

Currently released so far... 12646 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/08
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AORC
AF
AU
ASEC
AMGT
AS
APER
AR
AEMR
AG
ARF
AJ
AA
AINF
APECO
AODE
ABLD
AMG
ATPDEA
AE
AMED
AGAO
AFIN
AL
ASUP
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AID
ASCH
AM
AORL
ASEAN
APEC
ADM
AFSI
AFSN
ADCO
ABUD
AN
AY
AIT
ACOA
ASIG
AADP
AGR
ANET
ADPM
AMCHAMS
ATRN
ALOW
ACS
APCS
AFFAIRS
ADANA
AECL
ACAO
AORG
AROC
AO
ACABQ
AGMT
AX
AMEX
AFGHANISTAN
AZ
AND
ARM
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
ACBAQ
AC
AUC
ASEX
AER
AVERY
AGRICULTURE
AFU
BR
BTIO
BY
BO
BA
BU
BL
BN
BM
BF
BEXP
BK
BG
BB
BTIU
BBSR
BRUSSELS
BD
BIDEN
BE
BH
BILAT
BC
BT
BP
BX
BMGT
BWC
CS
CA
CH
CD
CO
CE
CU
CVIS
CASC
CJAN
CI
CPAS
CMGT
CDG
CIC
CAC
CBW
CWC
COUNTER
CW
CT
CR
CY
CNARC
CACM
CG
CB
CM
CV
CIDA
CLINTON
CHR
COE
CIS
CDC
CONS
CF
CFED
CODEL
CBSA
CEUDA
COM
CARSON
COPUOS
CIA
CL
CN
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CICTE
COUNTRY
CBE
CKGR
CVR
COUNTERTERRORISM
CITEL
CLEARANCE
CARICOM
CSW
CITT
CDB
CJUS
CTM
CAN
CLMT
CBC
EAID
ECON
EFIS
ETRD
EC
ENRG
EINV
EFIN
EAGR
ETTC
ECPS
EINT
EPET
ES
EIND
EAIR
EU
EUN
EG
ELAB
EWWT
EMIN
ECIN
ESA
ER
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EAIG
ET
ETRO
ELTN
EI
EN
EUR
EK
EUMEM
ENIV
EPA
ENGR
EXTERNAL
EUREM
ELN
EUC
ENERG
EZ
ERD
EFTA
ETRC
ETRN
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ENVR
ESENV
ENNP
ERNG
ENVI
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECINECONCS
EFINECONCS
EXIM
ELECTIONS
ECA
EINVEFIN
ETC
EAP
ECONOMY
EINN
ECONOMIC
EXBS
ECUN
ENGY
ECONOMICS
EIAR
EINDETRD
ECONEFIN
EURN
EDU
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ECIP
EFIM
EAIDS
EREL
EINVETC
ECONCS
ETRA
IC
IV
IAEA
IR
IT
IO
IN
IS
IZ
IMO
IPR
IWC
ICAO
ILO
ID
ICTY
ICJ
INMARSAT
INDO
IL
IMF
IRS
IQ
IA
ICRC
IDA
IAHRC
IBRD
ISLAMISTS
IDP
IGAD
ILC
ITRA
ICTR
ITU
IBET
ITF
INRA
INRO
INTELSAT
IEFIN
IRC
IRAQI
ITALY
ISRAELI
IIP
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
INTERNAL
INTERPOL
IEA
INRB
INR
IZPREL
IRAJ
IF
ITPHUM
ISRAEL
IACI
KBTR
KPAO
KOMC
KCRM
KDEM
KHIV
KBIO
KTIA
KMDR
KNNP
KSCA
KTIP
KWMN
KIPR
KCOR
KRVC
KFRD
KPAL
KWBG
KE
KTDB
KUNR
KSPR
KJUS
KGHG
KAWC
KCFE
KGCC
KOLY
KSUM
KACT
KISL
KTFN
KFLU
KSTH
KMPI
KHDP
KS
KHLS
KSEP
KMRS
KID
KN
KU
KAWK
KSAC
KCOM
KAID
KIRC
KWMNCS
KMCA
KNEI
KCRS
KPKO
KICC
KIRF
KPOA
KV
KDRG
KSEO
KVPR
KTER
KBCT
KFIN
KGIC
KCIP
KZ
KG
KWAC
KRAD
KPRP
KTEX
KNAR
KPLS
KPAK
KSTC
KFLO
KSCI
KIDE
KO
KOMS
KHSA
KSAF
KPWR
KVRP
KENV
KNSD
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCGC
KVIR
KFSC
KDDG
KPRV
KTBT
KWMM
KX
KMFO
KR
KMOC
KRIM
KCRCM
KBTS
KOCI
KGIT
KNUP
KPAONZ
KNUC
KNNPMNUC
KERG
KTLA
KCSY
KTRD
KNPP
KJUST
KCMR
KRCM
KCFC
KCHG
KREL
KFTFN
KLIG
KDEMAF
KPAI
KICA
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KHUM
KREC
KSEC
KPIN
KESS
KDEV
KWWMN
KOM
KWNM
KRFD
KMIG
KRGY
KIFR
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MX
MNUC
MCAP
MO
MR
MEPP
MTCRE
MAPP
MEPN
MZ
MT
ML
MA
MY
MIL
MD
MASSMNUC
MU
MK
MTCR
MUCN
MAS
MEDIA
MAR
MC
MI
MQADHAFI
MPOS
MARAD
MG
MTRE
MASC
MW
MRCRE
MP
MOPPS
MTS
MLS
MILI
MEPI
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MCC
MIK
MAPS
MV
MILITARY
MDC
NATO
NZ
NL
NO
NK
NU
NPT
NI
NG
NEW
NSF
NA
NPG
NSG
NE
NSSP
NS
NDP
NSC
NAFTA
NH
NV
NP
NPA
NSFO
NT
NW
NASA
NORAD
NGO
NR
NATIONAL
NIPP
NZUS
NC
NRR
NAR
NATOPREL
OEXC
OTRA
OPRC
OVIP
OAS
OECD
OIIP
OSCE
OREP
OPIC
OFDP
OMIG
ODIP
