

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10DAMASCUS168, V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10DAMASCUS168.
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDM #0168/01 0561343
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251343Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7419
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7727
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5921
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5240
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0012
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0889
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0888
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0842
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2497
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0807
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000168
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
LONDON FOR LORD
PARIS FOR NOBLES
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PTER, PREF, PREL, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
HIZBALLAH, DIRECTS U.S. DEMARCHE TO ISRAEL
REF: A. STATE 17307 B. TEL AVIV 404
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, for reasons 1.4 b,d.
¶1. (S) Summary: Responding to Ref A demarche, Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Miqdad expressed surprise the U.S. was sharing such a strong message in the wake of Under Secretary (U/S) William Burns’ positive February 17 visit. He argued Israel represented the major threat to stability in the region and that the U.S. should be directing its message toward Israeli officials. Syria, he claimed, wanted peace and was working with Turkey and the U.S. toward that end. Flatly denying any Syrian role in the supply of weapons to Hizballah, The most sophisticated weapons Damascus supported Lebanese independence while Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty on a daily basis. Miqdad argued Syria wanted to preserve the positive results of U/S Burns’ recent visit and promised to convey the message. He also pledged to review our request for assisting the Center for Victims of Torture and agreed to follow up Charge’s request for official written notification of the government’s decision to allow the Damascus Community School (DCS) to reopen. End Summary
--------------------------------------
Miqdad: Direct Your Message to Israel
--------------------------------------
¶2. (S) Charge and Pol/Econ Chief delivered Ref A demarche to Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Faisal al-Miqdad on February 25. A clearly surprised Miqdad listened attentively and took detailed notes, interrupting twice to confirm whether the demarche concerned the transfer of ballistic missiles and to clarify whether the message represented a U.S. or an Israeli “warning.” Charge explained the message reflected Washington concerns that SEMEP Mitchell and U/S Burns had shared previously with President Asad. Addressing the substance of the demarche, Miqdad argued that Israel itself could not have sent a stronger warning. The message, he continued, “shows the U.S. has not come to a mature position (that would enable it) to differentiate between its own interests and Israel’s.” Syria was “of course” not in the mood to increase tensions or escalate, “because we believe in peace.” Toward that end, Syria was doing its best with Turkey and the U.S. to achieve peace. Syria was not taking steps to escalate. Unless Israel had plans to escalate against Syria or Lebanon, “there’s no need to worry,” said Miqdad.
¶3. (S) Referring to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s February 16 speech, Miqdad emphasized that Hizballah was responding to Israeli threats and clearly conveyed Hizballah’s intent to respond only if Israel attacked first. Syria believed in and supported the role of UNIFIL, and was using its contacts with the Lebanese Government to “insist” on Lebanon’s full cooperation with UNIFIL. Miqdad insisted Israel, not Syria or Lebanon, was issuing provocative threats and using Hizballah as a pretext. The Syrian government had been pleased to hear Lebanese PM Hariri’s remarks expressing concerns about Israeli provocation, including the violation of Lebanese airspace and assassinations. The U.S. message, summed up Miqdad, “should be directed to Israel not to escalate.”
----------------------------------------
Denial of Supply of Weapons to Hizballah
----------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Charge replied that the U.S. message had come in the context of improving bilateral relations, which depended on a frank and candid exchange of assessments of regional developments. The U.S. was issuing neither threats nor
ultimatums, but rather it sought to convey what it believed to be a shared interest in avoiding conflict. Miqdad commented that it was “strange” the U.S. had chosen to deliver “harsh words while we’re trying to build better relations.” He promised to convey the message to his superiors but reiterated Syria’s desire to avoid escalation. “You may hear about weapons going to Hizballah,” he claimed, “but they are absolutely not coming through Syria.” The real threat to stability was coming from Israeli officials who had threatened recently to attack Damascus and to change the Syrian regime. “Please convey to Washington, while we take note of your demarche, this message should be directed at Israel,” he said.
¶5. (S) Charge replied that, as U/S Burns had conveyed to President Asad, the U.S. was urging all parties in the region, including Israel, to exercise restraint and support Lebanese independence. “This is our commitment,” Miqdad responded, “we shall not interfere (in Lebanon).” The Lebanese should be allowed to decide for themselves on how to resolve their own issues; those who would interfere want to disturb the peace after Lebanon successfully conducted national elections and formed a consensus government. “We’re confident the Lebanese can deal with their own situation,” he said. Charge rejoined that the military capabilities of a non-state actor like Hizballah represented a major concern because Hizballah responded only to its own leadership and not to government authorities.
