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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2706, LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS LEBANESE MARSHALL PLAN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BEIRUT2706 | 2006-08-21 05:40 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut |
Appears in these articles: not yet set |
VZCZCXRO5452
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #2706/01 2330540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210540Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5160
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0137
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1006
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002706
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS LEBANESE MARSHALL PLAN
REF: BEIRUT 2680
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4(d).
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C/NF) During a difficult 8/20 meeting at his Qureitem
mansion with Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman and poloff, a
somewhat erratic Saad Hariri pressed for the immediate
reopening of Lebanon's ports and airports. Pushing back, the
Ambassador said that until the Government of Lebanon (GOL)
does more to improve monitoring of points of entry, as is
required under UNSCR 1701, the U.S. will not be able to
convince the Israelis to lift their blockade. During the
meeting, Saad called Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to ask
(in a misleading way) that Hizballah-sympathetic LAF officers
be removed from the cargo terminal at Rafiq Hariri Beirut
International Airport (BIA).
¶2. (C/NF) Calling for "a Marshall Plan for Lebanon," Saad
said the USG must help strengthen Lebanese government
institutions, in particular the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and Internal Security Forces (ISF). When the Ambassador was
critical of a recent statement by LAF commander Michel
Sleiman supportive of "the resistance," Saad argued that the
LAF has been left in a weak position by the international
community and so must act submissive in front of Hizballah.
The Ambassador said that, in terms of assistance, no one will
be able to help Lebanon until the GOL presents a clear
reconstruction plan. Saad laid out the latest GOL plan,
which involves channelling funds through a new Arab fund for
Lebanon, and promised to push PM Siniora to present the plan
to ambassadors as soon as tomorrow 8/21. Regarding the
"special tribunal with international character" to try those
suspected in the Rafiq Hariri assassination, Saad said the
draft framework had been approved within the GOL at the
working level and it now only requires Nicholas Michel from
the UN's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to come and sign it,
before the Lebanese cabinet and parliament consider it. End
Summary.
CHANGING THE BALL GAME
----------------------
¶3. (C/NF) Seated in his funereal basement study, surrounded
by images of his late father and fidgeting nervously with his
prayer beads, Saad said that there needs to be "a different
ball game" in the South. Responding to the Ambassador's
complaints about LAF chief Michel Sleiman's recent 8/17 'Amr
ul-'Amaliyyat' (Operations' Order) saying that the LAF would
deploy "beside the resistance," implying tacit approval of an
armed Hizballah, Saad said that Sleiman is hardly in a
position to say anything else right now. So long as the army
remains militarily weaker than Hizballah, he said, the LAF
will have to maintain such a less-threatening posture. But
once the army has "some teeth and some morale," Saad urged,
then he promises to "smack Hizballah down." Growing more
strident (and clearly hoping to be recorded verbatim), Saad
assured the Ambassador, "Give me a chance, and I will f***
Hizballah." Saad also complained -- as have others including
PM Siniora and Speaker Berri -- that Israeli attacks like the
8/19 raid north of Baalbek only serve to buttress Hizballah.
¶4. (C/NF) Bothered that the USG has not come through yet on
items he has asked for previously -- Saad mentioned
specifically machine guns and helicopters -- for the military
and security forces, Saad urged that the U.S. do more to help
strengthen these institutions. The Ambassador said that,
indeed, we were increasing our assistance to both the LAF and
ISF. But, he noted, it is difficult to find sympathetic ears
in Washington when senior Lebanese officials like General
Sleiman (not to mention President Lahoud) are still crowing
about the merits of the resistance. It also makes it harder
for us to convince the Israelis of the LAF's seriousness in
containing Hizballah. Ticking off numerous speeches since
Sleiman's that strike a different tone (his own, PM
Siniora's, Walid Jumblatt's, Defense Minister Murr's), Saad
implied the Ambassador is blowing Sleiman's statement out of
proportion. He said that all that is needed is for the USG
to lean on some of the Gulf Arab states -- Qatar, Kuwait,
BEIRUT 00002706 002 OF 003
UAE, and Saudi Arabia -- to cough up military equipment for
the ISF and LAF. Saad pleaded, "Just please tell the Arabs
to help the army." He said that the UAE came up with $50
million for the ISF immediately once the USG asked. Now the
USG needs to ask for the army.
CONTROLLING POINTS OF ENTRY
---------------------------
¶5. (C/NF) Referring to lukewarm statements from Lebanese
ministers, the Ambassador asked why the GOL is treating UNSCR
1701 as a burden rather than a blessing to help Lebanon
secure its sovereignty. Why, for instance, is the GOL not
willing to quietly ask for UNIFIL assistance at the ports,
airports, and Lebanese-Syrian border to stop Iran and Syria
from supplying arms to Hizballah and others? This is a key
point. Saad replied that this is a sovereignty issue, adding
shockingly (surely in reference to violations of sovereignty,
not intent) that "there is no difference between UNIFIL and
Syria." The Ambassador told Saad that this answer would not
suffice in getting the Israeli blockade lifted, and if the
GOL wants to achieve that objective, then they need to ensure
effective monitoring at points of entry.
