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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1077, A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN'S MEETING WITH
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NAIROBI1077 | 2009-06-02 13:01 | 2011-03-07 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #1077/01 1531322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY CHANGED SUB AD07127BA MSI5903 580)
P 021322Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9670
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001077
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGED SUBJECT LINE)
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2039
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR KE
SUBJECT: A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN'S MEETING WITH
MINISTER FOR HIGHER ED SALLY KOSGEI
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (A/S)
Johnnie Carson and National Security Council (NSC) Senior
Director for Africa Michelle Gavin, and the Ambassador met on
May 12 with Minister for Higher Education, Science and
Technology Sally Kosgei. In a wide ranging conversation that
focused on current political personalities and their
aspirations, Kosgei confirmed that Kenya,s leaders are as a
whole unwilling or unable to advance real reforms. Sustained,
broad public pressure will be required to move leaders beyond
their narrow political interests to serving the needs of the
country. END SUMMARY.
-------------------
KARUA,S RESIGNATION
-------------------
¶2. (C) Concluding a long day of bilateral meetings, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs (A/S) Johnnie Carson and
National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Africa
Michelle Gavin dined at the Ambassador,s residence with
Minister for Higher Education, Science and Technology Sally
Kosgei. Kosgei opened the conversation by reflecting on the
recent resignation of Martha Karua as Minister for Justice
and Constitutional Affairs. &Karua is a good woman, and an
ally for reform,8 Kosgei remarked, but she &fell into the
trap of believing that Kibaki actually seeks to reform the
judicial sector.8 Frustrated in her ambitions for reform,
Karua chose to resign, a move that Kosgei regards as
unfortunate. Kosgei noted that Karua,s replacement as
Justice Minister, Mutula Kilonzo, used to be the personal
lawyer to former President Moi. &Kilonzo is a windbag and
not strong enough to take on the vested interests8 of the
current regime, Kosgei observed, but she expressed the hope
that he would undertake at least minimal reforms of the
judiciary.
------------------------------------
PRESIDENT AND PM INCAPABLE OF ACTION
------------------------------------
¶3. (C)Following A/S Carson,s observation that Prime Minister
Odinga appears to be shifting the blame for the slow pace of
reforms to the President,s PNU party, Kosgei reflected that
the two principles have no difficulty reaching agreement on
issues but for different reasons are each incapable of
advancing reforms. She noted from her own experience in
cabinet meetings that &the two principles are in a mutual
admiration club(in cabinet they always agree. In fact they
should meet more often because they can reach agreement
together.8
¶4. (C) Concerning the President, Kosgei noted that Kibaki
agrees to reforms in principle but is beholden to the corrupt
interests of his inner circle. Agreeing that the head of the
Civil Service Francis Muthaura has accumulated inordinate
control over government functions, Kosgei stated that
Muthaura, Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, and
Minister for Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula are all close
advisors of the President.
¶5. (C)Regarding the Prime Minister, Kosgei believes that
Odinga truly wants to achieve the reform agenda but does not
have the organizational discipline to do so. &Raila has no
office structure, no discipline in his life or schedule,8
Kosgei commented, and quoted former advisor Salim Lone as
observing that Odinga has made it this far in politics by the
force of his personality without having to demonstrate
managerial acumen. Though Odinga,s advisors are well
intentioned, most don,t have government experience and he
tends to surround himself with fellow ethnic Luos, Kosgei
observed. Odinga is unwilling to sack corrupt deputies, and
is overly focused on protocol issues and ODM inclusion in
appointment decisions such that it distracts his attention
from the broader reform agenda. Though Kosgei and other
ministers have access to Odinga, he often agrees to meet late
at night when he is tired and unfocused. Close advisors to
Odinga include the ODM whip Jakowo Midiwo, Agriculture
Minister William Ruto, several members of Odinga,s extended
family, and his wife Ida.
