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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09ROME395, ITALY DODGES FINANCIAL MELT DOWN, BUT GLOBAL
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ROME395 | 2009-04-06 14:02 | 2011-02-28 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
VZCZCXRO0626
RR RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0395/01 0961450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061450Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1883
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1346
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1922
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1588
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4532
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1892
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2552
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1996
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3561
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 7509
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9948
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3738
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 4784
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0982
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000395
SIPDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2014
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD IT
SUBJECT: ITALY DODGES FINANCIAL MELT DOWN, BUT GLOBAL
DOWNTURN HITS HARD
REF: ROME 320
SUBJECT: ITALY DODGES FINANCIAL MELT DOWN, BUT GLOBAL
DOWNTURN HITS HARD
REF: ROME 320
Classified By: Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Tom Delare fo
r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Conservative, risk-averse practices and
tight supervision allowed Italy's banking system to avoid the
worst of the financial melt-down that hit the United States
and other countries. But the worldwide recession sparked by this
financial crisis is now beginning to hit Italy's
export-dependent economy very hard. GDP is expected to drop
by between 2.5 and 4% in 2009, and unemployment to rise to
8%. The government has set up a system to bolster the
capital of Italy's banks, but its ability to give a stronger
fiscal stimulus to the economy is constrained by Italy's
already enormous public sector debt. Looking ahead, exports
to the rest of Europe and the United States will likely pull
Italy out of recession soon after global growth resumes, but
unfortunately Italy will then find itself back in the same
economic mess that it was in before the recession: the sick
man of Europe, condemned by demographics and bad policies to
growth rates significantly lower than its EU partners. END
SUMMARY
ITALIAN BANKS DODGE THE BULLET, BUT WHY?
¶2. (C) Italy's banking system for the most part avoided the
catastrophe that has engulfed financial markets in the U.S.
and elsewhere. Before the current crisis, Italian business,
policymakers and the public criticized the Italian financial
system frequently for its failure to embrace innovative
financial systems and to spur entrepreneurship. The U.S.
Embassy was a leader in this criticism. But it was this
aversion to innovation and Bank of Italy-mandated leverage
limits on derivative instruments that kept the Italians out
of what now appears to be round one of the global economic
crisis.
¶3. (U) The reasons Italian banks dodged the bullet, however,
are not all good. Italian bankers and economic policymakers
say, with some hubris, that banks here avoided trouble by
sticking to their core business and practices of lending to
known, trusted firms and households with adequate security
and high prospects of repayment. This is to some extent
true.
¶4. (C) Caution kept Italian banks out of sub-prime lending
and the market for derivatives built on top of sub-prime
mortgages and exotic credit default swaps. Also keeping
Italian banks out of high-risk, high-return investments was a
high-margin domestic market, where financial institutions
still enjoy loan/deposit margins that are 2 to 3 times those
in other advanced economies. Because there are relatively
few foreign banks operating in Italy, Italian consumers and
businesses were denied the competition dynamic that would
reduce the high cost of banking services. The end result is
a plodding financial sector in an already plodding economy.
BUT RECESSION NOW HITTING HARD
¶5. (U) Banks, avoidance of toxic assets notwithstanding,
Italy's export-dependent economy will not escape the global
recession sparked by the financial crisis. The effects of
that recession are now being felt here as export orders dry
up, unemployment increases and new business investment
screeches to a halt. As per ref A and newer data, estimates
of GDP contraction in 2009 range from 2 percent to over 4
(OECD). (Italy's worst post-war economic performance came in
1993, when the economy shrunk by 2.5 percent.) Rising
unemployment concerns policymakers, who fear unemployment
will top 8 percent by end of 2009. Curiously, consumer
confidence surveys in the first two months of 2009 revealed
that consumers expect things to worsen in general, while
indicating that their own personal economic situation remains
favorable. Businesses, on the other hand, remain quite
pessimistic - this is likely the result of dramatic declines
in industrial production (-4.3% in 2008) and exports (down
26% in January 2009). Business confidence surveys remain at
all-time lows, explaining a drop of 1.9 percent in gross
fixed investment during the third quarter of 2008.
BANKS BOLSTERED...
¶6. (U) Italian government policy makers remain focused on
ensuring that bank capital is adequate, seeking to bolster it
through the issuance of hybrid capital instruments informally
named after Economics and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti.
The government has pointed to the banking system's financial
health as key to economic recovery and suggested that an
insufficiency of capital is holding back banks from
lubricating the economy adequately. More recently,
policymakers and bankers are claiming that the hybrid bond
scheme is meant to address level playing field, concerns
with respect to state aid provided by other EU governments to
their financial sectors. The plan to beef up capital
unveiled in early March is technically sound, but
controversial in that banks wishing to participate in it must
sign on to as yet vague conditions constraining compensation
for executives and ""traders"", and to agree to additional,
unusual oversight of their lending practices and portfolios.
