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Viewing cable 96STATE237921, IRAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
96STATE237921 | 1996-11-17 04:47 | 2011-04-27 09:00 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
P R 170447Z NOV 96
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BAKU
AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
S E C R E T STATE 237921
ALMATY FOR AMBASSADOR JONES
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/06
TAGS: PINR PREL KZ PTER KNNP
SUBJECT: IRAN
REF: ALMATY 008329
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY INR TOM FINGAR, DAS/AN. REASON
1.5(C) (D).
¶2. (S) AS REOUESTED BY AMEMBASSY ALMATY, INR PROVIDES
THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFORMATION/TALKING POINTS ON
IRAN TO BE SHARED WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER GIZZATOV
AND SENIOR KAZAK OFFICIALS. WE HOPE THIS MATERIAL GIVES
ENOUGH DETAIL TO MAKE CLEAR THAT U.S. CONCERNS REGARDING
IRAN ARE WELL-FOUNDED. THIS CABLE IS BEING SHARED WITH
OTH~R POSTS IN THE REGION FOR GENERAL INTEREST AND
INFORMATION. THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET,
RELEASABLE TO SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS DEEMED
APPROPRIATE.
----------------------TEAR LINE-------------------------
IRAN: INTERNAL DEVELOPNENTS
¶3. (S) ELECTIONS. THE SECOND ROUND OF VOTING FOR THE
FIFTH NAJLIS IN APRIL SAW THE DEFEAT OF PRESIDENT
RAFSANJANI'S FACTION; THE CONSERVATIVES REASSERTED SOME
MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE NAJLIS, ALTHOUGH BY A
NARROWER MAJORITY, WITH NATEG-NURI RE-ELECTED AS SPEAKER.
SUBSEQUENT SPECULATION ABOUT MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION
TO ALLOW RAFSANJANI TO RUN A THIRD TERM WAS EFFECTIVELY
SUPPRESSED WITH SUPREME LEADER KHAMENEI'S PUBLIC
PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ANOTHER SUITABLE POST WOULD BE FOUND
FOR RAFSANJANI. NATEQ-NURI, BENEFITTING FROM A RECENT
RESURGENCE OF CLERICAL FORCES, HAS EMERGED AS THE
PRESIDENTIAL FRONTRUNNER.
-- THERE IS LITTLE TO SUGGEST THAT ANY MAJOR FACTION
WITHIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS
"MODERATE" WITH REGARD TO SUCH ISSUES AS TERRORISM, HUMAN
RIGHTS, OPPOSITION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, OR
PURSUIT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
-- FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT THE UPCOMING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, REGARDLESS OF VICTOR, WILL RESULT
IN IRANIAN POLICIES THAT WOULD LEAD TOWARD RESPECT OF
OTHER NATIONS. INDEED, UNDER NATEQ-NURI, IRAN COULD
REGRESS IN SOME AREAS.
¶4. (S) HUMAN RIGHTS. TEHRAN'S MANIPULATION OF THE
ELECTION PROCESS TO ELIMINATE ROUGHLY 40 PERCENT OF
PROSPECTIVE CANDIDATES TO THE NAJLIS SUSTAINED THE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF SIGNIFICANT SEGMENTS OF THE VOTING
POPULATION, AND MEDIA CENSORSHIP, HARASSMENT OF ACADEMIC
FIGURES, AND PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES--
PARTICULARLY BAHA'IS--ARE MATTERS OF PUBLIC RECORD. LESS
WELL-KNOWN ARE IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES INCLUDING
SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, TORTURE AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENTS,
ARBITRARY ARRESTS, AND UNEXPLAINED DISAPPEARANCES. THE
UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN HAS
JUST ISSUED HIS REPORT; IRAN HAS ALREADY BEGUN A
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT THAT REPORT AND ITS
AUTHOR.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
¶5. (S) DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN. TEHRAN RECENTLY HAS
BLITZED THE ENTIRE REGION WITH WIDELY PUBLICIZED VISITS
BY PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, IN PARTICULAR
VICE PRESIDENT HABIBI, FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI, AND
DEPUTY FOREIGN NINISTER VAEZI, TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE,
CREATE OPENINGS, AND ENGENDER TIES WITH ITS NEIGHBORS BY
PROMOTING CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND PROMISING ECONOMIC AND
TRADE BENEFITS. SIMILAR EFFORTS HAVE RANGED BEYOND THE
REGION TO EUROPE, RUSSIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE
FAR EAST AS IRAN TRIES TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS AN EMERGING
WORLD POWER.
