

Currently released so far... 12900 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AE
ASEC
AS
AR
AMGT
AFIN
AORC
AU
AG
AF
APER
ABLD
ADCO
ABUD
AM
AID
AJ
AEMR
AMED
AL
ASUP
AN
AIT
ACOA
ANET
ASIG
AA
AGMT
AINF
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AY
AADP
ARF
ACS
AGR
AMCHAMS
AECL
AUC
APEC
APECO
AFGHANISTAN
ACAO
ASEAN
ADM
AGAO
AND
ADPM
ATRN
ALOW
AROC
APCS
AORG
AO
AODE
ACABQ
AX
AMEX
AZ
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AFSI
AFSN
AC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
ASCH
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORL
BR
BO
BA
BM
BL
BH
BK
BEXP
BILAT
BTIO
BF
BU
BD
BY
BE
BG
BB
BBSR
BT
BRUSSELS
BP
BX
BC
BIDEN
BMGT
BWC
BN
BTIU
CA
CS
CO
CD
CR
CPAS
CDG
CI
CDC
CBW
CU
CVIS
CE
CONS
CH
CMGT
CASC
CY
CW
CG
CJAN
CIDA
CODEL
CWC
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CFED
CLINTON
CAC
CL
CACS
CIC
CHR
CAPC
CM
CT
CTR
COM
CROS
CN
COPUOS
CV
CF
CARSON
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
CYPRUS
COUNTER
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CARICOM
CB
CSW
CITT
CACM
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
CNARC
CIS
EFIN
ECON
ETRD
EAID
EC
EU
EUN
EINV
EG
ETTC
EIND
ELAB
EAGR
ECIN
EINT
ENRG
EFIS
ELTN
EAIR
EPET
EZ
ET
ENERG
ECPS
EWWT
EI
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ER
ES
EN
EMIN
ESENV
ENNP
ENGR
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ENVI
ECINECONCS
ELN
EFTA
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EXTERNAL
ENIV
ESA
EPA
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUR
ECUN
EXIM
EK
EUREM
ECONOMY
EUMEM
ERNG
EFINECONCS
EAIDS
ECA
ETRC
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
EAIG
EUC
ERD
IQ
IR
IS
IN
IA
IC
IZ
ICRC
ID
IDA
IT
IO
IAEA
ICJ
ICAO
IV
IBRD
IMF
IAHRC
IWC
ILO
ISLAMISTS
IGAD
ILC
ITU
ITF
INRA
INRO
ICTY
INRB
ITALY
IBET
IL
INTELSAT
ISRAELI
IMO
IDP
ICTR
ITRA
IRC
IRAQI
IEFIN
IPR
IIP
INMARSAT
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
IRS
INTERPOL
IEA
INR
ISRAEL
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
IACI
INDO
KPAO
KMDR
KCOR
KNNP
KJUS
KCRM
KDEM
KVPR
KTFN
KPRP
KTIP
KSCA
KSUM
KTEX
KIDE
KIRF
KV
KTIA
KN
KG
KFRD
KWMN
KUNR
KISL
KU
KGHG
KPKO
KOMS
KPAL
KIPR
KMCA
KOMC
KRVC
KSEP
KAWC
KOLY
KWBG
KACT
KFLO
KHIV
KZ
KGIC
KBCT
KDRG
KBTR
KCFE
KE
KHLS
KMPI
KAWK
KPWR
KIRC
KRAD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFLU
KPLS
KRIM
KSTH
KDDG
KPRV
KICC
KS
KSAF
KBIO
KREC
KCGC
KCIP
KTDB
KWAC
KPAI
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFSC
KSTC
KMFO
KID
KNAR
KMIG
KVRP
KNEI
KGIT
KNSD
KHDP
KSAC
KWMM
KR
KCOM
KAID
KENV
KVIR
KHSA
KO
KCRS
KPOA
KTER
KFIN
KSPR
KTBT
KX
KCMR
KMOC
KCRCM
KBTS
KSEO
KOCI
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KSCI
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KMRS
KNPP
KJUST
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KGCC
KICA
KHUM
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KPIR
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KRGY
KIFR
KWMNCS
KPAK
MARR
MOPS
MUCN
MCAP
MNUC
MEPP
MTCRE
MASS
MO
MIL
MX
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MTCR
MK
MG
MA
MY
MU
ML
MPS
MW
MD
MARAD
MC
MR
MT
MTRE
MASC
MRCRE
MAPP
MZ
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPN
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
