

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI967, UK READOUT OF DES BROWNE (SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SRI
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NEWDELHI967.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09NEWDELHI967 | 2009-05-13 13:01 | 2011-03-17 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi |
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1544202.ece |
VZCZCXRO3241
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0967/01 1331351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131351Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6558
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7649
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6360
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3394
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0364
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6322
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8013
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000967
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS CE UK IN
SUBJECT: UK READOUT OF DES BROWNE (SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SRI
LANKA) VISIT TO INDIA
REF: STATE 23178
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 ( B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary. UK Special Envoy for Sri Lanka Des Browne visited New Delhi May 6-7 to consult with Indian officials on possible collaboration on the humanitarian and political situation in Sri Lanka. Browne briefed diplomats on his view of the situation in Sri Lanka, and a UK High Commission colleague briefed Poloff later on Browne's meetings with GOI officials. Browne received the message that India was under particular domestic pressure to do more on Sri Lanka due to election politics, but that Indian officials believed there was little anyone could do to alleviate the fighting as Sri Lankan government forces moved toward the end game of defeating the LTTE. Indian officials were more upbeat on chances to persuade President Rajapaksa to offer Tamils a political solution once fighting had ended. Post believes the time is ripe to press India to work more concretely with us on Sri Lanka issues. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Comment. Special Envoy Browne's briefing to diplomats reiterated that there are very few differences in the UK and U.S. approaches both to Sri Lanka and to the positive influence we believe India could wield in Sri Lanka. At the same time, despite some high-profile visits to Colombo and revved-up pro-Tamil campaign rhetoric, India has seemingly been reluctant to jump into a substantive role in Sri Lanka. However, with the combat appearing to be about to end, it is likely India will want to be more active in mid- and long-term political arrangements, as well as in humanitarian/reconstruction issues. With elections ending this week, we will soon be able to move full steam ahead with the new administration's engagement with India. The case of Sri Lanka offers an excellent opportunity for us to collaborate on an immediate regional issue with strategic implications, and we should hold India to promises made by its officials to both the UK and U.S. (such as Foreign Secretary Menon's to Secretary Clinton and Under Secretary Burns, reftel) to work more closely with us on reconstruction and post-conflict political reconciliation. End Comment.
¶3. (C) British Special Envoy for Sri Lanka Des Browne briefed diplomats in New Delhi on May 6 on his views on the crisis in Sri Lanka. Conceding ""I don't think anybody can change events over the next 10 or so days,"" Browne said he expected military operations would end soon and that he hoped a humanitarian catastrophe could be avoided. He said that the UK had put estimates of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 180,000 and 200,000, adding that the Sri Lankan government may attempt to keep the IDPs in camps for longer than necessary in an attempt to manipulate the post-conflict political process. He noted that while the number of IDPs was overwhelming the camps, the humanitarian organizations which were operating in the affected areas were doing excellent work. As the conflict continues and IDPs increase, Browne said the international community should keep pressure on the GSL for unfettered access to camps.
¶4. (C) Looking beyond the military campaign, Browne believed the GSL realized a political solution which was acceptable to all parties and ethnic groups was necessary. However, he worried that the government would assume -- wrongly, in Browne's opinion -- that it could replicate the displacement of Tamils that it had earlier carried out in western Sri Lanka. Browne also expected the government to call for early elections, perhaps in early autumn, to try to capitalize on its military victory to control the election cycle. Should the government act unilaterally, or fail to implement a devolution package that addresses Tamil rights, it could ""become a breeding ground"" for a reconstitution of the LTTE and other terrorists, he suggested. Browne speculated that there could -- he emphasized it was just his personal conjecture -- be an advantageous role for the Tamil National Alliance, which he said had ""troubling elements"" but thought could be engaged to become constructive, much like Sinn Fein
NEW DELHI 00000967 002 OF 002
had in the Northern Ireland conflict.
¶5. (C) While the Sri Lanka government had openly opposed international interference in the conflict, not least because of the political points it scored, Browne believed it would be willing to accept a role for the international community post-conflict. ""At the end of the day they'll want the money,"" he noted, adding that the government had expended vast resources conducting the war. The international contribution would bring added leverage for the international community, and Browne felt at that point India would be able to play a unique role. Given its Tamil population, India could play an honest broker in convincing Sri Lankan Tamils that their interests are being protected, Browne argued. India was also best placed to provide reconstruction aid, and India shared an interest in assuring the LTTE did not re-emerge.
¶6. (C) In his meetings with Foreign Secretary Menon and National Security Advisor Narayanan, Browne was assured that India shared our concerns over the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka, but heard a pessimistic view of prospects for persuading the GSL to agree to stop military operations, according to a UK High Commission contact. Menon and Narayanan were slightly more optimistic of the chances to persuade President Rajapaksa to offer the Tamils a genuinely inclusive political settlement once fighting had ended. It was the Indians' impression that President Rajapaksa believed this was his moment in history, i.e., a chance to bring peace to the island for good, but that the Sri Lankan Army was an obstacle, having been emboldened by its victory over the LTTE. Indian officials told Browne that it was useful to have Sri Lanka on the UNSC's agenda, and to issue periodic Presidential Statements, but that it would be counterproductive for the UN to ""gang up"" on Colombo; providing Rajapaksa with a rationale for fighting off international pressure would only serve to bolster his domestic political standing. Menon and Narayanan told Browne that they were concerned about Rajapaksa's post-conflict intentions, saying that if he did not implement the 13th Amendment Plus quickly, a new terrorist movement could quickly fill the vacuum left by the LTTE's defeat.
BURLEIGH "