

Currently released so far... 12453 / 251,287
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
ASEC
AORC
AMGT
APER
AU
AF
AS
ACBAQ
AFGHANISTAN
AFIN
AR
AE
AJ
ADANA
AEMR
AG
ATRN
ADPM
APECO
AGAO
AMED
AX
AM
AL
ADCO
AA
AECL
AADP
ABUD
AMEX
ACAO
ANET
AODE
ASCH
AY
APEC
AID
AORG
ASEAN
AFSI
AFSN
AINF
AGR
AROC
AO
AMBASSADOR
AFFAIRS
ASIG
ABLD
ASUP
AND
ARM
ARF
AQ
ATFN
AC
ACOA
AORL
ADM
AUC
AGMT
ACABQ
ASEX
AFU
ALOW
AZ
APCS
AVERY
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AER
AN
AIT
AMG
AGRICULTURE
AMCHAMS
ACS
BR
BA
BD
BL
BO
BF
BU
BILAT
BEXP
BRUSSELS
BK
BN
BM
BT
BY
BX
BTIO
BIDEN
BG
BE
BP
BBSR
BC
BTIU
BWC
BB
BH
BMGT
CH
CY
CA
CU
CS
CO
CVIS
CPAS
CMGT
CE
COUNTER
CASC
COUNTRY
CJAN
COUNTERTERRORISM
CG
CI
CD
CIDA
CJUS
CDG
CBSA
CEUDA
CR
CM
CLMT
CAC
CBW
CODEL
COPUOS
CWC
CIC
CW
CBE
CHR
CFED
CT
CONS
CIA
CTM
CDC
CVR
CF
CLINTON
CITEL
CLEARANCE
COE
CN
CACS
CAN
CONDOLEEZZA
CB
CSW
CITT
CARSON
CNARC
CACM
CDB
CARICOM
COM
CROS
CAPC
CTR
CV
CKGR
CBC
CL
CICTE
CIS
ECON
EFIN
ELAB
ETRD
EIND
EC
EINV
EAGR
ENRG
ETTC
EAID
EPET
ELTN
EWWT
EAIR
EFIS
EMIN
EG
EU
ER
EUN
EPA
ENVI
EXTERNAL
ECPS
ENGR
ETRC
ECIN
EN
EI
ELN
ET
EINT
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ES
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EZ
ETRO
EDU
ETRN
EFTA
EAIG
EK
EUREM
EURN
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ENVR
ELECTIONS
EAP
ENIV
ECONOMY
ESA
EINN
ECONOMIC
EIAR
EXBS
ECA
ECUN
EINDETRD
EUR
EREL
EUC
ESENV
ECONEFIN
ECIP
ENERG
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFIM
ENGY
EAIDS
EINVEFIN
EINVETC
EUMEM
ETRA
ETC
ERNG
ETRDECONWTOCS
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EXIM
ERD
EEPET
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IO
IAHRC
ID
IC
IT
IRAQI
IWC
IN
IL
ISLAMISTS
IV
ICAO
INDO
ITPHUM
ITPGOV
ITALIAN
IPR
ICRC
INTERPOL
IQ
IBET
IMO
INR
ITRA
INTERNAL
ICJ
ICTY
IRS
ILO
INRA
INRO
ISRAELI
IEA
INRB
ITALY
ITU
IBRD
IIP
ILC
INTELSAT
IZPREL
IMF
INMARSAT
IRAJ
IDA
ICTR
IA
IGAD
IF
IDP
ITF
ISRAEL
IEFIN
IRC
IACI
KN
KCRM
KOMC
KNNPMNUC
KIPR
KPAL
KWBG
KSCA
KFRD
KNNP
KUNR
KTIP
KWMN
KSTC
KFLU
KOLY
KISL
KPAO
KMDR
KJUS
KSTH
KDEM
KCOR
KIRF
KAWC
KU
KTFN
KWAC
KNPP
KERG
KSEO
KACT
KHLS
KZ
KGHG
KTIA
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCRCM
KE
KPKO
KCIP
KDRG
KVPR
KV
KIDE
KICC
KPRP
KBIO
KSUM
KGIT
KCFE
KG
KBTS
KFLO
KMPI
KS
KGIC
KPAI
KHSA
KTLA
KSEP
KTEX
KFSC
KOCI
KHDP
KPLS
KTDB
KHIV
KCSY
KSAC
KTRD
KID
KMRS
KOM
KSAF
KRVC
KR
KMOC
KNAR
KIRC
KBCT
KSPR
KFIN
KBTR
KJUST
KNEI
KAWK
KGCC
KMCA
KREL
KMFO
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KFTFN
KVRP
KCOM
KO
KLIG
KAID
KVIR
KNSD
KHUM
KSEC
KRAD
KPRV
KCMR
KPWR
KCHG
KIFR
KCFC
KICA
KPIN
KSCI
KESS
KDEV
KTBT
KCRS
KCGC
KOMS
KRIM
KTER
KREC
KPOA
KWWMN
KRGY
KPAK
KWNM
KMIG
KDDG
KRFD
KWMM
KWMNCS
KX
KRCM
KPAONZ
KNUC
KDEMAF
KNUP
MARR
MOPS
MASS
MCAP
MTCRE
MNUC
MIL
MX
MEDIA
MO
MPOS
MU
ML
MA
MP
MY
MERCOSUR
MG
MD
MW
MK
MAS
MEETINGS
MR
MT
MI
MOPPS
MASC
MTS
MLS
MILI
MAR
MTRE
MEPN
MAPP
MTCR
MEPI
MQADHAFI
MAPS
MARAD
MASSMNUC
MEPP
MCC
MZ
MILITARY
MDC
MRCRE
MC
MV
MIK
MUCN
NATO
NL
NZ
NPT
NI
NAFTA
NU
NDP
NIPP
NP
NPA
NG
NRR
NO
NSC
NEW
NE
NH
NR
NA
NS
NSF
NZUS
NATIONAL
NSG
NC
NT
NAR
NK
NGO
NV
NSFO
NSSP
NASA
NW
NPG
NORAD
NATOPREL
OTRA
OAS
OPRC
OIIP
OVIP
OREP
OPDC
OEXC
OSCE
OFFICIALS
OMIG
ODIP
OFDP
OECD
OPIC
OBSP
OPCW
OFDA
OTR
OSAC
OSCI
ON
OCII
OES
OVP
OIC
OPAD
