributions; so far, he said, most had not done a damn
thing. The Dutch were training in Iraq while others, like
France and Germany, still only made limited contributions
outside Iraq. This continues to be a source of frustration,
he said, despite Dutch efforts to shame other countries to do
more..
GAZA:
----
¶7. (C) Recalling the recent visit of MFO Chief Larocco to the
Netherlands (ref a), Ambassador Sobel probed Bot on possible
Dutch contributions following an Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza. Bot made clear that the Dutch would consider a
national contribution to the MFO if asked, but in the
meantime would continue to work through the EU on development
and reconstruction projects (he noted the Gaza port project
as one possible example.) Bot added that he, personally,
would like to be more involved in the Middle East but could
not do so without an invitation and specific role. Bot said
he had raised this more than once with Solana.
EU POLITICS:
-----------
¶8. (C) Turning to internal EU dynamics, Bot said that Solana
still wants to be EU Foreign Minister, even if this meant
waiting for a long time to come. Bot had harsh words for
Luxembourg PM Juncker, who, he said, had hoped to be
President of the EU but now stood to lose everything on
July 10 if the referendum in Luxembourg goes against the
constitutional treaty. Bot suggested that recent polls
showing a growing majority voting against the treaty in
Luxembourg were swelled by those who just want to see if
Juncker will keep his word and resign -- it's like a
cockfight, Asked whether Bot thought German Foreign
Minister Fischer might be a good candidate to replace Solana
(as had been suggested to the Ambassador by NATO SYG Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer), Bot said he understood Schroeder intended to
leave his current job following the upcoming German
elections, regardless of the outcome.
RUSSIA:
------
¶9. (C) Asked about the June 28 visit to the Netherlands of
Russian FM Lavrov, Bot said that his encounters with Lavrov
had been much more productive and pleasant than their
meetings during the Dutch EU presidency. Lavrov was less
confrontational than in the past regarding Moldova and other
areas of concern, but warned the Dutch that the Ukrainians
were still a problem with regard to Transnistria despite
the change of regime in Kiev. Bot added that the main point
of the meeting was to lay the groundwork for a Putin visit
next November.
IRAN:
----
¶10. (C) Based on a meeting with visiting Iranian
parliamentarians the previous week, Bot said he believed the
new Iranian government would concentrate first on imposing a
harder line domestically while trying to maintain a more
reasonable approach in foreign policy. Bot noted that the
Dutch parliament's insistence (reconfirmed on June 30) on
having the government fund an exile-supported satellite TV
station to broadcast independent media into Iran put him in
an awkward position, as he did not wish to undermine EU
policy regarding Iran or put Dutch business interests there
in jeopardy. That said, he confirmed that the government had
no choice but to find a way to implement the binding
parliamentary amendment while doing as little damage as
possible to EU-Iranian relations.
SOBEL