

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 06BOGOTA11488, COLMIL: JTF-O ONTO A MORE AGGRESSIVE FOOTING
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BOGOTA11488.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
06BOGOTA11488 | 2006-12-27 19:07 | 2011-03-02 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota |
Appears in these articles: http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks |
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #1488/01 3611901
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271901Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1560
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8550
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC LIMA 4613
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9855
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5268
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
S E C R E T BOGOTA 011488
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: COLMIL: JTF-O ONTO A MORE AGGRESSIVE FOOTING
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) In the Colombian military's main focus area against
the FARC, the incoming commander is planning two changes to
improve results. First, he will spread battalion formations
to widen their area of control and increase chances of enemy
contact. Second, he will create new companies dedicated to
killing specific FARC leaders. Both plans require a shift to
smaller sized units, farther from bases and with rapid
reaction capability. The strategies hold real potential to
boost military impact against FARC guerrilla tactics, but
they are riskier to troops and dependent on extra training,
mobility, and political will to endure casualties. End
Summary.
---------------------------------------
Mission 40% Met; Adjustments Now Needed
---------------------------------------
¶2. (C) EmbassyMilgroup met on December 14 with the new
commander of Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O), General
Alejandro Navas, replacing General Gilberto Rocha who was
promoted to the General Staff. The Omega area -- comprising
portions of Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare departments -- is a
region of traditional FARC concentration, where some of its
leaders hide out. It is the main focus of the Plan Patriota
campaign. The force's eight Army mobile brigades, one Navy
riverine element, and four Air Force helicopters cover 30,000
square miles, which Navas noted is 3.5 times the area of El
Salvador. With 14,500 troops, JTF-O has reduced local FARC
forces by an estimated 40% in the last two years; 1,900
terrorists have been killed, captured, or demobilized. Navas
said his goal was to eliminate 80-90% of the enemy in the
area in the next two years.
¶3. (S) Achieving that objective will require the Colombian
Army to change from its traditional deployment at battalion
scale. Army concentration makes it easy for the FARC to
track its movements (via observation, signals interception,
or infiltration) while keeping its own forces at a safe
distance and moving its leaders out of danger. Navas
sketched a diagram of how the FARC surrounds its leaders with
rings of protective forces. As a result, the Army comes into
contact with minor elements of outer scouts and sentries. To
penetrate those rings, the Army must move in units that are
smaller and nimbler than battalions.
--------------------------
Widening Battalions' Reach
--------------------------
¶4. (S) As the former commander of JTF-O's rapid response
force, Navas knows the theater and comes to JTF-O command
with his own ideas on counterguerrilla combat. The first of
these is a method he calls the "active neutralization of
critical areas," involving an expanded layout of forces with
platoons sent further afield to rotate around the main camp.
Widening each battalion's radius of operations will expand
its footprint and multiply offensive contact with the
guerrillas. As seen in several costly encounters for the
military with the FARC in 2006, soldiers operating at platoon
scale will be more exposed to enemy attacks, and the FARC
will seek to exploit this vulnerability.
-------------------------
New HVT-Focused Companies
-------------------------
¶5. (S) Navas' second initiative is the creation of new
companies to target FARC leaders. President Uribe has made
this a priority, but the military has failed to achieve
results due to slow response times and poor operational
security. In Navas' plan, each of JTF-O's eight brigades
will form a "reconnaissance and destruction" company of
128-152 men, each to operate against a named FARC leader.
The goal is to move rapidly in response to timely
intelligence and to insert within 10 km of the target with
greater operational security. In practice mobility depends
on availability of scarce air assets. Company sized units
also cannot move with complete stealth. Milgroupasseses
that FARC Secretariat members may remain the domain of more
nimble special forces, while the new units may achieve
results against mid-level leaders.
¶6. (S) The plan's success relies on factors which the U.S.
can help support. Navas is expecting to increase his number
of helicopters from four to six, taking two of eight Black
Hawks arriving soon. Communications are critical, and the
U.S. has supplied a radio network to enable the new missions.
Friendly fire is a risk among converging small units,
especially during night operations. Navas has also pushed
for more timely intelligence from Bogota headquarters, as
well as for direct online access to data through the
U.S.-built intelligence communications computer system. The
general has initiated hiring of demobilized guerrillas to be
integrated into the companies. The U.S. will play an
essential role in the training of the new units; the
Milgroup's training teams are now designing a specialized
one-month program to kick off in February 2007.
------------------
Rewards vs. Risks?
------------------
¶7. (C) Embassy has long counseled the COLMIL to adapt to
FARC irregular warfare. Smaller units made up of the very
best soldiers could move more rapidly and be sequestered for
operational security. Navas' plans could measurably increase
effectiveness if well implemented. However, more dispersed
deployment also implies greater exposure of troops to enemy
fire, without the mobility and extensive backup called for in
U.S. doctrine. These strategies depend on quick reaction,
solid communications and coordination, and air mobility. It
remains to be seen whether Navas can summon the resources to
effect these changes and the political cover to sustain them,
how the FARC will exploit any vulnerabilities, and how many
casualties the COLMIL will suffer in exchange for gaining
ground. We will do what we can to support this tactical
shift.
WOOD