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Viewing cable 05NAIROBI4559, KENYA PURSUING PURCHASE OF F5'S FROM SAUDI ARABIA
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05NAIROBI4559 | 2005-11-03 01:01 | 2011-03-18 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004559
SIPDIS
PM/RSAT FOR BERNETA LEE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2025
TAGS: MARR PTER MASS PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA PURSUING PURCHASE OF F5'S FROM SAUDI ARABIA
REF: A. A) 04 SECSTATE 206331
¶B. B) NAIROBI 4428 C) NAIROBI 4462
Classified By: POL/C Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post has received Kenyan End-Use Monitoring
(EUM) Assurances for a pending purchase of 14 used F-5
aircraft from Saudi Arabia. In separate meetings with the
Permanent Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Defense,
Ambassador and DCM addressed concerns surrounding the
impending purchase, particularly inappropriateness of
fighters in countering the primary threat (terrorism) that
Kenya faces; possible corruption in the sale; the drain on
Kenyan military budgets; and the opportunity costs likely to
be incurred by the U.S. in helping maintain them -- assuming,
that is, that FMF and IMET are re-established if/when Kenya
signs an Article 98 agreement.
¶2. (C) Despite our misgivings, we recognize that this is a
sovereign decision, one which the Kenyans appear to have
weighed with some care. We do not believe it is in our
interest to oppose this purchase. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------------
A Long Time In The Making
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) The GOK first proposed this purchase in 2004. In
November of 2004, Poloff gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) a list of assurances required before the sale could be
consummated (ref. A). In March 2005, Post received and
forwarded to the Department a diplomatic note accompanied by
a signed agreement for end-use, retransfer, and security
assurances for 10 F-5E aircraft and four F-5F aircraft from
Saudi Arabia to Kenya. This agreement (which was dated 28
December 2004), was signed by a former P.S. of KDOD, Sammy
P.M. Kyungu. Mr. Kyungu was not the P.S. of KDOD at the time
Post actually received the agreement, and thus Post requested
another copy of the agreement signed by the current P.S.
Almost seven months later, Post received another diplomatic
note (dated October 18, 2005) and signed agreement for
end-use, retransfer, and security assurances for the 10 F-5E
aircraft and four F-5F aircraft (refs A and B). This
agreement was signed by the current Permanent Secretary
(P.S.) of the Kenyan Department of Defence (KDOD), Zachary N.
Mwaura (he signed the agreement on 7 October, 2005). (Note:
This final agreement incorporated the exact text Poloff
originally left with the MFA on November 1, 2004. End note.)
The MFA and KDOD called Post several times the week of
October 24 asking the USG to provide the End User
Certificates to Saudi Arabia so they can conclude this
purchase.
--------------------
Voicing Our Concerns
--------------------
¶3. (C) Several contentious issues surround this purchase.
First, post does not believe these aircraft respond to the
threat. F5s are not the most appropriate aircraft to serve
as an air defense/deterrent capability, and Kenya would be
better off investing the money in either reconnaissance or
helicopter lift assets. Second, there is concern that the
original deal may be marred by corruption. The KDOD P.S. who
provided the original set of assurances was sacked in an
anti-corruption shake-up and was implicated in corrupt
security-related procurement. Additionally, KDOD,s budget is
already experiencing negative growth, and the cost for this
aircraft could reach as much as $31 million, according to
local press reports. Lastly, the opportunity costs are too
high. Post is concerned that KDOD will be forced to seek to
use significant amounts of future U.S. FMF authorizations to
maintain this expanded fleet of F5s -- assuming, that is,
that Kenya signs an Article 98 agreement and FMF assistance
once again becomes available (ref C) -- which could be used
more wisely.
