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Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09WELLINGTON181, FIXING THE BIG CITY
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09WELLINGTON181 | 2009-06-26 03:03 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO0648
RR RUEHAP RUEHDT RUEHNZ RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0181/01 1770356
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260358Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0022
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHAP/AMEMBASSY APIA 0005
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0009
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0011
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 0008
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000181
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR EAP/ANP
PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM NZ
SUBJECT: FIXING THE BIG CITY
WELLINGTON 00000181 001.2 OF 003
¶1. (SBU) The Auckland region, New Zealand's commercial center and
home to a third of the country's population, is governed by a
patchwork of institutions - four city councils and mayors, two
district councils and an overarching regional council. These
overlapping and competing authorities slow decision-making and hobble
the city's development at taxpayers' expense.
¶2. (SBU) In 2007, the previous Labour government tasked the city's
leaders to come up with a new governance plan. Their proposed
changes were mostly cosmetic and designed to protect existing
political fiefs. Unimpressed with the product but not wanting to
deal with the issue during an election campaign, the Labour
government punted the job to a Royal Commission of three eminences
grises, with a mandate to come up with a new plan after the November
2008 national elections.
¶3. (SBU) After extensive consultations, the Royal Commission issued
its report in March. It called for the establishment of a single
city council with a popularly elected mayor and some council seats
set aside for Maori. Existing city and district councils would be
replaced by six local councils covering the same localities as the
current city and district councils. They would be subordinate to the
new greater Auckland council but still authorized to raise and spend
money independently.
¶4. (SBU) Within weeks, the National-led government in Wellington,
via Local Government Minister Rodney Hide, leader of the small ACT
Party, set aside much of the Royal Commission's plan and put forward
a more radical proposal. Hide proposed a single city council -
without Maori seats - and a popularly elected mayor. The six
proposed local council were eliminated, to be replaced instead with
20-30 community boards that would have very minor responsibilities
(graffiti and pet control) and would otherwise be limited to an
advisory role. The new governance structure is to be in place by
October 2010.
OXEN GET GORED
--------------
¶5. (SBU) Initial reaction was predictable. Current Auckland City
Mayor John Banks, a minister in an earlier National government and
frontrunner (to the extent there is one) for mayor of the new
"supercity," praised the government's plan. The mayors and council
members from the other current city and district councils, who will
be out of their jobs if the plan is implemented, spluttered in
outrage. The New Zealand Herald's op-ed pages have been filled with
columns penned by various mayors, deputy mayors, and city councilors
decrying Wellington's attack on local democracy. The decision has
also upset community activists concerned their neighborhood interests
and pet projects will be overlooked by a top-heavy city government.
¶6. (SBU) The Maori community condemned the government's elimination
of Maori seats, but Maori Party co-leader Pita Sharples' response was
nuanced. He objected to the elimination of the Maori seats, but took
pains to add that the disagreement would not affect the Maori Party's
confidence and supply agreement with National. The protests from
local Maori tribes were more pointed and a protest march (hikoi) was
called for late May. The 6,000-strong hikoi managed to close down a
few blocks of downtown Auckland on May 25 but PM Key dismissed it.
A STUMBLE, BUT A SMALL ONE
--------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The government seems taken aback by reaction to the
supercity plan, but it is not clear how seriously the government has
stumbled. The government has dropped hints that, when the enabling
legislation moves through parliament, there may be room for tweaking,
including a way to guarantee Maori representation on the new council.
While the opposition Labour Party has been trying to make political
hay out of the issue, strong opposition remains limited to Maori and
community activists. Media interest in the issue is fading. One
Auckland MP confirmed a view held by many: the average Aucklander
cares little about the governance debate so long as the outcome
delivers better traffic and lower taxes. A recent public opinion
poll showed Aucklanders were evenly split on the supercity concept,
but feelings among the general public on the issue do not seem
particularly strong. Outside Auckland, the debate attracts barely
any interest at all.
¶8. (SBU) One analyst suggested that the Maori Party's protest was
muted because Sharples has bigger fish to fry. This observer
suggested that Sharples is hoarding his political capital to expend
WELLINGTON 00000181 002.2 OF 003
on social and welfare issues more important to the Maori community.
By largely giving National a pass regarding Maori seats in Auckland,
he has earned points with PM Key that he can spend later.
BAD POLITICS?
-------------
¶9. (SBU) Some observers suggest that National has made bad decisions
both for itself and for the people of Auckland. One local government
expert from one of Auckland's big law firms noted that National's
rejection of the Royal Commission proposal meant that National had
taken ownership of Auckland governance issue. Given that few
analysts expect any form of local government reform to have much
impact on Aucklanders' tax bills and traffic woes, that may have been
a mistake. Had National simply implemented the Labour-appointed
Royal Commission plan, it could have dealt with Aucklanders'
inevitable disappointment by shifting the blame to Labour and the
Commission. At least one Auckland politician agreed, arguing that
while there were no votes to be won in redesigning Auckland's
government, there were at least a few votes to be lost.
