

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08DAMASCUS146, CORRECTED COPY: REACTIONS TO MAKHLUF
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08DAMASCUS146.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08DAMASCUS146 | 2008-02-28 13:07 | 2010-12-07 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Damascus |
VZCZCXRO9723
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHDM #0146/01 0591307
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281307Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4676
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 1392
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7240
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5477
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0777
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4865
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0127
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0073
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3561
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0467
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1302
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0387
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0415
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 7948
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0907
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2103
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0169
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0318
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000146
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/TFS; TREASURY FOR LEVEY/GLASER; NSC
FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO
EO 12958 DECL: 02/28/2028
TAGS ECON, EFIN, EINV, KCOR, PGOV, SY, LE
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: REACTIONS TO MAKHLUF
DESIGNATION
REF: A. DAMASCUS 126 B. DAMASCUS 70 C. DAMASCUS 54
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b,d)
This is a corrected copy of DAMASCUS 142 -- deleted extra word in the comment.
¶1. (S) Summary: The February 21 designation of Rami Makhluf pursuant to E.O. 13460 generated considerable discussion, but Syrian media coverage has been minimal. Makhluf’s defiant announcement on BBC Arabic radio that the designation was tantamount to a medal of honor was as close to an official reaction as we have seen. Human rights contacts overwhelmingly supported the action. A few Syrian websites reporting the designation generated comments that generally denounced corruption and favored the action, but roughly 30 percent of the postings had positive things to say about Makhluf. Business and other reactions were mixed, with some saying the timing of the designation could not have been better, while others suggested the USG action was a desperate political act that failed to achieve anything significant. We nonetheless detected uncertainty about what the designation could mean for Rami’s partners and his foreign-based assets. End Summary
----------------------------------------
MAKHLUF REACTS WITH BRAVADO ON BBC RADIO
----------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The February 21 designation of Rami Makhluf hit Damascus on the eve of the Syrian weekend and thus generated little initial media reaction. Two days after Washington’s announcement, Rami took to the airwaves of BBC Arabic Radio to respond, calling the designation “a medal we hang on our chest” as part of a “political ploy aimed at undermining important (Syrian) individuals.” He added, “They accuse us of corruption, while we are among the group that is working to invest the most in Syria.” Discounting the impact of the designation, Makhluf claimed that he had no assets in the U.S. “Only a fool would invest in America,” he said. “We were expecting such a decision to be issued over a year ago, but they were late.” Although FM Muallem responded publicly when the E.O. was first announced on February 13, there thus far has been no official SARG reaction to the Makhluf designation.
--------------------------------------------- --
SERENDIPITOUS TIMING AMPLIFIES IMPACT ON REGIME
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (S) Coming just a week after the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, and during a period of rising tensions with Saudi Arabia and the West, the timing of the Makhluf designation amplified its impact on the regime. Contacts report that Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) and General Intelligence Directorate (GID) officials are currently engaged in an internecine struggle to blame each other for the breach of security that resulted in Mughniyeh’s death. In recent days, the Saudi-sponsored Sharq al-Awsat published scathing articles suggesting that Syria is not worthy of hosting the upcoming Arab summit. Additionally, President Mubarak has publicly linked Syrian policy in Lebanon to Egypt’s
DAMASCUS 00000146 002 OF 004
participation in the Arab League summit, and Syrians are increasingly concerned about the direction Lebanon is heading. Thus, in the conspiracy-fueled streets of Damascus, our sources indicated that the Makhluf designation seemed to be a well-timed ratcheting-up of pressure on the regime.
--------------------------------------------
EDUCATED SYRIANS AND CIVIL SOCIETY CELEBRATE
--------------------------------------------
¶4. (S) The designation resonated on the Syrian “street” among middle class followers of international media, many of whom quietly celebrated Makhluf’s public humiliation as a long-overdue comeuppance. The website “Syrianews” covered Makhluf’s response on BBC, and approximately 70 percent of readers’ comments to the article were anti-Makhluf. “As for Santa Claus Makhluf who is showering us with his deeds,” wrote one, “could he explain to us where did he bring his first millions from?” Another commented, “Did Rami invest in any project which would support scientific research, develop the country, or do such projects that do not yield profits in the billions?” Still another opined, “Does anybody dare criticize the economic genius Professor Rami?” The human rights community was also very supportive, but expressed to Poloff their desire to see additional designations in the near future. Upon hearing the news at a meeting with Post’s TDY Press Attache, a XXXXXXXXXXXX dissident shouted and kissed the officer’s cheek.
-------------------------------------
SOME BUSINESSMEN EXPRESS APPREHENSION
-------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Reaction from Embassy business contacts tended to fall into one of two categories, depending on the contact’s relationship with the regime. Apolitical businessmen reported that the designation had sent shockwaves through Rami’s business partners who were now waiting nervously for any additional shoes to drop. Most were concerned about their potential liability due to their business relationship with Makhluf, especially those with assets in the U.S. and Europe. One contact predicted that if this designation was quickly followed by others, or even rumors of additional ones, Rami’s foreign and local partners would completely divest out of self-preservation and absorb whatever regime criticism resulted.
¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, a businessman XXXXXXXXXXXX argued any corruption sanctions that did not include Rami would be meaningless. He predicted before the designation that most Syrians were fully aware of Rami’s corruption and would secretly applaud it. Some regime insiders would attempt to portray the designation as a personal matter between the Bush administration and the Asad family. While Rami had been expecting the sanction for some time, it was nonetheless important for the U.S. to send a strong signal. XXXXXXXXXXXX did not think that sanctioning Rami alone would have much of an effect on Syria’s regional or domestic policies. More designations and tough implementation would be needed to convince the regime the U.S. was serious.
¶7. (S) A reporter for XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
DAMASCUS 00000146 003 OF 004
wasn’t sure the details of the designation were well understood by Syrian businessman and the average Syrian in the street. How would the designation affect foreign investment prospects, for example? Most Syrian elites assumed that the absence of Rami’s assets in the U.S. would make this a moot case. If there were ripple effects on Rami’s business partners, then that might cause people to pay closer attention.
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX a XXXXXXXXXXXX correspondent working on his own piece regarding Makhluf, passed along that he and other journalists had interviewed a former XXXXXXXXXXXX employee of Rami’s empire who had XXXXXXXXXXXX knowledge of Rami’s holdings. That source said the designation created many questions that had to be answered before one could assess the impact. Would all of Rami’s partners be sanctionable? Did Rami have to own a majority share in a company before Americans and others were liable? How would the designation affect ongoing negotiations regarding the sale of Rami’s share of Syriatel’s cell concession? XXXXXXXXXXXX supported the designation and reported that his contacts said that it was overdue. He believed more designations were desirable, arguing, “One a week for the next three months would pressure the Syrians and force them to capitulate.”
---------------------------------
WHILE OTHER ELITES ARE DISMISSIVE
---------------------------------
¶9. (S) Elites with a pro-regime bias characterized the designation as a purely symbolic gesture with no tangible economic repercussions. They viewed the designation as a feckless personal attack on the Asad family from a U.S. Administration with little remaining political leverage over Syria. Regarding Makhluf’s many prominent business partners in Cham Holding, this group’s opinion was that no Syrian would dare try to divest from Rami -- even if he wanted to -- for fear of being perceived as a coward in the face of US pressure. Consequently, this line of thinking concluded, Makhluf’s designation will result in a “circling of the wagons” around the regime.
¶10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted to Econoff that, after hearing about the designation on Al Jazeera, he had run his own name through Google to see what public information might connect him to Rami. Claiming to have no affection for the Makhlufs or the regime, he said he still could not imagine divesting XXXXXXXXXXXX and remaining in Syria. “I love the U.S.,” he explained, “but my entire life is in Syria. What am I supposed to do, take my family to the U.S. and get a job making 5000 dollars a month, or be my own boss and XXXXXXXXXXXX a better life in Syria?” XXXXXXXXXXXX would not put him in legal jeopardy, he finally shrugged his shoulders and said, “Whatever happens to Rami...happens to all of us.”
¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX assessed Rami’s designation as an empty, desperate attempt by the outgoing Bush administration to punish a member of Bashar’s inner circle. A marketing expert XXXXXXXXXXXX asked, “What was the intended message (of the designation)? I looked and looked, but could find very
DAMASCUS 00000146 004 OF 004
little. The time for such an action was two years ago.” Unless the U.S. could sanction Rami’s Byblos Bank (five percent share) or convince the Emiratis to freeze Rami’s UAE-based assets, he concluded that the designation would have very little teeth and would be regarded by most Syrians as yet another “wayward arrow from the warped bow of George Bush.”
¶12. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized Rami’s designation as a “mostly symbolic gesture” that would have little impact on the regime’s policies. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Bashar had already put some distance between himself and his cousin and Makhluf had moved a great deal of his personal assets to Dubai. XXXXXXXXXXXX conceded that most Syrians viewed Rami in a negative light and that his strong-arm business tactics had earned him many enemies. He nonetheless believed that a majority of Syrians, at least the few who had heard about it on BBC or read about it on the internet, would see the act as a last-ditch effort by the Bush administration to punish Bashar.
¶13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had had several run-ins with Makhluf XXXXXXXXXXXX during his tenure, but that Rami had learned “the hard way” from Bashar that there was a limit to how much he could get away with on the basis of his family ties. He predicted that Bashar would secretly welcome any U.S. sanctions against corruption, because corruption was rife in Syrian government and society and had undermined the President’s credibility with the Syrian people. Designating Rami, however, would have very little practical impact because Rami had diversified his many investments and it would be hard to identify majority share interests that he owned.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶14. (S) Rami Makhluf’s designation has generated the most reaction among Embassy contacts of any USG action vis-a-vis Syria in the past three years. With increased murmurings casting a pall over the Arab League summit, uncertainty about what will happen in Lebanon, and never-ending conspiracy theories about the Mughniyeh assassination, Rami’s designation occurred at a time when the SARG is facing pressure from multiple sources. Early indications are that the “business community,” regardless of political affiliation, is definitely nervous about the potential implications of doing business with Rami.
CORBIN