

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08REYKJAVIK199, Iceland's Bid for the UN Security Council
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08REYKJAVIK199.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08REYKJAVIK199 | 2008-09-12 16:57 | 2011-01-13 05:37 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Reykjavik |
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRK #0199/01 2561657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121657Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3792
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0094
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0017
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0021
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0003
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000199
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, IO A/S HOOK, IO/UNP, EUR, EUR/NB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC UN AU TU IC
SUBJECT: Iceland's Bid for the UN Security Council
Classified by: Amb. Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Iceland's bid for one of two available WEOG
seats on the UN Security Council in 2009-10 is rapidly drawing to a
close. The campaign, hamstrung by a slow start and tepid support at
home, has found its legs over the last year under the enthusiastic
direction of Foreign Minister Gisladottir. Iceland has campaigned on
a strategy of "every vote counts," but in recent months has taken
particular aim at competitor Austria. As a Security Council member,
Iceland would be generally supportive of U.S. priorities, though
particular engagement would be necessary on questions of armed
intervention. The small size of Iceland's foreign service and lack
of depth on many issues would force Iceland to look often to its
friends and neighbors for advice. Lobbying in other Nordic capitals
will be of key importance should Iceland win a UNSC seat. End
Summary.
Getting a slow start at home and abroad
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Iceland is one of three candidates for two Western European
and Other Group (WEOG) seats on the UN Security Council in 2009-10,
running against Turkey and Austria. Iceland's bid for a Security
Council seat did not begin to properly get organized until late 2006
under then-Foreign Minister Valgerdur Sverrisdottir. Previous FMs --
particularly David Oddsson from 2004-2005 -- did little to win
support at home or get organized overseas for the effort. Should
Iceland fail to win a seat, many supporters of the bid will point the
finger at Oddsson and the Independence Party as a whole.
¶3. (C) Reflecting the ambivalence inside the government, the
Icelandic public has also split on the issue. The campaign's cost
(roughly $3.33 million from 2001 to 2007, with an additional $800,000
budgeted through October 2008) is an easy target for those who think
Iceland should have a less activist foreign policy as well as critics
of government spending, particularly on the left end of the spectrum.
However, even some close to the Prime Minister's Independence Party
and in favor of a robust foreign policy have told PolOff that they
are dubious that Iceland can effectively carry out the
responsibilities of a UNSC member. Under current FM Ingibjorg Solrun
Gisladottir, who has made winning a UNSC seat a priority, polls show
support for Iceland's candidacy is only 46 percent, with 36 percent
against.
Every vote counts...but especially if we take them from Austria
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Valgerdur Sverrisdottir made the campaign more of a priority
than her predecessors during her 2006-2007 tenure as Foreign
Minister, but it still gained little traction. Foreign Minister
Ingibjorg Solrun Gisladottir took several bold moves immediately
after her arrival in May 2007 at the ministry. Pledging to make the
UNSC campaign simultaneously cheaper and more effective, Gisladottir
appointed a special envoy to head the effort and allowed her to
assemble a dedicated team. FM Gisladottir also began a series of
high-visibility trips to regions outside of the usual
Nordics-U.S.-Europe circuit: since May 2007, she has gone to the
Middle East five times, and Africa three times, as well as making
visits to the Caribbean and Afghanistan.
¶5. (C/NF) Senior MFA officials as well as working-level officers in
the UNSC campaign office have told post that in addition to the FM's
travel, the ministry as a whole is racking up frequent-flyer miles.
Rather than targeting strategic countries to influence a whole
regional bloc, the Icelandic approach has been one of stumping for
each and every vote -- a huge strain on a foreign service of only 205
people worldwide. In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador, Permanent
Secretary Gretar Mar Sigurdsson allowed that the campaign "has been
bloody hard for us," as he described having to spend the better part
of a week on a Pacific islands trip to counter Micronesia's
declaration of support for Austria.
¶6. (C/NF) Austria is Iceland's main target in the campaign. Though
Ministry officials declined to confirm this directly, the tone and
content of MFA pitches to Ambassador and visiting USG officials
indicate that they believe Turkey is a sure winner, but Austria's
dubious economic and energy ties to Iran and Russia may create an
opening for Iceland. Iran's nuclear efforts are likely to be the
most significant challenge to the UNSC in 2009-2010, MFA PermSec
Sigurdsson has argued to Ambassador and visiting U.S. officials, and
Iceland has neither the problematic history of dealings with Iran nor
the economic exposure that Austria does. Beyond substantive
concerns, Icelandic officials have also accused Austria of unfairly
leveraging Vienna's role as host to multiple UN agencies, and were
incensed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's comments in May 2008
apparently supporting Austria's bid -- in their eyes, another sign of
shady campaigning by Austria.
