

Currently released so far... 12453 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AORC
AMGT
APER
AU
AF
AS
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
AFIN
AR
AE
AJ
ADANA
AEMR
AG
ATRN
ADPM
APECO
AGAO
AMED
AX
AM
AL
ADCO
AA
AECL
AADP
ABUD
AMEX
ACAO
ANET
AODE
ASCH
AY
APEC
AID
AORG
ASEAN
AFSI
AFSN
AINF
AGR
AROC
AO
AMBASSADOR
AFFAIRS
ASIG
ABLD
ASUP
AND
ARM
ARF
AQ
ATFN
AC
ACOA
AORL
ADM
AUC
AGMT
ACABQ
ASEX
AFU
ALOW
AZ
APCS
AVERY
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AER
AN
AIT
AMG
AGRICULTURE
AMCHAMS
ACS
BR
BA
BD
BL
BO
BF
BU
BILAT
BEXP
BRUSSELS
BK
BN
BM
BT
BY
BX
BTIO
BIDEN
BG
BE
BP
BBSR
BC
BTIU
BWC
BB
BH
BMGT
CH
CY
CA
CU
CS
CO
CVIS
CPAS
CMGT
CE
COUNTER
CASC
COUNTRY
CJAN
COUNTERTERRORISM
CG
CI
CD
CIDA
CJUS
CDG
CBSA
CEUDA
CR
CM
CLMT
CAC
CBW
CODEL
COPUOS
CWC
CIC
CW
CBE
CHR
CFED
CT
CONS
CIA
CTM
CDC
CVR
CF
CLINTON
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CACS
CAN
CONDOLEEZZA
CB
CSW
CITT
CARSON
CNARC
CACM
CDB
CARICOM
COM
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CV
CKGR
CBC
CL
CICTE
CIS
ECON
EFIN
ELAB
ETRD
EIND
EC
EINV
EAGR
ENRG
ETTC
EAID
EPET
ELTN
EWWT
EAIR
EFIS
EMIN
EG
EU
ER
EUN
EPA
ENVI
EXTERNAL
ECPS
ENGR
ETRC
ECIN
EN
EI
ELN
ET
EINT
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ES
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EZ
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EFTA
EAIG
EK
EUREM
EURN
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EAP
ENIV
ECONOMY
ESA
EINN
ECONOMIC
EIAR
EXBS
ECA
ECUN
EINDETRD
EUR
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
ENERG
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFIM
ENGY
EAIDS
EINVEFIN
EINVETC
EUMEM
ETRA
ETC
ERNG
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EXIM
ERD
EEPET
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IO
IAHRC
ID
IC
IT
IRAQI
IWC
IN
IL
ISLAMISTS
IV
ICAO
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IPR
ICRC
INTERPOL
IQ
IBET
IMO
INR
ITRA
INTERNAL
ICJ
ICTY
IRS
ILO
INRA
INRO
ISRAELI
IEA
INRB
ITALY
ITU
IBRD
IIP
ILC
INTELSAT
IZPREL
IMF
INMARSAT
IRAJ
IDA
ICTR
IA
IGAD
IF
IDP
ITF
ISRAEL
IEFIN
IRC
IACI
KN
KCRM
KOMC
KNNPMNUC
KIPR
KPAL
KWBG
KSCA
KFRD
KNNP
KUNR
KTIP
KWMN
KSTC
KFLU
KOLY
KISL
KPAO
KMDR
KJUS
KSTH
KDEM
KCOR
KIRF
KAWC
KU
KTFN
KWAC
KNPP
KERG
KSEO
KACT
KHLS
KZ
KGHG
KTIA
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KE
KPKO
KCIP
KDRG
KVPR
KV
KIDE
KICC
KPRP
KBIO
KSUM
KGIT
KCFE
KG
KBTS
KFLO
KMPI
KS
KGIC
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KSEP
KTEX
KFSC
KOCI
KHDP
KPLS
KTDB
KHIV
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KMRS
KOM
KSAF
KRVC
KR
KMOC
KNAR
KIRC
KBCT
KSPR
KFIN
KBTR
KJUST
KNEI
KAWK
KGCC
KMCA
KREL
KMFO
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVRP
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KAID
KVIR
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KRAD
KPRV
KCMR
KPWR
KCHG
KIFR
KCFC
KICA
KPIN
KSCI
KESS
KDEV
KTBT
KCRS
KCGC
KOMS
KRIM
KTER
KREC
KPOA
KWWMN
KRGY
KPAK
KWNM
KMIG
KDDG
KRFD
KWMM
KWMNCS
KX
KRCM
KPAONZ
KNUC
KDEMAF
KNUP
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MCAP
MTCRE
MNUC
MIL
MX
MEDIA
MO
MPOS
MU
ML
MA
MP
MY
MERCOSUR
MG
MD
MW
MK
MAS
MEETINGS
MR
MT
MI
MOPPS
MASC
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MTRE
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
MARAD
MASSMNUC
MEPP
MCC
MZ
MILITARY
MDC
MRCRE
MC
MV
MIK
MUCN
NATO
NL
NZ
NPT
NI
NAFTA
NU
NDP
NIPP
NP
NPA
NG
NRR
NO
NSC
NEW
NE
NH
NR
NA
NS
NSF
NZUS
NATIONAL
NSG
NC
NT
NAR
NK
NGO
NV
NSFO
NSSP
NASA
NW
NPG
NORAD
NATOPREL
OTRA
OAS
OPRC
OIIP
OVIP
OREP
OPDC
OEXC
OSCE
OFFICIALS
OMIG
ODIP
OFDP
OECD
OPIC
OBSP
OPCW
OFDA
OTR
OSAC
OSCI
ON
OCII
OES
OVP
OIC
OPAD
OIE
OHUM
