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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1346, RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING VOICES
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VZCZCXRO2637
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1346/01 1461141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261141Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3458
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCPDC/NOAA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 001346
SIPDIS
OES/OA FOR JULIE GOURLEY
STATE EUR/RUS PLEASE PASS TO NOAA, INTERIOR, AND EPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: POLICY AND COMPETING VOICES
REF: A. MOSCOW 1115
¶B. MOSCOW 842
¶C. VLADIVOSTOK 10
¶D. MOSCOW 1281
¶E. MOSCOW 1242
¶F. MOSCOW 652
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) In March, Medvedev approved Russia's long-delayed
Arctic policy. It defined the region as Russia's strategic
energy reserve, called for its promotion as a transportation
corridor, and sought to balance cooperation with the
country's security needs. The policy itself reflects
competing voices within the GOR, with security officials
emphasizing the deployment of Federal Security Service (FSB)
forces and the Russian Foreign Ministry calling for
cooperation (although the GOR remains universally allergic to
NATO's presence in the region). The State Duma is now
considering a draft law on managing the Northern Sea Route
and the new policy supports additional FSB coast guard and
coastal stations to monitor the expected increase in sea lane
traffic. The GOR continues to abide by its commitments under
UNCLOS, although Presidential Envoy Chilingarov has called
for Russian withdrawal, if the states parties do not agree to
Russia's territorial claims. The GOR is ambivalent on global
warming, seeing both positive and negative effects from the
melting Arctic ice. Analysts discount the near-term
viability of the Arctic as a major source for commercially
feasible hydro-carbons, and point out that there are more
easily accessible fields that Russia has not yet exploited.
Joint U.S. and Russian efforts in the Arctic could encourage
Russian moderates to pursue cooperation, rather than
competition, in the region, with the MFA already proposing
some specific projects. End Summary.
Russia Defines Its Arctic Interests, Finally
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) On March 27, the GOR released its long-delayed
""Foundations of the Russian Federation National Policy in the
Arctic Until 2020 and Beyond."" President Medvedev chartered
the policy September 17, 2008 at a special meeting of the
Russian Security Council on Franz-Josef Land (the
northernmost Russian territory in the Arctic Ocean).
Originally scheduled for release in December 2008, the policy
presented the four fundamental national interests of the GOR
in the Arctic: its use as a strategic resource base, the
preservation of peace and cooperation in the Arctic, the
protection of the region's unique ecology, and the
establishment of the Northern Sea Route as ""exclusive"" to the
GOR.
Transport and Energy
--------------------
¶3. (SBU) Behind Russia's policy are two potential benefits
accruing from global warming: the prospect for an (even
seasonally) ice-free shipping route from Europe to Asia, and
the estimated oil and gas wealth hidden beneath the Arctic
sea floor. The shipping route would reduce the distance of a
voyage from Europe to Asia by 40 percent (if compared to a
route through the Suez Canal). These savings in shipping
costs to Russia and to Europe are potentially huge, even if
the voyage could only be made in the summer months. Artur
Chilingarov, Arctic explorer, State Duma member, and the
President's Envoy for Cooperation in the Arctic, with the
support of Medvedev's administration, has put forward draft
legislation that would establish a new regulatory body, ""the
Administration for the Northern Sea Route,"" for oversight,
management, navigation, and ecological protection. The
current draft defines the route as located in ""the internal
waters, territorial sea, or exclusive economic zone of the
Russian Federation."" However, some Russian shippers at a
conference held by the Carnegie Moscow Center October 2008
pointed out that short windows of good weather, the presence
of unpredictable ice flows, and the lack of logistical and
MOSCOW 00001346 002 OF 004
emergency response support would conspire to make the cost of
insurance for the Northern Sea Route unfeasible.
