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Viewing cable 07ISTANBUL353, A GATHERING OF GULENISTS, WITH A SPLASH OF SCOTCH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07ISTANBUL353 | 2007-04-27 14:41 | 2011-03-17 15:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Istanbul |
Appears in these articles: http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/abd-belgelerinde-fethullah-gulen.htm |
VZCZCXRO9560
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHIT #0353/01 1171441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271441Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6933
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000353
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: A GATHERING OF GULENISTS, WITH A SPLASH OF SCOTCH
REF: ISTANBUL 209
Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
¶1. (C) Summary. An April 17 gathering of journalists,
academicians, religious and political leaders either merely
familiar with, sympathetic to or loyal followers of Fethullah
Gulen painted a picture of the self-exiled, U.S.-based
Turkish religious leader as a compassionate and tolerant
humanitarian committed to reconciliation, both within
Turkey's various religious and social groups and throughout
the world at large. Our sources attributed the evasiveness
associated with Gulenist visa applicants to a fear that USG
officials share a prejudice against them similar to what
they've experienced with the Turkish government. These
interlocutors opined that Gulen would have no problem
returning to Turkey prior to November's parliamentary
elections if PM Erdogan were to become president (this was
prior to Thursday's announcement that FM Gul would step into
that role). A media glitch may help explain Gulen's rumored
links to the USG. End summary.
THE GUESTS
----------
¶2. (C) An eclectic group of Turks knowledgeable of and/or
sympathetic to religious leader Fethullah Gulen -
reverentially called "The Hoca" (HO-jah) by his followers -
joined us for dinner at the CGR April 17. The guests,
selected by Nazli Ilicak, herself a rather notorious figure
in Turkish political life as a Scotch-swilling, Justice and
Justice and Development Party (AKP) co-founder of
industrialist pedigree, who was expelled from parliament and
later exonerated by the European Court of Human Rights,
included well-known Turkish columnists Mustafa Akyol (Turkish
Daily News), Fehmi Koru (Yeni Safak), and Ali Bulac (Zaman);
academics Niyazi Oktem, professor of Sociology at Bilgi
University, his son, Emre, who teaches law at Galatasaray
University; Mahmut Kilic, theology instructor at Marmara
University; sociologist (and daughter of Turkish writer Cemil
Meric) Umit Meric; and Alparslan Acikgenc, Dean of the
Faculty of Letters at Fatih University. Secretary General of
the Turkish Catholic Episcopal Conference Monsignor Georges
Marovitch also made the guest list, as did Harun Tokak,
president of the Journalists and Writers Foundation.
GULEN THE HUMANIST IMAM
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Harun Tokak, described by those around the table as
being "closest" to the Hoca, recounted his attendance as a
young man in the late 1960's and early 1970's at a mosque in
Izmir where Gulen served as imam. Gulen's preaching was
unique in Tokak's experience for its vibrancy, warmth and
genuineness. Though entirely self-educated beyond primary
school, according to Niyazi Oktem, the young Gulen talked of
building schools, not mosques. Inspired by Gulen's genuine
piety and depth of character, derived from his developing,
moderate Sufi interpretation of scripture, Tokak moved to Van
in eastern Turkey where he opened a school that has since
served as springboard for the hundreds if not thousands of
schools that have since followed (reftel). Today, the
original "Gulenist" school in Van serves over 1000 students.
GULEN'S THEOLOGICAL BASIS
-------------------------
¶4. (C) Our guests placed Gulen in sharp contrast to their
somewhat stereotypical ideas of strict "Arab (read: Saudi
Salafist) Islam" and squarely within what they deem a
uniquely "Turkish" Sufi tradition that emphasizes purity of
the heart and a realization of one's whole self in God.
Niyazi Oktem and Fehmi Koru joined others in explaining
Gulen's appeal to followers drawn to his teaching and the man
himself because the Hoca addressed real spiritual needs, and
did not simply repeat Diyanet-prescribed scripts. His
interpretive approach to the Koran - freed from strict
adherence to the Arabic text - provided space for individual
expressions of piety, and for reconciliation with Christians,
Jews and even non-believers. One guest, who chose relatively
late in life to cover, recounted in terms not unfamiliar to
evangelical Christians how Gulen's preaching and his
individualized ministry had changed her life and led to a
deeper faith. Imam Gulen "retired" from the Diyanet in the
early 1980s to begin a ministry independent of Turkey's
official state-sponsored bureau of religion.
INTERFAITH ACTIVITIES AND MEETING THE POPE
------------------------------------------
ISTANBUL 00000353 002 OF 003
¶5. (C) Monsignor Marovitch spoke enthusiastically and at
length about his own efforts to promote Gulen's ecumenical
agenda, including introductions to other faith community
leaders and ultimately Pope John Paul II. Marovitch and
others confirmed the Hoca's early ties to a wealthy
Jewish-Turkish businessman, Uzayr Garih, found murdered in a
Muslim cemetery several years ago, who worked with Marovitch
to link Gulen to a broader audience in the interest of
interfaith dialogue and world peace. Marovitch said he'd
arranged for Gulen to meet the Pope only to find that
Turkey's Mission to the Vatican had cancelled the
appointment. (Note: This contrasts with earlier accounts
that Garih, in fact, introduced Gulen to Abe Foxman, who in
turn introduced him to the Cardinal of New York, who in turn
introduced him to the Pope. End note.) Marovitch said he
strenuously reclama'd that decision and the audience took
place, which raised the GOT's ire. Marovitch attributed
later suspicions of U.S. government involvement to press
inaccuracies in reporting that then-U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
"Abramowitz" - vice "Marovitch" - had arranged the meeting.