MASSMNUC
NI
NZ
NL
NO
NPT
NATO
NS
NU
NP
NPA
NSFO
NDP
NT
NW
NASA
NSG
NE
NORAD
NAFTA
NG
NATIONAL
NSSP
NV
NSF
NK
NA
NEW
NPG
NR
NGO
NIPP
NZUS
NH
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
NSC
OIIP
OPRC
OTRA
OEXC
OREP
OSCE
OVIP
OPAD
OBSP
OECD
OFFICIALS
OAS
OPDC
ODIP
OPCW
OES
OFDP
OPIC
OCS
OIC
OHUM
OSCI
OVP
ODC
OIE
OTR
OMIG
OSAC
OFDA
ON
OCII
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PARM
PE
PTER
PHUM
PO
PINS
PREF
PK
PM
POL
PBTS
PNAT
PHSA
PAS
PA
PL
PGIV
PHUMPREL
POGOV
PAK
PEL
PROP
PP
PINL
PBT
PTBS
PG
PINF
PRL
PALESTINIAN
PSEPC
POSTS
PAHO
PHUMPGOV
PGOC
PNR
PREFA
PMIL
POLITICS
POLICY
PROV
PBIO
PREO
PAO
PDOV
PGOF
POV
PCI
PRAM
PSI
POLITICAL
PAIGH
PJUS
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PY
PLN
PHUH
PF
PHUS
PU
PARTIES
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
RU
RS
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RO
RW
RCMP
RSO
RP
RM
ROOD
RFE
RICE
ROBERT
RSP
RF
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
SENV
SY
SNAR
SCUL
SP
SF
SW
SOCI
SU
SMIG
SO
SA
SR
SZ
SI
SC
SEVN
SN
STEINBERG
SK
SH
SNARCS
SPCE
SARS
SNARN
SG
SL
SYRIA
SIPRS
SAARC
SNARIZ
SWE
SYR
SEN
SCRS
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SSA
SPCVIS
SOFA
SENVKGHG
SANC
SHI
SHUM
TU
TSPA
TBIO
TS
TRGY
TINT
TPHY
TN
TW
TH
TZ
TSPL
TP
TBID
TI
TF
TD
TT
TNGD
TL
TC
THPY
TIP
TX
TV
TK
TERRORISM
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
TR
UK
UNSC
UNGA
UNESCO
UNHRC
UP
UN
USTR
US
UNDC
UY
UNICEF
UNDP
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNCHC
UNCSD
USOAS
UNFCYP
UG
UNIDROIT
UNO
UV
UNHCR
UNEP
USEU
UZ
UNCND
USUN
UNCHR
USNC
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
UNPUOS
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08ISTANBUL225, CHIEF EDITOR SPEAKS CANDIDLY AMIDST NEWSPAPER'S OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ISTANBUL225.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08ISTANBUL225 | 2008-05-07 15:53 | 2011-05-16 14:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Istanbul |
VZCZCXRO7393
PP RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHIT #0225/01 1281553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071553Z MAY 08
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8110
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 000225
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV EFIN PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHIEF EDITOR SPEAKS CANDIDLY AMIDST NEWSPAPER'S OWNERSHIP CONTROVERSY
REF: A. 07 ANKARA 1006
¶B. ANKARA 0513
¶C. 07 ANKARA 0778
Classified By: Consul General Sharon A. Wiener for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary and comment. Turkish daily Sabah's editor in
chief Ergun Babahan conducted a surprisingly candid tour
d'horizon with the Consul General a day after the
controversial financing of his new parent company Calik
Holding's purchase of Turkey's third most circulated
newspaper came to light. Babahan spoke frankly about the
change in ownership, US-Turkey relations and Turkish domestic
political issues, speculating AKP would ultimately lose the
closure case against it but would live on as a fragmented
movement whose followers would ultimately press the country's
democratization agenda forward after a likely two-year delay.