¶4. (SBU) The Arctic region, both within Russia's legally
clarified borders and in areas beyond, likely holds vast
untapped resources of oil and gas. While many Russian
analysts are skeptical that any of these resources will be
economically exploitable in the near future, the Russian
leadership wants to secure sovereignty over these ""strategic""
resources. Many analysts point to the fact that Russia has
not yet begun to exploit much more accessible potential
resources on its territory. Gazprom's plans, for example, to
develop new gas fields in the Yamal peninsula have been
pending for years. Furthermore, those development plans will
likely move much more slowly than had been previously
anticipated, given currently declining gas demand in the
region and an extremely tight financing environment. The
Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea, even given recent
movements toward its development, will likely not produce gas
until about 2020. Developments further afield in Arctic
territory would likely not materialize, if ever, for many
decades. Russia would need many tens of billions of dollars
of investment, both in development and in related
infrastructure, and would need new technologies, which Russia
would seek from potential foreign partners. Finally, gas or
oil from the Arctic would have to compete on world markets
with other oil and gas sources as well as other
non-hydrocarbon sources.
Environmental Concerns
----------------------
¶5. (SBU) State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chair
Konstantin Kosachev told CODEL Levin April 15, that climate
change ""was not a matter of any concern,"" and added that it
may work to Russia's advantage by reducing the cost of
transportation and easing access to petroleum resources in
the far north (Ref A). Despite potential economic benefits,
influential voices in the Russian scientific community
disagree with Kosachev, acknowledging that climate change
also poses a danger. A November 2008 report on climate
change by Russia's Federal Hydrometeorological Service
(Roshydromet) noted that the minimum seasonal level of Arctic
sea ice has receded by 9 percent per decade since satellite
observations began in 1979; in September 2007, the ice cover
reached the lowest level ever recorded (Ref B) Roshydromet
noted that climate change affected the Arctic region
disproportionately compared to lower latitudes. The habitat
of such threatened species as the polar bear have especially
suffered. Warming could increase the spread of certain
vector-borne diseases, negatively affecting human health.
Large-scale permafrost melting threatens Russian cities, such
as Yakutsk, whose foundations are built on permafrost (Ref C).
U.S.-Russia Cooperation
-----------------------
¶6. (SBU) In light of environmental concerns, the GOR
supports cooperation on environmental programs with the
United States and the other Arctic littoral countries.
Through the Arctic Council, Russian Arctic indigenous
communities are cooperating with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) on pollution remediation programs;
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) is cooperating with Roshydromet on climate monitoring
programs in the Arctic. On April 17, the MFA approached the
Embassy to request cooperation on a wide range of
long-stalled Bering Strait initiatives, including nature
protection, oil and gas exploration, and sea shipping and
transport (Ref D).
Competing Voices
----------------
¶7. (C) While now official policy, both during its long
deliberation and following its announcement, voices within
the GOR have given contradictory signals on what Russia
wanted in the policy and what was meant by it. State Duma
Deputy Chilingarov called for Russia to withdraw from the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) so that
Russia could stake a greater claim to the region's sea bed (a
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claim he tried to bolster when he planted a Russian flag
below the North Pole in August 2007). XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXXX(XXXXXXXXXXXX) told us
Chilingarov was following orders from the ruling United
Russia party. Although, XXXXXXXXXXXX was skeptical that Russia
and the United States would be able to agree on a
high-profile summit deliverable in the Arctic because of
expected opposition from the military and security services.
¶8. (SBU) Despite on-going efforts to renew U.S.-Russian
relations, some Russian voices have called the situation in
the Arctic a ""cold peace"" vis-a-vis NATO and the U.S. In
April 2008, Russian Navy head Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky said,
""While in the Arctic there is peace and stability, however,
one cannot exclude that in the future there will be a
redistribution of power, up to armed intervention."" His
statements preceded the July deployment of Russian Northern
Fleet missile cruiser ""Marshall Ustinov"" and anti-submarine
ships off the coast of Spitsbergen to coincide with fishing
season, and the Russian submarine ""Ryazan's"" September
underwater transit of the Arctic ice sheet, a first since the
end of the Cold War.
