

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09KABUL3068, AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09KABUL3068.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KABUL3068 | 2009-10-03 04:04 | 2011-01-28 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXRO0787
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3068/01 2760446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030446Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003068
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
IN KANDAHAR
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: in a lengthy and cordial introductory meeting
with Kandahar Provincial Council Chief Ahmed Wali Karzai
(AWK) and Governor Tooryalai Weesa, Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero underscored
the need for improved governance in Kandahar, and highlighted
the importance of naming credible provincial governors and
district officials before the inauguration to send a positive
signal on good governance to the Afghan people and the
international community. Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged the
weakness of the government in Kandahar, and outlined their
proposals for local solutions, including the empowerment of
shuras of district elders for local dispute resolution rather
than the courts. AWK also emphasized large-scale
infrastructure projects rather than smaller cash-for-work
program, and his desire to see private security companies in
the province under one licensee. AWK discounted the role of
elections and their importance to Afghans. End Summary.
AWK Nervous but Eager to Share Views
----------------------------------
¶2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met with AWK and Governor Weesa on
September 28 in the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The
Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ben Rowswell also
attended the meeting, which was held in a wood-paneled room,
beneath a large photo of President Hamid Karzai. (Note:
While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial
Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a
narcotics trafficker. End Note) AWK, dressed in a crisp
white shalwar kameez and pinstriped vest, appeared nervous,
though eager to express his views on the international
presence in Kandahar.
The Importance of Good Governance
------------------------------
¶3. (C) SCR emphasized the criticality of good governance in
the province, and said the United States would like to see
improvement in the post-election period. He said the United
States is ready to work with the GIRoA to strengthen key
provincial and district level governance, but we are only
willing to expend our resources in people and programs if we
have confidence those resources will pay off and make a real
difference.
¶4. (C) Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged there was a
credibility gap between the public and the government. Weesa
said it was a problem that in the 10 months he had been in
office, the government had not been able to deliver 24-hour
electricity to the people, and that 150 factories had closed
because of it. He said people looked to NGOs more than to
the government to deliver services, and he complained that
NGOs poach workers from the government by offering higher
wages. SCR emphasized the importance of naming credible
provincial governors and district officials before the
inauguration to send a positive signal on good governance to
the Afghan people and the international community.
¶5. (C) AWK suggested one way of fighting corruption in the
province would be to re-establish and empower district
shuras, instead of judges or police, to settle local
disputes. Currently there is only one judge for the five
districts around Kandahar City, he said, and a council of
local elders would be more effective at resolving land, water
and other disputes. (Note: there are a total of seven judges
for all 17 districts in the province.) "You can easily bribe
the chief of police or a judge,8 he said, &but you can't
bribe 50 elders." He said the provincial council, with the
support of the governor, could initiate the formation of
these district shuras, which would consist of 10-15 elders
elected by the people.
Infrastructure Priorities, Private Security Contractors and
Conflicts of Interest
--------------------------------------------- -----------------
¶6. (C) AWK said he had been in Kandahar almost continuously
since 1992, and that the U.S. reputation in the province was
built on the back of two key infrastructure projects done in
the 1950s and 60s. He said what would make a difference to
the population today would be similar large-scale,
labor-intensive projects that would provide jobs to the
people and keep them from being recruited by the Taliban.
AWK cautioned against the use of small scale projects and
KABUL 00003068 002 OF 002
additional cash-for-work programs; he stated that the use of
implementing partners does not allow expenditure of
development resources to reach villagers and other local
Afghans. Both he and Weesa added that it should be the local
elders who are empowered to distribute these jobs, not
officials or companies from outside.
Putting Private Security Under the Direction of the
Provincial Council
--------------------------------------------- --
¶7. (C) In the same vein of providing "local solutions to
local problems," as he put it, AWK recommended a "local
solution" to the problem of providing security in the area.
He said that currently, there are many jihadi commanders with
militias who independently provide protection to convoys and
projects, but that a proposal before the Ministry of Interior
would bring all these commanders under one umbrella in
Kandahar, with one person given the license for the private
security sector. He said there would be a meeting Wednesday
(September 30) of all the security companies, under the
auspices of the Provincial Council, to appoint this
representative to send to Kabul. (Note: AWK is understood to
have a stake in private security contracting, and has
aggressively lobbied the Canadians to have his security
services retained for the Dahla Dam refurbishment. Both he
and the governor have tried to exert control over how
contracts are awarded in the province ) all of which could
be a significant conflict of interest in the province. End
Note.)
Elections: What's the Point?
---------------------
¶8. (C) In answer to a question from the RoCK and the SCR
about the credibility of the elections, AWK said democracy
was new for Afghanistan, and that people in the region did
not understand the point of having one election, let alone
two. "The people do not like change," he said. "They think,
the President is alive, and everything is fine. Why have an
election?"
Comment
-----
¶9. (C) The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major
challenges in Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and
connect the people to their government, when the key
government officials are themselves corrupt. Given AWK's
reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large,
costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Still, his observations about
the unintended consequences of how NGOs and other
international partners do their work, e.g. "poaching" of
government staff, track with some of our own concerns,
including about how to promote Afghan-led solutions. We will
continue to urge AWK to improve his own credibility gap as
well as that of the GIRoA.
EIKENBERRY