¶10. (SBU) Auckland University Professor Ray Miller sounded a similar
theme, warning that National was identifying itself with a policy
drawn up by Hide. Hide's party drew only 3.7% of the vote in last
year's election and, argued Miller, Hide is not very popular with the
New Zealand electorate and is not trusted by his National
counterparts in cabinet. Hide's pro-business attitudes open the
government up to accusations that it is backing a plan meant to
promote a business takeover of Auckland's government. According to
this argument, only the wealthiest candidates will be able to mount
serious campaigns in a constituency of 1.4 million. (By comparison,
the population of Auckland City, the largest of the Auckland region's
current municipalities, is about 450,000.)
A BAD PLAN?
-----------
¶11. (SBU) Some experts in local government see a fundamental flaw in
both the Commission and government plans. Both plans opt for what
experts describe a "weak mayor" model. The mayor will get to appoint
his/her deputy and committee chairs and propose the budget, but the
mayor's authority will not be nearly as strong as that of London's
mayor, for example. Experts point with concern to Toronto, which
implemented municipal reform similar to that proposed for Auckland
and has been left with a divided council with a mayor too weak to
resolve disputes. It is certainly hard to see how a council that
included the four current mayors - different from each other in both
temperament and philosophy - could succeed.
ALTERING THE AUCKLAND-WELLINGTON DYNAMIC
----------------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) The impact of reform on the relationship between Auckland
and national politics remains to be seen. In New Zealand, local
government generally is not a stepping stone to higher levels of
government. While there are exceptions, mayoralties in New Zealand
are filled with politicians at the end, rather than the beginning, of
their careers. Likewise, members of city councils tend to limit
their focus to local issues. Last year's election to parliament of
Auckland City Councilman Peseta Sam Lotu-Liga is the exception rather
than the rule.
¶13. (SBU) A number of our interlocutors suggested that a supercity
might change all that. Traditionally, gaining a ministry required an
ambitious young politician to toil for years in the party hierarchy
and parliament's backbenches. That has already started to change, as
party leaders take advantage of the party list system to bring in
fresh blood. Some observers argue that a relatively junior
politician could avoid paying his dues in Wellington and pursue a
city-wide council seat or mayoralty in Auckland. A politician who
could succeed there, and demonstrate to party leaders that he can
capture a plurality in what will be by far the single largest
constituency in the country, could make a persuasive argument to
enter national politics at the ministerial level.
¶14. (SBU) Even if a reformed Auckland government does not become a
springboard to national office, many of our interlocutors hope it
might lead to better candidates at the local level. We heard many
complaints about the dismal quality of local government officials,
with the few noteworthy exceptions only drawing attention to the
mediocrity of the rest. A more authoritative government for the
entire Auckland region might draw more effective policymakers who
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consider pursuit of local office under the current structure to be a
waste of effort.
¶15. (SBU) Despite its weaknesses, reform may strengthen Auckland in
its dealings with the rest of the country. New Zealanders outside
the city tend to be wary of Auckland, believing it already gets too
much attention and too many resources compared to the rest of the
country. This is reflected in national politics, where some
politicians, such as former Finance Minister Michael Cullen, gain
reputations for being particularly "anti-Auckland." This infuriates
Auckland boosters, who point out the city contributes much more in
economic growth and tax revenues than it gets back in, for example,
funding for roads.
¶16. (SBU) One expert argued that even an imperfect supercity will be
better placed to battle for its interests in Wellington. He used a
recent example of a regional fuel tax. The previous Labour
government imposed a fuel tax for the Auckland region only, with the
proceeds to go to Auckland infrastructure. When gasoline prices
spiked last year, the tax became politically unsupportable and the
government withdrew it, without any indication of how it would
replace the badly-needed funding. Auckland's fragmented leadership
made no effective response. A mayor and city council from a single
Auckland supercity would have been better positioned to protect the
fuel tax or draw a commitment from the government that funds for the
needed infrastructure would be found elsewhere.
¶17. (SBU) The final shape of the supercity won't be seen for months,
after continued public debate and parliamentary hearings. The
hearings will keep the story in the newspaper, but it is unlikely to
return to the front pages soon. Prime Minister Key, a pragmatic
politician, will likely use the hearing process to make adjustments
to the new governance structure in order to appease key
constituencies like the Maori. Regardless of the final design, it
will be years before we learn whether the restructuring has created
the world class city everyone seems to agree New Zealand needs.
KEEGAN