

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08MANAGUA1405, THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL POLICE AND ELECTORAL FRAUD
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MANAGUA1405.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08MANAGUA1405 | 2008-11-20 14:15 | 2011-05-09 16:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Managua |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #1405/01 3251415
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201415Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3410
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T MANAGUA 001405
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, INL/LP, INR/IAA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2013
TAGS: SNAR ASEC PGOV PREL NU
SUBJECT: THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL POLICE AND ELECTORAL FRAUD
REF: A. MANAGUA 1195
¶B. MANAGUA 1343
¶C. MANAGUA 1384
¶D. MANAGUA 1393
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Callahan, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In the period before, during, and after
the November 9 municipal elections in Nicaragua, the
Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) conspicuously failed to
carry out its duties to uphold the Electoral Law and
generally failed to carry out its duties to maintain public
order in a non-partisan, professional manner. Embassy and
other third-party observers noted worrisome lapses in
provision of security for the opposition Vamos con Eduardo -
Constitutional Liberal Party (VcE-PLC) candidates as well as
selective inaction in the face of blatant election fraud and
violent actions on the part of the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN) and its supporters. Post is planning
to meet with NNP Chief Aminta Granera to present USG concerns
on the overall posture of the NNP during the entire election
period and the difficulty of continuing assistance programs
to the NNP considering their recent actions. End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Before the Election: Harbingers of Trouble
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) As early as September 2008, the NNP was beginning to
exhibit troubling patterns of partisan bias in favor of the
FSLN. On September 20, NNP officials stood idly by as FSLN
sympathizers violently disrupted a civil society march in
Leon organized by pro-democracy civil society groups. The
civil society protest organizers had previously filed for,
and received, permission from the Leon government to stage
their march, whereas the FSLN groups who violently disrupted
the march were clearly acting without a formal permit and
outside the boundaries of the law. FSLN supporters taking to
the streets of Leon boldly declared that the "streets are for
the people - only FSLN people." In the face of these illegal
actions, the NNP failed to warn or otherwise deter the FSLN
marchers and did not arrest or detain any agitators, even
when police themselves were directly threatened by FSLN
sympathizers with machetes, mortars and baseball bats.
Representatives from the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights
(CENIDH) believe that President Ortega ordered the NNP to
allow the FSLN supporters to conduct their attacks against
the civil society groups without impediment.
¶3. (C) A close contact and former NNP division chief, who was
also primarily responsible for re-organizing the anti-riot
police unit in the early '90s, told us that the anti-riot
police in Leon were clearly acting "under instructions." He
explained that standard procedures for anti-riot units in
Nicaragua was to form a "triangle-wedge" formation to enter a
disturbance, after which the wedge must identify, surround,
and detain major "instigators" of violence. In the case of
disturbance in Leon, however, our contact pointed out that
video footage of the riot police clearly showed a "triangle"
unit moving towards, then deliberately avoiding FSLN mayoral
candidate Manuel Calderon, who had brought a baseball bat to
the scene and was one of the main instigators of the mob.
See Ref A for the full account of pre-election clashes in
Leon.
¶4. (C) The NNP also clearly demonstrated preferential
treatment for FSLN forces in the pre-election period in its
tolerance of the illegal occupation of major Managua
intersections and traffic circles by FSLN supporters (Ref B).
PLC Deputy and National Assembly Justice Committee
Chairperson Jose Pallais explained to PolOff that not only
did the FSLN activists, who were clearly organized and funded
by the Ortega administration, fail to secure any permits from
the NNP for their activity, but that their very presence in
the period leading up to the election was a clear violation
of the Nicaraguan Electoral Law. Nicaragua's Electoral Law
(Law 331) expressly prohibits any political gatherings in
the 72-hour period preceding any elections. As reported in
Ref B, even Managua's Sandinista mayor, Jose Dionisio "Nicho"
Marenco (who has clashed with Ortega on various occasions)
declared the occupation of the intersections and circles an
illegal act. Despite the clear legal prerogative to act,
however, the NNP remained silent and inactive. To date, the
FSLN has continued to maintain its illegal presence at major
intersections in the city as a clear deterrent to political
opposition and a none-too subtle threat of violence against
those who would stand in their way - all under the watchful
and passive eyes of the NNP.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
During The Election: NNP Complicit in Electoral Fraud?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (C) Nicaraguan municipal elections were held on November
9, 2008. Throughout the day, Embassy and third party
organizations noted multiple instances of intimidation and
improper, if not outright illegal, behavior towards VcE-PLC
affiliated personnel (Ref C). In multiple voting centers
around the country, NNP uniformed police stood by and watched
as FSLN supporters forcibly and illegally ejected VcE-PLC
fiscales (poll-watchers) from the sites. According to PLC
Deputy Jose Pallais, there was at least one instance of
uniformed police officers actively involved in the expulsion
of opposition poll-watchers from a voting center - in the
FSLN dominated municipality of Telica. Post is attempting to
gather more information on the events in Telica, particularly
the alleged personal involvement of the Telica Chief of
Police in what transpired there.
¶6. (C) In addition, there were widespread reports of
"electoral police" involved in electoral irregularities
throughout the country. Embassy monitors, media outlets, and
other third party organizations reported that the electoral
police (who are not affiliated with the NNP) assisted in the
ejection of VcE-PLC officials from voting centers, the early
closure of key voting centers, and were likely involved in
actual physical tampering with a large volume of ballots.
