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Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON943, GNZ SAYS FIJI TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT IS TAKING NO
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06WELLINGTON943 | 2006-11-29 07:07 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington |
VZCZCXRO1665
OO RUEHMJ RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0943/01 3330714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290714Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4632
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0101
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0622
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0542
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0482
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WELLINGTON 000943
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D (FRITZ), EAP/FO, EUR/RPM, AND EAP/ANP
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISD JESSICA POWERS
PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: ASEC PREL PGOV FJ NZ
SUBJECT: GNZ SAYS FIJI TALKS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT IS TAKING NO
CHANCES
REF: WELLINGTON 938
Classified By: DCM David J. Keegan. Reasons: E.O. 12958, 1.4
(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Fiji Prime Minister Qarase and Commodore
Bainimarama today met for two and a quarter hours at Government
House in Wellington. New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT) characterized the meeting as a "considered and
serious discussion" of Bainimarama's nine demands, with
substantial progress made on each issue discussed. The most
difficult issue was Fiji's domestic legislation. Qarase's
position that due process and constitutionality be followed
clashed with Bainimarama's demands. While the meeting was on
the "upper end" of GNZ expectations going into the meeting, MFAT
remains uncertain about any real outcomes. Deputy Secretary
Alan Williams, who participated in the meeting, said that
Bainimarama privately indicated he would delay any actions until
at least mid-day on December 4 to give Qarase time to show
"signs of earnest movement" The challenge remains for Qarase to
find an adroit way to satisfy the military without exceeding
what his domestic political base will tolerate. PM Qarase
departed New Zealand at 3 p.m. on a Royal New Zealand Air Force
plane. Bainimarama was scheduled to depart at 6:05 on an Air
New Zealand flight.
¶2. (C) MFAT at this stage is making no assumptions that the
meeting will alter the Commodore's plans for a December 4 coup,
and will be working to encourage both sides to show continued
flexibility as PM Qarase and Commodore Bainimarama return to
Suva. In the meantime, MFAT is proceeding to plan for all
contingencies, and has authorized departure for any NZ High
Commission dependents who wish to leave Fiji. End summary.
¶3. (C) Today, Fiji's Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase met with
commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Frank
Bainimarama at Government House. The meeting resulted from the
efforts of New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and Foreign
Minister Winston Peters to advert a coup in Fiji (reftel). The
talks lasted about two and a quarter hours, after which
Bainimarama left to catch his commercial flight back to Suva via
Auckland. PM Qarase left for Fiji via a Royal NZ Air Force
plane.
¶4. (U) In a press release he read to the media a few hours after
the meeting, FM Peters said that the talks had been
"constructive" with a "positive character." He added that New
Zealand hosted the meeting because it recognizes "that resolving
the current situation in Fiji is fundamentally important to its
future, and to the future of the wider Pacific."
¶5. (C) MFAT Deputy Secretary Alan Williams was the fourth
participant in the talks. He told the DCM after Qarase and
Bainimarama had departed that the meeting saw "a really good
substantive, detailed, and serious discussion focused on the
nine Fijian military demands" -- once the ice was broken. He
noted that this had been the first conversation between the two
in nine months, a painful reminder of the depth of their
antagonism. In the days prior to the meeting, both Foreign
Minister Peters and Williams had engaged both leaders in an
intensive series of preparatory discussions by telephone. New
Zealand's first objective in the meeting was to avoid giving
Bainimarama any pretext for walking out in the wake of his
threat the day before to the media to make this a five-minute
meeting. Once the meeting shifted to a substantive discussion,
PM Qarase showed flexibility, while insisting on due process and
constitutionality. Bainimarama was hard-nosed, but substantial
progress was made on each of the issues discussed.
¶6. (C) The most difficult issue was FijiQs domestic legislation,
specifically two laws increasing the control by indigenous
Fijians, in one case over foreshore areas (the "qoliqoli" bill),
and in another over native land titles. Both laws confront the
complex interplay of private and communal ownership in Fijian
law. Bainimarama wants both bills to be struck down. Qarase has
agreed to accelerate a constitutional review of this
legislation, and New Zealand has promised to assist.
WELLINGTON 00000943 002 OF 002
¶7. (C) As the meeting concluded and both leaders prepared to
depart, MFAT arranged for Bainimarama to avoid the media as he
boarded his plane in Wellington and then transferred to a
Fiji-bound flight in Auckland. The objective was to give Qarase
sufficient space to shape the public perception of the meeting
and signal that he is prepared to reach out to the military, the
media, and civil society in ways that will give Bainimarama
reason to conclude that further steps toward a coup are not
warranted.
¶8. (C) Williams said that he had an extensive conversation with
Bainimarama as the two left the meeting and proceeded to the
airport for Bainimarama's flight. The Commodore remains heavily
skeptical of the Fijian government, but said that he is prepared
to test the government by waiting until mid-day on December 4
before deciding whether to proceed with a threatened coup. He
said that he is looking for "signs of earnest movement." The
question, Williams suggested, is whether both sides, but
particularly Qarase, are sufficiently astute, adroit, and
determined to bridge the divide between the two sides.
Recognizing that many of the issues raised by Bainimarama are
valid, Williams says he wonders whether the PM can open a public
dialogue that deals with legal issues and the aftermath of the
2000 coup in ways that persuade many in the military to step
back. Williams confessed he is "less than overconfident" about
whether a coup can be avoided.
¶9. (C) Other MFAT staff commented separately to Emboffs that it
was not an easy meeting, but that outcomes were at the "upper
end of (our) expectations." MFAT is uncertain about whether the
meeting will really achieve anything or how either party will
characterize their exchange. GNZ does not intend to speak
publicly about the substance of the meeting, leaving that to
Qarase and Bainimarama. In the meantime, Foreign Minister
Peters has made it clear to both that he is prepared to reengage
if there is space to do so. Tomorrow, New Zealand will be
talking to Qarase to urge him to move quickly to show that he is
using the window before December 4 to render the question of a
coup moot. But MFAT officials are planning for all
contingencies, and MFAT Consular Affairs informed post that it
has authorized evacuation of any NZ High Commission dependents
who wish to leave Fiji.
¶10. (C) Flying to Auckland en route to Suva for a
previously-scheduled TDY just as the talks were taking place, a
staff member from our Defense Attachi's Office sat next to New
Zealand Defence Minister Phil Goff. Goff was upbeat about the
talks, but said he would not be surprised if they failed. He
said that if a coup did take place, it would most likely be
confined to Suva -- adding that its scope would depend on the
mentality of rioting mobs. Goff expressed concern that a coup
could get out of hand quickly and spread to Nadi and other
places.
McCormick