¶6. (S) Miqdad said this issue should be discussed in the overall framework of the situation. He then contended the provision of U.S. weapons to the region represented a destabilizing factor. “The most sophisticated weapons are coming to Israel, to be used against whom?” he asked. When the U.S. pressed Israel to stop threatening its neighbors, the situation would stabilize. “We want peace. It’s the only solution. We are the ones who are threatened,” he declared. Charge replied the whole region was threatened. Miqdad said the U.S. and Syria needed to worked toward peace. “You should address your message to the people who don’t want peace,” he added, noting the results of U/S Burns’ visit should be preserved and continued to improve relations. Syria had responded positively to U/S Burns’ message because it felt more confident of Washington’s desire to move forward.
---------------------
CVT and DCS Follow-Up
---------------------
¶7. (C) Charge affirmed the U.S. shared this intent and wanted to maximize the opportunity by staying in close contact. In that context, he raised PRM’s pending request to Miqdad to assist the Center for the Victims of Torture to receive approval to begin a proposed project in Syria; Miqdad agreed to look at the matter and requested Embassy follow-up. Likewise, on the issue of visas for the next group of DHS circuit riders, Miqdad asked that the circuit riders not apply for visas until he had had a chance to intervene. (Note: Embassy will provide Miqdad with a list of the circuit riders.)
¶8. (C) Charge also asked Miqdad for advice on how to proceed regarding Damascus Community School (DCS). FM Muallim had instructed the Embassy to “start hiring teachers,” but the MFA had not yet provided any written notification of President Asad’s decision to allow the school to re-open. There also remained the issue of whether Syrian students would be allowed to enroll. Miqdad agreed that this matter required a response and advised the Charge to follow up with him in the coming week. (Note: Miqdad reported he would be traveling to Libya for two days to discuss bilateral
relations.)
-------
Comment
-------
¶9. (S) In the midst of hosting a quick-notice visit by Iranian President Ahmedinejad (who openly criticized the Secretary’s Congressional testimony expressing concern about Syria and Hizballah), the SARG might interpret our demarche as an attempt to divert the spotlight from the show of mutual support between Tehran and Damascus. Miqdad’s surprise that we would raise this issue so forcefully on the heels of U/S Burns’ visit may have been genuine, but the abject denial of any Syrian role in supplying arms to Hizballah and the verbal counter-attack against Israeli provocation were standard (if disingenuous) responses. Yet even a seasoned diplomat like Miqdad could not restrain a raised eyebrow at our mention of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah. We expect the specificity of this concern could well prompt further discussions among Syrian officials, Hizballah, and the visiting Iranian delegation.
¶10. (S) Miqdad notably did not respond to our concern about a possible Hizballah revenge operation for the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. While Miqdad and Syrian officials might take some comfort in UNIFIL’s role in preventing the spillover of recent tensions in south Lebanon, a Hizballah operation against Israeli targets could easily result in a situation in which UNIFIL found itself unable to contain rising escalation. One point we might stress in the future: Syria’s desire for a deterrent against Israeli military action -- presumably a motivation for the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah -- will not increase stability because there are no mechanisms or rules of the road to prevent and/or manage unanticipated escalation. Not having control over Hizballah’s missiles or influence over Hizballah’s military plans to avenge Mughniyeh increases this danger. Our demarche might resonate more fully here if we can persuade other key countries, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, France, and others, to underscore their concerns about regional instability, to which Syria’s supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah is directly contributing.
¶11. (S) Leaving aside the substance of Miqdad’s response to the demarche, his agreement to meet us on two hours’ notice on a Syrian holiday (the Prophet’s birthday) and during the Ahmedinejad visit is worth noting. Miqdad’s Chief of Staff is typically the recipient of Embassy demarches; CDA’s only other meeting with Miqdad apart from appointments involving Washington visitors was to discuss the Vice Minister’s trip to the U.S. last September. His future willingness to meet directly with us -- which FM Muallim instructed him to do to follow up on DCS issues -- will serve as one more barometer of the SARG commitment to engagement in the weeks and months ahead. HUNTER