-- IN OFFICIAL FRIDAY SERMONS AND SPEECHES BY ITS
HIGHEST LEADERS, TEHRAN CONTINUALLY STRESSES THE
CONVICTION THAT IRAN HOLDS MORAL TITLE TO SPIRITUAL
LEADERSHIP IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND MUST SPREAD ITS
VERSION OF ISLAMIC "REVOLUTION."
¶6. (S) REGIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS. TEHRAN CONTINUES TO
INVOLVE ITSELF IN SEVERAL REGIONAL CONFLICTS. IN
NORTHERN IRAQ, IRAN'S JULY CROSS-BORDER MILITARY
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN
(KDP-I) AND SUBSEQUENT HEAVY MILITARY SUPPORT OF ONE
KURDISH FACTION GAVE BAGHDAD AN EXCUSE TO REENTER THE
NORTH AND ONCE AGAIN THREATEN THE KURDS. IN AFGHANISTAN,
IRAN HAS PUBLICLY PROFESSED SUPPORT OF A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION UNDER A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT AND THE UN
SPECIAL MISSION, BUT HAS SECRETLY PROVIDED ARMS AND
PROMOTED AN ANTI-TALEBAN COALITION. IN TAJIKISTAN,
TEHRAN CLAIMS THE ROLE OF PEACE BROKER WHILE SUPPORTING
THE OPPOSITION. IN THE GULF, IRAN HAS HELPED FOMENT
GREATER UNREST, RECRUITING AND TRAINING DISSIDENTS.
TERRORISM
¶7. (S) TOOL OF STATECRAFT. SINCE THE CLERICS CAME TO
POWER, IRAN AND ITS SURROGATES HAVE CONDUCTED
KIDNAPPINGS, ASSASSINATIONS, AND BOMBINGS; IRAN HAS ALSO
PROVIDED CRITICAL TRAINING, FINANCING, AND ARMS TO GROUPS
ENGAGED IN INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL GOALS.
THESE ACTIVITIES ARE NEITHER ABERRATIONS NOR EXCEPTIONS,
BUT ARE CONDUCTED WITH FULL APPROVAL BY THE MOST SENIOR
LEVELS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, WHO CONSIDER THEM TO BE
LEGITIMATE TOOLS OF STATE POLICY. THE NINISTRY OF
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (NOIS) HAS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR IRAN'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, WHILE THE
NINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS ALSO PLAY ROLES. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED
OR SUPPORTED BY THESE AGENCIES ARE AUTHORIZED BY IRAN'S
SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, WHOSE MEMBERSHIP
INCLUDES PRESIDENT RAFSANJANI, SUPREME LEADER KHAMENEI,
NINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS VELAYATI, MINISTER OF
INTELLIGENCE ALL FALLAHIAN, AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE
YAZDI. UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EXACTS A
SUFFICIENTLY HIGH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRICE, IRAN WILL
HAVE NO REASON TO CHANGE THIS BEHAVIOR.
¶8. (S) MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THE MOST VIVID
EXAMPLE OF IRANIAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM HAS BEEN AGAINST
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. IRAN'S SUPPORT OF GROUPS
LIKE THE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (PIJ), LEBANESE
HIZBALLAH, THE PFLP-GC, HAMAS, AND SMALLER GROUPS
INCLUDES MONEY (EXCEEDING USDOLS 100 MILLION ANNUALLY),
ARMS, TRAINING, AND COORDINATION. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT
OF THE KILLINGS COMMITTED BY GROUPS SUPPORTED BY IRAN
PLACES A SERIOUS BURDEN ON THE PEACE PROCESS.
