

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05LIMA4132, FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05LIMA4132.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05LIMA4132 | 2005-09-22 19:23 | 2011-05-13 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima |
Appears in these articles: elcomercio.pe |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004132
SIPDIS
WHA FOR JMONSERRATE, BFRIEDMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PE
SUBJECT: FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE
OLLANTA HUMALA'S COAT-TAILS INTO CO...
id: 41148
date: 9/22/2005 19:23
refid: 05LIMA4132
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05LIMA3379|05LIMA3784|05LIMA424|05LIMA4968|05LIMA93
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004132
SIPDIS
WHA FOR JMONSERRATE, BFRIEDMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PE
SUBJECT: FAR LEFT, INSPIRED BY CHAVEZ, SEEKING TO RIDE
OLLANTA HUMALA'S COAT-TAILS INTO CONGRESS
REF: A. LIMA 3784
¶B. LIMA 3379
¶C. LIMA 424
¶D. LIMA 93
¶E. LIMA 4968 (03)
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4 (
b,d).
----------
SUMMARY
----------
¶1. (C) Most of Peru,s far-left Marxist parties, movements,
and labor organizations are attempting to unite forces for
the 2006 general elections under the banner of a "Frente
Amplio" (Broad Front). They hope their standard bearer will
be Ollanta Humala, leader of the fascistic Nationalist
Peruvian Party and brother of Antauro Humala, who led the
abortive January 2005 armed uprising in Andahuaylas. Ollanta
Humala, however, is insisting that the left sign up with his
own "National Front for the Salvation of the Republic."
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is reportedly conditioning
the provision of funds to the leftist Frente on its making
common cause with Ollanta Humala. Frente Amplio elements
believe they can obtain 10-15 percent of the popular vote and
a sizable congressional bloc with Humala at the top of their
ticket, an estimate with which we concur. End Summary.
--------------------------
FRENTE AMPLIO'S OBJECTIVES
--------------------------
¶2. (C) Peru,s far-left Marxists, divided many times over
since the Sino-Soviet split of 1965 and the break-off of
Sendero Luminoso in the early 1980s, are now trying to
overcome their marginal political status by creating the
Frente Amplio, a grouping that includes the Communist Party
Red Fatherland (CP-PR), the Teachers Union (SUTEP), and the
General Central of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), the country,s
largest union federation. Poloff interviewed SUTEP
International Relations Secretary (and former SUTEP
President) Nilver Lopez, SUTEP President Caridad Montes, and
CGTP Secretary General Juan Jose Gorritti on 9/13 regarding
the status of the Frente Amplio.
¶3. (C) According to SUTEP's Nilver Lopez, the Frente Amplio
will support Ollanta Humala's presidential bid. Ollanta and
his brother Antauro led a military rebellion against the
Fujimori regime in 2000. Sacked from the military by
Fujimori, interim President Valentin Paniagua reinstated
Ollanta and President Toledo sent him as military attache to
Paris and then Seoul. Ollanta was then forcibly retired in
December 2004. After 2000, Ollanta's brother, Antauro,
formed the radical, nativist, quasi-racist, pro-coca
Ethno-Cacerista movement (Ref E). Antauro led a January 2005
armed uprising in Andahuaylas, which was quickly put down by
the GOP, Since the rebellion, the Ethno-Caceristas have
largely disappeared from public view.
¶4. (C) SUTEP's Lopez said the Frente Amplio would have
preferred to cement an electoral alliance with Congressman
Javier Diaz Canseco and his Decentralized Democratic Party
(PDD), but Diaz Canseco, in Lopez' words, "wants to ally with
Paniagua" as part of a leftist/centrist front. Consequently,
the Frente Amplio shifted its gaze to Ollanta Humala, hoping
that Ollanta's ultra-nationalism will help them surmount
their image as discredited old-line leftists. With Ollanta
as their front man, Lopez continued, the Frente Amplio could
score between 10 and 15 percent of the vote and thereby gain
a base in the next Congress.
------------------------------
NEW MAGAZINE PUSHES NEW FRIEND
------------------------------
¶5. (U) Other evidence corroborates the far left's courtship
of Ollanta Humala. "Wankar" is an increasingly slick monthly
magazine that first came out in July, apparently timed to
coincide with Hugo Chavez visit to Lima. The publication
sports leading Marxists on its masthead (Ref A). Wankar's
second issue featured a long article on Ollanta Humala,
quoting from Humala's comments to the Frente Amplio's
National Directorate. "Wankar" commented that it was
publishing the excerpts to show the "national vision" of "a
noteworthy political leader," whose "eventual alliance with
democratic forces (i.e., the Frente Amplio) that are headed
in the same direction (as he is)."
