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Viewing cable 06SOFIA190, BELENE NUCLEAR PLANT: KEY TO DIVERSIFICATION,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SOFIA190 | 2006-02-03 11:58 | 2011-04-29 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia |
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlbelene.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/04/29/1082317_mrusna_energiia/ http://wlcentral.org/node/1722 |
VZCZCXRO5165
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0190/01 0341158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031158Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1389
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 000190
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: ENRG ECON ETRD TRGY EINV EPET PREL SENV RU BU
SUBJECT: BELENE NUCLEAR PLANT: KEY TO DIVERSIFICATION,
PIECE OF THE RUSSIAN (ENERGY) EMPIRE OR ALBATROSS?
REF: 05 SOFIA 2063
Classified By: Amb. John Beyrle for reason 1.4 (b)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU requirement that Bulgaria close
Kozloduy Nuclear reactors 3 and 4 by the end of the year as
part of the accession process, combined with increased
international gas and oil prices and pressure by Russia's
Gazprom to renegotiate gas delivery contracts, has focused
the GOB again on building a new nuclear plant at Belene.
February 1 marked the closing of the bid submission process
and the beginning of a five month review and negotiation
period before the GOB decides which of two international
consortia will build the plant - 2,000 MWe from two units.
¶2. (C) Bulgaria is faced with tough choices on its energy
future in order to diversify its sources. Belene nuclear
plant is perhaps the most interesting and risky option. Both
the Russian and Czech led bidders will incorporate
international partners into key construction and supply
areas, using Russian light-water reactor technology.
However, it appears both groups are at least partially-owned
by Gazprom ) which has been squeezing Bulgaria on gas
contracts (reftel). Outstanding questions of cost,
financing, the role of Russian and other international
players, the prices of alternative sources of energy,
environmental concerns, and the actual need for Belene, will
determine whether this weighty project gets off the ground.
END SUMMARY.
IS THERE A NEED FOR BELENE?
---------------------------
¶3. (U) Under the EU Accession process, Bulgaria has already
closed Kozloduy units 1 and 2, and will close 3 and 4 by the
end of 2006. (All four have 1970's vintage VVER-440
reactors. The remaining operational units, 5 and 6 are
VVER-1000's.) The Bulgarian energy community estimates that
between 2010 and 2015 Bulgaria will need an additional 1,000
to 2,000 MWe in order to replace this lost nuclear capacity,
maintain energy independence, continue to export electricity,
meet international environmental standards and satisfy
anticipated higher domestic electricity consumption. In
remarks on January 27, Minister of Economy and Energy Rumen
Ovcharov told parliament that due to its closure of Kozloduy,
Bulgaria has in effect become the only country to pay for EU
membership before joining.
¶4. (U) Bulgaria currently relies on foreign fuel supplies
for 87.1 percent of its energy consumption. Virtually all of
Bulgaria's natural gas (88.3 percent) and oil (73 percent)
come from Russia, as does all of its nuclear fuel. In fact,
with the exception of the coal-fired thermal plants at
Maritza East, all electricity generation is based on Russian
sources ) even the coal-fired plant on the Black Sea in
Varna relies on specially-processed Russian coal.
¶5. (U) Despite this over-reliance on Russia, some experts
have raised concerns about various aspects of the Belene
project, including whether Bulgaria really needs additional
nuclear capacity. Scientists from the Bulgarian Academy of
Science said the government overestimates future domestic
electricity demand and discounts increased energy efficiency.
They estimate in-country consumption to be less than 44,000
million kWh in 2010 vice the 63,000 million kWh estimated by
the government. In-country electricity consumption has been
declining in recent years, falling to 36,000 million kWh in
2004, according to official statistics.