¶6. (C/NF) Saying that "we are the ones who control the port
and the airport," Saad complained emotively that the U.S.
policy has led to an "embargo that has suffocated the Cedar
Revolution for one month." The embargo does not hurt
Hizballah but cripples March 14. Saad assured the Ambassador
that "99 per cent" of arms smuggled into Lebanon come across
the Syrian frontier. Only very few come through the port and
airport, and the GOL has made recent significant changes in
security at BIA. When the Ambassador told Saad that ISF
chief Ashraf Rifi had informed us that the BIA cargo terminal
remains under the influence of LAF officers sympathetic to
Hizballah (reftel), Saad picked up the phone and called Nabih
Berri directly. Speaking in Arabic, Saad cle粑rly lied to
Berri on the phone, saying that "the United Nations had told
him to just change the Shi'a officers at the cargo terminal,"
and also that "that will be the end of the issue. It will
solve the problem." Later on in the meeting, Saad said he
would resolve the issue of the cargo terminal with Nabih
Berri "today." "If I do, then open the airport." The
Ambassador did not guarantee that the Israelis would accept
this measure as sufficient, and again urged Saad to ask PM
Siniora to quietly request UNIFIL to come help at the
airport. (Comment. Striking throughout this meeting was
Saad's absolute disregard for Siniora's prime ministerial
prerogative. End Comment.)
¶7. (C/NF) When the Ambassador asked what the GOL intends to
do to secure the border, Saad complained that the army is
already stretched thin and has enough on its hands already in
the South. "We're asking the army to do everything at the
same time!" He said that the international community needs
to take a "stand" on the border. When the Ambassador asked
what this meant, Saad suggested getting the UN to place
sanctions on Syria.
RECONSTRUCTION PLAN TAKES SHAPE
--------------------------------
¶8. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the GOL is any
closer to developing a clear plan for reconstruction. Saad
replied confidently that, "We're going to rebuild all the
homes that were destroyed with money from the Saudis,
Qataris, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis." The first step will be to
assess the destruction and provide cost estimates for the
rebuilding of each village, a process well underway. The
assessment in southern Lebanon would be carried out under the
auspices of Nabih Berri's Council for the South (considered a
cash black hole, the Council will wisely not have any control
over project funds, but will still get much of the credit for
rebuilding). The donor countries, in conjunction with the
GOL, would then choose which villages they want to rebuild as
well as select the contractors. Sufficient project funds,
Saad said, would then be disbursed from a new 'Arab Fund for
Rebuilding Lebanon.'
¶9. (C/NF) On the Ambassador's urging that the GOL launch a
more effective public relations campaign to broadcast all
BEIRUT 00002706 003 OF 003
that it is doing to rebuild Lebanon, Saad said that PM
Siniora would be visiting him later today (8/20) to finalize
the plan. Following this, there will be a public
announcement of the GOL effort. Saad also noted that PM
Siniora and Speaker Berri had (finally) visited the southern
suburbs together earlier today, and that he himself would be
going there at some point in the next few days. Saad pressed
again for U.S. assistance in rallying international support
-- "Go freaking help Lebanon! Unleash everything on Lebanon!
We need a Marshall Plan!" The Ambassador mentioned that, in
order to see how much the international community could
pledge towards Lebanon, there must be GOL coordination so we
all have some idea of what work needs to be done and which
country will undertake what project. Saad promised he would
tell PM Siniora to convene ambassadors soon to give them a
list of "1 billion dollars worth of what needs rebuilding."
He said that the GOL's new relief coordinator, Ghassan Taher,
started work today, and that Taher was previously involved in
the German-supported Hizballah-Israeli prisoner swap
negotiations in 2003/04.
TRIBUNAL
--------
¶10. (C/NF) Noting that Bashar al-Asad's 8/15 speech was
"the best thing he could have done," Saad said the Saudis had
"gone ballistic" over Bashar's bullying anti-Lebanon
rhetoric. The Ambassador asked how things are proceeding on
the establishment of a "special tribunal with international
character" to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. Saad
said the GOL, particularly Justice Minister Charles Rizk, had
reviewed the draft tribunal agreement provided by the UN's
OLA and had made some "fixes" to it. The next step is for
UN/OLA's Nicholas Michel to come to Lebanon to finalize and
sign the agreement. (Note. Then comes the hard part, which
is gaining Lebanese Cabinet and Parliamentary approval while
avoiding a government collapse. End Note)
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C/NF) Locked away in his palace, 'Sheikh Saad' was in
an erratic mood. His claim that the USG's failure to get
supplies to the LAF leaves Michel Sleiman with no choice but
to say the LAF would deploy "beside the resistance" is simply
preposterous, and the Ambassador pointed out to Saad that it
would have been better had Sleiman simply not mentioned "the
resistance" at all. (Sleiman himself seems to have gotten
the message about the outrageousness of comments, for he is
busily spinning his comments -- delivered last Thursday -- as
meaning that the army would stand with the "heroic people of
the south," a dubious interpretation.) In addition, we were
shocked by Saad's total dismissiveness of Siniora,
particularly in phoning Speaker Berri, lying to him and
asking him outright to "change the Shi'a officers" without
consulting Siniora on this action. Saad tried to get through
to Acting Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat following his call
with Berri, presumably to inform Fatfat of his decision.
Throughout the meeting, Saad referred to GOL actions over the
past week (since his return from Paris) as if he himself had
carried them out, not Siniora. One wonders whether Siniora
might have preferred Saad to remain outside of Lebanon
conducting his so-called "diplomatic resistance."
¶12. (C/NF) Saad's comments on the reconstruction planning
and the tribunal indicate things are at least moving in the
right direction. The reconstruction effort seems to have
coalesced into a scheme which allows joint donor and GOL
control, along with transparency and accountability -- no
doubt due to Siniora's cautious, if agonizingly deliberative,
approach. In addition, by putting Berri's organization out
in front, but not allowing it to handle the funds, you give a
needed public relations boost to a secular Shi'a alternative
to Hizballah while not lining Randa Berri's pockets. We very
much hope to receive a clearer idea in the next days as to
Lebanon's specific reconstruction needs. On the tribunal
framework, if it is indeed ready to be signed, we should urge
the UN send Michel out to Lebanon as soon as possible,
perhaps -- as suggested by Marwan Hamadeh (see septel) -- to
accompany Kofi Annan during the SYG's visit next week.
FELTMAN