

Currently released so far... 6230 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
ASEC
AF
AE
AR
AORC
AJ
AU
AM
ABLD
AL
AMGT
ASUP
AFIN
APER
ABUD
AVERY
APCS
AEMR
ADCO
APECO
ASIG
AG
AA
AS
AFFAIRS
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AMED
AO
ACOA
AX
AROC
ATFN
ASEAN
AFGHANISTAN
AFU
AER
ALOW
AODE
ATRN
AID
AC
AGMT
CH
CO
CS
CE
CU
CLINTON
CG
CVIS
CMGT
CI
CJAN
CF
COM
CASC
CA
CBW
CM
CDG
CR
COUNTER
CD
CWC
CKGR
CN
CPAS
CJUS
CV
CONS
CT
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
CIA
CACM
CDB
CAN
COE
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CACS
CONDOLEEZZA
CARSON
CL
CIS
CODEL
CTM
CB
ECON
EFIN
EAIR
EUN
EINV
ENRG
EG
ETRD
EPET
ETTC
ELAB
EU
ER
ET
EAGR
ECPS
ECIN
ELTN
EAID
EMIN
EWWT
EFIS
EIND
EC
ES
EN
EI
ENVR
ENGR
ENIV
EUNCH
ENVI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ELN
EZ
EXTERNAL
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EINT
EUR
ECINECONCS
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EK
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
EUC
EREL
ECA
ENERG
ENGY
ETRO
EFTA
ECONCS
ECONOMICS
ECONEFIN
EINVETC
EINN
ESA
ETC
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ESENV
ETRDECONWTOCS
IN
IC
IR
IZ
IS
IAEA
IT
ICTY
IO
IA
IWC
ID
ICRC
ILC
INTELSAT
IMO
ISRAELI
IACI
ILO
ITRA
IBRD
IMF
ICJ
ICAO
ITALY
ITALIAN
IRAQI
INTERPOL
IV
IQ
IPR
INRB
ITPHUM
IIP
IL
INR
ITPGOV
IZPREL
IRC
INRA
INRO
IRAJ
IEFIN
IF
KDEM
KCRM
KJUS
KTIA
KWBG
KPAL
KIPR
KTIP
KE
KNNP
KGHG
KICC
KV
KTFN
KU
KCFE
KDRG
KWMN
KSCA
KGIC
KCOR
KFRD
KPKO
KSUM
KPRP
KPAO
KBCT
KIRF
KCFC
KISL
KREC
KSPR
KHIV
KBIO
KMCA
KMPI
KFLU
KSTH
KBTR
KS
KOMC
KOMS
KSEP
KPRV
KFLO
KHLS
KN
KWWMN
KUNR
KLIG
KSTC
KZ
KG
KRAD
KOLY
KTBT
KTDB
KOCI
KAWK
KCIP
KNPP
KWAC
KMDR
KAWC
KIDE
KSAF
KX
KWMNCS
KNEI
KCRS
KVPR
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KACT
KO
KFSC
KR
KPWR
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
KGCC
KPIN
KPLS
KIRC
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KGIT
KBTS
KERG
KWMM
KRVC
KNSD
KVIR
KNUP
KTER
KDDG
KHSA
KMRS
KHDP
KTLA
KPAK
KNAR
KREL
KPAI
KTEX
KCOM
KNNPMNUC
KPOA
KRFD
KHUM
KDEV
KNUC
MOPS
MARR
MASS
MNUC
MO
MX
MCAP
ML
MTCRE
MR
MP
MY
MU
MIL
MAR
MC
MRCRE
MTRE
MA
MEPI
MV
MPOS
MD
MZ
MEPP
MOPPS
MAPP
MASC
MT
MERCOSUR
MK
MDC
MI
MAPS
MCC
MASSMNUC
MQADHAFI
MUCN
MTCR
MG
OREP
OVIP
OFDP
ODIP
OPDC
OAS
OTRA
OSCE
OECD
OIIP
OEXC
OPCW
OPIC
OPRC
OVP
OSCI
OTR
OSAC
OIC
OFFICIALS
OIE
PHUM
PREL
PGOV
PREF
PTER
PARM
PBTS
PINR
PINS
PHSA
PK
POL
PM
PINT
PE
PINF
PEL
PA
PARMS
PO
PLN
PROP
PALESTINIAN
PAO
PL
POV
PG
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PSOE
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PBIO
PECON
PAK
POGOV
PINL
PKFK
PMIL
PY
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PUNE
PORG
PHUMPREL
PF
POLINT
PHUS
PGOC
PNR
PGGV
PNAT
PGOVE
PRGOV
PRL
PROV
PTERE
PGOF
PHUMBA
SENV
SY
SZ
SOCI
SO
SR
SNAR
SA
SP
SW
SMIG
SU
SCUL
SC
SAN
SN
SL
SG
SYR
SEVN
SF
SI
STEINBERG
SIPRS
SH
SNARCS
SOFA
SANC
SHUM
SK
ST
TRGY
TU
TBIO
TH
TS
TSPL
TT
TPHY
TSPA
TI
TK
TIP
TERRORISM
TZ
TX
TW
TD
TP
TC
TO
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TR
TFIN
TURKEY
UK
UNGA
UN
UNHRC
UNMIK
UNO
UZ
UNSC
UP
UG
UNHCR
UNDC
US
UNAUS
USTR
UV
UNEP
UY
UNESCO
USUN
UAE
USEU
UNDP
UNCHS
UNVIE
UNCHC
UE
UNDESCO
USAID
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 07MANAMA336, MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN WITH
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAMA336.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07MANAMA336 | 2007-04-11 05:05 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Manama |
VZCZCXRO0727
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0336/01 1010550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110550Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6702
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0218
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
Wednesday, 11 April 2007, 05:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000336
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MCAP, BA, BILAT, REGION, OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN WITH
CROWN PRINCE
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Crown Prince Shaikh Salman Al Khalifa told visiting Marine Corps Commandant General Conway April 5 that the “tide needs to be turned” in Iraq, and the Iraqi security forces need to find those perpetrating the violence to stop them. He advised coalition troop level reductions in urban areas and movements to outlying areas as soon as possible, with the exception of Baghdad, to force Iraqi forces to step up and handle the security situation. He admitted violence might rise for several months but would then settle down. The CP advocated for Iraq a strong civilian government backed by the military, similar to Turkey. Regarding Iran, Shaikh Salman expressed concern about Iran’s continued support for extremist groups around the world, including attempts to build networks in Bahrain, which Bahraini security works to disrupt. Commenting on the release of the 15 British sailors, the CP said that Iran had benefited disproportionately in terms of public relations over the incident. Recently back from a trip to Singapore, the CP said that officials there are concerned about the Islamic threat and youth in the community who might cause trouble. End summary.