OVP
OSCI
OIC
OIE
OPDC
ON
OCII
OPAD
OBSP
OFFICIALS
OPCW
OHUM
OES
OCS
OTR
OSAC
OFDA
PGOV
PREL
PM
PHUM
PTER
PINR
PINS
PREF
PARM
PL
PK
PU
PBTS
PBIO
PHSA
PE
PO
PROP
PA
PNAT
POL
PLN
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PCUL
PAK
PGGV
PAO
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PAS
PGIV
PHUMPREL
PDOV
PHUMPGOV
PCI
PTBS
PEL
PG
POLITICS
POLICY
PINL
POGOV
POV
PRAM
PP
PREO
PAHO
PBT
PREFA
PSI
PAIGH
POSTS
PMIL
PALESTINIAN
PARMS
PROG
PTERE
PRGOV
PORG
PS
PGOF
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PINF
PNG
PFOR
PUNE
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PSEPC
PNR
POLINT
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PDEM
PECON
PROV
PGOC
PY
PHUH
PF
PRL
PHUS
RU
RS
RO
RW
RP
RFE
REGION
REACTION
REPORT
RCMP
RM
RSO
ROBERT
RICE
RSP
RF
ROOD
RIGHTS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RELATIONS
SENV
SU
SCUL
SOCI
SNAR
SL
SW
SMIG
SP
SY
SA
SHUM
SZ
SYRIA
SF
SR
SO
SPCE
SARS
SN
SC
SIPRS
SI
SYR
SEVN
SNARCS
SH
SAARC
STEINBERG
SG
SCRS
SENVKGHG
SAN
ST
SIPDIS
SNARIZ
SNARN
SSA
SK
SPCVIS
SOFA
SANC
SWE
SHI
SEN
TW
TU
TBIO
TSPL
TPHY
TRGY
TC
TT
TSPA
TINT
TERRORISM
TX
TR
TS
TN
TD
TH
TIP
TNGD
TI
TZ
TF
THPY
TP
TBID
TL
TV
TK
TO
TRSY
TURKEY
TFIN
TAGS
UN
UK
UNSC
UNGA
US
UNESCO
UP
UNHRC
UNAUS
USTR
UNDP
UNEP
UNMIK
UY
UNCHR
UNO
UG
UZ
UNPUOS
USEU
UNDC
UNICEF
UV
UNHCR
UNCND
UNCHC
UNCSD
USUN
USOAS
UNFCYP
USNC
UNIDROIT
USPS
USAID
UE
UNVIE
UAE
UNODC
UNCHS
UNFICYP
UNDESCO
UNC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09QUITO108, COMMERCIAL MEDIA IN ECUADOR WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESIDENT AND
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09QUITO108.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09QUITO108 | 2009-02-11 20:33 | 2011-05-02 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Quito |
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0108/01 0422033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 112033Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0016
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7953
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB LIMA 3019
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3376
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4086
UNCLAS QUITO 000108
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO EC
SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL MEDIA IN ECUADOR WORRIED ABOUT THE PRESIDENT AND
THE NEW CONSTITUTION
REFTEL: 08 QUITO 616
1.(SBU) SUMMARY: Since President Rafael Correa came to office in
2007 he has criticized the Ecuadorian commercial media as
"incompetent," and complained that the majority of media outlets
were protective of the business interests of their owners and not
representative of the interests of Ecuadorian citizens. In 2008,
the government took management and editorial control of two national
TV stations owned by the Isaias family. Over the past year the
government has launched three "public" media outlets that in theory
report on the citizens' business, but in practice mainly report
favorably on government actions. The new constitution includes a
number of provisions that make commercial media outlets vulnerable
to government pressure. Taken together, President Correa's actions
and the provisions of the new constitution present a serious
challenge to Ecuadorian media and freedom of the press.