Istanbul's Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Armenian
Patriarch Mesrob also met with Fethullah Gulen, according to
Niyazi Oktem and other sources. Gulen subsequently traveled
to the U.S. for medical treatment in February 1999 and has
stayed ever since.
THE "TURKISH NATURE" OF GULENIST SCHOOLS
----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Turkey and its culture feature heavily in the
Gulenist curriculum, according to Niyazi Oktem. Harun Tokak
recounted that a retired but skeptical Turkish military
general was once persuaded to visit Gulenist schools in
Central Asia; he came away satisfied the group meant no harm
to Turkey and was probably a positive. Our guests in turn
explained the schools' emphasis on exploring Turkish culture,
and the historical "melting pot - just like America"
represented by the Ottoman Empire and its ethnic and cultural
mix. Oktem - being "deliberately provocative but accurate,"
noted that Turks are "more Greek than Arab." In other words,
there was nothing to fear.
¶7. (C) Several guests noted that instead of building on the
reforming and modernizing traditions of the Ottoman period,
which could serve to guide Turkey in its current situation,
the Republic's early leaders had chosen to discard
everything, including the relatively moderate brand of Islam
practiced during that period. Their authoritarian approach
to the "new Turkey" had stifled existing and "natural"
reforming impulses. Mustafa Akyol cited, for example, a
"women's movement" in the late Ottoman period stifled and
"reformed" by the leaders of the new Republic, who believed
they needed to prescribe even to the women what they should
and should not want. This had led to an artificial society
and the potential for backlash. The Gulenist movement was an
effort to return to Turkey's natural, multi-ethnic, tolerant
roots, allowing for the spiritual component that has always
been there.
FUNDING, FOLLOWERS AND GULEN'S CURRENT STATUS
---------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) In response to our questions about funding, numbers
of adherents, the Gulenist "organization," if any, and the
Hoca's personal status and possible return to Turkey, we
heard alternately straightforward and vague replies,
suggesting some facts may simply be unknown. Our guests
estimated Gulen's followers in Turkey to number between two
and three million, based in part on the 800,000 known
subscribers to a Gulenist magazine. The subscription journal
Sizinti also serves as the primary means of communicating
theological tenets to the faithful, broadly supplemented by
the Internet. Gulen's speeches also are carried in his
"Zaman" daily newspaper, printed in Turkey and in the U.S. in
English. Though vague on amounts, our guests asserted that
the organization itself holds no stockpiles of funds and that
schools and other activities generally are financed by
well-heeled businessmen. With wicked smiles, some of our
guests noted rumors widely believed among Turks that the CIA
was funding the Hoca, whom the U.S. reportedly had set up in
the first place. When asked why U.S.-bound visa applicants
appeared almost uniformly evasive about their intent to
either visit the Hoca or to attend a Gulenist school, our
interlocutors responded that the applicants - over whom they
exercised no control - were simply ignorant of U.S. visa
procedures and feared that U.S. government officials held
prejudices against the organization similar to the Turkish
government's.
¶9. (C) Personal details on Gulen were a bit harder to come
by aside from the hagiography of his early life; we never
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heard a clear answer, for example, regarding his marital
status.
WILL HE RETURN?
---------------
¶10. (C) We asked why the Hoca remained in the U.S., with so
many followers here. Were there security or health concerns?
Those closest to him said he would have no difficulty
returning to Turkey following a presumed AKP (and at the
time, Erdogan) presidential victory in May 2007, and prior to
November's parliamentary elections, downplaying rumors of
outstanding criminal charges or threats from ultranationalist
factions. That said, health considerations might preclude
the elderly leader's being "set upon" by thousands of his
adherents, according to our sources, and so he might choose
to remain in the U.S. In this context, some voiced concern
Gulen might be asked to depart the U.S. for political or
immigration purposes. A few appeared to be very conversant
with his drawn out immigration case and appeals process.
(Note: Having originally entered on a "B-2" visa for medical
treatment in February 1999, Gulen subsequently acquired an
"R" (nonimmigrant) visa, as a religious leader, but
reportedly failed to pay income taxes/maintain status. An
attempt to get legal permanent resident status through a
religious worker petition seems to have been rejected by
USCIS. His lawyers reportedly are seeking "O" status, which
would allow him to remain as an individual of outstanding
ability. End note.)
¶11. (C) Comment. This impressive group of academic,
religious and professional admirers and followers offers a
portrait of Fethullah Gulen that is light years away from
secularist perceptions of a scheming crypto-Mullah, plotting
to turn Turkey into a sharia-based Islamic state little
different than Iran. They clearly believe Gulen is a model
of enlightened Islam, amenable to and compatible with
present-day Turkish life and the modern world, and perhaps
even necessary to avoid Turkey's exploitation by radicalized
elements on both sides. They attribute Gulen's difficulties
with Turkey's secular state apparatus to the latter's need to
"control everything," citing the GOT's aversion to the word
"ecumenical" in the Greek Orthodox patriarchal title as an
example of this narrow-mindedness. Most impressive was the
example of tolerance and collegiality amongst themselves, a
clearly diverse group some of whom drank alcohol, others who
abstained, some who covered, others who did not. End comment.
JONES