OIE
OHUM
OCS
PREL
PGOV
PK
PHUM
PINS
PARM
PA
PTER
PINR
PREF
PHSA
PBTS
PBIO
PO
POL
PE
PARMS
PM
PROG
PL
PAK
POLITICS
PORG
PTBS
PNAT
PUNE
POLICY
PDOV
PCI
PROP
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PP
PS
PAO
PG
PY
PTERE
PGOF
PALESTINIAN
PKFK
PSOE
PEPR
PPA
PINT
PMAR
PRELP
PSEPC
PREFA
PGOVE
PINF
PHUMPGOV
PNG
PMIL
PGOC
PFOR
PCUL
PLN
PSA
PGIV
POLINT
PAS
POGOV
PHUMPREL
PHUMBA
PEL
PGGV
PNR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PGOVLO
PRAM
PHUS
PDEM
PECON
PF
POV
PROV
PRL
PREO
PAHO
PHUH
PSI
PINL
PU
PRGOV
PAIGH
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POSTS
RS
RU
REACTION
REPORT
REGION
RIGHTS
RO
RW
RCMP
RF
RM
RFE
RSP
RP
RICE
ROBERT
ROOD
RELATIONS
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RUPREL
RSO
SU
SNAR
SO
SOCI
SW
SENV
SMIG
SCUL
SP
SZ
SENVKGHG
SR
SY
SA
SYRIA
SF
SI
SC
SWE
SARS
STEINBERG
SN
SG
SIPRS
ST
SEVN
SL
SPCE
SNARIZ
SSA
SNARCS
SYR
SK
SPCVIS
SHUM
SIPDIS
SHI
SH
SOFA
SEN
SNARN
SAARC
SAN
SANC
SCRS
TRGY
TBIO
TU
TF
TERRORISM
TI
TSPL
TPHY
TH
TIP
TSPA
TC
TO
TW
TX
TZ
TNGD
TT
TL
TV
TFIN
TS
TRSY
TINT
TN
TURKEY
TBID
TD
TK
TR
THPY
TP
TAGS
UNGA
UN
UK
US
UNC
UNSC
USUN
UG
UP
UY
USEU
UNESCO
USPS
USTR
UZ
UNHRC
UNO
UNMIK
UNAUS
UNHCR
UNCHR
USAID
UNVIE
UAE
USOAS
UNFICYP
UV
UNEP
UNODC
UNCHS
UNIDROIT
UNDESCO
UNDC
UNCHC
UNDP
UNCND
USNC
UNPUOS
UNICEF
UNCSD
UE
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09TRIPOLI924, LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS' HIGH WIRE ACT? REF: A) TRIPOLI 883; B) TRIPOLI 685; C) TRIPOLI 212; D) 08 TRIPOLI 699; E) TRIP OLI 487; F) 08 TRIPOLI 870; G) STATE 43049; H) TRIPOLI 661; I) TRIPOLI 208; J) TRIPOLI 899
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TRIPOLI924.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09TRIPOLI924 | 2009-11-19 15:03 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
VZCZCXRO5186
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0924/01 3231552
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 191552Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5487
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6036
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000924
NOFORN SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS' HIGH WIRE ACT? REF: A) TRIPOLI 883; B) TRIPOLI 685; C) TRIPOLI 212; D) 08 TRIPOLI 699; E) TRIP OLI 487; F) 08 TRIPOLI 870; G) STATE 43049; H) TRIPOLI 661; I) TRIPOLI 208; J) TRIPOLI 899
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(S/NF) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent appointment of his son Saif al-Islam as "General Coordinator" and attendant indications of a succession plan have stirred up old rumors of rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne, Saif al-Islam and his brother, National Security Advisor, Mutassim al-Qadhafi. Saif al-Islam's return from a 12-month self-imposed absence from Libyan politics and his recent new appointment clearly indicate that his star is on the rise in the constellation of Libyan succession contenders. Qadhafi pere was reportedly disappointed in Mutassim's management of September 1 Revolution Day anniversary events and his late September travel to UNGA. Nevertheless, Mutassim's continued engagement on the U.S. file and continuing efforts to coordinate a meeting