¶9. (S) THREATS TO STATE STABILITY. IRAN IS A PATRON
OF OTHER POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS THAT EMPLOY
VIOLENCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS SUPPORT IS TO UNDERMINE
SECULAR GOVERNMENTS AND ENCOURAGE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
REGIMES THAT WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE TO IRANIAN AND
POLITICIZED ISLAMIC INFLUENCE. IRAN ALSO SEEKS TO GAIN A
FOOTHOLD IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS ON SEVERAL CONTINENTS AND
THEREBY FOSTER ITS IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP. MANY OF
IRAN'S CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION ORGANIZATIONS TAKE PLACE
IN THE SUDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON, ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF
THESE GROUPS ALSO TRAVEL TO IRAN.
-- EGYPT: IRAN HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF PROVIDING SUPPORT
TO AL-GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYAH, OR THE ISLAMIC GROUP, AND THE
EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD. EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC MILITANTS HAVE
BEEN REPORTED TO TRAVEL TO IRAN.
-- ALGERIA: IRAN HAS ALSO PROVIDED FUNDS TO THE
ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS) AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE
SHIPPED ARMS TO THE FIS VIA SUDAN.
-- TURKEY: IRAN FINANCIALLY SUPPORTS A MILITANT
ORGANIZATION SOMETIMES CALLED THE "ISLAMIC MOVEMENT,"
WHICH HAS TARGETED TURKISH SECULARISTS AND WESTERNERS.
IRAN ALSO PROVIDES SAFE HAVEN TO THE TERRORIST KURDISTAN
WORKERS' PARTY (PKK).
-- TAJIKISTAN: IRAN HAS PROVIDED TRAINING, FUNDING,
AND SAFE HAVEN TO THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENT OF
TAJIKISTAN (IRMT), NOW UNDER THE UNITED TAJIKISTAN
OPPOSITION (UTO), DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE ONGOING
INSURGENCY. THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN DUSHANBE HAS
CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE AND RECRUITING ACTIVITIES.
-- CENTRAL ASIA: IRAN HAS SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT WEAKNESSES
AND VULNERABILITIES IN TAJIKISTAN AND ELSEWHERE IN
CENTRAL ASIA, SENDING RELIGIOUS PROSELYTIZERS AND FUNDING
POLITICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS. GETTING AT THE REGION'S
URANIUM RESOURCES AND EXERTING INFLUENCE OVER ITS ENERGY
SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN KEEN OBJECTIVES.
¶10. (S) THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. TEHRAN HAS LONG
WAGED A VIOLENT STRUGGLE WITH SEVERAL IRANIAN OPPOSITION-
GROUPS, CHIEF AMONG THEM THE NOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ (~ZK) AND
THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN (KDP-I). THE
GOVERNMENT HAS USED TERRORISM AGAINST THEM, AS WELL AS
AGAINST NON-VIOLENT OPPOSITION GROUPS, AT HOME AND ABROAD
WITHOUT REGARD FOR BORDERS OR JUDICIAL SYSTEMS.
-- MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ: THE MEK IS A MILITARIZED
ORGANIZATION WHOSE OPPOSITION TACTICS HAVE INCLUDED
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST IRAN. IRAN HAS ASSASSINATED
DOZENS OF NEK MEMBERS, AND BECAUSE IT IS BASED PARTLY IN
IRAQ, MUCH IRANIAN RETALIATION HAS TAKEN PLACE IN IRAQ.
-- KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN: THE KDP-I ENGAGES
MOSTLY IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN OPPOSITION TO THE
TEHRAN REGIME, THOUGH IT HAS ALSO CLASHED WITH IRANIAN
MILITARY UNITS. IRAN HAS ASSASSINATED TWO KDP-I
SECRETARIES-GENERAL. IN 1994 ALONE, THREE MEMBERS OF THE
GROUP WERE KILLED IN IRAQ, TURKEY, AND DENMARK,
RESPECTIVELY, AND A FOURTH WAS WOUNDED IN SWEDEN BY A
LETTER BOMB.
-- IRANIAN PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN (IPF): IN SEPTEMBER 1995,
ALI TAVASSOLI, A FORMER LEADER OF THE IPF, WAS KIDNAPPED
IN BAKU, AZERBAIJAN BY ~OIS OFFICERS.
