

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09HELSINKI127, FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY: EU AN END POINT OR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09HELSINKI127.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09HELSINKI127 | 2009-04-02 10:59 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
VZCZCXRO7647
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0127/01 0921059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021059Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4901
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0089
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0973
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000127
SIPDIS
NSC FOR JEFF HOVENIER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: EU FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S SECURITY POLICY: EU AN END POINT OR
WAY-POINT?
REF: HELSINKI 79
Classified By: CDA Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Media attention on the Finnish Government's
(GOF) quadrennial defense and security white paper focused
more on the "strong case" in favor of Finland's possible NATO
membership than the fact that the document places primary
importance on the European Union's role in promoting
security. According to the GOF, the EU can combat a variety
of threats - weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource
scarcity, climate change - through its policies (crisis
management, neighborhood) and "key role" in certain sectors
(energy, transport). The white paper places particular
importance on a "European solidarity" that would be
strengthened by ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Reliance
on the EU as a security promoter reflects wide public support
for an EU security role and offers traditionalists a
counterweight to NATO as the primary source of security in
Europe. For others, including Foreign Minister Stubb and
counterparts in the National Coalition Party, focus on the EU
as font of security also provides a way-station on the route
to eventual NATO membership. Ultimately, any decision
regarding NATO membership is at least three years down the
line, and will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU,
and on the political will of the next government to take
Finland into NATO. End summary.
NATO gets the attention ...
---------------------------
¶2. (C) Upon the January 23 release of Finland's quadrennial
defense and security white paper, the media focused on its
treatment of Finland's possible NATO membership (REF). The
paper addresses Finnish-NATO relations in greater depth and
more positively than the 2004 version; in a March 11 briefing
on the paper for Embassy personnel, Defense Ministry
officials emphasized the positive evolution of successive
post-Cold War white papers' description of those relations.
The paper states "strong grounds exist" for Finland's
membership, but nevertheless concludes that the option to
join will remain open. (NOTE: President Halonen has ruled out
Finland's NATO membership during her tenure. END NOTE.)
¶3. (U) The paper highlights another important reason to
pursue NATO cooperation (if not membership) - the U.S.'s role
as sole remaining superpower and the most important NATO
member. The paper departs in small but significant ways from
prior treatment of the U.S. and the transatlantic
relationship. Reflecting the U.S.-EU tensions over Iraq, the
2004 version refers to a U.S. readiness to act unilaterally,
"bypassing well-established cooperation forums," and
neutrally refers to "fostering" bilateral relations. The
2009 version dispenses with unilateralist references and
explicitly identifies the need for Finland to maintain close
relations with the U.S.
... but EU gets top billing
---------------------------
¶4. (U) The media gave significantly less heed to the
organization given the most prominent attention in the paper:
the European Union. The paper describes the EU as "a
fundamental security policy choice" because EU integration,
enlargement, neighborhood policies and a "solid EU-Russia
partnership" have strengthened Finland's security. In a March
12 briefing on the paper for the diplomatic corps, MFA Under
Secretary Markus Lyra stressed the EU's importance in
combating a broad range of threats, including crises and
conflicts, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, resource
scarcity and climate change. According to the paper, the EU
affects security policy through such means as development of
policies related to crisis management and internal security,
and being a "key actor" in fields like energy and transport.
¶5. (C) For the GOF, "European solidarity" appears to be
fundamental to the security benefits the EU provides, as the
paper states EU Member States (MSs) belong to "a close-knit
political grouping" that shares "the will to act in unison."
The Lisbon Treaty's "solidarity clause" would not create a
new obligation, rather it would reinforce existing
"instruments and capabilities" and strengthen mutual
solidarity. For Finland, a strong sense of solidarity
reflects "the readiness to defend the other Member States by
all available means," such that "Finland will provide
assistance to the other Member States and expects others to
HELSINKI 00000127 002 OF 003
act likewise." In his briefing Lyra stated that Finland's
participation in crisis management operations, like the
currently EU-led operation in Chad, demonstrates their
willingness and ability to assist other MSs.