¶9. (SBU) Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev in an
interview published in the online media outlet Gazeta.ru
March 30 also posited a zero-sum view of the Arctic,
assessing that ""It is clear that (developments do) not
coincide with the economic, geopolitical, and defense
interests of Russia (in the Arctic) and is a systemic threat
to its national security."" In a March 31 interview with
Moscovskiy Komsomolets, he declared that ""there have been
efforts to drive Russia out of the Arctic."" To counter these
trends, he pointed to the creation of a new FSB coast guard
force and calls for new coastal stations to protect Russian
territory as outlined in Russia's new policy.
¶10. (SBU) Russia's senior Arctic official,
Ambassador-At-Large Anton Vasiliyev and Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov have made efforts to tamp down these more
aggressive statements. Vasiliyev said in a April 21
interview with Moscovskiy Komsomolets that ""Russia is far
from having imperial ambitions such as wanting to seize the
territory,"" and Lavrov in his April 29 Arctic Council
ministerial address said that ""There can be no validity to
the view of the Arctic as a zone of potential conflicts....""
Patrushev's comments also clashed with Medvedev's January 29
speech at FSB headquarters, where he told FSB officers and
leadership that the service must ""concentrate efforts on
creating a modernized coast guard, which is imperative for
effectively intercepting trafficked ocean and biological
resources,"" not to address an armed conflict. Further,
statements regarding the Arctic in the May 12 Russian
National Security Strategy are limited to calling for
investment in the ""formation of a basic transportation,
energy, information, and military infrastructure..."" (Ref E).
¶11. (SBU) Russian commentator Stanislav Belkovskiy said in
an interview with Svobodnaya Pressa on March 27, that the
effort to create an FSB coast guard was ""intended to conceal
the deterioration of the Russian Armed Forces"" and was a
pretext to secure greater appropriation for national defense.
Belkovskiy's comment reflects the broader realities of
Russian military reform and the difficulty in establishing
new military units, while at the same time downsizing the
officer corps and attempting to modernize the force (Ref F).
Andrey Fedorov in a January 14 article in Kommersant, wrote
that ""Confrontation (in the Arctic) will do no good. We
would do best to agree to pool our efforts and set up joint
structures to use the Arctic's natural resources.""
But No NATO
-----------
¶12. (SBU) While the Russian MFA has been more supportive of
cooperation in the region, it bristles at NATO exercises or
presence there. In his remarks at the Arctic Council, Lavrov
underlined that there were no threats that required
""force-based solutions or a presence of military-political
blocs in the region"" - Lavrov's clear reference to NATO and a
possible Nordic security alliance (a concept proposed in a
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February 9 report commissioned by the five Nordic foreign
ministries). These comments are routine for Russia,
including a recent statement from MFA spokesman Andrei
Nesterenko March 26, when he said that NATO's activity in the
Arctic ""can result in erosion of the present constructive
scheme of cooperation between coastal states,"" and will
continue to serve as an irritant. Russian Ambassador to NATO
Dmitriy Rogozin in a January 30 interview with Vesti-24 said
that ""The twenty-first century will see a fight for
resources, and Russia should not be defeated in this fight
... NATO has sensed where the wind comes from. It comes from
the North.""
Comment: Empowering Moderates
------------------------------
¶13. (C) The statements of the MFA and President Medvedev
indicate that moderates have focused on the Arctic as a zone
of cooperation. Our continued support of the Arctic Council
and bilateral engagement on the Arctic (included in the
proposed U.S.-Russia Action Plan), can help bolster the
moderates and give incentives to the GOR to continue
cooperation. Increased scientific cooperation, particularly
on climate change, could increase trust and build confidence.
Under the framework of either multilateral or bilateral
cooperation, we can also offer to jointly develop navigation
aids and port facilities, continue developing and sharing sea
current and meteorological data, promote social development
for indigenous peoples, and cooperate on emergency response
and oil spill remediation -- all tasks that Medvedev charged
the GOR with in his September 17, 2008 remarks, but will be
difficult to fulfill without outside expertise.