between his father and POTUS -- demonstrate that he may see this portfolio as his ticket to continue playing in the succession game (Ref A). Contacts assert that Saif al-Islam may be the "face of reform," due to his high-profile, public status, and the current favorite to succeed his father, but that Mutassim should not be counted out of the succession game, particularly given his backing by conservatives in the regime, such as PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and his rumored ability as National Security Advisor to access significant military and security elements, including brother Khamis's elite 32nd Brigade force. End Summary.
SAIF'S RETURN FROM THE COLD
2.(S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's October 6 speech to Revolutionary Committee members in Sebha marked the peak of a remarkably resurgent six weeks for Saif al-Islam, which began with the latter's high-profile return to Libya on August 20 with convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (Ref B). Saif has also recently begun to re-engage international media, with profiles in two CNN feature reports on his efforts to "rehabilitate" former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members (septel). He has also been involved in attempting to settle the ongoing contretemps between the GOL and Canada (septel). Saif's reentry onto the public scene signaled the end of his August 2008 self-announced retreat from politics, and comes after some significant setbacks for him over the past year at the hands of regime conservatives. In March, the draft constitution (a Saif-initiative that was to include a position for him as head of a 100-member council of deputies) was dropped from the agenda of the annual General People's Congress (Ref C). During the same meeting, the Congress installed or kept ministers historically opposed to Saif's reform agenda, such as PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (who kept his position after Muammar al-Qadhafi publicly called him a corrupt thief just six months earlier) (Ref D). Late April witnessed the sudden nationalization of Saif's quasi-independent media company, which included the take over of his al-Libia satellite channel mid-broadcast by the state-run Jamahiriya News Agency (Ref E) on reported grounds that Saif was overreaching in expanding media freedom.
3.(S/NF) Saif's slide was juxtaposed with younger brother Mutassim's rise, with the latter completing a state visit to Russia in October 2008 (Ref F), meeting the Secretary of State in Washington in March 2009 (Ref G), accompanying Qadhafi on the historic visit to Italy in June, welcoming CODEL McCain in August (Ref H) , and accompanying his father to New York for the UN General Assembly. Mutassim was very visible at his father's side throughout these high level visits. Additionally, Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's ability to maintain the PM-equivalent position proved to be positive for Mutassim, who is reportedly close to the conservative PM and, in the past, has orchestrated reactions against Saif's interests through the PM's office (Ref I). Regime insiders also tell us that Mutassim remains the only one who can actually challenge his father.
