

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ROME558, G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ROME558.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME558 | 2009-05-20 08:08 | 2011-03-18 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO9669
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRO #0558/01 1400819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200819Z MAY 09 ZFD
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2090
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4560
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3631
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0043
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3820
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4822
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000558
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR ENERGY SECRETARY CHU
DOE ALSO FOR A/S DAVID SANDALOW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: ENRG EPET OVIP PREL IR RU IT
SUBJECT: G8 ENERGY MINISTERIAL: SCENESETTE...
Classified By: CHARGE ELIZABETH DIBBLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Your 23-25 May visit to Rome will provide
opportunities to interact with senior Italian officials on
priority USG energy issues. On European energy security,
Italy's very close relationship with Russia often causes it
to resist efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy
sources. We hope you can urge a broader reevaluation of
energy sources and technologies. In particular, Italy's
decision to return to nuclear power will -- if carried out --
reduce this dependence; you should raise worrisome
indications that U.S. firms will be unfairly denied the
opportunity to participate in this multi-billion dollar
project. Italy is a laggard in the EU on the use of
renewable energy, but its market may grow the most in the
near future. You can support the use of U.S. technology in
this area. Italy's parastatal energy company Eni is active
in Iran and wants to expand its operation in that country;
the USG is strongly opposed to this expansion of ""business as
usual"" at a time when Iran is continuing its own nuclear
program in defiance of UN and IAEA requirements that it
sustpend enrichment activities.
¶2. (C/NF) Because of the strong influence of organized
crime, Italian seaports are vulnerable to use for the
shipment of illicit nuclear materials. DOE's Megaports
program could significantly reduce this threat, but at least
two USG efforts to launch Megaports in Italy have faltered
owing to Italian red tape. We would like to make another big
push on this high USG priority, and your intervention could
be critical in getting high-level Italian support for this
effort. End Summary.
INTERACTION WITH ITALIAN POLICY MAKERS
-------------------------------------
¶3. (C/NF) During the 23-25 May 2009 G8 Energy Ministerial
in Rome, you will have at least one bilateral meeting with
Claudio Scajola, the Italian cabinet minister with
responsibility for energy affairs. This meeting, and other
potential side meetings with Italian officials during the
Ministerial are key opportunities to press a number of top
USG energy concerns with the Berlusconi government.
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY
-----------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's close personal
ties with Vladimir Putin and the very strong corporate ties
between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom
often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce
Europe's dependence on Russian energy. That dependence has
been reflected in Italian policy vis--vis Russia. The
Italian government has been overtly apologetic for Russian
power projection in its so-called Near Abroad - notably
against Georgia last August. Italy opposes further expansion
of NATO, and, finally, Italy's energy policy too often
reflects Russian, rather than European, priorities. For
example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about
the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while ENI is poised to
help GAZPROM construct Black Sea and Baltic Sea pipelines
that will deepen EU's dependence on Russia. ENI, 30 percent
owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy
policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU
energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some
steps in the right direction: the Turkey-Greece-Italy
pipeline project could bring Europe gas from the Caspian, and
Liquid Natural Gas projects promise further diversification.
It would be helpful if you could raise with Italian officials
long-standing USG concerns about European energy security,
emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around
Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity
of energy sources, routes and technologies.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
--------------
¶5. (C) Minister Scajola announced in May 2008 that Italy
would pursue the start of construction of new nuclear power
ROME 00000558 002.4 OF 003
plants by the end of the current legislature (2013). The
uncertain cost of fossil fuels, the need to meet emission
targets, and a desire for greater energy security appear to
be the motives behind this return to nuclear power (Note:
Italy's previous nuclear power plants were decommissioned
after the Chernobyl accident led to a series of three
referenda in 1987 that had the practical effect of banning
nuclear power generation. End Note) Solid government
majorities in both chambers of parliament should facilitate
the passage of legislation to address the issues of nuclear
waste and plant siting. These issues, however, are likely to
remain thorny problems for the GOI. U.S.-based companies
Westinghouse and GE are interested in selling their nuclear
power plant technology to Italy, but they face stiff
competition from foreign rivals whose governments are heavily
lobbying the GOI. For example, intense French pressure,
possibly involving corrupt payments to GOI officials, led the
way for the February agreement by Italian and French
electricity parastatals ENEL and EdF to form a 50-50
consortium to build nuclear power plants in Italy and
elsewhere. The agreement foresees the construction of four
French Areva design nuclear plants in Italy by 2020 and,
more disturbingly for U.S. firms, may establish French
nuclear technology as the standard for Italy's return to
nuclear power. The GOI has assured us that GE and
Westinghouse can still compete for nuclear business, as Italy
intends to build up to 10 plants as part of its energy
security plan. Post continues to work for a level-playing
field for U.S. companies (see ref A). You could usefully
underline to Italian officials that we expect U.S. firms to
be given a fair opportunity to bid for contracts in Italy's
nuclear power program. You might also note that Italian
behavior since February has produced the impression that
other bidders -- including U.S. firms -- ""need not apply.""
