

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10TRIPOLI134, LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR REF: TRIPOLI 112 TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10TRIPOLI134.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10TRIPOLI134 | 2010-02-16 16:31 | 2011-01-31 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO4762
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0134/01 0471631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161631Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5807
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0263
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0120
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0011
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0085
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6365
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000134
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG AND EUR/ERA; NSC FOR S. AGUIRRE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS PINR LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR REF: TRIPOLI 112 TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: The Libyan Government unexpectedly followed through February 13 with threats to suspend visa issuance to nationals of Schengen member states (ref), deporting dozens of European nationals in the first 48 hours of the ban and creating chaos at Tripoli's airport. Local media reports that the retaliation came in response to the alleged publication of a list of 188 Libyan officials and their families, including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and son Saif al-Islam, who Switzerland barred from Schengen visa issuances. EU diplomats report that they have been unable to verify that the list was in fact published. A close aide to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi hinted that the Libyans had instituted the ban on Schengen travelers in frustration over the problems in the ongoing Swiss-Libyan negotiations. European diplomats have declared the situation a "political crisis," and while some have publicly blamed the Swiss for the current situation, others quietly assess the move as a vintage Libyan attempt to up the ante in Swiss-Libyan negotiations at a moment when the contretemps appeared to be near resolution. Schengen members in Tripoli are debating how to respond to the Libyan move. End Summary.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION LEADS TO AIRPORT CHAOS
2.(C) Late on February 13, the Libyan Government announced that it was halting issuance of visas to nationals of Schengen member countries, making good on its threats to retaliate for the Swiss ban on Schengen visa issuances for Libyan officials and Qadhafi family members. (The Swiss have been vetoing Schengen visas for certain Libyans since mid-2009, as part of their effort to resolve the plight of the two Swiss businessmen detained in Libya since the summer of 2008.) The Libyans began segregating Europeans from other arriving passengers late on February 14, holding them in the airport for several hours before ultimately deporting tens of European nationals, including several with valid residency permits. Although consuls were assured that European nationals with valid Libyan visas would still be granted entry into Libya, on February 14, European nationals on flights arriving in Libya from Rome, Valletta, and Vienna encountered serious difficulties at the airport. The Consul spoke with some Maltese who had arrived in Libya on an Air Malta flight on February 14; they had been detained at the airport for five hours, without food or water, before finally being allowed entry. The Consul also observed a European diplomat having difficulty entering the country, despite his valid diplomatic visa. The Italian Consul, who was at the airport's main arrival hall, was not permitted by the Libyan authorities to enter the rest of the facility to confer with the detained Italians. The Maltese Ambassador was also prohibited from entering the airport. Several flights from Europe and elsewhere arrived throughout the day on February 15, and European diplomatic contacts reported that passengers were stacking up at the airport as the Libyan authorities decided whether to admit them.
3.(C) On February 16, the situation seemed to have improved somewhat, with only 20 Schengen nationals deported. An EU diplomat attributed the improvement to several factors. First, Lufthansa and Austrian Air had stopped boarding nationals from Schengen member states, vastly decreasing the number of arrivals in Tripoli. Second, the Italians and other EU members had issued consular travel notices warning citizens of the strong possibility of deportation upon arrival, which led to a decrease in the number of arrival and, the diplomat speculated, also led the Libyans to ease up on the deportations. The diplomat also reported that the February 16 deportations seemed to focus on arriving general managers of foreign companies, rather than short-term visitors.
SAIF'S NEWSPAPER ANNOUNCES THE BAN, GOL JUSTIFIES IT
4.(C) The controversial Libyan decision was first announced by the quasi-independent Oea online newspaper (part of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Al Ghad media group) on February 14, in a report that quoted an anonymous Libyan official announcing that "Libya has decided to suspend granting visas to all EU nationals." The newspaper asserted that the decision came "following Switzerland's decision to ban 188 Libyan figures from entering its territories. The Swiss ban includes the Libyan leader [Muammar al-Qadhafi] and his family, including Saif al-Islam."
5.(C) In a February 15 conversation with Pol/Econ Chief, a TRIPOLI 00000134 002.2 OF 003 close aide and advisor to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi asserted that "the Europeans should not have been surprised" by the measure, as the issue of retaliation against all Schengen states for Switzerland's veto decision had been "raised with them lots of times, and as early as a month ago." Since "none of the EU nations were choosing to pressure the Swiss," the GOL decided to take action. Saif's staff asserted that the visa issue had reached a breaking point, "especially for Saif," who had been included on Switzerland's Schengen visa veto list despite his work to facilitate political reconciliation between the Swiss and Libyans. The aide asserted that Saif's inclusion on the list was "humiliating to him." He blamed the Swiss for stalling progress in the German-mediated political talks, claiming that the Swiss had backed off from a previous agreement to investigate the 2008 arrest in Switzerland of Hannibal al-Qadhafi as part of the normalization package. According to the Russian ambassador, Saif was in Moscow on February 15 following a hunting trip in southern Russia.
