

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05NAIROBI4559, KENYA PURSUING PURCHASE OF F5'S FROM SAUDI ARABIA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05NAIROBI4559.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05NAIROBI4559 | 2005-11-03 01:45 | 2011-03-18 22:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004559
SIPDIS
PM/RSAT FOR BERNETA LEE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2025
TAGS: MARR PTER MASS PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA PURSUING PURCHASE OF F5'S FROM SAUDI ARABIA
REF: A. A) 04 SECSTATE 206331
¶B. B) NAIROBI 4428 C) NAIROBI 4462
Classified By: POL/C Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post has received Kenyan End-Use Monitoring
(EUM) Assurances for a pending purchase of 14 used F-5
aircraft from Saudi Arabia. In separate meetings with the
Permanent Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Defense,
Ambassador and DCM addressed concerns surrounding the
impending purchase, particularly inappropriateness of
fighters in countering the primary threat (terrorism) that
Kenya faces; possible corruption in the sale; the drain on
Kenyan military budgets; and the opportunity costs likely to
be incurred by the U.S. in helping maintain them -- assuming,
that is, that FMF and IMET are re-established if/when Kenya
signs an Article 98 agreement.
¶2. (C) Despite our misgivings, we recognize that this is a
sovereign decision, one which the Kenyans appear to have
weighed with some care. We do not believe it is in our
interest to oppose this purchase. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------
A Long Time In The Making
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) The GOK first proposed this purchase in 2004. In
November of 2004, Poloff gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) a list of assurances required before the sale could be
consummated (ref. A). In March 2005, Post received and
forwarded to the Department a diplomatic note accompanied by
a signed agreement for end-use, retransfer, and security
assurances for 10 F-5E aircraft and four F-5F aircraft from
Saudi Arabia to Kenya. This agreement (which was dated 28
December 2004), was signed by a former P.S. of KDOD, Sammy
P.M. Kyungu. Mr. Kyungu was not the P.S. of KDOD at the time
Post actually received the agreement, and thus Post requested
another copy of the agreement signed by the current P.S.
Almost seven months later, Post received another diplomatic
note (dated October 18, 2005) and signed agreement for
end-use, retransfer, and security assurances for the 10 F-5E
aircraft and four F-5F aircraft (refs A and B). This
agreement was signed by the current Permanent Secretary
(P.S.) of the Kenyan Department of Defence (KDOD), Zachary N.
Mwaura (he signed the agreement on 7 October, 2005). (Note:
This final agreement incorporated the exact text Poloff
originally left with the MFA on November 1, 2004. End note.)
The MFA and KDOD called Post several times the week of
October 24 asking the USG to provide the End User
Certificates to Saudi Arabia so they can conclude this
purchase.
--------------------
Voicing Our Concerns
--------------------
¶3. (C) Several contentious issues surround this purchase.
First, post does not believe these aircraft respond to the
threat. F5s are not the most appropriate aircraft to serve
as an air defense/deterrent capability, and Kenya would be
better off investing the money in either reconnaissance or
helicopter lift assets. Second, there is concern that the
original deal may be marred by corruption. The KDOD P.S. who
provided the original set of assurances was sacked in an
anti-corruption shake-up and was implicated in corrupt
security-related procurement. Additionally, KDOD,s budget is
already experiencing negative growth, and the cost for this
aircraft could reach as much as $31 million, according to
local press reports. Lastly, the opportunity costs are too
high. Post is concerned that KDOD will be forced to seek to
use significant amounts of future U.S. FMF authorizations to
maintain this expanded fleet of F5s -- assuming, that is,
that Kenya signs an Article 98 agreement and FMF assistance
once again becomes available (ref C) -- which could be used
more wisely.
