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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SOFIA926, BULGARIAN CHIEF PROSECUTOR'S JULY 9-13 VISIT TO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SOFIA926 | 2006-07-05 07:28 | 2011-05-13 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlvelchev.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/05/13/1089147_na_chetiri_ochi_s_boris_velchev/ |
VZCZCXRO1994
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0926/01 1860728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050728Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2159
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
id: 70225
date: 7/5/2006 7:28
refid: 06SOFIA926
origin: Embassy Sofia
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06SOFIA198
header:
VZCZCXRO1994
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0926/01 1860728
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050728Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2159
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000926
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NCE AND INL
JUSTICE FOR OIA, OPDAT, CRIM DIV AND AG
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM OVIP BG
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CHIEF PROSECUTOR'S JULY 9-13 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
REF: SOFIA 198
SOFIA 00000926 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: New Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev is
arguably Bulgaria's best hope for fighting organized crime
and related political corruption. His position under the
constitution gives him vast powers, which, if wielded
effectively, could put a major crimp in the activities of
organized crime figures and corrupt politicians. However, he
has cautioned supporters against unrealistic expectations in
the short term, arguing that sustainable change takes time.
Saddled with his predecessor's venal legacy, Velchev began
his term with a strident commitment to build solid cases
against organized crime (OC) figures and assert control over
an undisciplined prosecutorial system. His ambition is
bridled, however, by the highly centralized and hierarchical
system he inherited, which makes it difficult to fire even
notoriously corrupt prosecutors. Nevertheless, he has taken
the first steps toward pushing some of the worst offenders
overboard by asking the Supreme Judicial Council to dismiss
two senior prosecutors. He has also successfully requested
parliament to lift the immunity of seven MPs accused of
corruption and other crimes. We should emphasize our strong
support for his reform agenda and encourage him to develop
alliances within the government to smooth the rocky road
ahead. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------
VELCHEV: ONE OF THE GOOD GUYS
-----------------------------
¶2. (C) From the very beginning of his term, Velchev has said
all the right things. His priorities align closely with
ours, and he has demonstrated a great rceptivity to U.S.
assistance. His shared interet in the issues we care about
) OC, corruption, udicial reform ) makes him a key partner
in pushig through reforms. Velchev has impressed us with
his commitment to building solid cases against oranized
crime figures and asserting control over he unruly
prosecutorial system. He has consistetly voiced his
intention to introduce critical reorms to strengthen
Bulgaria's lethargic and corrption-ridden prosecutorial
system, but he is thefirst to admit that he has not yet
accomplished uch. Though under pressure from Brussels and
th Government to show results before the European
Cmmission's September monitoring report, Velchev cations
against expecting high-profile results in he short term,
arguing that sustainble change requires longer than the four
months he has been in office.
¶3. (C) Velchev has already taken steps to root out corrupt
elements in government. He has initiated proceedings to
strip seven MPs of their criminal immunity in order to bring
charges against them. The Service is reexamining cases
closed by former CP Filchev without prosecution, as well as
those opened by Filchev solely to harass his personal and
political enemies. Velchev is expected to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against two prosecutors after an
internal investigation found evidence of improper suppression
of case files over a two-year period. These steps only mark
the beginning of a much needed housecleaning of the whole
Prosecution Service. Because of his strained relationship
with Interior Minister Petkov, however, it is difficult to
predict whether Velchev will be successful in his plan to
organize special district-level units focusing on OC,
corruption, and money-laundering and to link these units to
similar specialized units within the MoI.
¶4. (C) Despite what we assess as his good intentions,
Velchev's ability to restructure the prosecutorial system is
restricted by entrenched interests and laws that divide the
Prosecution Service into two branches ) the Supreme
Cassation Service and the Supreme Administrative Service.
Although the law prevents him from elevating the director of
the Anti-Corruption Department to the level of Deputy Chief
Prosecutor, he recently named two additional Deputy CPs, who
are expected to oversee new administrative and internal
inspection divisions. He has appointed a prosecutor to be
spokesman of the Supreme Cassation Service ) a critical
public relations move that Filchev never made ) while also
serving as head of the Anti-Corruption Department, a move
that combines both posts.
SOFIA 00000926 002.3 OF 003
-------------------------------------------
ENTRENCHED INTERESTS INHIBIT CP'S POTENTIAL
-------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Weakening the grip of OC and corruption is a key
objective for Velchev, who is quite aware that Brussels is
looking over his shoulder. Notwithstanding the omnipresence
of "mutri" (thugs) on Sofia streets, Velchev's forcefully
articulated desire to root out OC is encouraging. But
commitment alone will not suffice to jumpstart these efforts.
He will need the active cooperation of Interior Minister
Petkov, with whom Velchev has a strained personal and
professional relationship. While maintaining a "correct"
public relationship, Velchev and Petkov privately blame each
other for Bulgaria's lack of success in fighting organized
crime and related political corruption. In a recent
conversation with us, Velchev blamed both the Minister and
his institution for the lack of success in setting up joint
teams to fight organized crime, implying that Petkov himself
had links to OC figures, saying that the MoI as an
institution refused to share information, and suggesting that
corruption was pervasive throughout the MoI.
