

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04WELLINGTON173, THE U.S.-NEW ZEALAND RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WE COULD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04WELLINGTON173.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04WELLINGTON173 | 2004-02-25 21:28 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Wellington |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000173
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR EAP/FO/MDALEY AND EAP/ANP
NSC FOR MGREEN AND CJONES
USINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD/JHOLZMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2014
TAGS: PREL NZ
SUBJECT: THE U.S.-NEW ZEALAND RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WE COULD
NOT SAY IN THE MISSION PROGRAM PLAN
REF: 03 WELLINGTON 0339
Classified By: Charge David R. Burnett; Reasons 1.5 (B and D)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Since New Zealand walked away from the
ANZUS pact in 1986, we have had growing doubts about its
willingness and ability to contribute to regional security.
New Zealand remains a relatively friendly, like-minded
partner in many policy areas. But the ad hoc nature of the
its security commitments, decline of its defense capabilities
under successive governments, the current government,s view
of multilateralism as a means to limit U.S. power, and its
flirtation with China and France to limit U.S. and Australian
influence in the Pacific raise questions about the extent to
which we can count on New Zealand on security issues in the
future. The March 9-13 visit of CINCPAC Fargo to New Zealand
could make an important contribution to our dialogue with New
Zealand on its commitment to and capacity for sharing
regional security responsibilities, as well as the growing
compatibility gap with our other South Pacific partner,
Australia. The visit may have a direct bearing on release of
the opposition National Party,s paper on U.S.-New Zealand
relations and will follow a March 3 meeting between PM Clark
and Australian PM Howard, events that are expected to raise
these same concerns. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) COMMITMENT: New Zealand,s decision to sit out
the invasion of Iraq was a reminder of how far its security
policies and interests have drifted from those of its
traditional allies since NZ walked away from the ANZUS pact
in 1986 (reftel). Subsequent deployment of 60 combat
engineers to Basra has allowed the current government to
offset some of the damage done to its traditional
relationships while continuing to place criticism of the
Coalition in local media. But the drift in policy is more
fundamental than just differences over Iraq. In laying
groundwork for the visit of Chinese President Hu, the Clark
government privately mooted that it was necessary for New
Zealand to work more closely with other powers such as China
and France to curtail U.S. and Australian influence in the
region. During the visit of the Chinese Vice-Minister for
Trade, NZ Trade Minister Sutton publicly claimed that China
was New Zealand's most important and valued trading partner,
a claim that left Australian officials here scratching their
heads in wonder. Officials of the current government
continue to tout the importance of using the UN and other
multilateral organizations as a means of containing, rather
than engaging with or influencing, the United States.
¶3. (S/NF) Meanwhile, beneath the political level,
long-standing military and intelligence ties continue
virtually unabated. One can make the case that restrictions
levied by the USG on programs in those areas in the wake of
New Zealand's 1986 withdrawal from ANZUS have been
progressively weakened over the intervening years. Increased
use of waivers to provide training or intelligence support
for New Zealanders undertaking missions of interest to the
United States makes sense. Indeed, in this Mission's view,
any military-to-military or intelligence activity that can be
shown to have net benefit to the United States is clearly
worth pursuing. However, it is important to be aware that
these activities are used in New Zealand's domestic political
arena as a counterweight to opposition claims that the GNZ is
neglecting the bilateral relationship or is letting New
Zealand's strategic policies drift. This is why the GNZ
routinely attempts to bypass normal diplomatic channels to
press for further weakening of the restrictions imposed in
the wake of the introduction of the anti-nuclear policy.
¶4. (S/NF) It is also useful to note that the degree of
commitment expressed by military or intelligence counterparts
is often stronger than that of their political masters. For
example, in a discussion with State Counterterrorism
Coordinator Cofer Black on Indonesia, NZ military and
intelligence officials were enthusiastic about the
possibility that they could augment U.S. and Australian
efforts. However, the PM's senior policy advisor immediately
interjected that past Indonesian repression in East Timor
would make it impossible for New Zealand to engage in CT
activities there. The same individual also agreed after
lengthy discussion of various CT threats in the region that
these matters were indeed serious, but said New Zealand's
senior political leadership was far more concerned about food
security than physical security. With commitment gaps like
these, it is important that we take our cue on New Zealand's
commitment to regional security from those who set the
budgets and mandate the policies.
¶5. (S/NF) CAPABILITY: Successive governments have allowed
New Zealand's defense capabilities to decline since the
mid-1980s. We have been told by retired GNZ officials who
were in senior positions in the Lange government at the time
the anti-nuclear policy was instituted that one of the
considerations favoring the policy was that it would lead to
NZ withdrawing or being pushed out of ANZUS, thereby
lessening the country's defense spending requirements at a
time of fiscal and economic crisis. Defense budgets since
that time have not even been adequate to cover replacement
costs for basic coastal defense hardware. To its credit, the
Clark government, after scrapping the previous government's
agreement to buy F-16s, has moved to replace aging frigates,
helicopters and light-armored vehicles. It has allocated
NZ$3.0 billion over 10 years for this purpose. We have asked
repeatedly at all levels where that number came from, and
have never gotten a satisfactory answer. In any case, given
this apparently arbitrary budget figure, the military has
done its best to set priorities consistent with basic
defense, a limited peacekeeping role and an occasional nod to
its previous allies (e.g., sending an appropriately
configured frigate to the Persian Gulf). Some of the new
equipment, such as the LAV-IIIs, is less versatile than the
equipment it is replacing. Other hardware will be limited in
scope because it is meant to be used with systems that the
NZDF will no longer have -- e.g., combat helicopters but no
joint strike fighters. Finally, maintenance of the new
systems is not fully accounted for in the acquisition and
deployment costs covered by the NZ$3.0 billion budgeted.