This last sparked a tiff between Minister Tremonti and the
Bank of Italy's governor Mario Draghi, who has asserted
firmly and publicly his institution's primacy in supervising
banks.
¶7. (C) Under the scheme, participating banks (applications so
far total about 8.5 billion euros) will issue convertible
instruments to which the GOI will subscribe fully. The
convertible instruments pay interest, but only if the bank
distributes dividends to all its shareholders. The interest
rate and the premium for converting the instruments from
bonds, to common shares (thus repaying the taxpayers) grow
over time. In neither form (debt or equity) do the
instruments confer voting rights to the government.
¶8. (C) Tremonti may see in his namesake instruments a vehicle
to impose his eclectic economic world view to the benefit of
economic actors he claims have been left behind by
globalization, i.e., small businesses. Unfortunately, many of
these firms appear to be unable or unwilling to change to
meet the demands of a more dynamic market and global
competition. A former Socialist, like many in the ruling
People of Liberty party, Tremonti does not have his own
political constituency, but rather
draws his power from his relationship with PM Berlusconi and
support from the junior coalition partner, the Northern
League. A strong constituency of the latter are small family
businesses, which claim to have suffered from the break-down
of relationships with their local banks as these were
absorbed by larger competitors during a recent consolidation
wave. Tremonti can emerge as their champion by spurring
banks to lend more generously to them. Also in play could be
Tremonti,s desire to be seen abroad and at home as
successfully balancing free market principles and social
responsibility.
...BUT NO MONEY FOR STIMULUS
¶9. (U) Tremonti,s activism notwithstanding, the GOI has very
little leeway to use fiscal policy to stimulate the economy,
given the already high debt-to-GDP ratio (107% currently and
projected to rise to 110% or more this year) - well above the
Maastricht treaty guideline of 60% max) and an onerous tax
burden (at 43% the corporate tax rate is the highest in the
developed world).
¶10. (U) Eleven percent of Italy's central government revenue
already goes to service debt, while
the lion's share of the budget consists of entitlement
spending that is not easily reduced. On the revenue side,
the government has little ability to further squeeze more
from taxpayers, given already high rates and rampant tax
evasion. Were the GOI predisposed to cut taxes to stimulate
private investment or spending (of which we have not heard a
whisper), it might find it difficult, if not
impossible, to finance its still growing deficit in the
short-term. All this results in a very modest Italian
stimulus package (the smallest among Europe's major
economies) that as yet continues to dribble out piecemeal as
specific sectors succeed in their government lobbying
efforts.
LOOKING AHEAD
¶11. (U) Italy has built a strong export platform in niche
products and a solid reputation for design and top
craftsmanship among their EU customers. Over forty percent
of its exports go to wealthy markets in Germany, France, the
UK and the US. As those economies recover, they will pull
Italy along. Likewise, energy and commodity producers, who
are also among Italy's export targets, should also help boost
an Italian recovery as global demand for energy and raw
materials recovers. A larger question mark in the short run
is the performance of markets in central and eastern Europe
that Italy also pegged for export growth and foreign
investment. Meanwhile, Italy's penetration of the monster
emerging economies such as China and India remains weak. One
bank executive told us that Italian firms are not, for the
most part, able (or interested?) to fill orders at the scale
the new giants require.
AFTER RECOVERY: SICK MAN OF EUROPE ONCE AGAIN
¶12. (C) However long the global downturn lasts, at the end of
it Italy will remain hamstrung by an oversized public sector,
an over-regulated economy, insufficient competition in key
sectors such as financial services, inflexible labor laws,
corruption and an aging, shrinking population. All translate
into a job-poor economy that will continue to drive its
dwindling youth to emigrate.
¶13. (C) COMMENT: For the moment, Italian globalization
skeptics and defenders of The Italian Way, may feel smug
about having avoided the global financial catastrophe.
Government policymakers certainly seem to be doing a good job
of monitoring and bolstering banks, capital and consumer
confidence. On fiscal stimulus, however, Italy hasn't gone
nearly as far as we are asking our partners to go, because
policymakers know there is little they can do in the shadow
of their massive government deficit. The deficit is
emblematic (and the result) of the long term structural
policy errors pursued by Italian
governments of all stripes. Unfortunately, the current
crisis will embolden those calling for Italy to stay its
failing economic course. And they far outnumber those among
the policy makers, such as Minister for Administrative Reform
Brunetta, who have called for using the current crisis as an
opportunity to make Italy more competitive. At crisis-end,
we unfortunately predict that Italians will face the same
underlying problems with little appetite for serious (and
painful) reform. Italy will almost certainly
find itself back in its pre-crisis malaise.
DIBBLE
"