¶7. (C/NF) The "every vote counts" perspective has also influenced
Icelandic performance on other foreign policy issues over the last
year. Increased ties to the Middle East have translated into
contacts with both Syria and Iran. Similarly, Iceland has appeared
reluctant to annoy Russia on recognition of Kosovo and the conflict
with Georgia. Though in both cases Iceland eventually lined up with
USG views -- recognizing Kosovo within a couple of weeks of
independence and eventually calling in the Russian Ambassador here
regarding events in Georgia -- there were some questions as to
whether the UNSC bid made the MFA more gun-shy than it might
otherwise have been.
What would UNSC member Iceland do?
----------------------------------
¶8. (C/NF) Iceland has made a principled case for a UNSC seat based
on its impeccable democratic credentials, support for the UN system,
and the idea that all UN member states should have the chance to sit
on the Security Council. What it has not done is present a concrete
picture of what kind of Security Council member (and chair) it would
be. Post's analysis is that Iceland would be generally in agreement
with USG priorities. Some disagreements do exist, and the FM's
discomfort with the use of military force would require strong
engagement on questions of intervention. Iceland's initiatives would
closely mirror the interests of FM Gisladottir: Iceland would work
for progress on the empowerment and security of women, the broader
concept of human security, and possibly even environmental security
concerns.
¶9. (C/NF) In approaches to USG officials, Iceland has consistently
appealed to the history of our bilateral relationship and our common
membership in NATO. Post believes that our close defense ties and
the U.S. treaty obligations as Iceland's first defender in war --
notwithstanding the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iceland
in September 2006 -- and Iceland's voting record at the UN would
translate into a commonality of views on most issues. We have
consistently been on the same side of human rights issues in the UNGA
Third Committee and the UN Human Rights Council, and Iceland has been
a staunch supporter of U.S. efforts on UNSCR 1820 on the security of
women in conflic and the UNGA declaration on Prisoners of
Conscince.
¶10. (C/NF) Areas of disagreement do exist which may be exacerbated
by Iceland's lack of amilitary and the Foreign Minister's personal
discmfort with the use of force. Iceland shares a broad European
skepticism on USG policy towards Cuba, and has not voted our way on
the Cuba embargo resolution. Similarly, Iceland has followed the
Nordic line on anti-Israel resolutions in recent years. On Iraq, the
previous Icelandic government pledged its political support to the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and later sent personnel in support of
explosive ordnance disposal and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq.
However, FM Gisladottir campaigned in the 2007 elections on a pledge
of "removing Iceland's name" from the Coalition of the Willing and
called back the lone Icelander at NTM-I. Beyond simple opposition to
the Iraq war, FM Gisladottir's views are colored by the fact that
Iceland has no military, which she thinks gives Iceland a unique
moral role, as an honest broker and example, in world affairs. This
does not translate into a complete opposition to armed intervention
-- under Gisladottir, the MFA has maintained financial and logistical
support for NATO operations in Afghanistan -- but it means that
Iceland will need to be fully convinced that diplomatic efforts have
run their course.
¶11. (C/NF) A final complication is the tiny size of Iceland's
foreign service, which greatly limits both the information at hand as
well as the ability to process that information. The International
Organizations Department Head noted wryly to PolOff that until now,
Iceland had the luxury of deciding which issues to follow, but that
this will come to a swift end in October should Iceland be voted in.
The MFA's Security Council campaign office has carefully examined the
UNSC experience of Costa Rica, another comparatively small state
without an army. Much of the expense of the UNSC campaign stems from
the expansion of the permanent mission in New York; current plans are
to double the size of the mission to 20 diplomats should Iceland win
election. Given that this is nearly 10 percent of Iceland's total
diplomatic corps, the entire personnel transfer season for this year
is on hold pending the vote results.
¶12. (C/NF) In practical terms, this means the Icelanders will look
more than usual to their Nordic colleagues for background and advice
on key issues. A division of labor across issues already exists,
according to MFA contacts and the Norwegian Embassy in Reykjavik, and
the Norwegians are expecting to be asked for quite a bit more help.
This stems both from the traditionally close relationship between the
two countries as well as the warm ties between FMs Gisladottir and
Stoere. Though Iceland has formally abandoned a previous proposal to
dual-accredit other Nordic diplomats at the UN, Nordic ties and
collaboration in New York and capitals will be very close if Iceland
wins its bid. For the USG, this will mean that engagement in other
Nordic capitals will take on new significance in influencing
Iceland's position.
¶13. (C/NF) Comment: Despite some policy differences and the
challenges of working with such a short-staffed diplomatic corps,
Post is confident that Iceland would work closely and productively
with us on the Security Council. Iceland is a member of NATO with
impeccable diplomatic credentials, and its default worldview is
generally in line with U.S. values and priorities.
VAN VOORST