

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON663, MAORI PARTY PROSPECTS DIMINISH IN SEPTEMBER
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05WELLINGTON663.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05WELLINGTON663 | 2005-08-30 04:48 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000663
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, EAP/RSP, EAP/EP, INR/EAP
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA AND MICHAEL GREEN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU
PACOM FOR J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: MAORI PARTY PROSPECTS DIMINISH IN SEPTEMBER
ELECTION
REF: A. 04 WELLINGTON 601
¶B. 04 WELLINGTON 909
¶C. WELLINGTON 134
Classified By: Siria Lopez, Auckland Consul General,
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
(U) This cable originated from AmConGen Auckland. It
replaces and updates Wellington 661.
¶1. (C) Summary: Although the Maori Party has made
impressive gains in membership and general support in its
one year of existence, it is unlikely to capture all seven
Maori constituency seats in the September 17 election. Its
probable 3-5 constituency
seats would still make the Maori Party a potential
coalition partner, however. Maori leaders had been
insisting that it would be up to their followers to decide
on a coalition partner. But following an August 29 speech
by National Party leader Don Brash that called for an end
to separate Maori-oriented Government ministries, the Maori
party announced it had definitively ruled out a coalition
with National.
¶2. (C) Given that either Labour or National is likely to
need coalition partners to form a government, National's
announcement carries some risks. It seems more and more
that National has no natural coalition partner other that
NZ First, and a previous coalition with that party in the
1990s was not a success. But the Nats probably figure they
gain more from tapping into "middle New Zealand's"
unhappiness with Labour's preferential treatment of Maori
and other groups than it does from holding out for the
unlikely chance that Maori voters would choose a National-
Maori party coalition. As Labour has also tried to
distance itself from Maori party leadership, the Nats may
also be trying to play on some voters' fears that a Labour
victory would mean a leftist, Labour-Greens-Progressives-
Maori coalition. End Summary.
Background: Maori Party Makes Electoral Registration
Inroads
--------------------------------------------- --------------
--
¶3. (SBU) Maori anger over a perceived Labour Government
turnaround on Maori claims to New Zealand's foreshore and
seabed led to the creation of the Maori Party in July 2004
(reftel A). Since then the Maori Party has sought to
become the Maori voice in New Zealand's parliament. For
the September 2005 election, the Party will contest all
seven exclusively Maori constituency seats, as well as
other general electorate and list seats for a current total
of 51 candidates. Dr. Whatarangi Winiata is Maori Party
President but the party's most popular and visible figure
is co-leader (and former Labour Party member) MP Tariana
Turia. Turia will run against her Labour Party nephew for
the Te Tai Hauauru seat. Pita Sharples, an educator, is
the other party co-leader and is taking on the charismatic
but politically wounded Labour MP John Tamihere in Tamaki-
Makaurau.
¶4. (SBU) Despite the odds against its survival -- and
Tamihere's predictions of its stillborn birth -- the Maori
Party has evolved into a real Maori political alternative
to Labour. Since its inception, the Party has managed to
sign up more than 19,000 new members through "flaxroots"
efforts, an impressive achievement. Notwithstanding, voter
numbers are more important than total card-carrying party
members. Under New Zealand's political system, Maori
citizens have the option of signing up for either the
general roll or the Maori electoral roll, which votes on
the seven Maori constituency seats (seats the National
Party has long pledged to abolish). Currently, 204,519
persons
have enrolled on the Maori roll; 166,822 on the general
roll. This is a nearly 9% increase over 2002 figures for
both rolls. Of first-time enrollments, mainly younger
voters, 55 per cent are opting for the Maori roll. The
latter represents the fruits of the Maori Party's strategy
to focus registration efforts on first-time, younger voters
who lack a history of voting for Labour (reftel B).
¶5. (SBU) But what makes the Maori Party worth watching is
its potential as a coalition partner. It is widely assumed
that Turia will win her electorate seat. The Party is also
expected to capture other Maori constituency seats. Each
MP gained increases the party's legislative influence.
(NB: The Maori party would be allocated additional list
parliamentary seats if it gains more of a percentage of the
party vote than it meets with its electorate seats alone.
If the Party gets more electorate seats than party vote
share, it will keep those "overhang" seats until the next
election. This will affect the number of seats the major
parties would need to form a coalition.) Since neither
Labour nor National are expected to win clear majorities,
they will need parliamentary partners to form workable
governments. National Party's Don Brash's speech of August
29 in which he promised to review Maori-based government
agencies, however, have incited Turia and Sharples to spurn
National as a coalition partner. Despite the Maori Party's
birth as a
protest against Labour's foreshore and seabed legislation,
now that it has ruled out a coalition with National, Labour
is its only potential coalition partner.
Policies: Difficult to Assess
------------------------------
¶6. (C) From the start, the Maori Party has been
criticized for its lack of policy pronouncements. This
situation is little better in the immediate lead-up to the
September polls -- that is if a voter desires articulated
party platforms in the conventional, Euro-American sense.
In May, the Party did publicize the centerpiece of its
policies or "tikanga" but it actually consisted of
sweeping, idealistic guiding principles firmly based on
Maori socio-cultural values. One searches the "tikianga"
document in vain for the Party's position on taxes or
health care. For that, one must often rely on the ad hoc
emergence of specifics as uttered by party politicians on
the campaign trail. For example, we now know that the
Maori Party wants to lower the retirement age of Maori to
60, make tertiary education free for everyone and eliminate
tax for those earning under $25,000. It has also slowly
filtered out that the Party wants to make Maori language
compulsory for all civil servants, affirm Maori authority
on the national resource review process and reinstate New
Zealand's moratorium on genetically-modified plants.
