

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE361, COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE361.
VZCZCXYZ0053
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0361/01 0541928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231928Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7320
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3931
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000361
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND DS/IP/WHA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV ELAB ASEC PINR CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB
REF: A. 06 SAN JOSE 2431
¶B. SAN JOSE 175
Classified By: CDA Russell Frisbie per reasons 1.4 (b & d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) 1. (C) The next anti-CAFTA protest is scheduled for
Monday, February 26, with the locus of action likely to be
San Jose. Organizers promise a larger event than last
October's protest, but predicting turnout is impossible in
advance. The GOCR has vowed to prevent disruption of
essential services (not anticipated) and roadblocks
(probable) while respecting the right of citizens to protest.
Costa Rican security officials are confident they can
prevent major disturbances. With assistance from Post
(rented busses) as well as Colombia (Post-funded training)
and Taiwan (vehicles and equipment), the police have improved
their ability to respond to the protests. On the other side,
labor union leaders privately acknowledge that the event
probably will not be a decisive blow against CAFTA
ratification. A less antagonistic but equally determined new
leadership - the National Front - has become the public face
of the CAFTA opposition, seeking a "time out" to develop a
national consensus on the GOCR,s entire development agenda.
PAC leader Otton Solis has urged CAFTA opponents to take to
the streets in a celebration of Costa Rican democracy.
Assuming no violence, both sides will likely declare victory,
but momentum seems to favor the GOCR. Anti-CAFTA forces may
try to mount further (and perhaps more violent) protests
later, especially around the ratification vote. END SUMMARY.
------------------------
ANOTHER ANTI-CAFTA MARCH
------------------------
¶2. (U) Both sides are squaring off for the next anti-CAFTA
protest, scheduled for February 26. Led by the "National
Front of Support for the Fight Against CAFTA," an umbrella
group drawn from university students and faculty, labor
unions, and members of various social organizations, the
protesters plan to focus most of their action in San Jose.
They plan to assemble at the old national soccer stadium and
march through downtown to rally at the Legislative Assembly.
The organizers hope to far exceed the 6-9,000 person crowd
assembled for the last protest, October 23-24 (Ref A). As in
the October protests, a few additional marches and attempted
road blockages may take place around the country. The GOCR
has made it clear, including in stern television
advertisements featuring Minister of Presidency Rodrigo
Arias, that the public's right to protest peacefully will be
honored fully, but no disruption to essential services or
roadblocks will be allowed.
----------------------------
UNIONS: SIZE DOES NOT MATTER
----------------------------
¶3. (SBU) PolCouns and Poloff met with public employees,
labor union leader and outspoken CAFTA critic Albino Vargas
and two associates on February 7. Vargas, as feisty as ever,
repeated his familiar mantra: Since the GOCR has refused a
true national dialogue, CAFTA must be "decided in the
streets." The Agreement is illegitimate, anyway, because it
was negotiated "in secret" by the former administration.
And, the Arias Administration has no right to "impose" CAFTA
on Costa Rica because a) Arias "stole" the 2006 election and
b) Arias should not have been allowed to run again in the
first place. When asked why he continued to boycott meetings
with Arias and other union leaders, Vargas insisted the
President never listens to their concerns. When asked about
the impact if the protest turnout is lower than expected
(based on just-published CID-Gallup data showing that only
six percent of those polled supported the protests), Vargas
insisted "numbers don't matter". Although he dismissed the
CID-Gallup figures as biased, Vargas acknowledge that the
February 26 events probably will not b decisive. He expects
the GOCR will claim victoy no matter the tunout.
-------------------------------------------
NATIONAL FRONT: NEW FACE FO THE OPPOSITION?
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (U) The National Front, led byEugenio Trejos, Dean of
the Technology Instituteof Costa Rica at Cartago, has
increasingly become the public face of the opposition, part
of a clear effort to play down the role of the more
antagonistic unions. In a long meeting with PolCouns and
Poloff on February 21, Trejos said he and other Front leaders
had met with a wide range of protest organizers and GOCR
officials, including Public Security Minister Fernando
Berrocal, to urge that the events be peaceful. Trejos was
optimistic that ex-presidents Luis Alberto Monje (PLN) and
Rodrigo Carazo (PUSC) would join the protests to lend them
more gravitas. Trejos was fairly confident that the San Jose
events would remain peaceful, but he warned that the Front
could not "guarantee" calm everywhere, especially in the
hinterlands, and particularly if the police "provoked"
violence.
¶5. (U) Trejos echoed the legitimacy concerns about the Arias
Administration raised by Vargas. Insisting that the GOCR,s
38-seat working coalition in the Assembly was weak, he said
the best case scenario for CAFTA opponents would be to peel
away one or two of those legislators, so the GOCR would have
to halt CAFTA, "listen to the people," and seek a new
national "consensus," not only on CAFTA, but on the GOCR,s
entire development agenda. Trejos said a national referendum
would be the ideal vehicle to help build the consensus, but
admitted that it wasn't clear a referendum related to CAFTA
was constitutionally feasible. A team of opposition legal
experts are studying the issue, he said. For CAFTA
opponents, the GOCR,s pushing ahead to ratification would be
the worst case scenario, according to Trejos. A ratification
vote in April might provoke real violence, he warned. The
contest at hand, he maintained, is about the "60% of the
population that has not really made up their minds" about
CAFTA. Like Vargas, Trejos also dismissed the recent
CID-Gallup results (that 62% of those who are familiar with
CAFTA support it.)
