

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10MOSCOW318, INSOR REPORT REINVIGORATES DEBATE ON POLITICAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10MOSCOW318.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10MOSCOW318 | 2010-02-12 15:03 | 2011-02-18 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow |
Appears in these articles: http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/12/29/insor/ |
VZCZCXRO2701
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #0318/01 0431541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121541Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6217
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000318
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS
SUBJECT: INSOR REPORT REINVIGORATES DEBATE ON POLITICAL
REFORM
REF: MOSCOW 199
Classified ...
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000318 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS
¶1. (C) Summary: Igor Yurgens' and Yevgeniy Gontmakher's "21st Century Manifesto" has re-ignited debate among elite groups about President Medvedev's economic modernization objectives and proposed political reforms. Yurgens and Gontmakher support Medvedev's broader modernization agenda and express optimism that Medvedev will implement their recommendations. Many liberals and some conservatives characterize the policy paper as an attempt by some business elites to preserve their wealth and influence, with little regard for the wider social implications (instability) of implementation. The authors' immediate challenge is to overcome the argument that more democratic freedoms will lead to political instability and another 1990's style economic decline. End Summary.
¶2. (C) During a press conference on February 3, Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) Chairman Igor Yurgens and respected researcher Yevgeniy Gontmakher unveiled a 68-page manifesto entitled "Twenty-first Century Russia: An Image of the Desired Future." In the proposal, Yurgens and Gontmakher call for major political change and outline an ambitious agenda including reducing presidential terms from six to five years, restoring the direct election of governors, ending tight state control of the media, and dissolving the domestic surveillance practiced by the Federal Security Service (FSB). Their paper compiles proposals by researchers and analysts who believe that Russia faces a tough choice: reform political and economic systems now, or risk further decline as talented youth emigrate and social divisions deepen.
¶3. (C) Yurgens and Gontmakher held another briefing February 10 for diplomats, journalists, politicians, economists, and government officials. Gontmakher noted that Russia was capable of modernizing politically and economically, but the adjustment would require at least 10 years. He added that under existing conditions, economic reform was impossible, as the economy was "strangled by the bureaucracy" and vested interests. Political reform, in his view, was a precondition for economic transformation.
¶4. (C) Former Finance Minister Yevgeniy Yasin, Alexander Dynkin, and Dmitriy Oreshkin expressed their support of the report's conclusions. Russia, they said, was decades behind other developed countries in terms of GDP and life expectancy. Presenters said that President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin together could slowly implement the reforms. Neither Yurgens, who only stayed for opening remarks, nor Gontmakher, provided a roadmap for how the controversial changes would occur or who within the government was prepared to support them.
¶5. (C) Liberal commentators generally have praised the Yurgens/Gontmakher report for reviving debate on political reform. Some observers focused on Yurgens' connections to Medvedev (NOTE: Medvedev is the chairman of INSOR's Board of Trustees. End Note). They describe the release of the report as an attempt by Medvedev's supporters to encourage him not to give up the pursuit of political reform. Dmitry Oreshkin told us privately that he was encouraged by the INSOR report. Oreshkin, who is a member of President Medvedev's Council on Civil Society, lamented that Deputy Presidential Administration Chief Vladislav Surkov had not given President Medvedev Oreshkin's report on improving the election process. Oreshkin noted that Yurgens also had proposed election reforms in his report and hoped that President Medvedev would consider them.
¶6. (C) Deputy Director of the Institute for Social Systems, Dmitriy Badovskiy, does not expect this report to create serious differences between the Medvedev and Putin camps. He contends that the changes the authors suggest are indeed so radical that there is little chance Medvedev or Putin would implement them before the 2012 presidential elections. Political opposition leader Boris Nemtsov argued that, while the report's ideas might be worthy, "Russia's present leadership is interested only in preserving its power and influence through perpetuation of the status quo, not through any new political framework."
¶7. (C) Many of United Russia's leaders have reacted negatively to ideas in the report. United Russia Duma Member Vladimir Pligin commented that it is too early to change the constitutional amendment (which just went into effect in MOSCOW 00000318 002 OF 002 2009) to extend the presidential term to 6 years. Valeriy Fadeyev, Chairman of United Russia's November 4 Club, charged that implementation of the Yurgens/Gontmakher recommendations would lead to the "Ukrainianization" of Russian politics. Fadeyev's comments may reflect his desire to support Medvedev's economic modernization agenda, while protecting himself from Putin loyalists who are suspicious of his agenda (reftel). Other critics cite the report's vision of Russia as a NATO member in 20-30 years as a demonstration of the authors' inability to comprehend Russian political realities or long-term interests.
Comment -------
¶8. (C) Yurgens and Gontmakher deserve credit for their courageous, forward-leaning proposals and blunt assessment of the current dysfunctional political system. Their reforms appeal to the politically savvy business elite with the indirect message that United Russia is just a political machine with one objective -- delivering for its leader, Vladimir Putin. Yurgens and Gontmakher contend that political change is necessary to develop a substantial middle class, modernize the economy, and ultimately improve Russia's future. They write off those who have already abandoned hope, and instead focus on those, like Oreshkin, who still believe that Russia can change direction. They know that political change and economic development are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary and should be pursued jointly. At the very least the report broadens the limits of what can be discussed seriously and publicly.
Beyrle