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Viewing cable 05ANKARA296, TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S VISIT TO SYRIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05ANKARA296 | 2005-01-18 08:19 | 2011-04-30 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000296
SIPDIS
ISTANBUL PLS PASS ADANA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ETRD TU IS IZ SY
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM ERDOGAN'S VISIT TO SYRIA
REF: A. 04 ANKARA 226
¶B. 04 ANKARA 4196
¶C. 04 ANKARA 6258
¶D. 04 ANKARA 0248
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The Turks, led by PM Erdogan, FonMin Gul, and
chief foreign policy advisor Davutoglu, are selling improved
relations with Syria as a major foreign policy success. GOT
leaders cast Turkey as a channel of communication for the
U.S. and Israel with Syria and as a friend that can support
economic reform. At the same time our GOT interlocutors view
Assad's control as too fragile to sustain anything but
economic reform. In this context, Erdogan has promoted his
Dec. 22-23 visit to Damascus and Aleppo as a huge step
forward. Erdogan reportedly raised Iraq and Middle East
peace issues, but apparently received nothing new from Assad.
MFA contact spun the signing of a free trade agreement as
"the highlight" of the visit. We pushed back that this is
the wrong approach to take with Syria and will continue to
urge the GOT not to ratify it. End summary.
Warming Trend
-------------
¶2. (C) Under the influence of islam oriented chief foreign
policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul
have promoted improved relations with Syria as a major
achievement of the ruling AKP government. While relations
have been on an upward trend since hitting bottom in 1998,
Bashir Assad's Jan. 2004 visit to Turkey (ref A) signaled an
acceleration. As part of a broad push to ease tensions with
its neighbors, Turkey has focused on developing political,
cultural, economic -- but not military -- ties with Syria
(ref B). Syrian PM al-Utri and FonMin al-Shara came to
Turkey in July. In October, Turkey helped Syria extinguish a
serious forest fire near the border (ref C). PM Erdogan
received Syrian Baath Party Deputy SecGen al-Ahmar in
November.
"The Syrians Need Friends"
--------------------------
¶3. (C) MFA Middle East Department Head Bozay, who accompanied
Erdogan to Damascus, proclaimed the visit a success. He
asserted that Syria feels isolated and concerned by the
prospect of U.S. action against it. "The Syrians need
friends," he added. The Syrians hope Turkey can be a channel
of communication. According to Bozay, the Syrians want to
show they are not supporting terror.
¶4. (C) (C) Bozay said the Turkish Embassy in Damascus views
Assad as trying to reform Syria, especially economically,
against an older generation of Baathists. The Embassy views
Assad's control as fragile; too delicate, added Bozay, to
enable him to engage in political reform. According to ref
B, at least some in Turkey's military share this view.
Bozay asserted that the Syrians are engaging in economic
reforms and they see Turkey as a potential partner in that
effort. Erdogan asked the Syrians to remove obstacles to
Turkish investors; the Syrians asked the Turks for advice on
opening a stock exchange.
Iraq
----
¶5. (C) On Iraq elections, Erdogan reportedly told Assad that
Turkey supports Sunni Arab participation and Iranian
non-interference. Assad mostly just listened, according to
Bozay. Assad expressed concern about Iranian influence and
the possibility of an "unbalanced" election result favoring
Shiites.
¶6. (C) Bozay said Erdogan did not "directly" raise with Assad
the issue of Baath terrorist infiltration of Iraq from Syria,
but did tell Assad that terror and infiltration should stop;
Assad replied he was doing the best he could. Bozay
speculated that Erdogan may have also raised the issue in his
one-on-one meeting with Assad, which Bozay did not attend.
Middle East Peace
-----------------
¶7. (C) Erdogan reportedly raised Palestinian elections,
telling Assad extremism should not be encouraged at this
delicate stage, and that elected Palestinian leaders should
be supported. Erdogan did not raise the issue of Palestinian
rejectionist groups' offices in Syria, Bozay said. Assad
agreed the elections were important but expressed skepticism
about whether Israel would allow them to proceed freely or
would cooperate with the new Palestinian government.
