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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06LIMA2885, HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06LIMA2885 | 2006-07-25 19:37 | 2011-05-18 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: elcomercio.pe |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #2885/01 2061937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251937Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1502
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3686
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6903
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9681
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0559
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0747
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW
ADVERSARY
REF: A. LIMA 0086
¶B. LIMA 04854 (05)
¶C. LIMA 49...
id: 72567
date: 7/25/2006 19:37
refid: 06LIMA2885
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06LIMA86
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #2885/01 2061937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251937Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1502
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3686
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6903
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9681
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUL QUITO 0559
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0747
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002885
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: HUMALA A HAS-BEEN, SAYS FORMER ADVISOR, NOW
ADVERSARY
REF: A. LIMA 0086
¶B. LIMA 04854 (05)
¶C. LIMA 4968 (03)
Classified By: A/POL David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d)
--------
Summary:
--------
¶1. (C) Former radical, anti-system presidential candidate
for the Union por el Peru (UPP) and Peruvian Nationalist
(PNP) parties Ollanta Humala will neither be able to control
the 43-person Congressional bloc elected with him nor will he
succeed in electing political allies in November's regional
and municipal elections, ex-Humala political advisor Carlos
Torres Caro told Ambassador on 7/21. Torres Caro added that
Humala lacks "leadership" and that the quality of the
Congress representatives in his group is low. Torres Caro
took credit for peeling away the action wings of Humala's
movement -- both the cocaleros and the "Reservists" of Humala
brother Antauro's Ethnocacerist group -- when he broke with
Humala shortly after the 6/4 runoff presidential election.
Though he may overestimate his influence and could be too
eager to write off Humala, the crippling cleavages Torres
Caro describes in Humala's post-presidential movement track
with what others have been telling us. They indicate that a
post-election Humala might not be the threat in November's
regional and municipal balloting that many had feared. End
Summary.
--------------------------------------
Ambassador Meets Ex-Humala Top Advisor
--------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Ambassador met with ex-Ollanta Humala advisor Carlos
Torres Caro and his political ally, Congressman-elect Gustavo
Espinoza, on 7/21/06. Torres Caro recently broke with
Ollanta Humala and has announced plans to form his own
Congressional group and political party (to be named the
Democratic Party, PD). Torres Caro knows the inside of the
Humala movement well and spoke of its internal dynamics
during the campaign, the reasons for his own rupture with
Humala, and Humala's prospects for continuing as a force in
Peruvian politics.
¶3. (C) Torres Caro reviewed his participation in the Humala
movement, which began when he represented the Humala brothers
as their attorney after the failed putsch they organized
against former President Fujimori in 2000. This culminated
with Torres Caro's selection as Humala's second vice
President and his congressional candidacy at the top of the
PNP-UPP's congressional list. (Torres Caro won his seat with
the highest vote total of any candidate on the UPP-PNP
ticket.)
¶4. (C) Looking back on the campaign, Torres Caro said a
variety of voices had vied for Humala's ear. He identified
the three main groups around Humala as: the far left,
Humala's ex-military contacts, and the democrats. The last
group was the one Torres Caro led. Torres Caro described how
he and Humala's wife, Nadine Heredia, had tried to keep the
radicals at bay. He also noted that campaign planning
proceeded in secret. When Humala made his lightning visit to
Caracas in January, for example, Torres Caro was unaware of
the trip until hearing about it in the media (Ref A).
¶5. (C) In retrospect, Torres Caro concluded, Humala had
played with all of the factions around him, all along
secretly favoring the far left. Torres Caro implied that
SIPDIS
Humala's capture by the far left explained the candidate's
inability to stop Hugo Chavez from intervening in the
campaign even though Chavez' ham-handed attempts to influence
Peruvian voters were backfiring. He also noted Humala's
financial dependence on Chavez, stating that so much money
was coming in from Venezuela to finance Humala that the
candidate had to purchase a large safe for his house. Torres
Caro said that a considerable portion of the campaign's
funds remained unspent.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Post-Election Humala: Garcia Will Fall "In Six Months"
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶6. (C) Torres Caro repeated public claims that he broke with
Humala right after the 6/4 presidential runoff when Humala
chose the path of radical opposition to President-elect Alan
Garcia. Humala, he said, expected Garcia to fall &in six
months,8 a conclusion with which Torres Caro disagreed.
