

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08LAPAZ329, GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08LAPAZ329.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08LAPAZ329 | 2008-02-19 23:00 | 2010-12-03 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLP #0329/01 0502300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192300Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7598
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4967
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6087
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3307
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3522
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5243
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5936
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0553
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0912
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000329
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: GOB RESPINS ANTI-U.S. ALLEGATIONS
REF: A. LA PAZ 303
¶B. LA PAZ 304
¶C. LA PAZ 218
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Bolivian government attempted to renew
and, in some cases, repackage old allegations against the
U.S. February 16-18. Bolivian President Evo Morales
threatened to show USAID the door if it continues undermining
his administration. As proof, Morales provided the example
of a political organization that was allegedly turned down
for USAID assistance due to its pro-Morales stance. He also
cited unnamed groups that were asked to work against the
government as a condition for assistance. Morales also
argued against a free trade agreement with the U.S. and
charged the U.S. of involvement in the disappearances of
Bolivians during drug-related conflicts in the region of
Chapare. Morales' assertion that pro-government groups were
prepared to take up arms to defend his agenda were rebuffed
by a wide-range of social and labor groups. Government
Minister Alfredo Rada continues to accuse the U.S. of
involvement in a police "spying" scandal to deflect from his
role in the unauthorized surveillance of opposition
politicians and reporters. The Bolivian government's refusal
to sign a cooperation agreement concerning U.S. military aid
and the impact of that refusal on disaster assistance was
made public February 18. Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca
explained the government did not want to sign an agreement
"with its eyes closed" and was only reviewing the agreement.
Despite public assurances that they want better relations
with the U.S., the relentless public spinning of the Bolivian
government's complaints against the U.S. at the expense of
diplomatic channels suggest the BOG has another agenda:
discredit the U.S. and distract the Bolivian public. End
Summary.
Lights, Camera, Allegations
---------------------------
¶2. (U) Bolivian President Evo Morales made several references
to ongoing "political problems" with the U.S. February 15,
although he clarified diplomatic and commercial relations
would be maintained. Morales rehashed the argument that
USAID is supporting opposition groups and that the U.S.
Embassy is "making politics" at the expense of diplomatic
work, such as advancing commercial ties. Morales asserted
during recent months USAID has been convoking groups through
implementing NGOs and offering them money with the
stipulation that they work "against the Bolivian government."
Morales claimed leaders from the Federation of Ayllus
(indigenous local government units) of Potosi told him an
USAID-supported NGO denied their group's request for $20,000
because the organization "supports Evo Morales." Morales
urged citizens to report NGOs that are "bought by USAID to
distribute funds to make politics against the government."
He added, "The government will not allow NGOs to work against
the executive power. Faced with these provocations from
USAID, we will ask them to go home." Morales saluted U.S.
citizens that are denouncing both USAID and the Embassy for
practicing "politics," but offered no details on who he was
referring to.
¶3. (U) Although most of his criticisms were respun from old
charges, Morales added a new spin on some existing
allegations. Morales asserted Embassy Bolivian police guards
act "like embassy workers ... at the side of the U.S.
government." Morales claimed he learned of this "strange"
police arrangement through Fulbrighter van Schaick, who
accused Assistant Regional Security Officer Vincent Cooper of
asking him to "spy" on Cubans and Venezuelans in Bolivia last
week (Reftels a and b). Though not directly associated with
recent charges the U.S. is behind Bolivian police "spying" on
politicians and reporters, this mischaracterization of our
Bolivian guard force feeds into the Morales administration's
allegations of undue U.S. influence on Bolivian police units.
Evo on FTA, Drugs, and Cooper "Expulsion"
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Morales rejected a free trade agreement with the U.S.
as a return to the days of former-president Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada, when Morales alleges the government made deals
with U.S. businesses at the expense of Bolivians. Morales
characterized the Embassy's decision that ARSO Vincent Cooper
would not return to Bolivia as the "expulsion" of a "man who
conducted North American espionage." Morales repeated his
opinion that the war on drugs has been a failure because it
targeted coca leaf instead of cocaine. He alleged the DEA,
U.S. military, and Bolivian national police headed Bolivian
anti-narcotics efforts "from a U.S. military base" in
Cochabamba Department when there were "demonstrations and
disappearances," implying U.S. involvement. (Note: The U.S.
supports Bolivian anti-narcotics efforts at the Chimore
Airport and has offices there, but there are no U.S. military
bases per se in Bolivia. Despite Morales' intermittent calls
to dismantle such non-existent bases, this issue is a
misunderstanding or a straw man. End Note.)
Call to Arms Disconnected
-------------------------
¶5. (U) While railing against "oligarchic groups," and
particularly efforts to convoke an autonomy referendum in the
opposition-led Department (state) of Santa Cruz, Morales
claimed pro-government groups would defend his administration
"with arms." Morales said February 14 that sympathizers in
Santa Cruz had told him they would take up arms to ensure the
opposition showed Morales the proper "respect." However,
leaders from MAS-aligned social and union groups rejected any
attempt to resort to arms February 16, calling instead for an
electoral solution to settle Bolivian differences.
Spin Doctor Rada's Dizzying "Spy" Accusations
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (U) On February 15, the Ambassador met with Government
Minister Alfredo Rada to discuss the USG's support to the
Police's Special Operations Command (COPES) police unit, a
unit that Rada has stated was likely behind a growing
domestic surveillance scandal. Following their meeting, the
Ambassador issued a public statement which re-iterated that
the USG was never involved in domestic spying and explained
that USG would no longer fund COPES because the unit had been
disbanded on January 29.
¶7. (U) In an interview with the La Paz newspaper La Prensa
following the February 15 meeting Rada continued to insinuate
)- as he has done publicly on various occasions -- that
COPES was responsible for internal surveillance against
political officials and journalists. Rada once again called
COPES a parallel intelligence organization that conducted
"political intelligence," argued it reported directly to the
USG and not to the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI),
and that it exceeded the scope of its mandate. Rada
explained that since September 11, 2001 the U.S. government
had directed COPES to gather intelligence on terrorist
organizations which violated COPES' mission to conduct
surveillance only on narco-trafficking organizations. Rada
stated, that "terrorism is a fundamentally political
phenomenon . . . therefore COPES . . . conducted political
intelligence . . . All of this a function of the State
Department's priorities." (Note: According to the COPES'
memorandum of understanding between the Bolivian and U.S.
governments, conducting surveillance on both illegal
narcotics and terrorist targets is part of its mission. End
Note.)
¶8. (U) Throughout the interview Minister Rada engaged in
double speak, at times strongly insinuating the USG was
behind the domestic spying scandal, at other times
acknowledging there was little information tying the USG to
the case. "It would be irresponsible to affirm they (the
Embassy) were behind these (domestic spying) operations,"
Rada stated. He followed with, "The fact that intelligence
personnel from the Embassy received reports from ODEP (COPES'
official name since 2001) makes us believe that they were
aware of these things (domestic spying). Despite earlier
statements in the interview that COPES responded to the USG,
Rada closed the interview with the statement, "That
ODEP-COPES followed direct orders from the Embassy, we cannot
yet demonstrate, but we are investigating. But there was a
direct economic link, and it has been demonstrated that they
worked on priorities designed by Washington." Rada also
tried to link Fulbrighter Van Schaick case to the domestic
spy scandal. Arguing his Van Schaick's sworn statement is
the first piece of concrete evidence that links the USG to
espionage within Bolivia.
Eyes Wide Shut on MILGP Assistance
----------------------------------
¶9. (C) The Bolivian press reported February 19 that the
Bolivian government had frozen military humanitarian
assistance, by not renewing our humanitarian assistance
diplomatic note (which acts as a SOFA, or status of forces
agreement, for U.S. military personnel in Bolivia). The
article stressed that non-military aid (USD) 600,000 to flood
victims is not affected. However, it highlighted that our
MILGRP has provided humanitarian assistance (include medical,
dental and eye treatment) since 1996 and has already
prevented aid from arriving for flooding victims. Foreign
Minister David Choquehuanca responded that the government had
not canceled any agreement, but was simply reviewing it.
Choquehuanca stated, "We now do not sign agreements with the
United States with our eyes closed, like what happened in the
past, especially with anti-drug assistance." (Note: The
humanitarian assistance agreement has nothing to do with our
counter-narcotics aid. A Bolivian diplomatic note suspended
renewal of the assistance agreement January 29, citing the
need for a dialogue to bridge a "gap of understanding."
((Reftel C)) End Note).
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) Although charges that USAID is undermining the
Bolivian government are nothing new (Minister of the
Presidency Juan Quintana originally laid out the charges in
August and officials have drummed them up periodically
since), Morales' call for Bolivians to help the government
"identify these NGOs" ostensibly working to undermine his
administration is a troubling development. Using Morales'
example of the Potosi group that was "denied" $20,000, any
person or organization that asks for USAID funding and does
not receive it could allege a political motive. We will
continue to counter misunderstandings about USAID's
transparency and apolitical nature with reality. However,
the Bolivian government is unlikely to back off from its
USAID assault any time soon, as it enjoys the propaganda
value of creating an external enemy to distract from domestic
problems. Likewise, although government officials have
privately admitted to us they do not believe the U.S. was
involved in the police "spying" scandal, they are not
disengaging from insinuations of U.S. involvement. Rada's
accusations are designed not to lead to a formal process that
would prove or disprove them, but rather to create the
appearance of U.S. impropriety to distract the Bolivian
public from very real and potentially damaging charges
against him. As such, they are a success. The incongruity
of the government accusing us of being in cahoots with the
opposition and, at the same time, spying on them seems
largely overlooked in the public discourse. Unfortunately,
the Bolivian press does not consistently apply critical
analysis to these incoherent, vague, and sometimes
contradictory charges before distributing them to the
Bolivian and international public.
¶11. (C) Comment Continued. Although they may not always
believe in the merits of some of their specific accusations,
government leaders from Evo down appear to genuinely believe
the Embassy is working to undermine the Morales
administration. Given his proclivity to view the Embassy as
separate from the U.S. government and people, we expect
Morales to bring the GOB's vague litany of accusations
against the Embassy to both the visiting Congressional
delegation and to the U.S. public during his planned February
25-27 speaking tour in the U.S. End Comment.
GOLDBERG