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PK
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PA
PTER
PINR
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PBIO
PO
POL
PE
PARMS
PM
PROG
PL
PAK
POLITICS
PORG
PTBS
PNAT
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PROP
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PAO
PG
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PALESTINIAN
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PSEPC
PREFA
PGOVE
PINF
PHUMPGOV
PNG
PMIL
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
PLN
PSA
PGIV
POLINT
PAS
POGOV
PHUMPREL
PHUMBA
PEL
PGGV
PNR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PRAM
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PF
POV
PROV
PRL
PREO
PAHO
PHUH
PSI
PINL
PU
PRGOV
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
RS
RU
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RO
RW
RCMP
RF
RM
RFE
RSP
RP
RICE
ROBERT
ROOD
RELATIONS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RSO
SU
SNAR
SO
SOCI
SW
SENV
SMIG
SCUL
SP
SZ
SENVKGHG
SR
SY
SA
SYRIA
SF
SI
SC
SWE
SARS
STEINBERG
SN
SG
SIPRS
ST
SEVN
SL
SPCE
SNARIZ
SSA
SNARCS
SYR
SK
SPCVIS
SHUM
SIPDIS
SHI
SH
SOFA
SEN
SNARN
SAARC
SAN
SANC
SCRS
TRGY
TBIO
TU
TF
TERRORISM
TI
TSPL
TPHY
TH
TIP
TSPA
TC
TO
TW
TX
TZ
TNGD
TT
TL
TV
TFIN
TS
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TD
TK
TR
THPY
TP
TAGS
UNGA
UN
UK
US
UNC
UNSC
USUN
UG
UP
UY
USEU
UNESCO
USPS
USTR
UZ
UNHRC
UNO
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNHCR
UNCHR
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
USOAS
UNFICYP
UV
UNEP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDC
UNCHC
UNDP
UNCND
USNC
UNPUOS
UNICEF
UNCSD
UE
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO623, PMDB LEADER RULES OUT ALLIANCE WITH LULA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO623.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06SAOPAULO623 | 2006-06-02 14:02 | 2011-03-05 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo |
VZCZCXRO6287
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0623/01 1531425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021425Z JUN 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5196
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6303
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2962
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7152
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2599
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2275
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1384
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0314
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2828
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0993
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2009
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0315
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0994
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1736
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2450
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000623
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY
STATE PASS EXIMBANK
STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND FPARODI
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWARD USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER NSC FOR CRONIN SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD AID/W FOR LAC/AA SENSITIVE SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR BR
SUBJECT: PMDB LEADER RULES OUT ALLIANCE WITH LULA
REF: (A) SAO PAULO 573 AND PREVIOUS;
(B) SAO PAULO 355;
(C) SAO PAULO 30 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.
