

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04SANAA2346, PRESIDENT SALEH TO A/S BLOOMFIELD "NO NEW MANPADS"
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04SANAA2346.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04SANAA2346 | 2004-09-02 11:35 | 2010-12-03 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002346
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014
TAGS: MASS MOPS OVIP PARM PINR PREL PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH TO A/S BLOOMFIELD "NO NEW MANPADS"
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. discussed proposed
U.S. MANPADS buyback and destruction initiative with Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh on September 1. Saleh not only
agreed to move forward with the modalities of the buyback,
but pledged to A/S that the ROYG would not seek to buy any
new systems. Despite Saleh's attempt to extract more money
out of the buyback offer, Post expects/hopes to conclude an
agreement in the next two weeks. A/S Bloomfield's August 31
meeting with Minister of Interior al-Alimi, Chief of Military
Staff al Qassemi, and National Security Bureau Saleh covered
septel. End Summary.
---------------------------------------------
Saleh -- "We Have to Get Them Off the Market"
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) A/S Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. and Ambassador met
with Yemeni President Saleh on September 1 to discuss the
proposed U.S. MANPADS buyback initiative. Saleh welcomed A/S
Bloomfield's visit and the MANPADS initiative, describing it
as part of continuing U.S. - Yemeni joint security efforts in
the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East. A/S Bloomfield thanked
the President for his country's cooperation and partnership
in the GWOT, emphasizing that MANPADS in particular pose a
grave threat to U.S. and Yemeni global security interests
should they fall into terrorist hands. Saleh readily agreed,
adding "these weapons in the hands of al Qa'ida or Jihadists
threaten Yemen's security forces. We have to get them off
the market."
¶3. (C) A/S Bloomfield outlined the MANPADS buyback
initiative, explaining it was a very specific proposal to
purchase and destroy systems collected by the ROYG. In
addition to compensation for each system, U.S. technical
training and assistance would be provided to ensure the
safety of MANPADS collection and transportation, and to
conduct destruction. A/S Bloomfield stressed that there was
a 90-day window in which to buy and destroy current ROYG
illicit stocks, and that while the program did not have a
time limit -- the funding was, indeed, finite.
¶4. (S) Saleh told A/S Bloomfield that the ROYG was
currently in possession of 1435 MANPADS including 500 he had
recently collected from "private people" just prior to his
departure to London for an official visit on September 25.
The President made clear that these systems would be offered
up for sale and destruction according to the proposed
initiative, adding that he estimated there were another 150 -
200 still in private hands which the ROYG is targeted for
collection. (Note: On August 31 A/S Bloomfield viewed 79
recovered MANPADS stored in a MOD facility. The 1435 appear
to be some combination of these 79, plus the other 1029
emboffs observed in the same facility in 2003, and a number
of other illicit systems we were unaware had been collected.
We will seek clarification on these numbers from NSB Deputy
Director Ammar Saleh. End Note.)
¶5. (C) President Saleh assured A/S he was serious about
cutting off the possibility of MANPADS leakage from official
stocks. He said he had given the order to collect all
systems from the Yemeni Armed Forces in the field and return
them to storage immediately. A/S commended the President's
actions to get "these dangerous missiles out of dangerous
hands," emphasizing that Yemeni MANPADS must remain under the
lock and key of the authorities. "Actually," Saleh
responded, "we don't need them."
--------------------------------
Saleh Promises No New MANPADS...
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Saleh pledged to A/S Bloomfield that Yemen's
national defense did not require MANPADS; to the contrary,
the current crisis in Sa'da proves "it was a big mistake" to
allow such weapons to fall into the hands of our enemies
where they can be used against our own forces. "I assure
you," said the President, "there will be no new deals, we
will not trade in them." Bloomfield responded, "you have
made a very important statement, that MANPADS are more useful
to terrorists than to your military."
¶7. (S) A/S told Saleh he is engaged in ongoing discussions
with source country governments in Eastern Europe to stop
exporting MANPADS, but that we have indications arms dealers
claiming to represent Yemen continue to shop in these markets
for advanced MANPADS. Saleh advised, "You cannot prevent
(North) Korea, China, Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus from
producing or selling weapons. I do not believe you will be
successful." "Although," he continued, "maybe you can
convince them to sell through official government contracts
and not through brokers." A/S Bloomfield agreed that
controlling weapons production was not easy, but explained
that arms firms in nations working with the U.S. to limit
production of MANPADS report that Yemen remains a potential
client. "No," replied Saleh, we do not need them."
¶8. (S) A/S Bloomfield asked the President "if our friends
in Eastern Europe tell me they have a contract with Yemen,
may I tell them 'no, you do not'"?. Saleh replied. "yes,
tell them the contract is canceled -- stop it -- no one has a
deal to sell such weapons to Yemen unless they talk to me."