¶4. (C) Ambassador and Poloff (note-taker) called on the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ambassador Boaz Mbaya, October 31 to discuss Kenya,s plans
to purchase the 14 F5 aircraft from Saudi Arabia. Ambassador
voiced his concerns about this purchase, asking the following
questions: 1) How do these aircraft meet the border security
challenges facing Kenya? 2) Is the GOK aware that without an
Article 98 agreement, future FMF will not be available to
assist in maintaining and equipping these aircraft? and 3)
Can Kenya ensure this is a transparent and uncorrupt deal?
¶5. (C) In response to the first question, Mbaya explained
that Kenya lives in a volatile environment, with Ethiopia and
Eritrea to the north, and Sudan and Somalia on either side.
While Kenya is not preparing for war, he said it is in their
national interest to be prepared for any threat to their
national security from these bordering countries. He assured
the Ambassador that corruption is not an issue and that
nobody in the Kenyan Government wants another Anglo
Leasing-type scandal on their hands. He said the current F5
fleet is old and must be replaced. He understood the
implications of not signing an Article 98 agreement, and that
FMF (and IMET) cuts will impact this purchase, should Kenya
seek assistance in maintaining and equipping the aircraft as
well as training for pilots. He added he hoped the
Ambassador could convince the USG to grant Saudi Arabia the
end user certificates and allow Kenya to pursue their
national interests.
¶6. (C) Simultaneously, DCM, accompanied by Deputy Chief of
KUSLO and Poloff (note-taker), called on KDOD P.S. Zachary
Mwaura to discuss the same issue. KDOD Vice Chief of the
General Staff, LtGen J. W. Karangi, was also in attendance.
DCM inquired how the F5s fit into Kenya,s defense strategy
and why they are looking at buying these particular aircraft.
She also asked about the long-term plan to keep the aircraft
equipped and maintained, explaining that FMF funding will not
be available to assist due to the Article 98 situation.
Deputy Chief KUSLO suggested the money could be better used
for other aircraft, such as lift asset aircraft. Karangi
responded rather defensively that both aircraft are part of
the GOK's military plan but that the F5 purchase is a higher
priority.
¶7. (C) Mwaura, who just returned from Saudi Arabia,
explained that the current fleet of F5s is deteriorating, and
KDOD wants to replace the fleet with the same aircraft the
country has been operating for a number of years. Karangi
said the F5s would maintain the status quo; they are not
seeking to change their capacity. The issue of financing for
spare parts and maintenance raised some concern, with both
Mwaura and Karangi saying they did not see the connection
between Article 98 and this purchase. The DCM explained the
issue further, noting that spare parts and maintenance are
costly, and the U.S. will not be able to assist until an
Article 98 agreement is signed. Mwaura stated that even
without assistance, Kenya will still have to defend its
borders, and therefore will find a way to purchase the parts.
Karangi added "There is a price to pay for national
security.8 DCM asked Mwaura if there was any update on the
possible signing of an Article 98 agreement. Mwaura
responded negatively, saying it was now "a political matter."
Both officials took the opportunity to say that they did not
see why an Article 98 agreement was necessary since there is
already a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) protecting U.S.
military personnel stationed in Kenya. DCM responded that an
Article 98 agreement is broader and provides protection to
civilian as well as military personnel.
¶8. (C) The DCM wrapped up the meeting by explaining that the
Saudi government will need to resubmit their request for
end-use certificates to the USG because the case had already
been closed due to a lack of response from Kenya. (NOTE: The
MFA did not send their end user agreements to Post until
after March 1, at which point the DPM/RSAT already responded
to Saudi Arabia with &Returned without Action.8 END NOTE.)
¶9. (C) COMMENT: Despite the concerns surrounding this
purchase, it is not our place to stop it. This purchase is
not the best use of scarce military monies, but the Kenyans
have made it clear they plan to go forward with the deal.
Withholding end user certificates would not benefit our
bilateral relationship with Kenya. We practiced due
diligence by insisting the deal be transparent and explaining
we will not be able to assist in future costs associated with
the purchase until an Article 98 agreement is signed. END
COMMENT.
BELLAMY