

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05MADRID395, SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MADRID395.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05MADRID395 | 2005-02-02 16:04 | 2010-12-08 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000395
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION
REF: A) SECSTATE 2743 B) MADRID SP 0307
Classified By: Classified by Political Officer Ricardo Zuniga; reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. Coordinator for Afghanistan Maureen Quinn,
accompanied by Department of Defense, JCS, and State
Department officers met with Spanish MOD, MFA and Presidency
officials on 1/26 to discuss Spain's commitment to lead a PRT
in western Afghanistan. Just before Ambassador Quinn's
arrival, the GOS released a brief statement indicating that
it was "studying" the possibility of both a Spanish
deployment to western Afghanistan and taking over the FSB in
Herat. The MOD meeting will be reported via septel. GOS
officials told the USG team that the press release was
intended to convey Spain's determination to lead a PRT,
though operational and political details remain to be worked
out. MFA Director General for Foreign Policy Rafael
Dezcallar described the PRT decision as one of several recent
GOS gestures aimed at repairing bilateral relations with the
USG. Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may
travel to Afghanistan soon and that Spain may establish a
permanent diplomatic mission in Kabul.
¶2. (C) At the Presidential Palace, Deputy National Security
Advisor Maria Alonso stressed the Zapatero Government's need
to build public support for the deployment, given the general
Spanish skepticism towards overseas military missions of any
type. She reviewed the steps necessary for the GOS to obtain
Parliamentary approval of the PRT mission and said she was
confident that the deployment would be approved with minimal
debate. She said Spain would also like to further discuss
the USG offer to consider providing civilian experts to aid
the PRT, per REF A points. End Summary.
//MFA: SPAIN COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN//
¶3. (C) MOD DG for Policy Admiral Torrente confirmed to
Ambassador Quinn that Spain plans to lead a PRT in western
Afghanistan, specifically at Qal'eh-ye Now, and to contribute
troops to the FSB at Herat. Full details of the MOD meeting
will be provided septel.
¶4. (C) At the MFA, DG Dezcallar pointed to the success of
ISAF and OEF operations in Afghanistan as a "demonstration
that multilateralism can be effective" and said NATO could be
proud of its work in "helping the Afghans help themselves."
Ambassador Quinn agreed that much had been accomplished,
especially through new models such as PRTs. She welcomed the
news of Spain's decision to lead a PRT in western Afghanistan
and to participate in the Herat FSB.
¶5. (C) Dezcallar said the PRT decision was "intentionally
leaked" by the GOS in order to convey Spain's commitment to
the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan. He said this
was driven by strategic considerations, since Spain's
investigation of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid
suggested that the order to carry out the bombing had come
from individuals based in Afghanistan.
//NEXT STEPS ON SPANISH PRT//
¶6. (C) While Dezcallar emphasized that the GOS has made the
political decision to participate in a PRT, he also noted
that several steps remain. First, Spain will send a team of
MOD and MFA experts to Afghanistan to scout the precise
locations where Spanish forces will be deployed: Herat and
Qal'eh)ye Now (NOTE: The scouting team departed for
Afghanistan on 1/28. END NOTE). Second, the GOS will analyze
the report of the team and deliver a recommendation to
President Zapatero as to how Spain's deployment should
proceed. Lastly, President Zapatero will "consult" with
Parliament to gain legislative support for the mission.
//MENDING FENCES WITH USG//
¶7. (C) Dezcallar made clear that an important factor in
Spain's decision to proceed with a PRT was their sense that
it would help bring an end to bilateral tensions between
Madrid and Washington. Dezcallar said he knew the USG
appreciated actions more than words, so Spain had moved ahead
on Afghanistan and other issues, including Spain's
contribution of $20 million to the UNDP to support the Iraq
elections, GOS diplomatic efforts to encourage good behavior
on the part of Iraq's neighbors, and the decision of
President Zapatero not to stop in Venezuela during his visit
to Latin America. Dezcallar said he hoped these positive
steps would be recognized by the USG and would encourage
reciprocal gestures from Washington. He said "normalization"
of ties with Spain would help both sides work together to
advance the USG's "ambitious reform process" in the Mideast
and suggested Spain's experience with the Barcelona Process
could prove useful for the U.S. Ambassador Quinn said the
USG appreciated the positive steps taken by the GOS and told
Dezcallar that she would carry his message to Washington.
//DEEPER SPANISH ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN//
¶8. (C) Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may
travel to Afghanistan in the next several months. In
addition, Spain hopes to establish a permanent diplomatic
mission soon in Kabul and would eventually like to open an
embassy. Ambassador Quinn encouraged this increased GOS
engagement, saying the Afghan people were counting on the
international community to help them realize their growing
hopes for stability and economic growth. Dezcallar noted
that the GOS has directed aid to Afghanistan through the
Asian Development Bank, but would be willing to study other
possible assistance projects, including on counter narcotics.
//OEF)ISAF MERGER//
¶9. (C) At Dezcallar's request, the USG team briefed him on
the security situation in Afghanistan and the state of play
among the various regional leaders and factions. Dezcallar
said he was encouraged by the USG's information regarding
improved security conditions and suggested that coordination
between ISAF and OEF operations will have to improve and
perhaps even be merged as ISAF moves westward. (NOTE: We
assume Dezcallar was suggesting the merger of the missions
under an overall NATO command, since it is highly unlikely
the GOS would place Spanish forces at the disposition of a
U.S. command through participation in OEF. END NOTE.)
Ambassador Quinn agreed that integration is the right move,
but said that we have no set timeline. She noted the already
high level of coordination between OEF and ISAF personnel.
//PRESIDENCY: A FEW BUMPS ON THE ROAD TO PRT//
¶10. (C) In her meeting with Deputy National Security Advisers
Maria Alonso and Diego de Ojeda, Ambassador Quinn expressed
the USG's appreciation of Spain's decision to lead a PRT and
to contribute forces to the FSB in Herat. Alonso, who covers
the North America account, said the GOS was pleased that the
MOD and MFA had presented a good plan for Spain's
participation and that the GOS now had to explain the mission
to a public skeptical of any Spanish military deployment
abroad. Alonso was confident that the GOS would have no
problem in gaining Parliamentary approval for the deployment
since the Popular Party, the largest opposition party,
supported the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, Diego de
Ojeda pointed out that the PRT proposal would have to be
slipped in between major legislative action on controversial
internal issues, perhaps briefly delaying formal approval of
the PRT. Also the two small leftist parties that generally
work with the Socialists to give them a Parliamentary
majority will vote against Spain's leadership of a PRT,
creating a minor, but unwelcome rift within the center-left.
//USG SUPPORT//
¶11. (C) Alonso indicated that Spain wants to emphasize the
civil reconstruction aspect of its PRT, but lacks civilian
experts to support that element of the mission. Spain hopes
to establish strong links to NGOs already operating in
western Afghanistan. Alonso also alluded to the USG offer
per REF A to consider making U.S. civilian experts available
to buttress the Spanish deployment, saying Spain would
appreciate such assistance. Ambassador Quinn and Alonso
discussed the makeup of the existing PRTs and the USG team
urged Spain to study all of the models in developing its own
plans.
MANZANARES