WHAT SAIF'S RETURN MEANS FOR MUTASSIM
4.(S/NF) As Saif's star rises again, local observers are turning their eyes toward Mutassim for a reaction. Mutassim has time and time again evinced his aversion to the spotlight via media encounters or public events. Evidence of the elder Qadhafi's disappointment in Mutassim's management of September 1 Revolution Day anniversary events, as well as specific missteps in New York (i.e., Mutassim's inability to get necessary permissions for a tent to be pitched for the Libyan leader) have surfaced (Ref A). Saif is rumored to have trumped Mutassim during a recent order for all expatriate residents of the National Oil Company housing compound to vacate their houses. The residents report that while Mutassim originally gave the TRIPOLI 00000924 002 OF 002 order for everyone to move immediately, Saif intervened to block the demand in order to give the occupants more time to pack up and move. [Note: The reason for the demolition of the housing compound is rumored to be to clear a way for Aisha al-Qadhafi (known to have disagreements with Saif) to build a home adjacent to a park near the location. End note.]
5.(S/NF) Simultaneous with Saif's apparent ascendancy, Mutassim has moved in an uncharacteristically quick manner to reengage on the U.S. file. On November 8, he approved the 505 agreement, which had previously languished in his office for nearly six months (Ref J). A few days before, on November 5, he personally engaged the Ambassador on the treatment of Libyan ships at U.S. ports and Libyan diplomtas by U.S. border authorities. Additionally, Mutassim renewed his desire to coordinate a meeting between the Libyan leader and POTUS (Ref A). According to the Egyptian Embassy here, Mutassim was also expected to meet Egypt's Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman during a November visit to Tripoli (septel), and his staff advised us that he will meet the Turkish PM during the latter's historic upcoming visit.
THE SUCCESSION QUESTION - WILL IT BE SAIF OR MUTASSIM?
6.(S/NF) Contacts suggest that although Mutassim is not as skilled in public relations as his older brother Saif, he wields significant power from behind the scenes. As National Security Advisor (NSA), Mutassim directs at least some of Libya's national security policy decisions, including purchases of equipment, and he reportedly plays on issues regarding the military purse. Contacts also report that younger brother Khamis al-Qadhafi, Commander of the 32nd "Khamis" Brigade (widely known to be the most well-trained and well-equipped force in the Libyan military), is closer to Mutassim than to Saif. [Note: At least one contact has commented that Khamis could come out as a dark horse in the succession race. End note.] Mutassim's role as NSA and his reported closeness to Khamis would give Mutassim access to some of the most important military and security elements of the regime. Nevertheless, the ultimate authority over the regime's security apparatus remains in question. Independent website Libya al-Youm reported November 4 that the Minister-equivalent of Defense, Major General Abu Baker Younis Jaber, recently called on his officers to swear allegiance to Saif in his new post, making it unclear whether the military establishment will report to Mutassim or Saif -- or both -- in the future. [Note: Muammar al-Qadhafi reportedly mediated a conflict between Mutassim and Younis Jaber earlier this year involving their respective roles in military procurement. (Ref I). End Note.]
COMMENT
7.(S/NF) As Libya undergoes this latest round of Qadhafi's political restructuring, without a constitution or clarified succession plan, burgeoning sibling rivalry among Qadhafi's progeny is near inevitable. Qadhafi has placed his sons (daughter Aisha is considered by some shrewder and smarter than her brothers but does not seem to be playing a visible role in the succession struggle) on a succession high wire act, perpetually thrown off balance, in what might be a calculated effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to precisely gauge Mutassim's depth of ambition for the leadership role since those around him do not freely engage on the topic. The rivalry is likely to play out publicly over the next few months in a continued realignment of political and business interests, as reformists ("Saif backers") and conservatives ("Mutassim backers") continue to vie for the elder Qadhafi's attention. Mutassim appears to believe that progress in the U.S. relationship could prove key to keeping him in the game if he does indeed aspire to play a crucial role in the post-Leader era. Whichever of the Qadhafi children wins the "prize," there is a high level of anxiety among our Libyan contacts, given the potential for chaos in the absence of the traditionally "guiding hand" of the Leader and given the absence of viable state institutions to insure stability. They see a best possible outcome as a division of the spoils, with Saif handling the domestic side of the house and Mutassim handling the security and possible foreign relations part. A second possibility is a "trinity," whereby Saif would be the political face of the regime, Mutassim the national security face, and Khamis the military/security face. End Comm. CRETZ