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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07BERN158, IRAN: AMBASSADOR URGES POLDIR AMBUEHL TO STEP BACK \
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07BERN158 | 2007-02-16 11:11 | 2011-03-14 06:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bern |
Appears in these articles: http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers |
VZCZCXRO0021
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #0158/01 0471128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161128Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3709
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
2007-02-16 11:28:00 07BERN158 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113|07BERN130 VZCZCXRO0021\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #0158/01 0471128\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 161128Z FEB 07\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3709\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000158 \
\
SIPDIS \
\
SIPDIS \
\
STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR NEA, ISN, EUR \
\
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017 \
TAGS: PARM KNNP PTER ETTC IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: AMBASSADOR URGES POLDIR AMBUEHL TO STEP BACK \
\
REF: A. BERN 130 \
ΒΆB. BERN 113 \
\
Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
------- \
Summary \
------- \
\
1.(C) Ambassador Coneway advised Swiss State Secretary of \
Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl today that Swiss efforts to \
persuade Iran to return to negotiations were being \
misinterpreted in the press and risked sending mixed messages \
to Iran, especially given Switzerland's status as U.S. \
protecting power. Ambuehl countered that there was a value \
to having a neutral, disinterested party like Switzerland \
deliver the tough message that Tehran is isolated and must \
suspend enrichment. Ambuehl stressed that Bern viewed \
Washington as its "most privileged" partner on Iran and that \
his office made a point of briefing the Embassy soon after \
the recent meetings. The Ambassador underlined that having \
forewarning of high-level Swiss-Iranian contacts would help \
avoid misunderstandings. Ambuehl agreed to consider the \
Ambassador's points and noted that he was scheduled to speak \
to U/S Nick Burns later in the day. End summary. \
\
-------------------------------------------- \
The Relative Merits of Engagement or Silence \
-------------------------------------------- \
\
2.(C) The Ambassador met with State Secretary Ambuehl on \
February 16 at Ambuehl's invitation to discuss recent Swiss \
meetings with Iranian officials (reftels) and to convey USG \
concerns that Swiss actions might be misinterpreted. Swiss \
DFA Americas Desk officials Yvonne Baumann and Urs Hammer, as \
well as Embassy Poloff, joined the meeting. The Ambassador \
cited the varying reports found in the Swiss and \
international press about what the Swiss were up to, \
including reports describing the Swiss activity as a \
mediation initiative. While the USG trusted Ambuehl's \
description of what was discussed in the meetings, the \
Iranians were presenting a different interpretation in their \
statements, official and unofficial. Clearly, Swiss efforts \
were being used by the Iranians and misinterpreted by the \
press. \
\
3.(C) Ambuehl asserted that Iran well understood that \
Switzerland was acting on its own behalf, not as a proxy for \
the United States. The Swiss had numerous dialogue partners, \
including the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and Iran's \
neighbors. These outreach efforts were helpful, in that \
Switzerland, as a neutral, disinterested party, could tell \
the Iranians what they would not believe from members of the \
P5 plus 1, namely that no country is happy with what is going \
on in Iran and that Tehran is absolutely isolated on the \
nuclear issue. Ambuehl stressed that he had been very firm \
with Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and with Deputy \
Foreign Minister Sa-id Jalili that Iran had to stop the \
rhetoric and provocation and offer concessions to resolve the \
impasse. Ambuehl said he believes they were listening. \
\
4.(C) Looking forward, the Ambassador observed that, since \
Switzerland position was now well known, now would be an \
opportune time to rest. Tehran knew what it needed to do to \
begin negotiations. Swiss silence would speak louder than \
words. Certainly, Iranian officials might reach out to the \
Swiss, but it would be helpful if Switzerland itself did not \
pursue more dialogue. Sanctions were starting to bite and \
international pressure was getting to Iran. The \
international community needed to allow the P5-plus-1 track \
to have an effect. \
\
5.(C) Ambuehl replied that Switzerland fully respected the \
leading role of the P5 plus 1. Were the United States to \
begin talking directly to Iran, Washington would certainly be \
in the driver's seat. Indeed, Ambuehl said he would \
recommend that the USG take this step. Until that time, it \
was his view that there was merit in repeatedly reminding \
Tehran of the international community's unanimous concerns. \
He well understood USG worries about Switzerland being \
"instrumentalized" or used to split the international \
community. Moreover, Ambuehl said that it was his impression \
-- and that of IAEA head Mohammed Elbaradei -- that \
Switzerland was more firm on the imperative of full \
suspension and locating a nuclear consortium outside of Iran, \
than were some of the European members of the P5 plus 1. \
\
------------ \
No Surprises \
------------ \
\
BERN 00000158 002 OF 002 \
\
\
\
6.(C) On the subject of transparency, Ambuehl told the \
Ambassador that he viewed the United States as a privileged \
partner. Following every meeting with Iranian officials, his \
team had briefed the Embassy even before other members of the \
Swiss cabinet. The Ambassador thanked Ambuehl for his \
consideration, but encouraged him to notify the Embassy prior \
to such meetings, to avoid misunderstandings. It was awkward \
to have learned about Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey's meeting \
with Larijani from a Swiss press inquiry to the public \
affairs section. Ambuehl appeared receptive to this proposal. \
\
7.(C) Ambuehl mentioned that his deputy, Ambassador Tony \
Thalmann, would be leading a delegation to Tehran to engage \
in a long-scheduled human rights dialogue (the planned visit \
had already been briefed to the Embassy). Ambuehl said that \
Thalmann did not have the intention to meet with nuclear \
officials, but the Iranian government was liable to change \
plans at the last minute. \
\
8.(C) Finally, Ambuehl said that he looked forward to his \
telephone call with Under Secretary Nick Burns later that day. \
\
------- \
Comment \
------- \
\
9.(C) Ambuehl has a mandate from FM Calmy-Rey to maintain \
dialogue with all of the key parties in the Middle East, \
including Iran. Our repeated warnings to Ambuehl regarding \
the risks of this outreach can influence how the Swiss go \
about this dialogue, but probably not stop it altogether. \
Urging a "moment of silence" may be the most reasonable \
approach at the moment, particularly in view of the upcoming \
February 21 UN Security Council deadline. \
CONEWAY \