----------------------
EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
----------------------
¶6. (C) A/S Carson raised our concerns regarding extrajudicial
killings, in particular the Oscar Foundation murders. Kosgei
responded by noting that all security organs remain under the
MINISTER FOR HIGHER ED SALLY KOSGEI
control of Kibaki,s PNU party. Because PNU leaders believe
that Police Commissioner Ali did them a favor during the past
election by cordoning ODM strongholds, Kosgei expects that
the PNU will block any substantial police reforms and will
retain close control of the police, GSU (paramilitary), and
military in advance of the 2012 elections. In this context,
Ali is permitted to utilize extrajudicial killings to control
organized gangs such as the Mungiki, which threaten to
disrupt Kikuyu politics by operating in the heart of Central
province. The police freelance in extorting money from the
gangs and execute legitimate critics such as the Oscar
Foundation principles. Noting that Ali does not take calls
from ODM ministers, Kosgei wondered aloud why ODM has not
forced the issue of his continued tenure during cabinet
meetings.
------------------
A POLITICIZED NSIS
------------------
¶7. (C) Describing Gen. Michael Gichangi, the head of Kenya,s
NSIS intelligence service as a &man who has no energy,8
Kosgei stated that the NSIS is picking up reports of emerging
popular discontent and plans to disrupt public rallies with
violent protests. However, she believes the President no
longer reads NSIS reports and noted that Gichangi is more
interested in collecting information on ODM leaders than
issues of national importance.
-------------------
SUCCESSION POLITICS
-------------------
¶8. (C) A/S Carson noted that there is talk of an emerging
Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Coast political alliance to contest the
2012 elections. Kosgei acknowledged that Ruto (Kalenjin),
Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta (Kikuyu), and Vice President
Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) are indeed discussing an alliance,
but believes that the discussions are an artifact of the Waki
Commission (COMMENT: Both Ruto and Kenyatta are believed to
be on the Waki Commissions, sealed list of 10 architects of
the post election violence. END COMMENT). Ruto, in Kosgei,s
view, is working with Uhuru to block key reforms and scuttle
the Waki Commission,s call for a local tribunal to
investigate the post election violence. However, she expects
that Ruto will abandon Uhuru if he stumbles or is no longer
useful. Kosgei (an ethnic Kalenjin) expressed doubt that
Kikuyu voters in Central and Kalenjin voters in Rift Valley
will be willing to set aside the violence suffered at each
others hands to form a coalition in 2012.
¶9. (C) Reviewing other potential candidates, Kosgei noted
that Uhuru is hindered by &laziness8 and a very hands off
approach to running the Ministry of Finance. The recent
submission of a budget containing &inaccuracies8 of more
than 10 billion KSh ($130 million) has harmed Uhuru,s public
image. Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti &has
been appointed to every position he has held8 and lacks the
skills to fight effectively for the Presidency. Deputy Prime
Minister Musalia Mudavadi (ODM) lacks the energy and money to
seriously challenge Ruto. On the PNU side, Vice President
Kalonzo Musyoka &appears to be a diminishing asset8 who
frets that he will be overshadowed by Mutula Kilonzo.
Concluding her tour d,horizon, Kosgei stated that Odinga,
despite his flaws, remains the strongest candidate in a
crowded field thanks to strong opposition credentials and an
accessible personality.
----------------------------------
THE REAL FIGHT TO COME: BOUNDARIES
----------------------------------
¶10. (C) As the conversation drew to a close, Kosgei stated
that she expects the constitutional review process to be
contentious, but argued that the real political battle ahead
will be over provincial and constituency boundaries.
Painfully aware that their support was limited to Central and
parts of Eastern province in the last elections, the PNU
wants to divide Kenya,s 9 provinces into 19 in order to
relax the constitutional requirement that successful
Presidential candidates receive at least 25 percent of the
vote in 5 provinces. The PNU is also hoping to use the
recently appointed boundaries commission to redraw
parliamentary constituencies in their favor.
¶11. (C) The Ambassador concluded the conversation by noting
that the current challenge in advancing the reform agenda is
mobilizing broad public pressure on the political class, but
this goal is hindered by Kenya,s deep ethnic divisions.
Kosgei agreed that people across Kenya are restive, and
MINISTER FOR HIGHER ED SALLY KOSGEI
predicted that the June 1 Madaraka day celebrations could
turn violent.
¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Carson and NSC
Senior Director for Africa Gavin.
RANNEBERGER