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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05HELSINKI186, AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT HALONEN
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05HELSINKI186 | 2005-02-14 17:05 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000186
SIPDIS
STATE FOR A/S JONES, DAS CONLEY, EUR/NB, EUR/EX, AND
EUR/PPD; NSC FOR AMB FRIED
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2015
TAGS: PREL XF AF CH IZ RS FI EUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT HALONEN
REF: A. HELSINKI 160
¶B. 04 HELSINKI 1603
¶C. A/S JONES-AMB MACK JANUARY 31 TELECON
Classified By: Ambassador Earle I. Mack for Reasons 1.4(B) and (D)
Summary and Recommendation
--------------------------
¶1. (C) In a meeting over lunch February 11, Finnish President
Tarja Halonen reinforced in person what we have already heard
from her staff: that she would appreciate an opportunity to
meet with the President. Halonen told the Ambassador that
she wants to take a leading role in promoting the normalized
trans-Atlantic relationship described in the Secretary's
Paris address, both now and when Finland holds the EU
presidency (July-December 2006). Halonen feels that too
often the basis for this relationship has been crisis
management or follow-up coordination; in fact, the U.S. and
Europe can and should work together to build a better world
in all phases of life. She would like to discuss with the
President how the United States and Finland together can
advance this objective. Jukka Valtasaari, Finland's
ambassador to the U.S., currently in Helsinki on a regular
visit, reiterated this request and the rationale for it in a
call on the Ambassador February 14. At the same time, he too
referred subtly to the fact that Finland would have the EU
presidency.
¶2. (C) In response to Halonen, the Ambassador welcomed her
support for trans-Atlantic cooperation but said that, given
the President's crowded calendar, it does not appear possible
to schedule a meeting in the foreseeable future. Halonen
asked that the United States keep her request in mind, and
added that she has agreed with PM Matti Vanhanen that he will
defer until 2006 his own request to meet with the President,
so that Halonen's request can take primacy in 2005. (In his
conversation with the Ambassador, Valtasaari underlined that
Halonen's request takes precedence.) In the meantime,
Halonen also asked whether it would be possible for her to
have a moment of the President's time in Brussels just to
introduce him to Vanhanen, whom he has never met.
¶3. (C) The Embassy recommends that the President acknowledge
Halonen and Vanhanen on the margins of the February 22
meeting, so that Vanhanen -- who has not been shy about
describing the importance of the United States to Europe's
security, and who will be president of the Council of the
European Union in 2006 -- can at least say that he has been
introduced to the President. We also believe that a formal
meeting with Halonen later in the year would reap benefits
for the United States. It would be the first bilateral
meeting between the two heads of state since April 2002.
Halonen is a person of stature and credibility in Europe, and
during her presidency there has been an understated but
significant pattern of Finnish government support for the
U.S. -- most prominently in Afghanistan and the Balkans but
also in Iraq. The Finns see the trans-Atlantic relationship
as one of the cornerstones of their foreign policy, and it
will be one of the pillars of their EU presidency. These are
not empty words -- during Finland's last presidency, in 1999,
Turkey gained the status of candidate for EU membership.
Acknowledging this desire for closeness will stand the U.S.
in good stead over the next year in the many areas where we
seek Finnish cooperation. End Summary and Recommendation.
Halonen Requests a Handshake for Vanhanen in Brussels,
--------------------------------------------- ---------
and a Meeting for Herself Later in the Year
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) On February 11, the Ambassador had lunch with
President Halonen, at the latter's invitation. Presidential
advisor Jarmo Viinanen, who will become her chef de cabinet
later this year, also attended. The meeting covered a wide
range of topics, but the one most on Halonen's mind was her
desire to meet with President Bush, for reasons Halonen
explained to the Ambassador. She said that she is still
writing the remarks she will deliver in Brussels February 22,
but that her theme will be the need for close trans-Atlantic
cooperation, not just in times of crisis, but at all times.
Halonen said that too often the United States and Europe have
based their relationship on crisis management, and the
periods leading up to and away from crises. She said that
Secretary Rice was "convincing" in the case the Secretary has
SIPDIS
made for transformational diplomacy, and the opportunity for
nations to join forces in combating global problems. Whether
those problems are related to human rights, HIV/AIDS and
other infectious diseases, or any of the other challenges of
the 21st century, they call for trans-Atlantic cooperation in
response. Halonen would like to play a leading role in
fostering such cooperation, and would appreciate a chance to
meet with the President to discuss what Halonen can do -- now
and next year, when Finland holds the EU presidency -- to
play such a role.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador confirmed that the President and
Secretary have international cooperation very much in mind,
SIPDIS
and noted that the Broader Middle East and North Africa
Initiative is another such area where nations can work
together -- a long-term, multinational commitment to help
meet the aspirations of the people of the BMENA region for
democratic government. The Ambassador told President
Halonen, however, that we do not expect any bilats to be held
on the margins of the President's February 22 meeting in
Brussels. Moreover, President Bush's calendar is very
crowded right now, and we do not believe it will be possible
to schedule a meeting for the foreseeable future. Halonen
accepted this but reiterated that her request stands. She is
also aware that PM Matti Vanhanen had requested a meeting
with the President. In fact, Halonen and Vanhanen had spoken
about this earlier in the day, and had agreed that if
President Bush's schedule is full, Vanhanen will put off his
request until 2006, in favor of Halonen's request for a
meeting sometime in 2005.