¶7. (SBU) In terms of foreign policy, a Maori Party
representative, Charles Joe, spoke to a University of
Auckland audience mostly in the idealistic generalities of
the "tikanga" document. Perhaps because the audience was
non-Maori and the other party politicians present offered
specifics, Joe also confirmed that the party wanted NZ's
nuclear-free stance maintained, supported NZ's
international peacekeeping role and had a "no first-strike
policy." The Party also placed priority on the UN draft on
indigenous people and wanted an international treaty for
indigenous nations. As Turia has said in the past, Joe
added that his party would oppose any international
treaties or agreements that breached the principles
enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi. That is to say its
foreign and trade policies would be driven by adherence to
Maori values. (Note: The Maori Party has been accused of
refusing to criticize Robert Mugabe's regime simply because
he is a black African leader. The Party also opposed a
recent bill to strengthen NZ's anti-terrorism finance laws.
Still, it did support the rightist Federated Farmers in the
farmers' land access battle with Labour. End Note)
Election Prospects
------------------
¶8. (C) The Maori Party has been challenged from its
inception by the poverty of its core constituency.
Financially disadvantaged, the party has focused instead on
harnessing "people power" by drafting volunteers to go
door-to-door to drum up support. Labour's John Tamihere
told Auckland Consul General that the Maori Party's real
strength lies in the seductive, emotional appeal of its
message of grievance to relatively well-off, middle-class
Maori. As a result, it enjoys strong support from
influential Maori institutions such as Maori radio
stations, TV, university, language schools and health and
welfare organizations. This Maori infrastructure provides
the Party with its transport and information resource needs
and thus makes up for any ostensible lack of cash. Another
Maori political observer agreed that Maori institutions,
although funded under Labour governments, are "hotbeds" of
Maori Party support. She and Tamihere both observed that a
large Maori turnout in September will hurt Labour.
¶9. (SBU) Before the election date was announced, many
observers were predicting that the Maori Party would obtain
at least five constituency seats. In several polls, Maori
party candidates such as Pita Sharples and Hone Harawira
(for Te Tai Tokerau) were pulling way ahead of their Labour
rivals. Since then, however, some leads have narrowed;
Sharples is now running neck-to-neck with Tamihere (who
probably now prefers Labour Party money over Maori
institutional support). Harawira's lead over Labour's
Dover Samuels has almost halved. The Maori Party (and
Labour) is losing some votes with the entry of independent
candidates and those of Destiny New Zealand, a party allied
with a conservative Maori Christian church. (Destiny also
appeals to socially conservative Pacific Islanders, also
being courted by the Maori Party, who were upset by
Labour's prostitution and civil union bills.)
¶10. (SBU) Perhaps more influential than election rivals,
however, is the Labour tactic of scaring Maori by claiming
a vote for the Maori Party is a vote for National. This
message is being drummed into Maori and other left-leaning
voters. The Labour tactic is particularly effective on
those Maori concerned about National's threat to reduce
welfare benefits. Some Maori voters may try to reconcile
their divided loyalties by voting for the Maori Party for
constituency seats and ticking Labour for the party/ "list"
vote.
¶11. (SBU) Although it is also contesting 35 general
electorate seats in an effort to appeal to non-Maori, the
Party is not expected to win many, if any, of these seats.
The small size of the Maori electorate vote in general
means it will not obtain many list seats. A more realistic
scenario is that the Maori Party will win 3-5 Maori
constituency seats--but not 7. This result would still make
the Party a potential coalition partner for Labour or
National, notwithstanding the major parties' avowed
distaste for such an arrangement. In an August TV debate
with National's Don Brash, when asked about possible
Labour-Maori Party talks, PM Clark swatted the party off by
replying it was the "last cab in the rank." Brash more
tactfully said that he couldn't see cooperation happening.
Earlier, at a July Diplomatic Club lunch in Wellington,
Turia noted that the Maori Party had not offered itself as
a coalition partner, nor would it. But, she added, if
approached by one or more parties, it would put the issue
of which party to vote for and under what terms (e.g.
confidence and supply or a full coalition) to its voters.
As noted earlier, however, Brash's August 29 speech has
squashed, for now, speculation about National-Maori Party
cooperation.
Long-Term Goals: More Maori Constituency Seats and More
List Seats
--------------------------------------------- --------------
--------
¶12. (C) Echoing Turia, co-leader Pita Sharples told
Consul General that the Maori Party was not going "hell for
bent" to be in the Government right now. The question of
coalitions does not loom large for the party. For the
September election, it was trying to get the Maori voice
heard in Parliament and to stand staunch on the Treaty of
Waitangi. If it succeeded in getting seven MPs in, this
would have the desired impact and momentum. Then, the
following year, the Party would undertake a national
campaign to move every Maori from the general to the Maori
rolls in order to increase the number of Maori constituency
seats. Thus, in a subsequent election, the Party could
enjoy, for example, fourteen seats in addition to general
electorate and list seats. It was with this long-term goal
in mind that the Party had decided to contest the general
electorates, go for the list vote and choose several non-
Maori election candidates of European and Pacific Island
descent. There is, Sharples declared, not much of a long-
term future for the Maori Party "if we are not inclusive
and if we have just Maori sitting there-we must go for all
of New Zealand."
Burnett