LIMITED BUT GROWING USE OF RENEWABLES
-----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Although Italy has some of the most generous
subsidies for renewable energy in Europe, more solar energy
is produced in gloomy Germany than in sunny Italy. Experts
attribute this to NIMBYism and difficulties in dealing with
Italian bureaucracy, noting that the premium that Italians
pay for renewable energy subsidies compared to Germans can
even be considered a quantitative measure of the cost of
Italian red tape. That said, Italy is now attracting
attention as a growing renewables market, as Germany and
Spain rein in their subsidies, and Italy's remain in place$wQz!4k2Q)CQgIQj'Qthe Laboratory to the Market.""
TRYING AGAIN ON DOE's MEGAPORTS
----------------------------
¶7. (C) With seaports, particularly those in southern Italy
under the influence of organized crime, it is especially
important that Italy be included in DOE's Megaports project.
Italian ports send large numbers of containers to the United
States, and some Italian ports are major transhipment
centers. In 2007 about 3 million containers were shipped
from or through Gioia Tauro, probably the port of most
concern owing to organized crime influence. Among these were
40,000 shipments to the U.S. (See Reftels C and D.)
Megaports would provide a critically important safeguard that
might prevent the shipment to the United States of nuclear
materials by terrorists. The USG has tried twice before to
launch Megaports in Italy -- on both occasions our efforts
were thwarted by the Italian bureaucracy. The GOI showed
little enthusiasm for the project, and consistently failed to
name a senior ""point person"" for implementation. As a
result, Megaports-Italy was crushed by Italian interagency
squabbling and red tape. We
are set to make another major push on this critical USG
priority. In order to avoid the pitfalls that killed our
ROME 00000558 003.10 OF 003
earlier efforts, we are seeking early, high-level GOI buy-in.
We want the GOI, at very senior level, to commit to
Megaports implementation, and to formally designate an
Italian cabinet minister who will be responsible for
implementation.
¶8. (C) Your meeting with Minister Scajola represents an
important opportunity to move Megaports forward in Italy.
Scajola is one of the GOI's most powerful Ministers, and is
considered personally close to Prime Minister Berlusconi. We
recommend that you tell Minister Scajola that nuclear
materials security is a top priority of the Obama
administration, and that Megaports represents an important
opportunity for Italy to do something tangible in support of
President Obama's efforts to protect the world from nuclear
terrorism. You may also wish to point out that Megaports
will help Italian ports meet the requirement for 100 percent
radiation screening (by 2012) of all U.S.-bound containers;
without Megaports, Italian ports could lose business to
competing European ports that are currently implementing
Megaports. For the Berlusconi government to take this issue
seriously, key Italian officials must hear this directly from
Washington, particularly from yourself.
IRAN
----
¶9. (C) You should be aware that Italian parastatal energy
company Eni is active in Iran, and is currently considering
an expansion of its operations in that country. On May 18,
Eni officials broached the possibility of this expansion with
USG officials in Washington and were told that the USG
strongly opposes any such expansion.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKDROP
----------------------------
¶10. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi continues to enjoy
record popularity numbers; he possesses a commanding
parliamentary majority that gives him a degree of political
security unprecedented in post-war Italy. Berlusconi's
standing has been bolstered by positive public perceptions of
his response to the devastating April 2009 earthquake in the
Abruzzo region. We expect him to stay in power at least
until the next scheduled national election in 2013.
¶11. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices
allowed Italy's banks to avoid the global financial sector
melt down. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime
lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so
much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not
been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that
has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth
rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis --
has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its
export markets and falling domestic demand. Unemployment is
expected to exceed 8 percent this year and to rise further in
¶2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off
sharply. Moreover, according to the IMF, an already large
government debt is expected to hit 121 percent of GDP this
year. Both factors reduce the government's ability to
provide for stimulus measures.
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (C) On a variety of important issues, your interactions
with Italian officials provide an opportunity to advance
important U.S. interests. Because Megaports is a DOE
project, it is especially important for you to ask Minister
Scajola for GOI support. Absent such a request it will be
very difficult for Embassy Rome to push Megaports forward in
Italy. It is also very important for you to remind the GOI
that we expect U.S. firms to be given a fair opportunity to
bid on nuclear power projects in Italy, given what we have
seen to date on the selection process.
DIBBLE