Nevertheless the main private media outlets continue to report on
and criticize the Correa government, while the public remains
largely on the sidelines of this battle over government restrictions
on press freedom in Ecuador. End Summary
CORREA COMES OUT SWINGING
2.(SBU) In his public statements and weekly radio addresses,
President Correa has been attacking media outlet owners and
criticizing the press and journalists for most of his time in
office. For example, he recently threatened to stop placing
government advertising in the daily newspaper El Universo and in his
2009 state of the union address asked, " How is it possible that the
largest newspaper in the country (El Universo) is owned by three
persons with fake businesses in the Cayman Islands, and that one of
Ecuador's TV stations (Teleamazonas) has reported seven years of
losses?" Media analysts have also criticized the Government's use
of a law allowing it to broadcast short programs on two or more
private TV stations to interrupt the popular "Contacto Directo"
morning news program on TV Ecuavisa. The Government spots defended
the Housing Minister against criticisms by Contacto Directo anchor
Carlos Vera, a constant critic of Correa. Many journalists
criticized the action as a transparent attack on one journalist
critical of the government.
¶3. (SBU) Over the past two years and three national elections,
Correa has attacked established elites in all fields, including the
media, to neutralize his potential critics. While his attacks have
not stopped media outlets and individual journalists from
criticizing him, they might have helped pave the way for a host of
anti-media provisions in the constitution. Also, some newsroom
editors admit they have softened their coverage of his
administration. After Correa said this month in Cuba that, "I'm
ready to fight the 80 percent of the Ecuadorian press that are
private companies and defend private interests and those of
political partisans," one top newspaper editor observed in his
column, "(Correa) remains convinced that the private media is
pernicious to society and must be limited."
ISAIAS CASE - ASSET RECOVERY OR MEDIA TAMPERING?
¶4. (SBU) In July 2008, the Ecuadorian government's Deposit Guaranty
Agency (Agencia de Garantia de Depositos - AGD) began to seize
companies and properties of brothers William and Roberto Isaias, a
move which garnered wide public approval. The GOE declared that
its objective was to sell the assets to pay back depositors who lost
money when the Isaias-owned Filanbanco went bankrupt in 1998,
leaving a $661 million loss. The AGD seized two broadcast TV
stations owned by the Isaias Group, Gamavision (since renamed
GamaTV) and TC Television, whose viewership figures tie them for the
number two spot among Ecuador's seven broadcast TV stations, and two
small cable TV channels. These channels are now owned and run by
AGD, which is supposedly determining their value with an eye to
selling them by April 2009. After taking managerial and editorial
control of the TV stations in November, the AGD-installed general
managers claimed they would not tamper with the stations' editorial
content, but eventually cancelled a number of programs which
included political commentary that sometimes was critical of
President Correa or his administration.