¶6. (C) In addition, private economists and the IMF
representative have told us they question whether the GOB
should put state resources into such a costly project when
they are trying to privatize much of the energy sector and
preparing to be more competitive with European companies in a
deregulated market.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: OPTIONS GALORE, DECISIONS PENDING
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶7. (C) The GOB hired Deloitte&Touche to coordinate the
financial aspect of the project. Deloitte&Touche estimates
that construction will cost between 2-4 billion euros and
would require at least 60 percent foreign financing. The
Belene project falls squarely between two contradictory
government policies: On one hand, the government hopes to
minimize its financial involvement in order to honor its
agreement on a budget surplus with the IMF. On the other
SOFIA 00000190 002 OF 004
hand, the government would like to retain control. Minister
Ovcharov told Amb. Beyrle recently the GOB is weighing three
options for ownership structure: Majority government
ownership, minority government ownership, and private
ownership. Ovcharov said the GOB seeks a balance between
various international partners, but wants to keep a key role
for the state. He said a decision on ownership should come
within a month.
¶8. (C) A representative of Parsons, advisor to the GOB for
Belene, has suggested the GOB establish a joint national
nuclear company, consisting of Kozloduy Units 5 and 6 and
Belene, to enable project finance options. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told us Kozloduy carries 400 Million euros in debt to RosExim Bank (Russia), EXIM, Citibank and EuroAtom, which would not help Belene nor attract needed private financiers. Others feel
this approach would result in a non-transparent transfer of
state assets. Ovcharov is also discussing the possibility of
a "super electric company" consisting of Belene, Kozloduy and
the Maritza East plants, which would compete with European
companies.
¶9. (U) Other critics argue that Belene may well result in the most expensive electricity in Bulgaria. The financial consultant calculated that an electricity price of between 3.2-3.7 euro cents per kWh would be necessary to attract the interest of international financial institutions earning a rate of return of 11-14 percent. Currently the most
expensive electricity in Bulgaria -- 2.48 euro cents per kWh -- is being generated by the thermal power plant Bobovdol, while Kozloduy electricity costs 0.76 euro cents per kWh.
TECHNICAL AND TENDER DETAILS
----------------------------
¶10. (U) Discussion of a second nuclear power plant in
Bulgaria started as far back as the early seventies.
Construction work on Belene Unit 1 began in 1987, based on
the design of the pressurized water reactor in Kozloduy Units
5 and 6 -- VVER-1000 (B-320). Work was suspended in 1990 due
to lack of funds and environmental concerns. The GOB
estimates that about 40 percent of Unit 1 is completed,
including major civil works and equipment installation worth
about USD 660 million, but skeptics wonder whether this
nearly twenty year-old infrastructure will require extensive
refurbishing.
¶11. (U) The Council of Ministers decided in April 2005 to
proceed anew with light water reactors that would allow use
of the existing infrastructure. The government's preference
for a pressurized light water reactor eliminated one of the
potential bidders led by the Canadian AECL, which offered to
build two &CANDU 68 units. The government has hired US/UK
Parsons E&C Europe as architect-engineer to assist in
preparing the bidding procedure, evaluate bids, negotiate
contracts, and provide general management service during the
entire project execution. In return, Parsons will receive
almost 17 million euros. Parsons advised the GOB to either
upgrade the existing VVER 1000 MWe (B-320) on the Unit 1 site
and install VVER 1000 MWe (B-466) on the Unit 2 site, or
build VVER 1000 MWe (B-466) on each of the two Units.
¶12. (U) The Bulgarian government selected a combination of
turnkey and split package (island) contracting approach.
While the tender explicitly organized the construction work
into two separate contracting bids for design and
construction of the reactor (Nuclear Island) and turbine
(Turbine Island), the Nuclear Island contractor will be
responsible for the general coordination and implementation
of the project.
¶13. (C) Two groups submitted bids by the February 1
deadline: a consortium of the Russian Atomstroyexport and
French/German Framatom, and the Czech Skoda group. While
both consortia are ready to complete the existing type of
reactor, the Russians have expressed interest in installing a
second more advanced (VVER 1000 (B-466)) reactor on the Unit
2 site. Skoda has partnered with Westinghouse for completion
of the existing reactor VVER 1000 MWe (B-320) using the same
technology as in the Czech Temelin plant. Parsons told us
they are not happy with the French proposal for the
Instrumentation and Control solution, and would prefer
Westinghouse I&C equipment that successfully upgraded
Kozloduy reactors 5 and 6.