¶6. (S/NF) Cuts in hardware and redefinition of the
military's role as peacekeepers rather than peacemakers have
made recruitment and retention more difficult. Fighter
pilots have left the Air Force in droves. The NZDF is
hard-pressed to come up with two rotations of troops for
peacekeeping operations when even that is less than the
minimum three rotations required for effective long-term
operations. Only the elite SAS (three squadrons) is still
fully equipped and funded for missions relevant to the new
threats emerging in the region and beyond. The combat
engineers in Basra and the PRT in Bamian Province have
acquitted themselves well, but have been heavily dependent
for transport and other support services on ourselves and the
British. Closer to home, when the Australians asked the
Kiwis for help in the Solomon Islands, New Zealand's initial
offer was to keep an army company "on reserve" in New
Zealand. Meanwhile, Fiji sent 400 or so troops. Finally,
after great pressure from the Australians, the GNZ relented
and agreed to send troops. After all that, according to the
Australian High Commissioner (protect), due to an equipment
breakdown, the troops had to be flown to the Solomons on
Australian aircraft.
¶7. (S/NF) COMPATIBILITY: Given reduced commitment levels and
declining capability, the ability to work with
better-equipped, more focused forces would seem to be crucial
to maintaining an appropriate level of influence in the
region and beyond. This Mission does not expect a country of
four million people to punch at the same level as the United
States, or even Australia. However, the growing gap between
what the Australians can do in the South Pacific and the
ability of the Kiwis to help them do it is of great concern
to Australia, and should be of concern to us as well. For
example, we are pleased that New Zealand plans to equip its
new frigates with communications systems compatible with our
own. However, the contribution those frigates could make to
peacekeeping operations in Melanesia or Indonesia is limited,
and the military assets the NZDF could contribute to such
operations will not be interoperable with either Australian
hardware or our own.
¶8. (S/NF) OUR MESSAGE: We have already begun to raise the
above concerns with the GNZ. Beginning with Admiral Fargo's
visit, we would like to give them a higher profile in private
and in public. In doing so, we must be careful not allow
ourselves to be painted by the Clark government as bullies
telling Kiwis how to spend their tax dollars. We would
suggest the following themes:
-- We value our long-standing military and intelligence
relationship with New Zealand and the commonality of values
on which that relationship is based.
-- We are facing a world that has become increasingly
uncertain since the end of the Cold War; we all need to know
whom we can count on, for what, and when.
-- Many decisions by successive New Zealand governments over
the past 20 years beginning with, but not limited to, the
anti-nuclear policy have raised questions about whether we
can continue to count on New Zealand as a partner in ensuring
the security of this region.
-- While we may differ on any number of aspects of foreign
policy, the security of this region is clearly of mutual
concern.
-- We look forward to continued consultations with the
Government of New Zealand on your country's commitment to
this vital objective, your capability to join with us and
others to contribute to achieving our shared goals, and the
compatibility of New Zealand's future contributions with
those of its other partners.
¶9. (S/NF) Comment: We believe the message themes outlined
above will reduce the Clark government's wiggle room on
whether it prefers to work with us and Australia in the
region, or against us. We also believe engaging in an honest
dialogue on these themes will reassure New Zealanders that,
while we sould like to be able to count on a New Zealand with
greater capability, compatibility and commitment, we are not
asking them to do more than their fair share. In sum, the
creative ambiguity in our relationship since 1986 has
permitted us to do a great deal together in areas of mutual
interest, despite a major policy difference. It has also
allowed New Zealand to drift farther and farther from its
former alliance partners in its commitment to what should be
shared foreign policy goals. It has permitted a generation
of New Zealanders to believe our shared history began, and
perhaps ended, with the Vietnam War. Worst of all, it has
encouraged them to ignore any parallels between China's
interest in the region today and that of Japan in the 1920s
and '30s.
¶10. (S/NF) One of the most common questions we have run into
in discussing the remote prospect that the GNZ might scrap
all or part of the anti-nuclear policy is "If we were to do
so, would you expect us to resurrect the commitments of
ANZUS?" At present, we do not have a good answer to that
question. Replying "Change the policy and we will see," is of
scant help to those Kiwis who would like to see a closer
U.S.-NZ relationship. This Mission believes a frank
discussion of our mutual expectations on regional security
commitments, capabilities and compatibility would be useful
in furthering the bilateral relationship. If carefully
handled, it could also make a fruitful contribution to the
public discussion of the U.S.-New Zealand relationship
sparked by the U.S.-Australia FTA negotiations.
Burnett