Instead, the latter proposed that the Peruvian National Party
(PNP) and Union por el Peru (UPP) alliance that had supported
Ollanta Humala get itself organized, form a solid
Congressional bloc, and push for development programs for the
south and the sierras (regions like Ayacucho and Arequipa
that Humala carried overwhelmingly) with an eye toward
building an electoral base for the 2011 presidential race.
¶7. (C) Humala rejected this strategy, opting instead to try
to destabilize the Garcia Government. Seeing that his
candidate had been &completely captured8 by the radical
left, Torres Caro left the Humala movement. Since leaving,
Torres Caro claims to have developed close relationships
with both Antauro Humala (Ollanta's brother, now in jail
along with over one hundred of his followers ) called
&Reservists8 -- for having launched an abortive rebellion
against the Toledo Government on New Year's Eve 2005 -- Refs
B,C) and the cocaleros. He said that both these groups felt
betrayed by Humala, who seems more interested in launching a
political party loyal to him than in addressing their issues.
Torres Caro noted that Ollanta Humala's brother, Antauro, was
particularly concerned for the health of the Reservists, many
of whom are languishing in prison as their families suffer.
Torres Caro claimed that by breaking with Ollanta Humala, he
had pulled these two groups away from the ex-candidate,
denying him his political "artillery" (i.e. the ability to
create disturbances) and contributing to governability in
Peru. Alan Garcia, Torres Caro maintained, was well aware of
the positive role he had played in diminishing Ollanta
Humala's ability to cause trouble.
------------------
Humala's Prospects
------------------
¶8. (C) Torres Caro said that the prospects for the Humala
movement continuing are grim. He gave a scathing appraisal
of the quality of the 43-person PNP-UPP Congressional bloc,
which he said was divided into several factions that he
characterized in the following way: radical cocaleros or
radical leftists with limited, if enthusiastic, political
bases in marginal areas (about 7 members); country folk with
no political experience and, even more important, little if
any experience with either urban life or office work (Torres
Caro said some in this group were getting their first cell
phones or offices; about 26 members); and sophisticated
opportunists, people who know urban life, have some personal
resources, but are totally lacking in political experience
(about 10 members). He said there was no way these three
groups would stay together, and he predicted that 6-7 more
congress representatives would eventually join his movement.
¶9. (C) Torres Caro took a similarly dim view of the
Humalistas' prospects in upcoming regional and municipal
elections. Some had feared that PNP candidates might
dominate in Humala's base areas, creating a "solid south" and
"solid sierras," blocs of anti-Lima, anti-system regional
governments that could have made life difficult for
President-elect Alan Garcia.
¶10. (C) Torres Caro discounted this scenario. He said that
Ollanta Humala has "no real leadership" qualities, that he
"only knows how to boss people" but not how to lead. Humala,
he said, is trying to impose his personal candidates on his
party in the regions, with very poor results. Torres Caro
indicated that the winners in regional and municipal
elections would be strong local candidates, as has been the
case in the recent past.
--------
Comment:
--------
¶11. (C) Torres Caro likely overestimates his own role in
breaking up the pro-Humala forces and may be too sanguine
about the prospects for Humala's disappearance from the
political scene. That said, his insights into the basic
cleavages in the Humala movement and his commitment, however
opportunistically motivated, to promoting governability in
Peru could be helpful. Torres Caro is a flexible, capable
actor with, so far, a good sense of timing. His decision to
jump from Humala's ship could be an indication of things to
come.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================