(Another close contact and former NNP chief explained to
PolOff that although these groups are called "police" in
actuality they have no ties to the NNP.) The Supreme
Electoral Council (CSE) traditionally has the role of
gathering civilian volunteers and provide training to these
individuals as electoral police. This year, however, this
role was relegated to the Ministry of Government, which in
turn charged regional Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) with the
task. We know that the electoral police were FSLN members
hand-picked by the Ministry of Government. (Note: In a
formal briefing on electoral security, the Nicaraguan Army
stated that the electoral police were indeed directly trained
by the NNP.) Of course, contact concluded, these purely
partisan Sandinista organizations lost no time in gathering
groups of FSLN radicals who entered into service with one aim
- to steal the elections.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
After The Election: All Dressed Up With Nowhere To Go
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) The trend of police inaction in face of clearly
illegal acts of violence and intimidation continued in the
days following the election (Ref D). On November 11, an FSLN
mob attacked the VcE headquarters building in Managua,
causing extensive property damage and injuring some VcE
staff. On the same day, the NNP failed to prevent FSLN
forces from burning down the VcE campaign headquarters in
Nagarote. Despite receiving intelligence regarding the
potential for such attacks, the NNP failed to prevent the
attack or apprehend those responsible. It took police over
15 minutes to arrive on the scene in Managua. On November
16, FSLN supporters created an illegal barricade against
VcE-PLC supporters attempting to travel to Leon to protest
the fraudulent results of the mayoral race there. In a
situation reminiscent of the clashes in Leon in September,
the NNP again failed to protect the rights of the protesters,
who once again had obtained legitimate permits from the NNP
itself, to gather safely in Leon. The opposition group was
forced to turn away from Leon in defeat.
¶8. (C) During the week of November 17, FSLN forces gathered
in large, armed groups (machetes, home-made mortars, and some
guns) to continue their illegal occupation of major
intersections and roundabouts in Managua. In many instances,
units of anti-riot police - dressed in full anti-riot gear -
could be observed loitering safe distances away from the
armed FSLN mobs blocking traffic, laying down nail-strips and
other traps for vehicles, and shooting their home-made
mortars into the air. As a result of this intimidation,
opposition leaders were forced to abort a large march they
had scheduled on November 18 to protest the electoral fraud.
Participants in the opposition told us that police radios
were used to position FSLN supporters over the three-hour
standoff. Police also physically prevented opposition
supporters from accessing the march location. However,
opposition leaders were able to take advantage of the FSLN
focus on Managua to hold a successful protest march in Leon.
In an apparent act of retaliation, on the same night
Sandinista sympathizers led by an FSLN National Assembly
deputy, broke in and destroyed the radio transmitters of
three radio stations widely seen as sympathetic to the
opposition. When asked by Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa why
they stood aside and let the crime occur, one of the two NNP
officers who had been on the scene frankly replied, "we had
orders not to act."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Granera Embattled, Surrounded - But Still Struggling
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶9. (S/NF) The consensus that is emerging after all of these
events is that NNP Chief Aminta Granera has almost completely
ceded control over the institution to Ortega loyalists
ostensibly serving under her. A Former NNP Chief blamed the
inaction and seeming indifference of anti-riot units in
Managua on Managua Chief of Police Roger Ramirez, who he
claimed is receiving orders directly from FSLN security
organs. Our contact also accused newly promoted NNP
Sub-Director Francisco Diaz, who shares an illegitimate
grandson with Ortega, of being heavily involved in electoral
machinations involving the NNP. The Nicaraguan private
sector is also evidently aware of Granera's loss of control
in the NNP. Owner of Nicaragua Brewing Company Javier Solis
informed EmbOffs that NNP units on the street are actually
directly controlled by Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo.
(Note: He also informed us that he has offered Granera a job
at the Brewing Company.)
¶10. (S/NF) Despite her lack of influence, Granera appears to
be attempting to help VcE-PLC figures in a limited fashion.
According to various sources inside both the NNP and the
VcE-PLC organization, on November 10 Granera personally
warned VcE leader and Managua mayoral candidate Eduardo
Montealegre of a squad organized by FSLN security chief Lenin
Cerna to attack him as he approached CSE headquarters to
protest the fraudulent election results. Granera also seems
to be looking out for opposition figures who have personal or
geographic connections to her. PLC Deputy Jose Pallais, who
like Granera is a Leon native, said that when his team
discovered ballots marked in favor of VcE-PLC candidates
discarded in Leon's municipal dump, Granera acted quickly on
his tip to protect the ballots - thus preserving important
evidence of electoral tampering by the FSLN. Finally,
perhaps in response to widespread criticism over the
lethargic response of the NNP to election-related
disturbances to this point, the NNP now appears to be taking
more assertive actions to protect opposition politicians from
Sandinista mobs. Post will continue to closely monitor the
NNP posture as the likelihood of violent conflict between
FSLN and opposition supporters rises before the CSE's
official December 5 announcement of the results of the
election.
- - - -
Comment
- - - -
¶11. (S/NF) Comment: Granera has publicly characterized the
actions of the NNP as "balanced and cautious," with a focus
on "preventing a bloodbath" as opposed to being concerned
about "social conflicts." We remain, however, gravely
concerned both by the actions (and inaction) of the NNP
during these municipal elections and the systematic attack by
the Ortega Administration against the professionalism and
independence of the police organization. We are actively
seeking a formal meeting with Aminta Granera to present USG
concerns about the conduct of the NNP and warn of the effect
this might have on assistance programs for the police, but we
anticipate that the presence of Ortega loyalists and NNP Sub
Directors Carlos Palacios and Francisco Diaz will have a
chilling effect on the dialogue in the meeting. In short, at
this late stage of the game it is difficult to expect that
Aminta Granera will have the power, influence or even,
perhaps, the will to change the course of events both within
and without the NNP. The validity of our concerns was
brought into sharp focus on November 18, when an Embassy
officer waved down an NNP patrol for assistance with a FSLN
mob that was actively threatening him. The hapless officer
was succinctly told: "We are not here to help you."
CALLAHAN