

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05QUITO2057, A FIRST MEETING WITH PALACIO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05QUITO2057.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05QUITO2057 | 2005-09-02 19:41 | 2011-04-10 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Quito |
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/10/1/1355/cable-39765.html |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
021941Z Sep 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 002057
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON VE EC
SUBJECT: A FIRST MEETING WITH PALACIO
REF: QUITO 01978
Classified By: ECON LARRY L. MEMMOTT, REASONS 1.4 (B,...
id: 39765
date: 9/2/2005 19:41
refid: 05QUITO2057
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05QUITO1978
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
021941Z Sep 05
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 002057
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON VE EC
SUBJECT: A FIRST MEETING WITH PALACIO
REF: QUITO 01978
Classified By: ECON LARRY L. MEMMOTT, REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
¶1. (C) Summary: In their first substantive discussion,
President Palacio told the Ambassador that he sees himself as
a counterweight to Venezuela's Chavez; that he intends to
take a hard line to keep civil order in Ecuador; that he
believes the international financial institutions (IFIs) will
support his government's economic policies, which will
include universal health care for Ecuadorians; that the
Occidental problem will be resolved this year (see septel)
and that his government will implement important political
reforms. While his ambition is laudable, it is clear that he
will be lucky to accomplish even one or two of these goals.
End Summary.
¶2. (SBU) At his invitation, Ambassador and Econcouns dined
with President Palacio, the first lady, his brother and
Ecuadorian Representative to the Interamerican Development
Bank Gustavo Palacio, and Secretary of the Presidency Luis
Herreria the evening of August 31. The conversation was
extremely cordial, and Palacio made very clear his desire to
develop a close relationship with the Ambassador and with the
USG.
¶3. (U) Palacio greeted the Ambassador by expressing his
great sympathy for the disaster in New Orleans and said he
had sent a letter to President Bush expressing his sympathy.
He noted that he had been to New Orleans many times for
medical conferences and felt real sorrow for the loss. Mrs.
Palacio pointed out that all three of their children live in
Miami, where she also lived for many years, so they
understand the horror of hurricanes.
Venezuela
--------
¶4. (C) Palacio made clear his antipathy for Hugo Chavez at
several points during dinner. He described the offer by
Chavez of financing for Ecuador's budget as not even
economically advantageous to Ecuador, suggesting that the
8.5% nominal interest on the bonds which Chavez had offered
to buy would probably not be much better than market rates by
the time all costs were factored in. He said he had pointed
out to Chavez that the multilaterals were lending at 4%.
Chavez had responded that while that was true, they would not
lend to Ecuador. Palacio suggested that offering 8.5% when
4% was available elsewhere (even if not to Ecuador) was
"extortion." Further, he commented, he might even be taken
to court later for damaging Ecuadorian interests for
accepting an 8.5% interest rate. In the end, he had fired
his Minister of Finance for his continued promotion of this
deal, and his inability to ever put the offer down on paper
for objective analysis.
¶5. (C) Chavez' offer to loan Ecuador oil did not stand up to
Palacio's analysis, either. He said he had asked for oil of
a quality which Ecuadorian refineries could process (api 20).
Chavez had offered no better than 18.5 api, which might, or
might not, be light enough for Ecuador's outdated refineries
to handle (they can not refine 18 api crude). He had offered
to pay the crude back one barrel for one barrel. Chavez had
counter offered 1.4 barrels to one. While the Venezuelan
crude was of a higher quality than Ecuadorian, he concluded
this did not look like a great deal. Luckily, he said,
PetroEcuador production had recovered much more rapidly than
expected, and Ecuador would not likely need much, if any,
Venezuelan crude.
¶6. (C) As for Chavez himself, Palacio said a Latin American
counterweight was necessary to draw attention away from him.
Uribe had the charisma and the smarts to do it, but he was
"too far to the right" and too close to the U.S. to play the
role. Toledo was too weak internally, and Lula and Kirchner
would certainly not do it. The banner would have to be
carried by someone in the center- left, who would not
challenge Chavez directly, but simply divert attention from
him. Perhaps Michelle Bachelet, who he thought the likely
winner in Chile's upcoming presidential contest, could assume
that role, but she would need time to ascend to the
international stage. In the meantime, Palacio said, he
believed he could do it. But he would need U.S. assistance
to do so. Ambassador asked what kind of assistance. Palacio
responded that he would first need help "strategizing."