------- SUMMARY -------
¶1. (SBU) Former Governor Orestes Quercia, Sao Paulo state chairman of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), will support Senator Pedro Simon if he decides to run for President, but he considers it far more likely the PMDB will run no presidential candidate and will not ally with any party at the national level. He opined that having a PMDB Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket with Lula is "no longer a viable option" because it would prejudice the party in many state races. Quercia said he would likely vote for opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin but did not expect Alckmin to defeat Lula. He had low expectations of a second Lula administration, predicting that the economy will continue its low growth and Brazil will fall farther behind in competitiveness. Quercia has not decided whether to run for Governor of Sao Paulo state or for the Senate; the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) has offered to support him in a run for the Senate, but he doesn't completely trust them to provide full support. In the gubernatorial race, he acknowledged that former Mayor Jose Serra remains a strong favorite, but also noted that things can change very fast in politics. When asked about the recent violence in Sao Paulo state, Quercia pointed to press reports showing that the number of policemen per capita has declined since his term as Governor and said the blame for the rise of the PCC criminal gang rests on former Governors Covas and Alckmin, because "the police force has been weakened." END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------
A PARTY DISUNITED, BUT MUCH IN DEMAND
-------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Poloff and Econpol assistants met May 30 with Sao Paulo state PMDB chairman Orestes Quercia to discuss the upcoming elections. Quercia, who served as Governor from 1987 to 1991, now has a wide variety of business interests. He spoke of his activities exporting high-quality Sao Paulo coffee to U.S. processors, and indicated he might be interested in investing in his own coffee roasting factory in the United States. When the subject turned to politics, Quercia said he had always favored the PMDB's running its own presidential candidate because it was good way to unite the party - "unless the candidate were Garotinho, who creates total disunity" - and was prepared to support Pedro Simon, the 76-year old PMDB Senator from Rio Grande do Sul who recently announced his pre-candidacy. However, he believed that either Simon would ultimately decide not to run or else the party, at its June 29 national convention, would decide - definitively this time, unlike at its "unofficial" May 13 convention - not to run any candidate for President. (NOTE: Per press reports, supporters of a PMDB presidential candidacy plan to hold yet another national convention June 11. Opponents have not decided whether to boycott the meeting to deprive it of a quorum, or to attend it and muster the votes necessary to defeat the initiative. END NOTE.)
¶3. (SBU) Quercia acknowledged that the PMDB is being assiduously courted by both President Lula's Workers' Party (Partido dos
SAO PAULO 00000623 002 OF 004
Trabalhadores - PT) and by the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The party's pro-government faction, led by Senators Renan Calheiros and Jose Sarney, favored an electoral alliance with the PT because it would generate more government jobs, including at Cabinet level, for PMDB members. However, Quercia opined that the PMDB would not accept the Vice-Presidential slot on the ticket or otherwise formally ally with the PT, because, under the "verticalization" rule, this would require the PMDB to ally with the PT in campaigns for Governor and Federal Deputy as well. He dismissed as "PT propaganda" press accounts that Lula was trying to talk to him personally about a possible alliance, though he acknowledged he had spoken with PT Senator (and gubernatorial candidate) Aloizio Mercadante. The PMDB remains essentially a loose confederation of state and regional parties, with viable gubernatorial candidates in as many as fifteen of Brazil's 27 states, and it requires the freedom and flexibility to enter into ad hoc electoral alliances with other parties in many of these states, Quercia explained. For example, he expected populist PMDB Governor Roberto Requiao of Parana state to ally with the PSDB at the state level, even choosing a "tucano" as his running mate, while at the same time supporting Lula's re-election. Some would call it schizophrenia, but it's par for the course for the PMDB. Quercia expects the party to retain its leading role in both houses of Congress. It will again elect about 90 Deputies out of a total of 513, and will have about 20 Senators out of 81; whoever is running the government will need PMDB support in Congress in order to accomplish anything.
¶4. (U) NOTE: The day after our meeting, television news footage showed Quercia and Mercadante meeting with President Lula, reportedly discussing a possible national alliance. Quercia was characterized in the press as interested in the PMDB's providing a running mate, but as still concerned over the impact of such a candidacy on the PMDB's prospects in the various states. According to press reports, Lula plans to push for an alliance with the PMDB "up to the very last minute," or until the PT's June 13 convention, when the party has to decide on its alliances. If he can't convince the PMDB to provide a Vice-Presidential candidate, Lula reportedly will offer the job to Socialist Minister of National Integration Ciro Gomes or Communist President of the Chamber of Deputies Aldo Rebelo. END NOTE.
