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Viewing cable 09MEXICO3378, PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT)
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MEXICO3378 | 2009-12-01 16:24 | 2011-02-01 21:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Mexico |
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHME #3378/01 3351624
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011624Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9219
INFO RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
UNCLAS MEXICO 003378
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM KCRM PTER PREL ASEC PINR MX
SUBJECT: PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT)
REF: STATE 30541
1.(SBU) SUMMARY: A neutron alarm recorded by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) equipment in Manzanillo on 24 October appears to have been a false alert. Under the Megaports Initiative, DOE is installing radiation portal monitors (RPM) at the four Mexican seaports of Veracruz and Altamira on the Gulf of Mexico coast and Lazaro Cardenas and Manzanillo on the Pacific coast. Installation at the Port of Manzanillo is nearing completion. Because final installation is not finished and testing has not begun, the technology remains under DOE (i.e., USG) control. The incident presents an opportunity to enhance bilateral cooperation on detection of and response to radiation sources in Mexico's logistics chain. Where some Mexican reluctance existed, there is now increased GOM desire to develop and agree the bilateral communications protocol that will govern alarm notification procedures as all four ports come online. This cable reviews the incident chronologically (paras 2-8) and describes after-action engagement with GOM customs and nuclear regulatory officials (paras 8-9). END SUMMARY.
TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN MEXICO ----------------------------
2.(SBU) 24 OCTOBER 09: A radiation portal monitor in Manzanillo alerted for the presence of neutron radiation on 24 October. DOE officials in Manzanillo noticed the neutron alarm several hours later -- at approximately 1800 local time -- when reviewing the RPM daily file data. (Note: All times are for Mexico City. On 24 October, Central Daylight Time. On all subsequent dates, Central Standard Time. End note.) The system in Manzanillo was powered on and collecting data, but had not been accepted by DOE and was not yet manned by Mexican Customs (MXC). The DOE team forwarded the scan results to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The container that triggered the alarm had been released and exited the Port before the alert was detected, en route to a warehouse in Queretaro, two hours northwest of Mexico City in the capital's greater industrial zone. The container was one in a five-container shipment originated in China by Korean firm Samsung Electronics. The manifest listed the container contents as electronic motors; subsequent inspection by Mexico's National Commission for Nuclear Security and Safety (CNSNS) confirmed the load was washing machine motors packed in 24 wooden crates.
3.(SBU) 26 OCTOBER 09: DOE officials in Manzanillo informed local MXC officials of the alert at 0900. MXC advised DOE at that time that the shipment was destined for the United States (Note: this initial report was soon realized to be inaccurate. End note). The MXC office in Manzanillo took steps to track the container. At 1100, LANL advised DOE officials that the alert appeared genuine. DOE relayed LANL's conclusion to MXC in Manzanillo. DOE then made the initial notification to Embassy Mexico City -- to the CBP Attache and the Economic Section (ECON) via email. CBPMX contacted MXC headquarters in Mexico City. At 1157, DOE alerted CBPMX via email that the shipment was identified not to be destined to the United States; Mexico was the country of final destination. CBPMX sent an initial alert message to CBP's International Affairs (INA) and Field Operations (OFO) offices and a follow-on message clarifying the the shipment was not/not destined for U.S. territory.
4.(SBU) 27 OCTOBER 09: CBPMX and ECON briefed the Ambassador and DCM and the DCM spoke with State's Office of WMD Terrorism at 0800. CBPMX and ECON briefed the DCM several times per day through the remainder of the event. DOE also provided the available alarm spectra data to State during the morning. At 0900 and 0930, two conference calls convened CBPMX and ECON with Washington-based WMD incident response elements at DOE, DHS, DOD, DOJ, NSC, and DOS. The calls produced an agreed course of action: 1) confirm location of container and tractor, 2) isolate container at company warehouse, 3) determine appropriate GOM authority to conduct secondary inspection, and 4) conduct secondary inspection.
At 1000, MXC advised CBPMX that it was determining whether MXC had the jurisdiction to issue a Notice to Redeliver and/or detain the container at the company warehouse. MXC also said it had notified CNSNS, the GOM counterpart to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. By 1300, MXC told CBPMX that given the container had exited the Port of Manzanillo, CNSNS would be the lead GOM agency to coordinate the GOM response. On a third USG conference call at 1500, a difference in interpretation of the Manzanillo RPM scan images emerged between LANL and DOE-Triage team scientists. DOE-Triage reported a high likelihood cosmic radiation had triggered the alarm. LANL and DOE-Triage immediately moved to a fourth conference call to resolve their differing interpretations. Meanwhile, DOE engaged its contacts at CNSNS, which had just become the GOM response lead. At the same time, CBPMX contacted Samsung corporate security to ask that Samsung verify the container's location and secure and isolate it. At 1900, DOE reported that LANL and DOE-Triage scientists had reached consensus that additional data was needed to determine the root cause of the alarm and that secondary inspections should be performed on the container. They also determined that the possible neutron source was located in the trailer/container, not the tractor hauling it. Accordingly, USG responders downgraded efforts to locate the tractor and focused efforts on the container.