¶6. (U) According to the article, Ollanta lamented the
foreign takeover of the Peruvian economy, stressed the
weakness of Peru,s armed forces (which, he said, had the
lowest budget in eighty years), and warned that Chile and the
U.S. were "historic partners" while, in contrast, Peru and
the U.S. (during the Velasco era) had experienced "periods of
confrontation." Ollanta upheld production of coca leaf and
said that Peru should pursue a solution to its foreign debt
along the style of President Kirchner of Argentina.
¶7. (C) CGTP Secretary General Juan Jose Gorritti signaled
the direction for the Frente Amplio in a conversation with
Poloff on 9/13. Gorritti said that the Frente would take up
"national defense" issues like port privatization, stressing
the risk that Chilean investors might seize control of Peru's
docks and loading areas. SUTEP's Nilver Lopez put the point
even more bluntly. When questioned about some of the
non-leftist elements in the Humala family's Ethno-Cacerista
ideology, Lopez replied that the hard left needed to use
nationalism if it was to successfully project its social
justice message. Lopez told Poloff that even with Ollanta at
the top of the ticket, people who understand "the class
struggle" would run the campaign. In the end, the
ideological differences didn't matter to Lopez, since the
Marxists' goal in 2006 is not/not to win the presidency, but
rather to score 10-15 percent of the vote and place a sizable
bloc of their members in Congress.
¶8. (U) Recent developments indicate that Ollanta Humala and
the far left are both closing on one another and positioning
for advantage. Rolando Brena, far left presidential
candidate from the 2000 elections and member of both Patria
Roja and the Frente Amplio, said on 9/19 that the Frente was
negotiating with Humala. On 9/20, Ollanta Humala stated that
he was not interested in leading the Frente Amplio, but in
forming his own movement, the National Front for the
Salvation of the Republic (FNSR), and that this group would
welcome the participation of the far left as well as elements
from across the political spectrum.
---------------------------
A CHAVEZ/CASTRO CONNECTION?
---------------------------
¶9. (C) The marriage between the old left and the pro-coca
nationalist right is being encouraged by outsiders.
Presidential advisor Juan de la Puente told Polcouns on 8/8
that the GOP intelligence indicates that Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez and Cuban President Fidel Castro are pushing
Humala and Peru's far-left parties together. De la Puente
stated that Peruvian Communist Party - Patria Roja Secretary
General Alberto Moreno admitted as much in a recent
conversation the two had. De la Puente added that other
elements indicated this new dynamic. He noted that the
far-left and Humala have celebrated Bolivarian events
together in Lima, that Humala's movement has likely received
funding from Chavez, and that, for the first time in anyone's
memory, the far-left's previous standard-bearer, Javier Diez
Canseco, was not/not invited to Cuba this year while the rest
of the far-left leadership was.
¶10. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶11. (C) When Poloff asked CGTP General Secretary Gorritti
about possible Chavez financial support for "Wankar," the
latter hesitated pointedly before denying any such
assistance. When Poloff asked SUTEP's Lopez about Venezuelan
monetary support for the Frente Amplio, the union official
replied matter-of-factly, "We haven't gotten any help so far,
but we are looking for it."
¶12. (C) While they may deny receiving financial assistance
from Chavez, the Frente Amplio's members openly admit that
the self-proclaimed Bolivarian leader inspires them.
Gorritti, a member of the formerly pro-Soviet faction of
"orthodox" Peruvian Marxists, waxed admiringly about Chavez'
unique brand of socialism, which he said was really a form of
Christianity. For Nilver Lopez and Caridad Montes, Hugo
Chavez runs "the most democratic government in the
hemisphere," an assertion they said was proven by the fact
that Chavez "has won five elections."
----------
COMMENT
----------
¶13. (C) Despite differences in ideological origin, an
alliance between Peru's traditional far-left Marxists and
Ollanta Humala's brand of Peruvian fascism makes political
sense. With the failure of the Andahuaylas revolt and the
GOP,s subsequent crackdown on the Ethno-Cacerista movement
(Ref C), Ollanta was left without a political organization
and he lacks a registered party to sponsor a presidential
bid. At the same time, the far-left, whose factionalism and
whose identification with Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) terrorist organizations
have discredited it with the mass of voters, needs a
charismatic leader with a message that can project beyond its
narrow base within the intelligentsia, public universities,
and labor movements. Given their respective needs, a little
political push by Castro and financial incentives from Chavez
should be more than enough to bring the far-left and
fascist-right together on the basis of their shared extremism
and thirst for political influence.
¶13. (C) An August nationwide poll by the respected Apoyo
consultancy showed Ollanta Humala placing fourth in a
presidential race, with seven percent of the vote and over 10
percent in the southern coast and highlands. Given adequate
funding and strong organizational support from the far-left
parties, unions and NGOs, we would not be surprised if an
Ollanta candidacy could achieve 15-20 percent of the vote and
a comparable percentage of congressional seats in the April
2006 elections. END COMMENT.
POWERS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================