-- NON-VIOLENT OPPOSITION FIGURES: FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME NINISTER BAKHTIAR AND AN AIDE WERE ASSASSINATED IN
PARIS IN 1991. A MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITION GROUP, "FLAG
OF FREEDOM," WAS ASSASSINATED IN PARIS IN 1990. FOUR
DISSIDENTS WERE ASSASSINATED IN BERLIN IN 1992, AND REZA
NAZLUMAN, AN OFFICIAL UNDER THE SHAH, WAS ASSASSINATED IN
PARIS IN 1996. GERMAN COURTS HAVE ISSUED AN ARREST
WARRANT FOR NOIS CHIEF FALLAHIAN BASED ON EVIDENCE IN THE
BERLIN TRIAL, AND GERMAN AUTHORITIES WERE SUFFICIENTLY
CONVINCED BY FRENCH INFORMATION TO EXTRADITE AN IRANIAN
TO PARIS TO STAND TRIAL IN THE NAZLUMAN KILLING.
-- SALMAN RUSHDIE: IRAN HAS REFUSED TO RESCIND ITS
DEATH SENTENCE AGAINST INDIAN-BORN BRITISH AUTHOR SALMAN
RUSHDIE. THIS MONTH, RUSHDIE'S SCHEDULED RECEIPT OF A
EUROPEAN LITERARY AWARD IN COPENHAGEN CAUSED SUCH A ROW
OVER SECURITY PRECAUTIONS THAT IT ALMOST BROUGHT DOWN THE
DANISH GOVERNMENT.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS
¶11. (S) IRAN IS MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO DEVELOP
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WND) AND TO ACQUIRE
BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF DELIVERING WP~D TO REGIONAL
TARGETS.
¶12. (S) IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. DESPITE ITS OUTWARD
ADHERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT),
IRAN IS ATTEMPTING SECRETLY TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAPABILITY. IRAN HAS DEDICATED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE AND DEVELOP
NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES THAT ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH A PURELY PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM, BUT WHICH ARE
CRITICAL FOR THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS HEAVILY
DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, BUT, TO DATE, MOST
SUPPLIERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHINA AND RUSSIA, HAVE
REFUSED TO COOPERATE.
¶13. (S) PLUTONIUM. IRAN HAS ATTEMPTED TO ACQUIRE THE
CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE BOTH PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED
URANIUM. IN THE CASE OF PLUTONIUM, IRAN HAS BEEN TRYING
FOR MANY YEARS TO PURCHASE NUCLEAR REACTORS THAT ARE
OPTIMIZED FOR PRODUCING WEAPONS-GRADE PLUTONIUM AND NOT
ELECTRICITY. SPECIFICALLY, IT HAS TRIED--SO FAR
UNSUCCESSFULLY--TO ACQUIRE A LARGE, HEAVY WATER-
MODERATED, NATURAL-URANIUM-FUELED REACTOR AND ASSOCIATED
FACILITIES. THIS TYPE OF REACTOR HAS LITTLE USE IN
IRATI'S CIVILIAN PROGRAM, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN BASED ON
LIGHT-WATER REACTORS.
¶14. (S) ENRICHED URANIUM. IRAN HAS CONDUCTED RESEARCH
ON AT LEAST THREE URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGIES--GAS
CENTRIFUGE, GASEOUS DIFFUSION, AND LASER ISOTOPE
SEPARATION. IRANIAN PROCUREMENT EFFORTS SUGGEST IRAN IS
GIVING THE GREATEST ATTENTION TO GAS CENTRIFUGE
DEVELOPMENT AND IS ATTEMPTING COVERTLY TO PROCURE THE
REQUIRED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.
¶15. (S) INTERNATIONAL MONITORING. IRAN HAS ATTEMPTED
TO ALLAY INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
BY INVITING THE IAEA TO VISIT ANY IAEA-DESIGNATED
FACILITIES IN IRAN. THE IAEA HAS MADE SPECIAL VISITS TO
IRAN, BUT HAS NOT DISCOVERED ANY SIGNS OF A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROGRAM. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING SINCE IRAN'S
PROGRAM HAS NOT PROGRESSED TO THE STAGE WHERE WEAPONS-
RELATED FACILITIES ARE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED.
-- WITH RESPECT TO THESE VISITS, THE IAEA HAS TAKEN
CARE TO NOTE THAT IT CANNOT VOUCH FOR FACILITIES AND
SITES NOT VISITED, NOR CAN IT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY
THAT THE SITES IT HAS VISITED COULD BE USED FOR OTHER
ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE.
