

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2551, TFLE01: LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR PUSHES FOR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2551.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2551 | 2006-08-07 15:59 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO2889
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2551/01 2191559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071559Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4935
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0031
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0912
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002551
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR
TREASURY FOR MNUGENT
USDOC FOR 4250/ITA/MAC/OME
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV EFIN ECON EINV LE IS SY
SUBJECT: TFLE01: LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR PUSHES FOR
ALLEVIATION OF BLOCKADE
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C) In an August 7 meeting with Ambassador Feltman and
TDY poloff, Central Bank of Lebanon (CBL) Governor Riad
Salameh said that the Lebanese financial situation had so far
avoided disaster through some creative "financial
engineering" and other confidence-building measures such as a
$1 billion loan from the Saudis. However, Salameh stressed
to the Ambassador that the situation is not sustainable, and
that public confidence would soon dwindle if the conflict
continues. Salameh said that several factors in particular
would erode confidence: the continued blockade of Lebanon
and the resultant hardships for the Lebanese (Comment: On
the roads en route from the Embassy to the CBL, cars were
seen lined up for several blocks outside of gas stations.
End Comment), as well as the prospect of further Israeli
attacks on critical Lebanese infrastructure, particularly gas
depots and power plants. In this context, Salameh welcomed
the efforts to ship in fuel to power plants, as well as a
plan to truck in gasoline. He said he could even get the
Lebanese business community to support stationing UNIFIL
forces to monitor points of entry if it would allow for these
to be re-opened. Regarding the reconstruction of Lebanon
after the hoped-for ceasefire, Salameh said that prospective
donors would not trust any Lebanese government agency to
handle and distribute assistance funds and to make decisions
on projects. Instead, Salameh plans to recommend to PM
Siniora that an independent mutual fund be set up and
controlled by the donors. The GOL and Lebanese organizations
such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction and
the Fund for the Displaced could present project proposals to
the donors who could then decide on the allocation of funds.
End Summary.
TWO-PHASE RESOLUTION HAS A CHANCE
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) Salameh touched first on his assessment of the
political situation, which he described as "one big poker
bluff," with the Shi'a -- for whom Nabih Berri is the front
man -- posturing as if they intend to block the resolution
and leave the government in the hopes of getting a more
favorable ceasefire deal. Salameh does not believe this will
lead to a sectarian conflict. "There is no money for a civil
war." Rather, he believes that with the passage of a first
resolution, there will follow a traditional period of
Lebanese sectarian haggling, with Berri in particular hoping
to reassert his Shi'a primacy over Hizballah. In the end,
noone will want to be seen as the obstacle to a ceasefire
that would bring an end to the suffering of the Lebanese
people. "The Shi'a do not have the leverage to quit the
cabinet. But if a second resolution does not come, then all
of Lebanon will be with them." While these internal
discussions are going on, the international community would
be working toward a second resolution authorizing the
stabilization force and calling for the Israeli withdrawal.
So in this sense, according to Salameh, the oft-criticized
tendency of the Lebanese confessional system to work at a
snail's pace may in fact make the two-phased resolution
process workable.
¶3. (C) Salameh expressed disgust at the feeble maneuverings
of Lebanon's "political class," from President Lahoud on
down. He decried in particular the "lack of muscle,"
including on the part of PM Siniora, which allows Hizballah
to dictate its terms to the Lebanese people. Unable to
disguise his own presidential ambitions, Salameh (a Maronite)
felt that the passage and successful implementation of a
second resolution would weaken Syria and thus President
Lahoud so that he might be deposed. Asked about a future
career for Lahoud, Salameh responded, "he could do TV talk
shows." As for a future president, he needed to be someone
"not from either side" (i.e., neither pro-Syrian nor from
March 14) who can balance the two trends in Lebanon.
BEIRUT 00002551 002 OF 003
KEEPING THE LIRA STEADY
-----------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to the financial situation, Salameh lamented
that, "Nasrallah lied. He said he would not do anything to
hurt the economy during the summer." Since the rug has now
been pulled out from what many had hoped would be a booming
tourist season, Salameh now seeks to keep the lira under
control and the banking sector stable, particularly as people
begin to default on bank overdrafts. Salameh admitted that
in the first fifteen days of the conflict, the CBL lost over
890 million dollars. In addition, dollarization had
increased from 72 to 75 per cent which meant that over 1.5
billion dollars had left the country. However, though this
is decidedly gloomy news, public confidence is better than it
was in the period following the Hariri assassination in 2005,
when the CBL used up much of its dollar reserves in order to
stabilize the lira. One reason for this confidence,
according to Salameh, is that people believe the strategy in
2005 worked and so have faith in the CBL.
¶5. (C) According to Salameh, there are additional factors
contributing to this confidence and keeping the situation
steady. Saudi Arabia only today confirmed a 1 billion dollar
deposit into the CBL's coffers, while discussions are
continuing with the Kuwaitis for a further 500 million
dollars. The Saudis and Kuwaitis have made loans in the past
and have always been repaid with interest and are thus
comfortable that the CBL will not default. The CBL is also
buoying dollar reserves by forcing Lebanese banks which need
Lebanese lira to hand over U.S. dollars in exchange. If the
banks then come looking for U.S. dollars, Salameh is
accepting Lebanese treasury bonds and giving the banks 3-year
U.S. dollar CDs. Salameh noted that interest rates have not
changed.
"Lift the Blockade"
-------------------
¶6. (C) Salameh stressed that these were only stopgap
measures based upon the hope that the conflict will end soon.
"We cannot sustain this for long." The government deficit
is in a "very bad situation" but might be improved if a
permanent solution were found to the conflict. Lebanese
confidence may start to slip if the Israeli blockade does not
let up and people begin to feel the pinch of shortages.
Salameh wasd also worried about an escalation of the
conflict, especially the possibility of attacks on power
plants. He said that the "stupidest thing" the Israelis had
done was to bomb the Jounieh Casino bridge on August 4,
rather than restricting their strikes to the South.
¶7. (C) Salameh added that any measures which would
alleviate the shortages, including the planned delivery of
gasoline and diesel fuel by land and by sea in the coming
days, would buttress public confidence and stave off any
further capital flight. Salameh pleaded for the reopening of
the airport and ports, and said he could get the business
community to pressure the government to allow UNIFIL forces
to monitor the points of entry to interdict any possible
resupply of Hizballah.
The Aftermath
-------------
¶8. (C) Salameh urged that the international community step
in quickly to assist with reconstruction of the South. He
warned that if Iran does the lion's share of the rebuilding,
they will make people sign an "allegiance for life." Arguing
that any GOL-directed assistance effort would undercut donor
confidence, Salameh said that he will suggest to Siniora that
an independent agency be established, headed by the donors,
to review proposals and disburse funds. Unfortunately,
Salameh remarked, "I'm sure it won't be accepted."
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Salameh no doubt painted a rosy picture of the
BEIRUT 00002551 003 OF 003
Lebanese financial situation for our consumption, and his
concerns about the blockade of Lebanon and further
bombardments of infrastructure were clearly foremost in his
mind. This is a common refrain among the Lebanese with whom
we are meeting, and we believe that it is in the USG interest
to continue to support initiatives - and help to coordinate
with the Israelis - in order to relieve the psychological
burden of the blockade. We also suggest that we do all we
can to prevent the Israelis from launching any seriously
debilitating aerial attacks on Lebanese power plants and
remaining fuel depots.
FELTMAN