¶8. (C) Bozay said Erdogan raised the case of return of the
remains of Eli Cohen (executed as an Israeli spy by the
Syrians in 1965) but none of the other cases of Israelis
missing in Lebanon about whom the Syrians presumably have
information. Assad reportedly replied he would look into the
Cohen case and that this is solvable in the context of an
overall settlement between Israel and Syria. Israeli DCM
Nahshon told us subsequently that Israel asked Erdogan to
raise the Cohen case as a way to test the Turks. Nahshon
said the Israelis see the contradiction between Bashir
Assad's non-answer (which, given the centrality of the Cohen
case to Hafez al-Assad's justification for his regime, Israel
interprets as a continuing "no") and the Turks' --
principally Davutoglu's -- assertion that the Syrians have
not closed the door as a reflection of the Turks' lack of
capacity to play a meaningful role.
¶9. (C) Bozay was unsure whether Erdogan raised Syrian
occupation of Lebanon. The MFA's prepared talking points
included Lebanon, but Erdogan did not raise the subject in
the expanded meeting with Assad. Bozay again speculated
Erdogan may have done so in the one-on-one meeting.
Free Trade Agreement
--------------------
¶10. (C) Bozay painted the signing of the Turkey/Syria free
trade agreement as "the highlight" of the visit. We told
Bozay that the U.S. sees the agreement as unhelpful in view
of Syria's harboring of Iraqi former regime elements and
terrorists; harboring Palestinian rejectionists; and
occupying Lebanon. Bozay averred the agreement is designed
both to encourage Syrian economic reform, which in turn, he
asserted, will lead to political reform, and to keep Turkey
engaged with Syria. DCM also raised the FTA with DG for
Middle East, Oguz Cellikkol, underlining our view that
improved dialogue and trade benefits should be contingent on
positive responses from Syria on core issues such as support
for terrorists, in both the Iraq and MEPP contexts.
Cellikkol agreed it was essential to give the Syrians a clear
roadmap of requirements, but he also insisted that Turkey's
warming relationship could have a positive impact in moving
Assad forward on more difficult issues.
¶11. (C) We told Bozay that the U.S. thinks this is the wrong
way to approach Syria. Concrete messages to stop these
activities are more effective in changing Syrian behavior.
We reminded Bozay that when Syria was harboring PKK leader
Ocalan, Turkey delivered a clear message in late 1998 to
Syria to expel Ocalan and backed it with a promise of
military action. This approach worked: Syria expelled
Ocalan.
¶12. (C) Bozay denied press reports that the FTA includes
Syrian acknowledgment that the disputed Turkish province of
Hatay (called Alexandretta by the Syrians) belongs to Turkey.
Both sides pointedly refused to comment on the topic during
the visit. Bozay said agreements like the FTA and a
transboundary water agreement on the Orontes (Asi) reached
during the visit (ref D) would eventually amount to "de
facto" resolution of the dispute.
¶13. (C) Bozay told us the agreement still must be ratified
by the Turkish parliament. We will continue to reiterate our
opposition to the FTA and urge no ratification until Syria
changes its behavior on Iraq, Palestinian rejectionists,
Lebanon, and other issues of concern to the U.S.
Comment
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¶14. (C) The GOT's mixing wishful thinking and a form of
neo-Ottoman nostalgia in and approval to Syria (in this
regard, several contacts, including "Sabah" Ankara bureau
chief Asli Aydintasbas, have contrasted Erdogan's relaxed,
at-home behavior in Damascus and Aleppo with his competitive
body language in Western European capitals). This Turkish
love-fest with Bashir Assad and Syria (which has a reflection
on the law-enforcement and counter-terror areas) will soon
conflict with Turkey's attempts to repair the public side of
its relations with Israel (septel). It remains to be seen
what concretely is produced following the rhetoric. End
comment.
¶15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN