

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 93LIMA56, THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #93LIMA56.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
93LIMA56 | 1993-01-04 22:51 | 2011-05-13 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: elcomercio.pe |
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF DEPA...
id: 594
date: 1/4/1993 22:51
refid: 93LIMA56
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
R 042251Z JAN 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4660
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USEC BRUSSELS 0080
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 00056
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM OAS PE
SUBJECT: THE CCD, POVERTY AND THE SENDERO
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: IN AN INITIAL STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL VOTING PATTERNS,
POVERTY LEVELS PROVED A MUCH BETTER PREDICTOR OF
VOTING TURNOUT IN THE NOVEMBER 22 CCD ELECTIONS
THAN DID THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO
TERRORIST GROUP. THE IMPACT ON ABSTENTIONISM OF
RELATIVE POVERTY WAS ALSO MUCH GREATER THAN ITS
IMPACT ON SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT PARTY.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) SLIGHTLY LESS THAN ONE WEEK AFTER THE
OAS RENDERED ITS VERDICT AND EIGHTEEN DAYS LATER
THAN PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD PROMISED,
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 22
CONSTITUENT CONGRESS ELECTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED.
FOLLOWING IS A FIRST ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
POVERTY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO
ON VOTING TURNOUT AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
IN THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS (CCD) ELECTIONS.
POVERTY AND THE VOTE
--------------------
¶3. (C) BASED UPON DEPARTMENTAL VOTING FIGURES,
THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, ABSENTEEISM AND SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANALYZED USING
SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TECHNIQUES FOR
BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTIONS.
¶4. (C) IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT POVERTY AND
POLITICAL VIEWS ARE CLOSELY CONNECTED IN THE
CASE OF PERU, POVERTY APPEARS TO HAVE A MUCH
GREATER IMPACT ON THE DECISION TO VOTE THAN IT
DOES ON WHICH CANDIDATE OR PARTY A VOTER CHOSES.
¶5. (C) TO LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, THE
VOTE IN DEPARTMENTS WITHIN WHICH 48 OF PERU'S 50
MOST IMPOVERISHED PROVINCES (ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT
TO COUNTIES IN THE UNITED STATES) WAS COMPARED
TO THE REST OF PERU. WHEN ABSENTEEISM AND
SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S "NEW
MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" PARTY WERE COMPARED IN THE
MOST POOR AND LEAST POOR DEPARTMENTS, THE IMPACT
ON ABSTENTEEISM WAS MARKED. APPROXIMATELY 29.4
PERCENT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN NON-VOTING RATES
CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY THE
POVERTY FACTOR. IN CONTRAST, ONLY 10.8 PERCENT
OF THE DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR THE
GOVERNMENT'S "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE
CAN BE EXPLAINED BY ECONOMIC IMPROVERISHMENT.
¶6. (C) WHY DID RELATIVE POVERTY APPEAR TO HAVE
SUCH AN IMPACT ON THE VOTE? ALTHOUGH VOTING IS
COMPULSORY IN PERU, CHANGING ONE'S VOTING
LOCATION IS A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING
PROCESS. THE OPTION OPEN TO PERUVIANS IS TO NOT
VOTE AND EITHER PAY, OR HOPE TO EVADE THE 12
DOLLAR FINE FOR NON-VOTING. FOR THE POOR, WHO
HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ANY
EVENT, THE RISK OF THE FINE EVER BEING COLLECTED
IS MINIMAL. CONSTITUTIONS ARE SEE AS ABSTRACT
DOCUMENTS WITH LITTLE IMPACT ON DAILY LIFE.
THUS, IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION, IT APPEARS
THAT IRRELEVANCE COMBINED WITH ECONOMIC
NECESSITY COMBINED TO REDUCE VOTER TURNOUT IN
PERU'S POOREST AREAS.
THE SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE VOTE
---------------------------------
¶7. (C) MANY COMMENTATORS IN THE WAKE OF THE
NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION CONGRATULATED PERUVIANS FOR
DEFYING SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) THREATS AND
CASTING THEIR BALLOTS. IN 1992, APPROXIMATELY
25 PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY WAS DECLARED TO BE IN
A STATE EMERGENCY. JUST UNDER HALF OF PERU'S
POPULATION (47.45 PERCENT) LIVED IN THESE
EMERGENCY ZONES. TWO WAYS TO MEASURE THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM ON THE VOTE WOULD BE TO LOOK AT
PERCENTAGES OF NON-VOTERS (THE FEAR FACTOR), OR
LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT (REJECTION
OF GUERRILLAS FACTOR) IN EMERGENCY ZONES VERSUS
AREAS DECLARED FREE OF SUBSTANTIAL GUERRILLA
INFLUENCE.
