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Viewing cable 09QUITO216, SLOW-ROLLING THE GOE REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-16S
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO216 | 2009-03-27 19:48 | 2011-04-14 20:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/14/1/1355/cable-199357.html |
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0216/01 0861948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271948Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0205
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8061
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4123
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3473
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3121
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4221
RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2276
RUCOWCA/COGARD TISCOM ALEXANDRIA VA
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/USDOARMY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J2
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000216
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS EC
SUBJECT: SLOW-ROLLING THE GOE REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-16S
REF: QUITO 178
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons ...
id: 199357
date: 3/27/2009 19:48
refid: 09QUITO216
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO178
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0216/01 0861948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271948Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0205
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8061
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4123
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3473
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3121
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4221
RHMFISS/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ
RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2276
RUCOWCA/COGARD TISCOM ALEXANDRIA VA
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/USDOARMY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J2
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000216
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS EC
SUBJECT: SLOW-ROLLING THE GOE REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-16S
REF: QUITO 178
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) Commander
signed an official memorandum on November 25, 2008 requesting
a quote from the U.S. on the cost of purchasing 24 F-16 C/D
Block 50 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) aircraft, with the intention
of replacing its outdated fighter fleet. Post delayed
forwarding the request due to bilateral tensions and the
expectation that the GOE would decide to direct its resources
elsewhere; however, the FAE has continued to express an
interest in a response. Although the request is only for a
quote at this time, initiating discussions on the sale of
advanced fighter aircraft to Ecuador raises the question of
how such a sale would meet USG policy goals and the potential
for a negative reaction by other countries in the region.
The sale of F-16s would help maintain a longer term
U.S.-Ecuador military to military relationship, and keep
Ecuador from making the purchase from Russia, France, or
China. However, Ecuador's historic instability, current
leftist government, recent tensions with the U.S., and
economic woes also raise the question of its ability to pay
and the wisdom of the purchase, as well as its ultimate
objectives. The Embassy seeks guidance from Washington on
whether providing a price quote, with the potential for a
future sale, supports USG policy goals. (End Summary)
The GOE Makes Its Request
¶2. (C) The Embassy received an official memorandum dated
November 25, 2008. from the FAE requesting a price quote for
the potential purchase of two squadrons of F-16 C/D Block 50
MLU (24 total) aircraft. Although Post thought the GOE might
lose interest in the aircraft, subsequent verbal inquiries
have confirmed that the FAE still wants the information. In
meetings with several FAE generals, we are told that the
Ecuadorian military is looking to replace fully its current
Israeli KFIR and French Mirage fleet, which are both over 30
years old. The FAE currently has 33 out-of-commission
Mirages and KFIRs and three functional KFIRs. Initial
estimates of price are in excess of $800 million. The
request for a price quote would allow the FAE to include this
information in its proposal for 2010 and subsequent budgets.
Policy Concerns
¶3. (C) It is not clear whether U.S. policy will allow the
transfer of associated weapons systems for use by F-16s in
Ecuador. F-16 Block 50 aircraft are capable of employing the
US Air Force,s (USAF) most sophisticated and advanced
weapons technology, such as Joint Direct Attack Munition
GPS-guided bombs and laser guided munitions, as well as our
most advanced air-to-air missiles. Although it is extremely
unlikely that the GOE would use the aircraft or technology
against the U.S., Ecuador has a history of political
instability which could present a concern for regional
conflicts.
¶4. (C) Selling the F-16 to Ecuador, due to the high cost of
the package and subsequent need for maintenance, would help
in maintaining FAE-USAF ties for the next 30 years.
Furthermore, if the U.S. does not sell the F-16 and if the
GOE decides to move forward on the purchase of fighter
aircraft, the GOE could engage Russia, France or China, who
would have no issues in selling their aircraft. The Embassy
notes that it may be in the USG,s interest to strengthen the
military relationship through sales in general, rather than
having the GOE go elsewhere, but the significance of F-16s
merits careful consideration. Selling the F-16 also would
enable the U.S. to control the weapons capability used on
Ecuador's fighter aircraft.
Regional Impact
¶5. (C) Ecuador,s regional neighbors may perceive Ecuador,s
acquisition of the F-16s as a change in the regional balance
of power. Specifically, the history of conflict with Peru,
plus the March 1 Colombian attack in Ecuador and Ecuador,s
refusal to re-establish diplomatic relations with Colombia,
could cause regional U.S. allies to question the sale.
However, Peru has one of Russia,s most advanced fighters,
the SU-27, in its inventory, and Colombia recently completed
the acquisition of the most advanced Israeli KFIR.
Where,s the Money?
¶6. (C) Reflecting reduced oil revenues, Defense Minister
Javier Ponce announced on December 22 that the GOE will
reduce military spending by updating existing equipment,
setting a ceiling on military retirement pay, and selling off
non-defense related companies currently owned by the
military. Yet, the GOE has already made several commitments
for the acquisition of military equipment. The GOE spent
$631 million in almost two years ($463 million in 2008) to
acquire a Legacy 600 presidential plane, 24 Brazilian Super
Tucanos, seven Indian HAL Dhruv helicopters, jeeps, 14 boats,
two Leander class frigates, and other equipment and
munitions. The GOE has also told Embassy officials of its
strong interest in the purchase of two C-130Js at an
estimated cost of $240 million. The Ecuadorian military
announced the potential purchase of radars from the Chinese
government-owned Chinese Electronics Technology Corporation
(CETC) for use in the northern border region, at a cost of
$60 million (reftel). With all these announced purchases of
weapons, and with the global economic crisis and the price of
Ecuadorian oil at approximately $48 per barrel, it is unclear
whether the GOE would have sufficient funds to make the
purchase of F-16s. The priorities for the GOE during the
economic downturn also raises the question of whether this
money should be best spent elsewhere.
¶7. (C) High level Ecuadorian military officials have
privately told Embassy officials that the Minister of Defense
has instructed the Ecuadorian Joint Command to pursue any
acquisitions of military equipment from China, Russia or
Iran. However, FAE leadership continues to stress the
strategic benefits of purchasing the F-16s from the U.S.
Comment
¶8. (C) The purchase of the Super Tucanos and C-130s makes
more strategic sense for Ecuador in the patrol and protection
of its borders. The Embassy would like to avoid, however,
having to deny Ecuador,s request for only a price quote,
noting that an ultimate sale could take up to three years,
and that a price quote represents no commitment to make a
sale. The Embassy will attempt to guide the Ecuadorian
military in making strategic decisions on the purchase of
military equipment. Meanwhile, with the economic challenges
faced by the GOE and already announced reductions of military
spending, it is likely that the GOE will determine that
pursuing the purchase of fighter aircraft is not in its own
best interest at this time. The Embassy requests guidance
from Washington on whether providing a price quote, with the
potential for a future sale, supports USG policy goals.
HODGES
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