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Reference ID | Subject | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
06ROME3205 | ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA): ITALY | 2006-12-01 | 2011-02-03 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Rome |
07ROME290 | ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TREATY AGREEMENT (ACTA) - ITALY'S CONCERNS REF: A. 06 ROME 3243 B. 06 ROME 3205 C. 06 STATE 182554 | 2007-02-12 | 2011-02-03 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Rome |
08ROME1337 | BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AND IPR -- FIRST SIGNS OF LIFE | 2008-11-05 | 2011-02-03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome |
09STOCKHOLM736 | CONCERNS ABOUT ACTA NEGOTIATIONS AND IPR UPDATE: IPRED, PIRATE BAY, AND VODDLER Ref: A) STOCKHOLM 733, B) STOCKHOLM 676 STOCKHOLM 00000736 001.2 OF 002 | 2009-11-24 | 2011-02-03 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Stockholm |
04SANAA3023 | YEMENI PRESIDENT SALEH WANTS WASHINGTON TRIP | 2004-12-06 | 2011-02-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
05SANAA1589 | GOOD NEWS FOR YEMEN'S INVESTMENT CLIMATE: DUBAI | 2005-06-14 | 2011-02-03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sanaa |
05SANAA1790 | PRIORITIES FOR WASHINGTON VISIT: SALEH NEEDS TO BE PART OF THE SOLUTION | 2005-06-28 | 2011-02-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
06CAIRO3874 | GOE PROSECUTES STATE SECURITY OFFICER ON TORTURE | 2006-06-21 | 2011-02-03 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Cairo |
07CAIRO3449 | HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH MEETS WITH EGYPT'S STATE | 2007-12-10 | 2011-02-03 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Cairo |
09CAIRO624 | SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER | 2009-04-13 | 2011-02-03 | SECRET | Embassy Cairo |
09CAIRO814 | NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT | 2009-05-13 | 2011-02-03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo |
10CAIRO47 | SCENESETTER FOR A/S POSNER'S JANUARY 12-15 | 2010-01-06 | 2011-02-03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo |
10SANAA222 | IN ADEN, NEWSPAPER HEADQUARTERS STILL BLACKENED | 2010-02-03 | 2011-02-03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sanaa |
06STATE40904 | DISCOURAGING MORATINOS' SYRIAN STRATEGY | 2006-03-14 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State |
06MADRID779 | SPAIN: AMBASSADOR,S MEETING WITH FM MORATINOS | 2006-03-31 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
08MADRID1132 | NEA A/S WELCH MEETINGS WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS | 2008-10-31 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid |
08LONDON630 | IRAN NUCLEAR: UK COMMONS REPORT WILL CALL FOR DROPPING SUSPENSION; FCO DISCOUNTS REPORT'S IMPACT REF: A. LONDON 4204 B. EMBASSY DAILY OF JANUARY 31 C. 2008 D. GAYLE-NEA/IR FEBRUARY 29 E-MAIL | 2008-02-29 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy London |
08LONDON1452 | IRAN: FOREIGN SECRETARY SAYS UK TO LEAD FINANCIAL | 2008-05-23 | 2011-02-02 | SECRET | Embassy London |
08BEIJING2087 | SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 4 SECURITY DIALOGUE | 2008-05-29 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
08BEIJING2322 | U.S.-CHINA SECURITY DIALOGUE WORKING LUNCH: STRATEGIC SECURITY, MISSILE DEFENSE, SPACE, NONPRO, IRAN | 2008-06-13 | 2011-02-02 | SECRET | Embassy Beijing |
09LONDON718 | SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE | 2009-03-23 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London |
09BAGHDAD2586 | PM MALIKI CHARGES IRAN, SYRIA WITH SHIPPING WEAPONS | 2009-09-27 | 2011-02-02 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
04THEHAGUE281 | 2004-02-04 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague | |
06THEHAGUE210 | NETHERLANDS/ISAF: TURNING THE CORNER | 2006-01-31 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
06THEHAGUE2639 | NETHERLANDS: STILL STRUGGLING WITH SREBRENICA | 2006-12-19 | 2011-02-02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
07SOFIA1271 | STRATEGY TO SHAPE BULGARIA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION | 2007-10-29 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Sofia |
08TRIPOLI374 | LIBYA'S NSC SOLICITS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION & LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES REF: A) TRIPOLI 340, B) TRIPOLI 372 | 2008-05-08 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI375 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME | 2008-05-08 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI382 | DEATH OF KEY LIBYAN OFFICIAL HAMPERS COUNTER-MIGRATION EFFORTS REF: TRIPOLI 0050 TRIPOLI 00000382 001.4 OF 002 | 2008-05-12 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI401 | FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE REF: A) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 05/12/2008, B) TRIPOLI 375, C) TRIPOLI 229, D) TRIPOLI 280 | 2008-05-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI402 | POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM, JAMAHIRIYA-STYLE | 2008-05-16 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI411 | EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST | 2008-05-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI430 | DIE HARD IN DERNA | 2008-06-02 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI442 | MEETING OF AMU HEADS OF STATE - MINUS ONE - IN TRIPOLI; | 2008-06-09 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI455 | LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) STATE 14270, B) 07 TRIPOLI 1060, C) 07 STATE 163961, D) 07 TRIPOLI 723, E) 07 STATE 77783, F) 07 STATE 163961 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, and the legal basis on which they are being detained in Libya. One detainee's trial has been completed and he is awaiting a verdict on the four charges he faces; the case of the second detainee is expected to go to trial in the next two to three months. End summary. 