Fellow EU Members comment on Finland's position
--------------------------------------------- --
¶6. (C) Speaking to Finnish perceptions of the EU, Dutch DCM
Thomas van Leeuwen told Polchief that in the absence of
membership of a military alliance like NATO, and with a
sizable number of Finns uncertain about or opposing NATO
membership, the Finns must necessarily look to the EU.
Polish Political Counselor Stanislaw Cios told Polchief that
in several bilateral meetings in Helsinki in February GOF
officials emphasized the role of the EU as a "security
promoter." Cios said both sides agreed that demonstrating the
willingness and ability to participate in crisis management
operations signals an expectation and acceptance of similar
assistanc. Cios also described frustration about the EU,
ith the Finns complaining of a lack of strategic tinking
and cooperaton; for example, on Afghanisan, they complained
that at the political level E officials are focused on and
distracted by techical matters like the number of ciilian
slots for police trainers, something best left for the expert
level. (NOTE: In a March 11 conversation with Charge, Lyra
said some GOF officials are frustrated by the strong
influence of France, Germany and the United Kingdom within
the EU, and by the failure of the Lisbon Treaty to come into
force. END NOTE.)
Security role for EU: necessary and sufficient?
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) Across the coalition government and the political
spectrum, there is a consensus that the EU plays a necessary
role in advancing Finland's security interests. Polls show
the public strongly considers the EU to be an important
factor in increasing Finland's security. Whether the "EU
factor" is sufficient depends on two things: (1) whom one
asks, and (2) how one defines threats. On the former,
roughly half of those polled feel Finland should remain
militarily non-aligned, reflecting a deeply-ingrained sense
that Finland will always "go it alone" militarily and a
concern about having to fight "someone else's war" as part of
an alliance. Regarding threats, the white paper adopts a
broad concept of threat that includes, for example, energy
scarcity and climate change. For Finns who eschew military
alliances, who deem military threats to Finland a distant
prospect, and as see a strong EU role in addressing climate
change and other challenges, the EU is a final destination.
Within the coalition government, the center and center-left
members - Center Party (of PM Vanhanen), Green Party and
Swedish People's Party - more so than the center-right
National Coalition Party (NCP) contain the strongest EU
support.
¶8. (C) The NCP largely represents a different view, one that
acknowledges an important role for the EU while arguing for
the fundamental importance of NATO and Finland's eventual
NATO membership. For supporters of this view, the EU might
be seen as an enduring and integral component of a
multi-faceted security policy, or more simply a way-station
on the path to NATO membership. For them, the EU also serves
as a useful tool to reassure NATO skeptics, given the
considerable overlap of EU and NATO goals and membership (a
point included in the white paper). For some, the question
of the EU's role is moot: As Lyra told Charge, regardless of
the emphasis some officials place on the EU, the medium- to
long-term burden of maintaining an army of 250,000-350,000
soldiers dedicated to territorial defense was the strongest
argument for Finland,s entry into NATO.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Embedded in the paper's text is the debate within the
GOF about how to define the center of gravity in Finland's
security policy. The media coverage of the white paper
suggested a "NATO or EU" divide, given the tendency among
government officials or others to emphasize the importance of
one or the other. Certainly, one sees the influence of the
more transatlantic-oriented NCP in the paper, reflected in
the more positive treatment of NATO and the U.S., though U.S.
language also reflects a general openness to the new
Administration. EU supporters also had their say (as Lyra
HELSINKI 00000127 003 OF 003
said, the paper contained more favorable NATO language "but
then the politicians got in the way"). Nevertheless, the
differences within the GOF regarding the weight and
importance of the EU and NATO are not stark or polar.
Ultimately, any Finnish decision regarding NATO membership
will rest on public opinion about NATO, not the EU, and on
the configuration of the next coalition government, the
stance of the next President and the collective political
will to take Finland into NATO without a majority supporting
membership. End comment.
BUTLER