¶6. (C) Halonen concluded that she looks forward to seeing the
President in Brussels on the 22nd, and would like to take a
moment of the President's time to introduce him formally to
PM Vanhanen. She made clear that she was not speaking of a
bilat or pull-aside, but a few moments to enable Vanhanen to
at least say that he and President Bush have met. In a
February 14 conversation with the Ambassador, Finnish
Ambassador to the U.S. Valtasaari reiterated to us President
Halonen's interest in both a brief handshake in Brussels and
a later meeting, briefly noting the upcoming Finnish EU
presidency.
Iraq
----
¶7. (C) The Ambassador thanked President Halonen for the
assistance Finland has shown already for reconstruction in
Iraq, through support for the UN protection force, provision
of police instructors to the academy in Jordan, fielding
forensic scientists to survey mass graves, and humanitarian
aid. Now that the people of Iraq have shown the courage and
commitment to exercise their right to vote, he said, it is
essential that the international community step up its
efforts, in order to assist the new government in developing
the political institutions necessary to make democracy work.
For example, the Ambassador noted, Finland could join in the
NATO Training Mission in Iraq or other support and/or
multilateral funding. He pointed out that in the long run,
if a nation cannot take responsibility for its own security,
it cannot hope to preserve democracy. The Finns could also
contribute to strengthening newly-formed Iraqi political
institutions, and/or provide support for the political
process that will lead to a new constitution and future
elections.
¶8. (C) Halonen said she was happy to see how well the January
30 voting had gone. It would be difficult to gain Finnish
public support for stationing troops and/or civilian experts
within Iraq itself, she said, but she would like to work out
a "complementary system" that would enable Finland to do its
share in contributing more to Iraqi reconstruction. Doing so
would not only help the people of Iraq, but help the U.S. and
EU "rebuild confidence in each other." She and the
Ambassador agreed that the DCM would consult with Viinanen in
more detail about steps Finland could take. The Ambassador
commented that disagreements over Operation Iraqi Freedom are
history, "and history is in the past, the further in the past
the better." Halonen seconded the thought.
Afghanistan
-----------
¶9. (C) The Ambassador, noting Finland's long-term commitment
to reconstruction in Afghanistan (Ref A), asked whether the
Finns could increase their support -- by, for example,
contributing to a second Provincial Reconstruction Team.
Halonen said this is worth considering, but made no
commitments.
Middle East
-----------
¶10. (C) President Halonen said that assisting the
Israeli/Palestinian search for peace is a very high priority
for the EU, and that Finland strongly supports the common
U.S./EU effort. The Ambassador reviewed recent steps taken
by the United States, including the appointment of Lieutenant
General Ward as security coordinator, and asked Finland to
consider what role the Finns could play on a national basis.
Halonen agreed to review this, but also urged that the U.S.
keep the EU thoroughly engaged.
EU China Arms Embargo
---------------------
¶11. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that the GoF considers
the EU's Code of Conduct a more useful instrument in
controlling the types of technology transfers the Chinese are
most apt to want (Ref A). But not all governments are as
conscientious as Finland's. Lifting the embargo now would
send the wrong signal at the wrong time and could cause
serious trans-Atlantic repercussions. Halonen said she has
not been active in this discussion, and Finland's policy will
be consistent with EU decisions, but it seemed to her that
China's record on human rights is not as bad as that of some
other nations. The Ambassador, aware of Halonen's reputation
as a human rights activist, said, "In your heart, you know
lifting the embargo is the wrong thing to do." Halonen did
take this thought on board, smiled and nodded, but also
advised that U.S. efforts concentrate on France, which she
felt was out in front of all other EU nations in advocating
the lifting of the embargo.
Finland, the EU, and NATO
-------------------------
¶12. (C) Halonen has questioned publicly the wisdom of the
GoF's plan to expand Finland's peacekeeping law to allow
troops to be deployed on the basis of an EU mandate. (At
present only a UN or an OSCE mandate will suffice.) In her
conversation with the Ambassador she did not refer to the
mandate issue, but did assure us that EU defense cooperation
will not compete with or undercut NATO. The EU's rapid
reaction force will be for crisis management only, she said,
whereas broader questions of defense and security properly
belong to the North Atlantic Alliance. The Ambassador said
the U.S. appreciates that assurance, and also appreciates
Finnish and Swedish leadership within the Partnership for
Peace.
Russia
------
¶13. (C) Ref B reports on President Halonen's December meeting
with President Putin. She told the Ambassador that Putin is
a "northern man" -- referring to his St. Petersburg
background -- who hand-picked the governor. This gives the
Finns greater access and increases Finland's chances of
playing a leading role in developing EU/Russian relations.
She acknowledged that Putin has shortcomings, and expressed
misgivings about his apparent attempts to centralize power.
Nevertheless, she said, he clearly feels that Russia is a
part of Europe, and therefore it is in the EU's interest to
get along with him. Finland hopes that by 2010 Russia will
once again be the largest importer of Finnish products. The
Finns also would like to increase their investment in Russia,
but need more reassurance of economic and political stability
than they have at present.
¶14. (C) The Ambassador noted press reports that in January
Russian Trade Minister German Gref had telephoned Paula
Lehtomaki, his Finnish opposite number, to ask the GoF to
restrain Finnish press reporting on allegations that the
Russian trade mission in Helsinki had loaned some of the
apartments it owns to a prostitution ring. Halonen laughed,
and opined that opening a window to the West is the best way
to let democracy seep into Russia. (Note: MFA Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Lyra confirmed to us recently
SIPDIS
that the Gref-Lehtomaki conversation did take place. He said
that distribution of the memcon had been very limited, "but
obviously someone couldn't resist" leaking the juicy story.)
MACK