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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1057, SOMALIA - TFG PRIME MINISTER WORRIED ABOUT RIVAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI1057 | 2009-05-28 15:03 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXRO5046
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1057/01 1481535
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281535Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9645
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001057
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL MOPS EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG PRIME MINISTER WORRIED ABOUT RIVAL
ORGANIZATION, ANXIOUS FOR USG HELP
REF: NAIROBI 1037
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d
).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a brief Nairobi airport meeting May
28, TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke worried about the influence
of rival organization Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a and the failure
of talks in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to result in an
agreement to cooperate. Sharmarke confirmed that
communications and logistics problems had undercut the TFG's
initially successful counter-attack in Mogadishu on May 22,
and requested radios and military advice to prevent a
recurrence of the problems. The Prime Minister repeatedly
confirmed the TFG's willingness to accept any negative
publicity that might result from a U.S. military strike on
terrorists or their training camps in Somalia should such
strikes occur. The TFG, said Sharmarke, was looking for
money to pay security force salaries for June. In a
subsequent meeting with UNPOS Deputy Charles Petrie, the
Prime Minister asked assistance in getting the Government of
Iraq to make good on its pledge of USD 5 million in aid to
his government. The Prime Minister was grateful for the
Secretary's May 27 telephone call to President Sheikh Sharif,
which he had listened in on and which "really bolstered our
spirits." Sharmarke was briefly in Nairobi en route to
Tripoli at the invitation of Qadhafi. End summary.
Lessons of May 22 Counter-Attack
--------------------------------
¶2. (C) During a brief stopover in Nairobi May 28 while en
route to Libya, a relaxed TFG Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke
told Somalia Unit officers that his government's troops had
fared well in the initial stages of their counterattack
against insurgents in Mogadishu on May 22. After taking
significant parts of Mogadishu (reftel), TFG troops had been
forced to retreat, however, when its Uganda-trained
contingent found itself near the Industrial Road area and far
in advance of other TFG units. Inaccurate information passed
by cellphone, the troops' only means of communication, caused
the Uganda-trained soldiers to believe they had been cut off
from other TFG soldiers, and they beat a hasty retreat,
Sharmarke said. The May 22 counteroffensive, although
ultimately unsuccessful, showed that security force their
considerable weaknesses: communications, logistics, and
battlefield command. Sharmarke requested USG assistance in
procuring walkie talkies and other battlefield communications
equipment and any training that could be provided the TFG's
field commanders. He welcome the suggestion that experienced
Rwandan or Ugandan trainers be detailed, if possible, to
Mogadishu to lead intensive courses.
Praise for IGAD Communique
--------------------------
¶3. (C) Sharmarke was philosophical about progress al-Shabaab
and other insurgents had made against the TFG in recent
weeks. The TFG, he maintained, was keeping the door open to
"reasonable guys," while al-Shabaab's reliance on foreigners
was costing it support among Somalis. Sharmarke praised the
May 20 IGAD ministerial communique's call for control of
Somali airports and ports, and alleged that it had triggered
al-Shabaab's efforts, via incursions into Medina to win
control of Mogadishu airport.
Foreigners Fighting
-------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Sharmarke joined other Somalis in alleging
significant foreign involvement in al-Shabaab's efforts. A
"Pakistani general" was coordinating the attacks on the TFG
in Mogadishu, he said. Also present was an alleged al-Qaida
operative he was able to identify only as "al-Libi."
Sharmarke noted that he was keeping indirect tabs on Muhtar
Robow, but no one in the TFG, to his knowledge, had had
contact since Robow's resignation as al-Shabaab spokesman.
Sharmarke described considerable stress between Hisbul Islam
and al-Shabaab, with Hassan Dahir Aweys allegedly "shocked"
by al-Shabaab's "lack of a strategy other than fighting."
ASWJ Negotiations Faltering
---------------------------
¶5. (C) The TFG's negotiations with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a
(ASWJ) had produced no results to date, according to
Sharmarke. He described the Somalia central region
NAIROBI 00001057 002 OF 002
representatives they had been in contact with as "determined
to make gains quickly on the ground," so that those gains
could be parlayed into an improved negotiating position with
the TFG. Although the TFG had provided some money to ASWJ,
all assistance was now stalled, with some in the TFG worried
that TFG cash was feeding a potential rival. ASWJ continued
to push for high-profile ministerial positions and to stall
on active cooperation with the TFG. Sharmarke was not
certain what pressure the Government of Ethiopia could exert
on ASWJ, but he several times urged the USG to do what it
could to bring ASWJ around.
Money Needs
-----------
¶6. (C) The Prime Minister promised an accounting shortly of
the USD 500 thousand provided by the USG. He as very grateful
for USG efforts to supply TFG forces with larger-caliber
ammunition and weapons. The TFG had subsidized allies in
Hiraan and Jowhar, as well as having provided stipends to an
unspecified number of "al-Shabaab defectors." His government
believed it was safer if the technicals that belonged to
mercurial warlords Mohammed Dheere and Indha Adde were safely
in TFG control, and negotiations were now under way to that
end. Sharmarke estimated the total number of technicals at
18, in addition to one APC. He noted that their purchase
would place significant additional strain on the TFG's
finances and asked continued USG support. (In a subsequent
brief conversation with UNPOS Deputy Charles Petrie,
Sharmarke urged UN and USG intercession with Iraq to speed
the delivery of an alleged USD 5 million that the Baghdad
government had pledged to the TFG.)
Support for Kinetic Strikes
---------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Sharmarke recalled that he had called Somalia Unit
on May 16 to urge that the USG "take out" if possible
participants in an al-Shabaab - Hisbul Islam conclave near
Afgoye. That phone call, he re-affirmed, had been made with
the express consent of President Sheikh Sharif, who also
believed with Sharmarke that and USG strikes on known
terrorists or their training camps was necessary. Asked if
the TFG could weather the fallout from such a strike or
strikes and their potential collateral damage Sharmarke,
without hesitation said, "yes." "These people," he said, "are
out to destroy our way of life."
Travel Plans
------------
¶8. (C) Sharmarke was en route to Libya at the invitation of
Qadhafi and in place of President Sharif, whom Ambassador
Ranneberger, in a May 26 telephone call, had strongly
discouraged from leaving Mogadishu during this stressful time.
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) Sharmarke, like President Sharif in our recent
telephone contacts with him, was calm and convinced that the
TFG could prevail against its enemies. He philosophically
acknowledged the many basic problems confronting his
government, from forging an alliance with ASWJ to ironing out
command and control and logistical problems in its fragile
security forces. His dismissive comments about al-Shabaab's
reported increasing reliance on foreign fighters, ironically,
mirror al-Shabaab's accusations that the TFG is over-reliant
on the foreign fighters of AMISOM as it haltingly tries to
increase its hold on Mogadishu.
RANNEBERGER