"PUBLIC" MEDIA OUTLETS - WORKING FOR THE PUBLIC, OR IN FAVOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT?
¶5. (SBU) Since coming to office, the Correa government has created
three government-funded media outlets: the El Telegrafo daily
newspaper; radio station Radio Publica de Ecuador; and TV station
Ecuador TV (ECTV). The editor of El Telegrafo said that the vision
for the newspaper is to follow the BBC model, which is to say it
will neither publish state propaganda nor function like a commercial
media outlet earning a profit, and the president's communication
secretary said the three government media outlets are "at the
service of the people and the nation, but not the government."
However, the focus of reporting for these public media outlets
appears to be on the government's activities and its political
agenda. For instance, ECTV broadcasts all presidential
announcements and his Saturday addresses to the nation and was the
only media outlet to travel with the President on his January 2009
trip to Cuba. When Radio Ecuador was launched weeks before the vote
to approve Ecuador's new constitution, its first interview was a
one-hour talk with President Correa and much of its subsequent
programming focused on the government's campaign in favor of the new
constitution.
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS - WILL COMMERCIAL MEDIA SURVIVE? WILL
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ENDURE?
¶6. (SBU) Ecuador's new constitution reflects President Correa's
promise to implement "Socialism of the 21st Century" by creating a
"system of social communication," among other provisions. It
contains a host of articles aimed at regulating the commercial
media, overseeing news content, and giving the government ownership
control of commercial media outlets. The ultimate effect that the
Constitution will have on the media and freedom of the press remains
unclear, as many provisions have not yet been implemented through
accompanying laws, but media observers point out that the government
will have powerful tools at its disposal to make fundamental changes
to how media companies do business and how they report the news.
They fear the Correa administration, in keeping with its attacks on
the commercial media over the past two years, will use these tools
to restrict the free circulation of ideas and punish its critics in
the commercial media. During the Constituent Assembly's debate on
media provisions, assembly member Pedro de la Cruz of the
government's Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (PAIS) movement, said,
"The government should share in media company profits to
redistribute wealth," while PAIS member Pilar Nunez said, "We are
asking (media companies)for verified information that is not
speculation."
Future Government Role in Commercial Media Ownership and Oversight
¶7. (SBU) Transitory Article 24 of the constitution stipulates that
the executive branch will appoint a commission to conduct an audit
of all TV and radio frequency licenses. Some wonder whether this
commission will conduct a witch hunt against outlets that criticize
the government and cancel their licenses. This would free up
licenses to award to new "community media" stations since the
constitution says the government will guarantee licenses for and
assist in the creation of community stations (Article 16). However,
85 percent of licenses are in private hands, only three percent
belong to community stations, and some cities have no available
frequencies. The presidential decree creating the commission
specifically states that it is to identify any monopolies or
oligopolies using the licenses. In his 2009 state of the union
address, Correa said, "Alternative media outlets will have to be
created."
¶8. (SBU) Article 312 states that financial businesses are prohibited
from controlling or investing in media outlets, while Transitory
Article 29 states that financial company stock holders must sell any
current ownership positions in media outlets by October 2011.
Recently Correa has claimed that TV station Teleamazonas, owned by
banker Fidel Egas and home to news anchor Jorge Ortiz, a frequent
Correa critic, is evading taxes. Egas' spokesman has said that he
will abide by the constitution and divest from Teleamazonas. In
2007 Ecuador had four large independent commercial TV stations.
Today, two of those are owned by the government, and the third will
have to be sold at a time when the country is facing an economic
downturn and the constitution bars foreigners from owning a majority
share of media outlets. This leads commentators to wonder if any
Ecuadorian investors will come forward to purchase these three
stations and continue their tradition of independent newscasts.
