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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS5349, SARG FEELING CONFIDENT IS THE MESSAGE TO STAFFDEL
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VZCZCXRO4665
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #5349/01 3370737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030737Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2535
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 005349
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA; NSC FOR MARCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: SARG FEELING CONFIDENT IS THE MESSAGE TO STAFFDEL
TALWAR
Classified By: Classified by Charge D'Affairs Michael Corbin
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Professional staff member on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Puneet Talwar, held meetings in
Damascus November 22 with an opposition member, informal SARG
advisor, journalist, and others. The common perspective from
the meetings is that the SARG feels it is operating from a
position of strength and is willing to be helpful on Iraq,
but continues to focus on maintaining the stability of the
regime. It is also focused on events in Lebanon and has
become alarmed about the formation of the international
tribunal to investigate the murder of former PM Hariri. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) PROSPECTS FOR THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA: Opposition
leader XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the SARG feels it has prevailed
after a difficult period and that time has vindicated its
confrontational policies, as evidenced by recent EU
re-engagement. He said the opposition elements are concerned
that the West, in this new environment, will forget about
their efforts to build democracy in Syria, although he
reported that he had been told that the EU did commit to
imposing human rights conditions on their engagement with
Syria. He asked that the United States make a similar
commitment if it proceeded towards engagement, asserting that
without international scrutiny the SARG would crush the
opposition. He argued that while the regime maintains a few
reform figures, like Abdullah al-Dardari, for public
consumption, the regime is not capable of real reform. XXXXXXXXXXXX
asserted that the regime has developed a powerful rhetoric of
fear to deflect internal pressures, which leaves average
Syrians feeling they must either support the regime or face
Islamic extremists and Iraq-style instability and violence.
¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that despite regime pressure the opposition
has managed over the last four months to strengthen the
organization of the Damascus Declaration (DD) group. He says
the group, formed after the Damascus Declaration of 16
October 2005, brings together credible leaders from across
Syria, and is composed of diverse groups, including
communists, Arab nationalists, liberals, Kurds, and the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB). He says that despite regime efforts
to sow discord between the groups, they are now working
together towards a common democratic goal and have supporters
both in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in the United States.
¶4. (C) Regarding Abdul-Halim Khaddam, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the
former regime figure is a real thorn in the side of the
Bashar al-Asad regime, especially because he has the ability
to speak knowledgeably about inner-circle corruption and to
appeal to some Sunnis. However, Khaddam is fatally tainted
by his own corruption and his long-term association with the
regime of Hafez al-Asad. As such, Khaddam is not acceptable
to the DD group as a figure with whom they are willing to
cooperate, although the DD group does not publicly criticize
his National Salvation Front, wishes him well in his efforts
to damage the regime, and thinks the two can work in
parallel. The group has decided to continue partnering with
the MB, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶5. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTING DEMOCRACY IN SYRIA:
XXXXXXXXXXXX said that because the United States has lost credibility
in the region, most recently because of its veto of the
resolution on Beit Hannoun in the Security Council, the U.S.
needs to partner with Europe on democracy and human rights
issues. He encouraged the U.S. to exploit weaknesses in the
regime's propaganda, including:
--finding a fair solution in Palestine to undercut Asad's
rhetoric as defender of the Palestinian people;
--exposing the corruption of regime supporters who claim to
be high-minded, virtuous supporters of Islam; and,
--identifying regime members as perpetrators of the
assassinations in Lebanon.
He also suggested that the United States encourage the Saudis
to allow Saudi-owned media such as Al-Hayat or Al-Arabiya to
publish negative articles about Asad and positive articles
about Muslim life in the United States. He further suggested
that the U.S. press the Saudis to give Khaddam much greater
access to their influential regional media. He expressed
doubt that a statement on human rights released by the United
States would be useful at the present time.