¶6. (C) Velchev is also dealing with the legacy of his
predecessor. During his seven-year term, Nikola Filchev
developed a reputation as perhaps the most corrupt and
malevolent high-ranking official in Bulgaria. Unfortunately
for Velchev, both the Supreme Cassation Service and the
Supreme Administrative Service are headed by Deputy Chief
Prosecutors who had close ties to Filchev and have two or
three years left in their terms. Under the Bulgarian
constitution, Velchev cannot fire them outright to make room
for more reform-minded appointees, but must instead convince
the 24-member Supreme Judicial Council to dismiss them. The
constitution provides for only a handful of circumstances
under which prosecutors and other magistrates can be
dismissed, including criminal malfeasance. Velchev's desire
to promote the head of the anti-corruption directorate to
become a third Deputy CP requires a change in law, pushing
this proposal to the backburner for the time being.
¶7. (C) Despite these impediments, Velchev is Bulgaria's best
hope for convincing Brussels that it is serious about
fighting organized crime and rooting out corruption. His
efforts to spearhead judicial reform and to strip MPs of
their immunity have been well received by the EU, and
observers have their fingers crossed that the October report
will acknowledge that Bulgarians have shown the political
will to clear the dead wood out of the prosecutorial system.
For its part, the EU has offered minimal guidance, contending
on one hand that Bulgaria must take serious steps to curb OC
and corruption, but on the other hand keeping mum on the
specific steps that would demonstrate enough progress to win
its confidence.
----------------------
THE MAN AND THE SYSTEM
----------------------
¶8. (U) Elected by the Supreme Judicial Council and appointed
by the president, the Chief Prosecutor sits at the top of a
rigidly hierarchical institution that urgently needs the
energy and vision that Velchev brings to the job. The court
system consists of regional, district, appellate, and
military courts, as well as the Supreme Cassation Court and
the Supreme Administrative Court. The Constitutional Court
is separate from the rest of the judiciary. The sole
educational requirement for judges and prosecutors is the
Bulgarian equivalent of a bachelor's degree in law. The
Prosecution Service staffed almost entirely by prosecutors
hired under former CP Filchev and highly resistant to change.
Only recently have younger ) and presumably less
conservative ) prosecutors been appointed to the Prosecution
Service. Despite the CP's efforts to encourage prosecutors
to disclose their material assets, only 7-8 of the 1200
prosecutors have complied thus far.
¶9. (C) Public opinion is generally supportive of Velchev,
who is widely respected as an academician and whose
idiosyncratic manner and offbeat sense of humor many find
endearing. Until his election as Chief Prosecutor, he worked
as an associate professor in criminal law, heading the
President's Legal Council and lecturing on criminal law at
local universities. His opponents note his lack of
experience as a prosecutor, his political orientation toward
SOFIA 00000926 003.2 OF 003
the Socialists, and his family's Communist-Party pedigree
(Velchev's grandfather was a Politburo member and his father
was an ambassador to Moscow). Blunt yet refined, Velchev
possesses an offhand wit and sarcasm that translate cleanly
in his flawless English.
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COMMENT: WHAT VELCHEV NEEDS TO HEAR...
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¶10. (C) A strong message of support from the Attorney
General and other USG officials will strengthen Velchev, who
faces institutional as well as political resistance to his
stated goal of ending the near-impunity enjoyed by crime
bosses and corrupt politicians in Bulgaria for at least the
last 15 years. A long-time academic, Velchev is vulnerable
to criticism that he lacks real-world experience as a
prosecutor. Yet his ability to identify with career
prosecutors will be essential to changing the existing
mentality and overcoming internal resistance to the changes
he seeks. He is now working to build a personal relationship
with his staff, although many prosecutors ) particularly
those in Sofia ) maintain ties with Filchev and a work ethic
learned during his tenure. Velchev's ultimate success will
depend on strengthening morale and allaying prosecutors'
fears of retaliation once they begin investigating cases more
aggressively. He must convince them that the old system is a
thing of the past ) the task of changing directions in
midstream and moving toward sustainable reform of this office
is Herculean, requiring a dedicated leader who can secure
buy-in from all involved. Few people doubt Velchev's
sincerity or his intelligence, but it is still not clear that
he has the necessary political skill and bureaucratic
toughness to put Bulgaria's untouchables behind bars. We
should emphasize our strong support ) moral and otherwise )
for his reform agenda and encourage him to develop alliances
within the government to smooth the rocky road ahead.
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...AND CARRY HOME
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¶11. (C) In terms of specific deliverables, we should offer to
begin negotiations on an updated extradition treaty, which
would replace the existing treaty that was last amended in
the 1930s. The extradition of Bulgarian nationals was
disallowed until amendments to the Bulgarian constitution
were passed last year, so this meeting gives us the perfect
opportunity to initiate talks on the draft treaty. C-175
negotiation authority passed the inter-agency clearance
process and has received final approval from the Department.
END COMMENT
Beyrle