¶4. (C) Ambassador and Poloff (note-taker) called on the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Boaz Mbaya, October 31 to discuss Kenya,s plans
to purchase the 14 F5 aircraft from Saudi Arabia. Ambassador
voiced his concerns about this purchase, asking the following
questions: 1) How do these aircraft meet the border security
challenges facing Kenya? 2) Is the GOK aware that without an
Article 98 agreement, future FMF will not be available to
assist in maintaining and equipping these aircraft? and 3)
Can Kenya ensure this is a transparent and uncorrupt deal?
¶5. (C) In response to the first question, Mbaya explained
that Kenya lives in a volatile environment, with Ethiopia and
Eritrea to the north, and Sudan and Somalia on either side.
While Kenya is not preparing for war, he said it is in their
national interest to be prepared for any threat to their
national security from these bordering countries. He assured
the Ambassador that corruption is not an issue and that
nobody in the Kenyan Government wants another Anglo
Leasing-type scandal on their hands. He said the current F5
fleet is old and must be replaced. He understood the
implications of not signing an Article 98 agreement, and that
FMF (and IMET) cuts will impact this purchase, should Kenya
seek assistance in maintaining and equipping the aircraft as
well as training for pilots. He added he hoped the
Ambassador could convince the USG to grant Saudi Arabia the
end user certificates and allow Kenya to pursue their
national interests.
¶6. (C) Simultaneously, DCM, accompanied by Deputy Chief of
KUSLO and Poloff (note-taker), called on KDOD P.S. Zachary
Mwaura to discuss the same issue. KDOD Vice Chief of the
General Staff, LtGen J. W. Karangi, was also in attendance.
DCM inquired how the F5s fit into Kenya,s defense strategy
and why they are looking at buying these particular aircraft.
She also asked about the long-term plan to keep the aircraft
equipped and maintained, explaining that FMF funding will not
be available to assist due to the Article 98 situation.
Deputy Chief KUSLO suggested the money could be better used
for other aircraft, such as lift asset aircraft. Karangi
responded rather defensively that both aircraft are part of
the GOK's military plan but that the F5 purchase is a higher
priority.
¶7. (C) Mwaura, who just returned from Saudi Arabia,
explained that the current fleet of F5s is deteriorating, and
KDOD wants to replace the fleet with the same aircraft the
country has been operating for a number of years. Karangi
said the F5s would maintain the status quo; they are not
seeking to change their capacity. The issue of financing for
spare parts and maintenance raised some concern, with both
Mwaura and Karangi saying they did not see the connection
between Article 98 and this purchase. The DCM explained the
issue further, noting that spare parts and maintenance are
costly, and the U.S. will not be able to assist until an
Article 98 agreement is signed. Mwaura stated that even
without assistance, Kenya will still have to defend its
borders, and therefore will find a way to purchase the parts.
Karangi added "There is a price to pay for national
security.8 DCM asked Mwaura if there was any update on the
possible signing of an Article 98 agreement. Mwaura
responded negatively, saying it was now "a political matter."
Both officials took the opportunity to say that they did not
see why an Article 98 agreement was necessary since there is
already a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) protecting U.S.
military personnel stationed in Kenya. DCM responded that an
Article 98 agreement is broader and provides protection to
civilian as well as military personnel.
¶8. (C) The DCM wrapped up the meeting by explaining that the
Saudi government will need to resubmit their request for
end-use certificates to the USG because the case had already
been closed due to a lack of response from Kenya. (NOTE: The
MFA did not send their end user agreements to Post until
after March 1, at which point the DPM/RSAT already responded
to Saudi Arabia with &Returned without Action.8 END NOTE.)
¶9. (C) COMMENT: Despite the concerns surrounding this
purchase, it is not our place to stop it. This purchase is
not the best use of scarce military monies, but the Kenyans
have made it clear they plan to go forward with the deal.
Withholding end user certificates would not benefit our
bilateral relationship with Kenya. We practiced due
diligence by insisting the deal be transparent and explaining
we will not be able to assist in future costs associated with
the purchase until an Article 98 agreement is signed. END
COMMENT.
BELLAMY