DAMASCUS 00005349 002 OF 003
¶6. (C) PRO-REGIME ANALYST ASSERTS SYRIA'S KEY ROLE IN THE
REGION: XXXXXXXXXXXX, a pro-regime foreign policy analyst,
said time has proven Syria plays a key role in the region and
that the SARG cannot be overthrown by a coup d,etat. He
asserted that the SARG is ready to cooperate with the United
States if it accepts Syria as a partner with common interests
in obtaining peace in the Middle East. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that
the United States needs the rationality of the
secular-oriented Asad regime to counter ideological
extremists in the area, noting SARG efforts to arrest
Al-Qaeda members in Syria. He also claimed that Syria is not
in the pocket of Iran, but merely using the relationship to
pragmatically guarantee Syria's interests.
¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX briefly outlined Syria's goals in the region.
He claimed that although the SARG is willing to compromise in
Lebanon, it does not want an anti-Syrian Lebanese government
and feels attacked by the recent acceleration of the
international tribunal formation. He also noted that while
"Syria is currently the lung of Hizballah" and intensely
concerned about developments there, the SARG will not need to
be so involved in Lebanon once it gets back the Golan and is
assured through a revitalized peace process that Israel will
not seek to use Lebanese territory for invasion routes into
Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that towards this end Syria wants to
re-start the larger peace process and that it has not been
responsible for blocking the unity government in Palestine.
Regarding Iraq, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Syria is concerned about the
violence and is willing to work with the United States,
although he did not offer many specifics.
¶8. (C) SARG FEELINGS OF VICTORY: XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that the Syrian regime's position
had changed over the last year, from extreme insecurity and
fears of regime change after the Hariri assassination, to a
growing confidence that has turned into surging feelings of
SARG confidence, especially following the Hizballah-Israel
war in Lebanon. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that President Asad no
longer cares as much about his image as a reformer that was
publicized at the beginning of his Presidency, instead
shoring up his legitimacy with his assiduous efforts to
support the resistance in Palestine and Lebanon. He says
this shift has empowered Asad and that his more
confrontational posture and his anti-Israeli, anti-American,
pro-Hizballah rhetoric have greatly increased his popularity
and standing with the Syrian public XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that
the regime was not overly concerned about bilateral tensions
with Saudi Arabia or Egypt, noting relations with Egypt are
already on the mend, and that relations with Saudi Arabia
would necessarily improve over time as the Saudis inevitably
realize that Syria had an indispensable role to play in
Lebanon and Iraq.
¶9. (C) GOOD COP, BAD COP: XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that recently
President Asad is using Vice-President al-Shara'a to play the
"bad cop" and FM Mu'allim to serve as the "good cop" in
international politics, and asserted that since meeting with
Baker in September Mu'allim has enhanced his status inside
the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that Mu'allim pushes for
engagement with the U.S. to achieve a settlement in the
Golan, asserts Syria needs Europe for economic profit, and
speaks of Syria as a constructive player in the resolution of
regional problems, while Shara'a tends to deny Syria's need
to make concessions on any of these fronts, believing it is
in a position of strength and benefits from its current
posture of confrontation and delay. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that by
isolating Syria the United States has inadvertently
strengthened Shara'a and the hardliners, and through
engagement would strengthen the moderates.
¶10. (C) MU'ALLIM's TRIP TO IRAQ: XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that from a
Syrian perspective Mu'allim's trip to Iraq has three
significant components: it's the first time in 25 years that
a high ranking Syrian official had gone to Iraq; the trip
signified the resumption of diplomatic ties between the two
countries; and this was the first time a "senior-level" Arab
official stayed for a three-day visit in Iraq. He asserted
that Mu'allim would not attend a summit in Iran because the
purpose of the trip to Iraq to was to strengthen Syria's
"Arab hand," not the Iranian hand, and that traveling to Iran
would undercut the international goodwill that may have been
generated by Syria engaging with Iraq. While XXXXXXXXXXXX thought
Syria was more willing to be helpful in Iraq than Lebanon, he
asserted that Syria's capacity for influence in Iraq was
weaker than commonly believed among Shiites and Kurds, and
only moderately useful among Baathist elements in the Sunni
DAMASCUS 00005349 003 OF 003
camp.
¶11. (C) Staffdel Talwar cleared this cable.
CORBIN