A Hard Line with Protesters
---------------------------
¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked Palacio if he was concerned about
possible future protests in other provinces in the mold of
the Manabi and Orellana/Sucumbios protests. Palacio
expressed satisfaction with the accomplishments of his new
Minister of Defense Osvaldo Jarrin in the later part of the
recent protests in the oil fields. Once Jarrin had taken
over, the military responded immediately to his orders to
push protesters from the oil and transportation facilities
they had taken over. "There will be no more strikes,"
Palacio vowed, saying he fully expected the military to
follow his hard line with protesters. The Ambassador noted
that Jarrin is well respected by those in the Embassy who
know him.
¶8. (C) Palacio said he is concerned about reports from his
police force that indoctrination and training is being
provided to young people at several locations in Ecuador to
build a cadre for revolutionary purposes. According to these
reports, Ecuador could have a real problem with insurgency in
a few years. Ecuadorian intelligence had not been able to
determine who was behind the protests in the oil patch, but
they were too well organized to be purely the work of
internal forces, Palacio suggested.
¶9. (C) It did not look like the World Bank would be likely to
help Ecuador on security in the oil fields, Palacio said.
Maybe the U.S. could help. After all, these installations
were right on the border with Colombia and potentially
vulnerable to FARC attack. The Ambassador promised to look
into possibilities.
Economic Policy
---------------
¶10. (SBU) Turning to economic policy, Palacio said that
concern over Ecuadorian economic policy by the international
community was mostly a reflection of the ill-advised public
posture of former Minister of Finance Rafael Correa. Still,
he had not understood the depth of the damage which had been
done to relations with the World Bank. He would work to
salvage that relationship. However, he did not think the
differences were really great. The IFIs understood his
economic policies and would support them. His tough line
with the protesters would help to keep the budget within
reasonable parameters.
¶11. (SBU) Still, he continued, there was no doubt that
Ecuador needed to invest more in social programs. Chile and
Costa Rica had social indicators far better than those of
Ecuador. Ecuador needed to catch up. There was too much to
do, and he had little time, so he intended to focus on his
long-term goal of universal health care, which had motivated
him to run for public office in the first place. He noted
that different countries had taken different approaches to
universal health care and Ecuador would need to find an
approach which fit its political situation. He also believed
that "economic reactivation" via government spending would be
crucial to get out of the current "economic crisis."
¶12. (SBU) Econcouns noted that Palacio had mentioned Chile
and Costa Rica as examples to be followed before. Perhaps we
could help bring him together with Chilean or Costa Rican
officials who had been involved in the reforms these
countries had implemented, to discuss their experiences.
Palacio responded enthusiastically.
¶13. (SBU) Palacio said he had another meeting with business
leaders scheduled for the next day. At their last meeting,
the week before, they had agreed on a shared agenda which
included customs reform, labor reform, and energy policy
reform. These were all issues which were important to
implementation of an FTA, he stated. The next day they would
discuss customs reform in depth. Econcouns noted that USAID
is very interested in working with the GOE on customs reform,
and would be pleased to assist. We are already working with
the Minister of Labor on labor reform and would like to see
that process accelerated.
Political Reform
----------------
¶14. (C) Palacio highlighted the need for political reform to
strengthen Ecuadorian democracy, especially election of
congressional deputies by district, so that voters would have
a clear idea who represented them. He said election by
district would definitely be on the referendum his government
would propose to Congress.
Comment: No Lack of Ambition Here
----------------------------------
¶15. (C) Palacio has come a long way since taking over the
Presidency, and seems to be learning from some recent
mistakes. As he has gradually moved closer to us, he has
become more decisive in his decision making. However, he has
yet to understand that, as a caretaker government with no
mandate and only 16 more months to serve, his ambition to
become a major Latin American leader and counterweight to
Chavez would be unrealistic, even if he had the charisma
necessary to play the role. His ambition to implement
universal health care will also be extremely difficult to
fulfill, with Congress emboldened after recent presidential
missteps (septel). He is far too optimistic about prospects
for IFI financial support, given his proposal this week of a
2006 budget which grows by 14% over 2005(septel). It would
take great skill to keep the provinces calm without
disbursing significant new resources to them. Nonetheless,
our short term interests in Ecuador are likely to be
protected by a President who clearly understands how
important U.S. support and cooperation can be to him.
JEWELL
=======================CABLE ENDS============================