¶9. (SBU) Article 313 states that the government reserves the right
to administer, regulate, control and manage strategic sectors,
including the TV-radio spectrum. Article 315 states that the
government will create public companies to manage strategic sectors,
while Article 316 spells out that the government can allow mixed
public-private companies to participate in strategic sectors, or in
exceptional cases allow private-sector companies to do this.
Article 408 states that non-renewable natural resources, including
the TV-radio spectrum, are the inalienable property of the
government and that the government will share in the benefits of
using these resources in an amount not less than the companies that
exploit them. Considering that commercial TV and radio stations
receive licenses giving them the right to use the TV-radio spectrum
in their business operations, these articles raise the possibility
that the government will seek to manage TV and radio outlets and
share in the earnings of their operations.
¶10. (SBU) Article 384 stipulates that the law will define the
organization, functioning and forms of citizen participation in the
"system of social communication," which will assure the rights of
communication, information and freedom of expression, and strengthen
citizen participation. The system will be composed of public
institutions, and private, citizen and community actors who
voluntarily join it, and the government will formulate a public
communication policy. A published news story reports that Cuban
communications professor Jose Ignacio Lopez Vigil helped put this
article into the constitution in the last days of the constituent
assembly. Analysts are unsure how the government will use this
system to set communication policy and influence the news reporting
of private media outlets.
Will the Government Control the News?
¶11. (SBU) Article 18 states that all citizens have the right to
receive true and verified information without prior censorship.
Article 19 states that the law will regulate the content of the news
media's programming. Transitory Article 1 spells out that the
National Legislative Assembly, within 360 days of the new
constitution coming into force, will write a communications law.
Legal experts predict that the communications law will define the
form and function of the "system of social communication," and will
empower the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control to
establish mechanisms to enforce the constitutional provisions
governing the media and freedom of press described in Articles
16-20. In this case, the members of this council would have the
ability to interpret the broad language of these articles (in
particular Articles 18-19) and the authority to choose what
enforcement actions to take against private media outlets that they
determine violated those articles. Some media professionals have
expressed worry that this council, which has been dubbed the "fifth
branch of government," could abuse its authority by selectively
bringing enforcement action against private media outlets thus
leading to intimidation and/or censorship of the press.
¶12. (SBU) In the first example of how the government plans to use
these articles to regulate the commercial media, on January 28 the
National Radio and TV Council (CONARTEL) responded to complaints
against programs broadcast by TV Ecuavisa and Teleamazonas by
decreeing that TV and radio stations which use polls or opinion
surveys in their broadcasts must "eliminate statements that attack a
person's honor, dignity and good name." Referring to the language
of Article 18, CONARTEL's decree states that stations must avoid
making "statements about facts and cases that are untrue or
unverified and cannot be subsequently verified by the citizens." In
response, one columnist wrote that this is part of a well thought
out plan by the government to limit free speech guided by the idea
that citizen power must regulate the press.
¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: President Correa's two-year campaign of
criticism against Ecuador's "mediocre" press corps and "so-called
free press" has helped him discredit the media as an opposition
force. With some justification, he has painted it as aligned with
the country's political and business elite and therefore an obstacle
to the change agenda of his citizen's revolution. While the private
media has shown solidarity in defending themselves against the
attacks and continues to report and comment critically on Correa and
his government, some have admitted to a degree of self-censorship
and most are wary of how the constitutional provisions described
above could affect their newsrooms and businesses. They also wonder
whether Correa's verbal attacks might escalate into concrete actions
such as tax investigations, which have already begun in the case of
Teleamazonas. With Correa's popularity rating around 70 percent two
years into his term, they might be calculating that now is not the
time to take him on. It appears the public is willing for the time
being to allow Correa to continue attacking the media, at least
while the existing commercial media outlets still function more or
less independently. However, it remains to be seen how the public
would react if the president's attacks and the constitutional
changes lead to a situation like in Venezuela, where few independent
media outlets remain, or if the system of social communication
promised in the new constitution proves to be nothing more than a
government-run press.
HODGES