2. (S/NF) At a June 10 meeting, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) per ref A instructions. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli, and was attended by a host government security official. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on December 25, 2007 (ref B). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. The security official explained that the Abu Salim prison is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Al-Rimi said he remains in solitary detention in a 15 foot by 15 foot cell and has not been mistreated. He is able to walk outside regularly, and is able to speak with other prisoners during exercise periods. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that members of his family have visited him three times since his return to Libya, most recently in March 2008. (Note: As reported ref D, their previous visits were in January and May 2007. End note.) 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref D), al-Rimi said both were better. He repeated his earlier claim (ref A) that he sustained the injury to his arm in 2004 or 2005 during a scuffle with U.S. soldiers who entered his cell to punish him for allegedly instigating a disturbance among several other prisoners. 5. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi said he was questioned by the ESO and Internal Security Organization (ISO) officials between his return in December 2006 and February 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's office. His case has subsequently been been tried and is currently with a panel of judges, who are reviewing it. His understanding is that he faces four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Al-Rimi has court-appointed legal counsel. The Prosecutor General's Office told al-Rimi and his attorney that the court was expected to render a verdict in his case on/about June 16. A verdict had been expected on/about May 5; however, the trial was delayed. Al-Rimi does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted of one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed his attorney told him he stood a good chance of being acquitted and released. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he had been detained at an ESO detention facility for three months and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. He currently remains at Abu Salim, but understands he may be transferred next month to the Jdeida prison, which houses common criminals, in Ain Zaraa. He has been held in solitary detention since his return - his biggest complaint - and said he has not been mistreated. (Note: The security official explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population for extremist activities. End note.) He is not able to exercise at the Abu Salim prison, but was able to do so at the ESO facility before he was transferred. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have TRIPOLI 00000455 002 OF 002 access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been told he may be visited by a prison doctor if he is ill, but has not had need of one. Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law in January. He complained that his family had not visited since, but said he he did not know whether they had tried. (Note: He conceded that his wife had divorced him and remarried, and that relations between them were difficult; however, after the second visit, permission for further visits had to be obtained from the Prosecutor General's office, vice ISO. He speculated that the Prosecutor General's office may have been less efficient in processing visit requests. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, Hamouda said he was questioned by ESO and ISO officials between his return in August 2007 and May 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. According to the security official, Hamouda escaped from prison and left Libya illegally in 1992 to travel to Sudan; he may/may face separate charges for escaping and leaving the country. Hamouda has no legal counsel, but said he does not want an attorney because he has committed no crimes. Claiming that if he were really a member of al-Qaeda " ~ the U.S. would have never returned me to Libya ~ ", he said his impression is that all of the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect. He has been told by the Prosecutor General that his trial may start in two to three months. Hamouda does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted for one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed that he had been granted a pardon by the Qadhafi Development Foundation for the original drug trafficking conviction and his subsequent escape from prison and illegal exit from Libya. | 2008-06-11 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI457 | QADHAFI WORKS TO MUSTER ARAB OPPOSITION TO SARKOZY'S | 2008-06-12 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI458 | CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES | 2008-06-12 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI467 | DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME | 2008-06-16 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI470 | OIL- AND GAS-RELATED POLLUTION IN LIBYA | 2008-06-16 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli |
08TRIPOLI474 | ENI'S OIL AND GAS DEAL EXTENDED, OTHER COMPANIES WORRY TERMS WILL SET A NEW (UNFAVORABLE) PRECEDENT REF: 07 TRIPOLI 912 1. (SBU) Summary: Soaring oil prices are allowing Libya to press for more stringent long-term contracts with foreign oil and gas producers. A twenty-five year extension for Italian firm Eni North Africa BV, which entailed a sizeable bonus payment and dramatically reduced the company's production share, was recently ratified after lengthy negotiations. The potential impact of Eni's deal is significant. Local observers expect that the National Oil Company's (NOC) success in securing very favorable terms will embolden it to pursue renegotiation of existing contracts with other international oil companies (IOCs). Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOC's facing potentially long renegotiation periods and dramatically reduced production shares may choose to abandon production efforts in Libya. End summary. EPSA MODEL TIME-TESTED 2. (SBU) Libya's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric has been the most widely used model for producers in Libya since 1974. Under these agreements, international oil companies (IOCs) receive a fixed percentage of output from the fields involved based on the terms of their bid to explore and develop Libyan acreage. The terms of these agreements, particularly the share of overall production retained by companies, have grown increasingly less favorable to IOCs. Intense competition among foreign oil and gas companies to book reserves in Libya, widely perceived to be one of the relatively few places in the world with significant unproven reserves of sweet, light crude and natural gas, has fueled the trend towards less profitable EPSA's. 3. (SBU) As a point of comparison, the standard production share allocation for IOCs in the latest EPSA round (EPSA IV) has been 10-12% of overall production, down from production share allocations of 20% or more that were typical in earlier EPSA rounds. IOC's have accepted stiffer terms based on their high expectations of Libya's hydrocarbon producing potential, the comparatively low cost of oil recovery in Libya, the generally high quality of Libyan crude, Libya's close proximity to European markets and rapidly rising oil and gas prices. Encouraged by the willingness of some IOC's to accept production shares as low as 7 percent under the EPSA IV framework, the NOC - led by former Prime Minister Shukhri Ghanem, reputedly a hard bargainer - has been pressing all IOC's to accept further reductions in their production share allocations to increase Libya's take. Striking a nationalist tone, Muammar al-Qadhafi explicitly referred in his June 11 speech on the occasion of the "evacuation" of U.S. and British military bases in Libya to efforts to renegotiate EPSA contracts as a manifestation of Libya's continued resolve to resist Western imperialism. AT LONG LAST, ENI FINALIZES ITS CONTRACT EXTENSION 4. (SBU) In October 2007, ENI agreed with the NOC to convert its existing long-term production contracts, which were signed in the mid-1980s under EPSA III terms, to the most recent contractual model under EPSA-IV (reftel). That deal was submitted to Libya's General People's Congress for approval and ratification and was ratified on June 12. Under the new deal, Eni reduced its production share to 12% for oil (down from 35-50 percent for its various fields) and 40% for natural gas (down from 50 percent). The share for gas production will drop to 30% after 2018. In exchange, the NOC extended Eni's EPSA III contracts by 25 years, approved a 3 billion cubic meter (BCM) expansion to the Western Libya Gas Pipeline (WLGP), and the construction of a new 4 million tons per annum LNG facility at Mellitah. Eni accepted less attractive fiscal terms on its blocks (its overall portfolio has fallen by 42% due to lower production share figures), and made a $1 billion non-recoverable payment. Eni's licenses were converted to the EPSA IV model and will now expire in 2042 (for oil) and 2047 (for gas). OTHER DEALS IN THE OFFING? 5. (SBU) Several other major extensions are anticipated in the coming months, including those involving U.S. firm Occidental TRIPOLI 00000474 002 OF 002 Petroleum (along with Austrian partner OMV) and Petro-Canada. Those agreements were signed with the NOC in late 2007, but still require GPC ratification. It is possible the NOC will seek further concessions in light of its deal with Eni. Spain's Repsol and the NOC are renegotiating along the EPSA IV contractual model. The initial deal between Repsol YPF and NOC stipulated a 50-50 split of production; however, the NOC is now seeking a minimum production share of 72 percent. 6. (SBU) The NOC has approached numerous other IOCs about extensions, raising the possibility that it will reopen deals that were only concluded a few years ago. Even the U.S. Oasis Group (comprising Amerada-Hess, Marathon and ConocoPhillips), which paid $1.8 billion in December 2005 to return to acreage in Libya's Sirte Basin that it held before the suspension of U.S.-Libyan diplomatic ties and the imposition of U.S. and UN sanctions, may be affected. Libya's relatively modest 59.2 percent production share in that deal has generated preliminary probing by the NOC as to whether the Oasis Group would consider renegotiating, which it has so far successfully opposed. 7. (SBU) Comment: With ratification of its revised EPSA contract, Eni has secured a long-term position in Libya, but at a considerable price. Part of the calculus for Eni and other IOC's is the expectation that oil and gas prices are likely to remain high, making non-recoverable bonus payments and lesser production shares tenable from the standpoint of their projects' overall profitability. It is widely expected that the NOC will push hard to renegotiate other extant deals and extensions that involve reduced production shares for IOCs. Its confidence buoyed by favorable market conditions, Libya is playing hardball with the IOC's, sending a clear message that no deal is beyond renegotiation, no matter how recently concluded or how favorable the terms for the NOC. Libya and the IOC's have been here before: a spate of renegotiations and extensions occurred in the late-1960s and early 1970s, driven in part by the then-new al-Qadhafi regime to demonstrate to its people that it was a better steward of Libya's hydrocarbon resources than the Sanussi monarchy had been. As during that period, the current penchant for shifting the goalposts has not been well-received by the IOCs. Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOCs facing potentially long renegotiation periods (and associated costs of idle personnel and materiel) and diminished production returns may choose to abandon altogether their production efforts in Libya. End comment. STEVENS | 2008-06-17 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli |
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