--------------------------
Tide Needs Turning in Iraq
--------------------------
¶2. (C) On an April 5 visit, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Conway met with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, who said that he had been watching the situation in Iraq closely, especially the activities of Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq General David Petraeus. He commended General Petraeus for his clear commitment to the mission in Iraq, including his “Marhaba, shabab” (Hello, youth) statement. The “tide needs to be turned,” the CP said, and security forces need to find those responsible for the violence and stop them. General Conway said that there has been incremental progress, including with some Sunni tribes in Anbar province, some of whom are turning away from Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) because of its brutal tactics and abuse of some Sunni tribal leaders.
¶3. (C) Regarding U.S. troop levels in Iraq, the CP advised reducing troop levels as soon as possible in urban areas, with the exception of Baghdad, and moving the troops to outlying areas. He stressed the importance of keeping the borders secure, but counseled to let Iraqis begin to sort out the security situation. Admittedly there will be a rise in violence between people who want to “settle scores,” but after six months the situation will calm down. The Iraqi military needs to take over more responsibility, and it will grow to fill its role. Similarly Iraqi leaders need to increase their initiative and leadership over its people, demonstrating a sense of common purpose. When asked by General Conway whether he had expressed these ideas to U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, the CP said that he had and that Secretary Gates had listened carefully. The CP said that he
SIPDIS had experienced difficulty previously trying to convince U.S. policy-makers who still believed Iraq could be a model of democracy in the region, but Secretary Gates had not dismissed his ideas. Shaikh Salman said, “Iraq will not be a model of democracy, at least not in the next 10-15 years.”
¶4. (C) The CP said that Iraq needs a strong federal government with 18 provinces. Splitting the country into three areas by sects is the wrong thing to do, because the country will eventually fall apart. He said Iraq needs a strong civilian government backed by the military, referring to Turkey as a model. He also said that total de-Baathification was the wrong approach, but that there needed to be efforts to root out militia members from the security forces. Shaikh Salman stated that Prime Minister Al Maliki may not be the right leader for the job in the long run, “but he is the guy for now. It was unrealistic to expect that merely a single election cycle could take Iraq from Saddam to stability.” The CP offered Bahrain’s support in any way it could assist.
------------------
Concern About Iran
------------------
¶5. (C) Shaikh Salman expressed his concern about domestic
MANAMA 00000336 002 OF 002
problems in Iran, including the poor state of the economy, which increases desperation, and the corresponding danger, of the Iranian government. He said he was worried about a nuclear-armed Iran, as it would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Gulf. The CP focused on Iran’s consistent activity around the world spreading violence and unrest, including Iran’s support of Hizbullah, Hamas, militias in Iraq, and extremists in Indonesia. Iran is also trying to build networks in Bahrain, so the Bahraini security services are working diligently to contain and disrupt their activities. Iran’s policies to spread the revolution have nothing to do with being Shia, but everything to do with its Persian identity. The Iranians want to project their Persian identity across the entire Gulf. The CP noted that coverage of the release of the 15 British sailors and marines showed messages about the “Persian Gulf” prominently placed on signs in the background.
¶6. (C) The CP wondered aloud how the 15 British allowed themselves to be caught and why the British decided against immediate action. He surmised that they must have been too far from their support ship. General Conway added that the British seek to de-escalate tension in such incidents. The CP quipped that sometimes there is a need for quick, strong escalation (to send a message). He commented that Iran has benefited disproportionately from the incident in terms of public relations. The CP also said that he assumed the release of Jalal Sharafi, the Iranian official who had been abducted in Iraq, was connected to the release of the British sailors, mentioning that Iran has always used hostage-taking to their benefit.
--------------------
Success in Singapore
--------------------
¶7. (C) When asked by the Ambassador about his recent trip to Singapore, the CP said that it was a productive visit. Bahrain is in a similar position in terms of development and economic growth that Singapore was in 20 years ago. Even though Singapore is not close to the Middle East, the CP said that officials he talked with were concerned about the Islamic threat. Singaporeans live with Muslims, and officials fear the ways extremist messages affect their youth. He had been told there are approximately 2,000 hardened, completely convinced “psychopaths,” who have the potential to cause serious problems in Singapore. The CP said these extremists need to be handled like a cult and stopped at their source. He said that extremist groups often cut off their recruits from their families and friends to break their support network. Consequently, officials in Singapore encourage parents and other family members to be heavily involved in their youths’ lives to be more in touch with their activities and prevent their mixing with extremists.
********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** MONROE