Claiming to be close friends with President Gul, Babahan
predicted that should PM Erdogan be forced to step down, Gul
would use his presidential powers to appoint current FM
Babacan as the new Prime Minister. Perhaps most strikingly,
he asserted Turkey would break up over the Kurdish issue
unless the government began to pay attention to the claims of
a significant portion of its citizens. End summary and
comment.
-----------------------
In the Eye of the Storm
-----------------------
¶2. (C) Sabah's editor-in-chief Ergun Babahan appeared
un-fazed as he spoke candidly on April 24 about the
controversial purchase of his newspaper by Calik Holding (see
paras. 9-11 for background) and the state of Turkish domestic
politics with the Consul General, whose call on him
coincidentally occurred the day after the acquisition's
financing details came to light. Babahan expects problems in
the short term, acknowledging the public perception
challenges the Calik Group's ties to the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) create for the paper. The
"ownership's base doesn't match with the readership base," he
explained, describing the latter as mostly urban, middle
class, secular and afraid of AKP and its policies. Still,
Babahan believes business interests would trump political
ties in the long run and doesn't expect the new ownership to
make changes to the newspaper's staff or editorial policies.
He was not surprised to learn about Qatar's role in the
financing, pointing out the Gulf State had expressed interest
in the Sabah/ATV investment long before Calik Holding won the
bid.
¶3. (C) Dismissing reported allegations that the paper had
already begun demonstrating a pro-government bias while under
the control of the Turkish Savings Deposit Insurance Fund
(SDIF), Babahan asserted he had not felt any pressure on his
editorial policies. He noted his record as a columnist shows
he has always supported headscarf liberties and that he is
not necessarily pro-AKP but rather pro-democracy and against
military supremacy. Brandishing Sabah's mainstream
credentials, Babahan proudly pointed out it had dared to say
"no" to a military coup following the April 2007
"e-memorandum" (ref A). Acknowledging it was true the
newspaper doesn't criticize the government much, he proffered
that neither do its competitors. Hinting at the extreme and
often bitter competition that characterizes Sabah's
relationship with its Dogan Group rivals, Babahan argued the
Dogan media took a largely anti-headscarf stance because it
"knew what was coming," referring to the AKP closure case
(ref B).
¶4. (C) Asked what would happen if the Calik Group tried to
impose its government ties on Sabah's editorial policy,
Babahan responded he would try to direct the ownership in the
right direction. Pondering the challenge of such a scenario,
Babahan explained AKP is not very democratic; in Turkey, it
is not easy to run a party democratically since politicians
too frequently incur obligations to different organizations
to support their own interests. AKP does not know the media
and feels threatened by it, concluded Babahan. "In three to
four months, we'll see if we can make it together (with Calik
Holding) or not." Citing the current, volatile, domestic
political circumstances, he stressed the importance of
resisting attempts by owners to engage in a press war, as has
happened in the past, because, "in the end everyone loses."
------------------
Democracy on Hold?
ISTANBUL 00000225 002 OF 003
------------------
¶5. (C) Regarding the AKP closure case, Babahan believes the
Constitutional Court has likely already decided against the
ruling party. He expects PM Erdogan and 25 or so other party
members to be banned from politics but AKP followers would
succeed in the end, though probably not as a single entity.
Without Erdogan, AKP's successor would become more democratic
- and as a result, more populist/nationalistic - but also
more difficult to keep together. Other center-right
alternatives to AKP are in the works, he argued asserting
that Turkish Chamber of Commerce Chairman Rifat
Hisarciklioglu and former Prime Minister (now independent
parliamentarian) Mesut Yilmaz are trying to start new
parties. AKP will still control the presidency, and with PM
Erdogan out of the picture President Gul becomes the most
powerful figure in Turkey, with the power to appoint a new
prime minister. If it comes to this, Babahan believes Gul
would appoint current Foreign Minister Ali Babacan as PM
because he would listen to the president, is not corrupt and
would continue to pursue Turkey's EU membership.
