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Viewing cable 06MEXICO858, PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06MEXICO858 | 2006-02-15 20:08 | 2011-04-05 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico |
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/eu-dudaba-de-la-viabilidad-del-pri/ |
VZCZCXRO8786
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0858/01 0462034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 152034Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9010
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
53190
2006-02-15 20:34:00
06MEXICO858
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO8786
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #0858/01 0462034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 152034Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9010
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000858
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: PRI DISSIDENTS SPEAK OUT
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R
EASONS: 1.4(B/D).
¶1. (C) Summary: In order to broaden our understanding of the
dynamics within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
over the past two weeks, poloff met with three dissidents
within the party's congressional faction, two of whom had
just announced their defection from the party. In frank
conversations, our contacts described a party held hostage to
the personal agenda of presidential candidate Roberto
Madrazo. While the party appears to have achieved a thin
veneer of unity, this unity could easily be fractured if the
party's legislative lists do not satisfy the ambitions of key
activists, or if Madrazo's candidacy continues to languish in
the polls. While much could happen in the four and one-half
months remaining until election day, our conversations with
these PRI dissidents confirm the impression that the party
leadership's apparent willingness to subjugate the PRI's
broader interests to Roberto Madrazo's troubled candidacy
could have serious long-term consequences for the party. End
summary.
----------------------------------------
Madrazo Has Two Months To Turn It Around
----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) On February 14, poloff met with Senator Genaro
Borrego of Zacatecas, the most-high profile dissident within
the PRI's congressional delegation. A founding member of
Everyone United Against Madrazo (TUCOM, for its Spanish
acronym) faction within the PRI, Borrego reiterated what he
told us last October: that under no circumstances would he
ever support Madrazo, whom he characterized as "corrupt." He
said that while the party superficially had unified around
the candidate, this unity was "fragile" and "artificial."
Confirming what we have heard from numerous other sources,
Borrego said that Madrazo's day of reckoning would come in
March, when the party would finalize its legislative lists.
He said that given the numerous competing promises that
Madrazo has made to various allies, inevitably some important
PRI leaders would find themselves omitted from the lists,
possibly posing a severe test to party unity. He speculated
that if, by mid-April, Madrazo had not risen to a solid
second place position in the polls, many in the party would
quietly abandon his campaign as a lost cause, forging
alliances with other parties to protect their own interests.
He said it was difficult to predict what effect a second
consecutive defeat in the presidential contest would have on
the PRI, intimating that in the wake of such a defeat, many
party members might seek a political home elsewhere,
threatening the party's future.
¶3. (C) Borrego blamed the poor state of Madrazo's campaign
largely on the candidate himself, noting that his on-going
feud with teachers' union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and his
own long-tarnished reputation make his candidacy a very tough
sell. Nevertheless, he discounted press reports that some in
the party were seeking to replace Madrazo, saying that both
party rules and Madrazo's own dominance of the PRI's
machinery made such a move virtually impossible.
-------------------------------------------
A Climate of Insecurity Could Favor the PRI
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Notwithstanding the difficult electoral scenario
Madrazo now faces, Borrego said there were three factors that
could work to his advantage. First, he noted that the
current climate of public insecurity might lead the
electorate to vote their fears, leading them to favor the
candidate -- i.e., Madrazo -- whom they viewed as more
heavy-handed and ruthless. Borrego also noted that low voter
participation would favor the PRI, as a low turnout would
magnify the effect of the party's base of loyal voters (voto
duro) which, although shrinking, is still much larger than
that of the two rival parties. Grinning, he insisted that
Mexico's performance in the soccer World Cup could have an
unpredictable but significant effect on the national mood,
noting that the quarterfinals would be played 1-2 days before
the election.
-----------------------------------
Madrazo Casting Local Leaders Aside
-----------------------------------
¶5. (C) Deputy Benjamin Sagahon Medina, a former teacher and
indigenous leader in San Luis Potosi, told poloff that his
position in the PRI had been tenuous ever since he voted
against the "desafuero" of then Mexico City Mayor Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). In the wake of that vote, he
found himself increasingly frozen out of the party, asserting
that recently, he and some five other dissident deputies were
MEXICO 00000858 002 OF 002
threatened with expulsion. He told poloff that faced with
that possibility, he decided to abandon the PRI and to join
the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). He returned to his
home district two weeks ago and called an open meeting of
supporters to seek their support for his decision. He claims
that the great majority of the approximately 1,400 supporters
who attended the meeting -- including numerous lifelong
PRIistas -- ratified his decision to leave the party and
support AMLO. He predicted that at least five other PRI
deputies would defect in the next few months.
¶6. (C) Deputy Laura Reyes-Retana of Coahuila explained her
recent decision to defect from the PRI quite bluntly, telling
poloff: "I don't like Roberto Madrazo." She criticized his
leadership style as authoritarian, adding that he favored
party elite at the expense of local leaders like herself.
She said that she expected a number of additional defections
from the ranks of PRI deputies, including at least four of
the approximately 20 deputies aligned with Elba Esther
Gordillo. While those who are offered posts in other parties
will announce their defections publicly, those who are not
courted by other parties will leave quietly. She said she
expected the PRI to delay announcing its legislative lists
until after the PRD and PAN finalized theirs, so that
disappointed PRIistas will have less incentive to defect.
-----------------------
An End to Party Loyalty
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Reyes-Retana described Madrazo as a poor leader, who
had contributed to the balkanization of the party. She said
that in the past, loyal PRIistas would support the party's
presidential candidate even at great personal sacrifice.
However, she said Madrazo's ruthless and self-interested
management of the party penalized, rather than rewarded,
those who put party interests ahead of personal interests.
When asked about her own political plans, Reyes-Retana said
she planned to support AMLO, who she described as a
"disaffected PRIista" like herself. She noted that AMLO was
considerably more moderate than the PRD as a whole, for which
she has little enthusiasm. While she expected AMLO to win
the election, she noted that the PRI remained capable of
electoral chicanery.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Comment: Can a Third Place Candidate Afford to Burn Bridges?
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶8. (C) Neither Deputy Sagahon nor Deputy Reyes-Retana were
ever party heavyweights, so taken individually, their
defections hardly represent a major blow to the Madrazo
campaign. Likewise, Senator Borrego's considerable influence
within the national party has been waning for years.
However, strong grass root support has always been a key
element in the PRI's traditional formula for electoral
success. Each of the three undoubtedly commands a
considerable degree of loyalty within their respective
constituencies, and each may well have influence over
thousands of votes. Moreover, we suspect that the dissidence
and defections reflected by these three candidates is being
replicated, albeit quietly, in numerous other legislative
districts across Mexico, and that this phenomenon may
intensify once the party's legislative lists are published.
It is difficult to see how a third place candidate can
possibly gain ground by cavalierly alienating local party
leaders.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
KELLY