A/S replied that Saleh's pledge not to acquire new MANPADS
should not be underestimated, as it would enhance Yemen's
reputation in Washington and the international community.
--------------------------------------
...In Exchange for One Million Dollars
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) "Rest assured," Saleh continued, "Yemen will not
have such weapons anymore, but everything has a price. You
will have to pay...one million dollars for each strela!"
(Note: After an awkward silence, Saleh laughed, indicated he
was exaggerating, and promised the price would come down. In
fear some uncertainty remained, the Palace translator turned
to A/S saying, "I feel it is my duty to make sure you
understand this is a joke." End Note.) "How much are you
willing to pay?" pressed the President. A/S responded that
that the price for each MANPAD was fixed and not negotiable.
"Fixed, but well above what we believe to be the market
price."
---------------------------
Al-Houthi - Lessons Learned
---------------------------
¶10. (S) Saleh told A/S that the recent events in Sa'da,
(where ROYG forces are embroiled in an increasingly bloody
fight against the well-equipped supporters of rebel Shi'ite
cleric al-Houthi) has proven that it was a "big mistake" to
allow these weapons to reach enemy hands. Saleh reported to
A/S that 250 soldiers had been killed and 1000-1500 injured
in addition to 300-350 rebels. (Note: Post believes the
number of ROYG casualties to be much higher. End Note.)
¶11. (S) A/S Bloomfield replied that the U.S. was aware of
the cost to Yemen of the recent fighting and that "this hurts
us too." A/S told Saleh that the Embassy is looking to see
how else we can help.
-----------------------
...And the Kitchen Sink
-----------------------
¶12. (S) As expected, Saleh raised extending the buyback to
include other types of weapons. He reported that the ROYG
has been buying back all types from the grey market since
9/11, including SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles,
machine-guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, RPGs, and
explosives. "We have already paid 9 billion rials
(approximately 49 million USD) to keep these weapons out of
al Qa'ida hands," claimed the President we are ready to
destroy them. We hope you will not limit the program to
MANPADS." (Note: the ROYG claims it has collected 32 million
USD in assorted SW/LA and is seeking to recover this expense.
Although we doubt the claim of 32 million, we understand
from MOD and NSB contacts that the ROYG has yet to reimburse
the arms dealers it contracted to collect these weapons and
Minister of Defense Alaiwa is under considerable pressure to
make good on the deal. End Note.)
----------------------------
Inventory Control Assistance
----------------------------
¶14. (S) A/S emphasized that the program on the table is
urgent and specific; it targets several countries with large
numbers of these dangerous systems. He stressed that the
current proposal is for MANPADS only, and he is offering to
buy them for significantly more than market price. "We hope
that this important first step will be completed as soon as
possible," said A/S, adding, that he was prepared to explore
ways the U.S. can assist the ROYG in controlling its official
stocks such as providing inventory controls, computer
systems, stockpile security, and training. Saleh replied
that he looked forward to learning the details of this
assistance.
-----------------------
Give Us Our Spare Parts
-----------------------
¶15. (C) Saleh complained to A/S of ongoing licensing
difficulties which had grounded F-5's, and Augusta
helicopters, and rendered M-60 Tanks and M109 artillery
inoperable. "We have made request after request," he said,
"Why doesn't the U.S. respond?" The President repeated a
common theme, telling A/S Bloomfield that he pays a high
political price in the region and internally for his CT
cooperation with the U.S. "Our cooperation" he said will be
commensurate with yours, "As much as you move, we will move."
¶16. (S) A/S Bloomfield responded that the USG appreciates its
cooperative relationship with Yemen in the GWOT, and pointed
out that, "as a demonstration of our trust, yesterday I gave
Military Chief of Staff Qassemi a C-130 licensing agreement."
"No, interrupted Saleh, "that is a transport plane. We need
our F-5 in Sa'da." A/S assured the President that he would
personally look at each Yemeni licensing request when he
returned to Washington and would make sure that they received
full consideration. (Note: When A/S Bloomfield handed the
C-130 license to Chief of Staff Qassemi on August 31, the
General said sarcastically "these few parts to a transport
plane represent the biggest step forward in our military to
military cooperation in years." End Note.)
------------------------------
Comment: "What, Won't Haggle?"
------------------------------
¶17. (S) All joking aside, Saleh appears serious in trying
to push up the price per system. It is hard to imagine a
shrewd operator like the President paying more than market
price for Strela 2's, approximately 2000 USD. It would be
true to style for Saleh to try to extract as much possible
from the USG in exchange for his security cooperation. On
the margins of the meeting, NSB Deputy Director, and Saleh's
nephew, Ammar Saleh recommended A/S Bloomfield send the
President a follow-up letter to our meeting listing other
benefits to Yemen that may result from the agreement, and
urging him not to break the deal over prices that cannot/will
not change. End Comment.
KRAJESKI