--------------------------
GOVERNMENT: READY BUT WARY
--------------------------
¶6. (SBU) The GOCR seems ready for the protests. The
intelligence service is confident it knows who the real
troublemakers will be, but is still wary. In a detailed
pre-protest strategy session convened by Minister Berrocal on
February 3 (the first such planning session in our memory),
police officials were worried that the February 26 events
might be more disruptive than those of last October. Radical
elements outside of the organized anti-CAFTA groups, for
example, might block roads in defiance of the GOCR,s
warnings. Alternatively, a group of students perhaps aided
by opposition legislators - could "peacefully" take over the
Assembly building, forcing the police to remove them, at the
risk of looking "too aggressive." Security and screening has
been tightened at the building to prevent this. NOTE:
Poloff will also attend the final pre-protest strategy
meeting on February 23.
------------------------------
USG (AND COLOMBIAN) ASSISTANCE
------------------------------
¶7. (C) As in the case of the October protests, mobility is
the chief concern of the police. With approximately 450 riot
police available in San Jose, but only 160 of those
fully-equipped (and recently refresher-trained by
Embassy-funded Colombian police instructors), the police may
need to move resources quickly to potential traffic choke
points and protest hot spots throughout the capital. The
Ministry of Public Security thus asked Post to rent buses for
their use, using available INL funds. Post will provide 10
buses, for February 26 only. (The police do not believe they
will need the buses after that.) Berrocal believes that
managing the image of the demonstrations is crucial and that
the government will win this showdown if security officials
are not provoked into violence with protesters. Berrocal is
so determined that he told national police commanders that
"if blood must be shed, let it be our blood first." Berrocal
has announced publicly that police will not be armed during
the protests.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Colombian police instructors, provided
with the very helpful assistance of Embassy Bogota and the
Colombian Embassy here, greatly boosted the confidence of the
police anti-riot personnel. Poloffs observed this firsthand
during a visit to the National Police training facility in
Guanacaste. Adding to the police's confidence was the first
tranche of security assistance provided by Taiwan. An array
of 125 motorcycles, 60 pick-up trucks and other equipment was
received in a public ceremony on February 22, deliberately
timed to be a signal to protesters. END COMMENT.
-----------------------
IMPACT ON THE ASAMBLEA?
-----------------------
¶9. (SBU) CAFTA opponents have maintained pressure on
legislators, even in advance of the big day on February 26.
On January 23 and February 12, union leaders including Vargas
tried to disrupt proceedings in the Assembly by noisily and
personally threatening legislators from the visitors,
gallery. After trying to reason with the protesters,
Assembly President Fernando Pacheco called the police,
leading to a brief, but well-publicized scuffle as the
gallery was cleared. CAFTA opponents, including Trejos,
decried this use of "excessive force." Meeting with the
Ambassador on February 16, PLN faction chief Mayi Antillon
said the noisy union leaders had overplayed their hands by
being "too disrespectful." She acknowledged, however, that
some individual legislators - such as Jose Manuel Echandi of
the PUN -- were concerned for their safety and would be
allowed to be "absent" on February 26. (Echandi also
requested police protection near his residence.) Antillon
acknowledged that the protests, if widespread enough and
violent at all, could make some members of the GOCR,s
working coalition "waiver" a little. She remains confident,
however, that the Asamblea can complete the first
ratification vote by April. Once that is done, she predicts
that the opposition will lose most of its steam.
--------------------------------------------
THE PAC,S OTTON SOLIS: WILL HE OR WON'T HE?
--------------------------------------------
¶10. (U) And what about PAC party leader Otton Solis, who
vowed to join the protests when the CAFTA bill was voted out
of committee last December, and who has taken a higher
anti-CAFTA, pro-CBI profile since his January visit to
Washington? In a lengthy radio interview on February 6,
Solis said his PAC party was not organizing anything, but
would join the protests if they were convoked under "correct
terms," i.e., as "day for Costa Rica." He has since been coy
about his own participation, and whether PAC would take any
responsibility for keeping the protests peaceful. Minister
of Government Arias insisted to the media that if Solis
joined the march, then his participation (as leader of the
main opposition party) should be "a guarantee that the march
will be peaceful." In a TV commercial aired on February 22,
however, Solis urged those concerned about CAFTA to take to
the streets on Monday in a peaceful celebration of Costa
Rican sovereignty.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (SBU) Both sides seem ready and determined for Monday's
events. Assuming no violence, both sides are likely to claim
victory. Momentum seems to favor the GOCR, however, based on
the increased discipline and confidence in the Assembly (Ref
B), the better organization and higher confidence of the
police, and the CID-Gallup polling data (generally in support
of CAFTA, against the protests and unfavorable to the more
notorious union leaders). The opposition cannot keep holding
"rehearsals." But, if the GOCR does not blink in the
Assembly (and we don't think it will), then the anti-CAFTA
forces may try to mount further (and perhaps more violent)
protests later, especially around the ratification vote. The
CID-Gallup data also shows that most Costa Ricans expect more
turbulence before CAFTA is ratified.
FRISBIE