¶8. (C) WHEN NON-VOTING RATES IN DEPARTMENTS ALL
OR PART OF WHICH WERE DECLARED "EMERGENCY ZONES"
AS OF NOVEMBER 3 WERE COMPARED WITH DEPARTMENTS
WITHOUT EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 9.1 PERCENT OF THE
DIFFERENCE COULD BE STATISTICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR.
¶9. (C) WHEN THE DIFFERENCE IN VOTING RATES IN
DEPARTMENTS WHERE THERE WERE EMERGENCY ZONES IN
NOVEMBER WERE COMPARED TO THOSE WHICH HAD BEEN
ON THE LIST IN FEBRUARY, TEN MONTHS EARLIER, BUT
REMOVED IN NOVEMBER, NO STATISTICALLY SIGNFICANT
DIFFERENCES WERE DETECTED.
GUERRILLAS AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) IF THE ACT OF VOTING IS TAKEN AS A
HIGHLY SYMBOLIC STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO
TERRORISM, THIS SHOULD ALSO TRANSLATE INTO SOME
DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT.
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SL FOUNDER AND
LEADER ABIMAEL GUZMAN AND MUCH OF THE SL'S TOP
LEADERSHIP, MANY EXPECTED THE GOVERNMENT TO HAVE
RECEIVED A SURGE OF SUPPORT. YET WHEN THE
PERCENTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT VOTE (SUPPORT FOR
THE "NEW MAJORITY/CAMBIO 90" ALLIANCE) IN
DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT ANY EMERGENCY ZONE IS
COMPARED SIMILAR VOTES IN DEPARTMENTS WITHOUT
EMERGENCY ZONES, ONLY 6.2 PERCENT OF THE
DIFFERENCE CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR STATISTICALLY BY
THIS VARIABLE. THE DIFFERENCE ESSENTIALLY
DISAPPEARS WHEN THE DEPARTMENTS WHICH HAD
EMERGENCY ZONES IN FEBRUARY ARE COMPARED TO THE
REST OF PERU. APPARENTLY, WHAT HAROLD WILSON
SAID ABOUT POLITICS ALSO APPLIES TO PERUVIAN
VOTERS' MEMORIES. THIS FINDING TALLIES WITH THE
RESULTS OF FOCUS GROUP ANALYSES WHICH A
GOVERNMENT POLITICAL CONSULTING FIRM PERFORMED.
THIS FIRM FOUND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WERE
INCREASINGLY THE FOCUS OF VOTER'S ATTENTION WITH
THE PRESUMED RESOLUTION OF THE GUERRILLA PROBLEM
FOLLOWING GUZMAN'S CAPTURE.
THE 1992 CONSTITUENT CONGRESS
-----------------------------
¶11. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE FINAL LIST OF
INDIVIDUALS ELECTED TO THE CONSITUTENT CONGRESS
IN THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTIONS:
PARTY - NAMES OF REPRESENTATIVES
"NUEVA MAYORIA- CAMBIO 90"
JAIME YOSHIYAMA TANAKA
LUZ SALGADO RUBIANES
CARLOS TORRES Y TORRES LARA
VICTOR JOY WAY ROJAS
ANDRES REGGIARDO SAYAN
MIGUEL VELIT NUNEZ
CARLOS BLANCO OROPEZA
JOSE GAMONAL CRUZ
GILBERTO SIURA CESPEDES
JAIME FREUNDT-THURNE
ANASTACIO VEGA ASCENCIO
REYNALDO ROBERTS BILLIG
MANUEL LA TORRE BARDALES
JUAN HERMOZA RIOS
MARTHA CHAVEZ COSSIO
JORGE NAKAMURA HINOSTROZA
DEMETRIO PASTIAS MELLA
CESAR FERNANDEZ ARCE
CARLOS FERRERO COSTA
MARIA LOZADA DE GAMBOA
ROMULO GUERRA AYALA
JORGE VELASQUEZ URETA
DANIEL ZEVALLOS RIOS
MIGUEL PAJARES RUIZ
HUGO ZAMATA AGUIRRE
OSWALDO SANDOVAL AGUIRRE
JUAN HUAMANCHUMO ROMERO
PABLO TELLO TELLO
JUAN CRUZADO MANTILLA
SAMUEL MATSUDA NISHIMURA
PEDRO VILCHEZ MALPICA
TITO CHAVEZ ROMERO
CARLOS LEON TRELLES
MARIA VICTOR ALFARO
JORGE FIGUEROA VIZCARRA
NICOLASA VILLAR MARTINEZ
GENARO COLCHADO ARELLANO
GAMANIEL BARRETO ESTRADO
PEDRO GARCIA SAAVEDRA
VICTOR MELENDEZ CAMPOS
CARLOS REATEGUI TRIGOSO
ROGER AMURUZ GALLEGOS
RICARDO MARCENARO FRERS
GUILLERMO YSISOLA FARFAN
"PARTIDO POPULAR CRISTIANO"
LOURDES FLORES NANO
ANTERO FLORES ARAOZ
ALEXANDER KOURI BUMACHAR
LUIS BEDOYA DE VIVANCO