------------------------------------
ALCKMIN AND LULA: NOT MUCH TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ------------------------------------
¶5. (SBU) Quercia thought the PSDB had made a mistake in nominating Alckmin instead of Serra, and he was highly critical of Alckmin's campaign thus far. Alckmin, in his view, had gone too far in trying to differentiate himself from Lula. His speeches not only aroused no passion, they dampened it. And Alckmin's effort to portray himself as humble and ordinary by taking commercial flights and arriving at airports alone, with no one there to meet him, might make sense on paper, but in reality, "It's anti-marketing. It depresses people." Though he planned to vote for Alckmin himself, Quercia predicted Lula would defeat him. He did not expect much from a second Lula administration, though he said he had voted for Lula in 2002. Lula had followed the same orthodox macro-economic policies as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which stifled growth. Quercia lamented that twenty years ago, Brazil, along with India and China, was the country of the future; while the other countries are now arriving, Brazil remains mired in the past. Furthermore,
SAO PAULO 00000623 003 OF 004
Quercia - himself the target of countless corruption allegations over the years, some of them likely well-founded - believed that Lula's government and the PT, in implementing the "mensalao" bribery scandal, had introduced a new ingredient to the culture of political corruption in Brazil. In short, "probably the most successful initiative of Lula's government has been filling potholes," Quercia grumbled.
---------------------------------
SENATOR OR GOVERNOR? OR NEITHER? ---------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Asked about the PMDB's posture in Sao Paulo state, Quercia began by saying, "I can't tell you what's happening." He confirmed, however, that he has been discussing a possible alliance with PSDB representatives. Given a choice of running for Governor or Senator, Quercia said, he would much rather run for the Senate. But he did not rule out a gubernatorial candidacy. In December, polls had shown him the front-runner among possible gubernatorial candidates, "and I hadn't held any public office in fifteen years." Since then, of course, Jose Serra resigned as Mayor and launched his gubernatorial campaign (ref B), and polls show him winning in the first round against all comers, but "things can change very fast in politics... Serra wants me to stay out of the race because if I run it'll go to a second round, and who knows, I might even beat him." He did not think much of Mercadante's prospects, and thought Sao Paulo former Mayor Marta Suplicy would have been a stronger candidate, but acknowledged that Mercadante's candidacy might boost Lula's vote in the state.
¶7. (U) Quercia's analysis of the current political scene was intermingled with nostalgic reminiscences of his term as Governor, prompting Political Assistant to ask what sort of government program he would propose if he ran again. Investment in education was Quercia's reply. He spoke about schools he had opened and educational programs he had initiated, only to see them shut down by his successors. Asked about the recent wave of violence (ref A) instigated by the criminal gang First Capital Command (PCC), Quercia said blame should be laid at the door of PSDB former Governors Mario Covas and Geraldo Alckmin, whose policies, he claimed, had weakened the police. He was also critical of the overcrowded state prison system, noting that during his four-year term he had built 22 prisons.
¶8. (SBU) In addressing a possible campaign for the Senate, Quercia admitted that incumbent PT Senator Eduardo Suplicy would be difficult to defeat, but noted that the PSDB had offered the support of their alliance if he ran. "I'd do it if I were confident I'd have their full, united support, but...I trust Lembo [Alckmin's successor as Governor, from the Liberal Front Party (PFL)] and Kassab [Serra's successor as Mayor, also from the PFL] and even Serra, but some of the people around Alckmin, especially the ones who date back to the time of [the late Governor Mario] Covas [1994-2001], they never liked me and even if they supported me publicly, I don't think they'd work very hard for me."
------- COMMENT -------
¶9. (SBU) Quercia left office in 1991 amidst allegations of large-scale financial mismanagement and corruption. He ran for
SAO PAULO 00000623 004 OF 004
President in 1994 and finished a dismal and distant fourth, due in part to a lack of strong support from the already divided PMDB. His political career was considered to be over, but although he never returned to public office, he has continued to exercise considerable power within the party, which he served (1991-93) as national president. Current PMDB national president Michel Temer, a Federal Deputy from Sao Paulo (see ref C), reportedly can't do anything in Sao Paulo state (where about 23 percent of the country's voters reside) without Quercia's acquiescence. In our meeting, Quercia came across as relaxed, detached, and somewhat cynical. More than likely, he would prefer not to run for or hold any office, but he is enjoying all the attention and holding out to see which side makes him a better offer, one that will enable him to increase his influence on both the state and national levels. END COMMENT.
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.
MCMULLEN.