¶6. (C) Babahan does not expect the AKP to hold early
Elections in response to the closure case, as some columnists
have speculated. If that were their plan, they would hold
elections immediately but they know they are losing their
(Fetullah) Gulenist base, which likely blames AKP for
antagonizing secularists by prematurely pushing through
headscarf reform. Babahan wasn't sure who Gulenists would
support if not AKP, but knew Fetullah Gulen and PM Erdogan do
not like each other. Gulen may find it easier to exert his
influence through different, smaller parties than through a
Prime Minister who "wants to monopolize power."
Characterizing Erdogan as no longer Islamist but rather a
"conservative believer," Babahan thought the two would also
differ over policy, with Gulen hoping for a more Islamic
society. "If you believe in (the literal interpretation of)
the Koran, you want as a final goal, an Islamic state,"
concluded Babahan.
¶7. (C) Asked whether the president was more sympathetic to
Gulen's Islamist views than the Prime Minister, Babahan
listed his "good friend" Gul's secular credentials: he is the
most "anti-Iran" political figure in Turkey; he has pushed
for EU and IMF policies; and he is known to be against the
madrassa education system. At the same time, he is a product
of the Islamic "milli gurus" youth movement, Babahan noted,
and "sometimes what you believe in youth influences what you
believe in later."
¶8. (C) Babahan asserted US-Turkish relations have improved
since Turkey's cross-border operation in February, which
demonstrated U.S. support for Turkey's top priority of
fighting the terrorist PKK. The man on the street previously
believed Washington supported the establishment of a Kurdish
state, Babahan explained, a perception largely resulting from
Turks mixed feelings toward the Ottoman Empire; they hate it
for its backwardness but love it for its greatness. Many
still believe western powers are trying to fragment Turkey.
Turkey will eventually break up, Babahan surmised. "We can't
continue to ignore a large chunk of the country that has a
different culture and language."
----------
Background
----------
¶9. (SBU) Turkish media is largely controlled by a few,
competing conglomerates with a reputation for interfering in
their outlets' editorial policies. While the Dogan Group
controls the greatest share of readership, it is Sabah
newspaper and its new owner the Calik Group which has
monopolized headlines of late. The current controversy
concerning Sabah's (and television affiliate ATV's) ownership
dates back to 2002 when the SDIF seized the assets of the
newspaper's then owner Dinc Bilgin following the collapse of
Bilgin's Etibank and sold them at auction to the Ciner Group
(ref C).
¶10. (SBU) With a circulation exceeding 440,000, Sabah grew
to be the Dogan Group's most significant secular-oriented
rival under Ciner. Then, on April 1, 2007 the SDIF again
took control of Sabah and ATV along with the Ciner Group's
other media assets, claiming it had discovered a secret
agreement between the Ciner Group and Bilgin which illegally
permitted the latter a degree of control and ownership over
his previously seized assets. The SDIF operated Sabah and
ATV until the Calik Group purchased them at auction for $1.1
ISTANBUL 00000225 003 OF 003
billion in December 2007 in an eyebrow raising deal due to
Calik Holding's ties to AKP - its twenty-something General
Manager is married to one of PM Erdogan's daughters and
Chairman Ahmet Calik is said to be close to AKP and the Prime
Minister, himself.
¶11. (SBU) The Sabah/ATV sale captured headlines again on
April 23 when the Calik Group secured a combined $750 million
loan in an 11th hour deal with two public banks - Halkbank
and Vakifbank - and attracted $350 million from a little
known subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority to
complete the purchase just days before payment was due to
SDIF. Columnists speculated about the unusual nature of the
loan by the two public banks - its size and purpose is
reportedly unprecedented - and questioned whether Calik's
close ties to the government were at play. The Qatari
investment also fomented conspiracy theories as PM Erdogan
had just visited Qatar the week before. The Radio and
Television Administrative Board (RTUK), which had earlier
approved of the Calik Group's purchase of Sabah/ATV,
reportedly intends to challenge the purchase in light of the
new information concerning foreign financing.
WIENER