XAVIER BARRON CEBREROS
CELSO SOTOMARINO CHAVEZ
HECTOR CRUZ ARRUNAATEGUI
MARIO OCHARAN ZEGARRA
"FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE MORALIZADOR"
FERNANDO OLIVERA VEGA
ERNESTO GAMARRA OLIVARES
CARLOS CUARESMA SANCHEZ
CESAR LARRABURE GALVEZ
JULIO CHU MERIZ
HUMBERTO SABUCETTI PEDRAGLIO
WILLY SERRATO PUSE
"RENOVACION"
RAFAEL REY REY
GONZALO ORTIZ DE ZEVALLOS
ENRIQUE CHIRINOS SOTO
JUAN CARPIO MUNOZ
FRANCISCO TUDELA VAN BREUGEL
JUAN CARRION RUIZ
"MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRACTICO DE IZQUIERDA"
GLORIA HELFER PALACIOS
HENRY PEASE GARCIA
JULIO CASTRO GOMEZ
JULIO DIAZ PALACIOS
"COORDINADORA DEMOCRATICA"
JOSE BARBA CABALLERO
JORGE DONAIRE LOZANA
LUIS TORD ROMERO
JORGE TORRES VALLEJO
"FRENATRACA"
ROGER CACERES VELASQUEZ
PEDRO CACERES VELASQUEZ
JORGE VELASQUEZ GONZALES
"FREPAP"
MARIO PAREDES CUEVA
EUSEBIO VICUNA VASQUEZ
"SODE"
MANUEL MOREYRA LOREDA
"MOVIMIENTO INDEPIENTE AGRARIO"
GUSTAVO GARCIA MUNDACA
¶12. (C) COMMENT: BASED UPON A DEPARTMENTAL
LEVEL ANALYSIS OF VOTING PATTERNS, POVERTY
APPEARS TO HAVE HAD A MUCH STRONGER IMPACT ON
THE VOTING DECISION IN THE CCD ELECTIONS THAN
THE SENDERO. THE TERRORIST GROUP'S RELATIVE
LACK OF IMPACT ON THE VOTING MAY BE DUE IN PART
TO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. IT WAS WIDELY
BELIEVED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS THAT THE
SL CONSIDERED THE CCD ELECTIONS ESSENTIALLY
UNIMPORTANT. WHILE THE SL CONDUCTED A TERROR
BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN LIMA IN THE WEEK BEFORE THE
ELECTION, THE ATTACKS HAD TAPERED OFF SEVERAL
DAYS BEFORE THE VOTING. IF THE SL HAD HOPED TO
HAVE AN IMPACT IN NOVEMBER WITH THIS LAST MINUTE
EFFORT, IT APPARENTLY FAILED. IF THE GOVERNMENT
HAD HOPED TO RECEIVE A "GRATITUDE VOTE" FROM A
GRATEFUL POPULATION, IT TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED.
WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE
CCD, THE RESULTS REFLECT MOSTLY THEIR BETTER
ORGANIZATION AND FULLER COFFERS. CONTRIBUTING
TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY WAS ALSO HIGH
LEVELS OF OPPOSITION DISORGANIZATION AND POOR
TACTICAL DECISIONS BY APRA AND ACCION POPULAR TO
BOYCOTT THE ELECTION.
¶13. (C) THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
IN PERU IS CONSIDERED A SUB-FIELD OF LEGAL
STUDIES AND THIS TRADITIONAL, NON-QUANTATIVE
BENT IS REFLECTED IN THE ANALYSIS OF PERUVIAN
SOCIAL INVESTIGATORS. SINCE EMERGENCY ZONES DO
NOT, IN MOST CASES, CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH
POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS
COMPARING PRECINCT TALLIES WITH EMERGENCY ZONES
AND POVERTY WILL BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE
EXACT NATURE AND IMPACT OF THESE VARIABLES.
¶14. (C) SUCH A DETAILED, QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS
MAY BE A LONG-TIME COMING. MOST OF THE
COMMENTARY THUS FAR PRODUCED BY PERUVIAN
POLITICIANS, INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICIANS
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 22 ELECTION HAS BEEN
IMPRESSIONISTIC, HISTORICAL AND SUBJECTIVE. ONE
LONG-TIME STUDENT OF THE IMPACT OF GUERRILLAS
AND VOTING INSISTED TO POLOFFS DECEMBER 31 THAT
THE SL OBVIOUSLY HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE
NOVEMBER 22 VOTE. UNFORTUNATELY, SHE HAD NO
DATA OR ANALYSIS TO BACK UP HER GUT FEELING.
BRAYSHAW##
=======================CABLE ENDS============================