5.(SBU) 28 OCTOBER 09: Discussion on an 0830 interagency conference call focused on moderate difficulties experienced to that point in communicating with Mexican counterparts and the use of Alpha scan equipment to detect residue if the container were discovered to have been opened or its cargo manipulated. At 1000, CNSNS confirmed it would dispatch a team to location to conduct a secondary inspection. Just before noon, the Laboratory Scientific Services (LSS) unit located at DHS-CBP's National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) reported that LSS analysis indicated the neutron signature appeared to originate from the tractor rather than the container, contrary to LANL and DOE-Triage conclusions the day prior. DOE and CBPMX moved to put LSS, LANL, and DOE-Triage technical experts in touch to discuss their differing findings. At 1415, Samsung told CBPMX that the container was located at its warehouse facility in Queretaro and remained sealed. The tractor was no longer at the Queretaro facility; it had departed after delivery. CBPMX requested that Samsung isolate the container and restrict access pending further guidance to Samsung from CNSNS. At 1630, CNSNS notified ECON and DOE a two-person team was en route to Samsung's Queretaro facility to conduct a secondary inspection of the container that evening.
6.(SBU) 29 OCTOBER 09: CNSNS notified DOE at 0030 that its team had found the container sealed, secured and isolated at the Samsung warehouse on arrival. The team's preliminary inspection detected no presence of neutron radiation. At 1000, DOE reported to USG interagency participants that CNSNS had now conducted two inspections of the container, both with negative results. The team would proceed to devan the container and inspect the cargo package by package. At 1755, CNSNS emailed USG participants a summary of its three separate inspections of the container, indicating a gamma radiation value equivalent to background levels at the site (0.10 microSieverts/hour) and a zero cps reading for neutron radiation. The team used Interceptor detection equipment. CNSNS concluded there was no evidence of a radioactive source in the shipment.
7.(SBU) 30 OCTOBER 09: LSS and DOE-Triage reviewed the RPM data at 0800 and did not conclusively resolve their differing interpretations concerning the possibility the tractor rather than the container had emitted the neutron radiation. On a 1300 interagency conference call, DOE was asked to request the photos, data, and analyses from CNSNS's Queretaro inspections. Given the six days elapsed without positive control of the tractor and the uncertainty of the scientific analysis, the participants identified no further steps concerning the tractor.
AFTER ACTION AND WAY FORWARD ----------------------------
8.(SBU) After repeated requests during the week of 1 November, CNSNS forwarded photos from its Queretaro inspections. CNSNS indicated it would pass scan data and analysis by 9 November. On 17 November, CNSNS backtracked, saying the hand-held detection units used in Queretaro had not recorded any data beyond the baseline readings, and even this data was difficult to extract from the hand-helds. The incomplete data sharing does not appear to reflect a GOM reluctance to share, rather CNSNS' sense the urgency of the incident had subsided once they completed their inspections and the agency's uncertainty as to how to extract data from their equipment.
9.(SBU) CNSNS, MXC, DOE, CBPMX, and ECON convened an after action review and preliminary discussion of the communications protocol on 19 November in Mexico City. In the after action segment, concerns included the following. GOM interlocutors felt they had received notification of the alarm relatively late. Once the GOM engaged, it was initially unclear for jurisdictional reasons which Mexican agency, MXC or CNSNS, was the GOM lead. After CNSNS made its inspection of the container in Queretaro, the U.S. side worried Mexico has been slow to share its data with U.S. technical experts. Once the RPM system in Manzanillo is fully functioning, all agreed any container that triggers a neutron alarm must be held in port for additional inspection. Because the equipment will be run and monitored by MXC, USG visibility on future alerts will depend on the procedures set out in the communications protocol. In the protocol-focused discussion, the parties agreed in broad terms to the alert notification structure -- with a draft circulated by DOE accepted as the basis for more detailed talks. Mexican comments on the draft are due 7 December, the USG response to their comments 15 December, and the two sides will reconvene as early as January.
10.(U) The Department of Energy has cleared on this cable. PASCUAL
0 12/01/2009 10529 KNNP,MNUC,PARM,KCRM,PTER,PREL,ASEC,PINR,MX PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT)
A neutron alarm recorded by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) equipment in Manzanillo on 24 October appears to have been a false alert. Under the Megaports Initiative, DOE is installing radiation portal monitors (RPM) at the four Mexican seaports of Veracruz and Altamira on the Gulf of Mexico coast and Lazaro Cardenas and Manzanillo on the Pacific coast. Installation at the Port of Manzanillo is nearing completion. Because final installation is not finished and testing has not begun, the technology remains under DOE (i.e., USG) control. The incident presents an opportunity to enhance bilateral cooperation on detection of and response to radiation sources in Mexico's logistics chain. Where some Mexican reluctance existed, there is now increased GOM desire to develop and agree the bilateral communications protocol that will govern alarm notification procedures as all four ports come online. This cable reviews the incident chronologically (paras 2-8) and describes after-action engagement with GOM customs and nuclear regulatory officials (paras 8-9).