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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07SANJOSE406, TO CLOSE OR NOT TO CLOSE? VENEZUELA'S ALUMINUM
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07SANJOSE406 | 2007-03-01 18:06 | 2011-03-21 16:04 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose |
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSJ #0406/01 0601849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011849Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7380
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1016
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000406
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC AND EB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD EINV ECIN PGOV PREL CS
SUBJECT: TO CLOSE OR NOT TO CLOSE? VENEZUELA'S ALUMINUM
PLANT IN COSTA RICA
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. After two weeks of speculation, it appears that
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has backed away, for now, from his
planned closure of a Venezuelan state-owned aluminum processing
plant in Costa Rica. The GOCR remains concerned, however, about the
eventual fate of the CVG ALUNASA plant (http://www.alunasa.com), its
400 employees, and the local community (Esparza, Puntarenas) which
depends on the plant for its livelihood. As possible medium- to
long-term solutions, the GOCR may seek non-Venezuelan sources of raw
material (ingots) for the plant, buy the plant outright, or help the
employees convert it to a cooperative. Despite Chavez' public
explanation that he had decided to close the plant based on
"economic analysis", the GOCR sees the move as purely political
retaliation for allegedly critical comments by President Oscar
Arias. END SUMMARY.
------------------------------
I'LL TAKE MY PLANT AND GO HOME
------------------------------
¶2. (U) The crisis began on February 14, when a group of ALUNASA
workers wrote Arias to warn that Chavez had decided to close the
Esparza plant, piqued by Arias's comments earlier in the month
critical of the Venezuelan Congress's decision to grant Chavez
special powers. Arias called this a "denial of democracy", and
added that for a dictator "it is important to not have opposition
and have absolute power." Chavez retorted that Arias had "offended"
the Venezuelan people and alleged that Arias's comments were
motivated to appeal to Washington. Later, Chavez accused Arias of
wanting to "meddle in things he should not get into", insinuating
that Arias should stay out of Venezuela's internal affairs. At the
same time, Chavez also insisted to the media that the ALUNASA plant
was really being closed for economic reasons. According to
Bienvenido Venegas, the Legislative Assembly member representing the
area, the GOV was also rubbing salt in the wound by suggesting that
some of the plant operations might be moved to Nicaragua.
¶3. (SBU) Over the next 10 days, the GOCR sought confirmation of
Chavez's plan, but neither Venezuelan Ambassador Nora Uribe nor
ALUNASA chief executive Ramon Rosales would comment in public.
Costa Rican concerns were stoked when Venezuelan media began to
report the planned closure. Privately, Venegas told us that
although the GOV's overall plans were unclear, the flow of aluminum
ingots from Venezuela had been shut off, which would force the
Esparza plant to cease operating by the end of March. On February
19, Minister of Government Rodrigo Arias met with Venegas, his
brother (mayor of Esparaza) and ALUNASA employee representatives.
Minister Arias offered no immediate solution, but meeting
participants told the media that buying the plant or converting it
to a co-op were under consideration. With a large anti-CAFTA rally
looming for February 26, the GOCR tried to turn public attention to
the apparent lack of concern about the ALUNASA closing by Costa
Rican union leaders, who had offered neither a public defense of the
plant nor criticism of Chavez.
----------------------
CRISIS PASSED, FOR NOW
----------------------
¶4. (U) By February 28, the immediate crisis had subsided. Media
reported that Chavez had postponed his decision and would restart
ingot shipments to ALUNASA after meeting with a delegation of
company employees in Caracas. In that meeting, Chavez reportedly
pointed to economic feasibility "studies" which had sparked the
idea to move ALUNASA's operations to Panama and Nicaragua. Chavez
also reportedly offered to send a committee to Costa Rica to
evaluate the plant's problems, with an eye to allowing ALUNASA to
continue operations, but as part of the ALBA, the GOV's alternative
to CAFTA.
¶5. (U) For his part, President Arias assured the media that he had
no intention to "polarize" the ALUNASA issue, while maintaining that
he had not "intervened" in Venezuelan affairs nor "offended" anyone.
In response to the news of the postponed shutdown, Arias termed
Chavez's decision as "wise" and thanked him, "...in the name of the
government and people of Costa Rica..."
---------------------
BACKGROUND ON ALUNASA
---------------------
¶6. (U) ALUNASA was established in 1981 as a GOCR state-owned entity
to process aluminum ingots produced in Venezuela. In 1990, the GOV
purchased the plant outright and has since operated it in one of
GOCR's tax-free zones. The plant makes various forms of foils for
industrial and packaging use. It processes 9,000 tons of aluminum
annually of which 80% is exported to the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
According to Minister Arias, ALUNASA's exports are up from $26
million in 2000 to almost $47 million in 2006. The plant's
accumulated investment went from $12 million in 2001 to $57 million
in 2005.
¶7. (U) ALUNASA has 400 employees, who support nearly 2,000 family
members in one of the poorest regions of Costa Rica. According to
company employees, the community -- already feeling marginalized by
the GOCR -- was greatly concerned by the halt in raw material
shipments and remains worried about the uncertainty over the plant's
future. Neither the employees nor the GOCR believes the plant could
be moved quickly or inexpensively, however. The cost of relocation
is estimated at between $20-$25 million.
-----------------
SO WHY THE WORRY?
-----------------
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: Why is the Arias administration so concerned
about the potential loss of these 400 jobs, when the normal ebb and
flow cycle of business nationwide sees job loss and creation all the
time? The primary reason may be timing. The story broke less than
two weeks before the anti-CAFTA protest, when the GOCR could not
afford to appear insensitive to worker concerns, especially in
communities outside the mainstream that (according to critics) might
suffer under CAFTA. The GOCR weathered this well, since the
protests were peaceful and union leaders' relative quiet on ALANUSA
helped support the GOCR's argument that some of the loudest
anti-CAFTA voices are pro-Venezuela. Concerns about Chavez's
influence linger here, however, especially after Ortega's election
in Nicaragua, and as evidenced by Arias's exaggerated (and
unnecessary in our view) public thanks to Chavez. In the long run,
the GOCR may be satisfied with an ALUNASA solution which cuts Costa
Rican ties with the one and only GOV-owned entity in the country.