¶16. (S) IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. IRAN'S BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM DATES BACK TO THE EARLY 1980S AND HAS
MADE STEADY PROGRESS. WE BELIEVE IRANIAN LEADERS VIEW
ITS MISSILE PROGRAM AS INDISPENSABLE IN PERMITTING IT TO
THREATEN AND STRIKE A VARIETY OF TARGETS IN THE REGION.
DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, TEHRAN DEMONSTRATED ITS
WILLINGNESS TO USE BALLISTIC MISSILES AGAINST POPULATION
CENTERS (AS DID IRAQ).
-- IRAN HAS OVER 300 SCUD B AND SCUD C MISSILES, WITH
RANGES OF 300 AND 500 KILOMETERS, RESPECTIVELY. IRAN
ALSO HAS ACQUIRED FROM CHINA MORE THAN 200 CSS-8 SURFACE-
TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES, WITH A RANGE OF 150
KILOMETERS, WHICH ARE MORE ACCURATE THAN OTHER MISSILES
IN IRAN'S INVENTORY.
-- IRAN IS ASSEMBLING BOTH SCUD B AND SCUD C MISSILES
FROM NORTH KOREAN-SUPPLIED PARTS, AND IT IS LIKELY TO
ACHIEVE A FULLY INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY SOON, IF
IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO.
-- IRAN AND NORTH KOREA SIGNED A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR
CONTRACT FOR THE 1,000 KILOMETER RANGE NO DONG MISSILE IN
1993, THOUGH THAT CONTRACT WAS LATER SUSPENDED. WITH THE
NO DONG, IRAN COULD TARGET MOST OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE
MIDDLE EAST, AND PARTS OF SOUTH ASIA AND EUROPE.
-- IRAN HAS ALSO ATTEMPTED TO ACQUIRE MEDIUM-RANGE
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND WANTS
TO DEVELOP ITS OWN MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEM.
¶17. (S) IRANIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IRAN'S OFFENSIVE
CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) PROGRAM BEGAN IN 1983 DURING THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR. SINCE THE CW PROGRAM'S INCEPTION, IRAN
PROBABLY HAS PRODUCED AS MUCH AS 2000 METRIC TONS OF
BLISTER, BLOOD, AND CHOKING AGENTS.
-- IRAN IS CURRENTLY PROCURING ITEMS AND TECHNOLOGY
WHICH WILL ALLOW THE PRODUCTION OF HIGHLY LETHAL NERVE
AGENTS.
-- IRAN COULD DISSEMINATE THESE AGENTS VIA TRADITIONAL
TACTICAL SYSTEMS (I.E. ARTILLERY, MORTARS AND ROCKETS),
AS WELL AS AERIAL BOMBS OR POSSIBLY MISSILES.
-- IRAN IS STRIVING TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN BOTH
CHEMICAL AND BIO-WARFARE PRODUCTION. GREAT EFFORTS HAVE
BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH THE ABILITY TO PRODUCE MANY OF THE
KEY PRECURSORS NEEDED TO ENSURE AN UNINTERRUPTED SUPPLY
OF PRECURSORS. NOT ONLY WOULD THIS ASSIST IRAN'S OWN CW
PROGRAM, BUT WOULD ALSO ALLOW THE SALE OF THESE CHEMICAL
PRECURSORS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION FOR
DESPERATELY NEEDED HARD CURRENCY.
¶18. (S) IRANIAN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. IRAN'S BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE (BW) PROGRAM ALSO BEGAN IN 1983. SINCE THE LATE
1980'S, MILITARY PROCUREMENT ENTITIES HAVE BEEN SEEKING
DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL PROCESS EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR R&D
AND PRODUCTION OF BW AGENTS.
-- WE BELIEVE IRAN IS CURRENTLY PRODUCING LAB-SCALE
QUANTITIES OF SOME BW AGENTS.
-- AN OFFICIAL IRANIAN DOCUMENT OBTAINED IN 1986
INDICATED THAT TEHRAN HAD A LIMITED ABILITY TO EMPLOY BW.
IN BATTLE SITUATIONS, THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE DONE WITH
THE SAME DELIVERY METHODS USED BY THE IRANIAN CW PROGRAM.
CHRISTOPHER