¶14. (U) While the GOB decides on an ownership and financial
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structure, Parsons will lead a technical review and
negotiations with the two consortia, which will last until
July. At that time, a decision is expected on who will build
the plant. The project should be completed within 120 months
after the contract is signed with the first unit to be
commissioned in 2010-11.
RUSSIAN/INTERNATIONAL ANGLE
---------------------------
¶15. (C) Ovcharov told us the GOB wants to find a way to
balance the interests of all international players, meaning
that members of both consortia would have discrete projects.
However, an official within the ministry said that, while the
project is big enough to include roles for all, this could be
its downfall as well. Former Minister of Economy and Energy
Milko Kovachev asserted that the fact that the plant uses
Russian light-water technology does not signify a threat to
Bulgaria and that a Russian-led consortium could be selected
to build the plant. The risk, he said, is if the GOB opens
ownership to the private sector and Russian-led groups were
to win a controlling share.
¶16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us she researched Skoda
and Atomstroyexport and found links in both to Gazprom
through Gazprom Bank. Gazprom Bank apparently owns a part of
Atomstroyexport, and recently purchased a large share in the
Russian company OMZ, which in turn owns a majority of Skoda.
A Ministry of Energy Director confirmed to us this
information, but said that Gazprom has not officially claimed
they own OMZ. In any case, that would not affect the bidding
process. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us the concern would come only
if OMZ adversely influenced Skoda's desire to seek nuclear
supply from Westinghouse ) thereby keeping Russia in control
of nuclear fuel supply. Skoda told XXXXXXXXXXXX that
Russian ownership does not mean control over policy. Another
concern is that AtomstroyExport and Skoda could collude on
the bids, which could harm potential investors and/or
Bulgarian taxpayers and consumers who would not enjoy the
benefits of a transparent, competitive bidding process.
BULGARIAN HOPES -- AND FEARS
----------------------------
¶17. (C) Public opinion polls indicate strong regional
support for nuclear power and completion of Belene, according
to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that implementation of the project will
result in a significant decrease in unemployment in
Bulgaria's depressed north-central region. Belene will also
satisfy international environmental standards and meet the
country's commitments to reduce air emissions, according to
the GOB.
¶18. (U) However, a local environmental organization,
Ecoglasnost, supported by Greenpeace, has tried to stop the
project. Environmentalists claim the GOB revived the project
without fully evaluating the radioactive waste threat for
Bulgaria. The completion of Belene would entail the
expansion of the nuclear waste storage facility in Novi Han,
which could negatively affect its population, according to
Ecoglasnost, Greenpeace has also criticized the location of
the site on a seismically active area, and complained that
Bulgaria ) as one of the least energy-efficient countries in
Europe ) needs to focus on improving its existing
infrastructure.
COMMENT
-------
¶19. (C) Belene, if structured properly with full
international participation and ownership, could diversify
Bulgaria's energy independence and continue Bulgaria's
success as an electricity exporter. However, if Gazprom
becomes a majority owner, using Russian technology and fuel,
Bulgaria would be even more beholden to one energy source
than before. In both candid private conversations with us
and in more nuanced public statements, the President and
Prime Minster have made clear that Bulgaria's strategic
interests lie in greater diversity of energy sources. There
is no doubt that Belene, Gazprom and the proposed
Burgas-Alexandropolous oil pipeline are all inter-connected.
Ovcharov has said Bulgaria will agree to re-negotiate gas
transit fees if Russia invests strongly in Bulgaria. Since
two of the only major projects for potential large Russian
investments right now are B-A pipeline and Belene, it is
possible that Ovcharov is laying the groundwork with the
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Bulgarian public for a deal with Russia.
¶20. (C) It is clear that Bulgaria is at a crucial stage in
deciding how to ensure its own energy independence and the
demands of its growing economy - a message we deliver
repeatedly at the highest levels. President Purvanov, PM
Stanishev and Ovcharov seem to understand the stakes.
Bulgaria's economic, and to some extent political,
independence depends on how effectively they deal with
Russia's supply monopoly in the short term, while building
greater source diversity for the future. A separate
forthcoming cable will examine this dilemma with a focus on
oil and gas.
Beyrle