6.(C) Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa met Schengen Ambassadors late in the day on February 15 to confirm that no further Libyan visas would be issued to Schengen nationals and that even those with valid visas would not be allowed entry, with no exceptions. When pressed by the ambassadors, Kusa agreed that diplomats from Schengen member nations would be permitted entry and, possibly, Schengen nationals with valid residency permits. However, he said that he would need to investigate further the residency issue.
7.(C) Kusa said that the Libyan Government had implemented the policy after the Swiss had published the list of 188 Libyan citizens on the Swiss Schengen veto list. Waving a document that he claimed was the published list, Kusa said that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi viewed the list as a personal insult that Libya could not endure. Although the GOL recognized that the decision to halt visas for Schengen nationals could cause economic loss and complications, Libya would stick to its policy. Kusa said that Libya had been isolated for years and could manage without Europe. "And if we need help, we can turn to the U.S., Japan, Russia, or Syria," he reportedly told the ambassadors.
TRYING TO FIGURE OUT THE BACK STORY
8.(C) An Italian diplomat who briefed us on the Kusa meeting said that no one had been able to verify whether the Swiss veto list had in fact been published, and the Swiss have denied doing so. A French diplomat told us that the decision had come after a February 11 meeting chaired by PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, the same day the GOL returned the passport of Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani. The French diplomat believed that al-Mahmoudi chose to refer the decision to allow Hamdani to depart Libya to Muammar al-Qadhafi himself, and that the Libyan leader's response was to invoke the retaliatory ban on European nationals. The French diplomat suspected that the move was designed to up the ante in Swiss-Libyan negotiations at a moment when the contretemps appeared to be near resolution
9.(C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto said February 15 that based on readouts that he had received from Bern, the most recent, third round of German-mediated political talks had been positive, contrary to the report given by Saif al-Islam's aide. Lazarotto believes that the GOL was well aware that the Swiss were ready to end the Schengen visa freeze and to begin issuing visas immediately after the two Swiss businessmen had been allowed to leave Libya. He defensively said that the idea of an arbitration council had been off the table since the September 18, 2009, "kidnapping" of the two Swiss businessmen by Libyan officials. After their release, Swiss negotiators agreed to establish an arbitration tribunal to investigate the Hannibal case only if the Libyans agreed to set up a similar tribunal to investigate the circumstances involved in the "kidnapping" of Rachid Hamdani and Max Goeldi; a stipulation the Libyans refused.
10.(C) Until February 13, Lazarotto was positive that Hamdani was on track to receive an exit visa and permission to depart the country -- he had already been cleared of all charges and received his passport back from the GOL on Thursday evening, February 11. Also on February 11, the immigration court commuted Max Goeldi's sentence to four, from sixteen, months, and he had agreed to pay the fine sentenced to him by the tax court. Goeldi's lawyer was in the process of requesting a TRIPOLI 00000134 003.2 OF 003 suspension of the prison sentence, pending Libyan-Swiss political reconciliation. However, the "visa war" against Schengen states that Libya had declared moved the goal posts once again, and according to Lazarotto, was a typical pressure tactic that Libya was using to obtain something more from Switzerland, although he did not venture to guess what that might be. He did not know how Bern would respond to the latest Libyan pressure, but he dejectedly assessed that the only solution left was "to cut diplomatic relations, for the benefit of all." He believed that Bern was also coming to that conclusion.
11.(C) The Libyan Government's move unleashed a barrage of attacks and infighting within the Schengen community. The Austrian Ambassador told the Swiss Charge that the visa halt had become a "political crisis." In an interview with Italian media on February 16, the Italian Foreign Minister blamed the Swiss for the current situation, saying that Switzerland's unilateral ban on visas to Libyan officials had effectively held "other countries in the Schengen area hostage." The Ambassador witnessed a spirited debate at a reception on the evening of February 15, with the Dutch ambassador arguing that according to the Schengen Treaty, other countries were entitled to unilaterally act in defiance of the Swiss "hold." Other Europeans believed that was not the case but asserted that Switzerland could choose to release other states of their obligations to prevent issuance of Shengen visas. Interestingly, several of the ambassadors believed they heard Musa Kusa say that that was not a solution; Libya, he reportedly said, would accept no Schengen solution that did not include Switzerland's returning to the status quo ante with regard to complete Schengen issuances by all countries in the treaty. A Schengen Committee meeting is scheduled for February 18 in Brussels, and EU foreign ministers are expected to meet on February 22, to discuss the EU response to the Libyan action.
COMMENT
12.(C) Libya's escalation of its bilateral dispute with Switzerland came at an unexpected time. The Swiss and Libyans had been moving forward with the political reconciliation process and were near resolution, indicating that the Libyan leader, or his son Saif al-Islam, may want something more than the Swiss are willing to give. While Libya's pressure on European nations seems to be achieving its goal of dividing the European block through isolation of Switzerland, the full ramifications of the Libyan visa ban remain to be seen in the EU's response to the Libyans. The situation, if it is not resolved quickly, could evolve into a high-profile crisis over the coming days, with major implications for the ability of foreign companies to operate in Libya, as well as for EU-Libyan relations. CRETZ