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Viewing cable 06KABUL5855, PRT CHAGHCHARAN: PLAN AFOOT TO WITHDRAW ICELANDIC
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06KABUL5855 | 2006-12-15 07:07 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul |
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBUL #5855/01 3490717
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150717Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4901
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0037
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0005
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3408
UNCLAS KABUL 005855
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SCA/A
STATEPASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MARR AF IC PGOV
SUBJECT: PRT CHAGHCHARAN: PLAN AFOOT TO WITHDRAW ICELANDIC
MOBILE LIAISON OBSERVATION TEAM FROM CHAGHCHARAN PRT?
¶1. (U) This cable contains and action request -- see para 7.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Reports are circulating at PRT Chaghcharan
that the Icelandic government may be preparing to withdraw
the Icelandic Mobile Patrol Team (Mobile Liaison Observation
Team/MLOT) from Afghanistan at the end of April. Because of
its makeup, special equipment, and experience driving in the
kind of harsh terrain found in Ghor province, the Icelandic
team has been especially effective in conducting patrols.
Moreover, through its reliability, efforts to pass on skills
to other patrol units, and unique rescue capability, the
Icelanders have made the PRT as a whole much more effective.
Because of the potentially serious consequences for PRT
Chaghcharan, Post suggests Department intervene with
Icelandic authorities to underscore the value we attach to
the work of the Icelandic MLOT team and request its mission
be extended. END SUMMARY.
¶3. (SBU) U.S. PolRep in Chaghcharan recently learned from the
PRT,s Icelandic development officer that her government may
withdraw the Icelandic Mobile Liaison Observation Team (MLOT)
at the end of April 2007, when the current MOU with the
Lithuanian government runs out. When questioned about this,
the head of the Icelandic MLOT confirmed the report. His
team will rotate out in February, and its successor is
scheduled to remain only two months, instead of the usual
four. Speculation at PRT Chaghcharan is that the new
Icelandic foreign minister may be looking to remove the issue
of Iceland's &military8 mission in Afghanistan in advance
of upcoming national elections and so may be considering
replacing the MLOT with police trainers to give the mission a
more civilian face or redefining the MLOT,s mission as
solely to support development activities.
¶4. (SBU) The prospect of Iceland withdrawing or redefining
its MLOT raises serious concerns for us. The Lithuanian PRT
commander shares our concerns and is anxious for the
Icelandic team to continue in its present form. Certainly
the Lithuanians, Croats, and Danes all conduct valuable
patrols in their assigned districts, but the Icelandic team
is unique in the resources and skills it brings to its
designated patrols. The Icelanders, and only the Icelanders,
have truly all-weather vehicles (Nissan Patrols) capable of
operating throughout mountainous and often snow-bound Ghor.
They alone have the 388 (summer) and 448 (winter) tires
that allow the vehicles to handle the province's extremely
rough terrain (there are no paved roads anywhere in Ghor).
The Icelanders are particularly adept at using their GPS and
onboard laptops to chart their course, allowing them to
travel without difficulty even at night. The makeup of their
team, consisting of &civilian specialists,8 also gives them
special advantages. The current team, for example, includes
two counter-terrorism policemen, a search and rescue worker,
skilled drivers, a paramedic, and a mechanic (who
participates in the patrols). The result to date has been
remarkable reliability for the team's missions, and
particularly valuable and insightful reporting.
¶5. (SBU) Beyond the value they add through their patrols,
however, the Icelanders contribute in unique ways to the PRT
as a whole )- something that causes us to be especially
concerned at the prospect of their departure. A major
problem for all the other patrols is a lack of experience at
driving under the harsh mountain conditions of Ghor. The
Icelanders suggest the terrain in Ghor resembles in many
respects the conditions they face at home. Unlike the other
elements, the Icelandic team is used to off-road driving up
steep inclines and fording rivers. Importantly, they make
every effort to pass on to the other elements their special
driving skills. (The Icelanders in Chaghcharan argue that
turning over their vehicles to other PRT elements at the end
of April, as some in Reykjavik appear to be suggesting, would
result in a waste of the major investment Iceland has made in
bringing the vehicles to Afghanistan because, without the
corresponding special driving skills and ride-along mechanic,
they predict the vehicles would soon become as vulnerable to
problems as the rest of the PRT's vehicle fleet.) Moreover,
with winter just now settling in, the Icelanders have already
had occasion to rescue other units, stranded vehicles, and
as conditions worsen, they have been paired up increasingly
with other units as a safeguard )- a bit to the frustration
of the Icelanders themselves.
¶6. (SBU) Both the PRT,s Icelandic development officer and
MLOT chief express frustration that the message of the MLOT's
true mission does not appear to be getting back to the public
at home (a major Icelandic newspaper reportedly declined to
publish an account of the MLOT's work written by a former
team chief). To characterize the Icelandic MLOT as a
&military8 mission is largely a misnomer, they insist. The
team's rules of engagement do not allow it to participate in
combat except in self-defense, its members are not part of
the PRT,s quick response force, and they do not perform
guard duty. The Icelandic MLOT chief characterizes his
unit's real mission as to give the people of its assigned
districts a greater sense of security by its presence, to
find out their needs, concerns, and ideas, and to feed these
back into the reconstruction effort. He acknowledges that
Iceland has the resources to contribute to the PRT's effort
in Ghor in many ways, be it with its police trainers, health
care workers, or engineers; but, he argues, the core mission
of the PRT is performing patrols and his team does them
uniquely well and makes an all but irreplaceable contribution
to enabling the other elements to perform theirs effectively
too. Whatever else Iceland might decide to contribute, he is
distraught at the potential discarding of what he sees as a
mission genuinely helpful to Afghanistan and its ultimate
development. Both we and the PRT commander share his
concern.
¶7. (SBU) Action Request: Given the particularly valuable
contribution to PRT Chaghcharan provided by the Icelandic
Mobile Liaison Observation Team and the serious downside )
including added burden on others -- its withdrawal from
patrol work would present, Post requests Department consider
asking Embassy Reykjavik to contact appropriate Icelandic
officials to underscore our appreciation for the special work
being done by the Icelandic MLOT in Ghor and to request that
Reykjavik seriously consider extending its mission.
NEUMANN